Findings Of Fact The following findings are based on the uncontested facts alleged in Petitioner's Motion For Summary Recommended Order and from the Final Orders issued in Bayshore Homeowners Association v. Department of Environmental Regulation and Grove Isle, Inc., Case Nos. 79-2186, 79-2324 and 79-2354. On December 29, 1980 DER entered a Final Order on the application of Petitioner for a 90 slip marina in Biscayne Bay, Florida. The Order denied the permit because Grove Isle had not demonstrated that the project is "affirmatively in the public interest" and because the applicant had not demonstrated that it "can meet ambient water quality standards within the project area itself." In the Recommended Order on Remand the Hearing Officer had defined "existing ambient waters" to be the area in the cove between Grove Isle and the Miami mainland. The Final Order rejected that concept and held if any waters others than those contained within the immediate project site were to be considered as ambient, Petitioner must request a mixing zone as part of its application. See Section 17-4.242, (1)(a)2.b. and Section 17-4.244, Florida Administrative Code. By a letter received at the Department of Environmental Regulation on May 20, 1981, Grove Isle reapplied for the boat dock permit which was the subject of the foregoing proceedings. Petitioner's application, which was in the form of a letter from counsel, stated: May 18, 1981 Mr. Larry O'Donnell Department of Environmental Regulation Post Office Box 3858 West Palm Beach, Florida 33402 RE: GROVE ISLE - Application for Boat Dock Dear Mr. O'Donnell: On behalf of Grove Isle, LTD, I am reapplying for the boat dock permit previously applied for by Grove Isle, LTD. Please consider this a short-form application. Your office designated a previous file number, DF 13-7956, to this matter. In conjunction with that application I am applying for a mixing zone, pursuant to Rule 17-4.244, for both the construction and operation of this marina. Please refer to your file on the previous application and incorporate said documents into this reapplication. I am submitting with this application: A scale drawing (one inch = 100') of the proposed facility. (which you have) A certified survey of the proposed mixing zone. (one inch = 100') An application fee of $20.00 A copy of the Final Order issued by Jacob D. Varn, former secretary of DER, on the previous application. A copy of the Notice of Intent previously issued for this project, dated 9/23/79. (which you have) As you will note from reading Mr. Varn's Final Order, he concluded that issuance of this permit was not appropriate inasmuch as the applicant had not applied for nor received a designated mixing zone. We do not necessarily agree with this order and have, in fact, appealed this decision to the First District Court of Appeal. However, in an attempt to keep this matter from becoming any more complicated, we have decided to reapply for the permit and to apply for a mixing zone. We do not concede that a mixing zone should be required for this project or that the facility will result in the release of any pollutants so as to significantly degrade ambient water quality. However, should this project, through its construction or operation, result in the release of any pollutants, I believe they would be limited to: Bottom sediments placed in suspension by the installation of the concrete piles used to support the docking facility during construction; Minimal amounts of oil and grease which may escape from the various vessels moored to the docks; The constituants of anti-fouling paint which may be applied to the hulls of the various vessels moored at the docks. Turbidity will be controlled by the use of curtains during construction. If lowered water quality occurs at all in this project it would only occur within the designated mixing zone, as per Rule 17-4.242 (2)(b) F.A.C. Please advise me should additional information be needed to process this re-application. Yours truly, /s/ KENNETH G. OERTEL On June 19, 1981, DER sent a "completeness summary letter" to Petitioner which requested the following information: Your project is in Outstanding Florida Waters. Please provide the following items demonstrating compliance with Section 17-4.242, Florida Administrative Code. Please demonstrate that this project is clearly in the public interest and that this project will not result in the degradation of ambient water quality beyond the 30 day construction period. Petitioner responded by letter dated June 22, 1981 and which was received at DER on June 25, 1981. Petitioner said in pertinent part: Dear Mr. Duke: If you would check your previous file no. DF-13-7956, I believe you will find all the information you have requested has previously been provided to your office either in that permit file or through the administrative hearings held in pursuit of this application. I think it would be more fruitful if you would communicate with Al Clark, Attorney for DER, with regard to the status of this application. As I do not wish to speak on behalf of Mr. Clark, I believe you should confirm the status of this application with him, particularly in view of our attempt to comply with Secretary Varn's Final Order which suggests the application for this mixing zone. The record reflects no further correspondence between the parties until September 23, 1981 when the Department entered a Final Order Denying Application for Permit. The Order provided that: This project was reviewed previously (DF 13-7956) and was determined not to be clearly in the public interest pursuant to Section 17-4.242, F.A.C. No further evidence upon resubmittal, has been provided to clearly demonstrate that this project is in the public interest. Furthermore, the requested mixing zone exceeds that allowable pursuant to Section 17-4.244, F.A.C. and can be applied only during the construction period, pursuant to Section 17-4.242, F.A.C. During the operation of this facility ambient water quality is expected to be degraded in violation of Section 17-4.242, F.A.C. This order was entered ninety-one days after DER received Petitioner's June 22, 1981 letter.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Environmental Regulation issue the permit applied for by Petitioner, Grove Isle, Ltd. on May 20, 1981 subject to the conditions contained in the Notice of Intent To Issue Permit dated October 23, 1979 which is a part of the record in Bayshore Homeowners Association et al., v. State of Florida Department of Environmental Regulation and Grove Isle, Inc., Case Nos. 79-2186, 79-2324 and 79-2354. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 12th day of February, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida. MICHAEL P. DODSON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of February, 1982.
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Respondents are entitled to a renewed license for their facility. HRS' position is that the renewal should be denied because the sleeping room windows do not comply with the 1981 Life Safety Code. The Brevigs argue that HRS's interpretation of the code is too rigid, that the 1985 code is the applicable edition, and that they are entitled to an exception contained within the later code.
