The Issue On February 28, 1996, the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes (Petitioner) issued a Notice To Show Cause to Robert O'Brien (O'Brien) alleging that O'Brien violated Section 326.006(2)(e)7, Florida Statutes. Specifically, O'Brien was charged with allowing an unlicensed person to attempt to sell a 52' Hatteras known as "Watermellon" on behalf of O'Brien Yacht Sales. The issue is whether this violation occurred and, if so, what penalty is appropriate. On May 15, 1996, the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes (Petitioner) issued an Amended Notice To Show Cause to David Sandmann (Sandmann) alleging that Sandmann violated Section 326.004(1), Florida Statutes. Specifically, Sandmann was charged with offering or negotiating to sell a 52' Hatteras, known as "Watermellon". The issue is whether this violation occurred and, if so, what penalty is appropriate. RULINGS ON PETITIONER'S EXCEPTIONS TO ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE'S FINDINGS OF FACT Petitioner filed an exception to the Administrative Law Judge's Finding of Fact number 15. Section 120.57(1)(j), Florida Statutes, states that: The agency may not reject or modify the findings of fact unless the agency first determines from a review of the entire record, and states with particularity in the order, that the findings of fact were not based upon competent substantial evidence. A thorough review of the record has been made. The Division adopts and incorporates by reference the first sentence of the Administrative Law Judge's Finding of Fact number 15. Petitioner's exceptions to the remainder of Finding of Fact number 15 are accepted because the remainder of the Administrative Law Judge's Finding of Fact number 15 is not supported by competent substantial evidence. The second sentence, "The conflict as to whether Respondent Sandmann's acts, considered collectively, establish that he was attempting to sell the boat is resolved by finding that he was not attempting to sell the boat." is rejected because, the Petitioner presented testimony which proved that Sandmann: offered "to help" the Division investigators when they approached the boat. (T. 20, 38-39). gave the Division investigators a business card with his name and O'Brien Yacht Sales, Inc. written on it. (T. 19, 38-19, 52)( P's Exh. 2) gave the Division investigators a spec sheet containing information about the boat. (T. 21, 32, 39, 52). (P's Exh. 3). told the Division investigators that the price of the boat was negotiable. (T 22, 29-30, 39-40, 52). told the Division investigators that the commission would be paid by the seller. (T 21, 22, 29-30, 32, 34, 40, 43) had a copy of a blank sales contract faxed to him (from O'Brien Yacht Sales, Inc.) at the boat show. (T. 22- 23, 41, 52) Also at Recommended Order, page 5, paragraphs 9, 10, 11 and 12. Additionally, there was no competent substantial evidence to support the Hearing Officer's Finding of Fact that Respondent Sandmann was not offering or negotiating to sell the boat, because these actions were uncontroverted. Respondent Sandmann never denied that he was offering or negotiating to sell the boat. Furthermore, the sentence in question is not a Finding of Fact, but rather a Conclusion of Law. The Administrative Law Judge's characterization of this as a Finding of Fact, does not make it so. In Hernicz v. State Dept. of Professional Reg., 390 So.2d 194 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980), facts were undisputed that a nurse practitioner had done certain acts, and when the Board concluded that the actions were a violation of the statute, the court held that that amounted to a Conclusion of Law and not a Finding of Fact. The "facts" were the individual actions that were taken by the Respondent, whether these acts violated the statute was a Conclusion of Law. As stated above, the acts, themselves, in this case were neither denied nor disputed. The second sentence in Finding of Fact number 15 is stricken in its entirety. The third sentence in Finding of Fact number 15 states that "[I]t is clear that Respondent Sandmann was at no time acting as an employee of Mr. Mellon or Respondent O'Brien or with the expectation of receiving compensation for his acts". The "expectation of receiving compensation" was the argument relied on by the Respondents at hearing as their defense to participating in the boat show. Because "compensation" is an integral part of Chapter 326, Florida Statutes, its interpretation should be left to the expertise of the agency. It is a well settled principle that the interpretation of a statute by the agency responsible for its enforcement is entitled to great weight, and will not be overturned unless clearly erroneous. Department of Environmental Regulation v. Goldring, 477 So.2d 532 (Fla. 1985); Shell Harbor Grou, Inc. v. Department of Business Regulation, 487 So.2d 1141 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986). The Division believes that "compensation" can be other than a monetary commission, as claimed by Respondents. "Compensation" can be "perks" such as transportation or use of a house or yacht, or something intangible, such as friendship and affection. The existence of a quid pro quo is what is looked for. Furthermore, from a thorough reading of the record, it was proven by substantial competent evidence that a commission was anticipated being paid, because Petitioner's investigators were told that "the commission would be paid by the seller". (T 21, 22, 29-30, 32, 34, 40, 43). Possibly, no monetary commission was paid to Sandmann, because the yacht did not sell. Regardless, the Division finds that the friendship between Mr. Mellon and Sandmann was adequate compensation under Chapter 326, Florida Statutes. The third sentence of Finding of Fact number 15 is stricken in its entirety. The fourth sentence, "Respondent Sandmann was at the Boat Show and on the `Watermellon' solely as a friend of Mr. Mellon, the owner", is also rejected. The Division does not dispute the long standing friendship of Respondent Sandmann and Mr. Mellon, however being someone's "friend", does not exempt them from