The Issue Whether the Respondent's certification under the Home and Community Based Services Medicaid Waiver Program should be suspended.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: The Department of Children and Family Services is the state agency responsible for administering what is known as the Home and Community Based Services Medicaid Waiver Program ("Waiver Program") for the developmentally disabled. Chapter 393, Florida Statutes. The Department is specifically charged with the responsibility for establishing by rule procedures for carrying out the mandates of Sections 393.001-.501. Section 393.501(1), Florida Statutes. William L. "Timothy" Robinson is certified by the Department as a behavior analyst, which means he is qualified to "design[] and implement[] . . . behavioral programs for persons who are developmentally disabled." Section 393.165. Only persons who are certified behavior analysts may be certified to provide services to clients in the Waiver Program. As part of its procedure for certifying behavior analysts to provide services under the Waiver Program, the Department requires that applicants execute a contract consisting of several parts. Part III of the contract is entitled Assurances, and, by his or her signature, the applicant agrees to comply with state and federal laws, rules, and policies. On July 19, 1995, Mr. Robinson applied in his individual capacity for certification to provide behavior analyst services to clients in the Waiver Program administered in the Department's District 11. He signed Part III of the application, and, at some point after July 19, 1995, Mr. Robinson was certified to provide services to clients in the Waiver Program. Subsequently, Mr. Robinson incorporated his business, and, on November 18, 1996, as Executive Director of Behavior Management Training Systems, Inc., he again executed Part III of the application, which contains the same provisions as the document Mr. Robinson signed as an individual on July 19, 1995. On November 17, 1996, as part of the application process, Mr. Robinson executed on behalf of Behavior Management Training Systems, Inc., a document entitled "Agency for Health Care Administration, Electronic Claims Submission Agreement." Paragraph 8 of this document states that "[p]rovider shall abide by all Federal and State statutes, rules, regulations and manuals governing the Florida Medicaid Program and those conditions as set out in the Medical Assistance Provider Agreement entered into previously." Mr. Robinson was retained by several support coordinators5 to provide behavior analyst services to clients in the Waiver Program. He submitted his monthly invoices and reports to the support coordinators, who forwarded them to Unisys, the Department's billing agent, for payment. During the fall of 1996, Kirk Ryon, the Medicaid Waiver Coordinator for District 11, received complaints from at least one support coordinator alleging that Mr. Robinson's documentation was not adequate to support his invoices for services.6 On December 17, 1996, Mr. Robinson met with Mr. Ryon and several other individuals employed by the Department to discuss the complaints that had been made regarding Mr. Robinson's billing practices and the behavior analyst services he provided to clients paid both through the Waiver Program and through general revenue.7 During this meeting, Mr. Robinson was asked to provide backup documentation to support his invoices for services. On December 17, after the meeting, Mr. Ryon wrote a letter to Mr. Robinson following up on the discussion at the meeting and requesting backup documentation for services provided to ten clients, four of whom received services under the Waiver Program. The remaining six clients received services from Mr. Robinson that were paid from general revenue. Although Mr. Robinson may not have received the December 17 letter,8 he wrote a letter that he dated January 14, 1996, 9 to Dr. Michael Wesolowski, an employee of the Department who attended the December 17 meeting. Mr. Robinson sent with the letter to Dr. Wesolowski monthly reports for June, July, August, and September 1996 for Felicia's House, one of the facilities at which he provided behavioral analyst services. Mr. Robinson acknowledged in the January 14 letter that he sent these documents in response to the Department's request for backup documentation for his billings and that the Department's request was made in response to complaints received by the Department and discussed at the December 17 meeting. Dr. Wesolowski did not provide Mr. Ryon with a copy of this letter or the attached documentation.10 Mr. Robinson provided no other documentation to the Department prior to February 5, 1997, when Mr. Ryon notified Mr. Robinson that his certification to provide services under District 11's Waiver Program was suspended. After he requested a formal hearing to contest the allegations in the February 5 letter, Mr. Robinson provided the Department during the course of discovery all of the documents in his possession relating to the services provided to the four clients in the Waiver Program. These documents, together with the documents provided by Mr. Robinson to Dr. Wesolowski in January 1997, were provided to Mr. Ryon by the Department's counsel two days before the formal hearing in this case commenced. Mr. Ryon reconciled the documents with the invoices Mr. Robinson had submitted and found that the documentation provided did not support many of the units11 of service for which Mr. Robinson had been paid.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the certification of William L. "Timothy" Robinson to provide services under the Home and Community Based Services Medicaid Waiver Program be suspended until February 5, 1998, one (1) year from the effective date of his suspension on February 5, 1997. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of January, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. PATRICIA HART MALONO Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of January, 1998.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent failed to maintain a service plan for each of four residents, in violation of the Florida Medicaid Assistive Care Services Coverage and Limitations Handbook. If so, an additional issue is the sanctions that should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Respondent owns and operates an assisted living facility known as Izquierdo Home Care I. At all material times, Respondent was enrolled in the Medicaid program as a provider authorized to supply assistive living services to Medicaid recipients at Izquierdo Home Care I. At all material times, Respondent was subject to the Florida Medicaid Assistive Care Services Coverage and Limitations Handbook. The handbook imposed upon Respondent the duty to develop a service plan for each Medicaid recipient not less often than annually. On March 27, 2012, Petitioner's inspector conducted a site visit of Izquierdo Home Care I. At the time of the site visit, the facility had six beds, but only four residents. According to a letter from Petitioner dated March 27, 2012, and delivered to Respondent's representative at the time of the inspection, the following four residents were Medicaid recipients: E. C., R. R., J. H., and A. R. However, according to the questionnaire completed by Respondent's representative at the time of the inspection, only two of the four current residents were Medicaid recipients, although the questionnaire does not identify these residents. In fact, A. R. had been discharged from Izquierdo Home Care I in September 2011. At the hearing, Petitioner's inspector confirmed that Respondent had not billed Medicaid for services for A. R. after the date of discharge. The second resident whose Medicaid status is in question was identified, in Respondent's proposed recommended order, as E. C. Respondent contends in its proposed recommended order that E. C. was not receiving Medicaid at the time of the inspection. If the Proposed Recommended Order were the only notice to Petitioner of Respondent's claim that a second resident was not a Medicaid recipient, the Administrative Law Judge would ignore this assertion because it is not evidence, and, as a defense, it was raised too late. However, the questionnaire, which was admitted as one of Petitioner's exhibits, is evidence that two of the four residents were not receiving Medicaid at the time of the inspection. In assessing the evidentiary record in terms of whether it establishes a third Medicaid recipient, the Administrative Law Judge notes: a) Petitioner has alleged a violation concerning A. R., even though A. R. was no longer a Medicaid recipient at the time of the inspection; b) at hearing, Petitioner's inspector was readily able to read the "query" to confirm that Respondent had not submitted a Medicaid billing on account of A. R. after September 2011 (Transcript 49); and c) as discussed in the Conclusions of Law, Petitioner bears the burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence. Under these circumstances, Petitioner has proved only that two residents of the facility were Medicaid recipients at the time of the inspection. There is no dispute that current service plans for two Medicaid recipients did not exist at the time of the March 2012 inspection.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Health Care Administration enter a final order imposing a fine of $2000 against Respondent. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of October, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of October, 2012. COPIES FURNISHED: Jeffries H. Duvall, Esquire Office of the General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Executive Center, Building 3 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Station 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403 Julia Arrendell, Qualified Representative 13899 Biscayne Boulevard North Miami Beach, Florida 33181 Elizabeth Dudek, Secretary Office of the General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Executive Center, Building 3 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Station 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403 Stuart Williams, General Counsel Office of the General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Executive Center, Building 3 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Station 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403 Richard J. Shoop, Agency Clerk Office of the General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Executive Center, Building 3 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Station 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403
Conclusions Having reviewed the Administrative Complaints and the Notice of Intent to Deny, and all other matters of record, the Agency for Health Care Administration finds and concludes as follows: 1. The Agency has jurisdiction over the above-named Provider, Ana Home Care, Inc., pursuant to Chapter 408, Part II, Florida Statutes, and the applicable authorizing statutes and administrative code provisions. 2. The Agency issued the attached Administrative Complaints and Election of Rights forms to the Provider. (Ex. 1-A; Ex. 1-B; 1-C; Ex. 1-D; and Ex. 1-E). The Agency issued the attached Notice of Intent to Deny and Election of Rights form (Ex. 1-F). The Election of Rights forms advised of the right to an administrative hearing. 3. The parties have since entered into the attached Settlement Agreement. (Ex. 2) Based upon the foregoing, it is ORDERED: 1. The Settlement Agreement is adopted and incorporated by reference into this Final Order. The parties shall comply with the terms of the Settlement Agreement. 2. The assisted living facility license of Ana Home Care, Inc. is REVOKED. All residents shall be removed within 30 days from the entry of this Final Order. In accordance with Florida law, the Provider is responsible for retaining and appropriately distributing all client records within the timeframes prescribed in the authorizing statutes and applicable administrative code provisions. The Provider is advised of Section 408.810, Florida Statutes. In accordance with Florida law, the Provider is responsible for any refunds that may have to be made to the clients. The Provider is given notice of Florida law regarding unlicensed activity. The Provider is advised of Section 408.804 and Section 408.812, Florida Statutes. The Provider should also consult the applicable authorizing statutes and administrative code provisions. The Provider is notified that the cancellation of an Agency license may have ramifications potentially affecting accrediting, third party billing including but not limited to the Florida Medicaid program, and private contracts. 3. An administrative fine and survey fee in the total amount of $88,000.00 is imposed against the Provider, Ana Home Care, Inc., but the collection of the fine is STAYED unless the Provider applies for an assisted living facility license at which time the $88,000.00 will become due and owing. ORDERED at Tallahassee, Florida, on this _/ A day of Jane ‘i — , 2012.
