The Issue The ultimate issue is whether the Respondent, Tallahassee Coca-Cola Bottling Company (Coke), engaged in an unlawful employment practice on the basis of race in its termination of James Andrews, the Petitioner. Andrews was purportedly terminated because of allegations that he had repeatedly sexually harassed and touched female employees. Resolution of the ultimate issue does not require a determination of whether such sexual harassment actually occurred. Instead, the issue is whether Coke's motivation for the termination was racially based and thus impermissible.
Findings Of Fact Andrews, who is black, was initially hired by Coke in 1969 and worked on the production line until he quit in 1971. Andrews was rehired by Coke in 1973, also in the production department. He worked in various positions in both the production department and in the inventory warehouse, and was promoted to assistant production superintendent in 1977. When the production department was closed in June 1982, Andrews transferred to the warehouse as assistant warehouse supervisor. In 1983, he assumed the responsibilities of head shipping and receiving clerk, and was placed in charge of inventory control, plant security and vehicle maintenance. Warehouse Supervisor Dale Dunlap resigned in July 1988 and Andrews was promoted to Warehouse Supervisor. As warehouse supervisor, Andrews had primary responsibility for the overall management of the warehouse, including inventory control, shipping and receiving, personnel management, and warehouse and vehicle maintenance. Andrews' performance evaluations were generally excellent, but the most recent evaluations were less favorable than his earlier reviews. Reports of Sexual Harassment Prior to Andrews' termination reports of sexual harassment were made to Coke by three employees: Susan Lingerfelt, Mandy Stinson, and Sue Rosenthal (now Rubin). In summer 1989, Lingerfelt reported to Office Supervisor Mandy Stinson that Andrews had just grabbed her in the warehouse by the Coke machine and had forced her head back and kissed her. She had shoved Andrews into the Coke machine, told him not to do that, and went to report it to her supervisor. Because the Sales Center Manager had resigned and his replacement had not yet been appointed, the two women agreed not to tell anyone about the incident, but instead to wait until the new manager arrived. In February 1990, around Valentine's Day, Lingerfelt reported that Andrews came up behind her when she was sitting alone at a computer terminal, grabbed her hair, pulled her head back, and again kissed her on the lips. Lingerfelt again protested and tried to get away from Andrews. Lingerfelt again reported the incident immediately to Stinson. Stinson and Lingerfelt went immediately to Lee Burk, the new Sales Center Manager, and reported the incident and the earlier incident at the Coke machine. During this same meeting with Lee Burk, Stinson also complained that she had been repeatedly harassed by Andrews and that Andrews had come up behind her, given her a "bear hug," and tried to kiss her. Burk was confused about what had happened to Lingerfelt because a black employee, Roosevelt Humphrey, had reported to him a couple of months before that he had seen two employees consensually embracing at the Coke machine. Humphrey had not identified the two employees except to say one was a supervisor. Burk mistakenly believed that the two separate Coke machine incidents were the same event. Based on this mistaken belief, Burk thought that a supervisors' meeting would be enough to solve the problem. A few days later, Burk called a supervisors' meeting and discussed several topics, including sexual harassment. He redistributed and discussed Coke's written policy forbidding sexual harassment. Burk told all the supervisors in no uncertain terms that he would not tolerate unwelcome sexual advances at the plant and that if anything of that sort had happened, the supervisor had better clean up his act. In August 1990, Andrews again was reported by Lingerfelt for grabbing her hair, pulling her head back and kissing her on the lips. Lingerfelt tried to slap Andrews, but missed, hitting him on the shoulder. Lingerfelt went immediately to Stinson and they went to see Burk. Lingerfelt was quite upset and was crying. When Burk heard the report, he said he would take care of it. Lingerfelt left the plant for about an hour to collect herself. While Lingerfelt was gone, Burk called Andrews to his office and confronted him with the two women's allegations, including the previous reports by both women. Andrews categorically denied the allegations, except that he had once put his arms around Lingerfelt. He denied ever kissing her and said he did not mean anything by his actions. Burk stressed to Andrews that he could not touch any female employee again, even if he didn't think anything was wrong with it--that he must stop it. Andrews claimed that Lingerfelt had invited the contact by bumping against him and that she was making the allegations because he was black. Andrews also claimed that Lingerfelt had allowed sexually explicit advances from a white supervisor, Doc Roddenberry, and that Roddenberry, not Andrews, should be the subject of Burk's admonitions. Burk told Andrews that he had only gotten complaints about him (Andrews) and that if he continued with his unwelcome conduct, he could lose his job. No advances were reported by Lingerfelt for a few months, but she did complain that Andrews was uncooperative with her about work. In January 1991, Lingerfelt noted that Andrews was calling her frequently and spending long periods of time in her office. Because this behavior was similar to Andrews' conduct before the previous incidents, Lingerfelt became concerned. On January 16, 1991, Stinson was in Jacksonville at Coke's regional office. Lingerfelt became so concerned that she called Stinson in Jacksonville and reported that Andrews had spent several hours that day in Lingerfelt's office staring at her. Stinson immediately asked the Regional Human Resources Manager, Thomas Bauman, for assistance. Stinson informed Bauman of all the prior alleged sexual harassment by Andrews. The next day Stinson returned to Tallahassee and she and Lingerfelt spoke with Burk. Lingerfelt, who was visibly scared and crying, explained to Burk that Andrews had been standing around her office staring at her. Burk said he would address the problem immediately. After talking with Bauman and obtaining his approval, Burk called Andrews into his office and confronted him again. Andrews denied that he had been hanging around Lingerfelt's office staring at her. Burk then brought Stinson into his office to confront Andrews about his persistent harassment against her. Andrews denied the allegations and accused Stinson of "coming on" to him. Andrews again asserted that the women's allegations were racially motivated. He also brought up his allegations against Roddenberry and Lingerfelt and demanded to know why Roddenberry could "get away with it" and he couldn't. Burk advised Andrews that it was only his own misconduct which was being addressed at the moment. Burk also informed Andrews that the allegations of Andrews' misconduct would be brought to the attention of Bauman for further action. Shortly thereafter, Coke's Special Events Supervisor, Sue Rosenthal (now Rubin), reported several events of sexual harassment by Andrews. She had come forward to help support Lingerfelt. Coke's Investigation After discussing the situation and receiving instructions from Buddy Donaldson, Coke's Florida Human Resources Director, Bauman travelled to Tallahassee to conduct an investigation on January 24 and 25, 1991, into the allegations against Andrews. Bauman first met with Burk and received a briefing on the series of allegations. Burk reported the incident which Roosevelt Humphrey had reported to him, still thinking that incident involved Andrews. Bauman interviewed Lingerfelt, who related in great detail each of the alleged incidents set forth above. Bauman took notes and Lingerfelt signed those notes as being an accurate account of her statement. Bauman asked Lingerfelt whether she had any racial motivation for her reports. Lingerfelt denied that Andrews' race had anything to do with her allegations. At this meeting, Lingerfelt told Bauman that she had hired an attorney and had filed sexual harassment charges against Coke with the Florida Commission on Human Relations. Bauman next interviewed Roosevelt Humphrey. Humphrey told Bauman that the two people he had reported were Lingerfelt and Roddenberry, not Lingerfelt and Andrews. Humphrey also acknowledged that he had not seen any other such incidents involving Lingerfelt and Roddenberry since the one incident he had reported to Burk without giving names. Bauman then went to Lingerfelt and asked if Roddenberry had sexually harassed her. Lingerfelt denied that Roddenberry had ever harassed her. Bauman next interviewed Rosenthal. Rosenthal told Bauman that before she became a supervisor in early 1989, Andrews had engaged in unwelcome sexual conduct toward her on three occasions. The first two times, Andrews came up behind her in her office, lifted the hair on the back of her neck, and kissed her on the neck. The third time, Andrews surprised her by kissing her on the lips after she had finished a telephone call and had turned around. Rosenthal said she was too startled to say anything after the first incident, but after the second and third events, she told Andrews not to do that. She said she did not report these incidents at the time because she was new, young and nervous. Rosenthal also reported that she had recently seen Andrews "stalking" Lingerfelt, staring at her for long periods of time and waiting for Rosenthal to leave so that he could be alone with Lingerfelt. Bauman asked Rosenthal whether her allegations could be racially motivated. Rosenthal said race had nothing to do with it and, in fact, she lived with a black roommate. Rosenthal had selected that woman from a pool of applicants who had responded to her newspaper ad seeking a roommate. Bauman next interviewed Stinson. Stinson told Bauman of the harassment she had suffered from Andrews, which included several attempts by Andrews to hug and kiss her. She also related information about the times Lingerfelt would come to her and they would go to Burk about Andrews' actions toward Lingerfelt. On January 25, 1991, Bauman officially interviewed Burk. Burk related the actions he had taken, including the supervisors' meeting in February 1990 and the personal meetings with Andrews in August 1990 and January 1991. Burk also recommended that Andrews be terminated for sexual harassment and stalking. Suspension and Termination Bauman then called Donaldson and discussed the information he had learned. They decided that Andrews should be suspended immediately, pending a final decision. They also decided not to interview Andrews again because he had denied any wrongdoing twice, most recently a week earlier. They had no reason to believe that Andrews would recede from his denials. Before suspending Andrews, Bauman asked Lingerfelt and Stinson to leave the building. He did so because of his concern and the women's concerns about their personal safety, especially when Andrews was told of the suspension. As soon as the two women had left the building, Bauman called Andrews to Burk's office. They told Andrews that he was being suspended for conduct unbecoming a supervisor. Andrews wanted to know "who said what" about him, but Bauman declined to give him further details. As he was leaving Burk's office, not knowing that Lingerfelt and Stinson had left the building, Andrews shouted to the closed door of Stinson's office something to the effect of "Did you women hear that--are you happy now?" As soon as Andrews was escorted from the premises, Coke changed all the locks at the Tallahassee facility, which was standard procedure. Bauman also had an automatic front door lock installed so that no one could enter the front office without being pre-screened. The following week, Bauman and Donaldson reviewed all the information, including the interview notes which had been attested to by the three women. They concluded that sufficient evidence existed to require termination of Andrews' employment. On January 31, 1991, Donaldson came to Tallahassee, summoned Andrews to the facility, and terminated him for misconduct. The decision to terminate Andrews was based on a good faith belief that he had engaged in inappropriate sexual conduct on multiple occasions, despite and in the face of at least two warnings by the sales center manager. Coke did not immediately replace Andrews. Due to a "cost containment" program that had recently been instituted and because Tallahassee's volume was too low, Burk was not permitted to hire a replacement. In February 1992, more than a year later and after two neighboring sales centers were closed and their operations consolidated at the Tallahassee facility, Burk was allowed to hire a replacement. He hired the warehouse manager from one of the closed sales centers, a white male. Other Victims Come Forward While Coke knew of only three female employees who had been harassed by Andrews when Coke terminated him, three additional women also came forward to testify about sexual harassment they had suffered at the hand of Andrews. Johnnie Mae Marshall, a black woman who had worked for Coke as a receptionist, said Andrews had suggestively rubbed her arms and hands when she handed him documents. To stop it, she ceased to hand him papers, instead placing all such documents in a mail tray for him. Christen Cheshire, a white female telephone sales operator, testified that Andrews harassed her beginning in late 1988. She said Andrews came into her office once or twice a day, hugged her around the neck, and kissed or attempted to kiss her. This went on for about two months before Cheshire was able to persuade Andrews to stop the unwelcome advances. While Cheshire never reported Andrews' advances, Marshall remembers Cheshire complaining to her about it. Jeanie Benton, a white female who worked for Coke from 1987 to 1990, also testified about Andrews' unwelcome advances. One time when she rose from her desk and turned around, Andrews was right behind her and tried to kiss her. She told him to get back and leave her alone. On a later occasion, Andrews tried to massage her shoulders and she told him to stop. Thereafter, Andrews would stand in her office door and stare at her. Andrews' Claims of Discrimination Andrews' claims that the termination was motivated by racial discrimination and that Coke's reasons for terminating him were pretexts for discrimination. As evidence, he offered a story that Roddenberry committed egregious acts of sexual harassment and misconduct, but was not disciplined. Additionally, he alleged that a "white clique" wanted to get rid of him because they did not like that a black man was made warehouse supervisor. Not one shred of credible evidence was given to support Andrews' claims. Besides Andrews' own testimony, the only witness who claimed to have seen any sexually inappropriate conduct between Roddenberry and anyone, including Lingerfelt, was Roosevelt Humphrey. Humphrey was not a credible witness. First, he was terminated by Coke for stealing a check from a coworker and cashing it. Next, he said he saw Roddenberry and Lingerfelt three times a week with Roddenberry kissing Lingerfelt, rubbing her buttocks and her breasts. However, he was not even working at the warehouse during most of the time he said he saw this and his testimony was filled with contradictions and discrepancies. Finally, he named others who saw and discussed this behavior; but each of those named persons denied ever seeing any sexually inappropriate behavior between Roddenberry and Lingerfelt or other female employees. Andrews' suggestion that his termination was racially motivated by false reports from a group of white employees, including Lingerfelt, Stinson, Rosenthal, and Roddenberry, is also unworthy of belief. Andrews' purported to support his conspiracy theory with anecdotes about other white employees, Jeanie Benton and William Beck, who tried to help him in the face of the covert actions of the alleged conspirators. However, Benton and Beck both denied that the events Andrews described in his anecdotes ever occurred. Additionally, Andrews' version of all these incidents was simply implausible and inconsistent with the credible and substantial evidence. Finally, Andrews presented no credible evidence to rebut Coke's evidence of its legitimate reason for the termination. Andrews simply offered no competent or probative evidence of a racial motivation for his termination.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order denying and dismissing the Petition for Relief filed by James Andrews, Jr. DONE and ENTERED this 23rd day of September, 1993, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE K. KIESLING Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of September, 1993. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 92-2063 The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties in this case. Specific Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by Petitioner, James Andrews, Jr. 1. Each of the following proposed findings of fact is adopted in substance as modified in the Recommended Order. The number in parentheses is the Finding of Fact which so adopts the proposed finding of fact: 1-3(1-3); 9-12(8-11); 17-19(13- 15); 23-25(20-22); 34(29); 36(31); 37(32); 40(35); 41(36 & 37); 42(38); 45(42); 46(43); 50 & 51(46); and 53(47). 2. Proposed findings of fact 4-8, 13-16, 20-22, 26-33, 35, 38, 39, 43, 44, 47-49, and 54 are subordinate to the facts actually found in this Recommended Order. 3. Proposed finding of fact 52 and 55 are irrelevant. Specific Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by Respondent, Tallahassee Coca-Cola Bottling Co. 1. Each of the following proposed findings of fact is adopted in substance as modified in the Recommended Order. The number in parentheses is the Finding of Fact which so adopts the proposed finding of fact: 53(35). 2. Proposed findings of fact 4, 5, 12-17, 19, 20, 22-27, 29-36, 40, 43, 44, 47-52, 55, 56, 79, 80, 87-90, 127, and 137 are subordinate to the facts actually found in this Recommended Order. 3. Proposed findings of fact 6-9, 11, 18, 85, 91, 102, 107-113, 117, 118, 121, 128-130, 134, and 136 are unsupported by the credible, competent and substantial evidence. 4. Proposed findings of fact 10, 21, 28, 37-39, 41, 42, 45, 46, 54, 57-78, 81-84, 86, 92-101, 103-106, 114-116, 119, 120, 122-126, 131-133, 135, and 138-152 are irrelevant, repetitive, unnecessary, and contain summaries of testimony and argument which are not appropriate proposed findings of fact. COPIES FURNISHED: Marie A. Mattox Attorney at Law 3045 Tower Court Tallahassee, Florida 32303 William R. Radford Attorney at Law 5300 First Union Financial Center 200 South Biscayne Boulevard Miami, Florida 33131-2339 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Dana Baird General Counsel 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149
The Issue The issues for determination are whether Petitioner, Kenneth Davis, made sexually harassing statements and made body contact with a female counselor so as to constitute sexual harassment and a hostile work environment, in violation of Pinellas County Sheriff Office Civil Service Act and the rules and regulations of the Pinellas County Sheriff's Office, and, if so, what is the appropriate penalty.