Findings Of Fact Tom and Jeannie Brevig own Florida Haven Retirement Home #1, located in Maitland, Florida. They purchased the facility in 1981. Prior to 1984, Florida Haven was licensed as an adult congregate living facility (ACLF) by the HRS District Office and fire safety inspections were conducted by Seminole County inspectors. In 1984, the HRS Office of Licensure and Certification acquired jurisdiction and a fire inspector from that office conducted an inspection in July 1984. At that time a citation was issued for deficiencies in the sleeping room windows. In October 1984, the Brevigs sold the facility. Ray Heyser is an inspector certified by the State Fire Marshal. He is employed by HRS' Office of Licensure and Certification and conducts inspections of ACLFs in accordance with Chapter 22 of the Life Safety Code. On July 2, 1985, he inspected Florida Haven and personally measured the windows. He found the following: The front north bedroom window had a clear opening of 16 inches high, by 48 inches wide, and the sill was 42 inches from the floor. The rear south bedroom window was 16 inches high, by 32 inches wide, and the sill was 42 inches from the floor. The side south bedroom window was 10 inches high, by 48 inches wide, with a 54 inch sill. The front south bedroom was 16 inches high, by 48 inches wide, with a 34 inch sill. The remaining front bedroom window was also 16 inches high, by 48 inches wide, with a 34 inch sill. Each of these bedrooms was used as a sleeping room. None of the rooms has exterior doors. The Life Safety Code requires that an outside window in a sleeping room have a clear opening of not less than 24 inches in height, 20 inches in width, and 5.7 square feet in area. The bottom of the opening must be no more than 44 inches from the floor. "Clear opening" means the unobstructed passage when the window is opened. The reasons for the requirement are to allow emergency egress and to permit access by fire service personnel who may be equipped with large cylinder breathing apparatus. None of the sleeping room windows at the facility met the height requirement for clear opening and one window was out of compliance as to the height from the floor. In January 1986, the Brevigs regained ownership of the facility and were granted a transfer license. In August 1986 the home was again cited for deficiencies in the windows. This was noted as a "Class III" deficiency and the recommendation was a "conditional license pending correction". (Petitioner's Exhibit #1) At a re-investigation in February 1987, the window deficiencies still existed. By a letter dated July 7, 1987, Tom Brevig was informed that his license for Florida Haven Retirement Home #1 expired on June 30, 1987. Since he had not corrected the deficiencies noted in his conditional license, he was told to relocate the residents. HRS adopted the 1985 Life Safety Code in April 1987. Both that code and the prior edition provide for exceptions or variances to the window requirements in certain circumstances. HRS' policy is that exceptions are only rarely granted, and then only when the applicant affirmatively presents its basis for an exception. Tom Brevig discussed the possibility of an exception with HRS's architect but did not make a specific proposal. Tom Brevig claims that he was given an exception by a prior HRS inspector, but the HRS Office of Licensure and Certification has nothing in writing that would indicate that an exception was granted. The ACLF Director for that HRS office has no knowledge that HRS ever approved the windows as a pre-existing means of escape or entry.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is, hereby RECOMMENDED: That a renewal license be withheld from Florida Haven Retirement Home #1, until the deficiencies are corrected or the owner provides an alternative proposal consistent with the standards in the Life Safety Code, 1985 Edition and Rule 4A- 40.004, F.A.C. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 19th day of February, 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida. MARY CLARK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of February, 1988. APPENDIX The following constitute rulings on the findings of fact proposed by counsel for the Brevigs: Adopted in paragraph #1. Adopted in paragraph #2. Rejected as unsupported by competent evidence. Mr. Brevig's argument is a conclusion based on the fact of his obtaining a license. He did not establish that the windows were approved or that their size was at issue when the Seminole County inspections were made. Adopted in substance in paragraph 3, although it was not clearly established that this was the first citation by HRS. It was the first citation by the OLC. Adopted in paragraph 4. Rejected as uncorroborated hearsay. Adopted in paragraph 5. Adopted in paragraph 8. Rejected as unnecessary and a mischaracterization of the discussion as evidenced in the cited portions of the transcript. Adopted in paragraph 9. Rejected as irrelevant and hearsay. Adopted in part in paragraph 6. Access from the outside is not the sole reason for the requirement, in spite of the testimony from witness Mauger. The plain language of the section of the Code and the Handbook explanation establish the requirement as relating to a means of escape from the inside. Rejected as hearsay and inconsistent with the history of Rule 4A-40.005, F.A.C. Adoption was in 1987, not 1986, according to the F.A.C. Addressed in paragraph 2, Conclusions of Law. Rejected as unnecessary. This fact is not in issue. COPIES FURNISHED: James A. Sawyer, Jr., Esquire Department of Health and Rehabilitative Service 400 West Robinson Street Suite 911 Orlando, Florida 32801 Thomas C. Brevig 1680 Maitland Avenue Maitland, Florida 32751 Michael J. Bittman, Esquire DEMPSEY AND GOLDSMITH, P.A Suite 500, Day Building 605 E. Robinson Street Post Office Box 1980 Orlando, Florida 32802 Sam Power, Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Building One, Suite 407 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Gregory L. Coler, Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 John Miller, Esquire Acting General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue Whether the Petitioner, Fletcher Armour, should have been suspended by the Respondent, City of Clearwater, for a three-day period.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is an employee of the City of Clearwater and was at the time pertinent to this hearing a meter reader for the city. He was suspended for a period of three (3) days beginning July 31, 1979, and ending August 2, 1979, for insubordination and a serious breach of discipline. In February, 1979, Petitioner Armour and his superior, Fred W. Lewis, Accounts Supervisor, discussed the Petitioner's planned vacation. The Petitioner requested six (6) consecutive days: June 28 and 29, 1979, for religious reasons, plus the following four (4) days. Although tentative written approval was given by Lewis, he warned the Petitioner that if a meter reader with seniority requested the same four (4) "non-religious" vacation days Lewis would have to accede to the request for the reason that there is a seniority policy in the Utilities Department of the City of Clearwater, and further that the department could not properly function with two (2) meter readers on vacation at the same time. Lewis told the Petitioner that the two (2) vacation days requested for religious purposes, June 28 and 29, would be granted regardless of seniority. Subsequent to this first meeting, a Mr. Henderson, a meter reader with seniority over Petitioner Armour, requested the same four (4) days desired by the Petitioner. To resolve this conflict of vacation schedules, Lewis called a meeting during early June, 1979, at which all meter readers were present, including Kim Kyler, a witness for Respondent at the hearing. According to the testimony of Lewis and Kyler, Lewis asked Petitioner Armour during the meeting what days he wanted to take off. Petitioner responded by stating he would take his first two (2) vacation days (June 28 and 29), but not the last four (4) days, and that he would postpone taking these four (4) days until sometime in December when he had two (2) weeks. He was then told that he was not entitled to two (2) weeks until after January 1, and therefore could not take the requested four (4) days in December. Lewis thereupon documented the vacation schedules of Petitioner Armour and Henderson accordingly, giving Henderson the last four (4) days he desired and had theretofore requested. Witness Kyler corroborated the testimony of Lewis. Petitioner Armour took off the four (4) days following the two (2) days leave granted that he had requested in February but was denied in June.