Other Judicial Opinions A party who is adversely affected by this Final Order is entitled to judicial review, which shall be instituted by filing one copy of a notice of appeal with the Agency Clerk of AHCA, and a second copy, along with filing fee as prescribed by law, with the District Court of Appeal in the appellate district where the Agency maintains its headquarters or where a party resides. Review of proceedings shall be conducted in accordance with the Florida appellate rules. The Notice of Appeal must be filed within 30 days of rendition of the order to be reviewed. CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I CERTIFY that a true and correct sob of this Final Order was served on the below-named persons by the method designated on this_/7 “day of (eat Wa , 2012. Richard Shoop, Agency Cler Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Bldg. #3, Mail Stop #3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403 Telephone: (850) 412-3630 Jan Mills Lourdes A. Naranjo, Senior Attorney Facilities Intake Unit Office of the General Counsel (Electronic Mail) Agency for Health Care Administration (Electronic Mail) Finance & Accounting Shaddrick Haston, Unit Manager | Revenue Management Unit Assisted Living Unit (Electronic Mail) Agency for Health Care Administration (Electronic Mail) Katrina Derico-Harris Arlene Mayo Davis, Field Office Manager Medicaid Accounts Receivable Areas 9, 10 and 11 Agency for Health Care Administration Agency for Health Care Administration (Electronic Mail) (Electronic Mail) Shawn McCauley Lawrence E. Besser, Esquire Medicaid Contract Management Samek & Besser Agency for Health Care Administration 1200 Brickell Avenue - Suite 1950 (Electronic Mail) Miami, Florida 33131 (U.S. Mail) John D. C. Newton, IT Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings (Electronic Mail) NOTICE OF FLORIDA LAW 408.804 License required; display.-- (1) It is unlawful to provide services that require licensure, or operate or maintain a provider that offers or provides services that require licensure, without first obtaining from the agency a license authorizing the provision of such services or the operation or maintenance of such provider. (2) A license must be displayed in a conspicuous place readily visible to clients who enter at the address that appears on the license and is valid only in the hands of the licensee to whom it is issued and may not be sold, assigned, or otherwise transferred, voluntarily or involuntarily. The license is valid only for the licensee, provider, and location for which the license is issued. 408.812 Unlicensed activity. -- (1) A person or entity may not offer or advertise services that require licensure as defined by this part, authorizing statutes, or applicable rules to the public without obtaining a valid license from the agency. A licenseholder may not advertise or hold out to the public that he or she holds a license for other than that for which he or she actually holds the license. (2) The operation or maintenance of an unlicensed provider or the performance of any services that require licensure without proper licensure is a violation of this part and authorizing statutes. Unlicensed activity constitutes harm that materially affects the health, safety, and welfare of clients. The agency or any state attorney may, in addition to other remedies provided in this part, bring an action for an injunction to restrain such violation, or to enjoin the future operation or maintenance of the unlicensed provider or the performance of any services in violation of this part and authorizing statutes, until compliance with this part, authorizing statutes, and agency rules has been demonstrated to the satisfaction of the agency. (3) It is unlawful for any person or entity to own, operate, or maintain an unlicensed provider. If after receiving notification from the agency, such person or entity fails to cease operation and apply for a license under this part and authorizing statutes, the person or entity shall be subject to penalties as prescribed by authorizing statutes and applicable rules. Each day of continued operation is a separate offense. (4) Any person or entity that fails to cease operation after agency notification may be fined $1,000 for each day of noncompliance. (5) When a controlling interest or licensee has an interest in more than one provider and fails to license a provider rendering services that require licensure, the agency may revoke all licenses and impose actions under s. 408.814 and a fine of $1,000 per day, unless otherwise specified by authorizing statutes, against each licensee until such time as the appropriate license is obtained for the unlicensed operation. (6) In addition to granting injunctive relief pursuant to subsection (2), if the agency determines that a person or entity is operating or maintaining a provider without obtaining a license and determines that a condition exists that poses a threat to the health, safety, or welfare of a client of the provider, the person or entity is subject to the same actions and fines imposed against a licensee as specified in this part, authorizing statutes, and agency rules. (7) Any person aware of the operation of an unlicensed provider must report that provider to the agency.
The Issue The following are the issues presented: Whether the Division of Administrative Hearings (“DOAH”) has jurisdiction to determine the claim of Petitioners Wal-Mart, Inc. (“Wal-Mart”) and Sedgwick CMS (“Sedgwick”) to relief under section 440.13(8) and (11), Florida Statutes; If DOAH has jurisdiction, whether Petitioners have standing to raise the issue of medical overutilization; If DOAH has jurisdiction and the Petitioners have standing, whether Petitioners are estopped from seeking reimbursement of any monies paid to Intervenors Florida Institute for Neurologic Rehabilitation (“FINR”) and Fruitville Holdings - Oppidan, Inc. (“Oppidan”); If DOAH has jurisdiction and Petitioners have standing and are not estopped, whether Intervenors engaged in overutilization of medical care in their care and treatment of the injured worker, D.F.; Whether Respondent, Department of Financial Services, Division of Workers’ Compensation (the “Department), has the authority to order Intervenors to reimburse Petitioners for payments related to overutilization by Intervenors in the medical care of D.F.; and If the Department has such authority, how much money should Intervenors be ordered to reimburse Petitioners.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the final hearing, and the entire record in this proceeding, the following Findings of Fact are made: The Department is the state agency responsible for administering the Workers’ Compensation Law, chapter 440, Florida Statutes. Section 440.13 governs the Department’s responsibilities and procedures for overseeing the provision by employers to their employees of “such medically necessary remedial treatment, care, and attendance for such period as the nature of the injury or the process of recovery may require, which is in accordance with established practice parameters and protocols of treatment as provided for in this chapter ” § 440.13(2)(a), Fla. Stat. Petitioner Wal-Mart is an “employer” as that term is defined in section 440.02(16). Petitioner Sedgwick acts as a workers' compensation servicing agent or “third party administrator” (“TPA”) for Wal-Mart and is a workers’ compensation “carrier” as defined in section 440.13(1)(c). D.F. is an “employee” as that term is defined in section 440.02(15). In 2003, during the course of his employment with Wal- Mart in Sarasota, D.F. fell approximately six feet from a ladder to the ground, landing on his left side and striking his head. D.F. was diagnosed with a traumatic brain injury. Through Sedgwick, Wal-Mart accepted the compensability of D.F.'s injuries under the law and began furnishing “medically necessary treatment, care and attendance” to D.F. as required by section 440.13(2). In the immediate aftermath of the accident, D.F. was treated at Sarasota Memorial Hospital, where he was diagnosed with cephalgia (headache), left flank contusion, and cervical strain. He was later seen at First Care in Sarasota with complaints of headache, and by a Dr. Barnea (no first name in the record) with complaints of headaches, dizziness, backaches, trouble with memory, and an inability to taste food. D.F. was also seen by Dr. Hal Pineless, a neurologist at the Neurocare Institute of Central Florida, who diagnosed D.F. with a cerebral concussion with post-concussive syndrome, post-concussive headaches, depression, and anosmia (loss of the sense of smell). In January 2005, D.F. took a handful of pills in what was at least a suicidal gesture, if not a serious attempt to kill himself. He was admitted to the Halifax Medical Center, and a Baker Act2/ proceeding was initiated against him. Although D.F. was found not to meet the criteria for involuntary hospitalization at that point, three months later he was referred by James Hutchens, his attorney, to Dr. Howard Goldman, a psychiatrist, because of the attorney's fear that D.F. would again attempt to harm himself. In February 2007, D.F. was evaluated at FINR, an inpatient neurologic rehabilitation facility in Wauchula. FINR recommended inpatient treatment for D.F. at their facility for