Conclusions Having reviewed the Notice of Intent to Deny, and all other matters of record, the Agency for Health Care Administration (hereinafter “the Agency”), finds and concludes as follows: 1. This matter involves an action in which the Agency denied the Petitioner’s renewal application for a home health agency license. (Ex. 1) 2. The Agency sought the denial of renewal of license based on: a. Survey ending May 6, 2008 included eight deficiencies b. Survey ending February 23, 2011 included three deficiencies, one of which was failure to be operational at the time of surveyors came to conduct an unannounced survey. The home health agency refused to provide the requested plan of correction to the Agency within ten days. c. Survey ending August 4, 2011 included four deficiencies. 3. On February 17, 2012, the above-styled matter was referred for a formal hearing to the Division of Administrative Hearings. The matter was held in abeyance pending an appeal in a related case regarding the revocation of this same license. On March 19, 2013, the Court of Appeal dismissed the Petitioner’s appeal upholding the Final Order revoking this license. On April 9, 2013, the Agency filed a Motion to Close Case and Relinquish Jurisdiction in this case. On April 11, 2013, Administrative Law Judge June C. McKinney entered an Order Closing File and Relinquishing Jurisdiction. (Ex. 2) Based upon the foregoing, it is ORDERED: 1. The Notice of Intent to Deny is UPHELD. 2. In accordance with Florida law, the Respondent is responsible for retaining and appropriately distributing all client records within the timeframes prescribed in the authorizing statutes and applicable administrative code provisions. The Respondent is advised of Section 408.810, Florida Statutes, 3. In accordance with Florida law, the Respondent is responsible for any refunds that may have to be made to the clients. 1 Filed July 9, 2013 8:48 AM Division of Administrative Hearings 4. The Respondent is given notice of Florida law regarding unlicensed activity. The Respondent is advised of Section 408.804 and Section 408.812, Florida Statutes. The Respondent should also consult the applicable authorizing statutes and administrative code provisions. The Respondent is notified that the cancellation of an Agency license may have ramifications potentially affecting accrediting, third party billing including but not limited to the Florida Medicaid program, and private contracts. ORDERED in Tallahassee, Florida, this Kx day of , 2013. Elizabeth Dudek, Secretary alth Care Administration NOTICE OF RIGHT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW. A PARTY WHO IS ADVERSELY AFFECTED BY THIS FINAL ORDER IS ENTITLED TO JUDICIAL REVIEW, WHICH SHALL BE INSTITUTED BY FILING ONE COPY OF A NOTICE OF APPEAL WITH THE AGENCY CLERK OF AHCA, AND A SECOND COPY, ALONG WITH FILING FEE AS PRESCRIBED BY LAW, WITH THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL IN THE APPELLATE DISTRICT WHERE THE AGENCY MAINTAINS ITS HEADQUARTERS OR WHERE A PARTY RESIDES. REVIEW OF PROCEEDINGS SHALL BE CONDUCTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE FLORIDA APPELLATE RULES. THE NOTICE OF APPEAL MUST BE FILED WITHIN 30 DAYS OF RENDITION OF THE ORDER TO BE REVIEWED. CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I CERTIFY that a true and correc ry So this apr er_was served on the below-named persons by the method designated on this "a ets , 2013. Richard Shoop, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Stop 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403 Telephone: (850) 412-3630 Jan Mills Anne Menard, Unit Manager Facilities Intake Unit Health Care Clinic Unit Agency for Health Care Administration Agency for Health Care Administration (Electronic Mail) (Electronic Mail) Finance & Accounting Revenue Management Unit Agency for Health Care Administration (Electronic Mail) Arlene Mayo-Davis, Field Office Manager Local Field Office Agency for Health Care Administration (Electronic Mail) Katrina Derico-Harris Medicaid Accounts Receivable Agency for Health Care Administration (Electronic Mail) Nelson E. Rodney Office of the General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration (Electronic Mail) Shawn McCauley Medicaid Contract Management Valerie Jeune Compass Home Health Agency for Health Care Administration 16635 NE 19" Avenue (Electronic Mail) Miami Beach, Florida 33162 (U.S. Mail) | June C. McKinney Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings (Electronic Mail) NOTICE OF FLORIDA LAW 408.804 License required; display.-- (1) It is unlawful to provide services that require licensure, or operate or maintain a provider that offers or provides services that require licensure, without first obtaining from the agency a license authorizing the provision of such services or the operation or maintenance of such provider. (2) A license must be displayed in a conspicuous place readily visible to clients who enter at the address that appears on the license and is valid only in the hands of the licensee to whom it is issued and may not be sold, assigned, or otherwise transferred, voluntarily or involuntarily. The license is valid only for the licensee, provider, and location for which the license is issued. 408.812 Unlicensed activity. -- (1) A person or entity may not offer or advertise services that require licensure as defined by this part, authorizing statutes, or applicable rules to the public without obtaining a valid license from the agency. A licenseholder may not advertise or hold out to the public that he or she holds a license for other than that for which he or she actually holds the license. (2) The operation or maintenance of an unlicensed provider or the performance of any services that require licensure without proper licensure is a violation of this part and authorizing statutes. Unlicensed activity constitutes harm that materially affects the health, safety, and welfare of clients. The agency or any state attorney may, in addition to other remedies provided in this part, bring an action for an injunction to restrain such violation, or to enjoin the future operation or maintenance of the unlicensed provider or the performance of any services in violation of this part and authorizing statutes, until compliance with this part, authorizing statutes, and agency rules has been demonstrated to the satisfaction of the agency. (3) It is unlawful for any person or entity to own, operate, or maintain an unlicensed provider. If after receiving notification from the agency, such person or entity fails to cease operation and apply for a license under this part and authorizing statutes, the person or entity shall be subject to penalties as prescribed by authorizing statutes and applicable rules. Each day of continued operation is a separate offense. (4) Any person or entity that fails to cease operation after agency notification may be fined $1,000 for each day of noncompliance. (5) When a controlling interest or licensee has an interest in more than one provider and fails to license a provider rendering services that require licensure, the agency may revoke all licenses and impose actions under s. 408.814 and a fine of $1,000 per day, unless otherwise specified by authorizing statutes, against each licensee until such time as the appropriate license is obtained for the unlicensed operation. (6) In addition to granting injunctive relief pursuant to subsection (2), if the agency determines that a person or entity is operating or maintaining a provider without obtaining a license and determines that a condition exists that poses a threat to the health, safety, or welfare of a client of the provider, the person or entity is subject to the same actions and fines imposed against a licensee as specified in this part, authorizing statutes, and agency rules. (7) Any person aware of the operation of an unlicensed provider must report that provider to the agency.
The Issue The issue is whether a rule which requires that staff be directly employed by or under contract with a Medicaid home health agency, and that such agencies issue either W-2 or 1099 tax forms to individuals on their staffs, constitutes an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority.