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings and Conclusions of Law, the Hearing Officer recommends that the three (3) days suspension of the Petitioner, Fletcher Armour, by the Respondent, City of Clearwater, be sustained. DONE and ORDERED this 10th day of January, 1980, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DELPHENE C. STRICKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Rick Griesinger, Esquire Assistant City Attorney City of Clearwater Post Office Box 4748 Clearwater, Florida 33518 Mr. Fletcher Armour 535 Fairwood Avenue, #230 Post Office Box 794 Clearwater, Florida 33518
The Issue Whether Florida Administrative Code Rule 69B- 211.042(17)(b)1. constitutes an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority pursuant to Section 120.52(8)(b) and (c), Florida Statutes (2010), for the reasons stated in the Corrected and Amended Petition for Administrative Determination of the Invalidity of Administrative Rule.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: The Department is the state agency responsible for licensing public adjusters. See §§ 626.022(1); 626.112(1)(a) and (3); 626.171(a), Fla. Stat. Mr. Jaramillo is currently employed as an estimator by FRI Public Adjusters, d/b/a Epic Group Public Adjusters, where he has worked off and on since 1995. He earns approximately $42,000.00 per year. A public adjuster apprentice working for this firm earns $150,000.00 to $200,000.00 per year, and a public adjuster could earn up to $500,000.00. Mr. Jaramillo pled guilty to, and was convicted in the federal District Court of the Southern District of Florida of, the felony of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine. The conviction was entered on June 2, 1999, and Mr. Jaramillo was sentenced to 87 months in federal prison. Mr. Jaramillo's supervised release was terminated on November 25, 2009. On January 7, 2009, Mr. Jaramillo submitted to the Department an application for a new public adjuster apprentice license. He disclosed his criminal conviction in the application. On February 4, 2009, the Department sent Mr. Jaramillo a letter in which it advised him that it could not process his application because of certain deficiencies. Such a letter is known in the Department as a "deficiency letter." In the February 4, 2009, deficiency letter, the Department stated that, in order for his application to be considered complete, Mr. Jaramillo needed to provide the Department certified documents relating to his arrest and conviction, including a document showing that his civil rights had been restored, and with a copy of a $50,000.00 surety bond. In a letter to the Department dated April 8, 2009, Mr. Jaramillo enclosed, among other things, a copy of his Restoration of Civil Rights Application, dated March 31, 2009, and a copy of his application for a $50,000.00 surety bond. On or about June 17, 2009, Mr. Jaramillo provided the Department with a copy of a Public Adjuster’s Surety Bond in the amount of $50,000.00. In a second deficiency letter, dated June 24, 2009, the Department again requested that Mr. Jaramillo "provide evidence that [his civil rights] have been restored with a certified copy of [an] applicable law enforcement agency form attesting that civil rights have been restored." In a third and final deficiency letter, dated September 3, 2009, the Department again requested evidence that Mr. Jaramillo's civil rights had been restored. Mr. Jaramillo did not, and could not, provide such evidence because his civil rights had not yet been restored. Because Mr. Jaramillo did not provide documentation that his civil rights had been restored, the Department considered his application incomplete, and the application was closed on April 10, 2010, due to inactivity. The Department has not, as of the date of the final hearing, denied Mr. Jaramillo's application, although it prepared a draft denial letter dated January 14, 2010. The Department does not deny licensure applications that are incomplete because having a denial of such an application on an applicant's record could have an adverse impact on his or her chances of having a future application granted.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the City of Clearwater properly dismissed Respondent, Diane C. Hashil, from her employment as a Toll Booth Attendant for inefficiency in the performance of duties, in violation of Rule 14, Section 1, paragraph (c), of the Civil Service Rules and Regulations of the City of Clearwater.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Diane C. Hashil, was employed as a Toll Booth Attendant at the Sand Key Tollbooth by Petitioner, City of Clearwater, (the City), from July of 1992 until May 24, 1995. During the course of Respondent's employment with the City, Respondent has been the subject of numerous disciplinary actions, resulting in counseling, written reprimands, and suspensions. Beginning on December 6, 1993, and continuing through May 24, 1995, twelve disciplinary actions were taken against Respondent for charges including repeated discourtesy to customers, insubordination, failure to comply with verbal instructions, failure to follow policies regarding nonpayment of tolls, and entering the cash drawer of another employee without permission. Respondent's disciplinary action history includes the following actions: 1) On December 7, 1993, Respondent received a written warning for a Level 4, #2 offense (insubordination); 2) On December 21, 1993, Respondent was suspended for two days for a Level 2, #2 offense (discourtesy); 3) On January 26, 1994, Respondent was suspended for three days for a Level 2, #2 offense (discourtesy); 4) On August 10, 1994, Respondent received a letter of reprimand for a Level 1, #1 offense; 5) On January 12, 1995, Respondent received a letter of reprimand for a Level 4, #2 offense (insubordination); 6) On January 17, 1995, Respondent was given a letter of reprimand for a Level 2, #1 offense; 7) On March 9, 1995, Respondent was suspended for two days for a Level 3 offense (productivity); and, 8) On March 15, 1995, Respondent was suspended for five days for a Level 4, #2 offense (insubordination). In April of 1994, Respondent's employment with the City was terminated; however, the City reversed this decision, and Respondent subsequently remained in her position. On November 1, 1994, Respondent received an unsatisfactory performance evaluation. The primary basis for this evaluation was Respondent's continued