an initial period of 30 to 60 days. The cost of the treatment was set at $950 a day. Susan Smith was the Sedgwick claims adjuster assigned to D.F.’s claim. Relying on the expertise of the physicians at FINR, Ms. Smith agreed to the admission and the price. Ms. Smith testified that when she took over the case, there were five physicians treating D.F., including a neurologist, a psychotherapist, a psychiatrist, and a physiatrist. The physicians were all requesting different courses of treatment and were prescribing medications that were in some instances contraindicated with each other. The physicians were not communicating with each other. D.F.’s case was “just a mess.” Ms. Smith stated that FINR seemed to present an opportunity for D.F. to receive all of his treatments in one place, with one physician in charge, in a coordinated fashion. D.F. was admitted to FINR in March 2007. Dr. Jorge J. Villalba, the medical director of FINR, diagnosed D.F.'s medical conditions as post-traumatic headaches, anxiety, and depression. FINR provided monthly reports of D.F.'s progress to Sedgwick. D.F.’s treatment was administered by a team of physicians at FINR and consisted of medical monitoring, occupational therapy, physical therapy, and speech therapy. D.F. was provided vocational rehabilitation in FINR’s computer lab and in the wood shop, where he worked on sanding, staining, and building wood products. In August 2007, D.F. was transferred to Oppidan, an assisted living facility, as a “step down” in treatment from the inpatient FINR facility. Oppidan is affiliated with FINR, which does all of the billing for both entities. Again relying on the expertise of the physicians, Ms. Smith agreed to the transfer and to the $850 per day cost of care at Oppidan. Oppidan provided monthly reports to Sedgwick similar to those provided by FINR. These reports, later characterized as "boilerplate" by the Department’s expert medical advisor, Dr. Matthew Imfeld, showed that D.F. was receiving treatment similar to that which he had received at FINR, i.e., medical monitoring, occupational therapy, physical therapy, speech therapy, and vocational therapy. D.F. remained at Oppidan from August 2007 until August 2011, more than four years after his initial admission to FINR. Ms. Smith testified that she was in constant contact with the treatment facility and persistently inquired as to when D.F. would be ready for release from the facility. Ms. Smith noted a pattern in which D.F. would seem to improve to the point of discharge and then suffer some form of relapse or new symptom that would preclude his discharge. Increased symptoms included complaints of personality changes, anxiety, syncopal episodes accompanied by frequent falls, medication adjustments, emotional withdrawal, suspected Parkinson's syndrome, ringworm, shoulder problems, ringing in the ears, and anhedonia.3/ Petitioners worked with Oppidan’s medical staff to determine conditions for D.F.’s discharge from Oppidan. On January 9, 2009, Petitioner’s then-counsel, Brian Bartley, discussed the situation with Dr. Villalba and Dr. Jeffrey Walden, D.F.’s neuropsychologist. They agreed that D.F.’s needs could potentially be met within an outpatient day program. At Mr. Bartley’s suggestion, Dr. Villalba and Dr. Walden investigated the Adult Daycare program at Manatee Glens, a behavioral health hospital with an outpatient component. Though they rejected Manatee Glens as an appropriate placement, Drs. Villalba and Walden sent Mr. Bartley a letter, dated January 15, 2009, that outlined the components they felt necessary for an acceptable outpatient program: [D.F.] requires comprehensive case management services to oversee his program, assist with making and following-up on appointments, assist in managing his benefits, and coordinate his care. [D.F.] will require oversight of his medications. We feel that a home health nurse or, alternately, a nurse on site at a potential discharge site, would be necessary to provide for this need by packing his medication box with him, assessing him for possible side effects, overseeing a schedule of routine labs, etc. His wife can assist with prompting him at his medication times as necessary during non-program hours, but we do not recommend that she have primary responsibility for managing his medications or medical status. [D.F.] will require reliable transportation to and from his program and ancillary appointments. His wife will not be able to be his sole source of transportation. First, the only licensed and tagged vehicle they own is an old van that has had multiple reliability issues. Second, his wife has her own ongoing medical concerns that may interfere with her capacity to provide reliable transportation even with a working vehicle. [D.F.] requires activities that challenge him to be in the community and addressing his anxiety and panic symptoms. As such, a club-house model day program will be inadequate. He requires a vocational program where he is in a workplace, managing interpersonal relationships, and working on specified tasks. He has thus far been able to manage such assignments only with the assistance of a one-to-one job coach on the site with him and working at his side. As such, job coaching services will be required for all vocational hours. [D.F.] requires community recreational activities to further challenge his capacity to cope and master anxiety-producing situations with less structure than a workplace. His present program addressed this need through one-to-one lunch outings, fishing trips, etc. During these activities, he is encouraged to use the coping strategies developed in his psychotherapy sessions to manage and persevere despite his debilitating anxiety. [D.F.] requires a quiet place to which he can temporarily retreat and regroup between community-based activities. He can become overwhelmed in busy and chaotic environments such as a room with loud music or television playing, a busy game room, or an activity center. He has coping strategies he utilizes when he must be in such environments, but the availability of a place where he can escape such over- stimulation is required to facilitate his participation in his activities. [D.F.] requires continued participation in weekly cognitive-behavioral psychotherapy. He also requires regular contact with a neurologist and a neuropsychiatrist. His current program includes massage therapy as well to address his shoulder and to assist with relaxation skills. He also receives assistance with the management of his personal budget, including development of computer-based budgeting program, planning of future expenses and anticipated income, and development of financial priorities. He will require continued assistance in this area as well. We hope this adequately describes the services we feel will be required to address [D.F.’s] needs in an outpatient environment. Please feel free to contact us with any comments or questions you may have. We will gladly review any proposed discharge site and offer our thoughts regarding the acceptability of such a site to meet his needs. The record indicates that Mr. Bartley suggested at least one more potential discharge site to the medical staff at Oppidan. In a letter dated March 27, 2009, Drs. Villalba and Walden stopped short of rejecting this option outright but did set forth a list of concerns and requests for further information regarding the details of the proposed treatment. The record does not indicate whether Mr. Bartley followed up on these concerns and requests, or whether Petitioners proposed another outpatient program for D.F. By the time of D.F.’s discharge, FINR and Oppidan’s billed charges for his treatment totaled $1,451,301.27. Wal- Mart, through Sedgwick, paid these bills in full without disallowance, adjustment, or reduction. At all times relevant, Ms. Smith relied upon the expertise of the medical staff at FINR and Oppidan’s facilities confirming that the treatment being provided was medically necessary. Ms. Smith also understood that D.F. had been "Baker Acted" and feared that he might harm himself if Oppidan discharged him upon her disallowance of the charges for his treatment. Though they continued paying the charges during D.F.’s stay at Oppidan, Petitioners noted the mounting costs and apparently endless course of treatment. Petitioners referred D.F. to Glenn J. Larrabee, Ph.D., a diplomate in clinical neuropsychology, who examined D.F. on September 28 through 30 and October 5, 2009, and reviewed all of his available medical records. Dr. Larrabee produced a 41-page report, dated November 9, 2009. The report concluded that D.F.’s medical records “suggest that at worst, he suffered a mild traumatic brain injury of an uncomplicated nature, given normal CT Scan the day of injury and multiple subsequent normal CT Scans of the brain.” Dr. Larrabee noted that recovery from such an uncomplicated injury is usually three months at most and that D.F. had no cognitive or emotional complaints in follow-up visits shortly after the injury. It was only a few weeks later that he displayed the symptoms of anosmia. Dr. Larrabee’s examination of D.F. showed “deliberate feigning of odor identification in the left nostril, with significantly worse- than-chance performance, strongly supporting the feigning of anosmia.” Dr. Larrabee further