Chapter 326, Florida Statutes. There was uncontroverted testimony that Respondent Sandmann was offering or negotiating to sell the boat. That is all that is necessary for him to be within the jurisdiction of the Division, and require him to have a license. Although his friendship could be his motivation or compensation for being on the yacht, his actions, while there, show that he was offering or negotiating to sell the "Watermellon". The fourth sentence of Finding of Fact Number 15 is stricken in its entirety. RULINGS ON PETITIONER'S EXCEPTION TO ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE'S CONCLUSIONS OF LAW Petitioner filed an Exception to Conclusion of Law number 23 contained in the Recommended Order. This conclusion stated that the Petitioner had failed to meet its burden as to Sandmann because it failed to establish that he was attempting to sell the yacht, and, if the case against Sandmann failed, then the case against O'Brien failed. The Division rejects this Conclusion of Law because it believes that Petitioner proved by substantial competent evidence that Sandmann was offering or negotiating to sell the "Watermellon", and that friendship is adequate compensation.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the agency of the State of Florida that administers and enforces the Florida Yacht and Ship Brokers' Act, Chapter 326, Florida Statutes. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent O'Brien has been licensed as a Yacht and Ship Broker pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 326, Florida Statutes. Respondent O'Brien owns and operates O'Brien Yacht Sales. Respondent O'Brien resides in and has his principal place of business in Palm Beach County, Florida. Mr. Sandmann is a resident of Essex, Connecticut. He has never been licensed as a yacht salesman or as a yacht broker. Mr. Sandmann makes his livelihood as the owner of a dog collar manufacturing business. Henry Mellon, the boat's owner, held a salesman's license issued by Petitioner that expired in August 1994. At the times pertinent to this proceeding, Mr. Mellon was not licensed by the Petitioner. Respondent Sandmann, Respondent O'Brien, and Mr. Mellon have been close friends for many years. Mr. Mellon formerly worked for O'Brien Yacht Sales. Mr. Mellon and Respondent Sandmann are old friends from college. The Fort Lauderdale International Boat Show permitted only new yachts or brokered yachts. Individuals were not supposed to sell boats in this show. Respondent O'Brien was aware of this restriction. In October 1995, Respondent O'Brien had the boat "Watermellon" displayed and listed for sale at the 36th Annual Fort Lauderdale International Boat Show. The asking price for the sale of the Watermellon was $425,000. Mr. Mellon is neither an officer or a director of O'Brien Yacht Sales. Mr. Mellon signed a form styled "Application and Contract for Exhibit Space" so that the Watermellon could be exhibited at the boat show and on this application represented that he was a vice president of O'Brien Yacht Sales. Neither Respondent O'Brien or his company paid to put the Watermellon in the Boat Show and neither expected to receive any commission from the sale of the Watermellon. Respondent O'Brien was acting out of friendship with Mr. Mellon. 1/ On October 27, 1995, Peter Butler and Robert Badger, in their official capacities as employees of the Petitioner, attended the Boat Show and went to the Watermellon. They observed a sign on the back of the boat that advised that the boat was being offered by O'Brien Yacht Sales and gave its telephone number. Mr. Butler and Mr. Badger approached the boat and asked a person, later identified as Respondent Sandmann, whether Respondent O'Brien was aboard. Respondent Sandmann told Mr. Butler and Mr. Badger that Respondent O'Brien was not aboard, asked if he could help them, and gave them a business card with his name and the name of O'Brien Yacht Sales on it. No licensed salesman was on board at this time, but Mr. Mellon, the owner of the boat, was aboard. 2/ Respondent Sandmann gave Mr. Butler and Mr. Badger a copy of a printed sheet containing basic information about the Watermellon. This sheet, referred to as a spec sheet, contained errors that Respondent Sandmann verbally corrected when he gave them the sheet. In response to questions, Respondent Sandmann told Mr. Butler and Mr. Badger that the price of the boat was negotiable and that the commission would be paid by the seller. Mr. Butler and Mr. Badger asked Respondent Sandmann if they could see a copy of the contract that a buyer would need to sign if he purchased the boat. In response, Respondent Sandmann contacted the O'Brien Yacht Sales office and had someone fax to him a copy of the contract used by O'Brien. Respondent Sandmann then gave the form contract to Mr. Butler and Mr. Badger. The business card given by Respondent Sandmann to Mr. Butler and Mr. Badger was printed in 1994 when Respondent Sandmann, who is fluent in French, Spanish, and Italian, accompanied Mr. Mellon to a boat show in Europe. Mr. Butler and Mr. Badger did not inquire as to the amount of the commission that would have been paid by the seller of the Watermellon because Petitioner does not regulate commissions. None of Respondent Sandmann's acts, when considered individually, required a license from the Petitioner. 3/ The conflict as to whether Respondent Sandmann's acts, considered collectively, establish that he was attempting to sell the boat is resolved by finding that he was not attempting to sell the boat. It is clear that Respondent Sandmann was at no time acting as an employee of Mr. Mellon or Respondent O'Brien or with the expectation of receiving compensation for his acts. Respondent Sandmann was at the Boat Show and on the Watermellon solely as a friend of Mr. Mellon, the owner.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Petitioner enter a final order as to these consolidated cases that dismisses the charges filed against these respondents. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of August, 1996, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of August, 1996.
