Findings Of Fact Based upon the record evidence, the following Findings of Fact are made: Respondent is now, and was at all times material hereto, a physician authorized to practice medicine in the State of Florida under license number ME 0031424. Respondent has an office located at S.W. 8th Street and S.W. 34th Avenue in Miami, Florida. Delores Prado has worked in Respondent's office for the past ten years. Her duties are primarily administrative in nature. On occasion, however, Prado assists Respondent by administering physical therapy to Respondent's patients. She does so, though, only at the specific directive of Respondent, who provides her with detailed instructions regarding the precise treatment each patient is to receive. Prado never treats a patient when Respondent is not on the premises and immediately available if needed. During her first year of employment with Respondent, Prado received training in the practice of physical therapy. Prado is not now, nor was she at any time material hereto, licensed or certified to render any health care services in the State of Florida, including, but not limited to, those that licensed or certified physicians, registered nurses, practical nurses, physical therapists, and physical therapist assistants are authorized to perform. At all times material hereto, Respondent knew or should have of known of Prado's unlicensed status. On September 2, 1988, Thomas Daniels, an Investigative Specialist II with the Department, visited Respondent's office to investigate a complaint that Respondent was permitting unlicensed individuals to administer physical therapy to his patients. Upon his arrival at the office, Daniels was greeted by a young woman seated behind the reception desk. During the course of his conversation with the woman, Daniels inquired as to whether she had ever administered physical therapy to any of Respondent's patients. She replied in the negative. Daniels then showed her a copy of a letter, addressed to the U.S. Security Insurance Company and bearing her signature, which reflected the contrary. Confronted with this letter, the woman conceded that she and her fellow employees performed physical therapy on Respondent's patients. Respondent, who was nearby in a position where he could overhear the conversation, did not interject and deny the statement that his employee had made to Daniels. Later during his September 2, 1988, visit, Daniels met with Respondent and was shown the office's physical therapy area. He then left. Daniels returned to Respondent's office on September 6, 1988. On this visit, he was greeted by Prado. He asked her if he could speak with Respondent. Prado replied that Respondent was out of the office and she did not expect him back until later that afternoon. Daniels then asked Prado if he could take photographs of the physical therapy area. Prado indicated that she had no objection to him doing so. Daniel thereupon went into the physical therapy area where he observed one of Respondent's patients seated in a chair with "hot packs" on her neck and shoulders. The patient was in the midst of receiving physical therapy administered by Prado pursuant to the specific directive of Respondent. Notwithstanding what Prado had told Daniels, Respondent was in fact on the premises, albeit outside of the physical therapy area and beyond Daniels' view, and was immediately available if needed. Daniels took photographs of the physical therapy area and then concluded his visit. During the ten minutes that Daniels was in Respondent's office on September 6, 1988, he spoke to Prado and no one else. Their conversation was in English and Prado appeared to have little difficulty understanding what Daniels was saying to her.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Board of Medicine enter a final order finding that Respondent did not commit the offenses charged and dismissing the instant administrative complaint. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 17th day of August, 1990. STUART M. LERNER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of August, 1990.
Findings Of Fact CPC is an international health care company specializing in psychiatric care. It operates 25 hospitals in the United States and three in Great Britain. Its proposed Orlando hospital would be its fourth Florida facility. CPC has not yet selected a site for the proposed facility, but anticipates a South Orange County or Osceola County location. Site factors such as cost, services and zoning are obviously not determined and the estimated project cost of $6,776,125 is subject to substantial change. It has prepared basic architectural plans, however, which were shown to provide adequate space and necessary health care features for its proposal. The CPC facility would be "freestanding" and not a part of any larger medical complex. It would provide a range of psychiatric and substance abuse services for adolescent and adult patients, emergency evaluation, family therapy and follow-up care. CPC policy provides that up to 5 percent of gross annual revenue may be allocated for indigent care. Thus, some indigent patients could be treated. However, no specific commitment in this regard was made. CPC has adequate funds to finance this project "in-house" and anticipates no difficulty in obtaining necessary medical staffing. In view of this company's resources and experience, its ability to fund this project and adequately staff it are reasonably certain. OGH is a nonprofit 171-bed osteopathic acute care facility located in Orange County, seven miles east of downtown Orlando. It has been operated as a nonprofit facility since 1945, and has existed at its present location since 1960. In 1981, HRS issued a Certificate of Need authorizing OGH to add 70 medical-surgical beds to its facility by constructing four new floors to an existing building, including a top (sixth) floor which is now proposed for the OGH substance abuse program. The additional cost of construction is estimated to be $500,000. OGH proposes to apply osteopathic principles to its substance abuse program. Of the approximately 60 doctors of osteopathy in Orange County, most are admitted to the staff of OGH and not to the allopathic facilities in Orange County, which require that doctors of osteopathy have postgraduate training in an allopathic residency program. The proposed OGH facility would thus be the only one available to these physicians and would provide an opportunity for osteopathic practice and training in substance abuse. This would also be the only program of this type available to substance abuse patients who seek osteopathic treatment in Orange County. There are patient care advantages to locating a substance abuse program within an acute care hospital such as OGH, since patients who require substance abuse treatment frequently require other services provided by a general hospital. The program proposed by OGH would have such auxiliary hospital services readily available where the CPC program would not. OGH has made tentative arrangements for the additional health care and management personnel required by its proposal. OGH will provide some indigent care and anticipates that it will continue to experience a "bad debt" rate of about 9 per cent, which includes indigent care costs. Intervenor, Florida Hospital (FH), consists of three major campuses in the Orlando metropolitan area, (Orlando, Orange County; Altamonte Springs, Seminole County; and Apopka, Orange County). FH is a not-for-profit tertiary care hospital owned by the Seventh Day Adventist Church. It has been in operation for approximately 75 years and currently has 943 beds. As of the date of the hearing, FH had 99 beds in its facility dedicated to psychiatric and substance abuse services with 2 in Altamonte Springs, 51 in the main Orlando campus building and 24 in a building adjacent to the Orlando campus main hospital building. FH has been providing psychiatric and substance abuse services for approximately 25 years, but does not currently have any beds designated specifically for substance abuse patients. At the time of the hearing, FH had under construction and scheduled to be completed in October, 1984, a 56-bed, freestanding psychiatric facility which is to be located approximately 600 feet from the main Orlando campus