noted evidence of normal neuropsychological test performance in D.F.’s initial neuropsychological evaluation with a Dr. Frank in early 2004, in a second neurological evaluation conducted by a Dr. Bosco in 2007, and in Dr. Larrabee’s own current examination. These results “strongly contradict the presence of any persistent deficit from his original mild traumatic brain injury.” In each of these tests, Dr. Larrabee also noted “evidence of invalid test performance with failure of symptom validity tests and measures of response bias,” a further indication that D.F. was deliberately feigning responses. Dr. Larrabee wrote that “[o]ther health care professionals have noted a motivational basis or non-neurologic basis to symptomatic complaint.” Dr. Salter in 2005 included “factitious disorder” as one of his diagnoses, and Dr. Tatum noted that D.F. displayed seizures without any indication of actual epilepsy. Dr. Larrabee concluded that, while there was “compelling evidence of malingering” on the neuropsychological examinations, other professionals have noted “significant personality disorder features” that could lead one to be dependent on the inpatient hospitalization setting. Dr. Larrabee found that there could be “a mix of intentional (i.e., malingering) and unintentional (psychiatric) factors” in the case of D.F. He recommended a one-month stay in a psychiatric facility for evaluation and treatment. Without such hospitalization, it could not be determined whether D.F. had a legitimate psychiatric disorder or whether such disorder was a consequence of his workplace injury. At about the same time as the referral to Dr. Larrabee, Petitioners began to explore legal channels to procure D.F.’s discharge from Oppidan. Petitioners sent the case file to an attorney, Edward Louis Stern, who testified at the final hearing. Mr. Stern testified that he met with D.F.'s attorney for the purpose of obtaining his cooperation in having D.F. discharged. Mr. Stern provided D.F.'s attorney with a copy of Dr. Larrabee’s report. Mr. Stern stated that D.F.'s attorney agreed in principle to the discharge of D.F. but wanted to identify the parameters that would be allowed by FINR/Oppidan for his safe release. To this end, a meeting was set up for June 3, 2010, that included the program director at FINR, the treating neuropsychologist, a vocational consultant, D.F., D.F.'s spouse, and D.F.'s attorney. Mr. Stern reported that no one at the meeting was willing to definitively identify the parameters of D.F.'s discharge. Mr. Stern left the meeting with the definite impression that D.F.’s attorney would not agree to D.F.’s discharge. He also believed that no one at the facility would be willing to identify parameters for discharge. Therefore, Mr. Stern and his clients decided to initiate formal overutilization proceedings based on peer review, pursuant to section 440.13(6). Mr. Stern noted that peer review requires two or more "physicians" to make an evaluation of the care in question. Petitioners had in hand only the opinion of Dr. Larrabee, a neuropsychologist whose non-physician opinion would not be admissible before a Judge of Compensation Claims. After some negotiation, D.F.’s attorney agreed to an examination by a psychiatrist. On September 3, 2010, Dr. R.J. Mignone, a board- certified psychiatrist practicing in Sarasota, evaluated D.F. at Petitioners' request. Dr. Mignone’s 35-page report included a detailed narrative of D.F.’s treatment history, Dr. Mignone’s examination, and his impressions and recommendations. In brief answers to a series of questions propounded by Petitioners, Dr. Mignone concluded that D.F.'s industrial accident was not "the major contributing cause" for the psychiatric care he had been receiving at FINR/Oppidan. Dr. Mignone found no DSM-IV Axis I psychiatric injury to D.F. and concluded that D.F.’s treatment at FINR/Oppidan was actually "psychiatrically contraindicated." Dr. Mignone concluded that it would be appropriate to discharge D.F. from Oppidan with the understanding that some regression should be expected once his “Axis II characteropathy” ceased to be reinforced by the inpatient setting. Dr. Mignone believed that D.F.'s medical professionals had been guilty of "walking on eggshells" in their treatment of him and that D.F.'s "acting out" behavior had been a major factor in FINR/Oppidan's program design. Dr. Mignone concluded that because D.F.’s condition was unrelated to his work injury, all of the treatment he had received at FINR and Oppidan constituted overutilization. After a great deal more legal jockeying, a second peer review was performed by Dr. Thomas Goldschmidt on January 7, 2011. Dr. Goldschmidt is a specialist in neurology and psychiatry, and was specifically recommended by Dr. Mignone to perform an examination of D.F. However, because D.F.’s attorney declined to allow the examination, Dr. Goldschmidt’s opinion was based on his review of the medical record and Dr. Mignone’s evaluation. He summarized his findings as follows: The claimant experienced MTBI [mild traumatic brain injury] on May 9, 2003. He reported loss of consciousness for seconds and was able to drive himself home afterwards. Serial evaluations over time have chronicled multiple normal CT brain scans, normal forty-eight hour EEG monitoring suggesting PNES [psychogenic nonepileptic seizures, i.e., seizures with a psychological cause], symptom exaggeration/malingering on neuropsychological testing, pertinacious somatic preoccupation with trait characterological disturbance consistent with passive-dependent underpinnings, and counter-therapeutic institutionalization at OPPIDAN. As such, the claimant’s clinical course has iatrogenically served to enhance his misguided perception of being “brain injured” in pursuit of satisfying his formidable but chronically frustrated dependency needs. Furthermore, his clinical course is atypical for MTBI and cannot be objectivity [sic] reconciled with the neuropsychological or clinical data provided for my review. From a non-organic perspective, the claimant has parlayed his seven year old MTBI into a state of invalidism largely facilitated by OPPIDAN. In effect, his illness-behavior has been iatrogenically perpetuated by reinforcing the notion of “brain injury” and treatment of psychogenic-mediated symptomatology unrelated to his 2003 work injury. Negotiations continued and a private mediation resulted in a negotiated settlement between Petitioners and D.F. The parties agreed that Petitioners would no longer be responsible for workers’ compensation benefits as of the date the agreement was signed, though D.F. would continue to receive payments for lost wages and supplemental benefits. It was agreed that Petitioners would cease making payments to FINR/Oppidan on August 30, 2011, the date that D.F.’s residency would discontinue. In light of Petitioners’ suspicions regarding D.F.’s possible malingering, it is reasonable to ask why they never disallowed or adjusted any of the bills generated by FINR/Oppidan’s treatment of D.F. Mr. Stern testified that Petitioners did not unilaterally disallow payment out of fear that FINR/Oppidan might retaliate against D.F. by immediately discharging him, thereby risking another suicide attempt and possible tort liability for Petitioners.4/ Petitioners also feared that unilateral disallowance of payments could negatively affect their ongoing negotiations with D.F.’s counsel regarding voluntary discharge from Oppidan. On January 28, 2011, Petitioners filed the Reimbursement Petition with the Department, naming FINR and Oppidan as respondents and expressly disclaiming any direct reimbursement dispute with D.F. The Reimbursement Petition recited the history of D.F.’s treatment. It did not name a specific instance of overutilization; rather, it stated that all of D.F.’s treatment by FINR and Oppidan constituted overutilization. The Reimbursement Petition requested that the Department, “in accordance with Section 440.13(6), Florida Statutes . . . disallow the payment of services previously paid by the Petitioner[s] and reimburse Petitioners all sums paid.” The Reimbursement Petition also requested the return of payments made by Petitioners in accordance with section 440.13(11)(a).5/ Attached to the Reimbursement Petition was a copy of DFS Form 3160-0023, entitled “Petition for Resolution of Reimbursement Dispute,” executed by Wal-Mart and Sedgwick. Just below the title of DFS Form 3160-0023 is the following statement: “A Petition for Resolution of Reimbursement Dispute must be served on the Agency within 30 days after the Petitioner’s receipt of a notice of disallowance or adjustment of payment, pursuant to 69L-31.008, Florida Administrative Code.” Section 440.13(7)(a) likewise provides, in relevant part: Any health care provider, carrier, or employer who elects to contest the disallowance or adjustment of payment by a carrier under subsection (6) must, within 30 days after receipt of notice of disallowance or adjustment of payment, petition the department to resolve the dispute. The petitioner must serve a copy of the petition on the carrier and on all affected parties by certified mail. The petition must be accompanied by all documents and records that support the allegations contained in the petition. Failure of a petitioner to submit such documentation to