Findings Of Fact The Parties Petitioner Las Mercedes is a licensed home health agency. From July 1, 2004, through June 30, 2006 ("the audit period"), Las Mercedes was also an enrolled Medicaid provider of home health care services. Services were provided through so-called "staffing agreements" with twenty-two companies. Las Mercedes, together with the patient's physician, determined the scope, duration, and plan of care, and it controlled, coordinated, and evaluated the services provided. Las Mercedes established the policies and procedures for submitting progress and clinical notes, scheduling visits, periodic patient evaluation, and the payment for services. (See Stipulation of Facts filed October 6, 2009, in DOAH Case No. 08-5653MPI.) Respondent AHCA is the state agency responsible for administering the joint federal-state Medicaid Program in Florida. It is responsible for, among other things, reimbursing providers for services to Medicaid recipients. In an Amended Final Audit, AHCA determined that Las Mercedes was overpaid $878,843.93 in Medicaid funds between July 1, 2004, and June 30, 2006. The allegation was based on the undisputed fact that Las Mercedes did not issue W-2s or 1099 tax forms to the individuals who provided home health care, but instead issued 1099s to the twenty-two staffing companies. As a result, AHCA concluded that the staff was not employed by or under contract with Las Mercedes as required by Rule. The Rule Challenge The challenged Rule is a provision from the Florida Medicaid Home Health Services Coverage and Limitations Handbook, which is incorporated by reference by Florida Administrative Code Rule 59G-4.130. On page 1-8 of the Florida Medicaid Home Health Services Coverage and Limitations Handbook, July 2008 edition, the Rule is as follows: Home health services are provided by qualified health care professionals who are directly employed by or under contract with a home health agency that is enrolled in the Medicaid Home Health Services Program. Employed or contracted means that the home health agency provides a W-2 or 1099 tax form for the individual. The home health agency must ensure that all staff (employed or contracted) who provide home health services are qualified and licensed. By contrast, Subsection 400.462(9), in establishing licensure requirements for home health agencies has the following definition of a direct employee: "Direct employee" means an employee for whom one of the following entities pays withholding taxes: a home health agency; a management company that has a contract to manage the home health agency on a day-to-day basis; or an employee leasing company that has a contract with the home health agency to handle the payroll and payroll taxes for the home health agency. AHCA agrees that the Medicaid Rule excludes employee staffing agreements that are permitted by the licensure statute. Las Mercedes asserts that the Rule is an invalid exercise of AHCA's delegated legislative authority because: (1) it is ultra vires; (2) the definition of "employed by or under contract with" is in irreconcilable conflict with the definition of "direct employee" in Subsection 400.462(9), Florida Statutes; and (3) it is arbitrary and capricious and, therefore, unenforceable. Las Mercedes also claims that the Rule exceeds the authority granted to AHCA by federal law. It interprets the law as requiring that the licensure standard apply equally to the Medicaid and non-Medicaid providers. That view is based on the language in 42 U.S.C. § 1396(a)(33)(B), which is, in relevant part, as follows: [A state plan for medical assistance must provide] that, except as provided in section 1919(g) [42 USCS § 1396r(g)], the State or local agency utilized by the Secretary for the purpose specified in the first sentence of section 1864(a) [42 USCS § 1395aa(a)], or, if such agency is not the State agency which is responsible for licensing health institutions, the State agency responsible for such licensing, will perform for the State agency administering or supervising the administration of the plan approved under this title [42 USCS §§ 1396 et seq.] the function of determining whether institutions and agencies meet the requirements for participation in the program. The "agency utilized by the Secretary, as provided in 42 U.S.C. § 1395aa(a)" refers to the following: Use of State agencies to determine compliance by providers of services with conditions of participation. The Secretary shall make an agreement with any State which is able and willing to do so under which the services of the State health agency or other appropriate State agency (or the appropriate local agencies) will be utilized by him for the purpose of determining whether an institution therein is a hospital or skilled nursing facility, or whether an agency therein is a home health agency. (Emphasis added.) In Las Mercedes' view of the federal law, the qualifications for being licensed and being a Medicaid provider are expected to be the same. It appears that nothing prohibits that from being the case. Las Mercedes also asserts that the Rule conflicts with 42 C.F.R. § 447.204, which states: The agency's payments must be sufficient to enlist enough providers so that services under the plan are available to recipients at least to the extent that those services are available to the general population. In this record, however, Las Mercedes presented no evidence regarding payments or, as Las Mercedes implies, the extent to which Medicaid services may or may not be adequate without the use of the staffing arrangements permitted under Subsection 400.462(9), Florida Statutes. Las Mercedes also argues that the Rule is arbitrary and capricious. AHCA, it says, cannot articulate a valid reason why licensed home health personnel must receive a tax form directly from a Medicaid provider. Further, Las Mercedes asserts, the Rule is not logically related to the stated purposes of ensuring health, welfare, and safety, and avoiding waste, fraud, and abuse. The Agency's Explanation for the Rule AHCA is responsible for the licensure of home health agencies pursuant to Part III of Chapter 400, Florida Statutes, more specifically Sections 400.461 through 400.5185, known as the "Home Health Services Act." Florida Administrative Code Rules in Chapter 59A-8 implement the provisions of the Home Health Services Act by setting minimum standards for licensure. To be enrolled as a Medicaid provider, a home health agency must not only be licensed, but also must have entered into a Medicaid provider agreement, a voluntary contract between AHCA and the agency. See § 409.907, Fla. Stat. The provisions related to Medicaid are found in Sections 409.901 through 409.920, Florida Statutes. Florida Administrative Code Rule 59G-4.130, including the language that is challenged, cites as enabling statutes Sections 409.905, 409.908, and 409.9081, Florida Statutes, not the licensure provisions in Chapter 400. AHCA contends that challenged Rule is a logical, rational imposition of higher standards than the minimum standards for licensure on those home health agencies that are also Medicaid providers. Its purpose is to ensure health, safety, and welfare of Medicaid recipients, and to curb waste, fraud and abuse. To that end, AHCA maintains that the Rule allows it to exercise greater oversight over the Medicaid program. AHCA concedes that a violation of the challenged Rule would not in and of itself result in any action to deny or revoke a license, although exclusion from the Medicaid program would result in revocation or denial of a license.
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Respondent was overpaid $312,773.67 for claims which, according to Petitioner, did not comply with Medicaid requirements.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner Agency for Health Care Administration ("AHCA") is the state agency responsible for administering the Florida Medicaid Program ("Medicaid"). At all relevant times, Respondent has been a Home and Community Based (HCB) Medicaid provider that is authorized to receive reimbursement for covered services rendered to Medicaid recipients. Developmental Disability Home and Community Based Services Waiver Program The alleged overpayment in this case relates to services Respondent provided through the Medicaid Developmental Disability Home and Community Based Waiver Program ("the Program"). As explained during Ms. Olmstead's final hearing testimony, the Program was established to help developmentally- disabled individuals remain in their homes or home-like settings within the community, as opposed to institutions such as nursing homes or intermediate care facilities. Medicaid recipients that desire to receive services through the Program undergo an initial evaluation performed by a waiver support coordinator. The support coordinator is a Medicaid provider that is selected by the Medicaid recipient or his or her guardian. To determine the services needed by the recipient to remain in the home, the support coordinator assesses the recipient by conducting an in-home visit. Upon completion of this initial assessment, the support coordinator formulates a "support plan," a document which describes the recipient's personality, likes, dislikes, strengths, and weaknesses, as well as the recipient's existing support system, such as family, friends, and neighbors. In addition, the support plan details the services the recipient needs to stay in the home and identifies who will provide the services. The expected costs of the proposed services are described on a form titled "cost plan," which, combined with the support plan, comprise the plan of care for the recipient. The support coordinator is required to submit the plan of care, as detailed in the support plan and cost plan, to the Department of Children and Families ("DCF"). If the plan of care is approved, DCF staff will create a "service authorization form." This form, which the support coordinator forwards to the service provider, describes the services to be rendered, as well as the duration and frequency of each service. Without the service authorization form, a provider cannot be assured payment from Medicaid. At least one time per year, the support coordinator must assess the recipient's needs, complete updated support and cost plans, and submit the updated plans for approval. If the updated plan of care is approved, DCF will draft a new service authorization form, which is forwarded to the provider by the support coordinator, along with copy of pertinent support plan information. Should the recipient's services or support require modification, the support coordinator is required to update the cost report and submit it for approval. Communication between the support coordinator and providers such as Respondent is encouraged, as the support coordinator reviews with the provider the goals to be achieved for the recipient. A service provider is expected to assist in establishing support plan outcomes for a recipient's goals and participate in the personal outcome process. Moreover, a service provider expressly consents to such communication by virtue of the provider's contract with Medicaid, which includes an agreement to participate in discussions with the support coordinator on matters such as a recipient's progress, the extent to which a recipient's needs are being met, and modifications to the recipient's support plan. The Preliminary Audit and Final Audit Exercising its statutory authority to oversee the integrity of Medicaid, Petitioner conducted a review or audit of Respondent's records to verify that claims paid by Medicaid during the period from January 1, 2003, through December 31, 2004 (the "audit period"), were billed and paid in accordance with Medicaid statutes, rules, and policies. As the average number of claims per recipient during the audit period was substantial, Petitioner utilized "two stage cluster sampling." This first stage involved a random selection of 34 receipts for whom Respondent submitted claims during the audit period. Next, from those 34 recipients, a total of 255 claims was randomly selected. On October 7, 2005, AHCA requested that Respondent provide "the documentation for services paid by the Florida Medicaid Program" in connection with the 255 claims that comprised the random sample. On or about October 21, 2005, Respondent submitted 37 packages of documents in response to Petitioner's request. Respondent also executed an affidavit which alleged that the documents were true and correct copies, and that the records were made at or near the time that the services were rendered. The documents submitted by Respondent were initially examined by Ms. Effie Green, a program analyst employed by Petitioner. Ms. Green immediately noticed that the records from at least some of the packages were covered in dust with a crystal-like appearance. Law enforcement officers called to the scene ultimately determined that the substance was harmless. There is no evidence that any of the records were tampered with or removed from Petitioner's offices during the investigation. On the contrary, the evidence demonstrates that the documents remained in Ms. Green's office until the dust was analyzed. Following the events described above, the audit of Respondent's records was delayed for approximately one year while an appeal, which involved a different Medicaid provider, was completed. The appeal, which was resolved in AHCA's favor, concerned the