building, consisting of 24 adult general psychiatric beds, 16 substance abuse beds and 16 adolescent psychiatric beds. During FH's current fiscal year, which began January 1, 1981, there has been a decrease in patient days in the hospital in general and a decline in occupancy in the psychiatric treatment program. At the time of the hearing, the occupancy level for the pregram was approximately 60 percent and had been less than 75 per cent during the calendar years 1982, 1983 and 1981 (through August), with a projection of 62 percent for all of 1984. The opening of the facility by Intervenor, West Lake Hospital (WLH) in May, 1984, has had the effect of reducing the number of patient days and percentage of occupancy at FH. Intervenor, WLH, is located in Longwood, Seminole County, Florida, (HRS District VII) and provides psychiatric and substance abuse treatment. Forty-eight percent of its patients come from Orange County and it estimates that as many as 60 percent of those patients would go to another facility in Orange County, were one available. Since its opening in May, 1984, the WLH facility has had an occupancy level of less than 75 per cent for its 80-bed facility. Both intervenors oppose grant of the CPC application, but neither opposes grant of the OGH application. HRS Rules 10-5.11(25)(d) and 27(f), Florida Administrative Code (FAC), set forth the methodology to be used in computing bed need for short term psychiatric and substance abuse treatment. Beds are allocated within each health planning district on the basis of a five year projection. The proposed facilities would be located in HRS Health Planning District VII. Thus, projections, allocations and computations are based on health planning data applicable to this district. Although CPC seeks to create a sub-district consisting of Orange and Osceola Counties for evaluation of its application, there is no basis in these rules or in existing health plans for this proposed subdivision. The projected bed need for District VII (1989) is as follows: A. Short term psychiatric Existing and approved beds 368 Tentatively approved beds 60 1/ Total existing and approved 428 Total need 454 2/ Net need 26 B. Short term substance abuse Existing and approved beds 40 Tentatively approved beds 26 3/ Total existing and approved 66 Total need 78 4/ Net need 12 The above referenced rules, while providing for a minimum number of psychiatric beds in general hospitals, require no corresponding minimum number of beds in freestanding specialty hospitals, nor do they establish any preference for freestanding hospital beds. Should a freestanding facility be viewed as desirable, the new psychiatric treatment center at Florida Hospital is essentially freestanding, and would meet any such need. Further, the inventory of short term psychiatric beds indicates that the limited existing need is within the category of general hospital beds, rather than the specialty hospital category. HRS Rule 10-5.11(25)(d)5, F.A.C. provides that no additional short term psychiatric beds shall normally be approved unless the average annual occupancy rate for all existing psychiatric beds in the district exceeds 75 percent (for adult services) or 70 percent (for adolescent and children's services) for the preceding twelve months. Virtually all of the psychiatric beds in District VII have been for adult services. For calendar year 1983, the occupancy rate for short term psychiatric beds in District VII was approximately 73.5 percent. For the 12-month period from July, 1983 through June, 1984 the occupancy rate had declined to 71.7 percent. Thus, the occupancy standard for short term psychiatric beds was not met. Similarly, Rule 10-5.11(27)(h)1, F.A.C. provides that no additional inpatient substance beds will normally be approved unless the average occupancy rates for all existing hospital based substance abuse inpatient beds is at or exceeds 80 percent for the preceding twelve months. Since the occupancy rate for substance abuse beds during the 12-month period of July, 1983 through June, 1984 was in the low sixties, this standard was not met.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services enter a Final Order granting the application of Orlando General Hospital to establish a 26-bed substance abuse treatment program and denying the application of Community Psychiatric Centers to construct a 105-bed short term psychiatric and substance abuse facility in District VII. DONE and ENTERED this 20th day of December, 1984 in Tallahassee, Florida. R. T. CARPENTER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of December, 1984.
The Issue The issues to be determined are whether Respondent possessed Dilaudid without a legitimate purpose, and whether Respondent is unable to practice nursing with reasonable skill and safety, in violation of section 464.018(1), Florida Statutes, as alleged in the Administrative Complaint and, if so, the appropriate penalty.
Findings Of Fact The Department of Health, Board of Nursing, is the state agency charged with regulating the practice of nursing in the state of Florida, pursuant to section 20.43, and chapters 456 and 464, Florida Statutes. At all times material to this proceeding, Lisa Michelle Jackson was a licensed registered nurse in the state of Florida, holding license number RN 9375240. Respondent’s current address of record is 2358 York Street, Jacksonville, Florida 32207. On Saturday, November 7, 2015, Respondent left work and picked up her minor son from her parents’ house. She drove home, parked at her front door, and lost consciousness. At some point, Respondent’s parents called her cell phone. The phone was answered by Respondent’s son, who advised them of the situation. Respondent’s parents went to her house, and apparently called emergency medical services. EMS personnel arrived on the scene and administered Narcan to Respondent. Narcan is a medication that blocks receptors for opioid-based drugs, and is used to reverse the effects of opioids. It is commonly used when medical personnel suspect a patient of an opioid overdose. Respondent was thereafter transported to St. Vincent’s Riverside Medical Center (Riverside), and admitted with encephalopathy and acute respiratory failure. Respondent had to be placed on a respirator. A urine drug screen was performed, which returned positive for benzodiazepines and opiates. Riverside related the encephalopathy and respiratory failure to a suspected drug overdose. Respondent denied having taken anything containing benzodiazepines. She did indicate that approximately a year earlier she had undergone a tooth extraction, for which her dentist had prescribed Percocet. She had some left over, and testified that she had taken some for back pain several days before November 7, 2015. Respondent was discharged from Riverside on November 9, 2015, at approximately 11:40 a.m. After her discharge from Riverside on November 9, 2015, but later that afternoon, Respondent was speaking with her mother on the telephone. Respondent’s mother did not like the way she sounded, and came to the house. Respondent’s mother believed that Respondent was lethargic, but Respondent admitted only to being tired from her earlier hospital stay. EMS was called, and Respondent was again transported to Riverside, where she was admitted at approximately 5:45 p.m. Her diagnosis on admission was hypertensive disorder. She self-discharged against medical advice, signing the discharge papers at 6:36 p.m. There was no evidence that Respondent’s admission to Riverside on November 9, 2015, was the result of the use or abuse of any substance. On November 20, 2015, Respondent and Carl Nesmith were at Respondent’s residence. Respondent testified that she was experiencing back pain. At some time during the evening, Respondent took three or more Dilaudid tablets. Respondent testified that the tablets belonged to Mr. Nesmith, though the evidence was not sufficient to support a finding to that effect. Nonetheless, by the time of the arrival of the EMS team and her subsequent admission to Riverside as described herein, the tablets were in her possession. Dilaudid is a brand name of hydromorphone, an opioid. Pursuant to section 893.03(2)(a)1.k., Florida Statutes, hydromorphone is a Schedule II controlled substance that “has a high potential for abuse