The Issue Whether Respondent violated Sections 326.006(2)(e)1, 3, and 6 and 326.005, Florida Statutes, and if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact At all times material to this action, Respondent, Richard Spooner (Spooner), was licensed by the Petitioner, Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes (Department), as a yacht salesperson. In June 1998, Spooner worked for C & S Marine, Inc., (C & S), located in Fort Lauderdale, Florida. Chris Saumsiegle, the owner of C & S, was Spooner's employing broker. In June 1998, Chris Saumsiegle was working with Angelo Dieguez, a client from South Carolina, to locate a yacht for Mr. Dieguez to purchase. Mr. Saumsiegle negotiated the purchase of a yacht for Mr. Dieguez; however, the deal was not consummated. After Mr. Saumsiegle's attempt to negotiate the purchase of the yacht for Mr. Dieguez failed, Mr. Saumsiegle put Spooner, as a salesperson for C & S, in touch with Mr. Dieguez to find him a yacht to purchase. Spooner and Mr. Dieguez discussed the purchase of a 1995, 33-foot Sea Ray yacht, and Mr. Dieguez became interested in buying the vessel. Mr. Dieguez was advised by Spooner that he was working at home while his wife recovered from surgery. Spooner drafted a Purchase Agreement, which was a C & S form agreement containing the title "C & S Marine Brokerage Purchase Agreement." Spooner crossed out the telephone and fax numbers for C & S on the form, wrote in his home fax number, and faxed the document to Mr. Dieguez for execution. The purchaser agreement contained the following paragraph: The purchase price of the Vessel is Eighty- Seven Thousand Dollars ($87,000.--) Upon signing this agreement by the PURCHASER, a deposit of Eight Thousand Seven Hundred Dollars ($8,700.--) shall be paid by the PURCHASER to (hereinafter called the BROKER) and shall be held in Escrow by the BROKER. This offer is withdrawn if not accepted by June 12, 1998. Mr. Dieguez executed the purchase agreement and returned it to Spooner by fax for Spooner to make an $87,000 offer on the yacht. The terms of the purchase agreement required Mr. Dieguez to send ten percent of the purchase price as earnest money. Pursuant to the purchase agreement, the seller had only one day to respond to the offer after Mr. Dieguez faxed the purchase agreement to Spooner. Thus, Mr. Dieguez asked Spooner where to electronic funds transfer (EFT) his earnest money. Spooner faxed Mr. Dieguez instructions to make his check out to the Boating Center of Fort Lauderdale (Boating Center), the seller's agent or the seller, and to send the funds to Boating Center. In Mr. Dieguez' previous attempt to purchase a yacht through C & S, he had been given instructions to send his deposit by EFT to C & S's escrow account. Mr. Dieguez contacted Mr. Saumsiegle and asked why he was supposed to send a check to Boating Center. Mr. Saumsiegle was unaware that Spooner was trying to sell Mr. Dieguez a boat through Boating Center and that he had directed Mr. Diequez to send a check to Boating Center. Ultimately, Mr. Dieguez did not send a deposit and did not purchase the yacht. Mr. Saumsiegle terminated Spooner's relationship with C & S Marine in July 1998. Boating Center is not a licensed yacht brokerage.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered finding that Richard Spooner violated Subsections 326.006(2)(e)1, 3, and 6, Florida Statutes; suspending his salesperson's license for two years; and imposing an administrative fine of $5,000. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of December, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUSAN B. KIRKLAND Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of December, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Philip Nowick, Director Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202 Barbara D. Auger, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202 William Oglo, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202 Richard J. Zaden, Esquire Zaden & Wardell, P.A. 1749 Northeast 26th Street, Suite 200 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33305
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a Swiss national, who resides in Jamaica. His business in Jamaica involves water sports and vacation tours, primarily for European tourists. Petitioner attended a boat show in Fort Lauderdale, Florida, in order to locate a suitable boat for entertainment and tour purposes for use by his business in Jamaica. There, he saw The Lady, a vessel being brokered by Anchorline Yacht and Ship Brokerage, Inc., of St. Petersburg, Florida. On February 28, 1980, Petitioner purchased The Lady from Anchorline for $120,000. Prior to that date, a survey was conducted by Wilkinson Company, marine surveyors, and repairs indicated by that survey were completed at South Pasadena Marina, Inc. At the time that Petitioner purchased The Lady from Anchorline, he advised the broker that he was taking the vessel out of the country. Accordingly, the broker required Petitioner to sign an affidavit that Petitioner had read the provisions of Section 212.05, Florida Statutes, and no tax was collected on the sale and purchase of The Lady. As The Lady was journeying from St. Petersburg across the State of Florida to West Palm Beach in order to reach Jamaica, she started taking on water. She was taken to Lantana Boatyard, where another marine survey was conducted. That survey concluded that The Lady was not seaworthy and, therefore, could not be taken to Jamaica at that time. As one of the required repairs, her engines needed to be overhauled by Cummins in Miami. Accordingly, after the repairs to be made at the Lantana Boatyard were completed, The Lady was taken to the Keystone Point Marina in North Miami, Florida, so that the work on her Cummins engines could be undertaken. During this time, Petitioner attempted to register The Lady in Jamaica; however, the Jamaican Government refused to license or register the vessel since she was not in Jamaica but was still physically located within the State of Florida. As a result of discussion between Petitioner and a Mr. Mathews at Anchorline, on September 18, 1980, the Petitioner made application for a Florida boat Certificate of Title at a tag agency. He reported the purchase price as ten dollars and, accordingly, paid forty cents tax on the transaction. Cummins started the repair work necessary on The Lady's engines while she had been docked at the Keystone Point Marina. On occasion, Petitioner has stayed overnight on The Lady for security purposes. He has had a telephone attached to the vessel for his personal use while on board. On January 7, 1981, Respondent Department of Revenue issued a Warrant for Collection of Delinquent Sales and Use Tax against the Petitioner in the total amount of $9,967.37, representing the follows: Tax $4,799.60 Penalty 4,799.60 Interest 350.17 Filing Fee 18.00 $9,967.37 On January 19, 1981, Petitioner made payment to Respondent Department of Revenue in the amount of $5,167.77, which payment was made under protest and which payment represents the amount of tax, interest, and filing fees, but does not include the amount of penalty. Pursuant to its warrant, the Department of Revenue has chained The Lady to the dock at the Keystone Point Marina. Accordingly, the work being performed by Cummins on her engines has not been completed, and no sea trial can be conducted. As stipulated by the parties, since the Petitioner purchased The Lady, she has been under repair and has never left Florida waters.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is therefore, RECOMMENDED THAT: A final order be entered denying Petitioner's claim for a refund, finding the Petitioner liable for a sales tax equal to four percent of the purchase price, together with interest and filing fees, but finding the penalty assessed against Petitioner to be erroneous and therefore invalid. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of October 1981 in Tallahassee, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of October 1981. COPIES FURNISHED: Michael Lechtman, Esquire 801 N.E. 167th Street, Suite 301 North Miami Beach, Florida 33162 John Browdy, III, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mr. Randy Miller Executive Director Department of Revenue 102 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 The Honorable Gerald A. Lewis Comptroller, State of Florida The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the agency of the State of Florida charged with the responsibility to administer and to enforce the Florida Yacht and Ship Broker's Act, Chapter 326, Florida Statutes. At times prior to June 21, 1991, Respondent Bongiovi was licensed by Petitioner as a yacht broker. Respondent Bongiovi did not hold any license as a yacht broker at any time after June 21, 1991. Respondent AJB Yachts was not licensed as a yacht broker at any time pertinent to this proceeding. Respondent Bongiovi does business as AJB Yachts or AJB Yacht Sales, Inc. There was no evidence that AJB Yacht Sales, Inc., is legally incorporated. On various dates in September and October 1994, Respondent Bongiovi placed two separate advertisements in the classified ads section of the Fort Lauderdale, Florida, Sun-Sentinel newspaper. The first of these ads offered for sale a 41' Hatteras yacht for the sum of $150,000. The second of these advertisements offered for sale a 43" Portofino yacht for the sum of $125,000. Both advertisements contained the Respondent's telephone number, 305-942-7425. On or about May 28, 1993, Respondent, acting as a yacht broker, represented Charles Robbins in the purchase of a 66' Pacemaker yacht named the Sea Cow. The owner of the yacht, Dennis Gaultney, was represented by Mauch Yacht Sales, Inc., the listing broker. As part of the offer made by Mr. Robbins, he gave to Respondent Bongiovi a check in the amount of $33,000 as earnest money. Respondent Bongiovi deposited this money in a bank account at First Union National Bank of Florida, Pompano Beach branch on June 1, 1993. This account is entitled "AJB Yacht Sales, Inc., Escrow Account." Respondent Bongiovi was the sole signatory on this account. Respondent Bongiovi immediately began making withdrawals from this account that were not related to the Robbins transaction. 1/ As of June 10, 1993, the balance in this account was $29,575.54. As of June 21, 1993, the balance was $23,570.83. As of June 30, 1993, the balance was $21,554.04. Negotiations for the sale of the Sea Cow continued between the purchaser and the owner until July 20, 1993. The final version of the owner's proposal was a response to the last proposal made by Mr. Robbins and contained several changes to the last offer made by Mr. Robbins, including a change in the price of the vessel and an extension of the closing date to July 22, 1993. These changes were initialed by the owner of the boat, but they were not initialed by Mr. Robbins. Mr. Robbins never received a signed copy of the final proposal from the owner of the Sea Cow. A survey to evaluate the condition of the vessel was conducted and a copy of the inspection report faxed to Respondent Bongiovi by Jan Mauch of Mauch Yacht Sales on June 9, 1993. The transmittal note that accompanied the fax stated the following: "Here is the 'Schedule A' 2/ to go with the contract. After Charlie sees the survey, have him sign this and Acceptance of Vessel on contract and fax back both to me and I'll have Denny sign." Included in the inspection report was the following information: ". . . an engine inspection did not include a detailed mechanical inspection or test of components. A complete engine survey by a qualified mechanic is recommended in all cases." Mr. Robbins thereafter requested that Respondent Bongiovi arrange for an inspection of the vessel's engines before he accepted the vessel. Mr. Robbins never received an inspection report for the engines, he did not obtain his own financing for the vessel, and he never tendered the balance of the purchase price. The transaction involving Mr. Robbins did not timely close because the inspection of the engines were not completed. Because there was a delay in closing the transaction, the owner sold the yacht to another buyer. Neither Mr. Gaultney nor Mauch Yacht Sales demanded a portion of the $33,000 earnest money deposit. Mr. Robbins demanded the return of his money from the Respondent after he learned that the Sea Cow had been sold to another purchaser. Respondent Bongiovi refused to return the deposit and asserted the position that he was entitled to keep all of the deposit as liquidated damages because the transaction had not closed. Respondent Bongiovi relies on Paragraphs 3 and 4 of the form agreement for his contention that he was entitled to retain the $33,000 deposit as liquidated damages. Those provisions are as follows: The purchase of the vessel is subject to survey - seatrial - capt (sic) - inspection showing condition subject to purchasers (sic) sole judgment and approval to be conducted as soon as practicable after execution of this agreement at the option and expense of the PURCHASER. The PURCHASER shall give written acceptance or rejection of the Vessel by June 10, 1993, and if written notification is not received by the BROKER (A.J.B. Yacht Sales) on or before said date, it shall be construed as acceptance of the Vessel by PURCHASER. In the event, after written or construed acceptance of the Vessel, the PURCHASER fails to pay the balance of the purchase price and execute all papers necessary to be executed by him for the completion of his purchase, pursuant to the terms of this contract, on or before July 10, 1993, the sum this date paid shall be retained by A.J.B. Yacht Sales as liquidated and agreed damage and the parties shall be relieved of all obligations under this contract. In paragraph 2 of the agreement executed by Mr. Robbins on May 28, 1993, there was a provision that the offer submitted by Mr. Robbins was withdrawn if not accepted by June 5, 1993. There was no evidence that there was a final and complete agreement sufficient to bind the parties by June 5, 1993, or at any time thereafter. The agreement executed by Mr. Robbins on May 28, 1993, also contained the following provision: In the event that this sale is not consummated by reasons of unsatisfactory survey . . . the deposit shall be returned, providing all expenses incurred by the PURCHASER against the Vessel have been paid, and this agreement shall be null and void. Mr. Robbins verbally notified Respondent Bongiovi that he would require additional testing on the engine before accepting the vessel. Mr. Robbins did not receive the results of those additional tests and learned soon thereafter that the vessel had been sold to another purchaser. Following the failure and refusal of the Respondents to return the deposit, Mr. Robbins sued the Respondents in the Circuit Court in and for Broward County, Florida, pursuant to the provisions of Sections 772.11 and 812.014, Florida Statutes. Based on the evidence presented, the Circuit Judge in that civil proceeding entered a final judgement for treble damages ($99,000) in favor of Mr. Robbins and against the Respondents based, in part, on the following: . . . On the evidence presented, the Court finds: * * * Plaintiff (Mr. Robbins) gave Defendants (Mr. Bongiovi and his corporation) a check in the amount of $33,000.00 on May 28, 1993, to be held in escrow as a deposit pending accep- tance by the owner of a vessel for the purchase of said motor vessel. Said $33,000.00 was deposited into a bank account owned and/or controlled by Defendants. The owner of the vessel failed to accept Plaintiff's offer within the time provided in the written contract attached to the Amended Complaint; and, therefore, Plaintiff was entitled to return of his $33,000.00 deposit. Plaintiff demanded return of said $33,000.00 deposit, but Defendants failed and refused to return same, which sum has been due with interest since June 5, 1993. Defendants breached the Purchase Agree- ment on June 5, 1993, by failing and refusing to return Plaintiff's deposit of $33,000.00 when the offer to purchase the vessel was not accepted by the owner by that date. Defendants had a fiduciary responsibility to Plaintiff as escrow agents under the Purchase Agreement, and they breached their fiduciary responsibility by failing and refusing to return the $33,000.00 deposit when the offer to purchase the vessel was not accepted by the owner by June 5, 1993. . . .