the department results in dismissal of the petition. FINR and Oppidan filed a Motion to Dismiss the Reimbursement Petition arguing that jurisdiction for a reimbursement review can be invoked only where a medical bill has been disallowed or adjusted for payment. They further argued that Petitioners could not invoke the Department’s jurisdiction to conduct a mandatory utilization review under section 440.13(6) because of that subsection’s provision that if a carrier finds that overutilization of medical services has occurred, the carrier “must disallow or adjust payment for such services.” FINR/Oppidan argued that the dispute mechanism afforded a carrier under section 440.13 is limited to disallowing or adjusting a payment, which triggers the filing of a petition by the health care provider and a response from the carrier. Given that the Sedgwick did not disallow or adjust any payments, the Reimbursement Petition should be dismissed. As a result of the Reimbursement Petition, the Department initiated an investigation of FINR/Oppidan and of Dr. Villalba individually as medical director of FINR/Oppidan pursuant to section 440.13(11). Eric Lloyd, who at the time was program administrator of the office of medical services in the Division of Workers’ Compensation, testified that the Department did not then have a formalized method for reporting provider violations and that the language of 440.13(7) makes it clear that only a health care provider may pursue a petition for resolution of a reimbursement dispute. Mr. Lloyd stated that the Department therefore treated the Reimbursement Petition as a report of provider violation and converted the matter into a review under section 440.13(11). Delays in the resolution of the audit were caused by the need to advertise for and contract the services of an Expert Medical Advisor (“EMA”) pursuant to section 440.13(9). The Department’s initial contracting efforts were futile. Two contracted EMAs disqualified themselves for conflicts of interest. The Department finally engaged the services of a certified EMA, Dr. Imfeld, a specialist in the field of physical medicine and rehabilitation. Dr. Imfeld reviewed D.F.'s medical records from FINR/Oppidan, as well as the reports from the various doctors that were provided to the Department by the parties. Petitioners provided documents pursuant to a “Health Care Provider Violation Referral Document Request” issued by the Department on March 31, 2011, and a “Health Care Provider Violation Referral Document Request Addendum” issued by the Department on April 4, 2011. Both documents required the carrier to submit various forms of documentation. The Department’s initial document request states that the Reimbursement Petition alleged “that services rendered by Dr. Jorge Villalba, M.D. (hereinafter “Provider”), for the treatment rendered to the above referenced injured employee while an inpatient at FINR/OPPIDAN was in excess of established practice parameters and protocols of treatment established in Chapter 440, Florida Statutes.” In fact, the Reimbursement Petition made its allegations against FINR and Oppidan as institutions. Dr. Villalba was not mentioned by name in the Reimbursement Petition. The only reference to him was a statement that “[b]oth entities seemingly have the same medical director or attending physician.” Pamela Macon, bureau chief of the bureau of monitoring and audit in the Division of Workers’ Compensation, conceded at the hearing that it was her office that decided to include Dr. Villalba in the investigation because he was the medical director of the facilities. The language of the document requests plainly reflects an attempt to impute to Petitioners the Department’s own decision at the outset of the investigation to focus on Dr. Villalba individually. The end result of the investigation was that charges were brought against Dr. Villalba, but not against FINR or Oppidan as institutions. As explained more fully below, the case against Dr. Villalba was settled. No case was ever brought against the institutions. The following colloquy at the hearing is between Ms. Macon and counsel for Petitioners: Q. And as I understand it, you added Dr. Villalba to the case because he would have been, as the medical director, responsible for any medical care that was provided within the facility and he then should be responsible? A. Yes. Q. That’s why you added him? A. Correct. Q. But then you changed your mind and determined that he wasn’t involved with it at all, so you weren’t going to give – you weren’t going to penalize him? A. Right, that he didn’t render the direct care. Q. Okay. Did you ever make a determination who did the direct care? A. Not to my knowledge, no. Mr. Lloyd testified as to a policy dispute within the agency as to whether a “health care provider” violation may be brought only against individual health care providers or whether a facility can also be found in violation and sanctioned. He acknowledged that the statutory term “health care provider” explicitly includes health care facilities, but cited the difficulty involved in disciplining a facility such as FINR, which treats multiple injured workers. If the Department bars an entire facility, it would affect not just the individual injured worker whose treatment is in question but any others the facility is treating now or in the future.6/ In his report, dated August 12, 2013, Dr. Imfeld concluded that while D.F.'s 2003 accident resulted in a mild traumatic brain injury, it did not cause a seizure disorder or Parkinson's disease. He further concluded that all of the inpatient treatment from FINR/Oppidan was excessive and not medically necessary. On September 23, 2013, the Department entered its “Report of Health Care Provider Investigation and Notice of Intent to Impose Penalties Pursuant to §440.13, F.S.”7/ The Notice of Intent was directed to Dr. Villalba individually and stated as follows, in relevant part: The record in this matter, corroborated by the EMA opinion, evidences certain care that was neither medically necessary nor clinically appropriate for D.F.'s compensable condition. Accordingly, the Department finds that because of your role at FINR and OPPIDAN, you have directly or indirectly engaged in a pattern or practice of overutilization or a violation of Chapter 440, Florida Statutes, in the treatment rendered to D.F. Dr. Villalba filed a Petition for Formal Administrative Hearing on October 7, 2013, in response to the Notice of Intent. The Department and Dr. Villalba agreed to hold the case in abeyance rather than forward it to DOAH. The case was ultimately settled, the parties entering into a Settlement Stipulation for Consent Order on May 13, 2014. The settlement provided that the Department would withdraw and dismiss its Notice of Intent and that Dr. Villalba would withdraw and dismiss his petition for an administrative hearing with prejudice. Mr. Lloyd testified that after the Notice of Intent was filed against Dr. Villalba, the Department received a Recommended Order from an Administrative Law Judge in another DOAH case in which the Department had issued a Notice of Intent against an individual physician for overutilization. The Recommended Order was “pretty critical of the Department and the process that was involved,” and the Department felt obliged to enter a settlement for attorney’s fees. Mr. Lloyd testified that the Department believed Dr. Villalba’s case had “the same shortcomings” as that earlier case. Mr. Lloyd stated that this belief played a large role in the decision to settle with Dr. Villalba in lieu of trying to prove a difficult case of overutilization in a formal proceeding. Wal-Mart and Sedgwick were given no notice of the settlement negotiations or the entry of the Settlement Stipulation for Consent Order between the Department and Dr. Villalba. Mr. Lloyd testified that there is no statutory obligation for the Department to apprise the complainant of the status of the Department’s investigations. On March 23, 2015, the Department issued an order titled “Workers’ Compensation Medical Services Reimbursement Dispute Dismissal” that purported to dispose of the Reimbursement Petition filed by Wal-Mart and Sedgwick on January 28, 2011. The order provided as follows, in relevant part: There is no information to suggest that Wal- Mart, Inc. or Sedgwick CMS discontinued authorization for treatment and care for [D.F.] by the Respondent herein during the specified dates of service. * * * The issues raised by Wal-Mart, Inc. and Sedgwick CMS are utilization review issues, not appropriate for resolution in reimbursement dispute resolution proceedings under section 440.13(7), Florida Statutes. The utilization issues were resolved by the Department in its MSS Case No. ROV00039 and Department Case No. 143376 [i.e., the case against Dr. Villalba that was dismissed via Consent Order]. Therefore, this Petition for Resolution of Reimbursement Dispute in MMS Case No. 20110531-001 is hereby DISMISSED.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that the Department of Financial Services, Division of Workers’ Compensation, issue a final order dismissing the Petition for Formal Administrative Hearing. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of February, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of February, 2016.