and has a currently accepted but severely restricted medical use in treatment in the United States, and abuse of the substance may lead to severe psychological or physical dependence.” Respondent did not have a prescription for Dilaudid. At some point during the evening of November 20, 2015, Respondent passed out in her bathroom. EMS was called and dispatched to Respondent’s residence. The inference is that Mr. Nesmith called them, but since Respondent was unconscious, and Mr. Nesmith did not testify, the identity of the caller is not known. More to the point, the identity of the caller is not relevant. When EMS personnel arrived, they found Respondent unresponsive on the bathroom floor. Mr. Gorsuch recognized Respondent’s symptoms, including agonal breathing, as characteristic of an opioid overdose, and administered Narcan to counteract the effects of the suspected drug. The Narcan “worked,” and Respondent regained consciousness. EMS personnel discovered a plastic bag with loose pills in Respondent’s purse. The pills were taken with Respondent as she was transported by EMS to Riverside. Respondent was received at the Riverside emergency room shortly after midnight on November 21, 2015. Her condition was described as “drowsy but arousable with slurred speech.” Upon her arrival at Riverside, Ms. Quartano observed that Respondent was clutching a Ziplock-type bag of pills in her hand. How the pills came to be in her hand was not explained. Whether in her purse or in her hand, the pills were in Respondent’s possession. The pills were provided to Dr. McBride Johnson, who identified the pills as Dilaudid based on their shape, color, and markings. Respondent’s diagnosis upon admission was acute encephalopathy; poisoning by unspecified drugs, medicaments, and biological substances, accidental, initial encounter; and altered mental status. Respondent underwent a urine screening, which returned positive for benzodiazepines. Despite the fact that Respondent knew that she had taken “pills” during the evening in question, she denied to hospital personnel that she had taken any drugs or alcohol. As she had on November 9, 2015, Respondent self- discharged against medical advice, signing the discharge papers at 5:30 a.m. Upon her discharge from the hospital, Respondent was taken into custody by Sergeant Coleman from the Jacksonville Sheriff’s Office. Respondent told Sergeant Coleman that the Dilaudid had been given to her by a friend for back pain, and that she had them for several days. Despite her deposition testimony that she had taken pills allegedly provided to her by Mr. Nesmith, she told Sergeant Coleman that she had taken one of her previously prescribed Percocet tablets, and denied having taken any of the pills given to her by her “friend.” Respondent was then placed under arrest. Respondent’s mother had, for years, taken care of Respondent’s son while Respondent was working, often at night. Between November 2015 and January 2016, Respondent’s parents took over primary care of her son in order to provide him with a more stable environment. There is no evidence that Respondent ever diverted opioids, or any other drugs, from her employer. However, after having been visited by a Department of Health investigator, Respondent’s employer, University of Florida Health - Shands (Shands), first suspended and then, in January 2016, terminated Respondent’s employment as a registered nurse. On February 14, 2016, a Jacksonville Sheriff’s Deputy performed a traffic stop on Respondent after observing her fail to maintain her lane of traffic, stop past the stop bar at a stop light, drive up onto the curb nearly striking a pole, drive onto another curb and nearly onto the sidewalk, and while attempting to negotiate a turn, nearly strike another pole. The deputies called to the scene observed that Respondent had bloodshot eyes, slurred speech, lethargic movements, and that she was unsteady on her feet. She underwent Field Sobriety Exercises but failed to perform them to standard. Respondent testified that she had taken some over-the- counter sleeping medication at least 12 hours before being stopped. She could think of no reason why such medications would have had an effect on her by the time of the stop. Respondent stated that her erratic driving was caused by her vehicle pulling to the right and being difficult to control, which was consistent with her deposition testimony that it was because her car needed an alignment. That explanation was not believable. Respondent was arrested for driving while under the influence. The charges were ultimately reduced to reckless driving, but Respondent was required to attend DUI driving school, attend the DUI Victim Impact Panel, and perform community service. On March 15, 2016, Respondent was walking from her mother’s house to her car when she passed out in her mother’s yard. The Jacksonville Fire and Rescue Department responded, arriving at approximately 12:15 p.m. The EMS personnel administered Narcan to Respondent, and transported her to Baptist Medical Center (Baptist). By the time she arrived, she was able to communicate with medical personnel, and attributed the incident to a fight with her mother, and lightheadedness from not eating that day. Respondent testified that “they told me at the hospital that I had morphine in my system, and I had no morphine.” Respondent’s understanding of what she was told is not substantiated by the Baptist medical records. Thus, the evidence is not sufficient to support a finding that Respondent had morphine in her system on March 15, 2016. Respondent was discharged from Baptist at approximately 1:15 p.m., about an hour after her arrival. Beginning “towards the end of 2015,” and extending “maybe up until March or April [2016], maybe a little later,” Respondent went to the Jacksonville Metro Treatment Center where she received daily methadone treatments in an effort to wean herself off of controlled substances. She “somewhat” received counseling, but the substance of her testimony indicates that the methadone was the driving cause of her visits to the treatment center. She stopped attending the treatment center due to the cost. From April 2016, when she stopped receiving methadone treatment at the Jacksonville Metro Treatment Center, until June or July 2016, Respondent received outpatient Suboxone treatment at Merit Health River Region, which accepts Medicaid. Suboxone is like methadone, but it blocks opioid receptors. Respondent stopped going to River Region because it was hard for her to get there due to transportation issues. Respondent did not complete her treatment, and she was not advised that she was in remission or that she should discontinue her treatment. Respondent has received no substance abuse treatment since she stopped going to River Region. On or about March 17, 2016, Dr. Sanchez evaluated Respondent as allowed by section 464.018(1)(j). The evaluation included not only a face-to-face interview with Respondent, but included a review of records, including medical and law enforcement records, related to each of the incidents described herein. During the evaluation, Respondent advised Dr. Sanchez that she had used opioids “opportunistically” for about 10 years, with her usage being sporadic and impulsive. Respondent further advised Dr. Sanchez that she had used a Fentanyl patch three to four days prior to the evaluation. Pursuant to section 893.03(2)(b)9., Florida Statutes, Fentanyl is a Schedule II controlled substance with the same potential for abuse as Dilaudid. Respondent did not have a prescription for Fentanyl. Dr. Sanchez opined that Respondent’s use of Fentanyl that close to the evaluation, with the risk of detection in the toxicology screen, was an indication of the strength of her addiction. Respondent did not tell Dr. Sanchez about the March 15, 2016, incident during which she passed out in her mother’s yard, an incident that occurred only two days prior to the evaluation. She agreed that the incident would have been relevant to Dr. Sanchez’s evaluation. The failure to disclose the incident is indicative of an evasive attitude towards matters that would reasonably be expected to affect Respondent’s ability to practice nursing with reasonable skill and safety. Dr. Sanchez noted that Respondent had a history of emergency