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Petitioner enter a final order in this proceeding that adopts the findings of fact and conclusions of law and which imposes an administrative fine jointly and severally against the Respondents in the amount of $10,000 for the violations of Count I and imposes an additional administrative fine jointly and severally against the Respondents in the amount of $10,000 for the violation of Count II. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of December, 1995, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of December, 1995.
The Issue Whether the Respondent committed the violation alleged in the Notice to Show Cause dated March 30, 1998, and, if so, the penalty which should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: The Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes, is the state agency responsible for licensing and regulating yacht and ship brokers in Florida. Section 326.003, Florida Statutes (1997). Nivardo Beaton is a resident of Miami, Florida. He is not now, and never has been, licensed as a yacht broker or salesperson. The Division has no record of any prior enforcement or disciplinary actions against Mr. Beaton. At the times material to this action, Mr. Beaton worked at Avanti Powerboats, where he did assembly, electrical installation, and motor installation work on the boats built by Avanti Powerboats. Although he was originally a salaried employee of Avanti Powerboats, at the times material to this action, Mr. Beaton worked on a "piece work" basis and was paid a flat fee when he completed rigging a boat. Mr. Beaton also had a verbal agreement with Raul Rodriguez, the owner of Avanti Powerboats, whereby he was to be paid a five-percent commission for each direct sale of an Avanti boat and a one-and-one-half- percent commission for each Avanti boat sold by a dealership he had recruited as an Avanti distributor. An advertisement appeared in the October 17, 1997, edition of South Florida Boat Trader in which "Beaton Boat Sales and Service - Nivardo Beaton" offered three new boats and three used boats for sale. The three new boats were all Avantis; the three used boats were a twenty-one-foot Corona, a thirty-five- foot Contender, and a thirty-three-foot Avanti. Mr. Beaton owned the Corona; the Contender was owned by a friend, and Mr. Beaton did not expect any compensation from the sale of this boat; and the Avanti, an open-decked fishing boat, had been taken in trade by Mr. Rodriguez and was owned by Avanti Powerboats. Pursuant to a verbal agreement with Mr. Rodriguez, Mr. Beaton was to receive a five percent commission on the sale of this used thirty-three- foot Avanti. The advertisement was seen by an employee of the Division, and, when the Division's records revealed that neither Mr. Beaton nor Beaton Boat Sales and Service were licensed to offer yachts for sale, an investigation was initiated. Peter Renje, the Division's investigator, contacted Mr. Beaton on November 19, 1997, and informed him that he could not offer for sale used boats over thirty-two feet in length with the expectation of compensation unless he was licensed as a yacht broker. After Mr. Renje's first visit, Mr. Beaton immediately contacted the South Florida Boat Trader and discontinued the advertisement. He also provided Mr. Renje with the materials he requested to assist him in his investigation. Mr. Beaton abandoned the idea of doing business under the name of Beaton Boat Sales and Service. Mr. Beaton never sold a boat or transacted any other commercial transaction through this business. The only action Mr. Beaton took under the name of Beaton Boat Sales and Service was placing the advertisement in the October 17, 1997, issue of the South Florida Boat Trader. Mr. Beaton has worked in the management and production areas of the boat-building industry for over twelve years; he began working in sales in 1997. Before working for Avanti Powerboats, he worked for a short time selling Boston Whalers, Zodiac Inflatables, and Key West Boats. He also was employed as a full-time salesman by Fisherman's Paradise, Inc., a division of Warren Craft Distributing, Inc., from January to June 1997. Mr. Beaton was aware at the time he placed the advertisement in the South Florida Boat Trader that a person must have a broker's license in order to sell used yachts. He was not aware at the time he placed the advertisement that he needed to have a broker's license to offer for sale the thirty-three-foot Avanti open fishing boat. The evidence presented by the Division is sufficient to establish that Mr. Beaton, doing business as Beaton Boat Sales and Service, offered for sale a used boat over thirty-two feet in length and that he expected to earn a commission if he sold the boat. The evidence is also sufficient to establish that Mr. Beaton worked with Avanti Powerboats as an independent contractor, that he cooperated with the Division in its investigation, that he immediately cancelled the subject advertisement, and that he did not do any business as Beaton Boat Sales and Service. Mr. Beaton's testimony that he was not aware that a thirty-three-foot open-decked fishing boat fell within the statutory definition of a yacht is accepted as credible. Although Mr. Beaton had a few months' experience in boat sales, there is no evidence to establish that he engaged in the sale of used boats or that he sold boats in excess of thirty-two feet in length. The evidence presented by the Division is, therefore, not sufficient to permit the inference that Mr. Beaton knew or should have known that offering for sale a used boat over thirty- two feet in length without a broker's license violated Chapter 326. Likewise, the evidence presented by the Division is not sufficient to permit the inference that Mr. Beaton intended to violate Chapter 326. There was no evidence presented by the Division to establish that any member of the public suffered any injury as a result of Mr. Beaton's action in advertising for sale the used Avanti.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes, enter a final order finding Nivardo Beaton guilty of violating Section 326.004(1), Florida Statutes (1997); ordering Mr. Beaton to cease and desist from any other violations of Chapter 326, Florida Statutes, and the rules promulgated thereunder; and imposing a civil penalty in the amount of $250. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of October, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. PATRICIA HART MALONO Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of October, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: William Oglo, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1007 Nivardo Beaton, pro se Beaton Boat Sales and Services 14812 Southwest 81 Street Miami, Florida 33193 Philip Nowicki, Ph.D., Director Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1030 Lynda L. Goodgame, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulations 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