Findings Of Fact Based upon observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying in person and the documentary materials received in evidence, stipulations by the parties, evidentiary rulings made pursuant to Section 120.57, Florida Statutes, and the entire record compiled herein, the following relevant and material facts are found: Respondent, Sheriff Everett S. Rice (Sheriff), is a constitutional officer of the State of Florida, responsible for providing law enforcement and correctional services within the geographic boundaries of Pinellas County, Florida. Petitioner, Detention Deputy Kenneth Davis (Deputy Davis), is a 23-year employee with the Pinellas County Sheriff's Office, having spent his entire career as a detention officer. As a result of years of training and experience, Deputy Davis is intimately familiar with the Sheriff's policy regarding sexual harassment, detention policies, operations, procedures, and the priority of security applicable to detention deputies. The evidence demonstrates that in the collective opinions of those detention deputies who worked longest with Deputy Davis, all agreed that his personality was that of one who "[was] loud and obnoxious--to pretty much everybody," "play[ed] around a lot," "never insulted anybody," and "[didn't] mean any harm." At all times pertinent to this cause, Deputy Davis held the rank of detention corporal until the Sheriff reduced his rank to Deputy and removed him from his position of detention corporal on March 10, 2003. Deputy Davis' chain-of-command consisted of Major Kirk Brunner, Detention and Correction Bureau commander; Captain Nesbitt; Lieutenant Keith George; and Sergeant Buckingham. Deputy Davis did not have authority over Lori Atwater (Ms. Atwater), the complainant in this cause. He was not in her chain-of-command nor was he one of her bosses in the sense that he could assign her tasks. At all times pertinent to this cause, Deputy Davis worked in detention barrack C, North Division. Barrack C is a two-storied structure divided into B block and C block, with each cellblock divided into an upper level and lower level. Deputy Davis had four deputies under his supervision in cellblock C. At all times pertinent to this cause, Control Deputy Salazar worked the control center at barrack C. The control deputy is stationed in a glassed enclosure with clear view of individuals desiring entrance into the waiting room of barrack C and with clear view of inmates desiring to leave the cellblock and enter the waiting room. On or about March 4, 2002, Ms. Atwater, an African- American and a long-time resident of St. Petersburg, Florida, commenced employment with the Pinellas County Sheriff's Office as an inmate-counselor. Ms. Atwater has an Associate of Science degree in Computer Technology Engineering and a Bachelor of Science degree in Management Information Systems. Her inmate- counselor duties consisted of identifying inmates who had family, legal, and personal issues requiring her intervention. The Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) employed Ms. Atwater for ten years before she began employment with the Pinellas County Sheriff's Office. While employed with DCFS, she worked in food stamps, Medicaid, protective services, adoptions, and several community recruitment programs. DCFS also has a policy against sexual harassment. The Sheriff has adopted Pinellas County Sheriff's Office General Order 3-4, which defines and prohibits sexual harassment. Pursuant to General Order 3-4, sexual harassment is defined as: All unwelcome or unwanted advances; including sexual advances or unwanted sexual attention, whether between person(s) of the opposite or same sex. This includes, but is not limited to, leering, touching, patting, brushing against, hugging, kissing, fondling, any other similar physical contact, or quid pro quo arrangements (i.e., a situation in which an employee is forced to engage in unwelcomed sexual conduct in order to protect or advance his/her job.) Unwelcome requests or demands for favors, including sexual favors. This consists of subtle or blatant expectations, pressures, or request for any type of favor, including sexual favor, including unwelcome requests for dates, whether or not the request is accompanied by an implied or stated promise of preferential treatment or negative consequences. Inappropriate third party comments or one time comments made which do not constitute a hostile work environment, language not directed at the offended member, jokes (spoken, printed or drawn) that are not directed at the offended member or joint banter of a sexual or offensive nature in which the offended member may or may not be a party. All employees of the Sheriff, including Deputy Davis and Ms. Atwater, received instructions regarding the Sheriff's Sexual Harassment Policy. The evidence demonstrates that beginning in March of 2002 and continuing through the months of April and May 2002, Ms. Atwater noticed, without telling him to stop and without reporting her resulting complaint to her supervisor, that Lieutenant George would call her "Ms. Ashwood." At some unspecified time prior to March of 2002, Ms. Atwater concluded that the name "Ms. Ashwood" was offensive. Ms. Atwater based her conclusion on her interpretation and knowledge of the general reputation of a Ms. Ashwood (no first name given) within the African-American community of St. Petersburg. According to Ms. Atwater, Ms. Ashwood was known throughout the African- American community for engaging in sexual encounters with multiple partners. As a direct result of her superior, Lieutenant George, continuously calling her Ms. Ashwood, a name she considered to be sexually offensive, Ms. Atwater chose not to report her sexual harassment complaint against Lieutenant George through the proper protocol. The record contains no evidence that Ms. Atwater asked Lieutenant George what was his intended meaning by calling her Ms. Ashwood. The evidence demonstrates that Lieutenant George, having been involved in both the hiring of Ms. Atwater as well as involved in her performance evaluation, knew her name to be Ms. Atwater. Alleged statements made by Deputy Davis to Ms. Atwater in the cafeteria during a lunch period. The evidence demonstrated that Ms. Atwater and Deputy Davis initially enjoyed a rather cordial relationship at work during the period of March through May 2002, at least by outward appearances. Deputy Davis and Ms. Atwater both attended read- off sessions; on occasions, they walked together from the read- off sessions back to barrack A; and on two separate occasions, they were seated at the same table in the compound's buffet- styled cafeteria. They did not have contact with each other beyond what was necessary in the performance of their respective duties. They did not have contact with each other outside the workplace. On some unspecified date during lunch in the compound cafeteria, Ms. Atwater chose to ask Deputy Davis why Lieutenant George kept calling her Ms. Ashwood. According to Ms. Atwater, Deputy Davis came over to the table where she sat and she allegedly initiated the following conversation: Atwater: I really don't appreciate that, him [Lieutenant George] calling me Ms. Ashwood. Davis: He's probably P-U-S-S-Y whipped and you probably remind him of her. Atwater: He just alluded to--and used the term inside whore. Atwater: What's an inside whore? Davis: That's when you sleep with someone that makes Decisions for your career. Atwater: If I ever get promoted around here it will not be because I've slept with anybody, but based on my own merits. At the final hearing, Deputy Davis denied the allegations regarding the above statements attributed to him by Ms. Atwater. Thus, the evidence is irreconcilably in conflict as to whether Deputy Davis made those statements attributed to him with the intent of sexually harassing Ms. Atwater, and if the statements were, in fact, made, whether his answers were truthful responses to her question. The compound cafeteria has several long tables seating six to eight persons and several shorter tables seating four to six persons. It is significant that not a single witness, from among others who were seated at the same table with Ms. Atwater and Deputy Davis in the cafeteria on that unspecified day, was called to corroborate the statements allegedly made by Deputy Davis to Ms. Atwater. With knowledge of the Sheriff's sexual harassment policy coupled with her prior knowledge of DCFS's similar sexual harassment policy, and having been highly offended by Deputy Davis' conversation, it is significant that Ms. Atwater, whose counseling job included accurate record keeping, made no attempt to record this first incident with Deputy Davis resulting from repeated incidents with Lieutenant George. Additionally, Ms. Atwater chose not to follow protocol and report to her immediate supervisor her complaint of sexual harassment by a relatively new co-worker. Having carefully weighed and evaluated all the relevant, persuasive, and credible evidence, the undersigned is unable to find that Ms. Atwater's testimony is superior in weight and quantity, thus proving by a preponderance of the evidence that Deputy Davis made unwelcome or unwanted sexual comments or advances and/or unwelcome unwanted sexual demands, nor created a hostile work environment as Ms. Atwater has accused him. This determination reflects the fact finder's judgment concerning the weight of the evidence and nothing more; it is not a finding regarding what was said or not said by Ms. Atwater or by Deputy Davis during the alleged conversation that took place on some unspecified date in the compound cafeteria. Alleged intentional body contact by Deputy Davis with Ms. Atwater in the cafeteria buffet serving line. Ms. Atwater further testified that on another unspecified day while she was in the cafeteria buffet serving line fixing her salad, she felt "a brazen--it felt maybe like his [Deputy Davis] radio or something-it was hard--and then he went in my ear 'boo.' It made me jumpy and I made a squealing noise-because I didn't expect anything to braze in the back on my----." Continuing, Ms. Atwater testified that Lieutenant George came in the cafeteria at that time, and she asked him "why don't you tell your friend to just cut it out?" The Sheriff did not call Lieutenant George to testify. No other witness testified to corroborate Ms. Atwater's statements. Deputy Davis denied this second allegation of intentionally making body contact with Ms. Atwater and speaking in her ear. Having carefully weighed and evaluated all the relevant, persuasive, and credible evidence, the undersigned is unable to find that Ms. Atwater's testimony is superior in weight and quantity and that Deputy Davis engaged in the conduct of which Ms. Atwater has accused him. This determination reflects the fact finder's judgment concerning the weight of the evidence and nothing more; it is not a finding regarding what occurred or did not occur on that unspecified date between Deputy Davis and Ms. Atwater in the buffet serving line in the compound cafeteria. It is significant that Ms. Atwater, whose counseling job required accurate and detailed daily record keeping, made no record of Deputy Davis' second alleged sexual harassment of her person. With firsthand knowledge of the Sheriff's sexual harassment policy plus her ten-year experience with a similar sexual harassment policy during her employment with DCFS, Ms. Atwater chose again not to follow proper protocol. She chose not to properly report this second incident to her immediate supervisor. Her second decided refusal to report what she considered sexual harassment by the same co-worker is not a defense, if Deputy Davis was guilty of such conduct, and does not absolve him from liability. Having chosen for the second consecutive occasion not to report the alleged sexual harassment by Deputy Davis does present a significant impediment regarding Ms. Atwater's memory, recall, and credibility. Alleged repeated harassing comments by Deputy Davis resulting from Ms. Atwater's frightened squealing. Concluding, Ms. Atwater testified that "for months" after the undated cafeteria serving line incident, "every time" she would see Deputy Davis (minimum twice a week in barrack C) he would repeatedly come behind her and say--"Ewwww, counselor," and "Counselor, I want to see you." According to her, these statements allegedly resulted from the cafeteria serving line incident and from a subsequent work related discussion and disagreement between Deputy Davis and Ms. Atwater regarding the form "62" (a form used by inmates requesting to see the counselor). Ms. Atwater, when confronted with what she considered a third but continuing sexual harassment by Deputy Davis, again chose not to follow protocol and report this third incident to her supervisor. It is significant that according to Ms. Atwater, she was initially and had been continuously sexually offended by Lieutenant George calling her Ms. Ashwood. When she inquired of Deputy Davis why Lieutenant George called her Ms. Ashwood, she was again sexually offended by his alleged answer to her question. She turns then to Lieutenant George, who was continually sexual harassing her and (did not ask him to stop calling her Ms. Ashwood) asks his assistance (not to file a proper complaint) but to have Deputy Davis (whose answer to her question about Lieutenant George she considered sexual harassment) to "just knock it off." Regarding her third alleged sexual harassment complaint against Deputy Davis (Ms. Atwater with knowledge that Lieutenant George and Deputy Davis were friends and she admittedly intended to take advantage of their friendship), she went to Lieutenant George, who (1) had continuously called her Ms. Ashwood; (2) was in her chain-of-command; and (3) was also in Deputy Davis' chain-of-command (but not file a complaint against Deputy Davis) and asked if he would "talk to his friend [Deputy Davis]--I don't want to make waves over this-I don't want to make a big to do-if you could talk to him--just have him knock it off." At the final hearing, Deputy Davis denied her third allegation that he would repeatedly come behind her and say--"Ewwww, counselor," and "Counselor, I want to see you." It is significant that after months and three separate allegations of sexual harassment by Deputy Davis, Ms. Atwater chose not to follow protocol and make a sexual harassment complaint against Deputy Davis to Lieutenant George, who would have been obligated to initiate a formal investigation. She chose instead to ask a favor from one who had continuously called her the sexually harassing name of Ms. Ashwood. The evidence is irreconcilably in conflict as to whether Deputy Davis continually made the alleged sexual and harassing comments to Ms. Atwater during an unspecified number of months. The Sheriff presented no witness to corroborate Ms. Atwater's allegations on this issue. Lieutenant George was not called to testify, leaving Ms. Atwater's hearsay testimony regarding this particular issue without corroboration. For the third time, Ms. Atwater chose to not follow protocol and report her third sexual harassment incident. The fact finder acknowledges that her third decided refusal to report sexual harassment by the same co-worker is not a defense, if he were guilty of such conduct, and does not absolve Deputy Davis from liability. Her choosing a third time not to report the alleged sexual harassment by Deputy Davis to her immediate supervisor does present a significant obstacle in the evaluation of Ms. Atwater's credibility. Having carefully weighed and evaluated all the relevant, persuasive, and credible evidence, the undersigned is unable to find that Ms. Atwater's testimony is superior in weight and quantity that Deputy Davis for months engaged in the conduct of which Ms. Atwater has accused him. This determination reflects the fact finder's judgment concerning the weight of the evidence and nothing more; it is not a finding regarding what occurred or did not occur during unspecified months when Deputy Davis may have been in the presence of Ms. Atwater. Allegations that Deputy Davis intentionally delayed or caused delay of inmates desiring conference with Ms. Atwater. Regarding her final allegation of sexual harassment by retaliation against Deputy Davis, Ms. Atwater recalled that on one occasion, Deputy Davis intentionally caused a "two-hour" delay in getting inmates on her list from their cells to the conference area where she awaited them. The purported intent of this alleged two-hour delay was to threaten or to produce a negative consequence regarding Ms. Atwater's performance of her duties. I find that Ms. Atwater's August 9, 2002, memo to her supervisor, Deputy Armsheimer, purporting to be a chronology of events that occurred on August 8, 2002, conclusively demonstrates that Deputy Davis was not the cause, directly or indirectly, for Ms. Atwater's two-hour delay in getting the two inmates she had requested. The evidence demonstrates that Ms. Atwater gave her form "62" list (inmates to be pulled who had requested a conference with her) to the control deputy, Deputy Salazar, in barrack C and waited 40 minutes. Returning to the holding area and inquiring as to the whereabouts of her inmates, Deputy Davis and not Deputy Salazar informed Ms. Atwater that the top three inmates on her list were not there. Ms. Atwater asked Deputy Davis of the inmates' whereabouts, but he gave her no further explanation. Ms. Atwater thereafter called Deputy Hartfield, who is in her chain-of-command, to ask if he would look into the matter and Deputy Hartfield promised to get back to her. Ms. Atwater waited for Deputy Hartfield's return call. After waiting an unspecified period of time and not receiving Deputy Hartfield's returned message, she called Deputy Hartfield a second time and was told that he had relayed his message to control (Deputy Salazar) about one and one-half hours ago. In that message, Deputy Hartfield explained that her first requested inmate (no name given) had been moved to maximum security and her second inmate (Brandon) was written up earlier that morning by him. In her August 9, 2002, memo to Deputy Armsheimer, Ms. Atwater wrote, "the conversation concluded with me stating [to Deputy Hartfield] if I had known 1 1/2 hours ago, I would have just left out of here and could have eaten lunch." It is significant that Ms. Atwater authored her August 9, 2002, memorandum to Deputy Armsheimer, for the singular purpose of explaining the exact cause (and persons involved) of her two-hour plus wait for inmates who were not pulled for her. At the final hearing in May 2003, she contradicts her August 9, 2002, written statements by testifying that Deputy Davis caused her a "two-hour" delay in pulling her inmates. This obvious contradiction is a severe detriment upon her credibility. Ms. Atwater's memorandum to Sergeant Groff, dated October 30, 2002, was written to give a recount of her experiences with Deputy Davis during all times pertinent to this case. She began her memorandum with the statement: "[S]o for the whole story to be clear, I must tell you how we ended up here and start from the beginning." In her first sentence of the second paragraph appears the first conflict in the evidence of record. In that sentence, Ms. Atwater writes, "Shortly after starting to work here, I began to experience unpleasantness from Cpl. Kenneth Davis. His obnoxious gestures, comments and disposition could not be tolerated any longer." (This conclusion consisted of the three separate allegations against Deputy Davis made herein above.) With this opportunity to formally complain of sexual harassment in the work place, Ms. Atwater failed to include the fact that it was she who initially asked Deputy Davis why Lieutenant George called her the sexually offensive name of "Ms. Ashwood." Intentionally choosing to allege that Deputy Davis' answer to her question why Lieutenant George kept calling her "Ms. Ashwood" was the initial sexual harassment that created a hostile work place is contradictory to her testimony. Continuing, Ms. Atwater wrote--"I did tell him that I felt he 'played too much,' and need[ed] to stop moaning and groaning behind me." Even though she recounted moaning and groaning, she specifically omitted her alleged verbatim statements made by Deputy Davis (Finding of Fact 12 hereinabove) when he answered her question "why Lieutenant George calls me Ms. Ashwood." This is significant in that Ms. Atwater's testimony was that Deputy Davis' alleged verbatim statements when he answered her question were so "sexually harassing" that she was "immediately" offended the moment she heard them. Yet, she omits any mention that it was Lieutenant George continuously calling her "Ms. Ashwood" that initially and repeatedly offended her. The name Ashwood she considered had such a negative sexual reputation in the community that she was immediately offended and sexually harassed when Lieutenant George first called her Ms. Ashwood and each time thereafter. She omits any mention that it was her inquiry of Deputy Davis, "why Lieutenant George [sexually harassing her] was calling her the offensive name of Ms. Ashwood" that produced the alleged response. Based upon Ms. Atwater's acknowledgement contained in her October 30, 2002, memorandum to Sergeant Groff, I find that her allegations that Deputy Davis caused a delayed wait of two hours to get inmates pulled and, thus, "creat[ed] a hostile work environment" to be contrary to her August 9, 2002, memorandum to Sergeant Armsheimer, admitting that had she known her inmates were not in barrack C, she would have left and had lunch "one and one-half" hours prior. Ms. Atwater further admits in writing that from May of 2002 forward, she and Deputy Davis "barely" spoke to one another. If Ms. Atwater's memory is presumed to be accurate and she and Deputy Davis discontinued speaking to one another during the March through May 2002 period, it was not logical to conclude that Deputy Davis repeatedly and continually moaned and groaned in her ear for "months" thereafter (i.e. June, July, August, and October). For the fourth time, Ms. Atwater chose not to and did not report this fourth incident to her immediate supervisor at or near the time it occurred. Her sexual harassment complaint against Deputy Davis was filed after her October 2002 complaint was filed against Lieutenant George. Her fourth decided refusal to immediately report sexual harassment by the same co-worker is not a defense, if he were guilty of such conduct, and does not absolve Deputy Davis from liability. Her choosing a fourth time not to report the initial alleged sexual harassment by Deputy Davis during the March through May period, when coupled with the contradiction between her testimony that Deputy Davis was the cause of a two-hour delay in pulling her inmates, and her memorandum wherein she acknowledges that her inmates had been written up by Sergeant Hartfield, presents a credibility obstacle. Ms. Atwater makes no further mention of Deputy Davis in her October 30, 2002, memoranda, devoting the remainder to Lieutenant George. She recounts in detail their initial friendly relationship, turning to a cold and unfriendly relationship, the keeping-your-distance treatment, their many phone conversations at work, their lunch dates away from the work place, and their private phone calls when at home, ending on October 24, 2002, with an incident of kissing and Lieutenant George rubbing his groin against her buttocks and her resisting his advances. (See Joint Exhibit J-1.) In her final paragraph, Ms. Atwater relates how, unbeknownst to Lieutenant George, she arranged for a three-way call between herself, Lieutenant George, and her uncle, a City of St. Petersburg employee. She arranged the three-way call for the purpose of securing a witness to corroborate her statements regarding the Lieutenant George sexual harassment encounter. Though her alleged initial sexual harassment was initiated by Deputy Davis and continued for months, Ms. Atwater made no similar attempt to corroborate her claims of sexual harassment against Deputy Davis. Knowing that Deputy Davis was not within her chain-of-command and not in a supervisory position over her, there was no logical reason for Ms. Atwater to fear promotions and job security. Ms. Atwater knew that filing a complaint against a lieutenant within her chain-of- command presented a greater risk than filing a complaint against Deputy Davis who was not in her chain-of-command. Her choosing not to record (or procure corroboration) the Deputy Davis incidents, when coupled with her delay of many months in reporting her compliant through proper channels because of fear of reprisal, rings hollow. It was after the Administrative Review Board had begun an investigation of Ms. Atwater's October 2002 complaint of sexual harassment against Lieutenant George that the Sheriff initiated an investigation of Deputy Davis. Only after her egregious October 24, 2002, incident involving Lieutenant George did she file a subsequent and separate sexual harassment compliant against Deputy Davis. In the absence of corroboration, Ms. Atwater's testimony of a single incident of intentional touching and her testimony of alleged verbatim statements made by Deputy Davis and his unequivocal denial presents a "she said-he said" dilemma. Neither party's testimony is inherently more credible than the other party's testimony. Contrary to the opinion of Major Brunner, who sat on the Administrative Review Board, that when the Administrative Review Board questioned Deputy Davis regarding those allegations, Deputy Davis was "in denial." This assumption and by implication presumed guilt, thereby lending credibility to Ms. Atwater's allegations, is a conclusion not based on fact and is contrary to the evidence adduced during the de novo proceeding. Ms. Atwater's testimony of incidents having occurred over a four-month or more period and the lack of time or specific dates coupled with the contradictions between her testimony during the final hearing and her August 9, 2002, memorandum to her supervisor, creates an unfathomable chasm in the evaluation of her credibility. The Inspection Bureau of the Administrative Inspection Division investigated Ms. Atwater's complaint and submitted their investigative results to the Administrative Review Board, made up of various employees with the Pinellas County Sheriff's Office. The Administrative Review Board determined that Petitioner, Deputy Davis, had violated the Pinellas County Sheriff's Office Civil Service Act, Laws of Florida, 89-404, as amended by Laws of Florida, 90-395, Section 6, Subsection 4: violation of provisions of the law or rules, regulations, and operating procedures of the Pinellas County Sheriff's Office. The Administrative Review Board determined that Deputy Davis' conduct was a violation of the rules and regulations of the Pinellas County Sheriff's Office, Rules 3-1.1 (level five violation) and 5.16, relating to sexual harassment and discrimination as defined in the Sheriff's General Order 3-4. The Administrative Review Board determined that Deputy Davis' available range of discipline was calculated in conformance with the matrix contained within General Order 10-2 of the Pinellas County Sheriff's Office that allocates a point scale to various violations. The matrix provides that a level five offense, which includes sexual harassment, results in a 50- point assessment. Deputy Davis scored a total of 50 cumulative points with a discipline range of five-day suspension up to and including termination. Demotion is also authorized under the applicable General Order. After considering the evidence and available sanctions, the Sheriff notified Deputy Davis on March 10, 2003, that he was imposing a ten-day suspension without pay and demoting him from the rank of corporal to the rank of detention deputy. After weighing all the evidence, including the Sheriff's evidentiary presentation of Ms. Atwater's testimony of verbal comments made and intentional body conduct allegedly engaged in by Deputy Davis, this fact finder finds the uncorroborated hearsay evidence insufficient to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, the allegations that Deputy Davis made sexually harassing verbal comments to Ms. Atwater, and that he made intentional sexually harassing body contact with her, so as to create a hostile work environment.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Civil Service Board of the Pinellas County Sheriff's Office enter a final order finding that: Petitioner did not commit the verbal and physical conduct alleged in the charging document and that there was no violation of the rules, regulations, and policies of the Pinellas County Sheriff's Office as alleged. Petitioner's ten-day suspension from his employment as a detention corporal with the Pinellas County Sheriff's Office was therefore inappropriate. Petitioner's demotion from his previous rank of detention corporal to the rank of detention deputy was therefore inappropriate. Petitioner's ten-day suspension from his employment as a detention corporal with the Pinellas County Sheriff's Office be restored with full detention corporal's pay and benefits. Petitioner be restored to the rank of detention corporal2 and given full duties and responsibilities as previously held. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of August, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S FRED L. BUCKINE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of August, 2003.
The Issue Should Petitioner impose discipline on Respondent in association with her correctional certificate and law enforcement certificate?