room visits over extended periods of time with different pain complaints, including back pain, abdominal pain related to gastric bypass surgery, and a broken tooth, all of which resulted in recommendations for short-term opiate therapy. Dr. Sanchez opined that Respondent’s actions suggested drug- seeking behavior. However, the maladies described, including a bulging disc from a car accident, and chronic tooth issues including, at the time of the evaluation, an abscess, were diagnosed by physicians, who prescribed pain management medications, and were not illusory. Regardless of whether Respondent’s use of opioids was initiated as a result of a medically-prudent prescription, the evidence is clear and convincing that Respondent’s use has passed to the stage of addiction. Dr. Sanchez opined that the incident on November 7, 2015, when Respondent took some form of opioid and picked up her child on the way home, ultimately losing consciousness at the wheel of her car, was evidence of a strong compulsion to use opioids. Dr. Sanchez’s opinion that this incident indicated a significant lack of judgment and control is credited. The incident on November 20, 2016, is further strong evidence of a growing and dangerous addition. In light of the other incidents described herein, and Respondent’s familiarity with opioids over the years, both as a patient and a nurse, Respondent’s testimony that she did not understand what she was taking that evening is simply not credible. Dr. Sanchez stated the circumstances surrounding Respondent’s February 14, 2016, arrest for driving under the influence is further evidence that Respondent was “losing control” of her addiction. The suggestion that the incident was the result of poor alignment is not credible, particularly in light of Respondent’s appearance and performance during the stop. Dr. Sanchez determined that Respondent refuses to accept responsibility for her behavior and remains in denial of her substance abuse issues, a conclusion that is supported and accepted. As a result of his evaluation, Dr. Sanchez diagnosed Respondent with severe opioid use disorder. He opined that Respondent has significantly impaired judgment due to her substance abuse, which precludes her from functioning as a registered nurse with the necessary skill and safety to patients. His testimony is credited. Dr. Sanchez further opined that Respondent requires an extended period of continuous supervision with monitoring, substance abuse treatment, random toxicology testing, and an extended period of time of documented abstinence from controlled substances before Respondent would be able to practice nursing with sufficient skill and safety to patients. He recommended that Respondent complete a full course of treatment geared to substance abuse and chemical dependency, initially as inpatient treatment, followed by an intensive outpatient program after a reasonable period of abstinence. Finally, Dr. Sanchez recommended that Respondent execute an Intervention Project for Nurses (IPN) monitoring agreement. IPN is the impaired practitioner program for the Board of Nursing, pursuant to section 456.076. IPN monitors the evaluation, care, and treatment of impaired nurses. IPN oversees random drug screens and provides for the exchange of information between treatment providers, evaluators, and the Department for the protection of the public. Respondent has not entered any form of inpatient treatment, though she indicated that she is currently on a wait- list for inpatient treatment, has discontinued outpatient treatment, and has not entered into an IPN agreement.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Health, Board of Nursing, enter a final order: determining that Respondent violated sections 464.018(1)(i) and 464.018(1)(j); imposing a suspension of license number RN 9375240 for one year and thereafter until such time as Respondent personally appears before the Board and can demonstrate the present ability to engage in the safe practice of nursing, with such demonstration to include at least one IPN evaluation in which the evaluator finds Respondent to be able to engage in the safe practice of nursing or recommend the conditions under which safe practice could be attained; requiring compliance with IPN recommendations and contract conditions, as imposed; imposing an administrative fine in the amount of $250.00; and awarding costs incurred in the prosecution of this case to the Department. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of November, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S E. GARY EARLY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of November, 2016. COPIES FURNISHED: Lisa Michelle Jackson 2356 York Street Jacksonville, Florida 32207-3541 (eServed) Rob F. Summers, Esquire Brynna J. Ross, Esquire Prosecution Services Unit Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin C-65 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3265 (eServed) Nichole C. Geary, General Counsel Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 (eServed) Joe Baker, Jr., Executive Director Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin C02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 (eServed) Jody Bryant Newman, EdD, EdS Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin C02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701
Findings Of Fact Marlene Solomon is the Respondent in this case and at all times pertinent to this hearing was licensed by the State of Florida as a registered physical therapist under License No. PT0001665. As of the date the hearing commenced, her license issued on September 2, 1975, was in good standing, and there was no derogatory information in her file. Her licence will be current through December 31, 1984. Marlene B. Holland was employed by Respondent as receptionist-secretary in her Orlando Physical Therapy & Fitness Center (OPTFC) from May 15 to December 21, 1978. She was not a physical therapist. From June until the end of October 1978, she and Ms. Solomon were the only people in the facility, which was open for business from 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. Monday through Friday. Respondent was not always present when therapy prescribed by a physician was given to a patient. When that was the case, Ms. Holland administered the treatment at the direction of Respondent. One of these patients to whom Ms. Holland administered treatment was a Dr. Douglas, who was receiving whirlpool treatments for his broken arm. This treatment consisted of heating up tile whirlpool bath, helping him into it, and standing by and talking with him while he was in the pool. At no time did she manipulate his arm or request that he flex it through the range of motion, nor did she apply ultrasound without direction. She had no freedom of choice to decide what treatment was to be given or when. Anything she did was done either by written or oral direction of Respondent whether Respondent was physically present or not. Another physical therapist, Mr. Rolf Kuhns, contends this constitutes the practice of physical therapy and, if done by a non licensed individual, must be done under the direct supervision of a physical therapist. Mr. Kuhns initially adamantly claimed there were no exceptions to this position but thereafter substantially relaxed his position. In any case, it is quite apparent, though he denies it, that as a direct competitor of Respondent he would benefit by the discipline of her license and the attendant loss of business she would suffer and, in fact, gratuitously provided information about her difficulties to physicians and others who had been or were clients of Respondent at the time. Marilyn Roofner, a registered physical therapist, works for Respondent from November 1 to December 21, 1978, at OPTFC with Ms. Holland. One of Respondent's patients during November 1978 was a Ms. Marilyn Caswell. During the entire period of time Ms. Roofner worked for Respondent, she saw Ms. Caswell come into the facility on approximately three occasions. On none of these occasions, however, did she give Ms. Caswell any physical therapy treatment. She did try, however, on one occasion to treat Ms. Caswell. In This particular instance, Ms. Caswell had an appointment for a treatment. Ms. Roofner saw her sitting in