The Issue Whether Respondent, a licensed yacht broker, committed the offenses set forth in the Notice to Show Cause dated June 20, 1994, and the penalties, if any, that should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the agency of the State of Florida charged with the responsibility to administer and to enforce the Florida Yacht and Ship Brokers' Act, Chapter 326, Florida Statutes. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent has been a licensed Yacht and Ship Broker pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 326, Florida Statutes. Respondent resides in and has his principal place of business in Martin County, Florida. Respondent's corporation, Rampage of Stuart, Inc., has been licensed by Petitioner at all times pertinent to this proceeding. The parties stipulated that Respondent's corporation was, at times pertinent to this proceeding, doing business as Stuart Cay Marina, a fictitious name that had not been registered with the Petitioner. The parties stipulated that Respondent was guilty of violating the provisions of Section 326.004(2), Florida Statutes, as alleged in the Notice to Show Cause dated June 20, 1994. The parties also stipulated that the appropriate penalty for this violation is an administrative fine in the amount of $500.00. James Withers began working for Respondent at Stuart Cay Marina in January 1994. At the time he began working at Stuart Cay Marina, Mr. Withers was not licensed under the Yacht and Ship Brokers' Act. Respondent knew or should have known that Mr. Withers was not licensed when he first became employed at Stuart Cay Marina. On January 27, 1994, Mr. Withers attended an educational seminar sponsored by Petitioner where the attendees received instruction as to the requirements for licensure as a salesman or a broker under the Yacht and Ship Brokers' Act. The successful applicant must submit a completed application form, a completed fingerprint card, the proper application fee, and a surety bond. The Petitioner's processing of the application includes having the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) run a fingerprint check on the applicant. The attendees of the educational seminar were told that the application fee had increased from $538.00 to $539.00 as of December 20, 1993, due to a $1.00 increase in the fee charged by the FBI to process fingerprint cards. Mr. Withers and the Respondent knew, or should have known, that Mr. Withers could not act as a salesman until after his license had been issued. In late January 1994, Mr. Withers applied for licensure as a salesman pursuant to the Yacht and Ship Brokers' Act. Because the application form used by Mr. Withers reflected the old application fee, Mr. Withers submitted a check in the amount of $538.00 with his application and fingerprint card. There was no evidence as to where Mr. Withers had obtained this application form. Mr. Wither's application package was received by Petitioner's Finance and Accounting Office on February 4, 1994. The check for the application was deposited and the application forwarded for further processing. On February 7, 1995, Mr. Withers was advised by mail that his application was deficient since the application fee was short by $1.00. This letter, from the Petitioner's Yacht and Ship Section, advised Mr. Withers that the $1.00 was needed to continue the application process. Mr. Withers forwarded his $1.00 check, dated February 9, 1994, to the Petitioner to correct this deficiency. This check was received and deposited by Petitioner's Finance and Accounting Office, which is located in the John's Building in Tallahassee, on February 17, 1994. The Finance and Accounting Office released the application package for further processing on February 18, 1994. From the Finance and Accounting Office, the application package went to the Division Director's Office located in the Warren Building in Tallahassee. From that office the application package was sent to the Yacht and Ship Section located in the Bloxham Building in Tallahassee, where it was received February 21, 1994. Licenses are not completely processed until after the Yacht and Ship Section receives notification that the entire application fee has been paid. Processing of Mr. Withers' application was completed by the Yacht and Ship Section and his license was issued on February 21, 1994. Mr. Withers and the Respondent knew, or should have known, that Mr. Withers had not received his license from the Petitioner as of February 18, 1994. 1/ There was no evidence that either man had reason to believe as of February 18, 1994, that the license had been issued and was being forwarded by mail. Both men correctly believed that Mr. Withers had substantially complied with the licensure requirements as of February 18, 1994, and that the license would be issued at some juncture since the only deficiency had been corrected. Mr. Withers represented Respondent at the Sixth Annual Miami Brokerage Yacht Show on February 18, 1994, where he acted as a salesman within the meaning of the Yacht and Ship Brokers's Act. Respondent permitted Mr. Withers to use his company name at this show. On Friday, February 18, 1994, James Courchaine and Peter Butler, in their official capacities as employees of the Petitioner, located Mr. Withers at the boat show and inquired as to whether he was licensed. Mr. Withers told them that he had completed his application package and was merely waiting to receive his license in the mail. Mr. Butler thereafter called his office in Tallahassee and learned that Mr. Withers' check for $1.00 may have been received, but that the application had not been received by the Yacht and Ship Section and that the license had not been issued. Mr. Butler informed Mr. Withers that the earliest his license could be issued was Monday, February 21, 1994.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a final order adopting the findings and conclusions contained herein, that imposes an administrative fine in the amount of $500.00 against Respondent for the violation of Section 326.004(2), Florida Statutes, and that imposes an additional administrative fine in the amount of $500.00 against Respondent for the violation of Section 326.06(2)(e)7, Florida Statutes. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of January 1996 in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of January 1996.
The Issue The issue presented for decision herein is whether or not Respondent's real estate license should be disciplined based on conduct, set forth hereinafter in detail, which is specifically alleged in an Administrative Complaint filed herein dated June 24, 1987.