validity of the statistical formula utilized in calculating probable Medicaid overpayments.4 The responsibility of reviewing the documents provided by Respondent was later transferred to Ms. Robin Satchell, an investigator employed by Petitioner in the Bureau of Program Integrity. Prior to her employment with AHCA, Ms. Satchell worked for eight years as an HCB Medicaid provider. Ms. Satchell fully reviewed the records previously submitted on October 20, 2005, and also examined additional records subsequently provided by Respondent to verify that the claims paid during the audit period were billed and paid in accordance with Medicaid statutes, rules, and policies. Rules applicable to the claims reviewed in this case are enumerated in the Florida Medicaid Developmental Services Waiver Services Coverage and Limitations Handbook, and include: Only those services that have been identified in a recipient's plan of care and which have been approved and authorized prior to delivery are covered. Providers are limited to the amount, duration, and scope of the services described on the recipient's support plan and current approved cost plan. Only those services that are medically necessary are covered. Services furnished through the developmental disability waiver program are deemed to be medically necessary only if certain elements are present, including but not limited to the following: the service is not in excess of the recipient's needs; and, the service is furnished in a manner not primarily intended for the convenience of the recipient, the recipient's caregiver, or the provider. In order to receive payment for services, the provider must document the service appropriately. Documentation is a written record that supports the fact that a service has been rendered. Depending upon the particular service provided (e.g., Personal Care Assistance, Homemaker Services, Chore Services), the documentation requirements may vary and are detailed in the Florida Medicaid Developmental Services Waiver Services Coverage and Limitations Handbook. On May 24, 2007, AHCA issued a Final Agency Audit Report, which alleged that Respondent was overpaid $1,647,960.81 during the audit period for services that were not covered by Medicaid. Following the issuance of the Final Agency Audit Report, and as announced at the outset of the final hearing in his matter, Petitioner now alleges that Respondent was overpaid $312,773.26. The manner in which AHCA reached the alleged overpayment of $312,773.67 is as follows: of the 255 claims examined by Ms. Satchell, 197 were allowed.5 Ms. Satchell made downward adjustments to 52 claims, and 6 were denied outright. Based upon the adjustments and denials, Ms. Satchell concluded that Respondent had received $1,287.26 in reimbursement of claims in the sample for services not covered by Medicaid, either in whole or in part. Having discovered this "empirical overpayment" of $1,287.26, AHCA employed a statistical formula to ascertain the "probable total overpayment" that Respondent received from Medicaid in connection with the total number of claims made during the Audit Period.6 As noted above, Petitioner contends that the "probable total overpayment" is $312,773.67. In her Proposed Recommended Order, Respondent asserts that with respect to the entire sample of claims, only one instance of incorrect billing occurred. In particular, Respondent concedes that that services provided to Recipient number 24 on September 2, 2003, were inadvertently overbilled in the amount of $0.96. Respondent disputes the remaining 51 downward adjustments and six outright denials, which are discussed separately below by recipient.7 Recipient No. 1 The support plan for this recipient authorized Personal Care Assistance, which is described in the Florida Medicaid Developmental Services Waiver Services Coverage and Limitations Handbook as follows: service that assists a beneficiary with eating and meal preparation, bathing, dressing, personal hygiene, and activities of daily living. The service also includes activities such as assistance with meal preparation, bed marking and vacuuming when these activities are essential to the health and welfare of the beneficiary and when no one else is available to perform them . . . . Personal Care Assistance is limited to the amount, duration and scope of the services described in the beneficiaries [sic] support plan and current approved cost plan.[8] (Emphasis added). The support plan indicates that this recipient lived with his mother and three siblings, all but one of whom were capable of completing homemaker tasks. AHCA alleges that of the five claims examined during the audit, one is problematic. In particular, AHCA contends that six of the activities performed on November 12, 2004, constituted unauthorized homemaker tasks, and therefore overbilling occurred in the amount of $12.90. According to AHCA, the unauthorized activities included organizing clothes, cleaning the kitchen, washing dishes, cleaning tables, cleaning the living room, and washing laundry. The undersigned finds that four of the six activities were unauthorized homemaker tasks: organizing clothes, cleaning the living room, washing laundry, and cleaning tables. The undersigned cannot agree, however, that Respondent inappropriately billed for washing dishes and cleaning the kitchen. Notably, and as demonstrated by the service log, meal preparation was one of the services provided to the recipient on November 12, 2004. There is no allegation that meal preparation was unauthorized, and the various exhibits submitted by AHCA plainly reveal that the service was appropriate (i.e., meal preparation was not included in AHCA's list of unauthorized activities for that date). In the undersigned's judgment, if a service provider is authorized to cook a meal for a beneficiary, it necessarily follows that the provider be permitted, and indeed expected, to wash the dishes and clean the kitchen. The undersigned's conclusion that Respondent appropriately billed for cleaning the kitchen and washing dishes is supported by the notes made by Ms. Satchell in one of AHCA's exhibits. In particular, page 3 of Petitioner's Exhibit H indicates that with respect to the October 17, 2004, services provided to Recipient No. 6 (who likewise received Personal Care Assistance), one unit of service was deducted for cleaning the kitchen because there was "no meal prep that day." The obvious implication of this notation is that cleaning the kitchen would not have been considered improper if a meal had been prepared. As Respondent was authorized to prepare a meal for the recipient on November 12, 2004, Respondent properly billed for the services of washing the dishes and cleaning the kitchen. Accordingly, the $12.90 alleged overpayment should be adjusted, as only four unauthorized activities (organizing clothes, cleaning the living room, washing laundry, and cleaning tables) were billed. Recipient No. 3 The service authorization for Recipient No. 3 provided for four hours of Homemaker Services per week. The service authorization further indicated that the Homemaker Services were intended to achieve the support plan goal of providing "the beneficiary with [a] clean environment. General household activities, such meal [sic] preparation, vacuuming, and routine cleaning." It appears from the support plan that the Homemaker Services were authorized due to the poor health of the recipient's mother. Homemaker Services are defined in the Florida Medicaid Developmental Services Waiver Services Coverage and Limitations Handbook as follows: Homemaker services are those general household activities such as meal preparation, laundry, vacuuming and routine household cleaning provided by a trained homemaker, when the person who usually handles these tasks is unable to perform them. The intent of this service is to ensure that the beneficiary's home environment remains clean, safe, and sanitary. Homemaker services are provided only when there is no one else capable of accomplishing the household tasks . . . . * * * Homemaker services shall be provided in the beneficiary's own home or family home. This service is available in the family home only when there is documentation as to why the family cannot provide the support If approved, homemaker services will be limited to the beneficiary's primary living areas such as bedroom and bathroom. This includes the kitchen and a common area, if regularly utilized by the beneficiary. (Emphasis added). On December 11, 2004, Respondent provided four hours of Homemaker Services, which were billed in the amount of $59.20. AHCA concedes that nine of the services provided on December 11, 2004, were authorized and therefore appropriately billed: making the bed; changing the bed sheets; throwing garbage away; cleaning the room; organizing the room; organizing the clothes; cleaning the bathroom; changing the towels; organizing the bathroom; vacuuming; cleaning the rugs; and meal preparation. However, AHCA contends that ten other activities provided on December 11, 2004, were unauthorized: cleaning the kitchen; washing the dishes; cleaning the tables; cleaning / organizing the cabinets; cleaning the stove; cleaning the refrigerator; cleaning the living room; washing laundry; ironing; and cleaning windows. It is evident from Ms. Satchell's notes (in the "MPI worksheet") that she found these tasks unnecessary because they occurred "outside of recipient's bedroom / bathroom."9 As a consequence, Ms. Satchell concluded that Respondent was overpaid for one hour of services in the amount of $14.80 Once again, the undersigned cannot agree that Respondent inappropriately billed for cleaning the kitchen, washing dishes, and cleaning the stove. Cooking was permitted by the service authorization, and there is no allegation that Respondent should not have billed for the meal that was prepared for the recipient on December 11, 2004. If a provider is authorized to prepare a meal, it is only logical that he or she clean up afterward and bill for the time. Nor can the undersigned agree that Respondent should not have billed for cleaning the living room, tables, windows, and refrigerator. These four activities plainly fall within the services contemplated by the service authorization, which directed Respondent to provide "the beneficiary with [a] clean environment" and carry out "general household activities . . . such as routine cleaning." Moreover, these activities are comparable to "cleaning rugs," an activity performed on the same date that was not alleged to be improper. Although, as AHCA point out, these activities may have occurred outside of the recipient's bedroom and bathroom, that fact is not controlling, as the Florida Medicaid Developmental Services Waiver Services Coverage and Limitations Handbook provides that Homemaker Services extend to "the kitchen and a common area, if regularly utilized by the beneficiary."10 The undersigned also finds that washing laundry was not an unauthorized activity, as it falls within the definition homemaker services. Further, in light of the recipient's incontinence, washing laundry is obviously essential to achieving the support plan goal of providing "the beneficiary with [a] clean environment." The undersigned does agree with AHCA that ironing and "cleaning / organizing cabinets" were unauthorized because these activities were not related to the support plan goals. Based on the findings herein that only two of the activities were unauthorized (ironing and "cleaning / organizing" cabinets), an adjustment should be made to the alleged overpayment of $14.80. Recipient No. 6 This recipient was authorized to receive six hours of Personal Care Assistance per day. Pursuant to the support plan, Respondent was authorized to provide bathing, dressing and eating assistance to the recipient. On October 17, 2004, Respondent provided six hours of services to the recipient, at a cost of $120.96. AHCA alleges, correctly, that one of the services provided on that date, cleaning the kitchen, was unauthorized because the service documentation provided by Respondent reflects that no meal was prepared. Accordingly, the undersigned finds that Respondent was overpaid $5.04. Although Respondent has suggested that cleaning the kitchen may have been necessary due to the recipient (who is incontinent) defecating on the kitchen floor, no documentation has been provided that would support such a finding. In the absence of appropriate documentation, AHCA appropriately found that an adjustment of one unit was required for the October 17, 2004, services. Respondent also provided six hours of services to the recipient on November 26, 2004, at a cost of $120.96. With respect to this date, AHCA contends, and the undersigned agrees, that overbilling for one unit in the amount of $5.04 occurred, as one of the activities performed, "organizing clothes," constituted an unauthorized homemaker service. For the reasons expressed above, AHCA demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence overbilling totaling $10.08 with respect to this recipient. Recipient No. 7 This recipient was authorized to receive Personal Care Assistance. Significantly, the recipient's support plan clearly indicated that her mother prepared meals for her. The service logs indicate that Respondent provided four hours of services to the recipient on the following dates: September 4 and November 25, 2003, and February 10 and April 26, 2004. AHCA