discourtesy to patrons which had resulted in disciplinary actions against Respondent during the evaluation period. The City's employee performance ratings policy requires that an employee receiving an unsatisfactory rating be reevaluated in three months. On February 13, 1995, at her three-month follow-up reevaluation, Respondent again received an unsatisfactory performance rating. The basis for this evaluation was that Respondent had received repeated reprimands for insubordination, failure to follow rules, and entering the cash drawer of another employee without permission. On March 9, 1995, as a result of her unsatisfactory reevaluation, Respondent received a two-day suspension, and twenty disciplinary points. On March 15, 1995, Respondent was suspended for five days for insubordination. Respondent's appeal of these suspensions was upheld through the City Manager stage. Respondent did not seek further review of these suspensions. On May 5, 1995, at her second follow-up reevaluation, Respondent again received an unsatisfactory performance rating. Under the City's policy this unsatisfactory rating was automatic because Respondent had been suspended for five or more days during the rating period. In addition the second follow-up performance evaluation stated that Respondent filed a false police report alleging a customer had defrauded her, that Respondent entered the cash drawer of another employee without permission, and that Respondent was responsible for low morale of the other employees at the Sand Key Tollbooth. Respondent admits that she entered the cash drawer of another employee without permission, and that she kept a daily log of the activities of other employees which contributed to the low morale at the Sand Key Tollbooth; however, Respondent believed other employees were allowed to violate rules, and that she was being unfairly disciplined because she was female and not a member of the union. The evidence does not support a finding that other employees were allowed to violate rules, nor that Respondent was treated differently than other employees. The evidence does not reflect that Respondent was subjected to disciplinary actions because of her gender or her failure to join a union. During her employment at the Sand Key Tollbooth, Respondent received more complaints from customers and other employees than any other tollbooth attendant. Because Respondent had received two consecutive three-month reevaluations with an unsatisfactory rating, she was subject to termination under the City's policy. In addition, because Respondent had accumulated excessive disciplinary points she was subject to termination under the City's Guidelines for Disciplinary Action. The performance evaluations and the disciplinary actions taken with regard to Respondent were appropriate and consistent with those given other employees. Following her five-day suspension, Respondent filed a report alleging various rule violations of other employees. The City investigated Respondent's allegations and required three employees to attend counseling with regard to cash drawer procedures. The evidence does not support a finding that the City singled out Respondent for disciplinary actions. The City allowed Respondent to serve her five-day suspension over two pay periods to lessen the financial impact of her suspension. The City Harbormaster has employed other females within the department without incident. As of October 1995, the City has eliminated the position of tollbooth attendant because of the construction of a new Sand Key bridge which will, upon completion, be toll free. The City has assisted former tollbooth attendants in attempting to secure other positions of employment with the City. Subsequent to her termination, Respondent applied for a meter reading position with the City, but was not hired.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that: The City of Clearwater Civil Service Board enter a Final Order dismissing Respondent from her position of employment with the City of Clearwater. RECOMMENDED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 29th day of November, 1995. RICHARD HIXSON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of November, 1995. APPENDIX As to Petitioner's Proposed Findings: 1 - 12. Accepted and Incorporated. As to Respondent's Proposed Statement of Facts: Accepted, except that unauthorized entry into another employee's cash drawer violated City rules and regulations. Rejected as irrelevant. Rejected as not supported by the evidence. COPIES FURNISHED: Leslie K. Dougall-Sides, Esquire Paul Richard Hull, Esquire City of Clearwater Post Office Box 4748 Clearwater, Florida 34618-4748 Diane C. Hashil 1527 South Prospect Avenue Clearwater, Florida 34616 Ms. Cynthia Goudeau City Clerk City of Clearwater Post Office Box 4748 Clearwater, Florida 34618-4748
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the allegations contained herein, the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission, (Commission), was the state agency responsible for the certification of law enforcement officers in Florida. Respondent, Kenneth E. Beck, was a police officer, certified by the Petitioner, and employed by the City of Clearwater Police Department. In September, 1988, Joyce Ann Cooper Horten, currently of Easley, S.C., was residing in Clearwater, Florida. At that time, she was approximately 16 years old. On the evening in question, two of her friends, a boy and girl, had "egged" a neighbor's apartment and the neighbor called the police. In response to this call, the Respondent came to the scene and was talking to Ms. Horten's friends in back of the house. When he had completed his conversation with them, he told Ms. Horten he had to search her for a knife, and took her into a hallway where he put his hands up under her shirt and around her shoulders and sides. In addition, he touched her legs by putting his hands on both sides of each leg, running them all the way up to the crotch. After this search, Respondent took Ms. Horten into her apartment where he searched for the knife in the kitchen. Finding nothing, he took her into the bedroom, went into her closet, and looked through her clothes as well as through her chest of drawers. Finding nothing, Respondent then had Ms. Horten roll up her skirt from both the back and the front and when she did so, pulled her panties out from the front. When he did this, he could observe her pubic area though he did not touch her there. He then had her roll up her shirt, both in the front and the back. Since she was not wearing a bra, when she rolled up her shirt front, her breasts were exposed to his view. After finishing his search, he gave Ms. Horten his card, with his name on it, and went back outside to talk to the other young people. Ms. Horten did not think that what Respondent was doing to her was appropriate, but claims that since she was not familiar with the law, she did not know she could resist. Nonetheless, she later told her mother and the neighbor who had initially called the police. This neighbor apparently filed a report with the police and Ms. Horten thereafter taped a statement as to the matters previously discussed, a typed copy of which she subsequently signed under oath. At approximately 3:50 AM on April 16, 1989, Tara D. Grey, then a 17 year old college student, was driving her car eastward on Drew Street in Clearwater, Florida when she was pulled over by the Respondent who was in a police cruiser and in uniform. Initially he did not tell her why he had stopped her, but asked for her driver's license and registration, which