Findings Of Fact In consideration of the election of rights form, in which Respondent limited dispute of allegations of facts in the Administrative Complaint to those accusations of "fraternization" between Respondent and a female inmate Donna Rodriguez (Rodriguez), it is assumed that Respondent agrees that she holds a correctional certificate and a law enforcement certificate issued by Petitioner. Further support for the finding in relation to the correctional certificate, is based upon the fact that Respondent served as a correctional officer in the John E. Pope Correctional Facility, Seminole County, Florida, as contemplated by the Administrative Complaint. During the period in question Rodriguez was an inmate in the Seminole County Correctional Facility. Rodriguez was an inmate participating in the RRAP Program related to drug rehabilitation. Rodriguez entered that program in May 2002, and was a participant at all times relevant to the Administrative Complaint. Respondent was responsible for Rodriguez as a correctional officer at the facility. While serving as a correctional officer Respondent engaged in inappropriate conduct with Rodriguez, conduct outside Respondent's professional duties. Respondent brought V05 shampoo and conditioner into the facility where Rodriguez was incarcerated. Respondent transferred the substances from their original containers into unlabeled bottles which were the property of Rodriguez. Respondent then took the V05 bottles from the cell where the transfer was made. Respondent in her testimony at hearing acknowledged that this provision of hair care products to Rodriguez was unauthorized. In a statement provided to Investigator Teresa Maiorana of the Seminole County Sheriff's Office, Respondent acknowledged that the provision of the V05 products constituted the introduction of contraband into the Seminole County Correctional Facility. In a telephone conversation between Respondent and Rodriguez, Respondent had asked Rodriguez what kind of hair conditioner Rodriguez liked. The answer was V05. This led to the provision of the shampoo and conditioner. The telephone call was among many telephone calls made from Rodriguez to Respondent while Respondent was at home. While Rodriguez was incarcerated she placed numerous telephone calls to Respondent at her home, totaling approximately 7 to 8 hours in duration. Respondent was charged for the calls made to her home. To make matters worse, in a telephone conversation with Rodriguez, Respondent agreed with the inmate to deny that the telephone calls had taken place. Respondent had provided her home telephone number to Rodriguez to facilitate the calls. The telephone calls between Rodriguez and Respondent were part of an on-going relationship that had a romantic overture. The nature of romantic overture was described by Respondent in a statement given on December 6, 2002, to Investigator Teresa Maiorana as "an emotional attachment." That relationship lasted approximately two months. The relationship between Respondent and Rodriguez involved physical contact. Five to ten times while Rodriguez was incarcerated there were hugs and kisses, some on the lips. While out of the facility on the way to church or returning from church there was a hug and a kiss on the cheek. Respondent recognizes this conduct as inappropriate given her position as a correctional officer. Respondent gave Rodriguez a "mood ring." Without a request from Rodriguez, Respondent obtained socks and t-shirts from other inmates in the correctional facility and provided them to Rodriguez. Respondent also provided Rodriguez M&Ms candy that Respondent had paid for from a vending machine in the correctional facility commissary. Respondent and Rodriguez prepared and passed written correspondence between themselves in the correctional facility. Examples of the correspondence which Respondent gave to Rodriguez in the facility are found within Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 5 admitted into evidence. Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 7 admitted into evidence is constituted of correspondence prepared by Rodriguez to give Respondent that was not delivered. Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 5 in its terms expresses a level of affection directed from Respondent to Rodriguez. Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 7, although undelivered, constitutes expression of affection from Rodriguez to Respondent. Respondent acknowledges receiving 30 or more letters from Rodriguez. The letters Respondent gave to Rodriguez were written while Respondent was at work in the correctional facility or were purchased outside the facility and brought in and given to Rodriguez. The correspondence provided from Respondent to Rodriguez in the correctional facility was not through authorized official channels.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the facts found and Conclusions of Law reached, it is RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be entered which revokes both Respondent's certificate as a correctional officer and as a law enforcement officer. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of November, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CHARLES C. ADAMS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of November, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: Linton B. Eason, Esquire Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Gwendolyn Byrd 1758 Vanallen Circle Deltona, Florida 32738 Rod Caswell, Program Director Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Michael Ramage, General Counsel Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
The Issue Whether Respondent, a certified law enforcement officer, failed to maintain good moral character as alleged in the Amended Administrative Complaint.
Findings Of Fact Respondent was certified by the Petitioner on April 2, 1982, and was issued Law Enforcement and Instructor Certificate Number 124699. Respondent was employed by the Miami Dade Police Department from April 2, 1982, until his employment was terminated as a result of the incident at issue in this proceeding. Respondent had a good record while working for the Miami Dade Police Department. He earned several commendations and received performance evaluations of satisfactory or above. Respondent is the biological father of Shannon Delano, a female born March 10, 1973. Shannon's parents divorced when she was four, and her mother was awarded primary custody of Shannon and of Shannon's twin sister. In 1981, Respondent moved to Florida. As a consequence of the divorce and of Respondent's move to Florida, Shannon seldom saw her father while she was growing up. Shannon maintained periodic telephone contact with him over the years and visited him in Florida in 1992, while she was on Spring break. They had a pleasant visit on that occasion. After he moved to Florida, Respondent married for the second time to a woman named Patrice. Respondent and Patrice had a son named Sean. Shannon joined the United States Air Force on October 15, 1992. Her permanent assignment was as a member of the military police at Langley Air Force Base in Virginia. In 1993, she was temporarily assigned to duty in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) as a support person for Desert Storm. While in the UAE, Shannon talked to Respondent occasionally by telephone. While she was in the UAE, Shannon and Respondent agreed that she would visit Respondent and Sean when she returned to the United States from the UAE. Respondent and Patrice had divorced by that time and Respondent was living alone in a two-bedroom apartment in Broward County, Florida. Their visit began on January 8, 1994. Respondent paid for Shannon's roundtrip airline ticket from Virginia to Florida. The visit was uneventful until the evening of January 12, 1994. Respondent worked his usual hours on January 12, 1994, and thereafter returned to the two-bedroom apartment at approximately 6:00 p.m. Respondent and Shannon had made plans to go out to eat dinner and then go to a comedy club that night. Respondent and Shannon were alone in the apartment. Respondent and Shannon engaged in a conversation in the living room area of the apartment. Because Shannon thought Respondent was despondent about his child custody fight over his son and his relationship with Shannon's twin sister, she hugged him and began to rub his back. There is a conflict in the evidence as to what happened next. The record establishes clearly and convincingly that Respondent thereafter preformed oral sex on Shannon, that he placed his mouth and tongue in her vaginal area, that he penetrated her vagina with his finger, and that he penetrated her anus with his finger. The conflict is whether Shannon was a willing participant in this sexual encounter. According to her testimony, Respondent forced her to the floor using a police take-down technique; he forcibly removed her clothing, and he held her down with his body and with one arm while he performed the sexual acts on her. She testified that she asked him to stop, but that she was too stunned to physically fight him. Respondent testified that Shannon was a willing participant and that the sexual encounter was consensual. Shannon and her father went to the comedy club that night, she subsequently rode with him on patrol where she met several of his colleagues, and she stayed with him at his apartment until her scheduled return flight to Virginia. Shannon returned to active duty in Langley, Virginia, as scheduled without reporting the incident. Approximately two weeks after the incident, she reported the incident to her superiors. She thereafter contacted the Broward County Sheriff's office, who assigned Detective Deborah Cox to conduct an investigation. As part of her investigation, Detective Cox had Shannon engage in a telephone conversation with Respondent that Detective Cox monitored and taped. Detective Cox also had Patrice engage in a telephone conversation with Respondent that Detective Cox monitored and taped. In his telephone conversation with Patrice, Respondent categorically denied that he touched Shannon and lamented that he was being falsely accused. Although there are statements made by Respondent contained in his telephone conversation with Shannon that substantiate his position that the sexual encounter was consensual,2 the following excerpts establish that Respondent did what he thought Shannon wanted him to do, not what she consented for him to do: Shannon: I guess I just need to understand why you felt the need to touch me that way. Respondent: I find, to be perfectly honest, I thought you had the need for it, believe me it's nothing I wanted, it's nothing I ever thought about, it's not something I consider to be normal thing between a father and a daughter. Shannon: I mean if I had the need to have that touch, why did it have to come from you, I mean - Respondent: It's something I thought you asked for, or it's something you wanted, believe me it's not something I want to do, it's not something I thought about, something that I looked forward to or thought about afterwards as being something good. Do you think you've had sleepless night over it, I had from that day forward. It's bothered me, it's upset me, it's bothered me a lot since then. I never would have believed that I could have done that , all I've ever tried to be is what you needed at the time. Obviously what you needed or what I thought you needed wasn't what you think you need now. Whether it was or it wasn't then, I really can't tell you. I, from what you said, from what you did, from the way you acted, felt, truly believed that's what you wanted and what you felt you needed. . . . The conflict in the testimony is resolved by finding that while she did not physically resist the sexual encounter, she did not implicitly or explicitly consent to the sexual encounter. Detective Cox turned over the results of her investigation to the State Attorney's office, who prosecuted Respondent on felony charges of sexual battery and on misdemeanor charges of committing Unnatural or Lascivious Acts. Based on the sexual encounter of January 12, 1994, Respondent was convicted of five misdemeanor counts of committing Unnatural or Lascivious Acts. He was acquitted of the felony sexual battery charges.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a final order that adopts the findings of fact and conclusions of law contained herein; finds Respondent guilty of failing to maintain good moral character; and revokes his certification as a Law Enforcement Officer and Instructor (Certificate Number 124699). DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of May, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of May, 1999
The Issue Whether Respondent Employer has committed an unlawful employment practice against Petitioner by discrimination against her on the basis of race, sex, handicap, or retaliation, in violation of Chapter 760, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a Negro female. As of March 12, 2003, she was rated by the Veterans’ Administration (VA) as having a 30 percent disability, due to a knee injury which occurred while she was on active military duty. (Petitioner’s unrefuted testimony and Exhibit P-37.) Petitioner specifically has alleged “sexual harassment,” “hostile work environment,” racial discrimination, retaliation, disparate treatment, and that she was denied a reasonable accommodation for her alleged knee “handicap.” Her “disparate treatment” allegation was presented in two respects: (1) that employees outside Petitioner’s protected racial class were not disciplined as harshly as Petitioner; and (2) that because Petitioner had worked for Respondent Employer for more than twelve months’ total, the State of Florida career service rules do not support her being terminated as a “probationary employee” from the position to which she was promoted and in which she had worked for less than twelve months at the time of her termination. Petitioner was first employed by Respondent Employer on November 15, 2002, at St. Lucie Regional Juvenile Detention Center in the position of Juvenile Detention Officer (JDO). After completing her twelve months’ probation in that position, Petitioner attained permanent State of Florida career service status. This meant that Petitioner was considered a permanent State of Florida employee, but it did not mean, as she has asserted, that she did not have to undergo a twelve months’ probationary period in each career service promotional position, if and when she attained one, or that she could never be terminated for cause. (See Conclusions of Law.) On September 10, 2003, at Petitioner's request, she was transferred from St. Lucie Regional Juvenile Detention Center to a vacant JDO position at Alachua Regional Juvenile Detention Center (ARJDC or “the facility”). This transfer permitted her to pursue a higher education at Santa Fe Community College (SFCC) in Gainesville, via her VA benefits, while being employed fulltime. When she transferred, Petitioner prepared a memo to all her supervisors at ARJDC stating that she needed to work the 11:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m. shift so she could attend college classes in the mornings. However, at no time did the Employer guarantee that Petitioner would always be assigned to that shift. (P-35) At all times material, Petitioner was a single parent, working full time, and taking college classes. As a single parent, she was the sole support of her child. Because she was going to college pursuant to VA guidelines, she had to attend her classes and successfully complete them in order to continue to receive VA tuition and assistance. At all times material, Jill Bessette (Caucasian female) was employed in the position of ARJDC’s superintendent. As such, she was responsible for the overall functioning and operations at ARJDC, and for ensuring the safety and security of that facility’s juveniles and staff. Bessette relied on the facility's two assistant superintendents, Patricia Newman (Caucasian female) and Charles Parkins (Caucasian male), to assist her. Newman and Parkins oversaw daily operations, attended to personnel matters, and provided direct supervision of staff. In so doing, they regularly made written and oral reports to Bessette. On February 13, 2004, as a result of good reports about Petitioner's performance as a JDO at the facility, Bessette promoted Petitioner to the position of Senior Juvenile Detention Officer (SJDO). (P-17). On or about February 23, 2004, Petitioner complained to her superiors about Douglas Singleton (male) evaluating her, because she felt he had not observed her often enough. She was also rated by a female officer, Cohen, and wanted Cohen’s rating retained. This may have been a departmental career service or a union grievance, but it appears to have had no discrimination overtones. (See Findings of Fact 31 and 34.) Assistant Superintendent Parkins, who was Petitioner’s direct line senior supervisor, denied Petitioner’s grievance about her rating as untimely, but Petitioner did not demonstrate any specific negative personnel action resulting directly from Singleton’s evaluation. There is no evidence that this rating reflected that Petitioner was ever tardy or had unexcused absences. (P- 24, 25). After her termination in September 2004, Petitioner wrote the Governor stating that she had complained to Parkins in March 2004, about his attempt to switch her to a shift which would have interfered with her college classes and that Parkins was hostile about her going to college (P-36), but at hearing she presented no credible evidence that such an attempt by Parkins had ever occurred or that she had ever complained to anyone about such an attempt prior to her termination. Additionally, Petitioner was consistently assigned to the 11:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m. shift she had requested until September 2004. (See Findings of Fact 31-35, 55, and 75, and Conclusion of Law 81.) In late February 2004, Petitioner complained because Newman, the assistant superintendent most concerned with timesheets, had inquired of a middle-level supervisor why Petitioner had been absent on a specific day. The testimony about this incident is so sparse, disjointed, and inconclusive that the undersigned cannot determine whether Petitioner also filed any type of grievance about Newman’s inquiry, but again, Petitioner’s complaint does not seem to have had anything to do with discrimination. (See Findings of Fact 31, 34.) In any case, Newman was apparently satisfied when informed by Cohen that Petitioner had been on pre-approved leave, and Petitioner did not suffer any detrimental personnel action specifically as a result of Newman’s inquiry. (Cf. Findings of Fact 74-75.) During the first week of April 2004, Petitioner tendered a letter of resignation to Bessette, which Bessette reluctantly accepted. Bessette testified that the only reasons Petitioner gave for this resignation were personal ones unrelated to discrimination. Petitioner did not testify otherwise. A short time later, Petitioner reconsidered her decision, and Bessette accepted Petitioner’s rescission of her resignation in such a way that Petitioner suffered no lapse in her career service. (R-5). From April 13, through July 25, 2004, Bessette took extended medical leave. During Bessette's absence, Assistant Superintendent Charles Parkins assumed the role of “Acting Superintendent.” At all times material, Shirley Edmond (Negro female) and Bruce Perry (Negro male) were employed by ARJDC as middle level supervisors. They supervised the JDOs and SJDOs assigned to their shift(s). At ARJDC, there are three shifts around the clock. SJDOs and JDOs at the facility are assigned to work shifts. In order to maintain an appropriate minimum correctional officer- to-juvenile detainee ratio, and in order to ensure the safety and security of staff, juveniles, and the community, SJDOs and JDOs are subject to having their shift assignment rotated or changed. Also in order to prevent the facility from operating below minimum staffing levels, JDOs and SJDOs may be required to “holdover” or continue working into the next shift when asked to do so as a result of on-coming staff members’ tardiness or absence. As a result of minimum staffing level requirements, ARJDC's operating procedures address the issue of tardiness and identify three instances of tardiness in any rolling 90-day period as “excessive.” (R-17). ARJDC’s operating procedures also address absenteeism. The required procedure for “calling in sick” requires employees seeking approved leave to contact the on-duty officer or acting supervisor at least two hours in advance of the employee’s report time, and further requires that thereafter, the employee also speak to the shift supervisor and discuss the employee's return-to-work date. Medical verification may be required by the Employer for absences in excess of three consecutive days. (R-17). Upon her hire, and again in June 2004, Petitioner was made aware of, and was provided with, a copy of the Employer’s policies and procedures with regard to absenteeism and tardiness. (R-3, 19). From May through June or early July 2004, Petitioner, Perry, and Edmond all worked the 11:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m. shift. During these months, both Perry and Edmond observed that Petitioner frequently arrived late for her shift, that is: more than one minute after 11:00 p.m., which is the grace period allowed by the facility’s policies and procedures. (R-17). On one occasion, Perry spoke to Petitioner about her tardiness. Petitioner attributed her tardiness to problems with her babysitter. At all times material, Petitioner was aware of the Employer’s policy against, and procedures for reporting, discrimination or sexual harassment. These procedures are given in numbered paragraphs, but are not referred to as “steps.” They permit Petitioner to involve the internal EEOC officer and the Employer’s hierarchy outside the facility. (R-4). On June 25, 2004, while he was her shift supervisor, Bruce Perry wrote Petitioner a counseling memo concerning her tardiness on June 1 and 25. She received the memo on July 13, 2004. (P-15). Shirley Edmond testified that July 22, 2004, Petitioner threatened her as set out in greater detail in Findings of Fact 68-72 infra, concerning Bruce Perry’s counseling memo. On or about July 16, 2004, Petitioner filed what was described as a “departmental grievance” against Perry’s counseling memo(s).2/ This grievance could have been brought pursuant to a union collective bargaining agreement or pursuant to Section 110.227(4), Florida Statutes. However, that statute provides a "two-step" grievance procedure only for career service employees who are no longer on probation in their current position, and it excludes consideration of both "discrimination" and "sexual harassment" issues, which are supposed to proceed through superiors and the EEOC officer. Due to her probationary status as SJDO, Petitioner would have been ineligible to pursue the statutory grievance. In any case, her grievance did not raise issues of sexual discrimination or sexual harassment (P-38), nor was it directed to an internal EEOC officer. On or about July 17, 2004, Petitioner sent an e-mail letter outside the facility to the Assistant Superintendent for Detention Services, Perry Turner. Respondent's discrimination and sexual harassment procedures permitted this. However, in the e-mail Petitioner complained in general terms that she was experiencing problems getting facility personnel, particularly Charles Parkins, to follow all the "steps," in appropriate sequence, of established grievance procedures. (P-39). Turner, who oversees all detention facilities and services statewide, and whose office is in Tallahassee, delegated responsibility for investigating Petitioner's complaint to Operations Manager Richard Bedson, who supervises all of the detention branches’ support services. Mr. Bedson had recommended Petitioner for her promotion to SJDO and for a raise in connection therewith, but they did not know each other. (P-17). He was not housed in her facility. He was entirely independent from ARJDC staff. On July 19, 2004, Perry rescinded his counseling memo to Petitioner (P-12), because it had been shown to Parkins that Perry was not on the same shift with Petitioner on June 25, 2004 (P-13), and/or that on June 25, 2004, or the other date cited in Perry’s memo (June 1, 2004), Petitioner had prior permission from a different supervisor to “back down” her hours so as to legitimately arrive late for her shift (P-39). Perry’s testimony herein confirmed that for one of the days cited in his counseling memo, he had relied on someone else’s observation of Petitioner’s tardiness, and that he, himself, had not seen that particular tardy arrival. In any case, a counseling memo is not considered a disciplinary memo, and Perry’s memo stated that fact. (P-15). A counseling memo does not begin the three-tier progressive discipline that could lead to termination of a permanent employee for cause, and Perry’s counseling memo was rescinded, anyway. Petitioner acknowledged that the offending memo was rescinded after she complained about it. Despite the happy outcome for Petitioner of her grievance about Perry’s counseling memo, Petitioner claimed at hearing that everything that happened to her after February 2004, was the result of Parkins’ retaliation against her for filing the first evaluation grievance which Parkins had ruled was untimely (see P-12, 14, and Finding of Fact 10) and/or because Parkins and Perry were retaliating against her for grieving Perry’s alleged sexual harassment of her. At hearing, Petitioner testified that from late May 2004 to June or July 2004, Bruce Perry made suggestive remarks to her about her lips and buttocks; made comments designed to make others infer that Petitioner and Perry were sexually involved; put his hands on her shoulders; and rubbed his privates in her presence. She claimed that she rejected Perry and reported these unsavory and harassing activities to superiors Parkins (male), Singleton (male), Smith (female), and Cohen (female), and that thereafter, Perry created a hostile and retaliatory workplace for her. She also related that Freda Smith, a middle level supervisor, had promised to report Petitioner’s complaint of sexual harassment by Perry to Parkins. None of the foregoing supervisors Petitioner named corroborated that Petitioner had reported any sexual incident with Perry to them. Of the supervisors Petitioner named, only Parkins actually testified, and he denied that either Petitioner or Freda Smith, on Petitioner’s behalf, had made any such report to him. (R-20). Bruce Perry denied in writing, when the issue was first raised after Petitioner’s termination, and in his testimony herein that he had committed any of the acts of which Petitioner accused him. (R-7). Interestingly enough, although Parkins and Perry both denied any knowledge of Petitioner reporting Perry to Parkins, Petitioner personally testified that when she had reported Perry to Parkins, Parkins removed her from the area physically near Perry and