The Issue Whether the Agency for Health Care Administration (Agency or Petitioner) is entitled to recover alleged Medicaid overpayments, administrative fines, and investigative, legal, and expert witness costs from Kenneth O. Harden, d/b/a Ken Care, Inc. (Respondent).1/
Findings Of Fact The Agency is the state agency responsible for administering the Florida Medicaid Program (Medicaid). Medicaid is a federally-funded state-administered program that provides health care services to certain qualified individuals. Respondent, Kenneth O. Harden, is an individual who was enrolled as a provider in both the Florida Medicaid Developmental Disabilities Waiver Program (DD Program) and the Florida Medicaid Family Supported Living Waiver Program (FSL Program) at all material times. By enrolling in the Medicaid programs, Respondent agreed to fully comply with all state and federal laws, policies, procedures, and handbooks pertaining to the Medicaid program. Respondent submitted bills to Medicaid while he was enrolled and these bills were processed and paid to Respondent through the Florida Medicaid automated payment system. Claimed services for which Respondent submitted bills and was paid by Medicaid include in-home support, personal care assistance, self-care/home management training, companion support, supported living coaching, and respite care. The Agency is authorized to recover Medicaid overpayments, as appropriate. § 409.913(1)(e), Fla. Stat.4/ One method the agency uses to discover Medicaid overpayments is by auditing billing and payment records of Medicaid providers. Such audits are performed by staff in the Agency's Bureau of Medicaid Program Integrity (MPI). Providers are identified as potential candidates for auditing by a combination of referrals from field offices, data processing offices, and the Agency?s fraud and abuse hotline, and a random audit process.5/ In 2011, Agency Administrator Robi Olmstead identified Respondent as a potential audit candidate through a field office referral. She opened two cases on Respondent, one for each provider number, and assigned the cases to Kristen Koelle, then Program Analyst, for full audits. Ms. Koelle completed the first steps of the audit process according to established protocols. She reviewed Respondent?s provider information and billing to determine what types of services he provided, what types of claims he had submitted, and how much had been paid by Medicaid. In consultation with Ms. Olmstead, Ms. Koelle selected January 1, 2008, through June 30, 2010, as the audit period. During that audit period, Respondent submitted 10,578 claims for 47 recipients alleged to have received services from Respondent through the DD Program, and 2,485 claims for 22 recipients alleged to have received services from Respondent through the FSL Program. When the Agency audits a Medicaid provider for possible overpayments it "must use accepted and valid auditing, accounting, analytical, statistical, or peer-review methods, or combinations thereof. Appropriate statistical methods may include, but are not limited to, sampling and extension to the population . . . and other generally accepted statistical methods." § 409.913(20), Fla. Stat. The audit method used by the Agency depends on the characteristics of the provider and of the claims. For example, where a provider serves thousands of Medicaid recipients during the audit period, but the number of claims for each recipient is small, then the Agency may use a single-stage cluster sampling methodology. Under this approach, a random sample of recipients is selected, and then all claims are examined for the recipient sample group. Alternatively, where there are so many claims per recipient that it would be impractical to review all claims for each recipient or all claims for a sample group of recipients, a two-stage cluster sample methodology may be used. Under this approach, a random sample of recipients is selected, followed by a random selection of sample claims for the recipients in the sample. As a general target, the Agency considers samples of between 5 and 15 claims per recipient to be reasonable sample sizes for the second stage of two-stage cluster sampling. However, if a given recipient has fewer than 15 claims, a smaller number of claims for that recipient will be selected. Because of the high volume of claims generated by Respondent during the audit period in this case, Ms. Koelle determined with her supervisor that a two-stage cluster sampling methodology would be used. In other words, it was not feasible to review all 13,063 claims generated by the recipients Respondent claimed to have served during the audit period. Using a computer program to carry out the random sampling, the Agency's two-stage cluster sampling software selected a random sample of Respondent?s recipients under both the DD Program and the FSL Program during the audit period. The software generated a list of 30 recipients in the DD Program and 21 recipients in the FSL Program. It then selected a random sample of between 5 and 15 claims for each recipient from Respondent?s paid-claims data in the Agency?s data warehouse for the audit period. For the DD Program, 344 sample claims for the 30 sample recipients were randomly selected from among the 10,578 claims submitted by Respondent during the audit period. For the FSL Program, 256 sample claims for the 21 sample recipients were randomly selected from among the 2,485 claims submitted by Respondent during the audit period. Thereafter, Ms. Koelle prepared a “demand letter” for each of the two programs, informing Respondent that audits had been initiated and requesting that Respondent provide Medicaid- related records to substantiate billing records of the identified recipients, as well as the employment/personnel records or files for any of Respondent?s staff who provided services to Medicaid recipients during the audit period. The letters gave Respondent the standard 21-day period to submit the requested records. Ms. Olmstead reviewed and signed the letters and they were mailed, along with a Provider Questionnaire and Certification of Completeness of Records, to Respondent on July 26, 2011. After requesting and receiving a series of extensions, Respondent complied with the demand letters on September 13, 2011. Respondent delivered to the Agency Medicaid-related records and employee documents, along with the Provider Questionnaires and signed Certificates of Completeness, which certified the accuracy, truthfulness, and completeness of the records submitted. Persons who provide Medicaid services must meet certain minimum qualifications and obtain certain trainings, otherwise the person is deemed “ineligible” or “disqualified” and Medicaid cannot reimburse for services provided by such persons. All persons who provide services directly to Medicaid recipients must also pass a Level 2 background screening. Training and screening requirements for staff of Medicaid providers during the audit period are set forth in the Medicaid Handbook and the DD Handbook. Upon receiving records sent by Respondent in response to the Agency's July 26, 2011, letters, Ms. Koelle first reviewed Respondent's staff files to determine whether each staff member met the necessary requirements to provide Medicaid or Medicaid waiver services. Respondent produced staff files for 30 of the 39 staff members who provided services to randomly-selected recipients during the audit period. Of those 30 files, 16 contained no documentation of core competency training, eight had incomplete or no background screening documentation, one had a disqualifying background screening, and 22 lacked documentation of required training in HIV/AIDS, Infection Control, Zero Tolerance, or CPR during the audit period. In addition, 13 staff files revealed the staff member did not meet the experience or educational requirements for the position held. Next, Ms. Koelle reviewed the documentation Respondent submitted for each recipient against the 344 DD Program claims and 256 FLS program claims in the random sample and recorded her findings on worksheets along with her descriptions of any deficiencies or noted violations of Medicaid law. Ms. Koelle noted numerous violations of Medicaid laws, including, but not limited to, the following: of the 344 DD Program sample claims, 127 were submitted without any supporting documentation, 67 were submitted without a service log to document services provided to the recipient, 36 were submitted for companion services provided to recipients who were ineligible because they either lived in a licensed residential setting or were receiving in-home support services, and 28 were submitted for unauthorized activities provided to recipients. The most common violation, services provided by unauthorized staff, appeared in 243 claims submitted by Respondent. Of the 256 FSL Program sample claims, 50 were submitted without supporting documentation, and 208 were submitted for services provided by unauthorized staff. Ms. Koelle also documented a handful of cases in which the unauthorized staff provided services outside the scope of the recipient?s service plan or overbilled for the services provided. Ms. Koelle found no claims that were allowed under the Medicaid law and, therefore, no claims that merited adjustment. Ms. Koelle completed her review and entered all amounts that she found to be disallowed into the computer program. The program added the figures to find the overpayment amount for the samples, and then extrapolated the overpayment to the entire universe of recipients, according to an established statistical methodology, which yielded the total overpayment amount. The computer program generated a printout showing the exact overpayment amount for each of the claims in the samples, and the total overpayment extended to the population. The figures on the printouts correspond to the figures on the worksheets. Utilizing this methodology, Ms. Koelle determined that Respondent had been overpaid by an amount of $568,250.01 for services in the DD Program, and $162,700.08 for services in the FSL Waiver program. Thereafter, she prepared the Preliminary Audit Reports (Preliminary Audits), describing the methodology applied to determine overpayment and the deficiencies that led to that determination. She attached to the Preliminary Audits the printouts, copies of her worksheets, and a copy of the spreadsheets with staff findings. A provision in the Preliminary Audits explains that Respondent may submit additional documentation to support the sample claims, although such submission may be deemed evidence of previous non- compliance. Ms. Olmstead reviewed, approved, and signed the Preliminary Audits, which were mailed with attachments to Respondent on October 18, 2011. After receiving the Preliminary Audits, Respondent again submitted records and a written response in an effort to further support the sample claims. However, Ms. Koelle determined that the records submitted were duplicates of records previously submitted by Respondent and did not support any change in her findings from the Preliminary Audits. In preparation of the Final Audit Reports, Ms. Koelle, in consultation with Ms. Olmstead, reviewed Respondent's documentation and found that there was insufficient documentation to support any of the sample claims in either the DD Program or the FSL Program. The deficiencies included incomplete or missing staff files, lack of documentation of services, no service authorization, no service logs or service logs that did not meet Medicaid handbook requirements, no monthly summary, and indications that ineligible staff members were providing services. In some instances, the service provided was ineligible