he took back to his cruiser. After approximately 5 minutes, he came back and told her that her license did not check out and asked for additional identification which, he claimed, did not check out either. Finally, she gave him her social security card which seemed to satisfy him. After an extended series of questions regarding her drinking, her use of illegal drugs, or her prior arrest record, all of which she denied, he required her to get out of her car, after which he administered a sobriety test to her. He then asked if he could search her car, to which she consented. While he conducted the initial search, he asked her to stand behind the car, but then requested her to take the numerous items which were on the car floor out so he could see what he was doing. At time she was wearing a miniskirt and boots, along with a sweater, and when she did what he asked of her, she had to bend over and her skirt came up in the back, giving him a broad view of her posterior. When she finished cleaning out her car to his satisfaction, Respondent asked her with whom she lived and why she had other clothing in the car. After several other questions, he finally told her, after about 45 total minutes of interview, that she had been stopped because she was speeding. He then indicated he would have to follow her to her friend's home, (the place to which she was in progress when stopped), and kept her license while he followed her there. Before he allowed her to go into the house, he indicated he would have to frisk her, and in doing so, had her put her hands up on the top of his car. He then ran his hands across her shoulders and across her hips and bottom, but did not touch either her pubic area or her breasts. He also checked her socks and in doing that, felt her legs down in that area but did not run his hands up over her bare legs. After finishing the frisk, he drove off and Ms. Grey went into her friends's home. In April, 1990 Louise Ann Frattaruolo, Respondent's former mother-in- law, received a letter through the mail which, when opened, indicated that her husband had broken his word and must pay the penalty. The letter then went on to indicate that all the Frattaruolos must die. This letter was unsigned, but Mrs. Frattaruolo turned it over to her daughter, a police officer, who released it to the Clearwater Police Department. A latent fingerprint was developed on the envelope in which the letter was sent, which was subsequently analyzed and determined to be that of the Respondent. From the date of the postmark on the letter, the day it was mailed, to the day the fingerprint identification was made, there was absolutely no opportunity for Respondent to have handled either the letter or the envelope. Therefore, it is concluded that the envelope containing the letter was at least touched by the Respondent prior to mailing, and was most likely mailed by him. On October 30, 1990, Patrick J. Lombardi was working as a security officer at the Clearwater Mall and was approached by a man and lady who pointed out an individual allegedly exposing himself on a bench within the mall. Mr. Lombardi got his supervisor, Mr. O'Dell, and both officers observed an individual, subsequently identified as the Respondent, sitting on a bench, wearing bright yellow jogging shorts that were split up the sides. They observed him sitting in such a manner whereby whenever a woman or a group of women walked by, he would open his legs and then slap them together, and both officers observed that when he did this, his genitalia, which had been released from the inner lining of his shorts, would fall out onto the bench. To insure they were not making a mistake, the two officers went to one of the jewelry stores in the mall and contacted Janine M. Edwards, a clerk who they asked to walk by the individual and tell them what she observed. When she did so, she observed the Respondent open his legs and expose himself to her. She noted that the liner of his shorts had been pulled to one side allowing his penis and testicles to be fully exposed. She also observed Respondent do this in front of a couple, and she is convinced it was not accidental. Respondent appeared nervous and when she first saw him, he was hunched over. When he saw her, however, he turned toward her and opened his legs to show her his private parts. It is concluded, therefore, that his actions were intentional. Shortly thereafter, Respondent was observed by a mall employee leaving the mall and getting into a blue Ford automobile. The employee got the license number of the vehicle which was subsequently traced to the Respondent. Thereafter, Sgt. Joseph Tenbieg, of the Clearwater Police Department, put together a package of 5 or 6 photographs of individuals, including Beck, all of whom resembled the Respondent, which he showed, independently, to Officers O'Dell and Lombardi, as well as to Ms. Edwards. All three identified the photograph of the Respondent, which was taken from his police personnel records, as the individual who was exposing himself in the mall.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore recommended that a Final Order be entered revoking the Respondent, Kenneth E. Beck's certification as a law enforcement officer. RECOMMENDED this 29th day of April, 1991, in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of April, 1991. COPIES FURNISHED: Elsa Lopez-Whitehurst, Esquire Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Kenneth E. Beck 28 Valencia Circle Safety Harbor, Florida 34695 James T. Moore Commissioner Florida Department of Law Enforcement P.O. Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Jeffrey Long Director Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission P.O. Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Rodney Gaddy General Counsel FDLE P.O. Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
The Issue Whether Appellant was wrongfully denied a variance of 21.33 feet to construct a second floor deck at 673 Bay Esplanade, Five Palms Motel Condo, Clearwater, Florida.
Findings Of Fact John Shaw, a resident of Massachusetts, purchased the condominium for which the variance is here requested in December, 1988 without first visiting the property or inquiring about zoning restrictions. The unit purchased is on the second floor of a two story building earlier converted from a hotel or motel into condominiums. The seller told Shaw he could construct a deck over the existing deck on the ground floor condominium below the unit purchased by Shaw. While the construction of this deck was in progress it was discovered no permit had been pulled for the project and the work was stopped. The subsequent application for a permit was denied because the proposed deck encroached some 21.33 feet into the setback area. The application for a variance was denied by the Clearwater Development Code Adjustment Board and this appeal followed. The two buildings comprising this complex were erected many years ago and are non-conforming, i.e., the buildings themselves violate the current Development Code. An existing deck extending into the setback area was constructed on the unit directly below the condominium purchased by Shaw and a similar deck extending to the seawall was constructed on an adjacent building. No permits are on file for those decks. Construction of the proposed deck would improve the livability of the condominium greatly by expanding the area usable for looking seaward. The condominium has been used without this deck for many years. This property is zoned CR-24 and the setback requirement is 25 feet from the water's edge.