contends that on each of the four dates listed above, Respondent provided the unauthorized service of meal preparation, and as a result, Respondent was overpaid a total of $18.68. As the recipient's support plan clearly indicated that meals were prepared by a parent, AHCA has demonstrated an overpayment of $18.68 by a preponderance of the evidence. Recipient No. 8 Recipient No. 8 was authorized to receive Personal Care Assistance and Companion Services, both of which were provided by Respondent. AHCA alleges that of the eleven claims reviewed pursuant to the audit, two were problematic. Specifically, AHCA contends the service logs associated with the personal care assistance provided on October 26 and November 19, 2004, were obvious photocopies of Respondent's service log from March of 2004 for the same recipient. Accordingly, AHCA asserts that the records submitted by Respondent in connection with the October 26 and November 19 services were not contemporaneous and therefore inadequate. As no contemporaneous records document the services provided on October 26 and November 19, 2004, AHCA contends that Respondent was overpaid $275.20 ($137.60 for each of the dates). The undersigned has examined the service logs for October and November 2004 for this recipient and finds that they do not constitute contemporaneous records. As such, Respondent was overpaid in the amount alleged by AHCA. Recipient No. 9 This recipient was authorized to receive Homemaker Services. AHCA alleges, and the undersigned agrees, that of the five claims audited, two involved overpayments. In particular, Respondent's service log reveals that on April 29, 2003, the unauthorized activity of "shopping" was performed. As such, Respondent was overpaid in the amount of $3.70. Further, Respondent's service log indicates that on January 7, 2004, homemaker activities were provided from 9:00 a.m. through 11:00 a.m., which included shopping and meal preparation. As noted above, shopping is an unauthorized activity. In addition, the support plan indicates that the recipient's mother was responsible for preparing meals. Accordingly, an overpayment of $3.70 occurred with respect to this date of service. For these reasons, AHCA has demonstrated a total overpayment of $7.40 in connection with this recipient. Recipient No. 10 Recipient No. 10 was authorized to receive Companion Services, which, pursuant to the support plan, were intended to help the recipient "continue to be exposed to different options in the community." AHCA contends that two of the five claims examined during the audit are problematic. First, with respect to the July 29, 2003, claim, Respondent provided no documentation to support the $49.44 billed for the four hours of service. As such, AHCA correctly determined that Respondent was overpaid in that amount. In addition, AHCA properly found that Respondent was overpaid $3.70 in connection with the September 26, 2003, services. Specifically, the service log indicates that a meal was prepared, which is an activity unrelated to the specific goals identified in the support plan. Based on the above findings, Respondent was overpaid a total of $53.14 with respect to this recipient. Recipient No. 12 Recipient No. 12 was authorized to receive eight hours of Companion Services per week. Pursuant to the support plan and service authorization, the services were intended to help the recipient be "socially active in the community." The support plan further indicated that the recipient was able to "clean her room, clean the bathroom . . . wash dishes and help her mother with chores." AHCA correctly alleges that of the five claims examined, three involved overpayments. First, for the 32 units of service provided on December 28, 2003, Respondent was overpaid $3.70 because the service log indicates that dishwashing was provided. This was obviously inappropriate because, as noted above, the support plan expressly provided that the recipient was capable of washing dishes. Next, Respondent's service log indicates that dishwashing was performed for the recipient on April 24, 2004. As such, Respondent was overpaid $3.70. An overpayment of $3.70 was also proven in connection with the July 3, 2004, services, as the service log demonstrates that the unauthorized activities of dishwashing and "organizing the bathroom" were performed. For these reasons, AHCA appropriately determined that Respondent was overpaid in the total amount of $11.10 for the services provided to this recipient during the audit period. Recipient No. 17 This recipient was authorized to receive Personal Care Assistance and Homemaker Services. Of the twelve claims reviewed concerning this recipient, AHCA alleges that only the November 11, 2004, services are problematic. In particular, a review of the service logs demonstrates that seven activities billed as homemaker services for November 11, 2004, were also provided and billed as personal care assistance for the same date. Based upon this unauthorized duplication of services, AHCA has proven that an overpayment of $14.80 occurred. Recipient No. 18 This recipient was authorized to receive forty hours of Personal Care Assistance per week. According to the support plan, the recipient lived alone with her father (who worked full time) and had little contact with her mother, who lived "far away" and visited only occasionally on weekends. The support plan further provided that the personal care assistance was intended to provide assistance with "bathing, dressing, grooming, food preparation, feeding, and transportation to . . . therapy." AHCA determined, following a review of the service logs and other documentation, that Respondent was overpaid in connection with two of the seven claims reviewed during the audit. First, AHCA alleges that Respondent was overpaid $7.72 by performing unauthorized homemaker tasks on September 19, 2003, which included shopping, washing dishes (although no meal was prepared), and assisting with household activities that would not typically be completed by an eight-year-old child. The undersigned agrees that the activities identified by AHCA in connection with the services rendered on September 19, 2003, were unauthorized, and that Respondent was overpaid in the amount of $7.72. AHCA also contends that Respondent was overpaid $7.72 in connection with the services provided on February 27, 2004. Specifically, AHCA asserts that three of the activities (shopping, laundry, and washing dishes) were unauthorized homemaker tasks. It is critical to note that in contrast to the services provided on September 19, 2003, the provider prepared a meal (as authorized by the support plan) for the recipient on February 27, 2004. As such, and for the reasons expressed previously in this Recommended Order, dishwashing should not be deemed an unauthorized activity. However, the undersigned concludes that shopping and laundry, the other two questionable activities performed on February 27, 2004, were indeed unauthorized. In light of the undersigned's finding that meal preparation was not an unauthorized activity, AHCA should make an appropriate adjustment to the February 27, 2004, overpayment. Recipient No. 19 Of the eight claims examined for Recipient No. 19, who was authorized to receive Companion Services, AHCA found fault with only one. In particular, AHCA determined that of the $59.20 billed on November 26, 2004, Respondent was overpaid $3.70 by performing the unauthorized homemaker activity of "organizing bathroom." The undersigned agrees with AHCA's finding, as organizing the recipient's bathroom is a homemaker activity that does not fall within the ambit of companion services. As such, an overpayment of $3.70 occurred. Recipient No. 20 This recipient was authorized to receive twenty hours of Companion Services per week, which were typically provided in four hour blocks from 1:00 p.m. to 5:00 p.m. Companion Services are defined in the Florida Medicaid Developmental Services Waiver Services Coverage and Limitations Handbook as follows: Companion services consist of non-medical care, supervision, and socialization activities provided to an adult on a one-on- one basis. This service must be provided in direct relation to the achievement of the beneficiary's goals per his or her support plan. A companion provider may also assist the beneficiary with such tasks as meal preparation, laundry and shopping . . . . Providers may also perform light housekeeping tasks, incidental to the care and supervision of the beneficiary. (Emphasis added). Significantly, the support plan expressly provided that the recipient "receive[d] assistance from her companion in some house chores, like cleaning the kitchen and meal preparation to avoid risky situations in the kitchen." (Emphasis added). AHCA contends that overpayments occurred with respect to four of the five claims audited. First, AHCA alleges that with regard to the November 11, 2003, services, Respondent was overpaid $3.70 by performing the unauthorized activity of "light housekeeping." The undersigned cannot agree, as the support plan plainly allowed the provider to assist the recipient with "some house chores," which is indistinguishable from "light housekeeping." Further, and as noted above, companion services may include "light housekeeping tasks, incidental to the care and supervision of the beneficiary." The service log for November 11, 2003, demonstrates that supervision was provided to the recipient. Accordingly, Respondent did not overbill in the amount of $3.70 for this date of service. Next, AHCA contends that with respect to the services provided on December 10, 2003 (which included non-medical care, supervision, shopping, and "goals and support plan assistant"), one activity was unauthorized: meal preparation. As such, AHCA alleges that an overpayment of $3.70 occurred. The undersigned concludes, based on the unambiguous language of the support plan, that meal preparation was authorized. As detailed above, the recipient "receive[d] assistance from her companion in some house chores, like cleaning the kitchen and meal preparation to avoid risky situations in the kitchen." (Emphasis added). Accordingly, an overpayment of $3.70 did not occur with respect to the December 10, 2003, services. Turning to the services provided on May 6, 2004, AHCA contends that the unauthorized activity of washing laundry resulted in an overbilling of $3.70. As referenced in the definition of companion services previously quoted, laundry may only be performed "in direct relation to the achievement of the beneficiary's goals per his or her support plan." In this instance, the documentation submitted by Respondent fails to make such a showing. As a result, AHCA correctly found that $3.70 was overbilled for this date. Finally, with respect to the May 12, 2004, services, AHCA alleges that Respondent was overpaid $3.70 for the unauthorized activity of "dishwashing." The undersigned does not agree that dishwashing was unauthorized, since the support plan contemplated that the recipient would receive assistance from a "companion in some house chores, like cleaning the kitchen." As washing dishes is integral to the process of cleaning a kitchen, Respondent was not overpaid in connection with this date of service. Based on the above findings, the total overbilling for this recipient was $3.70, which related to the May 6, 2004, services. Respondent was not overpaid in connection with the services provided on November 11 and December 10, 2003, and May 12, 2004. Recipient No. 21 This recipient was authorized to receive 20 hours of Personal Care Assistance per week, which was typically provided from 2:00 p.m. through 6:00 p.m. The support plan for this recipient, who is incontinent, reads in relevant part as follows: Food requires modification. Food needs to be blend [sic] or puree [sic] at all times to avoid choking . . . . [Recipient] arrives home around 2:00 p.m. Personal Care service changes her diaper. Then she prepares her a snack. She is [sic] assists with eating. AHCA contends that Respondent was overpaid in connection with three of the four dates of service examined during the audit. First, with respect to the services provided on April 14, 2004, AHCA asserts that two unauthorized activities were performed (organizing clothes and performing a massage), which resulted in overbilling of $3.86. Having reviewed the support plan carefully, the undersigned agrees that these activities were unauthorized and that an overpayment occurred in the amount alleged. Turning to the services provided on October 14, 2004, AHCA alleges that five unauthorized activities (providing a massage, washing dishes, changing sheets, organizing the bathroom, and cleaning a table) resulted in overbilling of $11.58. The undersigned concurs with AHCA's assertion that the activities of "massage," change sheets, organize bathroom, and clean table were unauthorized. However, overbilling did not occur for washing dishes, as the service log reveals that a meal was prepared for the recipient on October 14, 2004, an activity that was expressly authorized by the support plan. As meal preparation was permitted, washing the dishes constituted a permissible activity. In light of the above findings, AHCA should make an appropriate adjustment to the overpayment associated with the October 14, 2004, services. Finally, AHCA contends that with regard to the December 24, 2004, services, Respondent was overpaid $7.72 by providing four