later removed Perry from her shift altogether, so as to separate them. Perry confirmed that he only worked with Petitioner "a couple months" until he was removed from her 11:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m. shift. When, precisely, Perry was removed from that shift is not clear on this record. Petitioner testified that she needed larger pants for her correctional officer’s uniform, to accommodate the knee brace she sometimes needed to wear for her prior military injury, and that Perry had remarked that her pants were all right, in connection with his comments about her buttocks. Perry denied making any suggestive remarks. No other witness noticed a problem with Petitioner’s uniform pants or that Petitioner was in any manner unable to do her job, due to her knee or for any other reason, until she had a shoulder injury on August 4, 2004, as described infra. However, Petitioner testified that Parkins told her to get a doctor’s note stating that she needed the knee brace. Petitioner had admitted in evidence such a note from her doctor dated July 21, 2004, on which she had printed a note to Parkins requesting larger uniform pants and stating she had spoken to Parkins about the larger pants a month before July 21, 2004. This note said nothing about Perry or his alleged sexual comments. (P-11). Petitioner's testimony is not entirely clear as to whether she believed that Parkins refused her request for larger uniform pants, or just ignored it, but since she admitted that she slipped the note under Parkins’ office door when she was told by another supervisor that Parkins would not be in, her delivery system may have failed to get her doctor’s note to Parkins. Parkins testified that he recalled no requests, either oral or written, for bigger uniform pants, but if he had received such a request he would merely have passed it on to the person who was in charge of ordering/issuing property on a regular basis. It is probable the property officer only worked a standard day shift, while Petitioner worked the 11:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m. shift. On July 25, 2004, Bessette returned and resumed her duties as superintendent of ARJDC. Bessette testified that she knew nothing of any sexual harassment allegations until after Petitioner was terminated in September 2004, and the evidence as a whole shows that Petitioner first approached internal and external EEOC officers about sexual harassment only after she was terminated. (R-7, P-26,36) Moreover, in late July, Petitioner had every opportunity to speak to the Employer’s non-facility personnel to resolve any alleged “sexual harassment,” “hostile work environment,” racial discrimination, retaliation, disparate treatment, or problems concerning being denied a reasonable accommodation for her alleged knee “handicap,” but she did not do so. In late July, Operations Manager Richard Bedson telephoned Petitioner at the facility and asked if he could speak to her about the concerns she had expressed in her letter to Assistant Superintendent for Detention Services, Perry Turner. (See Finding of Fact 26.) Petitioner refused to speak to Bedson over the phone about her e-mail to Turner or her concerns, stating she did not know who Bedson was and she was not going to speak to him unless someone else on the phone vouched for him. Bedson then arranged to meet with Petitioner, personally. (P-39). Discrimination investigations, particularly those involving sexual matters, are best begun by a discreet meeting between the investigator and the complainant alone, but Petitioner had not told Mr. Bedson what her problems were, and her memos had referred to “step” grievance procedures which are a union device. The use of the word "step" could also have referenced the Section 110.227(4) procedure which, by its nature, could not deal with "discrimination" or "sexual harassment." (See Finding of Fact 25.) Petitioner also had declined, via e-mail, to come to Bedson's office in another city unless she received per diem travel pay, and had stated that she preferred to meet at ARJDC. (P-39). Therefore, Bedson held a meeting on July 30, 2004, with Petitioner, Bessett, Parkins, and Petitioner's union representative, Mr. Reeves, who is a teacher from outside the facility. Bedson chaired the meeting and asked Petitioner to relate her concerns regarding her treatment at ARJDC. At no time during the July 30, 2004, meeting did Petitioner indicate she was being, or had been, sexually harassed; that she or anyone else was the subject of any type of disparate or preferential treatment; or that she had a knee injury that was not being accommodated. She did not state that she was entitled to preferential treatment by virtue of being a veteran. She did orally accuse Parkins of practicing undefined retaliation against her. However, she refused to discuss anything more and stated she would put her concerns in writing. Bedson informed Petitioner that he would request that an investigator meet with her as quickly as possible so that an investigation could occur. He then concluded the meeting. After this meeting, Bedson telephoned Operations Management Consultant II James Darbin Graham, who is assigned to Respondent Department’s North Region Office. He directed Graham to meet with ARJDC staff and Petitioner to determine what Petitioner’s concerns were and to conduct an investigation as necessary. Bedson recounted to Graham his earlier meeting with Petitioner, her prior e-mail, her general allegation of "retaliation" by Parkins, and her refusal to provide any further explanation. On August 4, 2004, while working the 11:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m. shift, Petitioner injured her shoulder opening a door. She left the facility for the hospital. After treatment at the hospital, she returned to the facility at approximately 5:00 a.m. with hospital paperwork for facility administrators so that she could obtain workers' compensation benefits, including medical care, disability pay, and leave. On this same morning, Graham arrived, unannounced, at the facility at approximately 6:00 a.m. to meet with Petitioner. He was advised that she had left for the hospital, but then he spotted her in the ARJDC lobby. Petitioner was wearing a hospital gown, and her arm was in a sling. Graham introduced himself to Petitioner and advised that he needed to speak to her. Petitioner refused to speak to him, stating she was on medication and that he would have to make an appointment so that she could have her union representative at the meeting when she was not feeling the effects of the medication. In order to be able to arrange such a meeting, Graham advised Parkins that he needed to speak with Petitioner upon her return to work from medical leave. From August 4, 2004 onward, Parkins did not arrange such a meeting or notify Graham when such a meeting could occur. Graham concluded this was because of Petitioner’s extended absence and subsequent termination, effective September 8, 2004. As a result of her on-the-job shoulder injury, Petitioner was immediately placed on workers’ compensation leave. The parties agree that Petitioner was entitled to all workers’ compensation benefits, including medical care, leave, and pay, from August 4, through August 10, 2004. It is the two periods of August 10, to August 19, 2004, and August 20, to September 8, 2004, that drive this case. Assistant Superintendent Newman maintains and processes paperwork related to workers' compensation for the facility. On August 10, 2004, Petitioner’s medical physician released Petitioner to return to work with the following restrictions and medications: Employee is to avoid all use of affected arm. . . . Avoid lifting, reaching, grasping with right arm only. Physical therapy ordered. Stop percocet and discontinue sling. The following medication(s) has (have) been prescribed: Naproxen . . . Effects include . . . dizziness Metaxalone . . . May cause drowsiness Cyclobenzaprine . . . common side effects include drowsiness, decreased judgment, . . . blurred vision . . . caution should be exercised when driving or operating dangerous equipment Tramadol . . . May cause sedation . . . Use caution when driving or operating dangerous machinery. (Emphasis supplied) (R-2). Petitioner received a copy of the foregoing document, as quoted supra. It is probable that the Employer’s independent workers’ compensation contract carrier, “Covel”, also received a copy, but there is no evidence this detailed document was presented to anyone at ARJDC. However, ARJDC was made aware of its medical restrictions on use of Petitioner’s arm. “Master Control” is the only light duty available at ARJDC. It has always been used for situations such as Petitioner’s, and is the only “accommodation” Respondent has available. Master Control is a desk assignment away from juvenile detainees, which requires only monitoring cameras, answering telephones, and pushing buttons, but which has no potential for strenuous restraint of, or harm from, detainees. Petitioner was advised on August 10, 2004, that the facility could accommodate her doctor's restrictions of modified duty by assigning her to Master Control. However, Petitioner did not report to work for nine more days, or until August 19, 2004.3/ Petitioner also did not obtain authorization for her absence August 10-19, 2004, using the methods required by the Employer’s policies and procedures. (See Findings of Fact 16- 18.) Instead, Petitioner reached Parkins by telephone on August 10, 2005, and told him that her medications were making her too drowsy and dizzy to drive. Parkins took what Petitioner told him at face value. He was concerned about Petitioner’s safety and the Employer’s liability. He told her not to come to work until she could drive or could see her doctor. Petitioner followed up on their conversation by faxing Parkins, that same day, a written explanation that she was on four medications and that three out of the four medications, which she did not name, were causing her symptoms. (P-34). Petitioner’s next doctor’s appointment was not until August 19, 2004, so she did not report to work until after that appointment. Although her physical restrictions diminished over time, from August 4, 2004, until October 20, 2004, Petitioner’s workers’ compensation physician continued to prescribe one or more medications for Petitioner which could have rendered her dizzy or drowsy. (P-10, 32). However, there is no evidence this information was sent to ARJDC, even though it probably was sent to the independent workers’ compensation contract carrier, Covel. Petitioner did not work the full 11:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m. shift in Master Control on August 20, 2004. Upon her placement in Master Control early, at about 10:30 p.m., on August 19, Petitioner immediately complained of pain in her shoulder and drowsiness from her medications. After she was observed with her head on the table, she was sent home by her supervisor. She had been present on the jobsite about an hour. Petitioner called in on August 21, 2004, at midnight (an hour after she was due to report for her shift), to say she had just awakened, was in a lot of pain, and would not be reporting to work. Petitioner did not follow proper procedures in reporting this absence. (See Findings of Fact 16-18.) Petitioner's regular days off work fell on August 22, and 23, 2004. On August 24, 2004, Petitioner still did not report to work and did not call the facility, as required by Respondent’s policies and procedures. On August 24, 2004, Assistant Superintendent Newman received a call from Julie Bumgardner of Covel, who wanted to be sure that the facility was accommodating Petitioner’s workers’ compensation shoulder injury with an appropriately restricted work assignment. When Newman indicated that Petitioner continued to be absent due to drowsiness associated with her medication, Bumgardner advised Newman that the medications Petitioner was currently prescribed for her workers' compensation injury did not contain narcotics to make her drowsy and Petitioner should have returned to work on August 10, 2004, with the accommodation for her arm as previously stated. Bumgardner faxed Newman either an incomplete copy of the August 10, 2004, physician's order, which did not mention the four drugs which could have been making Petitioner dizzy or drowsy between August 10-19, 2004, but which did say to discontinue percoset, and/or a separate document showing that the narcotic percocet had been discontinued by the physician on August 10, 2004, and which listed the other four drugs, but not their side effects. (R-8). As a result of this incomplete and therefore misleading information, Newman and Bumgardner concurred that any of Petitioner’s absences after August 10, 2004, should be charged against Petitioner’s accrued sick and annual leave and should not be categorized as workers’ compensation leave. Petitioner was credited with working eight hours on August 25 and eight hours on August 26, 2004. On August 26, 2004, Newman wrote a memo to Petitioner advising her that effective Friday, September 10, 2004, Petitioner was being temporarily reassigned to the 7:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m. shift in Master Control. The memo explained to Petitioner that Newman's purpose in this reassignment was to further accommodate Petitioner by assigning her to Master Control during the day shift when another employee, also assigned to this same station, could assist Petitioner if Petitioner needed assistance. By writing the memo on August 26, and not making the assignment change effective until September 10, Newman intended to give the customary two weeks’ notice so that Petitioner could arrange her personal life to fit the change of shift. When she wrote this memo, Newman should have, but did not, realize that Petitioner was taking morning classes. When she received this memo on August 26, 2004, Petitioner believed that she was entitled to never be reassigned to a shift that did not accommodate her college classes. She refused to sign, acknowledging receipt of the memo. Petitioner wrote the following on the bottom of Newman’s memo: I am confused about this letter because of the last letter I received from D.S. Bessette. I cannot sign this at this time. You must have me confused with SJDO L. Green. She’s the one with the shift ch[ange].(R-10) In her routine review of employee timesheets, Newman had noted that Petitioner had not signed her timesheet covering August 13, 2004, through August 26, 2004, and that Petitioner had claimed “leave without pay: code 60”, signifying that she expected to receive workers’ compensation disability pay and not be docked any sick or annual leave for that period of time. On August 27, 2004, Newman issued a memo to Petitioner's immediate supervisor, Wilcox, requesting that Wilcox address with Petitioner the incorrect coding Petitioner had written into her timesheet covering the dates of August 13, through August 26, 2004. (P-33). Ms. Newman also wrote across Petitioner’s first timesheet (see Finding of Fact 57), in red ink, advising Petitioner: Ms. Francis you need to recode your leave to 52-sick and resubmit w/ signature. According to your doctor’s note you should have assumed work duties on the 10th of August. (R-12) Workers’ compensation pay does not begin until a specified time after the compensable accident. Many employers, including this one, have an elaborate system in place to pay an employee full salary and adjust leave categories of accrued sick and annual leave to make up the difference between the workers’ compensation rate and the regular pay rate, instead of paying the employee just the lesser amount permitted by the workers’ compensation statute. However, neither of those considerations was afoot here. Here, despite Newman’s testimony as to “the first 40 hours of workers’ compensation coverage,” the exhibits clearly reveal that Newman was attempting to get Petitioner to use her accrued sick leave to cover any time she had been absent from work after August 10, 2004. Because of her conversation with, and the incomplete materials supplied by, Bumgardner, Newman believed this was the correct way to code Petitioner’s timesheet. (See Findings of Fact 49-53.) When she received Newman’s August 27, 2004, memo to Wilcox, that same day, Petitioner responded to it by writing a note on the bottom in which she stated that she was not going to use sick leave; that she had permission from Parkins for her August 10-19, absence; that she was on four different “meds”; that her arm became swollen when she did come in on August 19; and again that she would not use sick time for an on-the-job injury that Newman refused to accommodate. Petitioner then finished with I am so sick and tired of the inconsistency and lack of communication among the management team. . . . You all need to stop this please. (P-33) Petitioner’s adamant and belligerent attitude did not sit well with Newman who, based on the information provided by Bumgardner, believed she was just doing her duty. On September 2, 2004, Newman came in at 6:00 a.m. to talk to Petitioner before Petitioner went off her shift at 7:00 a.m. Petitioner insisted on being confrontational with Newman in front of staff, instead of coming to Newman’s office as Newman requested. Petitioner adamantly refused to change the first timesheet or to sign it. (R-14). She stated to Newman that she had relied on Parkins’ oral authorization to be on workers’ compensation leave from August 10, to August 19, 2004. She later submitted a new, typed timesheet, still claiming “Code 60-workers’ comp. disability” for each of her scheduled work days between August 13, and 24. This version she signed. (R- 13). Newman caught up to Petitioner as Petitioner was checking out at the time clock on September 2, 2004; handed her a copy of the August 26, 2004, memo (see Finding of Fact 55); and inquired if Petitioner would be reporting as previously ordered to the 7:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m. shift on September 10, 2004. Petitioner stated she could not make the change due to her babysitter and previous registration for college classes. She continued to rely on Parkins’ oral authorization for August 10-19, and apparently expected workers’ compensation considerations for her absences after August 19, 2004, as well. (R-14). Newman never received corrected timesheets from Petitioner, despite explaining the situation to someone from Petitioner’s union who telephoned Newman and offered to act as an informal intermediary. Finally, in order to get Petitioner paid on time, either Newman or Parkins filled out a timesheet covering August 13 through August 26, 2004, and signed for her. Petitioner ultimately was charged sick leave from August 10-20, 2004, and was declared absent without authorization for August 21 and 24, when she had not followed the prescribed procedures for an authorized absence. (See Findings of Fact 49 and 51.) This meant that Parkins had retroactively withdrawn his oral authorization for Petitioner to take workers’ compensation leave for August 10 through August 19/20, and that Respondent viewed Petitioner’s absences on August 21 and 24 as unexcused. From the way this case was presented, it is difficult, if not impossible, to pinpoint when Petitioner did, and did not, report for duty after August 26, 2004. For instance, Petitioner insisted that she was not scheduled for duty on September 3, 2004, because that was the date of Hurricane Frances. She also claimed she could not work on September 3, 2004, because that was a day on which lack of accommodation the night before had caused her arm to swell. (See Finding of Fact 68.) Parkins confirmed that he did not schedule any “light duty” officers, of which Petitioner was one, for duty during Hurricane Frances, but he did not know the date of Hurricane Frances. Another witness thought Hurricane Frances had occurred in August 2004. If Hurricane Frances occurred on August 3, 2004, instead of September 3, 2004, then all such testimony is irrelevant because Petitioner's arm was not injured until August 4, 2004. There is documentation and testimony from Newman and Petitioner that Petitioner worked September 2, rolling into September 3, 2004. (See Finding of Fact 68.) Other dates Petitioner worked are equally confused or obscure, but Petitioner claims she worked August 25-28; was off on August 29-30; and contradicts herself that she was, or was not, scheduled to work on August 31, 2004; and was, or was not, scheduled to work on September 3, 2004. (See, infra.) However, both Petitioner and Edmond agree that on September 2, 2004, Edmond assigned Petitioner to a regular duty post. Edmond claims the assignment was a pure mistake on her part. Petitioner complained, via a 6:05 a.m. September 3, 2004, e-mail to Bessette, Newman, and Parkins, that her arm was swollen because of Edmond’s mis-assignment. (R-18). Petitioner’s e-mail also asserted that the Employer was not accommodating her work restrictions from her workers’ compensation doctor and that she was unable to come in to work that night due to her swollen arm. On September 3, 2004, at 11:35 a.m., about five-and-a- half hours after Petitioner’s complaint about Edmond’s assignment of her to regular duty on the 11:00 p.m September 2, to 7:00 a.m., September 3, 2004, shift, Edmond provided Bessette with a written statement, via e-mail, relating that on July 22, 2004, Petitioner threatened to "take her [Edmond] down." Edmond testified that shortly after receiving Perry’s June 25, 2004, counseling memo, Petitioner had called Edmond into a courtyard area at the facility to discuss her tardiness and her belief that management was tracking her tardiness. Respondent had always tracked its employees’ tardiness but had recently added a new method of keeping track. Petitioner referred to management’s tracking of her tardiness as "foolishness." Petitioner told Edmond not to engage in such behavior or Petitioner would “take her down" with the rest of management. Edmond claims to have acknowledged the incident to her immediate supervisor, Wilcox, on the same night it occurred. Wilcox was not called to corroborate Edmond’s testimony, and Edmond did not memorialize the event in writing until September 3, 2004, when she felt her job was being threatened by Petitioner’s September 2, 2004, memo of complaint. (See Finding of Fact 68.) Edmond testified that she also notified Bessette on September 3, 2004, about the July 22, incident because she believed that Petitioner was using codeine on the job. There is insufficient credible evidence to substantiate Edmond's testimony about codeine. It is more likely that Edmond related the story about July 22, 2004, to Bessette in retaliation for Petitioner's complaining that her workers’ compensation injury was not being accommodated by Edmond. The fact that Edmond also kept the July 22, 2004, incident to herself for six weeks renders the truth of her whole testimony suspect. However, that does not mean that Edmond's superiors had reason to disbelieve her September 3, 2004, accusation. Since August 24, 2004, Parkins and Newman, in reliance on Bumgardner, believed that Petitioner was using a narcotic drug (percocet) which her doctor had told her to discontinue on August 10, 2004. They were unaware that some of the other drugs legitimately prescribed by Petitioner’s authorized workers’ compensation physician might have caused the drowsiness and dizziness that had kept Petitioner from reporting for work between August 10 and August 19, 2004, and sporadically thereafter. (See Finding of Fact 53.) After Julie Bumgardner’s mis-information had been received on August 24, 2004, and continuing onward, Superintendent Bessette received reports from Newman, Parkins, and Edmond about Petitioner’s tardiness problems. It is not clear what instances of tardiness besides those occurring after August 10, 2004, were actually reported to Bessette. It is probable that both Newman and Parkins had an overall impression that Petitioner had frequently been tardy over the whole period of her employment at ARJDC, and it is possible, but not proven, that the rescinded Perry counseling memo (see Findings of Fact 23-27) was remembered or utilized. However, tardiness was only part of Bessette’s considerations. Bessette was also apprised of Petitioner's incorrectly coded timesheets and adamant attitude that she would not use sick leave to cover time off. Petitioner’s belligerency toward Newman and her attitude that everyone was “out to get her” aggravated the situation. Bessette considered Petitioner's refusal of Newman’s direct order to correct her timesheets to be insubordination. Parkins and Newman believed, however erroneously, that Petitioner was taking the narcotic percocet, contrary to her doctor’s instructions. Parkins may also have believed and resented that his oral authorization to Petitioner for leave August 10-19, had been obtained by fraud. The report to Bessette of a threat against Edmond was the last straw. Upon the mounting objections to Petitioner’s job performance, and based on a consensus of Newman, Parkins, and herself, Bessette determined that discipline was appropriate and requested authorization from her superiors to terminate Petitioner, which they granted. Petitioner was terminated by a September 8, 2004, letter, effective that date, stating that her termination was because of . . . your failure to satisfactorily complete your probationary period . . . . (P-9) Petitioner proved that ARJDC SJDO Genevieve Hazelip (Caucasian female), Respondent’s employee since 2000, was disciplined in the position of SJDO on one occasion in January 2005, after Petitioner was terminated. This was an oral reprimand for “a conversation with racial undertones, regardless of intention". (R-15). The oral reprimand of Hazelip was only stage one of the Employer’s three-stage progressive disciplinary system, which could lead to termination of a permanent employee at the third step. If Hazelip was on probation in her SJDO position, the Employer did not have to go through the three steps to terminate her, but it was not proven that Hazelip was on probation when she received the oral reprimand. Petitioner also proved that Hazelip was disciplined on two other occasions but was unable to establish whether these disciplinary actions occurred while Hazelip was a JDO or an SJDO or what level of discipline was imposed either time. At hearing, Petitioner claimed that Caucasian officers at ARJDC regularly got weekends and other coveted days off and Negro officers did not. She submitted nothing to substantiate this allegation, but admitted that there were more Negro officers than Caucasian officers and that she had never complained about the shift assignments because she was not dissatisfied with her own days off. It also may be reasonably inferred that Petitioner was not privy to any requests by other officers, Caucasian or Negro, for what shifts or days they wanted to work.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Charge of Discrimination and Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of September, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of September, 2006.