Findings Of Fact Based upon my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, documentary evidence received and the entire record compiled herein, I make the following relevant factual findings. At all times pertinent to the charges herein, Respondent was the holder of a Florida Real Estate license and operated as a real estate broker. (Petitioner's Composite Exhibit 1 and Stipulation of the parties). On October 17, 1985, Respondent obtained four exclusive listing agreements from John S. Blosnick (Blosnick) for warehouses he owned located in Miami, Florida. (Petitioner's Composite Exhibit 2). Respondent was unable to find a buyer for the units and instead leased them to Jim Gardner and V.I.P Car Care pursuant to a business lease entered into on July 22, 1986. During the time, Blosnick was experiencing financial difficulties and needed someone to either purchase or lease the premises. The lease specified that Mr. Gardner would use the premises for the manufacture and repair of cars and boats. (Petitioner's Exhibit 3). During the fall of 1986, a company that Respondent was affiliated with and served as President, Reaction Marine, Inc., took over the rental units and began constructing boat hulls from fiberglass resin. At this time, Reaction Marine erected a sign outside the warehouses where it remained during the time of the instant hearing. (Petitioner's Exhibit 4). On January 6, 1987, Respondent's bookkeeper, a Mrs. Bryant, issued a check for payment of rent drawn on the account of Reaction Marine, Inc. to John Blosnick for $945.00. The check was subsequently returned for insufficient funds. That check remains unpaid as of the date of hearing. After Reaction Marine began occupancy of the Blosnick warehouses, Respondent and Jim Gardner had a dispute and Gardner is no longer affiliated with Reaction Marine. Respondent who owned the molds for boat manufacturing, continued to store the molds in the leased warehouses. During the time when Respondent obtained the exclusive listing agreement to sell the warehouses for Blosnick, they were good friends and Blosnick frequented Respondent's office and home two to three times per week. Respondent is an entrepreneur of sorts and owns three bars and various and sundry other businesses in the Miami area. Respondent and Blosnick often talked about different business ventures as Blosnick was interested in pursuing business ventures with Respondent. As early as the fall of 1986, Blosnick was aware that Respondent was affiliated with Reaction Marine, Inc., and that Reaction Marine thereafter occupied the subject warehouse. Respondent has offered to make good on the check which was returned for insufficient funds against the account of Reaction Marine, Inc., however that offer is contingent upon Blosnick's tender of the check to Respondent upon payment. Blosnick has requested that payment be made to a third party and has not offered to tender the check to that third party simultaneous with Respondent's tender of payment to make good on the returned check. Respondent has attempted to clean the floors of the warehouses by removing the resins, epoxys, and gel coats caused by Reaction Marine, Inc. This was done during January and February, 1987 by Respondent using the assistance of an acquaintance, Heather Rockcastle, who was involved with the cleaning of the warehouse and restoration of the floors to their original condition. The cleanup process took more than one day. In Respondent's second attempt to gain entry to the warehouses, Blosnick had hired a locksmith to change the locks and thereby prevented Respondent from gaining entry. The lease agreement entered into by Blosnick and VIP Car Care specifies that the property was to be used and occupied as a place for car and boat manufacture/repair. (Petitioner's Composite Exhibit 3). Pursuant to the terms of that business lease, VIP Car Care was authorized to assign or sublet the premises for the usage here which was consistent with the usage for which VIP Car Care leased the premises. (Petitioner's Composite Exhibit 3, first stipulation and condition of the business lease).
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that: The Administrative Complaint filed herein be DISMISSED. RECOMMENDED this 11th day of May 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of May, 1988. COPIES FURNISHED: Steven W. Johnson, Esquire Contract Attorney DPR-Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Mark Weissman, Esquire Katz and Weissman 300 Aragon Avenue Suite 330 Coral Gables, Florida 33134 William O'Neil Esquire General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 101 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent, Jerry Green, acted as a yacht and ship broker as defined in Section 326.022(1), Florida Statutes, without being licensed by Petitioner, the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes, as alleged in a Notice to Show Cause entered September 3, 1996.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes (hereinafter referred to as the “Division”), is an agency of the State of Florida. The Division is charged with the responsibility for carrying out the provisions of Chapter 326, Florida Statutes, the Florida Yacht and Ship Brokers’ Act (hereinafter referred to as the “Act”). Respondent is Jerry Green. Mr. Green is not licensed by the Division pursuant to the Act as a yacht and ship broker. At all times relevant to this proceeding, Mr. Green was employed at Rick’s on the River (hereinafter referred to as “Rick’s”), in Tampa, Florida. Mr. Green was compensated for his employment at Rick’s by being provided room and board. During 1996 the Division received an anonymous complaint including a copy of an advertisement from a October 13, 1995 edition of a publication known as the “West Florida Boat Trader”. The advertisement indicated it was from Rick’s and included several photographs of boats purportedly for sale at Rick’s. Among other boats listed on the advertisement was the following: 1975 42’POST Full Tuna Tower, Twin Turbo Charge Detroit 671 Out of Town Owner DESPARATE to Sell, $84,500 A similar advertisement was placed in the November 3, 1995 edition of the “West Florida Boat Trader”. Although Mr. Green denied at hearing that he had placed the advertisement, he admitted in his Response to Notice to Show Cause that “between October of 1995 and May of 1996 he advertised a 1975 42’ Post named the ‘Dunn Deal’ . . . .” He also admitted in the Response “that he advertised the 42’ Post at the request of the owner, Richard Dame, who is a personal friend, for the purpose of testing whether there was a market for such a boat and to determine the approximate value of the boat.” It is, therefore, concluded that Mr. Green was responsible for the advertisement. On May 31, 1996, James Courchaine, an investigator for the Division, went to Rick’s. After arriving at Rick’s, Mr. Courchaine met Mr. Green. Mr. Green identified himself as the “dockmaster”. Mr. Courchaine asked about the 42-foot Post and Mr. Green told him that he knew all about the Post and could talk to Mr. Courchaine about it. Mr. Green told Mr. Courchaine the Post belonged to a friend and that he, Mr. Green, could sell it. Mr. Green also indicated the Post was in Key West and that he wasn’t sure if the owner would be bringing it back. Mr. Green also told Mr. Courchaine that the owner was originally asking $84,500.00 for the Post but, that since it had been on the market so long without any interest, he might take between $79,000.00 and $81,000.00 for it. Mr. Courchaine asked Mr. Green whether the amount Mr. Green quoted included Mr. Green’s commission. Mr. Green told Mr. Courchaine that “he would be taken care of.” Mr. Green wasn’t employed as the dock master at Rick’s. Mr. Green lived on the premises and looked after the property, including boats located there. In return, he received room and meals. At the time of the formal hearing Mr. Green testified that he was not employed and that his only source of funds is Social Security. He also testified, however, that he still lives at Rick’s. The evidence failed to prove that Mr. Green has any source of funds other than Social Security. The evidence failed to prove that Mr. Green offered to sell any vessel regulated under the Act except as described in this Recommended Order.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered by the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums, and Mobile Homes ordering Jerry Green to cease and desists from acting as an unlicensed broker in violation of the Act and that he pay a civil penalty in the amount of $500.00 within thirty days of the date this matter becomes final.DONE and ORDERED this 28th day of April, 1997, in Tallahassee, Florida. LARRY J. SARTIN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of April, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Suzanne V. Estrella Senior Attorney Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1007 Paul T. Marks, Esquire Post Office Box 4048 Tampa, Florida 33677 Lynda L. Goodgame General Counsel Department of Business & Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Robert H. Elizey, Jr., Director Department of Business & Professional Regulation Florida Land Sales, Condominium & Mobil Homes 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
The Issue Did Respondent commit the violations alleged in the Administrative Complaint dated April 11, 2000, and if so, what discipline is appropriate?