as it did not further the recipient?s goals or was an unauthorized activity (e.g., watching a movie). Ms. Koelle recorded her findings in a separate spreadsheet for each audit. The spreadsheets, organized by recipient number, contain the following information for each of the claims in the samples: date of service (DOS), procedure code, procedure description, unit of service (UOS), cost per unit of service, amount paid to Respondent, claim determination (Allow, Adjust, or Deny), review determination, whether there was a document deficiency (Doc. Def.) or a billing amount issue, and the amount of the overpayment for the claim (O/P). Next, Ms. Koelle entered the disallowed amounts into the computer program, which added the amounts together, found the overpayment amount for the sample, and extended the overpayment to the entire population of 10,578 claims in the DD Program and 2,485 claims in the FSL Program. Ultimately, Ms. Koelle prepared the Final Audit Reports (Final Audits), which Ms. Olmstead signed and sent to Respondent on November 21, 2011. Because the records submitted by Respondent in response to the Preliminary Audits did not change the findings, the Final Audits reported the same overpayment amounts as the Preliminary Audits: $568,250.01 in the DD Program and $162,700.08 in the FSL Program. The Final Audits notified Respondent of the total overpayment calculations, described the types of non-compliance found in the sample claims, and explained the methodology employed to select the claims for review and extend the sample overpayment to arrive at the total overpayment amount. The Final Audits also advised Respondent that the Agency intended to recover fines in the amount of $113,650.00 for violations of requirements in the DD Program and $32,540.02 for violations of requirements of the FSL Program. Additionally, the Agency sought a total of $1,437.38 for costs of the two audits. Copies of the worksheets, as well as the two spreadsheets detailing the staff review findings, were attached. Respondent disputed the Final Audits and the Agency referred the matter to the Division. In preparation for the final hearing, the Agency consulted with Dr. Fred W. Huffer, a professor in the Department of Statistics at Florida State University with a B.S. in mathematics from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and a Ph.D. in statistics from Stanford University. He has taught and researched statistics for more than 30 years at various institutions of higher learning. Dr. Huffer reviewed the Agency?s Preliminary and Final Audit findings and found one error in the analysis. In each audit, one randomly-selected recipient had submitted only one claim during the audit period. According to the Agency?s overpayment calculation methodology, the second-stage random sample may only be taken from those recipients with two or more claims during the audit period. Therefore, the Agency?s overpayment calculation included one incorrect variable. Dr. Huffer adjusted the formula and recalculated the overpayment with the correct variables for each audit. The result was a modest change to the final overpayment amounts -- a reduction of $8,368.36 for the DD Program and $818.44 for the FSL Program. The final adjusted total overpayments were $559,881.65 for the DD Program and $161,881.64 for the FSL Program. Respondent offered no witnesses and introduced no evidence at the final hearing. Instead of presenting contradictory expert testimony, Respondent attempted to undermine Dr. Huffer's opinions through cross-examination and argument. On cross-examination, Respondent attempted to challenge the reliability of the Agency?s sampling methodology and Dr. Huffer?s calculations. Respondent inquired as to the “authentication” of Dr. Huffer?s results and the requirements for determining when Dr. Huffer?s calculations were final, and insinuated that Dr. Huffer may have been biased because he has consulted with the Agency since 2004. Respondent was not effective in this regard. The methodology and description of two-stage cluster sampling were explained and confirmed at the final hearing by Dr. Huffer, who was accepted as an expert in statistical analysis and methodologies. In addition, the methodology comports with established law. See § 409.913, et seq., Fla. Stat.; Ag. for Health Care Admin v. Custom Mobility, Inc., 995 So. 2d 984 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008), cert. denied, 3 So. 3d 1246 (Fla. 2009). Dr. Huffer was familiar with the case at hand and with the science of random sampling of populations and the analysis of samples, including extension of results to the total population. Dr. Huffer analyzed the sampling method utilized by the Agency in this case with a program he personally developed for that purpose. Dr. Huffer repeated random simulation that recreated the audit circumstances many thousands of times, and found them to be accurate in this case. The software utilized by the Agency determined the amount of overpayments at a 95 percent confidence level. As explained by Dr. Huffer, if the entire procedure is repeated “many times, 95 percent of the time this value that they get to at the end would be less than the true amount” of the overpayment. In other words, the amount the Agency has asked Respondent to repay is most likely lower than the actual overpayment. In sum, Dr. Huffer credibly explained that the Agency?s cluster sampling method is appropriate and that it comports with the technical meaning of random sample and generally accepted statistical methods. Moreover, Dr. Huffer verified the adjusted overpayment amount through professionally accepted methodology. Dr. Huffer's opinions that the audits in this case utilized a correct and reasonable application of two-stage cluster sampling and that the sampling method used in this case was reasonable and comported with generally accepted statistical methods are accepted as credible and accurate.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner, Agency for Health Care Administration, enter a final order requiring Respondent, Kenneth O. Harden, d/b/a Ken Care, Inc., to: Repay the sum of $559,881.65 for claims in the Medicaid Development Disability Waiver Program that did not comply with the requirements of Medicaid laws, rules, and provider handbooks; Repay the sum of $161,881.64 as recoupment of claims in the Medicaid Family and Supported Living Waiver Program which did not comply with the requirements of Medicaid laws, rules, and provider handbooks; Pay interest on the sums of $559,881.65 and $161,881.64 at the rate of 10 percent (10%) per annum from the date of the overpayment determination; Pay a fine of $6,000 per agency action (for a total of $12,000) for violations of the requirements of Medicaid laws, rules, and provider handbooks; and Pay allowable costs of $3,405.71, pursuant to section 509.913(23), Florida Statutes. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of March, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE VAN WYK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of March, 2013.
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Petitioner was a medicaid provider in the State of Florida. At all times pertinent to this proceeding John Whiddon was the Chief of Florida's Medicaid Program Integrity. Florida's Medicaid Program Integrity is charged with the oversight of the Medicaid program in Florida. The parties stipulated that Mr. Whiddon would have testified that the responsibility is ". . . basically to see that the Medicaid program gets what it pays for." The Florida Medicaid Program Integrity has the responsibility to protect Medicaid funds should an investigation reveal there is fraud or willful misrepresentation. Section 409.913(3), Florida Statutes, provides as follows: (3) Any suspected criminal violation or fraudulent activity by a provider, or by the representative or agent of a provider, identified by the department shall be referred to the Medicaid fraud control unit of the Office of the Auditor General for investigation. The Medicaid Fraud Control Unit (MFCU) is the agency with the statutory responsibility for criminal investigations in the Medicaid program. The Medicaid Program Integrity is a part of the Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services. The MFCU is a part of the Office of the Auditor General, which is an agency of the legislative branch of government. On occasions, the MFCU advises Medicaid Program Integrity of a criminal investigation into a particular provider's activities. However, Medicaid Program Integrity is not told of the specific facts of the criminal investigation until after the case is prosecuted or until after the case is closed. The parties stipulated that Mr. Whiddon would testify that he is of the opinion that Section 409.913(7), Florida Statutes, prohibits MFCU from revealing anything about its investigation while the investigation is ongoing. Mr. Whiddon received a letter dated April 6, 1993, from John G. Morris, Jr., the Director of the Medicaid Fraud Control Unit, which referenced Petitioner as the provider, and which stated as follows: Pursuant to provisions of 42 CFR 455.23, this is to advise you that there is reliable evidence that the above referenced provider billed for home health care services that were not provided and this investigation will be referred for criminal prosecution. No specific facts of this criminal investigation were given to the Medicaid Program Integrity by the MFCU. The parties stipulated that Mr. Whiddon would testify that Program Integrity believes that the Petitioner will be prosecuted based upon the MFCU investigation as stated in the April letter, but that Mr. Whiddon concedes that any decision to prosecute is solely the decision of the prosecutor and may be declined. During the months of April, May, and June of 1993, the Petitioner continued to receive substantial Medicaid payments. These payments amounted to approximately $28,906 every week. Mr. Whiddon decided it was necessary to withhold Medicaid payments to the Petitioner until the MFCU investigation was completed. This decision was based solely on the MFCU letter of April 6, 1993, and his interpretation of his responsibility under 42 CFR 455.23. Mr. Whiddon directed Mike Morton to sign the Agency's letter to Petitioner dated June 29, 1993, because Mr. Whiddon was unavailable because of an unrelated special assignment. The letter dated June 29, 1993 provided, in pertinent part, as follows: PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the undersigned has directed Consultec, the fiscal agent for the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, to withhold Medicaid payments to A-Community Home Health, Inc. in accordance with the provisions of 42 CFR 455.23. This action is being taken because of receipt of reliable evidence that the circumstances giving rise to the need for a withholding of payment involves fraud or willful misrepresentation. The withholding of payment will be temporary and will not continue after: The Department or prosecuting authorities determine that there is insufficient evidence of fraud or willful misrepresentation by A-Community Home Health, Inc., or Legal proceedings related to A-Community Home Health, Inc., alleged fraud or willful misrepresentation are completed. The type of Medicaid claims withheld are home health claims.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a Final Order which terminates the withholding of Medicaid payments from Petitioner and which reimburses Petitioner for payments that have been withheld. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of November 1993, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of November 1993.