Respondent's office talking to her and asked if she were ready for her treatment. Ms. Caswell stated she was not. Therefore, Ms. Roofner made up a hot pack and took it to Respondent's office. When Respondent saw her, she frowned and waved her away. On the other visits Ms. Roofner is aware of, she did not see Ms. Caswell receive any treatment but instead observed her just sit there and talk with Respondent. During the period of her employment, she became concerned about the business practices of Respondent and how they might impact on her own professional standing. She observed appointments in the Respondent's appointment book marked "cancelled" or "no-show," which entries were later erased, and the insurance company would be billed for treatment that was not given. This occurred on November 3, November 6, November 13 and November 20, 1978. She heard the administrative employee, Ms. Holland, discuss this practice with Respondent, who advised her to do what she was told--it was none of her business. She heard Ms. Holland chastised by Respondent for calling Ms. Caswell and asking her to come in for treatments. When she realized that the scope of this practice was larger than she thought, she realized she would have to take steps to protect her own license. As a result, she resigned from employment with Respondent. Before doing so, she made copies of the appointment book and ledger cards to support what she had found and thereafter wrote a letter to the president of the Florida chapter of the American Physical Therapy Association. As a result of this letter, after investigation by that Association and findings that Respondent had been engaged in unethical billing practices, Respondent was conditionally suspended from the Association for one year. The Respondent met the condition imposed, and the suspension was forestalled. Respondent was paid $400.00 by Ms. Caswell's insurance company on October 4, 1978, for treatment rendered. She received another $240.00 on October 25, 1978, for additional treatment, and $700.00 on December 22, 1978. Each treatment was billed at $20.00, and billing records show that on several occasions Ms. Caswell allegedly received two treatments in one day. On December 27, 1978, Respondent returned the check for $700.00, indicating there had been a billing error, and thereafter submitted a bill for $320.00 for the period October 22, 1978, Through December 15, 1978. This latter bill included billings on November 3, 6, 13 and 20, 1978. Comparison of these dates with the Respondent's appointment book for these same dates shows that the appointments on November 3, 13 and 20, 1978, were marked "no-show," meaning the patient, Ms. Caswell, did not show up; and that for November 6, 1978, was cancelled. It is clear, therefore, that even after the correction Respondent billed the insurance company for treatment not rendered. By affidavit submitted July 29, 1983, Respondent denies both improper billing, as alleged in Count One of the Administrative Complaint, and allowing an unlicensed individual to practice physical therapy unsupervised, as alleged in Count Two. There was extensive evidence on both sides which indicates an unhealthy relationship existing between Respondent and her employees. As a result, the credibility of Ms. Holland and, to a lesser degree, Ms. Roofner, is in question. Discounting this to a substantial degree, there still remains the documentary evidence in the form of four pages from Respondent's appointment book showing missed appointments on the dates set out supra and the billing statements reflecting physical therapy treatments on those days for each which $20.00 was charged. On none of the appointments book pages is there a showing of a second or alternate appointment for that day. The fact that the bill on these dates postdates the alleged audit of the account and the return of the prior check to the insurance company makes it unlikely there was any mistake on the part of the Respondent, here. Further, the testimony of Dr. Johnson that a part of treatment can include counselling to a distraught patient is not persuasive here. That may well be proper medical treatment for which a physician, counselor, psychologist or psychiatrist can bill, but by no stretch of the imagination can counselling not related to physical therapy be considered a part of billable physical therapy. The very use of the term "physical" in the description of the procedure would exclude such a conclusion. It is clear, therefore, that improper bills were submitted for at least November 3, 6, 13, and 20, 1978.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That Respondent's license as a physical therapist in the State of Florida be suspended for six months. RECOMMENDED this 14th day of September, 1983, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of September, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: Jerry Frances Carter, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Michael Sigman, Esquire 125 East Jefferson Street Orlando, Florida 32801 Frederick Roche, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Dorothy Faircloth, Executive Director Board of Medical Examiners 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER ================================================================= BEFORE THE BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS DEPARTMENT OF PROFESSIONAL REGULATION Petitioner, vs. Case No. 82-659 MARLENE SOLOMON, R.P.T., License No. PT 1665 Respondent. /
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent's treatment of a patient diagnosed with a fecal impaction deviated from the applicable standard of care, in violation of Section 458.331(1)(t), Florida Statutes, and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact At all material times, Respondent has been a licensed physician, holding license number ME 0016053. He has been in practice for 33 years. He is Board Certified in Family Practice. Late in the afternoon of July 6, 1997, M. D., a 58- year-old female, presented to the emergency room at North Shore Medical Center in Miami, complaining of lower and upper abdominal pain, vomiting, and constipation. She reported taking a Fleets enema, but to no effect. She had been experiencing this discomfort for two or three days. Emergency room staff conducted a physical examination of M. D. and ordered blood work and abdominal x-rays. The results of the physical examination and blood work were generally within normal limits, except for generalized abdominal tenderness. M. D. also had an elevated respiration rate and a subtly elevated component of the white blood cell count. The abdominal x-rays revealed what was likely to be a fecal cast in the sigmoid colon, and the radiologist noted the possibility of a partial occlusion in the distal colon. Emergency room staff contacted Respondent for the first time at 10:30 p.m. on July 6. During the conversation, Respondent learned of M. D.'s presence in the hospital emergency room. He learned about her general history and that the results of her physical examination and blood work were generally normal, except for diffuse abdominal tenderness. He also learned generally of the results of the abdominal x-rays. Although the radiologist's report was not available, Respondent understood that the report was consistent with her complaints of constipation. A member of the emergency room staff informed Respondent of the diagnosis of fecal impaction. The staff person reported that they had found no evidence of any other acute processes and asked if Respondent wanted to admit M. D. to the hospital so that they could clear out her impaction. Respondent ordered that the hospital admit M. D. He ordered a liquid diet to rehydrate M. D. and her stool, routine monitoring of M. D.'s vital signs, bathroom privileges, Tylenol as needed for pain, a barium enema, and a standard preparation for a barium enema. The barium enema requires a clear colon. Otherwise, fecal material would show as lumps, which would be indistinguishable from colon masses. The standard preparation for a barium enema takes place over one to two days prior to the administration of the enema. Over this period of time, the patient follows a liquid diet to reduce the amount of fecal material, then takes a laxative, and finally one or more tap