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant findings of fact are made: The Department is the agency of the State of Florida charged with the responsibility of regulating the practice of contracting pursuant to Section 20.165, Florida Statutes, and Chapters 455 and 489, Florida Statutes. Respondent is, and has been at all times material hereto, a certified residential contractor in the State of Florida, having been issued license number CR CO13253 by the Florida Construction Industry Licensing Board. At all times material hereto, Respondent was licensed with the Construction Industry Licensing Board as an individual. On or about November 20, 1993, Respondent entered into a written contractual agreement (contract) with Kevin Watkins (Watkins) to construct a single family residence at 126 Meadow Lark Boulevard, Lot 65, Indian Lake Estates, Florida. The contract price was $333,944.00. Between December 7, 1993, and February 1, 1996, Watkins and Respondent executed 102 addenda to the contract which increased the contract price by approximately $241,874.43, for a total amount of approximately $575.818.43. On or about December 9, 1993, Respondent obtained permit number 93-120l850 from the Polk County Building Department and commenced work on the project. The contract provided that the "project shall be substantially completed on or about 195 days from the date all building permits are issued." However, due to the 100-plus addenda to the contract, it was estimated that an additional 190 days would be needed to complete the project. Additionally, construction ceased on the home for approximately 60 days so that Watkins could explore the possibility of a construction loan. However, due to the extent of completion, the lending institutions decided not to make any construction loans. On or about May 27, 1996, Watkins moved to Florida with the expectations that his home would be completed within a short period of time. (Watkins' recollection was that the home was to be completed in a couple of weeks. Respondent's recollection was that the home was to be completed in a couple of months.) In any event, Respondent did not complete the Watkins home within a couple of weeks or a couple of months. After Watkins moved to Florida, Respondent paid for Watkins to live in a Best Western motel for a few weeks. Subsequently, Respondent moved Watkins into a rental home for which Respondent paid the rent through September 1996. Beginning October 1996 through July 1999, Watkins paid $600.00 per month for a total of $20,400.00 as rent on the rental home. In early 1998, Respondent and Watkins went through the home, identified those items which had not been completed and Respondent made a handwritten list of those items. Respondent failed to complete the items identified on the list. In fact, shortly thereafter, Respondent ceased working on the project and was unresponsive to attempts to contact him. At the time Respondent ceased working on Watkins' home, the home was approximately 75 percent complete. While this estimation of completion may not be totally accurate, it is the best that could be derived based on the evidence presented, including Respondent's testimony to which I gave some credence. Watkins paid Respondent $561,617.91, which represents approximately 97.534 percent of the total contract price plus addenda to the contract. Seventy-five percent of the contract price plus addenda to the contract equals $431,863.82 for an overpayment of $129,754.09. To date, Respondent has not returned any of the money he received from Watkins above the amount completed under the contract. From early 1998, until August 1998, when Watkins had Respondent removed as general contractor on the building permit, Respondent failed to perform any work on the home for a period in excess of 90 days. Respondent contracted with Jack Eggleston to install cabinets in Watkins home. Eggleston performed under the contract but Respondent failed to pay Eggleston in full, requiring Watkins to pay Eggleston $1,200.00. After Watkins' home was partially complete, Respondent advised Watkins that he had the home insured when in fact he did not have the home covered with insurance. While Respondent was building Watkins' home, Respondent and Watkins entered into a joint venture called Contractors of Central Florida to build modular homes sometime after January 1, 1995. Respondent contends that some of the checks Watkins claims as payment under the contract for his home, were in fact reimbursement to Respondent for funds he had advanced for the joint venture. There is insufficient evidence to establish facts to show that any of the checks Watkins claims as payment under the contract for his home were in fact reimbursement for funds advanced by Respondent for the joint venture. Up until the time of the final hearing, the Department had incurred costs for the investigation and prosecution of this matter, excluding costs associated with an attorney's time, in the amount of $1,451.28.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and after careful review of the guidelines set forth in Rule 61G4-17.001(8) and (11), Florida Administrative Code, and the circumstances for purpose of mitigation or aggravation of penalty set forth in Rule 61G4-17.002, Florida Administrative Code, it is recommended that the Department: Enter a final order finding Respondent guilty of violating Section 489.129(1)(h)2., Florida Statutes, and imposing a penalty therefor an administrative fine in the amount of $1,000.00; Enter a final order finding Respondent guilty of violating Section 489.129(1)(k), Florida Statutes, and imposing a penalty therefor an administrative fine in the amount of $1000.00; Assessing costs of investigation and prosecution, excluding costs associated with an attorney's time, in the amount of $1,451.28, plus any such further costs which have or may accrue through the taking of final agency action and; Requiring Respondent to pay restitution to Kevin Watkins in the amount of $129,754.09 which represents the amounts accepted by Respondent for work not performed. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd of October, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6947 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of October, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert A. Crabill, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32388-2202 Ronald J. Powell Post Office Box 7043 Indian Lake Estates, Florida 33855 Rodney Hurst, Executive Director Construction Industry Licensing Board 7960 Arlington Expressway, Suite 300 Jacksonville, Florida 32211-7467 Barbara D. Auger, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