Conclusions THIS CAUSE came on for consideration before the Agency for Health Care Administration, which finds and concludes as follows: 1. The Agency issued the above-named Respondent the attached Administrative Complaint. (Ex. 1) 2. The Respondent requested an administrative hearing, but subsequently withdrew the request for hearing. (Ex. 2) Based upon the foregoing, it is ORDERED: 3. The findings of fact and conclusions of law set forth in the Administrative Complaint are adopted and incorporated by reference into this Final Order. 4. The Respondent’s license is REVOKED. 5. In accordance with Florida law, the Respondent is responsible for retaining and appropriately distributing all client records within the timeframes prescribed in the authorizing statutes and applicable administrative code provisions. The Respondent is advised of Section 408.810, Florida Statutes. 6. In accordance with Florida law, the Respondent is responsible for any refunds that may have to be made to the clients. 7. The Respondent is given notice of Florida law regarding unlicensed activity. The Respondent is advised of Section 408.804 and Section 408.812, Florida Statutes. The Respondent should also consult the applicable authorizing statutes and administrative code provisions. The Respondent is notified that the cancellation of an Agency license may have ramifications potentially affecting accrediting, third party billing including but not limited to the Florida Medicaid program, and private contracts. Filed December 17, 2013 10:36 AM Division of Adnhinistrative Hearings ORDERED at Tallahassee, Florida, on this le day of Meeenher. 2013. Elizabeth Dudek, Secretary Agency for Heglth Care Administration
Other Judicial Opinions A party who is adversely affected by this Final Order is entitled to judicial review, which shall be instituted by filing one copy of a notice of appeal with the Agency Clerk of AHCA, and a second copy, along with filing fee as prescribed by law, with the District Court of Appeal in the appellate district where the Agency maintains its headquarters or where a party resides. Review of proceedings shall be conducted in accordance with the Florida appellate rules. The Notice of Appeal must be filed within 30 days of rendition of the order to be reviewed. CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregs cing was furnished to the the peso named. below by electronic mail or the method designated on this {2 ay of > 2013. Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Stop 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403 Telephone: (850) 412-3630 Jan Mills Shaddrick Haston Facilities Intake Unit Assisted Living Unit Manager Agency for Health Care Administration Agency for Health Care Administration (Electronic Mail) (Electronic Mail) Katrina Derico-Harris Medicaid Accounts Receivable Agency for Health Care Administration (Electronic Mail) Donah Heiberg, Field Office Manager Local Field Office Agency for Health Care Administration (Electronic Mail) Shawn McCauley Medicaid Contract Management Agency for Health Care Administration (Electronic Mail) Sharon Jones, Assistant General Counsel Office of the General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration (Electronic Mail) Thomas J. Walsh IJ, Esquire Clay B. Adkinson, Esquire Presiding Officer Adkinson Law Firm Agency for Health Care Administration Post Office Box 1207 (Electronic Mail) DeFuniak Springs, FL 32435 ee ee (U.S. Mail) NOTICE OF FLORIDA LAW 408.804 License required; display.-- (1) It is unlawful to provide services that require licensure, or operate or maintain a provider that offers or provides services that require licensure, without first obtaining from the agency a license authorizing the provision of such services or the operation or maintenance of such provider. (2) A license must be displayed in a conspicuous place readily visible to clients who enter at the address that appears on the license and is valid only in the hands of the licensee to whom it is issued and may not be sold, assigned, or otherwise transferred, voluntarily or involuntarily. The license is valid only for the licensee, provider, and location for which the license is issued. 408.812 Unlicensed activity. -- (1) A person or entity may not offer or advertise services that require licensure as defined by this part, authorizing statutes, or applicable rules to the public without obtaining a valid license from the agency. A licenseholder may not advertise or hold out to the public that he or she holds a license for other than that for which he or she actually holds the license. (2) The operation or maintenance of an unlicensed provider or the performance of any services that require licensure without proper licensure is a violation of this part and authorizing statutes. Unlicensed activity constitutes harm that materially affects the health, safety, and welfare of clients. The agency or any state attorney may, in addition to other remedies provided in this part, bring an action for an injunction to restrain such violation, or to enjoin the future operation or maintenance of the unlicensed provider or the performance of any services in violation of this part and authorizing statutes, until compliance with this part, authorizing statutes, and agency rules has been demonstrated to the satisfaction of the agency. (3) It is unlawful for any person or entity to own, operate, or maintain an unlicensed provider. If after receiving notification from the agency, such person or entity fails to cease operation and apply for a license under this part and authorizing statutes, the person or entity shall be subject to penalties as prescribed by authorizing statutes and applicable rules. Each day of continued operation is a separate offense. (4) Any person or entity that fails to cease operation after agency notification may be fined $1,000 for each day of noncompliance. (5) When a controlling interest or licensee has an interest in more than one provider and fails to license a provider rendering services that require licensure, the agency may revoke all licenses and impose actions under s. 408.814 and a fine of $1,000 per day, unless otherwise specified by authorizing statutes, against each licensee until such time as the appropriate license is obtained for the unlicensed operation. 3 (6) In addition to granting injunctive relief pursuant to subsection (2), if the agency determines that a person or entity is operating or maintaining a provider without obtaining a license and determines that a condition exists that poses a threat to the health, safety, or welfare of a client of the provider, the person or entity is subject to the same actions and fines imposed against a licensee as specified in this part, authorizing statutes, and agency rules. (7) Any person aware of the operation of an unlicensed provider must report that provider to the agency.
Conclusions Having reviewed the Notice of Intent to Deny dated August 25, 2010, attached hereto and incorporated herein (Ex. 1), and all other matters of record, the Agency for Health Care Administration (‘Agency’) has entered into a Settlement Agreement (Ex. 2) with the parties to these proceedings, and being well-advised in the premises, finds and concludes as follows: ORDERED: 1. The attached Settlement Agreement is approved and adopted as part of this Final Order and the parties are directed to comply with the terms of the Settlement Agreement. The Notice of Intent to Deny is superseded by the Settlement Agreement and an administrative fine of $10,000 is imposed in lieu of license application denial. 2. The request for an administrative proceeding is withdrawn. 3. Each party shall bear its own costs and attorney’s fees. 4. The above-styled case is hereby closed. DONE and ORDERED this | | day of March, , 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. Agency for Health. Gare Administration Filed March 14, 2011 8:48 AM Divigfion of Administrative Hearings A PARTY WHO IS ADVERSELY AFFECTED BY THIS FINAL ORDER IS ENTITLED TO JUDICIAL REVIEW WHICH SHALL BE INSTITUTED BY FILING ONE COPY OF A NOTICE OF APPEAL WITH THE AGENCY CLERK OF AHCA, AND A SECOND COPY, ALONG WITH FILING FEE AS PRESCRIBED BY LAW, WITH THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL IN THE APPELLATE DISTRICT WHERE THE AGENCY MAINTAINS ITS HEADQUARTERS OR WHERE A PARTY RESIDES. REVIEW OF PROCEEDINGS SHALL BE CONDUCTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE FLORIDA APPELLATE RULES. THE NOTICE OF APPEAL MUST BE FILED WITHIN 30 DAYS OF RENDITION OF THE ORDER TO BE REVIEWED. Copies furnished to: Barrington Coombs, Administrator Nelson E. Rodney Prima Home Health, LLC Assistant General Counsel 3500 N. State Road 7, Suite 499 Office of the General Counsel Lauderdale Lakes, FL 33319 Agency for Health Care Admin. (U. S. Mail) (Interoffice Mail) Finance & Accounting The Honorable Stuart M. Lerner Agency for Health Care Admin. Administrative Law Judge (Interoffice Mail) Division of Administrative Hearings (Electronic Mail) Jan Mills Home Care Unit Agency for Health Care Admin. Agency for Health Care Admin. (Interoffice Mail) (Interoffice Mail) CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of this Final Order was served on the above-named persgn(s) and entities by U.S. Mail, or the method designated, on this the 1 Pe tay of _/ VanPP , 2011. Richard Shoop, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Building #3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403 (850) 412-3630