The Issue Whether Petitioner was subjected to sexual harassment and/or retaliation while employed with Respondent in violation of Subsections 760.10(1)(a) and/or (7), Florida Statutes (2008).1
Findings Of Fact Respondent is an employer within the definition found in Section 760.02, Florida Statutes. Petitioner was hired as an employee of Respondent in July 1993, as an X-ray technologist ("tech") in the Radiology Department. She is an adult female and, as such, is a member of a protected class. During her employee orientation, Petitioner received and read a copy of Respondent's Employee Handbook. Among other things, Respondent's Employee Handbook addresses the issue of sexual harassment in the workplace. Respondent's policy strictly prohibits sexual harassment and states that Respondent "will not tolerate such action by employees." Respondent's policy also encourages any employee who feels that he/she is being subject to sexual harassment to discuss and/or make a complaint with the Human Resources Department. Any such complaint is handled according to Respondent's Policy No. 9510-17, in order to ensure appropriate investigation and action. Respondent's employees also receive computer-based training regarding sexual harassment and Respondent's policy prohibiting the same, every year. Petitioner received this computer-based training regarding sexual harassment. In October 2006, Petitioner started training to be a magnetic resonance imaging ("MRI") tech. Petitioner was chosen to be cross-trained from an X-ray tech to a MRI tech by Greg Phillips, who was then the manager of Diagnostic Imaging. Phillips became her unofficial "mentor" at Respondent's facility. Petitioner received on-the-job training for an MRI tech from Chris Depelteau, Amy Brantly, and Lucinda Swales, all of whom were MRI techs at the time. In December 2006, Petitioner received a secondary job code which allowed her to work independently as an MRI tech part-time. Essentially this meant that she could "take call." That same month, Paul Licker was hired by Respondent as lead MRI tech. Depelteau had also applied for this job, but had not been chosen. Upon being hired by Respondent, Licker was also made aware of its policy regarding sexual harassment. As lead MRI tech, Licker was responsible for scheduling the MRI techs, ordering supplies, working on protocols, ensuring that patients were being properly scanned and treated, and following up with the MRI techs as they cared for patients. Therefore, Licker became Petitioner's immediate supervisor. Like all the other MRI techs, Licker also trained Petitioner in MRI. In training Petitioner, Licker often taught her different techniques or ways of doing things than the way she had been taught by the other MRI techs. Licker, on several occasions, sought to teach Petitioner his way of doing things on the computer, which was different from the others. In doing so, Licker invaded Petitioner's workspace and engaged in inappropriate touching, particularly by covering her hand with his while manipulating the mouse, to the point that she became uncomfortable. Licker also started implementing changes and different ways of doing things throughout the MRI department. As lead MRI tech, Licker had the authority to implement such changes. Also, during this same period, if Licker added patients or made other changes to her schedule, Petitioner would argue with or complain to him. In fact, Petitioner did not like Licker and also told Depelteau and other employees that Licker was a "bad supervisor." Licker himself recognized that Petitioner did not like the way he was supervising the department. A few weeks after Licker started working for Respondent, Petitioner approached Phillips complaining that Licker was calling her, other female employees, and patients, "Babe." For instance, Licker would say, "Babe, I need you to do this for me," when asking Petitioner to complete a task. Petitioner indicated that she thought that the use of this term was inappropriate and demeaning and that it made her uncomfortable. In fact, other employees who were friendly with Petitioner understood that Licker was using the term "Babe" the way another person might use the terms "Sweetie," or "Honey," i.e., in a non-sexual or non-derogatory way. However, understanding that Licker was a new supervisor who may not have understood that the term suggested something sexual in using the term "Babe," Phillips suggested to Petitioner that she speak directly with Licker to resolve this issue. Phillips also spoke to Licker directly regarding his use of the term "Babe." Specifically, Phillips advised Licker that he "needed to carefully choose his words around patients and employees." Phillips also advised Licker that some people did not like being addressed by "Sweetie or Hun or Babe," and that he should refrain from using these terms in the workplace. Licker understood Phillips' suggestion and tried to refrain from calling Petitioner, or anybody else, "Babe" or any word similar to the term. Petitioner did not complain about any other alleged inappropriate conduct by Licker to Phillips, or any other manager, until February 1, 2007. However, shortly after he started working for Respondent, Licker made an inappropriate comment in the cafeteria to Petitioner. Licker stated to other employees that he could not sit next to Petitioner because they were sleeping together. Licker made a similar inappropriate comment to Dana Keach when he first started employment at Parrish. He suggested that there was a lesbian relationship between Keach and another woman. This conduct was not reported until much later. Prior to February 1, 2007, it became readily apparent that the MRI department was suffering serious setbacks because the department employees were not working cooperatively together. The biggest problem in the MRI department appeared to be a lack of teamwork resulting from the staff's inability to communicate effectively with one another. Licker advised Gallacher that he was struggling in his "daily interactions" with Depelteau and Petitioner and that he simply "could not make the group happy, whether it was scheduling or time off or just getting through the day." MRI's problems grew to the point that Phillips and Gallacher both stepped in to try to improve communications and teamwork among Licker, Petitioner, Depelteau, and Shelly Hugoboom, the MRI CT assistant. The entire MRI department engaged in team-building meetings and even worked with the medical center's chaplain in an attempt to learn to work together. These department meetings were intense and discussion often became heated among the MRI staff members. In addition to these team-building meetings, Gallacher met with staff members individually to discuss their concerns. Gallacher also addressed the interpersonal skills issues between Petitioner and Hugoboom. Specifically, Gallacher met with the two employees together "to see if they could put [their issues] to rest and move on." In the midst of these efforts to improve the department, Petitioner came to Phillips on February 1, 2007, complaining that Licker was continuing to call her "Babe," and that he had also offered her some concert tickets. Phillips observed that Petitioner was extremely upset and immediately contacted Human Resources Manager Roberta Chaildin to start an investigation in regard to Licker's alleged behavior. Phillips and Chaildin spoke with Petitioner and Licker, individually, regarding Petitioner's claims. When questioned regarding the concert ticket, Licker explained that he had been looking to sell an extra ticket that he had. Licker advised Phillips and Chaildin that Petitioner had taken his offer to sell her the extra ticket "out of context," when she assumed that he was asking her to the concert on a date. Licker specified that he had asked Petitioner if she wanted to buy his extra ticket and "tag along" with him and his friends to the concert. Licker also offered his extra ticket to other people besides Petitioner. After speaking with Petitioner and Licker, Phillips and Chaildin determined that they were dealing with a "he-said- she-said situation and a misunderstanding." "He said, I was trying to sell the ticket or give it away. She said, he had asked me out on a date to a concert." Phillips and Chaildin determined that this was not a case of "sexual harassment" by Licker. They did, however, warn Licker that as a supervisor, he had to be "extremely careful" in how he spoke to his subordinate employees. Phillips and Chaildin advised Petitioner that they had investigated her claim and concluded that there was no evidence of sexual harassment. They encouraged her, however, to file a report if she continued to have issues with Licker. Over five months passed without a complaint or incident. Then on July 11, 2007, Licker verbally counseled Petitioner regarding her having accumulated nine tardy appearances ("tardies") at work since January 1, 2007. In speaking with Petitioner, Licker wanted to ensure that Petitioner understood that she needed to be on time in the future, as she had exceeded the number of tardies deemed acceptable by Respondent. To ensure that nothing said during the verbal counseling session was misconstrued by Petitioner, Licker had another supervisor, Boyd Wallace, serve as a witness. The tardies cited in Licker's verbal counseling to Petitioner were unrelated to instances when he would excuse her from work due to slower volume in the MRI department. On August 21, 2007, Licker observed Petitioner on the telephone being advised by security that she had parked in a "no parking" zone. During the conversation, Petitioner became agitated. Licker documented and filed the incident. Phillips personally addressed this incident with Petitioner. On October 10, 2007, the MRI department was working an already full schedule when Licker had to add a patient to the schedule due to an emergency situation. Petitioner objected to Licker adding another patient to the day and became withdrawn and resentful. Licker instructed Petitioner that she needed to change her attitude and become more cooperative. The evidence is not persuasive that Licker assigned Petitioner "menial tasks" after she complained about his having offered her the concert tickets in February 2007. In October 2007, Gallacher, Phillips and Chaildin met Petitioner and issued her a Decision Day disciplinary letter. A "Decision Day" meeting and letter is a management tool in which the employee is given a paid day off to contemplate whether they wish to remain an employee of Respondent. This resulted from Respondent's concerns regarding her "interpersonal skills." This was an issue that had been continuously addressed by Licker and other supervisors or managers at Respondent. The incident which prompted the progressive disciplinary action involved Debbie York, a relatively new employee who resigned from the MRI department, claiming that Petitioner and her interactions with other employees and with Licker was the reason for her leaving. During the Decision Day meeting, Petitioner stated that she was the "victim" and brought up the previous incidents of allegedly being sexually harassed. Petitioner was reminded that she had not complained of any other instances of alleged sexual harassment since she complained of Licker's offering her concert tickets in February 2007 and that the matter was investigated and resolved. From the point of view of management, the Decision Day meeting was intended to address Petitioner's on-going issues with her co-workers and her supervisor. However, Petitioner did not bring up any new incidents of alleged sexual harassment by Licker during the Decision Day meeting. Following the meeting, Petitioner took her Decision Day letter and returned to work. The Decision Day letter called for the creation of an Action Plan, which Respondent uses to help a struggling employee "become invested with the organization and with [his or her] team." Thereafter, Petitioner met with Gallacher to discuss what should be included in her Action Plan. On November 7, 2007, an Action Plan was drafted and signed. It included a number of initiatives designed to assist Petitioner in being "re[-]engaged" with the MRI department. Despite being placed on an Action Plan, Petitioner continued to have issues with Licker being her supervisor. On November 20, 2007, Licker verbally counseled Petitioner for her failure to discuss changes in her weekly schedule with him. Licker specifically identified Petitioner's "communication skills" as a continuing issue. On December 19, 2007, Petitioner was suspended without pay for two days for stating that Licker was being an "asshole," or something to that effect, in front of a co-worker. Petitioner accepted responsibility for her comment. Along with her suspension, Petitioner was also issued a written warning stated in pertinent part, "Upon your return [from suspension], you will be expected to demonstrate a high level of interpersonal skills towards your co-workers, management and this organization and work on completion of your Action Plan items. Any reports of less than acceptable behavior or performance or deviation from a Diagnostic Imaging or PMC policy or procedure will result in immediate termination." As a result of the written warning, Petitioner also lost 50 percent of her annual merit increase. In January 2008, management considered that the MRI department was still very "dysfunctional." Scott Hazelbaker, the new executive director of Diagnostics/Cardiovascular, met with all of the MRI employees as a group to discuss his "expectations of working together as a team." Hazelbaker also discerned that Licker lacked leadership skills to be an effective supervisor. In fact, none of the MRI employees had much respect for Licker's management style. On April 10, 2008, Hazelbaker, Gallacher, and Chaildin met with Petitioner to discuss her progress under the Action Plan. During the meeting, Hazelbaker reviewed Petitioner's history toward Respondent, explaining that her negative attitude could not be tolerated. Specifically, her negativity, failure to be a team player, and refusal to embrace or become engaged in Respondent's culture were detrimentally affecting the work of MRI as a whole. Hazelbaker continued by advising Respondent that as a result of her "track record," she could either resign from her employment or be terminated. Petitioner was advised that if she resigned, Respondent would pay her for two weeks in lieu of having her work through her notice period, pay her the balance of her personal leave bank, extend her health benefits for two weeks so that she could fill her prescriptions, and even designate her eligible for rehire in its system. At the end of the meeting, Petitioner tendered her resignation notice to Respondent. At no time during the meeting did Petitioner ask to leave the room or make a call in order to seek advice or legal counsel. Further, at no time during the meeting did Petitioner raise her past issues regarding Licker and the alleged sexual harassment she suffered. The evidence is persuasive that Licker did not influence the decision to terminate Petitioner. He had not asked for her to be terminated. In August 2009, more than one year after Petitioner resigned, Respondent received a complaint regarding Licker from then-X-Ray Tech Dana Keach, who claimed that Licker made sexually suggestive comments to her. Following an investigation, Licker was terminated, effective September 24, 2009, for "communication unsuitability between care partners." It does not appear that Licker was terminated for engaging in sexual harassment. The evidence is not persuasive that during the time he was employed by Respondent that Licker had inappropriate discussions in the workplace on numerous occasions in front of both male and female employees; nor that Licker would also discuss pornography in the workplace.
Recommendation Based upon the above Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing Petitioner, Lesa Burkavage's, claims of unlawful sexual harassment and retaliation against Respondent, Parrish Medical Center. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of July, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of July, 2010.
The Issue Whether Respondent committed the unlawful employment practices alleged in the employment discrimination complaint Petitioner filed with the Florida Commission on Human Relations (FCHR) and, if so, what relief should Petitioner be granted.
Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following findings of fact are made: The County is a political subdivision of the State of Florida. The County Park and Recreation Department (Department) is a department of County government. At all times material to the instant case, Carolyn Gibson was a Region Manager with the Department, having ultimate supervisory authority over the operations at the County parks in her region (Region 2), including Arcola Park and West Little River Park. At all times material to the instant case, Rhonda Ham was a Recreational Specialist 2/Service Area Manager with the Department, who was based at Arcola Park and worked under the immediate supervision of Ms. Gibson. Ms. Ham has been married to her husband Earl for the last 13 or 14 years. Although Ms. Gibson considers Ms. Ham to be a friend,4 her friendship with Ms. Ham has not prevented her from taking disciplinary action against Ms. Ham when the "facts" have warranted. Petitioner is a single, custodial father of three children (two daughters and son) aged three, five, and seven. He is now, and was at all times material to the instant case, "the sole support of these children." Unlike Ms. Ham, Petitioner is college educated. He attended the University of Miami and Clarksdale Community College in Clarksdale, Mississippi, before receiving his Bachelor of Arts degree from Virginia State University (VSU) in 1993. After finishing his undergraduate studies, he spent a year in graduate school at VSU. Petitioner played football in college, and he went on to play the sport professionally after being selected in the National Football League (NFL) draft. One of Petitioner's teammates on the University of Miami football team was James Stewart.5 As teammates, Petitioner and Mr. Stewart "got along with one another and communicated from time to time," but they were not "close friends" and did not "hang out" together. Mr. Stewart also went on to play in the NFL. Following his playing career, he was convicted of a felony, and, in 2001, began serving a five-year prison sentence. He was released from prison in 2006 and is currently on probation. From March 20, 2006, until December 14, 2006, Petitioner was employed by the County as a Park and Recreation Manager 1 at West Little River Park. In that capacity, he had supervisory authority over the other Department employees assigned to work at the park. At all times during his employment with the County, he was a probationary employee with no entitlement to continuing employment.6 Ms. Ham was Petitioner's immediate supervisor for the duration of Petitioner's employment with the County except for a three-week period in April and/or May 2006.7 Her office (at Arcola Park) was located approximately two miles from Petitioner's office (at West Little River Park). Ms. Ham had the authority to monitor and evaluate Petitioner's job performance and to counsel and reprimand Petitioner, both verbally and in writing. The authority to terminate Petitioner's employment resided, not with Ms. Ham, but with Ms. Gibson. It was Ms. Gibson who hired Petitioner. She did so after reviewing Petitioner's application and interviewing him. Petitioner had applied for the position on or about March 2, 2006, by submitting a filled out and signed County employment application form. By signing the application, he "certified," among other things, the following: I certify that to the best of my knowledge and belief, all of the statements contained herein, and any attachments, are correct, complete and made in good faith. I understand that a background check will be conducted and that should an investigation disclose any misrepresentation, I may be subject to dismissal. The application form had an "Employment History" section, which contained the following instructions: List previous employment history, starting with your current or most recent employment. If you have held more than one position within the same organization, list each position as a separate period of employment. Be sure to indicate where employment may be verified. Please include job-related volunteer, temporary, part-time work and military experience. On his application, Petitioner knowingly failed to disclose that he had been employed from May 30, 2005, to September 17, 2005 as a Recreation Aide V with the City of Miami Parks and Recreation Department, working under the supervision of Lewis Mahoney, who was the Park Manager at Gibson Park. As a City of Miami Parks and Recreation Department employee, Petitioner had had a poor work record and had not gotten along with Mr. Mahoney. He undoubtedly knew, at the time he filled out the County employment application form in March 2006, that Mr. Mahoney, if contacted by the County, would not have good things to say about him. Ms. Gibson did not find out about Petitioner's failure to disclose his employment with the City of Miami on the County employment application form until after she had terminated Petitioner. Had she known about this non-disclosure, she would have never hired Petitioner and allowed him to work for the County. As part of the application and hiring process, Petitioner signed various forms in addition to the County application form. One of these forms was an Oath on Outside Employment for Full-Time Employees form that Petitioner signed on March 2, 2006. It read as follows: I, Damacio Green, a full-time employee of Miami-Dade Park and Recreation Department, certify that I am not engaged in any type of outside employment. I certify that I am not paid by, nor do I receive any equivalent gratuities from, any employer for any of my services except as performed during the normal course of my employment with the Miami-Dade Park and Recreation Department. I certify that before accepting outside employment, I will submit a complete record of intended outside employment to my Department Director for approval. I will abide by the Department Director's decision on the matter. I further certify that I fully understand the County policy on outside employment outlined below. MIAMI-DADE COUNTY POLICY ON OUTSIDE EMPLOYMENT (SEC. 2-11 OF THE CODE OF METROPOLITAN DADE COUNTY, FLORIDA) No full-time County employee shall accept outside employment, either incidental, occasional or otherwise, where County time, equipment or material is to be used or where such employment or any part thereof is to be performed on County time. A full-time County employee may accept incidental or occasional outside employment so long as such employment is not contrary, detrimental or adverse to the interest of the County or any of the department and the approval required in subsection (C) is obtained. Any outside employment by any full-time County employee must first be approved in writing by the employee's department head who shall maintain a complete record of such employment. Any employee convicted of violating any provision of this section shall be punished as provided in Section 1-5, and, in addition thereto, shall be subjected to dismissal by his Department. (Ord. No. 58-5, Sec. 25.01, 2-18-58) When Petitioner "first started working" for the County, he asked Ms. Gibson if, under the County's Policy on Outside Employment, he would be able to operate his mobile food service business, Damacio's Mr. Tasty, LLC, while employed with the County. Ms. Gibson responded to Petitioner's inquiry by telling him, "You can't do it." On at least two occasions during his employment with the County, Petitioner operated his mobile food service business without Departmental approval, despite knowing that doing so was in violation of the County's Policy on Outside Employment. It was not until after Petitioner had been terminated that Ms. Gibson discovered that Petitioner had committed this violation of the County's Policy on Outside Employment. Ms. Gibson would have terminated Petitioner's employment had he still been employed with the County at the time she learned of the violation. Among the other forms that Petitioner signed during the application and hiring process was an Acknowledgment of Receipt of the County's Unlawful Harassment Policy (Administrative Order No. 7-37). He signed this form on March 2, 2006. By doing so, he acknowledged the following: I have received a copy of this Unlawful Harassment Policy and understand that it contains important information on filing a complaint of harassment with my department or the Office of Fair Employment Practices. I will familiarize myself with the Unlawful Harassment Policy and understand that I am governed by its contents. If I have questions about the policy I can contact my Department Affirmative Action Officers Yolanda Fuentes-Johns or William Lindley at (305)755-7866 or the Office of Fair Employment Practices at (305)375-2784. The County's Unlawful Harassment Policy (which was printed on the form) provided, in pertinent part, as follows: POLICY The policy of Miami-Dade County is to ensure that all employees are able to enjoy a work environment free from all forms of discrimination, including harassment, on the basis of race, sex, color, national origin, religion, retaliation, age, disability, ancestry, marital status, pregnancy, sexual orientation, or the exercise of their constitutional or statutory rights. Administrative Order 7-28 was adopted in 1987 specifically to protect County employees from sexual harassment. Administrative Order 7-28 and Administrative Order 7-6, Personnel Policy on Equal Employment Opportunity, have since been interpreted to extend similar protection to employees who believe they have been harassed for unlawful reasons other than sex. This Administrative Order is intended to make clear that all County employees who believe they have been unlawfully harassed must notify the County's Office of Fair Employment Practices or their Departmental Affirmative Action Officer and may file a complaint for prompt and proper investigation. Employees who are found guilty of unlawfully harassing other employees shall be subject to appropriate sanctions, depending on the circumstances. These may range from counseling up to and including termination. Miami-Dade County will not tolerate adverse treatment of employees because they report harassment or provide information related to such complaints. The County, in exercising reasonable care to prevent and promptly correct harassment or retaliation for reporting harassment, will protect victims from further unlawful harassment and retaliation. * * * COMPLAINT PROCEDURE Employees who believe they have been the subject of harassment prohibited by this Administrative Order, must notify the County's Office of Fair Employment Practices or their Departmental Affirmative Action Officer and, if they choose, may file a formal complaint with the County's Office of Fair Employment Practices. Employees may, if they desire, also report such incidents of unlawful harassment to their supervisor but are under no obligation to do so. Employees are encouraged to report harassment before it becomes severe or pervasive. This will facilitate early mediation and effective resolution of potential unlawful harassment complaints. All complaints of harassment, subsequent investigations and corrective actions shall be handled on a confidential basis to the extent possible under the law. Protective measures will be instituted to protect the complainant. Miami-Dade County has established procedures for resolving, filing and processing complaints of unlawful harassment. If the investigation confirms the existence of unlawful harassment, the Fair Employment Practices Office will pursue prompt corrective action, including remedial relief for the victim, and appropriate disciplinary action against the offender. * * * At no time during his employment with the County did Petitioner complain, in accordance with the "complaint procedure" described in the County's Unlawful Harassment Policy, that he was being, or had been, sexually harassed by Ms. Ham. During much of the time that Petitioner worked under Ms. Ham's immediate supervision, the two had an amicable relationship--so amicable that on one occasion, without being asked by Ms. Ham, Petitioner gave her a check in the amount $125.00 to help her purchase a dance outfit for her daughter. What started out as a friendly, non-physical relationship evolved into a sexual one, in which both Petitioner and Ms. Ham freely and willingly participated. They engaged in sexual activity on three separate occasions--once in Petitioner's office at West Little River Park and twice in Ms. Ham's office at Arcola Park. The first of these consensual sexual encounters occurred in August 2006. The third and final encounter was in October 2006. On each occasion, Petitioner was the one who initiated the physical contact. "[A]shamed and embarrassed" by her conduct, Ms. Ham decided to put an end to her adulterous affair with Petitioner. There was no further sexual activity between Ms. Ham and Petitioner after October 2006. Ms. Ham oversaw a Children's Trust-funded after-school program at Arcola Park in which Petitioner's daughter, DK, was registered. It was Ms. Ham's responsibility to make sure that children in the program were picked up from their respective schools at the end of the school day and transported to Arcola Park. After the end of the school day on November 6, 2006, Petitioner received word from DK's school that DK had not been picked up and was still at school. Petitioner ultimately telephoned Ms. Gibson on her cell phone and, in a "very loud" tone of voice, said, "Ms. Ham left my daughter, she didn't pick my daughter up from school, what are you going to do about it?" Ms. Gibson later met with Petitioner and Ms. Ham to discuss the matter and try to sort things out. During the meeting, Petitioner was, in Ms. Gibson's eyes, "irate" and "out of control." He told Ms. Gibson that she "couldn't tell him anything" because she did not "have any kids" and she "kn[e]w nothing about parenting." Ms. Gibson sensed from Petitioner's and Ms. Ham's "body language" and the way that they were "glaring at each other" at the meeting that they might be involved in a non-work- related relationship. She therefore asked them, before they left, whether they had "crossed the line." They both denied that there was anything going on between them. A few days later, Petitioner came into Ms. Gibson's office and asked her, rhetorically, "Do you think I'm interested in Ms. Ham?" He then told her, "Well, Ms. Gibson, I'm not interested in Ms. Ham, I'm interested in you." Ms. Gibson's response to this come-on was to direct Petitioner to "get out of [her] office." Petitioner was due to be evaluated on or about September 24, 2006, but it was not until November 17, 2006, that he received his first Management Performance Evaluation. This November 17, 2006, evaluation was prepared by Ms. Ham (who signed the evaluation as the "rater") with input from Ms. Gibson (who signed the evaluation as the "reviewer"). The overall rating was unsatisfactory. The evaluation contained the following narrative: ACHIEVEMENT OF OBJECTIVES: RATING: Unsatisfactory Mr. Green, you entered this department on March 28, 2006 as a Park & Recreation Manager 1 at West Little River Park. From your inception there has been an increase in participant enrollment in spring and summer camp, and [the] after school program. However, there has been a decrease in registration/attendance in your sports development program, which is the region's primary program. DECISION MAKING AND JUDGMENT: RATING: Needs Improvement Mr. Green, over the past 6 months I have had the opportunity to observ[e] your decision- making skills and often times your decisions are hasty. At your level you should take the opportunity to first identify the problem, gather the facts and make decisions based on facts and not what you are feeling at the time, i.e. sending part-timers home and then call[ing] them back to work within the hour.[8] Also, it is important that you understand parents are our customers, they might not always be right in their actions. However, as professionals we must always maintain our composure by allowing them to vent and then by explaining the circumstances rather than trying to talk over them and suggesting they bring a spouse to deal with the situation instead, as you have done.[9] PERSONAL DEVELOPMENT RATING: Satisfactory Mr. Green, you have a solid educational foundation and you have taken the initiative to enroll in PAR training to aid you in better understanding the payroll attendance record. You are currently involved in the recreation modular training. However, being new to the department it is extremely important that you make a concentrated effort to enroll in trainings in the following areas[:] time management and dealing with conflict in the workplace, progressive discipline and a host of other trainings relative to your professional development. You need to encourage your subordinate staff to enroll in training to improve their knowledge and skills. PLANNING AND ORGANIZING RATING: Needs Improvement Mr. Green, during your first six months in the department you have not taken the initiative to plan, organize or implement any special events, activities or sporting events.[10] You have not shown any creativity or enthusiasm. INTERPERSONAL SKILLS RATING: Needs Improvement Mr. Green, your relationship with your subordinate staff has been less than cohesive. There have been instances of verbal conflict and derision between you and Mr. Morgan and Ms. Johnson,[11] a seasonal employee[,][12] and several parents of patrons that you were not able to resolve satisfactorily as the leader. Although we have discussed strategies on how you can improve in this area improvement is still needed to foster the teamwork ethic at West Little River Park. You have not made an effort to understand[] how the chain of command works. It is very important that you understand your first point of contact is your Service Area Manager. If we cannot resolve the situation at my level and if you're not satisfied with the resolution, you can then request a meeting with the next level in the chain of command. COMMUNICATIONS RATING: Unsatisfactory Mr. Green, your very limited knowledge of the computer has been a hindrance for you as a Park & Recreation Manager 1. It is very important for you to have a basic working knowledge of the computer. The computer is an essential tool that is used everyday. Our reliance on them is an ever increasing fact. Mr. Green, you are not taking the initiative to learn what you need to know in order to function in your capacity as a manager. During our regional staff meetings you are not attentive and you do not take notes, yet you come back to me with questions that were covered during the staff meetings.[13] I have been supportive by consistently aiding you with your assignments. However, in many instances you have not comprehended the information well and have looked to me for more than just support. You are now faced with spreading your part- time budget and coming up with goals and objectives. You have missed every deadline given. ADMINISTRATIVE POLICY AND PROCEDURE RATING: Needs Improvement Mr. Green, an improvement is needed in the area. You have been encouraged to avail yourself of all the resources available to educate yourself on the subject of the department's policies and procedures via the use of our various manuals and through counsel with your supervisors and peers. However, you have been challenged in your role as a leader in applying them in the daily operations of the park and rapport with your staff and patrons. ADDITIONAL FACTORS RATING: Not Applicable RATER'S OVERALL EVALUATION: Unsatisfactory Is employee eligible for merit increase? Deferred. Re-evaluate in 1 1/2 months/ Is employee eligible for permanent status? N/A IN WHAT WAYS CAN OR MUST THE EMPLOYEE IMPROVE PERFORMANCE? Mr. Green, to improve your overall performance, concentrate on the following: Increase participant registration/ attendance in the Sports Development Program which has declined under your supervision. Demonstrate more leadership before subordinate staff. Enroll in department management courses. They will help in your professional growth. Enroll for "Service Excellence" training to enhance you customer service skills with patrons. Plan, organize and market at least 2 annual special events at West Little River Park. Enroll [in] computer courses to be more proficient in the use of the personal computer. Follow the chain of command as mandated by our Regional Manager and your immediate supervisor. You will be re-evaluated in the next 1 1/2 months. If there has been no substantial improvement stronger measures will be made. Petitioner prepared a written rebuttal to his November 17, 2006, evaluation, which he provided to Ms. Ham and Ms. Gibson on or about November 27, 2006. It read as follows: SECTION 2: DECISION MAKING AND JUDGMENT: RATING: NEEDS IMPROVEMENT In the subject of decision-making and judgment, I received a rating of need[s] improvement. I totally feel that this rating is unfair because of one incident that happened in a six-month period. However, the situation with the parent being treated unprofessionally is completely wrong. The parent made the statement to me of having her husband deal with the issue rather than herself. I simply responded, "If you feel that this is necessary for your spouse to speak with me rather than you, then I have no problem with it. I will be here in my office whenever he ha[s] time to speak with me." The entire ordeal was handled totally in a professional manner. SECTION 4: PLANNING AND ORGANIZING: RATING: NEEDS IMPROVEMENT In the area of planning and organizing, I received a rating of need[s] improvement, which I feel is totally unfair and incorrect. During the entire six month[] period, I never once received a memo or any corresponden[ce] to the effect that my planning and organizing skills was not up to par.[14] When I received this position on March 21st, 2006, I was given a brief overview pre-training of my duties and responsibilities i.e., administrative paper work, sports development participation, seasonal camp programming, after school daily programming and maintenance responsibilities. Special events were never mentioned. My facility participated in spring break and summer camps in which we increase[d] the numbers a great deal from past history. We also participated in every sport development cycle. According to the directions I was given, I felt as if I was totally within my responsibilities. Now to receive an impromptu surprise that I am not on task is not only incorrect but also absolutely unprofessional. SECTION 5: INTERPERSONAL SKILLS: RATING: NEEDS IMPROVEMENT I feel that this rating, needs improvement, is unfair and incorrect. During my first six months, I've had two situations with parents that are sisters, which was a misunderstanding about the kids coming into the facility unsupervised. After explaining the danger of that to the parents, they both agreed with me. The second situation had already been explained in section 2 when a parent felt she would like for her husband to address the issue rather than herself. At that time the situation was resolved without further discussion. The issues that I had with Mr. Morgan, I feel personally w[ere] created by Mrs. Ham by allowing him to break the chain of command by calling you without discussing anything with me first was wrong. When I give Mr. Morgan an assignment that he does not like, he feels that he could call you to change it. Must I remind you that Ms. Gibson warned you about this behavior during summer camp. Ms. Gibson also stated to you, "Rhonda, this is wrong! You wouldn't want Mr. Green to do this to you with me." This is not the support I expected from my immediate supervisor. I feel sabotaged, betrayed and set up for failure. In my evaluation, you mentioned me breaking the chain of command and asked me to call my immediate supervisor about any issue before contacting the regional manager. If I remained unsatisfied, what did I violate if you were contacted twice, you were told that I was unhappy with your answer and I needed immediate attention? This would mean that I followed the chain of command to the letter. SECTION 6: COMMUNICATIONS: RATING: UNSATISFACTORY The rating that I received in section 6 communication: Unsatisfactory, I feel that it is unfair and incorrect. I have basic knowledge of the computer and can perform all of my duties as a Park and Recreation Manager 1. During our regional staff meetings, I did not always take written notes because at times I recorded the meetings. However, I feel my immediate supervisor should be someone I can go to for clarity which is not outside of her responsibilities. On top of this, I was faced with spreading a part-time budget in this department for the very first time and was left hanging out to dry by Mrs. Ham. I received very little directions and had to look toward other colleagues for help. Mrs. Ham set meeting dates when I asked for help and never met them. When she finally did show, she took the work that I had already done and said, "I'll handle it from this point." Mrs. Ham may have her method of assisting her staff but I feel the more hands on involvement I have with the new work and assignments will make me effective in learning the process and being more self- sufficient with the budget assignments as well as other paper work. However, I received no correspondence or memos of any type reflecting how off the mark I was in the area of communication during the entire six months. As a matter of fact, I felt the communication between Mrs. Ham and I was great. It was so great that I had no problem doing financial favors for her when she needed it. Now for everything to turn so bad so fast, I have no choice but to feel it is retaliation [for] the call made to Ms. Gibson on the day my daughter was an hour and a half late being picked up from her school which was supposed to be done by one of Mrs. Ham's staff workers which I had to do myself because of the number of calls I received from her school. This is pertaining to the issue of the broken chain of command. SECTION 7: ADMINISTRATIVE POLICIES AND PROCEDURE: RATING: NEEDS IMPROVEMENT I received a rating of need[s] improvement, which I feel it is only natural that a new employee to need improvement in this area if it is based on the knowledge of the manual instead of knowing where to go in the manual to retrieve the information. However, I will continue to read through my operation manual and my personal handbook in my sp[are] and down time. Overall, I feel this evaluation