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, as well as my observation of the demeanor of the witnesses who observed and/or participated in each of the four episodes, the following facts are found: At all times material to the charges herein, respondent DeSantis was an on-duty Clearwater Police Department. officer, holding the rank of patrol sergeant. The respondent had been employed by the Clearwater Police Department since March 14, 1977. He was certified by the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission on July 7, 1977, and was issued Certificate Number 02-18239. THE ANDERSON INCIDENT At approximately 8:00 p.m. on October 27, 1984, a radio dispatch was transmitted to Clearwater police officers advising that there was an armed black male in the area who had threatened that he was either going to get some money or someone would be hurt. Respondent observed a suspect, later identified as Harold Anderson, in front of a laundromat where three or four people were sitting in chairs. Respondent drove up to the laundromat, and observed Mr. Anderson walk inside. A woman and a child were inside the front area of the laundromat. Respondent followed Anderson into the laundromat and Anderson proceeded to walk the back area, keeping his back to the respondent. Assuming that Anderson had a gun in his hand and fearing a possible hostage situation with the woman and child, respondent drew his service revolver and informed Anderson that he was under arrest. With pistol drawn and facing Anderson's back, respondent made two attempts within the laundromat to take Anderson into custody. During the second attempt and while respondent's gun was placed on Anderson's spine, a struggle ensued near the front doorway. The struggle caused both the respondent and Anderson to fall, with Anderson on the bottom, upon the hood of a car parked outside the entryway to the laundromat. Sometime during the struggle, respondent was attempting to place his service revolver under Anderson's chin. Instead, the barrel of respondent's pistol went into Anderson's mouth, where it remained for between 20 and 40 seconds, causing Anderson to make choking and gagging sounds. Respondent's pistol was removed from Anderson's mouth after Anderson was handcuffed with the assistance of two other police officers. A loaded handgun was retrieved from the waistband of Anderson's trousers. Officer Kettel arrived on the scene as respondent and Anderson were struggling at the doorway of the laundromat. He observed that Anderson was resisting arrest and that respondent was attempting to calm Anderson down and to retrieve his gun. He recalled that respondent's pistol went into Anderson's mouth as they both landed on the car hood. Officer Watson was the third police officer to arrive. He did not observe the struggle between respondent and Anderson prior to the two reaching the hood of the parked car. When Watson arrived at the scene, Anderson was lying on his back on the car hood and respondent was holding a pistol in Anderson's mouth. Watson's testimony was conflicting as to the exact point in time that Anderson ceased to struggle and the point in time that the pistol was removed from his mouth. Until the point in time that Anderson was handcuffed and his loaded gun retrieved from him, respondent was in fear for his life. He admits that the barrel of his service revolver went into Anderson's mouth, but states that this was unintentional and that he could not remove it without endangering himself until he received assistance from other officers in subduing Anderson. The testimony of two civilian eyewitnesses to this incident was somewhat conflicting as to when the gun went into Anderson's mouth, when Anderson ceased resisting his arrest, and when the gun was removed from Anderson's mouth. There was no evidence that Mr. Anderson was injured as a result of respondent's revolver being inside his mouth. THE HEYWOOD INCIDENT On November 3, 1984, three police officers responded to a radio dispatch concerning an individual who had returned to a Maas Brothers department store armed with sticks and bricks after previously having had an altercation with the security guard there. The individual was Steve Heywood, a 19 year old black male, who had testified that he had returned to Maas Brothers "to defend himself" because the security guard had broken his necklace approximately one-half hour earlier in the evening. When respondent drove into the Maas Brothers parking lot, he observed five or six people standing near the doorway and saw Heywood, dressed only in shorts and tennis shoes, throw some bricks and sticks in a bush. Respondent got out of his cruiser and Heywood started walking away from him. Respondent told Heywood to "freeze" and to "hit the ground." Heywood took three or four more steps, then turned around quickly. At that point, respondent drew his service revolver. Heywood put his hands out or up, started pleading that he had done nothing and went down to the ground on his stomach, with his hands visible. Respondent then approached Heywood with his gun still pointing at him, put his knee on Heywood's back, and placed the barrel of his service revolver next to Heywood's head where it remained for a period of about 30 seconds until another officer handcuffed Heywood. While Heywood appeared excited or upset during this process, he did not fight or struggle. THE TRUBY INCIDENT On October 5, 1984, respondent and Reserve Officer Karen Jackson were dispatched to investigate a report of a fight at an apartment complex. Soon after the officers arrived, Paul Truty began creating a disturbance in the parking lot by shouting abusive and threatening remarks at a victim of a prior sexual abuse, her family and the police officers. Detective Margaret Jewett was also dispatched to the scene to assist the sexual a~use victim. When Truby refused to stop yelling obscenities and inciting the crowd, respondent told him he was under arrest. Truty then began to walk backwards away from the respondent. Respondent pounded his nightstick on the ground three or four times, demanding that Truby return, and Truby then turned and started walking between two apartment buildings. Respondent and Detective Jewett followed Truby a short distance and apprehended him. The respondent pushed Truby against a wall and Jewett placed handcuffs on Truby, securing his hands behind his back. The respondent and Detective Jewett each took one of Truby's arms and escorted him approximately fifty yards back to the respondent's police car. During the walk back to the car, Truby did not resist or struggle and was cooperative and submissive. From this point, there is conflicting evidence between respondent's recollection of events and the recollections of Reserve Officer Jackson and Detective Jewett. Respondent states that Truby was highly intoxicated at the time of his arrest and that he had to use his nightstick to keep Truby's spine stiff and steer him while they were walking back to the patrol car. Respondent explains that Truby stumbled near the car due to the presence of some concrete tire stops adjacent to the passenger side of the cruiser. Detective Jewett and Officer Jackson recall that respondent positioned his police baton parallel to Truby's spine and under his handcuffed hands. As Truby was beginning to enter the police cruiser, respondent intentionally pulled up on the lower end of the nightstick near the handcuffs, thus causing TruLy to stumble and fall off balance. According to these witnesses, respondent then made a sarcastic remark about Truby falling and subsequently pulled Truby up with the nightstick and placed him in the car. Detective Jewett stated that Truby may have been intoxicated. THE VONDERAU INCIDENT On the evening of October 5, 1984, Officer David Watson was dispatched to investigate a report of a domestic disturbance in a residential neighborhood. Officer Green was dispatched as a back-up officer. Upon arrival at the scene, the officers spoke to a very upset woman who told them that her son had done extensive damage to her home and had threatened her. The interior of the woman's home was in shambles. A neighbor led the son, later