water, Fleets, or soap-suds enemas to clear fecal material from the lower bowel. Given the time constraints present in this case, largely due to M. D.'s discomfort, Respondent ordered a barium enema the next morning. He did not want M. D. to receive a laxative, due to the possibility of a bowel obstruction, so he ordered tap water enemas until clear. After giving the orders, Respondent planned to see M. D. at 8 a.m. the next day. Unknown to Respondent, the standard practice at the hospital was to prepare the patient for the barium enema with a laxative, even if the physician ordering the enema did not expressly request one and did expressly request a tap water enema. At 12:30 a.m. on July 7, a hospital nurse administered a saline laxative in the form of a Fleets Phospho-Soda. This gentle laxative is an osmotic agent that draws fluid into the bowel, although it also generates some gastrointestinal peristalsis, by which muscular bowel contractions propel the bowel's contents from the upper portion of the intestinal tract to the rectum. Hospital staff administered a tap water enema to M. D. at 4:00 a.m. on July 7. She did not tolerate the enema well and began to complain of stomach cramps. The record is not entirely clear whether M. D. underwent a second tap water enema at 6:00 a.m.; it appears that her previous discomfort prevented the administration of the second enema. Shortly after 7:00 a.m., M. D.'s condition suddenly deteriorated. Her blood pressure and pulse increased, and her respiration decreased. Her breathing was labored, and her skin became cool and clammy. At 7:57 a.m., a member of the hospital staff telephoned Respondent's answering service and reported M. D.'s deteriorating condition. A minute later, staff summoned an emergency resuscitation team. Two minutes later, staff summoned an emergency cardiac arrest team. However, all attempts to resuscitate M. D. were unsuccessful, and she expired at this time. An autopsy revealed that M. D. died of fecal peritonitis caused by a perforated rectal carcinoma. M. D. had an undiagnosed tumor in her intestinal tract that had killed sufficient tissue so that the intestinal tract had lost its integrity. It is unclear whether the tissue was perforated by the peristalsis caused by the laxative. The mild abnormality in one component of the white blood cell count may have been an early indication of an infection consistent with a spontaneous failure of the weakened intestinal tract, but other white blood cell counts suggest a failure of the intestinal tract long after the administration of the laxative. Clearly, if the weakened intestinal tract withstood the laxative, it could not withstand the cumulative effects of the laxative followed by the tap water enema a few hours later. It is undisputable that the intestinal tract would have failed catastrophically, sooner or later, even without the administration of a laxative or enema. It would have been within the applicable standard of care for Respondent to have sent M. D. home rather than admit her to the hospital. It was within the applicable standard of care for Respondent to visit M. D. anytime within the first 24 hours of her admission to the hospital. It was within the applicable standard of care for Respondent to order a barium enema and tap water enema, even with a gentle laxative, such as the one used. It was within the standard of care for Respondent to treat this case as a simple matter of constipation caused by fecal impaction. The applicable standard of care did not require Respondent to rule out other highly uncommon conditions, such as the loss of tissue due to undiagnosed carcinoma, prior to undertaking the treatment plan that he undertook in this case.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that Board of Medicine enter a final order dismissing the Administrative Complaint against Respondent. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of July, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ___ ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of July, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: William W. Large, General Counsel Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 Tanya Williams, Executive Director Board of Medicine Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 R. S. Power, Agency Clerk Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 Bruce A. Campbell, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration Post Office Box 14229 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-4229 Ricardo Torres, Jr., Esquire 7975 Northwest 154th Street Suite 340 Miami, Florida 33016
The Issue This is a bifurcated proceeding in which the sole issue before the hearing officer at this present stage of the proceeding concerns whether the construction of a radiation therapy center and the institution of Radiation Therapy Medical Services by Sacred Heart Hospital should be considered a "new institutional health service" pursuant to Section 381.706(1)(h), Florida Statutes, as that relates to the right of Baptist Hospital to intervene in this proceeding. If the project is deemed to be merely a capital expenditure of a million dollars or more and reviewable only for that reason pursuant to Section 381.706(1)(c), Florida Statutes, then the Intervenor would have no standing as stated in Section 381.709(5)(b), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Radiation oncology is a therapeutic process in which external radiation beams are utilized to treat cancerous tumors to effect a cure or a palliation. Radiation therapy is provided by board certified radiation oncologists in specialized facilities which house radioactive materials and specialized equipment, such as linear accelerators. The provision of radiation therapy requires specialized medical personnel such as technicians certified to operate linear accelerators to provide radiation treatments, as well as physicians and dosimetrists to calibrate machines and insure that radiation treatments are properly delivered. Radiation therapy is a medical specialty which deals with the utilization of radiation for the treatment of cancerous tumors and sometimes benign diseases. Radiation oncology or radiation therapy involves the use of consultative services, the knowledge of clinical, biological and pathological characteristics of the disease process, the evaluation of patients, the localization of tumors, the planning of radiation, the delivery of radiation treatments, and subsequent evaluation of the effects of treatment on the tumor and the patient. Sacred Heart provides cancer therapy through surgery and medical oncology. The various aspects of those cancer treatment services do not include the provision of radiation therapy, although in the past, in several isolated instances, radiation oncology trained physicians have provided brachytherapy involving the implanting of radioactive materials in the tissues or body cavities of the patients involved. These instances did not involve a regular program of radiation therapy provided by Sacred Heart, however, and in the typical instance, any cancer patients needing radiation therapy, including brachytherapy, are and have been referred out to facilities offering such services, including the Intervenor. The present cancer therapy services offered by Sacred Heart are delineated on pages 55-60 of the transcript of this proceeding. Sacred Heart filed an application for a certificate of need (CON) for a radiation therapy center on its campus to serve inpatients and outpatients. The total project costs for constructing the building and equipping as a radiation therapy center is estimated to be approximately 3.7 million dollars. The applicant proposes that the radiation therapy center would be an adjunct or extension of the hospital's existing oncology program and would not constitute a "new service" as defined in Chapter 10-5, Florida Administrative Code. The Department also takes the position that the initiation of radiation oncology or therapy services is not the establishment of a "new institutional health service" or a "substantial change" in health services. The Department takes the position that the project and application is reviewable only for the construction costs portion of the project as a capital expenditure in excess of one million