unauthorized activities: performing a massage, making the bed, changing towels, and cleaning the living room. The undersigned agrees that these activities were not approved and that an overpayment occurred in the amount alleged. Recipient No. 23 Recipient No. 23 was authorized to receive Personal Care Assistance, which was typically provided multiple times each week for eight hours. AHCA contends that Respondent was overpaid in connection with eight of the nine claims examined during the audit. Six of the claims involve identical issues. In particular, with respect to the services provided on August 29, 2003, and February 2, February 17, April 5, May 28, and September 13, 2004, AHCA asserts that the unauthorized activities of "make bed, meal prep, [and] clean table" resulted in overbilling totaling $60.48 (i.e., $10.08 for each of the six dates). As it appears from a review of the support plan that the recipient's mother was able to complete these activities, the undersigned agrees that overbilling occurred in the amount alleged. AHCA also alleges, and has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence, that $10.08 was overbilled in connection with the services provided on August 8, 2003. In particular, the activities of "played outside, played with castle set, and lunch" are beyond the scope of the services contemplated by the support plan. Finally, AHCA has met its burden with respect to the alleged $5.04 in overbilling associated with the September 10, 2003, services, as "went to pool" and "watered deck flowers before dinner" plainly constitute unauthorized activities. Recipient No. 24 As noted previously, Respondent concedes that an overpayment of $0.96 occurred with respect to this recipient. Recipient No. 25 Recipient No. 25 was authorized to receive 16 hours of Companion Services each week to assist with socialization and supervision. Of the six claims examined during the audit, AHCA contends that two are problematic. First, with regard to the services provided on January 29, 2003, AHCA contends that the entire billing for that date ($24.72) should be denied due to inadequate documentation. In particular, AHCA notes that the service log provided during the preliminary audit and final audit was different than a log submitted by Respondent in April of 2009. Further, the earlier log is vague (it merely indicates "assist household, escort activities, other") and fails to address any specific support plan activities. AHCA also points out that the later log was incomplete and failed to indicate the date of the activities. AHCA has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that the services provided on January 29, 2003, were not adequately documented, and therefore Respondent was overpaid in the amount of $24.72. Next, AHCA alleges that the services provided on March 25, 2004, were not adequately documented, and therefore the entire billing of $44.40 should be denied for that date. Specifically, AHCA points out that the service log only reads "supervision" and "escort activities" and failed to address any of the activities enumerated in the support plan. Although a later service log was submitted, it was incomplete, vague, and failed to delineate which activities were performed on March 25, 2004, as opposed to the other nine dates of service during that month. For the reasons detailed above, AHCA demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that the March 25, 2004, services were not properly documented, and therefore the $44.40 payment should be denied. Recipient No. 26 AHCA contends that of the nine claims examined during the audit concerning this recipient, one should be fully denied due to the lack of proper documentation. Specifically, AHCA alleges that the $74.00 payment for the services rendered on May 31, 2004, should be denied outright, as the service log for May of 2004 was created by photocopying the service log for the previous month and changing the date. The undersigned has examined the documents11 and concludes that the May 2004 service log was not contemporaneously prepared. As a result, AHCA has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that the $74.00 payment associated with the May 31, 2004, services should be denied. Recipient No. 28 This recipient was authorized to receive Personal Care Assistance to address daily needs such as grooming and dressing. Significantly, the support plan also indicates that meal preparation was authorized. AHCA contends that with respect to the services provided on May 15, 2003, four unauthorized homemaker activities were performed: cleaning the bathroom, washing laundry, cleaning the kitchen, and washing dishes. As a result, AHCA alleges an overpayment of $12.00, which represents four units of service. AHCA has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that cleaning the bathroom and washing laundry were unauthorized. However, AHCA has failed to prove that dishwashing and cleaning the kitchen were unauthorized, as the provider prepared a meal (as indicated by the service log) for the recipient on May 15, 2003, an activity that was authorized by the support plan. As explained previously in this Recommended Order, if a provider is authorized to prepare a meal, then it is entirely reasonable for the provider to wash the dishes and clean the kitchen afterward. This is particularly true with respect to this recipient, who lived alone with her stepfather (who, according to the support plan, worked "intensive hours"), and was incapable of performing basic tasks (e.g., grooming and dressing) without assistance. Accordingly, AHCA should make an appropriate adjustment to the alleged $12.00 overpayment based on the above findings that cleaning the kitchen and washing dishes were not unauthorized. Recipient No. 29 Recipient No. 29 was authorized to receive Personal Care Assistance in the amount of two hours each weekday and five hours on weekends. Pursuant to the support plan, the recipient required assistance with basic activities such as dressing, bathing, brushing teeth, and preparing meals. AHCA contends that overbilling occurred with respect to four of the eight dates of service examined during the audit. First, AHCA alleges, and has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that $10.08 was overbilled for the October 6, 2004, services, as the following unauthorized homemaker activities were performed: cleaning the recipient's room, cleaning the bathroom, organizing the room, organizing the bathroom, and changing towels. In addition, AHCA has proven an overpayment of $10.08 in connection with the November 24, 2004, services, where the service log demonstrates that unauthorized homemaker activities (identical to the services identified in the previous paragraph) were performed on that date. With regard to the services rendered on December 14, 2004, AHCA has demonstrated overbilling of $10.08 for the unauthorized homemaker services of cleaning the room and changing towels. Finally, AHCA alleges, and has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence, a $5.04 overpayment in connection with the December 29, 2004, services. In particular, the service logs demonstrate that the unauthorized homemaker activities of vacuuming, organizing the bathroom, and taking out garbage were performed. Recipient No. 31 This recipient was authorized to receive Personal Care Assistance, which was provided eight hours per day, Monday through Friday, and ten hours on both Saturday and Sunday. As the recipient is a quadriplegic, personal care assistance was obviously necessary for feeding and maintaining personal hygiene. Of the nine claims examined during the audit concerning this recipient, AHCA alleges that overbilling occurred with respect to two. First, with regard to the October 27, 2003, services, AHCA contends that insufficient documentation was provided by Respondent to support ten hours of billing. In particular, AHCA asserts that "ate well" is the only activity described in the contemporaneous service log.12 As a result, AHCA argues that one hour of billing should be permitted for meal prep, and that the remaining billing in the amount of $181.44 should be disallowed. Contrary to AHCA's contention, "ate well" is not the only event described in the contemporaneous service log. Significantly, the log also reads, "Incontinent B & B." Given the recipient's physical condition, this notation obviously means that the service provider was required to address at least one episode of bladder and bowel incontinence during the ten hours of service. As such, billing should be permitted for toileting. Based on the above finding that services were documented for toileting, AHCA should make an appropriate adjustment to the October 27, 2003, overpayment. Next, AHCA contends that that due to inadequate documentation, overbilling of $161.28 occurred with regard to the ten hours of services provided on February 16, 2004. In particular, AHCA contends that the documentation submitted by Respondent supports only two hours of billing, as bathing was the only activity described in the contemporaneous service log. Once again, however, the contemporaneous service log also indicates that the service provider was required to address the recipient's bladder and bowel incontinence. Accordingly, additional billing should be permitted for toileting, and AHCA should make an appropriate adjustment to the February 16, 2004, overpayment. Recipient No. 32 Recipient No. 32 was authorized to receive Personal Care Assistance and Companion Services. AHCA contends that Respondent was overpaid in connection with eight of the fifteen claims examined pursuant to the audit. With respect to the services provided on March 21 and 23, 2003, AHCA has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent was overpaid $61.80 in connection with each of the two dates (totaling $123.60) where the documentation does not support the units of service billed. Next, AHCA contends, and the undersigned agrees, that Respondent inappropriately billed for recreational activities in connection with the personal care assistance services provided on August 13, 2003, and December 1, 2003. As a result, $3.86 was overbilled for each date, for a total of $7.72. AHCA also alleges, and has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence, that unauthorized homemaker activities were billed in connection with the companion services rendered on October 7 and 11, 2003, and December 2, 2003, which resulted in overbilling of $11.10, $11.10, and $7.40, respectively. In particular, the service logs indicate that meal prep, laundry, and housekeeping were performed on October 7 and 11, 2003, and that laundry and housekeeping were provided on December 2, 2003. Finally, AHCA has proven an overpayment of $15.44 with respect to the personal care assistance services provided on March 25, 2004. Specifically, the service log indicates that the service provider "walked the dog" and "checked live bait," tasks which do not fall within the scope of personal care assistance. Based on the above findings, AHCA demonstrated a total overpayment of $176.36 with respect to this recipient. Recipient No. 33 This recipient was authorized to receive three hours per week of Companion Services, which were intended to "increase awareness of community resources and increase community integration skills." AHCA alleges that Respondent was overpaid in connection with one of the two claims examined during the audit. Specifically, with respect to the services provided on July 15, 2003, the only activities described in the service log are "shopping" and "exercise." AHCA contends, and the undersigned agrees, that neither shopping nor exercise constitute goal oriented activities in under the circumstances of this recipient. Accordingly, AHCA has demonstrated an overpayment of $15.44, which represents one hour of billing. Recipient No. 34 This recipient was authorized to receive Personal Care Assistance. Pursuant to the support plan, the recipient lived with her able-bodied mother and older brother. Of the five claims examined during the audit, AHCA contends that Respondent was overpaid with respect to two. First, AHCA alleges that $5.29 was overpaid in connection with the August 4, 2004, services, where the service log suggested that the provider took the recipient to the park. The undersigned has examined the monthly summary, and agrees with AHCA's assessment of the documentation. Accordingly, AHCA has demonstrated an overpayment in the amount alleged. Turning to the services provided on December 9, 2004, AHCA has demonstrated an overpayment of $5.29 by a preponderance of the evidence, as "cleaning the living room" is an activity that could have been performed by the recipient's mother.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is Recommended that AHCA: Make appropriate adjustments to the empirical overpayment; Recalculate the probable total overpayment using the adjusted empirical overpayment and the statistical formula previously employed, and enter a final order requiring Respondent to repay AHCA the amount determined through such recalculation; The final order should further require Respondent to pay interest at the rate of 10 percent per annum on the recalculated total overpayment. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of November, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S Edward T. Bauer Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of November, 2010.