was a personal attack for some personal reason, i.e. contacting Ms. Gibson after trying to resolve the issue with Mrs. Ham to no satisfaction. This is when I first found out I was doing such a poor job as a manager and feel th[ere] will be more retaliation. While Petitioner's written rebuttal contained various accusations against Ms. Ham of supervisory wrongdoing, it was devoid of any allegation that Ms. Ham had subjected Petitioner to any type of sexual harassment.15 On November 30, 2006, after it had been brought to her attention that Petitioner was having his subordinates complete for him written assignments that Petitioner was supposed to be doing himself for a Department-sponsored management training class he was taking, Ms. Ham sent the following memorandum to Petitioner: I was informed by your PSA Jerome Jamison that you have been delegating your Recreation Module Training assignments to him and PSA Tremaine Morgan to complete. If this is correct, please stop this immediately. The training series that you have been recommended to participate [in] requires you to complete these assignments. These exercises [are] a part of your development and training as a manager. On December 5, 2006, Ms. Ham sent another memorandum to Petitioner. This memorandum was about an incident that had occurred the previous day. It read as follows: On Monday, December 4, at approximately 2:18 p.m. you called to let me know that the key for the West Little River Park's van was misplaced and that you could not find the key. I asked you why you were just now reporting this when your driver is scheduled to be at your first scheduled pickup point at 2:00 p.m. You began to yell in a loud voice at me, "You were the one that told me to schedule my driver to report at 2 p.m." I responded that you needed to lower your voice and that you were being insubordinate and that this is my last warning. Your statement was untrue as well. I directed you to schedule your staff to report at least one half hour prior to the first pick up anticipating travel time and to inspect the van. This is not the first instance of offensive conduct to me and I am aware that you acted similarly toward our Region Manager. I have discussed your conduct with you before. Mr. Green, there must be an immediate and sustained improvement in your performance or more serious disciplinary action will result. I need the Unusual Incident Report detailing the details on the missing van keys today. On December 5, 2006, in response to the November 30, 2006, and December 5, 2006, memoranda he had received from Ms. Ham, Petitioner sent a memorandum of his own to Ms. Ham. He provided a copy of this memorandum to Ms. Gibson. The memorandum read as follows: Ms. Ham, pertaining to the memo I received on Nov. 30, 2006, stating you were told by Mr. Jamison that I was delegating my module training to him and Mr. Morgan. That alleged statement you claimed Mr. Jamison made after speaking with Mr. Jamison, he stated that it was not true. Mr. Jamison stated that he was only inquiring more about the module. Now, let me tell you what really happened. What I simply did was shared the information that was in the module training with my staff because of their daily hands on with the participants. I felt as the Park Manager that I was well within my rights to discuss the information with my staff and ask for feedback w[hether] it was verbal or written. The reason I did this was because the questions in the training w[ere] not only rel[evant] to me but to them as well because of their dealings with the participants on a daily basis. When I told them why I was doing this, they both agreed. Mr. Jamison and Mr. Morgan also told me that the few questions they went over [were] not only intriguing but also very helpful in dealing with some of the issues they encounter with some of the participants. By the way Mrs. Ham, I was told in a discussion with Mr. Jamison that the question about the module was asked three weeks ago prior to [the] Nov 30, 2006 memo I received from you. My question to you is why give me a memo pertaining to this now. Pertaining to the memo I received today on my alleged conduct on December 4, 2006 is not only unfair but also untrue that I was yelling at you when I called about the missing key. I deplore that statement. What is true that I did do the right thing by notifying and informing you about the missing key. What is also true is that contrary to popular opinion, you were the one that became angry with me because I was asking you what else could I do in terms of getting my after school participants picked up. I also asked you should I go in my personal van to make sure that they were all picked up in a timely manner. You then started . . . yelling at me in sequence, "when did you first notice that the key was missing, Mr. Jamison must be just getting to work, what time do[es] he come in and why is he coming in at 2 p.m. when he has a 2 o'clock pick-up.["] I simply stated to you that "you were the one that made me change his scheduled time to come in from 1 o'clock to 1:30 p.m. to now 2:00 p.m." which was all I said in return with my regular tone of voice. Then you replied "you better watch [your] tone of voice with me. This is your last warning about that tone of voice." When in fact, you were the one that was doing all of the yelling and I have a witness to prove it. As I stated in my rebuttal to my regretful performance evaluation which came a week later after my call to our Regional Manager when I was doing so well before then. "I feel that th[ere] will be more retaliation to come" and it is now clear that I was right. You are doing just that because of my phone call to our Regional Manger about my daughter being an hour and a half late picked up by one of [your] subordinates which I had to do myself. In his memorandum, Petitioner alleged retaliation only for his having complained to Ms. Gibson about Ms. Ham's not having picked up his daughter on time. He made no allegations of sexual harassment. On December 5, 2006, Petitioner attended a Department- sponsored training class, the title of which was "How to Maintain a Harassment Free Work Environment." The class was lead by Beatriz Lee, the Department's Human Resources Manager and its Affirmative Action Officer. In her introductory remarks, Ms. Lee told the class "what [her] role [was with] the [D]epartment." The class lasted approximately three hours, during which Ms. Lee discussed, among other things, the County's Unlawful Harassment Policy, including how to file an unlawful harassment complaint. After the class ended Petitioner walked up to Ms. Lee and indicated that he wanted to talk to her. Ms. Lee took Petitioner into her office so that they could converse in private. Petitioner told Ms. Lee that he was "having problems with his supervisor," Ms. Ham, and then showed Ms. Lee the November 17, 2006, evaluation he had received. Ms. Lee asked Petitioner why he thought these "problems" existed. Petitioner replied that he and Ms. Ham were "tight" and were "good friends" and that he "didn't understand why [Ms. Ham] was being so demanding with him, because he had even helped her out financially." During their conversation, Petitioner told Ms. Lee about Ms. Gibson's having asked him and Ms. Ham if they had "crossed the line." Ms. Lee then inquired why Ms. Gibson would ask such a question. Petitioner responded, "I guess because we were so close. Because we-–you've got to understand me and Rhonda [Ham] are very tight . . . ." Petitioner crossed his middle finger over his index finger to show Ms. Lee how "tight" he and Ms. Ham were. At no time during his talk with Ms. Lee did Petitioner claim he had been sexually harassed by Ms. Ham. On Thursday, December 14, 2006, less than one and a half months after receiving his first Management Performance Evaluation, Petitioner received his second (and last) Management Performance Evaluation. This December 14, 2006, evaluation was prepared by Ms. Ham (who signed the evaluation as the "rater"). Ms. Gibson was on vacation, so Bobby Johnson signed the evaluation as the "reviewer" in her stead. Ms. Gibson, however, "concur[ed] with the statements contained in this performance evaluation" and had already decided that Petitioner's "probation [would] be failed." The evaluation contained the following narrative: ACHIEVEMENT OF OBJECTIVES: RATING: Satisfactory Mr. Green, the sports development program registration increased by 4, however you need to continue this effort by better utilizing your present staff and by developing a recruitment strategy. DECISION MAKING AND JUDGMENT: RATING: Needs Improvement Mr. Green, your continued effort is still needed for your improvement in this area. Please follow the recommendations given to you in your last performance evaluation. PERSONAL DEVELOPMENT RATING: Unsatisfactory Mr. Green, you completed the recreation module training, although I had to advise you that you are not allowed to delegate any of the related assignments to your subordinate staff.[16] You have enrolled for department training as I recommended. Remember, you need to encourage your subordinate staff to enroll in training likewise to improve their knowledge and skills. Your effort to recruit satisfactory seasonal and year round part-time staff has been a challenge for you. I recommended that you visit the local colleges for satisfactory applicants, however, thus far you have resisted my suggestions.[17] PLANNING AND ORGANIZING RATING: Unsatisfactory Mr. Green, there have no special events, activities or sporting events implemented by you for West Little River Park or as a regional event. On December 6 during the trial budget reviews with the Region Manager it was noted that you had set a goal of forming a basketball league to operate from January-May 2007. However in your planning you failed to include adequate time for publicizing the event in the community. You should have routed all your budget related items through your Service Area Manager. INTERPERSONAL SKILLS RATING: Unsatisfactory Mr. Green, improvement is still needed to foster teamwork at West Little River Park. During this rating period you were verbally reprimanded for your unprofessional conduct when speaking to me and our Region Manager, during presentation of your 6 month performance evaluation for a merit increase, during a phone conversation with me about a missing van key and during a phone conversation with Ms. Gibson. You have also reacted defensively when receiving constructive criticism from your supervisor. COMMUNICATIONS RATING: Unsatisfactory Mr. Green, use of the computer and related programs has been a challenge for you. Your registration paper work was not organized as I had directed and as a result the input of West Little [River Park] Program registrants into the CITRIX system has not been completed.[18] As I stated in your earlier evaluation, the computer is an essential tool and our reliance on them is an ever increasing fact. ADMINISTRATIVE POLICY AND PROCEDURE RATING: Satisfactory Mr. Green, I encourage you to avail yourself of all the resources available to educate yourself on the subject of the department's policies and procedures via the use of our various manuals and through counsel with your supervisors and peers. ADDITIONAL FACTORS RATING: Not Applicable RATER'S OVERALL EVALUATION: Unsatisfactory Is employee eligible for merit increase? Deferred. Not Granted. Is employee eligible for permanent status? Not Granted. Because she considered Petitioner to be a "substandard employee" who had performed poorly during his probationary period (and for this reason alone), Ms. Gibson decided to "fail [Petitioner's] probation" and terminate his employment with the County. Ms. Gibson's decision was based on: (1) Ms. Ham's evaluation of Petitioner's performance; (2) information provided to Ms. Gibson by other employees about Petitioner's performance19; and (3) Ms. Gibson's "independent observations of [Petitioner's] performance." On the evening of December 14, 2006, after having been presented with his second Management Performance Evaluation, Petitioner was advised that he was being terminated. Later that evening, Petitioner telephoned a friend of his, Jennifer Williams. (Ms. Williams taught reading to Petitioner's daughter DK and to the other children in the Children's Trust-funded after-school program at Arcola Park.) Petitioner began his conversation with Ms. Williams by telling her, "That bitch fired me," referring to Ms. Ham. He then asked if he could come by Ms. Williams' home. Ms. Williams told him that he could. Petitioner arrived at Ms. Williams' home shortly thereafter, and Ms. Williams invited him in. They went to the den, sat down, and talked. Petitioner again explained to Ms. Williams that "Ms. Ham had terminated him." He then told Ms. Williams that Ms. Ham had been "harassing him sexually." When Ms. Williams heard this she "just started laughing." Having seen Petitioner and Ms. Ham and "their interactions," she "could not believe" that Ms. Ham had sexually harassed Petitioner. Petitioner then asked Ms. Williams "to help him type up a letter" (on Ms. Williams' computer) describing "exactly what [had] happened between [Petitioner] and Ms. Ham." Ms. Williams agreed to provide such help. Following Petitioner's directions, Ms. Williams typed a letter addressed to Ms. Gibson, which read as follows: Subject: Wrongful Conduct from Immediate Supervisor This letter is in reference to the meeting that took place yesterday on December 7, 2006 around 3:00 p.m. at the region office.[20] You stated to me that you have a problem with me not being truthful about things that have happened between Mrs. Ham and I. As I indicated to you "yes, you are right! I have not told you everything that has happened." I feared that if I had told you Ms. Gibson about the constant request for money as well as the constant request for sexual favors that I would be terminated. Mrs. Ham has explained to me on several occasions that I can be terminated anytime she felt like it and it would be nothing I could do about it, each time before financial and sexual favors were requested. Mrs. Ham and I have been sexually involved over 10 times. These sexual acts have taken place at West Little River and Arcola Park. Also, at times when Mrs. Ham has told me to take her [to] lunch she has then pulled into a nearby motel and again requested sexual favors. Many times I wanted to tell you about these issues between Mrs. Ham and me, however, I feared for my job and I wanted to pass probation so that I could then start denying Mrs. Ham of these favors. Sincerely Damacio Green Petitioner asked Ms. Williams to "backdate the letter" to December 8, 2006, and Ms. Williams complied. The following day, Friday, December 15, 2006, Petitioner (or someone acting on his behalf) went to the Region 2 office to return his Department uniforms and, while there, surreptitiously placed in Ms. Gibson's desk an envelope containing the backdated "Wrongful Conduct from Immediate Supervisor" letter Jennifer Williams had typed the evening before. Ms. Gibson was not in the office that day, and her administrative secretary, Debbie Williams,21 was on break when the envelope was placed in Ms. Gibson's desk. Later that day, Petitioner telephoned Ms. Lee, complaining that Ms. Ham had sexually harassed him and had "fired" him because he had refused to "put up with it any more." Ms. Lee asked Petitioner why he had not said anything to her previously about Ms. Ham's sexually harassing him. Petitioner responded that he "had been afraid" and thought he might "lose [his] job." During his conversation with Ms. Lee, Petitioner falsely told her that, prior to his termination, he had "provided a letter to Ms. Gibson telling her that [Ms. Ham] had been forcing him to engage in sex." Ms. Lee asked Petitioner to send her a copy of that letter. At approximately 3:00 p.m. on December 15, 2006, Petitioner faxed to Ms. Lee a copy of the backdated "Wrongful Conduct from Immediate Supervisor" letter that Jennifer Williams had typed for Petitioner the evening of December 14, 2006. Ms. Lee showed the letter to her supervisor, Yolanda Johns, who subsequently telephoned Ms. Gibson to inquire about the matter. Ms. Gibson informed Ms. Johns that she did not know anything about a "Wrongful Conduct from Immediate Supervisor" letter addressed to her from Petitioner. Ms. Johns then faxed a copy of the letter to Ms. Gibson, who was at Martin Luther King Park attending a Christmas party. After reviewing the letter, Ms. Gibson confirmed that she had never seen it before. On Monday, December 18, 2006, Ms. Gibson (who was on leave) came by her office and discovered the letter inside an envelope in her desk drawer (where it had been placed on December 15, 2006, the day after Petitioner's termination). Ms. Lee conducted an investigation of Petitioner's allegations of sexual harassment. As part of her investigation, she interviewed Petitioner and numerous other individuals. Based on the information she obtained, Ms. Lee determined (correctly, as it turns out) "that Mr. Green and Mrs. Ham not only engaged in a consensual sexual relationship, but . . . Mr. Green was persistent in pursuing Mrs. Ham to engage in such activity." Consequently, Ms. Lee concluded that Petitioner's allegations of sexual harassment were unfounded. Ms. Lee issued her investigative report in February 2007. In her report, Ms. Lee recommended that Ms. Ham be suspended 30 days without pay for her "lack of judgment in succumbing to the pursuit of a subordinate." By letter dated March 15, 2007, Ms. Ham was given "formal notification" that she was being "suspended without pay for four (4) weeks to be served beginning Monday, April 9, 2007 through Sunday May 6, 2007," for having "engaged in a consensual sexual relationship with a subordinate employee, Mr. Damacio Green, former Park and Recreation Manager 1, which affected [her] ability to properly supervise this employee."
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order finding the County not guilty of the unlawful employment practices alleged by Petitioner and dismissing Petitioner's employment discrimination complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of May, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of May, 2009.
The Issue Whether petitioner suffered sexual harassment for which respondent is answerable, or whether, on account of her sex, respondent discriminated against her by paying her unequal wages, or whether, in terminating her employment, respondent retaliated against her on account of statutorily protected activity?
Findings Of Fact In April, of 1982, the year after her 19-year marriage to a Mr. Powell, whose surname she originally kept, came to an end, petitioner Gloria Patricia Hord, as she has been known since her remarriage in August of 1984, began work for respondent Bell Aerospace Textron, which has since become the Textron Marine Systems Division of Textron, Inc. (Textron). A defense contractor that builds landing craft air cushion vehicles and trains Navy personnel to operate them, Textron employs perhaps 130 persons in Panama City alone. Textron has a written policy against sexual harassment by or of its employees. As Textron's director of logistics at its Panama City facility, George Gust Alepakos, told the petitioner she was hired on April 3, 1982. Robert L. Ormsby and Albert Eugene "Bud" Small, the supervisor of inventory control who, as her immediate supervisor, shared an office with her when she began, had already interviewed her. Bell hired her as a clerk, general class III in labor grade N-6. The duties of general class III clerks are: Under general supervision, performs a variety of clerical work, where there is individual responsibility for the accuracy and completeness of important records and where decisions within the limits of policies or rules are required. Performs duties such as or similar to the following: supervises and works with a small group of clerks; sets up and maintains record systems of a widely varying nature, including secret or confidential material or information; prepares and issues reports as required; contacts other personnel as necessary in maintaining accurate records; reads reports, correspondence, publications, etc., and abstracts therefrom information pertaining to a particular subject; may perform miscellaneous duties relate dot office work, such as filing, operating various machines, etc. (sic). Respondent's Exhibit No. 23. According to Bell's job description, "demonstrated supervisory ability", is a desirable qualification for general class III clerks. In addition to processing receipts and keeping inventory logs, Patty Powell, as her co-workers then called her, typed and did other secretarial chores for Textron. She worked in a trailer which housed other offices and other workers, including Carol Bjorgan, Robert L. Ormsby, Monica Mitchell, Mike Pate, Mike Smith, Betty Brandon, and George Alepakos, to whom Mr. Small reported. Mr. Alepakos was in the adjoining office. Witnesses described Mr. Alepakos as personable, fun loving, happy go lucky, warm, friendly, outgoing, talkative, loud, sometimes grouchy, displaying a temper at times without being a screamer, dedicated, conscientious, a hard worker and a firm manager. He looked at the hearing to be in his sixties. The time Ms. Powell told him he reminded her of her grandfather, he said she had hurt his feelings. One day as Ms. Powell, then 36 years old, was typing, Mr. Alepakos stood behind her and placed his hands on her shoulders, watching her finish a memorandum. Mr. Alepakos invited Ms. Powell to lunch on several occasions. He regularly took employees in his group to lunch, both male and female, individually and in groups. Conversations at lunch were "business-related" and "very professional" at first. The third or fourth time they ate lunch together, however, Mr. Alepakos professed his love for Ms. Powell. Thereafter, when Mr. Small left the office, Mr. Alepakos would stop in. Within a week of declaring himself at lunch, he said, "I really mean it." He told her she would grow to love him, would learn to, and began leaving notes for her, typically like the one that said, "I love you," signed "George ." She "tried to laugh it off," questioning his sincerity. He was married, and she had a boyfriend. Beginning in the summer of 1982, he asked her almost daily for lunch. He telephoned to inquire, "Have I told you today that I love you?" Sometimes she went to lunch with him during this period, but more often she declined. He promised to behave if she accepted his invitations for lunch, but, in Ms. Powell's view, he welshed on these promises. She had mixed feelings about George Alepakos. She discussed with Carol Bjorgan the possibility of a relationship with him. By this time, her boyfriend Chip McDill had left her in the lurch. It would be nice to have someone older to take care of her, she mused aloud; and she felt she would be better off materially. Never once did she complain to Carol Bjorgan about Mr. Alepakos' romantic interest in her. She left him notes. One note, signed "Patty" and written on notepaper depicting two smiling bees among azalea blossoms, read, "Have a wonderful vacation, then hurry back." Respondent's Exhibit No. 2. One night she and Carol were drinking during "happy hour." Saying she wanted to talk to George, she telephoned his home, but hung up when his wife answered. She sometimes seemed to boast about Mr. Alepakos' taking her to lunch, asking, "Guess who I'm going to lunch with?" At Peddlers Alley one night, Mlles. Hord and Bjorgan met Mr. Alepakos for drinks. When they arrived, Ms. Hord playfully pretended to sit in Mr. Alepakos' lap, and said to Ms. Bjorgan, "We can handle it from here." In December of 1982, both Mr. Alepakos and Ms. Powell attended a party at a bar or restaurant. Mr. Alepakos "didn't think much" of her going out with the 23-year old man who escorted her to the party, danced with her, kissed her while they were on the dance floor, and, later in the evening, wrestled with her in the back seat of an automobile parked outside the establishment. He felt that "it looked bad for the company." The next morning, he called her into his office, told her she had "fallen off [her] pedestal," and that somebody had said she had behaved like a slut. Over the Christmas holidays she was in the hospital, and afterwards visited her mother in Atlanta. Mr. Alepakos called her there at the number she had given him, to ask about her health and to learn when she was coming back to work. On her return she talked things over with Mr. Small, her immediate supervisor, although she never told him about Mr. Alepakos' touching her. He advised her to decline the luncheon invitations and avoid Mr. Alepakos as much as possible. He spoke to Mr. Ormsby about the matter, at her request. In deference to Ms. Powell, who asked that nobody say anything to Mr. Alepakos, Mr. Small spoke to Mr. Ormsby "off the record." At some point, Mr. Alepakos called on Ms. Powell at the apartment she had recently moved into at Panama City Beach. She had invited him. When he arrived he found her with her daughter and stayed only about 20 minutes. Eventually Patty Powell went herself to Mr. Ormsby, and Mr. Ormsby took the matter up with Clarence L. Forrest, then the vice-president in charge of Textron's Panama City operations. Messrs. Ormsby and Forrest decided to transfer Ms. Powell to a general secretarial and word processing assignment in "the training trailer." The transfer was "lateral" in the sense that neither Ms. Powell's official job description nor her labor grade changed. In her new situation, she was involved in the production of training manuals. Bell hired two other word processing clerks to assist in this effort, Diane Ansell and April Dawn Day. Ms. Powell had recommended both Ms. Ansell and Ms. Day. She helped train them when they began. Even after they had learned the ropes, she gave them work to do which she proofread afterwards. If she was out, Ms. Ansell would assume these duties. Ms. Powell wrote out evaluations for Ms. Ansell and Ms. Day, although she never signed them. She did once sign an overtime authorization form, but Mr. Forrest sent it back for Mr. Higgins' signature and resubmission. She assumed her new duties in February of 1983, but invitations to lunch and expressions of affection continued after the transfer. One afternoon, just after Ms. Powell left the office, Mr. Alepakos said to Diane Ansell, "I love that girl," referring to Ms. Powell. After she told Mr. Ormsby that Mr. Alepakos would not