dollars. HRS maintained at hearing that it has consistently taken the position that radiation therapy is not considered to be a new inpatient institutional health service pursuant to subsections 381.702(8)(13), Florida Statutes (1989). The Department's representative who testified was unable to explicate the reason for the alleged determination by the Department that radiation therapy is not a new institutional health service. She was unable to relate when such a supposed policy of treating radiation therapy only as a capital expenditure was adopted by the Department. It is noteworthy when reviewing her testimony, appearing at page 88 through 126 of the transcript of this proceeding, that repeated references are made by the HRS witness, the overall tenor or theme of which is that the purchase of linear accelerators is not regarded as the effectuation of a new institutional health service according to her view of the Department's policy regarding radiation therapy. Thus it may be that the Department views the addition of radiation therapy as involving simply the purchase of capital equipment, i.e., a linear accelerator. The evidence reflects otherwise however. The institution of radiation therapy at a hospital involves much more than the mere purchase of a linear accelerator device. It involves the purchase of the accelerator, the construction of a shielded space or building in which to house it and operate it, the employment of physicists, dosemetrists, qualified radiation therapy oncologists, and even the institution of a machine shop to make repairs and repair parts. The institution of radiation therapy at a hospital involves much more than the mere purchase and installation of a linear accelerator and the instant application seeks to institute such a comprehensive therapy service and not merely the capital expenditure required to purchase a linear accelerator solely. Thus, the Department's purported policy of viewing the institution of radiation therapy service as merely a capital expenditure (if, indeed, a policy, which was not proven in this case) is misplaced because the evidence in this record reveals that institution of radiation therapy at a hospital involves much more in the way of equipment and services than the mere purchase and capital expenditure related to acquisition of a linear accelerator. The Department has reserved Rule 10-5.011(1)(g), Florida Administrative Code, for a radiation therapy methodology. The remainder of that rule contains methodologies reserved for other services which HRS regulates as new institutional health services as well. These include such services as medicare, certified home health agencies, cardiac catheterization programs, and open heart surgery services. The reservation of a radiation therapy methodology in the rules is significant because of its indication of what the Department's intent with regard to the regulation of this service is or might be, because the Department has deleted references in its rules to reservations for services it has since chosen to deregulate, such as computerized tomography and chronic renal dialysis (see former Rules 10-5.011(1)(c) and (1)(h). The elimination of these rule reservations was published in the Florida Administrative Weekly, Vol. 15, No. 27, July 7, 1989. The Department in the past has had a rule governing need methodology for radiation therapy services. That rule was in effect until late in 1985 when it was invalidated in a 120.56 Florida Statutes rule challenge proceeding in South Miami Hospital v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, 7 FALR 5491 (DOAH Nov. 1985). After that rule methodology for radiation therapy services was invalidated, the Department's witness in this proceeding, in her supervisory capacity, signed a memorandum regarding reconsideration of certificate of need #2682 involved in the South Miami Hospital case wherein South Miami Hospital sought to initiate radiation therapy services. That memo stated: The Department does not currently have a rule in place to determine the need for radiation therapy, as such the reconsideration of CON #2682, utilizing statutory criteria, will consider an applicant's specific justification for the purchase of major medical equipment and the initiation of a new service (emphasis added). The Department subsequently reiterated that the establishment of a radiation therapy service would be reviewed as a new institutional health service in the case of Bayfront Medical Center v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, DOAH Case No. 87-2029 (Final Order entered September 1988). In adopting the hearing officer's conclusions of law from the recommended order in that case concerning the need for review of St. Anthony's Hospital's CON application for a radiation therapy service the Department determined that, as did the hearing officer: A certificate of need is required when a hospital proposes a capital expenditure over a threshold amount to provide inpatient health services or proposes a substantial change of inpatient institutional health services. Section 381.706(1)(c) and (h), Florida Statutes, (1987). Since the application under consider- ation in this proceeding proposes radiation therapy services to inpatients, as well as outpatients for a total project cost of almost 4.2 million dollars, a CON is required. The Department failed to explain any reasonable basis for any proposed change in the policy explicated in the May 22, 1986 policy memorandum, quoted above, and in the final order in Bayfront Medical Center supra. The Department's position may be summed up to the effect that its policy has changed from one of considering radiation therapy to be a new institutional health service to the current alleged policy of considering it to be a capital expenditure. It did not explicate why that policy had changed or a rational, factual or legal basis for it however and in view of the totality of Ms. Dudek's testimony it seems that the Department witness was emphasizing the policy of referring to the addition of radiation therapy as reviewable as merely a capital expenditure because of the Department's view, apparent from her testimony, that it in essence involves purchase of a linear accelerator. In the face of the unrefuted evidence to the effect that much more in the way of equipment, services and staff is involved in adding radiation therapy to the range of services offered by a hospital, it is apparent that the Department has failed to explicate a rational basis for the putative policy of regarding the institution of such a health service as merely a capital expenditure. Baptist Hospital operates a radiation therapy center of its own of approximately 10,000 square foot space. This area contains shielded space for linear accelerators, examination rooms, physicians offices, as well as a machine shop for repair and maintenance of the linear accelerators and space for dosimetry computers. This department at Baptist is organized and operated separated from other oncology services. Radiation therapy is primarily used to treat cancer patients and the patients are seen, evaluated, and treated within the confines of the radiation therapy facility. Policies and procedures unique to the radiation therapy department are utilized. Staff members include, physicians, technicians, physicists, and dosimetrists who are dedicated only to the provision of the radiation therapy service at the hospital. Thus from a clinical perspective, therapy is not merely an extension or an adjunct of the existing oncology program but rather is a separate therapeutic service in and of itself to which oncology patients may be referred when the services are deemed needed. Indeed, oncology involves different forms of curative and palliative treatment, including surgery and chemotherapy, with much different protocols, differently trained specialized staff members, differently trained and/or certified physicians with different methods, therapies and protocols for treating cancer. The commonality between the two types of service is that they have the ultimate goal of treating cancer patients, but the evidence shows that they are clearly two different medical specialties and institutional health services. There is little relationship between radiation oncology and the field of diagnostic