Findings Of Fact Billings for home health care services once made CCI the recipient of substantial Medicaid moneys. By resort to, among other things, "a variety of different types of statistical investigations," (T.82) the Office of Program Integrity within HRS' Medicaid Office is "continuously asking the question, do we get what we pay for?" Id. A separate, legislative agency, a unit of the Office of the Auditor General, investigates allegations of Medicaid fraud. Investigation In February of 1990, Ellen Williams, a medical health care program analyst in HRS' Office of Program Integrity, noticed that CCI was "suddenly showing up as either number one or number two in the State, and . . . was intrigued why a home health agency in Palatka would be [b]illing to the extent it appeared that they were." T.36. She "requested a printout of their billings" (T.37) and opened a file. Not long afterwards, Ms. Williams learned that the Medicaid Fraud Control Unit (MFCU) in the Auditor General's Office "had basically a new review of the same agency." T.37. MFCU investigators copied "a number of boxes" (T.116) of CCI's records, including "pieces of files" for ten of the 49 patients whose files HRS subsequently attempted to obtain from CCI. T.53. As far as the evidence showed, MFCU did not obtain "the entire files on any of these people." Id. In early May of 1990, Ms. Williams received an unsigned investigative report the Medicaid Fraud Control Unit had prepared. On the strength of this report, at her supervisor's direction, she prepared a letter which was sent to CCI by certified mail on May 20, 1991. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 3. She did not attempt at that time to verify the allegations in the MFCU report. Prosecution The letter dated May 20, 1991, initiated a recoupment and termination proceeding, Conval-Care, Inc. v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, No. 91-4020, intended to end CCI's "participation in the Florida Medicaid program for [alleged] violation of federal and state laws and regulations respecting the Medicaid program," stating: Information has been received from the Medicaid Fraud Control Unit of the Office of the Auditor General (MFCU) to the effect that you have billed and been paid $591,082.00 for services that are not covered by Medicaid. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 3. HRS also sought to recover the alleged overpayment, and impose an administrative fine. The letter did not allege times. (HRS later concluded that the overbillings alleged in the letter occurred between December of 1989 and November of 1990, but HRS never sought leave to amend to allege this, and took no other step to limit the allegations in the recoupment and termination proceeding.) In response to CCI's request for formal administrative proceedings, HRS referred Case No. 91-4020 to the Division of Administrative Hearings. Discovery and Further Investigation On September 23, 1991, while Case No. 91-4020 was pending at the Division of Administrative Hearings, HRS' Ellen D. Williams wrote CCI's Inez Browning, as follows: In order to complete the Medicaid review of services billed by Conval-Care, Inc. to the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, it will be necessary to obtain completed home health records on a selected statistical sample of recipients. I plan to arrive at your Palatka office on Tuesday, October 8, 1991, for the purpose of copying the records for the individuals on the attached list. Please have them available at that office. If you have any problems or questions, please call me at (904) 488-3588. Respondent's Exhibit No. 1. Although not identified as such, the list of names was purportedly a random sample of Medicaid beneficiaries to whom CCI had provided services between December of 1989 and May of 1991, a period during which CCI's alleged overbillings were even higher. In response to Ms. Williams' letter of September 23, 1991, counsel for CCI wrote Ms. Williams, on September 30, 1991, as follows: Please recall that your office, due in large part to your actions, is involved in litigation with Conval-Care, Inc. As a result, any request for documents must be pursued through appropriate discovery channels pursuant to the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure. No records will be provided as a result of your letter of September 23rd. If you appear at the door, you will be refused entry. You referred to a "statistical sample" of recipients, yet requested information concerning both recipients whose records have already been provided and the remaining recipients whose records were not provided during the initial investigation. This hardly reflects any statistical sampling. Further, your letter contradicts your sworn testimony in which you indicated there was no pending investigation of Conval-Care, Inc. by DHRS. In any event, Conval-Care, Inc. is a represented party in active litigation with your agency and neither you or any other representative from DHRS may contact Conval- Care, Inc. or any of its employees without my consent. You and others at the agency may have realized the weakness of your claims against Conval-Care, Inc., since the credibility of several of your key witnesses has been seriously undermined, but we will not permit you to go on a fishing expedition to try to develop new allegations against our client. You made your case Ms. Williams, now live with it. If DHRS must seek other documents related to the matters at issue, its attorneys should know how to do that. Respondent's Exhibit No. 2. HRS did not file any request for production in Case No. 91-4020 under Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.310(b), 1.350 or 1.351, which are applicable to administrative proceedings by virtue of Rule 60Q-2.019, Florida Administrative Code. Instead, attaching the same list of 49 names that Ms. Williams had attached to her letter of September 23, 1991, counsel for HRS wrote CCI's counsel, on October 17, 1991, as follows: Pursuant to Chapter 400.484 and 409.913 Florida Statutes, representatives of the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services intend to copy certain records in the possession of Conval-Care, Inc. It is their intention to go to your clients place of business on Tuesday, October 22, 1991 and obtain these copies. I have attached a list of those records which are of interest. Please advise the undersigned if this date is inconvenient. Respondent's Exhibit No. 3. Some, but not all, of the listed records concerned patients for whom reimbursement between December of 1989 and November of 1990 was at issue in Case No. 91-4020. On October 21, 1991, in response to Mr. Scott's letter dated four days earlier, Respondent's Exhibit No. 3, Julie Gallagher wrote, on behalf of CCI: Section 400.487, F.S., grants HRS the authority to make "such inspections and investigations as are necessary in order to determine the state of compliance with the provisions of this act and of rules or standards in force pursuant thereto." It is our position that HRS has already made such "inspections and investigations" and has determined that Conval-Care, Inc. is not in compliance with various provisions of the statute and rules and, hence, HRS has initiated termination proceedings to exclude Conval-Care, Inc. from the Medicaid Program. Further "inspections and investigations" are not necessary as required by the statute and will, therefore, not be permitted. The other statute you cited, Section 409.903 [sic], F.S., has nothing to do with the inspection of documents. Should you desire documents from Conval-Care, Inc., which are pertinent to the issue in the pending litigation, please submit a discovery request and we will respond appropriately. Respondent's Exhibit No. 4. Insisting it had the right to inspect the records in question, HRS sent Ms. Williams to Palatka where, as CCI's counsel had forewarned, nobody from CCI was on hand to receive her. Main Case Abandoned "In the month or so preceding" (T.52) September 23, 1991, Ms. Williams came to believe "that what MFCU referred to . . . as their sample was not in fact a [random] sample . . . [and] did not encompass the entire billing period." Id. At hearing, she testified that she wanted "to determine an overpayment amount, irrespective of the termination proceeding." T.60. But at the time this desire arose HRS was seeking to recover the "overpayment amount" in Case No. 91-4020, the recoupment and termination proceeding in which final hearing was then set for October 14, 1991. HRS' counsel in the recoupment and termination proceeding relied on the attempt to obtain records Ms. Williams initiated on September 23, 1991, as his sole means of securing records that HRS listed as exhibits it intended to offer in the recoupment and termination proceeding, Case No. 91-4020. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 7.; T. 134-5. After the attempt to gather evidence in this fashion proved unavailing, and after several continuances, HRS dropped the recoupment and termination proceeding it had initiated against CCI.
Recommendation It is, accordingly, RECOMMENDED: That HRS dismiss the sanctions letter which initiated these proceedings. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of June, 1993, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of June, 1993.