leave her be, Mr. Forrest instructed Mr. Alepakos to cease and desist from any activity involving Ms. Powell unrelated to professional requirements, and directed him to communicate with her, if at all, through third parties. During the ensuing eight or nine months, Mr. Alepakos avoided Ms. Powell entirely. He "went the other way around when he saw her coming." In the fall of 1983, however, they were both at an office party at the Long Glass. She grabbed his shirt and led him into another room, where she asked him why he had been avoiding her. According to a friend and co-worker, petitioner was not "an outward flirt," except when she drank. Encouraged by the evening's events, Mr. Alepakos resumed his attentions. He telephoned several times a day, unless he was angry, and they began lunching together again. At various times, she told him she was at the point of reconciliation with her ex-husband, that she was seeing a boyfriend, and that she was gay. But she accepted a good many of his luncheon invitations, which was enough to inspire him to several proposals of marriage. In November of 1983, Ms. Powell came to work early one morning and made her way in the still dark trailer to the word processing room. Suddenly Mr. Alepakos, whom she had not seen nor expected to be there, embraced her and tried to kiss her. When the lights came on, he said, "I'm sorry", and left. During this period, Ms. Powell worked under the immediate supervision of Frank Higgins, who left civilian employment with the Navy and began with Textron in August of 1983. In early December of that year, Ms. Powell spoke to Mr. Higgins about Mr. Alepakos. After a second conversation on the subject, on February 9, 1984, Mr. Higgins stated, in a "Memo For the Record": FOR BACKGROUND, PATTY IS AN EXTREMELY QUIET, SHY PERSON WITH A RATHER "FRAGILE" QUALITY. SHE IS A DEDICATED PROFESSIONAL IN HER APPROACH TO HER JOB. SHE HAS NEVER APPEARED TO PROJECT (AVERT OR OTHERWISE) HER SEXUALITY AT WORK, DRESSES CONSERVATIVELY - AN IDEAL FEMALE WORKER IN TERMS OF NOT BEING INVOLVED TO ANY EXTENT WITH HER MALE CO- WORKERS OTHER THEN PROFESSIONALLY. SHE HAS NOT AND PROFESSES NO[T] TO WANT TO DATE ANYONE FROM WORK. GEORGE IS APPARENTLY "LEANING" ON HER AT WORK TO THE POINT SHE'S BECOMING EMOTIONALLY FRAZZLED OVER IT. HE PROFESSES TO BE IN LOVE AND "WANTS HER." GEORGE IS INSANELY JEALOUS OF HER BEING SURROUNDED BY ALL THESE MEN AND TOLD HER THAT DAVE STULTS, BOB NISSLEY AND MYSELF ARE OR MAY WANT TO BE ROMANTICALLY INVOLVED. HE CALLS HER SEVERAL TIMES SOME DAYS, SOMETIMES ASKING HER TO COME TO HIS OFFICE WHERE "COMMENTS ARE MADE" TO HER. SHE IS AFRAID NOT TO GO OVER TO HIS OFFICE - APPARENTLY FEELS GEORGE IS A POWER BROKER AND IF SHE GETS HIM MAD, HE'LL TAKE IT OUT ON TRAINING BY NOT SUPPORTING OUR NEEDS. PATTY SAYS SHE HAS TRIED EVERY CONCEIVABLE APPROACH TO TELL GEORGE SHE IS NOT INTERESTED IN HIM AND HE'S ANNOYING HER & SHE WANTS IT STOPPED. YET HE REFUSES TO LEAVE HER ALONE. I TOLD HER THAT SHE NEEDS TO THREATEN HIM WITH HARASSMENT CHARGES & BE WILLING TO FOLLOW UP ON THEM TO THE BITTER END - IF GEO. KNEW SHE WAS SERIOUS AND HIS JOB WAS IN DANGER, I HOPE HE WOULD BE PRUDENT ENOUGH TO BACK AWAY. PATTY SEEMS RELUCTANT TO PRESS CHARGES FOR FEAR THAT SHE WILL END UP BEING FIRED AND PERCEIVED AS THE CAUSE OF THE PROBLEM. SHE FEELS CASEY WILL PROTECT GEORGE AND WOULD CONSIDER GEO. MORE IMPORTANT TO BELL THAN PATTY. IN PREVIOUS DISCUSSIONS WITH CASEY DATING BACK TO DECEMBER, I TOO SENSED THAT EITHER CASEY WASN'T BE[ING] OBJECTIVE OR FAIR IN HIS ASSESSMENT OF PATTY OR THAT POSSIBLY GEORGE HAD BEEN FEEDING CASEY LIES AND INNUENDO ABOUT PATTY'S POTENTIAL INVOLVEMENT WITH PERSONNEL IN TRAINING. THE APPARENT STRATEGY IS TO CAST DOUBTS ABOUT PATTY'S CHARACTER SUCH THAT IF HIS SITUATION EVER BOILED TO THE SURFACE HE COULD BLAME IT ON HER TO SAVE HIS JOB. I BELIEVE THERE IS ENOUGH INFO AVAILABLE TO HAVE GEO. REPRIMANDED OR FIRED OVER THIS. THERE ARE SEVERAL PEOPLE WHO HAVE SEEN OR HEARD GEO. MAKE APPROACHES TO HER WHO I'M SURE WOULD COME FORWARD TO SUPPORT PATTY'S POSITION. SINCE THE DISCUSSION WAS OFF THE RECORD I AGREED NOT TO APPROACH CASEY YET. I OFFERED TO SPEAK WITH GEO. BUT IF HE PERCEIVES ME AS A COMPETITOR FOR PATTY, HE OBVIOUSLY WOULD MISCONSTRUE MY INTENTIONS. I DO INTEND TO SPEAK TO LENNY MORGAN "OFF THE RECORD" NEXT WEEK IN NEW ORLEANS TO GAIN SOME ADDITIONAL INSIGHT IN HANDLING THIS ISSUE. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1. In a second "Memo For The Record," Mr. Higgins reported discussing the situation with Mr. Morgan, and summarized the latter's advice. * * * LENNY'S BOTTOM LINE WAS AS I SUSPECTED - DON'T LEAVE IT SIMMERING TAKE FIRM ACTION. BRING IT TO CASEY'S ATTENTION. LENNY INDICATED HE WOULD BE GLAD TO COME OVER AND BECOME DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN SOLVING THIS. * * * Petitioner's Exhibit No. 2. Although Mr. Higgins never showed these memoranda to "Casey" Forrest, who only learned of them after the present proceedings began, he did mention the situation to Mr. Forrest, who indicated that he wondered whether there was a "problem on both sides," but agreed to speak to Mr. Alepakos. By the time Mr. Higgins left Panama City, in July of 1984, he thought the situation had been resolved. About this time, Ms. Powell told Mr. Alepakos she planned to remarry. He responded that he would be there, if it did not work out. He said he still loved her, and he did not stop asking her out, although, after she became Mrs. Hord, she consistently declined. He continued to declare his love. Mrs. Hord again complained, this time to B. L. Nissley, Textron's director of training documentation, on or about December 15, 1985. Her complaint notwithstanding, she sent Mr. Alepakos a poinsettia for Christmas. At some point, she left a note on his desk, saying "Missing you, P.H." By a memorandum dated January 29, 1985, Mr. Nissley asked Mr. Forrest for a formal investigation "to assure that this problem be resolved once and for all." Respondent's Exhibit No. 6. On January 31, 1985, Mr. Forrest interviewed Mrs. Hord in Mr. Ormsby's presence. She reported the frequent invitations to lunch and a suggestion by Mr. Alepakos that they take a vacation together, but said nothing about his touching her. Messrs. Forrest and Ormsby also interviewed Mr. Alepakos. They decided it might be well for a disinterested third party to investigate, and asked Textron's Mr. Morgan to come over from New Orleans for the purpose. Mr. Morgan interviewed Mrs. Hord for two and a half hours on February 10 or 11, 1985. In answer to his questions, Mrs. Hord said that Mr. Alepakos had not asked her for sexual favors, and had not behaved vulgarly, lewdly or indecently. Nor did she advert to the early morning incident in the trailer, which Mr. Alepakos admitted at hearing, while denying any attempt to kiss her. When Mr. Morgan asked her if Mr. Alepakos had ever touched her, or tried to kiss her or to force himself on her, she answered no. Mr. Morgan asked Mrs. Hord to name others who could support her claim of harassment. She gave him only one name, Ms. Ansell's. Mr. Morgan also interviewed George Alepakos at length, and asked him to name others who could support his assertions. Mr. Alepakos gave him some five names. After interviewing these people and Ms. Ansell, Mr. Morgan returned to New Orleans and stated his conclusions in a memorandum dated February 15, 1985. Mr. Forrest wrote Mr. Alepakos a memorandum advising him that his "conduct in the matter lacked professionalism and good judgement." Petitioner's Exhibit No. 6. He was "warned to confine ... communications and relationships with Mrs. G. Hord to a professional/business environment." Id. This February 25, 1985, memorandum raised "the possibility of termination of [Alepakos'] employment," id. in the event "the cited harassments reoccur[ed]." Id. But the phrase "cited harassments" was a reference to the February 15, 1985, memorandum, Respondent's Exhibit No. 6, in which Mr. Morgan stated: Since the evidence indicates that the relationship was two sided, I find it difficult to describe the activity of Mr. Alepakos as one of harassment. Respondent's Exhibit No. 6, p. 2. Mr. Forrest did not warn or reprimand Mrs. Hord because he felt a supervisor or manager had a different responsibility in matters of this kind than an employee under supervision. At no time, did Mr. Alepakos tell her off color stories, show her pornographic photographs, explicitly solicit sexual favors, or make obscene gestures to or from Mrs. Hord. It fell to Messrs. Ormsby and Nissley to relay the results of Mr. Morgan's investigation to Mrs. Hord. The three of them gathered in Mr. Nissley's office, and he furnished her a copy to read. She had gotten part way through when she exclaimed, "That's a lie. I never sent him flowers. I never left notes on his desk." She threw down the report, and left the office, despite Mr. Nissley's telling her to stay. She dismissed the February 15, 1985, memorandum as a "bunch of bullshit." Mr. Nissley spoke to her afterwards and told her that he would not tolerate vulgar outbursts in the future. She telephoned Mr. Morgan and complained to him about the result of the investigation. She told him she did not think the report was fair or that it reflected what had happened. She became upset and characterized the report as "bullshit." To this he replied, "Wait a minute. I'll answer any question you want to ask." But she hung up the telephone. On January 30, 1985, Mrs. Hord had asked to take a leave of absence. Her request approved, she began thirty days' leave soon after she learned the results of Mr. Morgan's investigation. Upon her return, Mr. Nissley told her about the results of her annual evaluation, and informed her she had been given a raise of $.20 per hour. The $.20 raise took effect March 16, 1985. With the raise, Mrs. Hord was paid $7.90 per hour, a dollar an hour more than Diane "Dee" Ansell was paid. And Ms. Ansell was paid more than April Dawn Day, the third word processing clerk who helped produce training materials for Navy personnel. Mrs. Hord requested a meeting with Mr. Forrest to discuss the raise, which brought her salary to the highest authorized for her position; it was the same amount as the raise the other two word processing clerks in the training program received. But, since she was paid more than they were, the raise represented a smaller percentage of increase, and she objected. On the morning of March 27, 1985, when Mrs. Hord met with Mr. Forrest, Messrs. Ormsby and Nissley were also present. She told them Bell could keep the raise. Mr. Forrest began to explain the mechanics of Bell's merit raise system, when Mrs. Hord interrupted, "It's a bunch of bullshit. You can do anything you want." As she started to leave, Mr. Forrest told her to stay, but she refused. At one point, she called her bosses "jackasses." According to Mr. Forrest's secretary, who was outside, she "had a wild look" as she slammed the door on her way out. Before they dispersed, Mr. Forrest and the others decided to terminate her employment, unless Mr. Morgan advised against it. Mr. Forrest thought her language "unbecoming a lady." He certainly would not have expected a woman to use such language, and it did not affect him in the same way as it would have, if a man had used the same language. On the other hand, he would not have expected any of Bell's Panama City employees to use language of this kind in such a setting. Mr. Forrest testified under oath that Mrs. Hord was not fired because he found her language the more offensive on account of her femininity. Apprised of the situation, Mr. Morgan consulted a New York lawyer, then told management in Panama City he had no objection to firing Mrs. Hord. Mr. Ormsby then caused a memorandum to be addressed to Mrs. Hord, notifying her that her employment was "terminated as of this date (27 March 1985), for gross disrespect, incertituded (sic), premeditated and continued disregard for all levels of Management ... so as to challenge the management of this company and to incite disrespect of other employees ...." Respondent's Exhibit No. 10.
Recommendation It is, accordingly, RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Commission on Human Relations dismiss Gloria Hord's petition for relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of September, 1987, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of September, 1987. APPENDIX Petitioner's proposed findings of fact Nos. 1, 5, 6, 7, 8, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, 23, 24, 25, 26, 29, 30, 32, 33, 36, 37, 38, 39 and 40 have been adopted, in substance, insofar as material. With respect to petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 2, the evidence showed that she worked as an acting supervisor for Columbia Research but not, as far as the hearing officer's notes reflect, for CSC. With respect to petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 3, the evidence showed that Mr. Small interviewed her first. Mr. Alepakos, as his supervisor, could presumably have overruled Mr. Small's choice even if Mr. Small made the "basic decision" to hire. Petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 4 has been adopted, in substance, except that the evidence did not establish that he placed his hands on her shoulders more than once. With respect to petitioner's proposed findings of fact Nos. 9 and 10, the evidence did not reveal any sexual advances at this point, aside from declarations of love, which were not entirely unwelcome. Except for the last sentence, petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 11 has been adopted, in substance, insofar as material. With respect to the final sentence of No. 11 and the word "Again" in No. 13, it was not clear from the evidence that she went to Mr. Ormsby before Christmas. With respect to petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 12, Mrs. Hord did not always go "to great lengths to avoid contact with Mr. Alepakos during this time period." She not infrequently accepted his invitations to lunch. Petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 14 has been rejected as against the weight of the evidence. Petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 16 has been adopted, in substance, insofar as material, except that Mr. Alepakos was not put on any formal probation. With respect to petitioner's proposed finding of fact Nos. 21 and 22, the evidence showed that he resumed his attentions because of her advances. With respect to petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 27, the evidence showed that he called, but not that he called frequently. With respect to petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 28, he did not come by uninvited. With respect to petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 31, he said she needed to see a doctor but not, in so many words, that the marriage would fail. With respect to petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 34, nobody placed limits on Mr. Morgan's investigation. Petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 35 has been rejected as contrary to the evidence. She was not told she would be reprimanded for making good faith complaints. Respondent's proposed findings of fact Nos. 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 13, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 26, 29, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, the first two sentences of No. 38, Nos. 40, 41, 42, 43, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 58, 60, 61, 62, 65, 66, 70 and 72 have been adopted, in substance, insofar as material. With respect to respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 4, she lived at Panama City Beach at one point. Respondent's proposed findings of fact Nos. 9 and 10 are immaterial or subordinate. Respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 11 is rejected. With respect to respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 12, Ms. Bjorgan's testimony was that she was not sure Mrs. Hord wanted to see him that night. Respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 14 has been accepted, in substance, insofar as material, except for Small's suggested advice to change her manner of dress. With respect to respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 25, Mrs. Hord was ambivalent about Mr. Alepakos before as after the incident. Respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 27 is rejected. Respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 28 blows a single incident out of proportion. Respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 30 is rejected. The final sentence of respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 38 is rejected, as is No. 39 to the extent it proceeds on the assumption there was any hiatus. Respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 44 has been adopted, in substance, except that the evidence did not establish that the poinsettia was flowering. With respect to respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 57, the epithet was "jackasses." With respect to respondent's proposed findings of fact Nos. 59 and 64, Alepakos had no input, but the fact of her complaints was considered and inspired the call to Morgan. Respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 63 is immaterial, except that Alepakos' attentions did not cause great mental stress. With respect to respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 67, his overtures were romantic. With respect to respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 68, he did propose marriage. Respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 69 has been adopted, in substance, insofar as material, except for the final clause of the final sentence which is rejected. Respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 71 is immaterial or subordinate. COPIES FURNISHED: Alvin L. Peters, Esquire 36 Oak Avenue Panama City, Florida 32401 William B. deMeza, Jr., Esquire Holland and Knight Post Office Box 241 Bradenton, Florida 33506 Donald A. Griffin, Executive Director Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1925 Dana Baird, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1925
The Issue Whether Respondent committed the violations alleged in the Administrative Complaint, as amended, and, if so, what penalties should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at the final hearing and the record as a whole, the following findings of fact are made: Respondent is now, and has been since June 5, 1986, a Florida-licensed clinical social worker, holding license number SW1666. S. G. became a patient of Respondent's in the fall of 1992, when she was experiencing marital difficulties. Her then husband, from whom she was separated, was already a patient of Respondent's. Pursuant to Respondent's suggestion, S. G. saw Respondent as a patient once a week. S. G. and her husband met with Respondent both as a couple and separately. At first, during his sessions with S. G., when they were alone, Respondent's demeanor was "pretty professional"; however, as time passed, "boundaries were crossed." Respondent began to talk to S. G. about his personal life. For example, he told her about the extramarital affairs he had had, claiming that these instances of infidelity had occurred "when he was highly stressed." After making this claim, he added that he "had been very, very stressed lately." In or about late April of 1993, when S. G. was still a patient of his, Respondent telephoned S. G.'s residence and asked S. G.'s son, who had answered the telephone, if he could speak with S. G. S. G.'s son thereupon handed S. G. the telephone and S. G. began conversing with Respondent. During their conversation, Respondent told S. G. that he "wanted to engage in phone sex." When S. G. declined to participate in such activity, Respondent asked her to visit him that evening at his office, which she agreed to do. As promised, that evening, after dark, S. G. went to Respondent's office. When she arrived, at around 8:00 or 9:00 p.m., Respondent was in his office seeing another patient. S. G. remained in the waiting area outside Respondent's office until the other patient left and Respondent came out and invited her to return with him to his office. Upon entering the office, S. G. sat down in a chair. Respondent thereupon took off his tie and asked S. G. if she trusted him, to which S. G. replied, "Yes." Respondent then tied S. G.'s hands behind her back with his tie. The two wound up on the floor together, where they engaged in sexual intercourse. They were interrupted by the ringing of the telephone in the waiting area. Respondent left the office to answer the telephone. He joked that it was probably his wife "wondering where he was." When he returned to the office, Respondent tossed S. G. a few tissues to use to clean herself off. He then asked S. G. (whose car was parked in front of the building in which Respondent's office was located) to drive him to his car (that was parked behind the building), which she did. They both then went their separate ways. S. G. was "very upset" following this encounter. Respondent telephoned her the following morning and told her he needed to see her. He met her later that day at a delicatessen. When S. G. ordered only a cup of coffee, Respondent told her that she was a "cheap date." During their conversation in the delicatessen, Respondent told S. G. that what had happened the night before "had to remain between the two of [them] and no one else could know." On a subsequent occasion, approximately a month or so later, in or about early June of 1993, when she was still a patient of Respondent's, S. G. had another encounter with Respondent in which the two of them engaged in sexual activity. This meeting took place in the evening, at approximately 9:00 or 10:00 p.m., in S. G.'s vehicle, which was parked near a "video store" from which Respondent had rented "some videos" that he needed to return. After returning the "videos," Respondent joined S. G. in her vehicle. Upon entering the vehicle, he commented "about how [S. G.] looked." The two then engaged in oral sex, after which Respondent stated that "somebody's wife wasn't going to get any that night." Following this second instance of sexual activity between Respondent and S. G., S. G. began to feel that she was "being taken advantage of, manipulated, and betrayed" by Respondent. She therefore stopped seeing him. In addition, she filed a civil action against Respondent and gave a statement to the police concerning her relationship and activities with Respondent. At the time of the final hearing in this case, S. G.'s civil action against Respondent had been settled and S. G. had received from Respondent the money he had agreed (as part of the settlement) to pay her. S. G.'s statement to the police led to criminal charges being filed against Respondent in Broward County Circuit Court Case No. 94-17857CF. Respondent was initially charged with three counts of sexual conduct by a psychotherapist, in violation of Section 491.0112, Florida Statutes, 3/ to which he pled not guilty. Pursuant to a "plea bargain," the charges were reduced to three counts of simple (misdemeanor) battery, to which Respondent pled guilty "in [his] best interest." 4/ Respondent was adjudicated guilty and, as to each count, placed on consecutive one-year terms of probation. The following is an excerpt from the transcript of the proceeding at which Respondent entered his guilty plea to these reduced charges: THE COURT: Is there a stipulation to the factual basis of the plea? MR. DUTKO [Defense Counsel]: Yes[] sir[,] as to the offense of battery. THE COURT: Okay. What facts would the State bring forth if the case went to trial? MR. SHANE [Prosecutor): The State would allege that on or about the 27th day of April, 1993, on two separate occasions, at two separate times and locations, the defendant did unlawfully touch or strike [S. G.] without her permission. With respect to Count III, as amended in the information, on or about the 1st day of June, 1993, the defendant did touch or strike [S. G.] without [her] permission or consent. THE COURT: Court finds that the defendant received advice of competent counsel with whom he is satisfied[;] [t]hat he knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived the constitutional rights contained in the plea form[;] and [that] he freely entered into this plea agreement. The Court finds the defendant competent. There's a factual basis and the Court hereby accepts [the change] of plea and makes the agreement to enter the plea and waiver of rights an exhibit for the purpose of the court file. Any reason why sentence should not be imposed? MR. DUTKO: No, sir. THE COURT: As to case 94-17857 as far as amended Court adjudicates the defendant guilty of Count I, II and III, which has been amended to Misdemeanor Battery. The defendant is placed on one year probation on each count. All counts are to run consecutive[ly], rather than concurrent[ly], with the following special conditions[:] $143.00 court cost[s], and that's to be paid at minimum equal monthly increments over the period of probation; [r]andom urinalysis to determine the presence of a controlled substance[;] [t]wo hundred hours of community service, and that may be performed at any nonprofit entity at a minimum and equal monthly increments over the period of his three years of probation[;] [n]o contact directly or indirectly with [S. G.], her family or her place of business[;] [t]hat the defendant may travel for business purposes within Dade, Broward and Palm Beach[;] [t]he defendant is permitted to go to Orlando, during the periods that have been set forth[;] [a]nd the Court has no objection to the defendant, at some future date, . . . com[ing] in and request[ing] further travel once the Department has been given an opportunity to be heard. Is that [the] sum and substance of the agreement? MR. DUTKO: It is Your Honor.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Board enter a final order finding Respondent guilty of the violations of Section 491.009(2)(c), (k), (q), and (s), Florida Statutes, described above and disciplining him for having committed these violations by fining him $2,000.00, suspending his license for a period of six months, and placing him on probation for a period of one year commencing immediately following the conclusion of the period of his suspension. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of July, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of July, 2000.