identified as John Vonderau, to the area of the street where the officers were. He was wearing no shirt and the officers believed he had been drinking. Vonderau exhibited bizzare behavior, marked bye dramatic swings of mood from calm and lethargic to aggressively pacing the street with clenched fists. Officer Watson was concerned that Vonderau could become violent, but he was unsure of his legal right to arrest him since no crime had been committed in Watson's presence. He considered taking Vonderau to a detoxification center or effecting an involuntary commitment to a treatment facility for the mentally ill, pursuant to the Baker Act. Being unsure of the legal ramifications of doing so, Watson radioed respondent, who was his superior on duty that evening, and asked him to come to the scene to advise on the proper course of action. Before respondent arrived, Officer Desrosiers drove by and Officer Watson requested that he stay because Vonderau appeared to be getting more agitated. When respondent and Reserve Officer Jackson arrived on the scene, Officers Watson, Green and Desrosiers were standing in the street in a loose circle around Vonderau, who was pacing back and forth. Officer Watson advised respondent that Vonderau had made death threats to his mother and had completely ramshackled her house. A decision was made that the officers would take Vonderau into custody as a Baker Act patient. When respondent and Watson began to approach Vonderau, he brushed against respondent's shoulder and then assumed a martial arts/karate-type stance, and said, "You'd better get your clubs out. You're going to need them." The officers all took out their police batons, and Vonderau continued to make karate- type motions. Officer Desrosiers was talking on his radio when Vonderau swung at him. Respondent thought Vonderau struck Desrosiers, but no contact was made. Vonderau also approached Officers Watson and Green in an aggressive fashion. When he turned away from Officer Watson, Watson struck Vonderau's leg with his police baton. Vonderau then ceased his crouched stance, stood erect, put his hands in the air and said, "You got me." Officer Watson then ordered Vonderau to get down on the ground. After hesitating momentarily, Vonderau then assumed a push-up position, facing the street and suspending himself with his feet and hands. Immediately after Officer Watson ordered Vonderau to lie flat on the street, the respondent struck a very hard blow with his police baton across Vonderau's shoulders, causing a welt. Vonderau then went immediately to the ground. Once Vonderau was down flat on the street, at least three of the officers quickly moved to securely hold him down and handcuff his hands behind his back. The fourth officer walked over to the police vehicle to retrieve a set of "flex cuffs" to place around Vonderau's legs. At some point, respondent drew his service revolver and, after Vonderau was down and was being handcuffed by the other officers, respondent held his gun to the back of Vonderau's neck behind his ear, while pushing his nightstick against Vonderau's neck. Vonderau had ceased resisting and being aggressive from the time he went flat on his stomach to the street. Respondent held the gun to Vonderau's neck or head for approximately thirty seconds, angrily telling him that if he moved, respondent would "blow his head off." After Vonderau was hand and leg cuffed, he was taken to the police station by Officers Watson and Desrosiers. The testimony is somewhat conflicting as to the exact point in time that respondent withdrew his service revolver from his holster. Respondent states, and the other officers present admit the possibility, that his pistol was drawn when Vonderau first assumed his karate-type stance and began swinging at the other officers. He further states that he thereafter attempted to place his pistol back in its holster, but, because his holster lining was torn, he had to hold it there. However, on cross- examination, respondent admitted that he intentionally placed his gun next to Vonderau's head because he felt he and the other officers were in jeopardy. Respondent felt that the placing of his service revolver against Vonderau's neck was effective in calming him down. All officers on the scene believed that Vonderau possessed knowledge of a martial art and that he was dangerous. However, officers Watson, Green, Desrosiers and Jackson agreed that Vonderau ceased to resist completely once he was flat on the ground on his stomach.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law recited herein, it is RECOMMENDED THAT: Respondent Joseph DeSantis be dismissed as an employee of the Clearwater Police Department for utilizing excessive force during the arrests of Steve Heywood and John Vonderau, and that the Administrative Complaint filed by the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission be DISMISSED. Respectfully submitted and entered this 20th day of April, 1987. DIANE D. TREMOR Hearing Officer The Division of Administrative Hearings 2009 Apalachee Parkway The Oakland Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488 9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of April, 1987. COPIES FURNISHED: Louis Kwall, Esq. 133 N. Ft. Harrison Avenue Clearwater, FL 33516| Margot Pequignot, Esq. P.O. Box 1669 Clearwater, FL 3351 Robert G. Walker, Jr., Esq. P.O. Box 4748 Clearwater, FL 33516 Miles A. Lance, Esq. P.O. Box 4748 Clearwater, FL 33516 Joseph S. White, Esq. Florida Department of Law Enforcement P.O. Box 1489 Tallahassee, FL 32302 APPENDIX The proposed findings of fact submitted by each of the parties have been carefully considered and have been accepted and/or incorporated in this Recommended Order, except as noted below: Petitioner, CJSTC 22. The evidence is unclear as to the number of officers holding Vonderau down. 40, 41 and 43. Rejected; not established by competent, substantial evidence. Rejected; not established by competent, substantial evidence. First sentence rejected; contrary to the evidence. 55. Rejected, contrary to the evidence. Petitioner, City of Clearwater (NOTE: Many of the City's proposed findings of fact constitute recitations or summaries of an individual's testimony. The following rejections of the proposed factual findings does not indicate that the cited witness did not so testify, but that said testimony was not sufficient, in light of other testimony, to support a factual finding.) 8(b) Rejected. 8(f) Rejected. 8(i)(2) Rejected, as contrary to the evidence. 8(i)(5) Rejected, as contrary to the evidence. 8(i)(6) Rejected, as contrary to the evidence. 8(i)(7) Rejected, as constituting a legal conclusion as opposed to a factual finding. 9(i) McKenna was accepted as an expert in the area of law enforcement standards. 9(k)(5) Rejected as a factual finding. 10(d)(l) Rejected, not established by competent, substantial evidence. 10(d)(3) Rejected, not established by competent, substantial evidence. 10(g)(3) & (i) Rejected, not established by competent, substantial evidence. Respondent (NOTE: Many of respondent's proposed factual findings constitute verbatim recitations of testimony. These are improper findings of fact and are rejected as such.) page 6, first Rejected, as contrary to the sentence of last evidence. paragraph page 24, second Rejected, not supported by full paragraph competent evidence. page 27, first Rejected, as contrary to the paragraph evidence. page 28A, last Rejected as irrelevant and paragraph immaterial to the issues in dispute. ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER ================================================================= STATE OF FLORIDA, DEPARTMENT OF LAW ENFORCEMENT CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND TRAINING COMMISSION CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND TRAINING COMMISSION, Petitioner, vs. DOAH Case Nos. 85-3698 86-0889 JOSEPH R. DESANTIS, CJSTC Case No. L-1703 Certificate Number: 02-18239 Respondent. /
The Issue The issue for consideration in this case is whether Respondent should be disciplined, to include a three day suspension without pay, because of the misconduct alleged in the Notification of Suspension issued herein.