radiology. Diagnostic radiology services are utilized almost exclusively to diagnose illnesses, conditions, while radiation oncology or radiation therapy is used to therapeutically treat patients with radiation to effect a cure or palliation. Radiation oncologists consult with and exchange patients with general surgeons, ear, nose and throat specialists, and other specialists as they do with medical oncologists. Therefore medical oncology and radiology are separate and distinct services. Although there is a relationship between radiation oncology and other cancer services such as chemotherapy and surgical therapy, the relationship is different in terms of the unique services, equipment and specially trained personnel required to provide radiation therapy as opposed to differently trained personnel, different equipment, therapy and procedure protocols required for other types of cancer services. Thus from a health planning perspective it does not logically follow that because a hospital provides medical or surgical oncology services, that it should also provide radiation therapy. The issue of the need for the service in terms of patient demand, availability of the specially trained personnel, the costs of providing the service, including the financial feasibility of constructing the facilities and buying the equipment needed, as well as the impact on other providers in terms of diversion of available patient days must be considered. It is noteworthy, as a corroborative aside concerning the evidence that establishes that radiation therapy is a separate and distinct institutional health service, that 29 of the 33 states which have certificate of need programs for the regulation of acute care facilities require a separate certificate of need in order to establish a radiation therapy service program. Sacred Heart does not currently have a radiation therapy service. It does have oncology services and surgical services that includes surgical therapy for cancer patients. Patients who need radiation therapy currently are referred out to other facilities including Baptist Hospital. Sacred Heart attempted, in its case in support of the HRS position treating this as merely a capital expenditure situation, to analogize the provision of radiation therapy services to the acquisition of a lithotripter. Sacred Heart contends that lithotripsy which is a form of treating kidney stones is an extension of the urology program of a hospital and that radiation therapy, a form of treating cancer tumors is merely an extension of an overall integrated cancer treatment program. However, whereas the residency requirement for radiation therapy or oncology is four years, after at least one year of post-doctoral work, the specialized training necessary to perform lithotripsy is a specialty training course of only several weeks duration. Further, hospitals requiring lithotripters typically have urologists treating kidney stones on the hospital staff. Sacred Heart in this instance has no radiation oncologist on its staff acting with admitting privileges who could provide radiation therapy services at the present time. Although it may have medical oncologists and surgeons on staff who treat cancer patients, Sacred Heart lacks the specialized policies and protocols, equipment, shielded physical space, specially trained medical personnel such as radiation oncologists, dosemetrists and physicists necessary to provide radiation therapy absent to the establishment of a new service. The list of institutional health services for which there is a specific need methodology includes, among others, inpatient cardiac catheterization, open heart surgery, neonatal intensive care units and transplant programs. The Department's attempt to distinguish between the establishment of an inpatient cardiac cath service and an inpatient radiation therapy service by stating that HRS had a rule methodology for the establishment of inpatient cardiac cath services whereas it didn't for inpatient radiation therapy services is a distinction without any logical basis. This is because the establishment of a service such as radiation therapy as a distinct and separate institutional health service depends upon the factual uniqueness or differences in the equipment, staff, protocols and policies required to institute such a service, as compared to other existing services at such a hospital, rather than the mere fact that the Department in the past has chosen to have a rule methodology for one type of service and not for another one. This distinction cannot serve as the basis for establishment of HRS's intent or policy in this regard in any event, however, because HRS has at least reserved Rule 10-5.011(1)(g), Florida Administrative Code for a radiation therapy methodology in any event, it simply has not enacted one yet, thus belying any distinction in terms of its body of rules, regarding different institutional health services based upon the mere fact that it has enacted a rule methodology for determining need for one type of institutional health service and not for another as yet. In summary, although the Department and Sacred Heart attempt to distinguish between radiation therapy and other institutional inpatient health services such as open heart surgery and cardiac catheterization by contending that radiation therapy is not a specialized service, in reality it has been established that radiation therapy requires a separate facility with specialized equipment, specially trained medical personnel with different training from personnel devoted to other types of cancer services, different protocols and procedures. It thus cannot be found to merely be an adjunct or extension of other cancer services, but rather is a separate and distinct institutional inpatient health service, just as open heart surgery, cardiac catheterization, diagnostic radiology or medical oncology for instance.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses and the pleadings and arguments of the parties it is therefore recommended that the motion to dismiss the petition to intervene filed by Baptist Hospital be denied, that Baptist Hospital be accorded standing in this proceeding and that the case proceed to hearing on the substantive merits of the application. RECOMMENDED this 3rd day of April, 1991, in Tallahassee, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of April, 1991. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 90-3576 Petitioner's proposed findings of fact: Accepted. Accepted, but subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on the subject matter. 3-6 Accepted. Rejected as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter. Accepted. Rejected as immaterial in this de novo proceeding. 10-20 Accepted. 21-22 Accepted, but not itself dispositive of material issues. 23-24 Accepted. 25-26 Accepted, but not materially dispositive. Accepted, but subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact. Accepted, but not materially dispositive. Accepted, but not material. Rejected as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact. Rejected as irrelevant. Rejected as immaterial. Rejected as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact and as immaterial. Rejected as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on the subject matter. Accepted, but not materially dispositive. Rejected as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's 'findings of fact and as contrary to the preponderant weight of the evidence. 37-41 Rejected as a discussion and recitation of testimony and not fact finding and as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact. Intervenor's proposed findings of fact: 1-18 Accepted. COPIES FURNISHED: Stephen Ecenia, Esquire Katz, Kutter, Haigler, Alderman, Davis, Marks & Rutledge, P.A. 215 S. Monroe Street Suite 400 First Florida Bank Building Tallahassee, FL 32301 Karen O. Emmanuel, Esquire Emmanuel, Sheppard & Condon 30 South Spring Street Post Office Drawer 1271 Pensacola, FL 32596 Richard A. Patterson, Esquire Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 2727 Mahan Drive, Suite 103 Fort Knox Executive Center Tallahassee, FL 32308 Sam Power, Agency Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700 Linda Harris, General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700