Conclusions Having reviewed the Administrative Complaint, and all other matters of record, the Agency for Health Care Administration finds and concludes as follows: 1. The Agency has jurisdiction over the above-named Respondent pursuant to Chapter 408, Part II, Florida Statutes, and the applicable authorizing statutes and administrative code provisions. 2. The Agency issued the attached Administrative Complaint and Election of Rights form to the Respondent. (Ex. 1) The Election of Rights form advised of the right to an administrative hearing. 3. The parties have since entered into the attached Settlement Agreement. (Ex. 2) Based upon the foregoing, it is ORDERED: 1. The Settlement Agreement is adopted and incorporated by reference into this Final Order. The parties shall comply with the terms of the Settlement Agreement. 2: The Respondent had voluntarily surrendered the license for this assisted living facility and voluntarily closed this assisted living facility. 3. In accordance with Florida law, the Respondent is responsible for retaining and appropriately distributing all client records within the timeframes prescribed in the authorizing statutes and applicable administrative code provisions. The Respondent is advised of Section 408.810, Florida Statutes. 4. In accordance with Florida law, the Respondent is responsible for any refunds that may have to be made to the clients. Ss The Respondent is given notice of Florida law regarding unlicensed activity. The Respondent is advised of Section 408.804 and Section 408.812, Florida Statutes. The Respondent should also consult the applicable authorizing statutes and administrative code provisions. The Respondent is notified that the cancellation of an Agency license may have ramifications potentially Filed November 3, 2014 4:29 PM Division of Admihistrative Hearings affecting accrediting, third party billing including but not limited to the Florida Medicaid program, and private contracts. 6. The Respondent shall pay the Agency $6,000.00. If full payment has been made, the cancelled check acts as receipt of payment and no further payment is required. If full payment has not been made, payment is due within 30 days of the Final Order. Overdue amounts are subject to statutory interest and may be referred to collections. A check made payable to the “Agency for Health Care Administration” and containing the AHCA ten-digit case number should be sent to: Office of Finance and Accounting Revenue Management Unit Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, MS 14 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 7. The Agency’s Bureau of Central Services and the Assisted Living Unit shall maintain an alert on the Respondent’s controlling interest, Aida Salgueiro, in order to ensure compliance with the terms of the Settlement Agreement. ORDERED at Tallahassee, Florida, on this ro 2) day of Crctotecr _ , 2014. ek, Secretary alth Care Administration Elizabeth Agency for
Other Judicial Opinions A party who is adversely affected by this Final Order is entitled to judicial review, which shall be instituted by filing one copy of a notice of appeal with the Agency Clerk of AHCA, and a second copy, along with filing fee as prescribed by law, with the District Court of Appeal in the appellate district where the Agency maintains its headquarters or where a party resides. Review of proceedings shall be conducted in accordance with the Florida appellate rules. The Notice of Appeal must be filed within 30 days of rendition of the order to be reviewed. CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I CERTIFY that a true and correct_cgpy of this Final Order was served-6n the below-named persons by the method designated on this 52>-day of TE , 2014. 2727 Mahan Drive, Bldg. #3, Mail Stop #3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403 Telephone: (850) 412-3630 Jan Mills Facilities Intake Unit (Electronic Mail) Catherine Anne Avery, Unit Manager Assisted Living Unit Agency for Health Care Administration (Electronic Mail) Finance & Accounting Revenue Management Unit (Electronic Mail) Arlene Mayo-Davis, Field Office Manager Local Field Office Agency for Health Care Administration (Electronic Mail) Katrina Derico-Harris Medicaid Accounts Receivable Agency for Health Care Administration Alba M. Rodriguez, Senior Attorney Office of the General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration (Electronic Mail) (Electronic Mail) Shawn McCauley Aida Salgueiro Medicaid Contract Management Pretty Family Home Care Agency for Health Care Administration 2980 S.W. 103" Court (Electronic Mail) Miami, Florida 33165 (U.S. Mail) Ashley Jenkins Brian J. Perreault, Jr. Bureau of Central Services Lydecker Diaz Agency for Health Care Administration (Electronic Mail) 1221 Brickell Avenue, 19" Floor Miami, Florida 33131-3240 (U.S. Mail) June C. McKinney Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings (Electronic Mail) NOTICE OF FLORIDA LAW 408.804 License required; display.-- (1) It is unlawful to provide services that require licensure, or operate or maintain a provider that offers or provides services that require licensure, without first obtaining from the agency a license authorizing the provision of such services or the operation or maintenance of such provider. (2) A license must be displayed in a conspicuous place readily visible to clients who enter at the address that appears on the license and is valid only in the hands of the licensee to whom it is issued and may not be sold, assigned, or otherwise transferred, voluntarily or involuntarily. The license is valid only for the licensee, provider, and location for which the license is issued. 408.812 Unlicensed activity. -- (1) A person or entity may not offer or advertise services that require licensure as defined by this part, authorizing statutes, or applicable rules to the public without obtaining a valid license from the agency. A licenseholder may not advertise or hold out to the public that he or she holds a license for other than that for which he or she actually holds the license. (2) The operation or maintenance of an unlicensed provider or the performance of any services that require licensure without proper licensure is a violation of this part and authorizing statutes. Unlicensed activity constitutes harm that materially affects the health, safety, and welfare of clients. The agency or any state attorney may, in addition to other remedies provided in this part, bring an action for an injunction to restrain such violation, or to enjoin the future operation or maintenance of the unlicensed provider or the performance of any services in violation of this part and authorizing statutes, until compliance with this part, authorizing statutes, and agency rules has been demonstrated to the satisfaction of the agency. (3) It is unlawful for any person or entity to own, operate, or maintain an unlicensed provider. If after receiving notification from the agency, such person or entity fails to cease operation and apply for a license under this part and authorizing statutes, the person or entity shall be subject to penalties as prescribed by authorizing statutes and applicable rules. Each day of continued operation is a separate offense. (4) Any person or entity that fails to cease operation after agency notification may be fined $1,000 for each day of noncompliance. (5) When a controlling interest or licensee has an interest in more than one provider and fails to license a provider rendering services that require licensure, the agency may revoke all licenses and impose actions under s. 408.814 and a fine of $1,000 per day, unless otherwise specified by authorizing statutes, against each licensee until such time as the appropriate license is obtained for the unlicensed operation. (6) In addition to granting injunctive relief pursuant to subsection (2), if the agency determines that a person or entity is operating or maintaining a provider without obtaining a license and determines that a condition exists that poses a threat to the health, safety, or welfare of a client of the provider, the person or entity is subject to the same actions and fines imposed against a licensee as specified in this part, authorizing statutes, and agency rules. (7) Any person aware of the operation of an unlicensed provider must report that provider to the agency.
The Issue The following are the issues presented: Whether the Division of Administrative Hearings (“DOAH”) has jurisdiction to determine the claim of Petitioners Wal-Mart, Inc. (“Wal-Mart”) and Sedgwick CMS (“Sedgwick”) to relief under section 440.13(8) and (11), Florida Statutes; If DOAH has jurisdiction, whether Petitioners have standing to raise the issue of medical overutilization; If DOAH has jurisdiction and the Petitioners have standing, whether Petitioners are estopped from seeking reimbursement of any monies paid to Intervenors Florida Institute for Neurologic Rehabilitation (“FINR”) and Fruitville Holdings - Oppidan, Inc. (“Oppidan”); If DOAH has jurisdiction and Petitioners have standing and are not estopped, whether Intervenors engaged in overutilization of medical care in their care and treatment of the injured worker, D.F.; Whether Respondent, Department of Financial Services, Division of Workers’ Compensation (the “Department), has the authority to order Intervenors to reimburse Petitioners for payments related to overutilization by Intervenors in the medical care of D.F.; and If the Department has such authority, how much money should Intervenors be ordered to reimburse Petitioners.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the final hearing, and the entire record in this proceeding, the following Findings of Fact are made: The Department is the state agency responsible for administering the Workers’ Compensation Law, chapter 440, Florida Statutes. Section 440.13 governs the Department’s responsibilities and procedures for overseeing the provision by employers to their employees of “such medically necessary remedial treatment, care, and attendance for such period as the nature of the injury or the process of recovery may require, which is in accordance with established practice parameters and protocols of treatment as provided for in this chapter ” § 440.13(2)(a), Fla. Stat. Petitioner Wal-Mart is an “employer” as that term is defined in section 440.02(16). Petitioner Sedgwick acts as a workers' compensation servicing agent or “third party administrator” (“TPA”) for Wal-Mart and is a workers’ compensation “carrier” as defined in section 440.13(1)(c). D.F. is an “employee” as that term is defined in section 440.02(15). In 2003, during the course of his employment with Wal- Mart in Sarasota, D.F. fell approximately six feet from a ladder to the ground, landing on his left side and striking his head. D.F. was diagnosed with a traumatic brain injury. Through Sedgwick, Wal-Mart accepted the compensability of D.F.'s injuries under the law and began furnishing “medically necessary treatment, care and attendance” to D.F. as required by section 440.13(2). In the immediate aftermath of the accident, D.F. was treated at Sarasota Memorial Hospital, where he was diagnosed with cephalgia (headache), left flank contusion, and cervical strain. He was later seen at First Care in Sarasota with complaints of headache, and by a Dr. Barnea (no first name in the record) with complaints of headaches, dizziness, backaches, trouble with memory, and an inability to taste food. D.F. was also seen by Dr. Hal Pineless, a neurologist at the Neurocare Institute of Central Florida, who diagnosed D.F. with a cerebral concussion with post-concussive syndrome, post-concussive headaches, depression, and anosmia (loss of the sense of smell). In January 2005, D.F. took a handful of pills in what was at least a suicidal gesture, if not a serious attempt to kill himself. He was admitted to the Halifax Medical Center, and a Baker Act2/ proceeding was initiated against him. Although D.F. was found not to meet the criteria for involuntary hospitalization at that point, three months later he was referred by James Hutchens, his attorney, to Dr. Howard Goldman, a psychiatrist, because of the attorney's fear that D.F. would again attempt to harm himself. In February 2007, D.F. was evaluated at FINR, an inpatient neurologic rehabilitation facility in Wauchula. FINR recommended inpatient treatment for D.F. at their facility for an initial period of 30 to 60 