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the issues herein, Respondent, William T. Mooney, worked as a laboratory technician for the City of Clearwater's Public Works/Water Pollution Control Division. On April 15, 1993, Doreen Spano, the City's utility lab supervisor, held a meeting of her division personnel at which she identified Iracema Drysdale as the lead worker and, in order to clarify any misconceptions among lab workers as to work deadlines, presented a policy letter for the lab, entitled "New Work Schedule". The schedule set guidelines and deadlines for the daily workload. The memorandum contains inconsistent statements, however. For example, while Ms. Spano indicated both in the memo and at hearing that the instructions therein are merely guidelines, she also used such imperatives as "must" and "will" in the memo. Specifically, the memorandum indicates the daily plant BOD must be in the incubator by 12:00 PM, and the daily plant bacteria must be in the incubator by 12:30 PM. Respondent has worked in this City laboratory for approximately 14 years. During this time he has developed a method of accomplishing his tasks which is described by Ms. Drysdale as less than efficient. She indicates he frequently misses his time deadlines and works at his own pace. Respondent, on the other hand, claims he has always completed his tasks according to the Standard Methods Manual, but, due to the time the samples are received in the lab, could not accomplish both the BOD and the bacteria procedures within the guidelines set in that manual and the Environmental Protection Agency standards manual. Either one or both would be late. This controversy, much of which was made by both sides, is, in reality, only peripherally related to the issue in controversy here which is whether Respondent was insubordinate or not on September 9, 1993. Both Ms. Drysdale and the Respondent signed the memorandum in question here indicating their receipt and understanding of the directions contained therein. Thereafter, on September 9, 1993, Ms. Drysdale entered the lab shortly before the lunch period to find the bacteria procedure not done and Respondent working on the BOD procedure. It appears that the bacteria sample was taken at 6:00 AM on this day and, under EPA guidelines, had to be preserved in the incubator within six hours or the results of the procedure would be invalid and not eligible for reporting to the EPA. When Ms. Drysdale asked Respondent why he was doing the BOD when the bacteria procedure had not been accomplished, he indicated that Ms. Spano's memorandum required the BOD to be done by 12:00 noon and the bacteria not until 12:30 PM. He considered this a directive and indicated he would complete his work consistent therewith. Again, there is a contradiction in the testimony as to the nature of the conversation between Ms. Drysdale and the Respondent. Ms. Drysdale asserts that about noon on the day in question, she suggested to Respondent that he start the bacteria procedure first and then do the BOD procedure. Respondent refused because he believed he had to follow the new work schedule prepared by Ms. Spano. Ms. Drysdale then told him to do the bacteria procedure first and she would assume the responsibility. Respondent still refused and, raising his voice to her, completed the BOD procedure. When he finished that, he did the bacteria procedure but by that time, the sample was too old and had to be discarded. Respondent's recounting of the incident is somewhat different. He claims he was approached by Ms. Drysdale who asked him why he did the bacteria procedure after the BOD procedure. When he pointed out the dictates of the memorandum, she claimed to know nothing about it even though her signature, along with that of Respondent and Mr. Olson, appears on the bottom thereof. Nonetheless, according to Respondent, Ms. Drysdale said she would check on it. After lunch, according to Respondent, Ms. Drysdale came back with the Standard Methods book. When he showed her the new work rules, he claims, she admitted she was aware that Ms. Spano had written them. When he asked her what Ms. Spano had said about the situation, she allegedly replied, "Why don't you do it the way I say and if Doreen (Ms. Spano) asks, I'll take the responsibility." Respondent was upset because, he contends, things like this always happen. Respondent, in subsequent testimony, denied ever getting a direct order from Ms. Drysdale or that she indicated she would assume responsibility. On balance, while there is little doubt in Ms. Drysdale's testimony as to what happened, Respondent tells two different stories regarding the conversation. At one point he claims she asked him why he didn't do it her way and that if he did, she'd assume responsibility. At another, he claims she merely asked why he was doing the procedures as he was and made no mention of assuming responsibility. It is clear that Ms. Drysdale wanted the bacteria procedure done first, and while she might not have couched her request in directory language, there can be little doubt she communicated her desires to Respondent, albeit in a perhaps more gentle manner. In any case, she was Respondent's supervisor and he knew it. She wanted the work done as she indicated and her request, made under the authority she had to get the work done as she desired, had the force and effect of a direct order which Respondent disobeyed at his peril. Ms. Spano indicated she discussed not only the appointment of Ms. Drysdale as lead worker at the April 15, 1993 meeting, but also the six hour requirement for specimens. Respondent denies this, but it is found he knew exactly what the requirements were. He claims he has been doing things the way the memorandum calls for ever since it was promulgated and this is not inconsistent with his current position on doing the BOD procedure first. When this incident took place, Mr. Reckenwald, the superintendent of the water and pollution control division, and the overall supervisor of the laboratory operation in question, received a recommendation for discipline, primarily because of Respondent's failure to follow orders. In addition, however, the incident created a problem for the City which has to report to the EPA and other federal agencies. Because of this report requirement, it is imperative the work be done properly. If it is not done properly, the work is worthless and may result in sanction action against the city by federal regulatory agencies. Not the least of concerns, also, is the public health consideration since effluent, the source of samples for both BOD and bacteria procedures, is discharged into the public waterways. On the basis of the above, a recommendations was made that Respondent receive a three day suspension. This is consistent with disciplinary guidelines contained in the City's Guidelines For Disciplinary Action. Respondent appealed the action to the City Manager who reviewed his submittal but nonetheless upheld the disciplinary action proposed.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that the City of Clearwater take final action in this matter to consist of suspension of the Respondent without pay for three days and imposition of 40 disciplinary action points. RECOMMENDED this 24th day of May, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of May, 1994. COPIES FURNISHED: Miles A. Lance, Esquire Assistant City Attorney City of Clearwater P.O. Box 4748 Clearwater, Florida 34618 William T. Mooney 1433 Laura Street Clearwater, Florida 34615 Michael J. Wright City Manager City of Clearwater P.O. Box 4748 Clearwater, Florida 34618-4748