days. The cost of the treatment was set at $950 a day. Susan Smith was the Sedgwick claims adjuster assigned to D.F.’s claim. Relying on the expertise of the physicians at FINR, Ms. Smith agreed to the admission and the price. Ms. Smith testified that when she took over the case, there were five physicians treating D.F., including a neurologist, a psychotherapist, a psychiatrist, and a physiatrist. The physicians were all requesting different courses of treatment and were prescribing medications that were in some instances contraindicated with each other. The physicians were not communicating with each other. D.F.’s case was “just a mess.” Ms. Smith stated that FINR seemed to present an opportunity for D.F. to receive all of his treatments in one place, with one physician in charge, in a coordinated fashion. D.F. was admitted to FINR in March 2007. Dr. Jorge J. Villalba, the medical director of FINR, diagnosed D.F.'s medical conditions as post-traumatic headaches, anxiety, and depression. FINR provided monthly reports of D.F.'s progress to Sedgwick. D.F.’s treatment was administered by a team of physicians at FINR and consisted of medical monitoring, occupational therapy, physical therapy, and speech therapy. D.F. was provided vocational rehabilitation in FINR’s computer lab and in the wood shop, where he worked on sanding, staining, and building wood products. In August 2007, D.F. was transferred to Oppidan, an assisted living facility, as a “step down” in treatment from the inpatient FINR facility. Oppidan is affiliated with FINR, which does all of the billing for both entities. Again relying on the expertise of the physicians, Ms. Smith agreed to the transfer and to the $850 per day cost of care at Oppidan. Oppidan provided monthly reports to Sedgwick similar to those provided by FINR. These reports, later characterized as "boilerplate" by the Department’s expert medical advisor, Dr. Matthew Imfeld, showed that D.F. was receiving treatment similar to that which he had received at FINR, i.e., medical monitoring, occupational therapy, physical therapy, speech therapy, and vocational therapy. D.F. remained at Oppidan from August 2007 until August 2011, more than four years after his initial admission to FINR. Ms. Smith testified that she was in constant contact with the treatment facility and persistently inquired as to when D.F. would be ready for release from the facility. Ms. Smith noted a pattern in which D.F. would seem to improve to the point of discharge and then suffer some form of relapse or new symptom that would preclude his discharge. Increased symptoms included complaints of personality changes, anxiety, syncopal episodes accompanied by frequent falls, medication adjustments, emotional withdrawal, suspected Parkinson's syndrome, ringworm, shoulder problems, ringing in the ears, and anhedonia.3/ Petitioners worked with Oppidan’s medical staff to determine conditions for D.F.’s discharge from Oppidan. On January 9, 2009, Petitioner’s then-counsel, Brian Bartley, discussed the situation with Dr. Villalba and Dr. Jeffrey Walden, D.F.’s neuropsychologist. They agreed that D.F.’s needs could potentially be met within an outpatient day program. At Mr. Bartley’s suggestion, Dr. Villalba and Dr. Walden investigated the Adult Daycare program at Manatee Glens, a behavioral health hospital with an outpatient component. Though they rejected Manatee Glens as an appropriate placement, Drs. Villalba and Walden sent Mr. Bartley a letter, dated January 15, 2009, that outlined the components they felt necessary for an acceptable outpatient program: [D.F.] requires comprehensive case management services to oversee his program, assist with making and following-up on appointments, assist in managing his benefits, and coordinate his care. [D.F.] will require oversight of his medications. We feel that a home health nurse or, alternately, a nurse on site at a potential discharge site, would be necessary to provide for this need by packing his medication box with him, assessing him for possible side effects, overseeing a schedule of routine labs, etc. His wife can assist with prompting him at his medication times as necessary during non-program hours, but we do not recommend that she have primary responsibility for managing his medications or medical status. [D.F.] will require reliable transportation to and from his program and ancillary appointments. His wife will not be able to be his sole source of transportation. First, the only licensed and tagged vehicle they own is an old van that has had multiple reliability issues. Second, his wife has her own ongoing medical concerns that may interfere with her capacity to provide reliable transportation even with a working vehicle. [D.F.] requires activities that challenge him to be in the community and addressing his anxiety and panic symptoms. As such, a club-house model day program will be inadequate. He requires a vocational program where he is in a workplace, managing interpersonal relationships, and working on specified tasks. He has thus far been able to manage such assignments only with the assistance of a one-to-one job coach on the site with him and working at his side. As such, job coaching services will be required for all vocational hours. [D.F.] requires community recreational activities to further challenge his capacity to cope and master anxiety-producing situations with less structure than a workplace. His present program addressed this need through one-to-one lunch outings, fishing trips, etc. During these activities, he is encouraged to use the coping strategies developed in his psychotherapy sessions to manage and persevere despite his debilitating anxiety. [D.F.] requires a quiet place to which he can temporarily retreat and regroup between community-based activities. He can become overwhelmed in busy and chaotic environments such as a room with loud music or television playing, a busy game room, or an activity center. He has coping strategies he utilizes when he must be in such environments, but the availability of a place where he can escape such over- stimulation is required to facilitate his participation in his activities. [D.F.] requires continued participation in weekly cognitive-behavioral psychotherapy. He also requires regular contact with a neurologist and a neuropsychiatrist. His current program includes massage therapy as well to address his shoulder and to assist with relaxation skills. He also receives assistance with the management of his personal budget, including development of computer-based budgeting program, planning of future expenses and anticipated income, and development of financial priorities. He will require continued assistance in this area as well. We hope this adequately describes the services we feel will be required to address [D.F.’s] needs in an outpatient environment. Please feel free to contact us with any comments or questions you may have. We will gladly review any proposed discharge site and offer our thoughts regarding the acceptability of such a site to meet his needs. The record indicates that Mr. Bartley suggested at least one more potential discharge site to the medical staff at Oppidan. In a letter dated March 27, 2009, Drs. Villalba and Walden stopped short of rejecting this option outright but did set forth a list of concerns and requests for further information regarding the details of the proposed treatment. The record does not indicate whether Mr. Bartley followed up on these concerns and requests, or whether Petitioners proposed another outpatient program for D.F. By the time of D.F.’s discharge, FINR and Oppidan’s billed charges for his treatment totaled $1,451,301.27. Wal- Mart, through Sedgwick, paid these bills in full without disallowance, adjustment, or reduction. At all times relevant, Ms. Smith relied upon the expertise of the medical staff at FINR and Oppidan’s facilities confirming that the treatment being provided was medically necessary. Ms. Smith also understood that D.F. had been "Baker Acted" and feared that he might harm himself if Oppidan discharged him upon her disallowance of the charges for his treatment. Though they continued paying the charges during D.F.’s stay at Oppidan, Petitioners noted the mounting costs and apparently endless course of treatment. Petitioners referred D.F. to Glenn J. Larrabee, Ph.D., a diplomate in clinical neuropsychology, who examined D.F. on September 28 through 30 and October 5, 2009, and reviewed all of his available medical records. Dr. Larrabee produced a 41-page report, dated November 9, 2009. The report concluded that D.F.’s medical records “suggest that at worst, he suffered a mild traumatic brain injury of an uncomplicated nature, given normal CT Scan the day of injury and multiple subsequent normal CT Scans of the brain.” Dr. Larrabee noted that recovery from such an uncomplicated injury is usually three months at most and that D.F. had no cognitive or emotional complaints in follow-up visits shortly after the injury. It was only a few weeks later that he displayed the symptoms of anosmia. Dr. Larrabee’s examination of D.F. showed “deliberate feigning of odor identification in the left nostril, with significantly worse- than-chance performance, strongly supporting the feigning of anosmia.” Dr. Larrabee further noted evidence of normal neuropsychological test performance in D.F.’s initial neuropsychological evaluation with a Dr. Frank in early 2004, in a second neurological evaluation conducted by a Dr. Bosco in 2007, and in Dr. Larrabee’s own current examination. These results “strongly contradict the presence of any persistent deficit from his original mild traumatic brain injury.” In each of these tests, Dr. Larrabee also noted “evidence of invalid test performance with failure of symptom validity tests and measures of response bias,” a further indication that D.F. was deliberately feigning responses. Dr. Larrabee wrote that “[o]ther health care professionals have noted a motivational basis or non-neurologic basis to symptomatic complaint.” Dr. Salter in 2005 included “factitious disorder” as one of his diagnoses, and Dr. Tatum noted that D.F. displayed seizures without any indication of actual epilepsy. Dr. Larrabee concluded that, while there was “compelling evidence of malingering” on the neuropsychological examinations, other professionals have noted “significant personality disorder features” that could lead one to be dependent on the inpatient hospitalization setting. Dr. Larrabee found that there could be “a mix of intentional (i.e., malingering) and unintentional (psychiatric) factors” in the case of D.F. He recommended a one-month stay in a psychiatric facility for evaluation and treatment. Without such hospitalization, it could not be determined whether D.F. had a legitimate psychiatric disorder or whether such disorder was a consequence of his workplace injury. At about the same time as the referral to Dr. Larrabee, Petitioners began to explore legal channels to procure D.F.’s discharge from Oppidan. Petitioners sent the case file to an attorney, Edward Louis Stern, who testified at the final hearing. Mr. Stern testified that he met with D.F.'s attorney for the purpose of obtaining his cooperation in having D.F. discharged. Mr. Stern provided D.F.'s attorney with a copy of Dr. Larrabee’s report. Mr. Stern stated that D.F.'s attorney agreed in principle to the discharge of D.F. but wanted to identify the parameters that would be allowed by FINR/Oppidan for his safe release. To this end, a meeting was set up for June 3, 2010, that included the program director at FINR, the treating neuropsychologist, a vocational consultant, D.F., D.F.'s spouse, and D.F.'s attorney. Mr. Stern reported that no one at the meeting was willing to definitively identify the parameters of D.F.'s discharge. Mr. Stern left the meeting with the definite impression that D.F.’s attorney would not agree to D.F.’s discharge. He also believed that no one at the facility would be willing to identify parameters for discharge. Therefore, Mr. Stern and his clients decided to initiate formal overutilization proceedings based on peer review, pursuant to section 440.13(6). Mr. Stern noted that peer review requires two or more "physicians" to make an evaluation of the care in question. Petitioners had in hand only the opinion of Dr. Larrabee, a neuropsychologist whose non-physician opinion would not be admissible before a Judge of Compensation Claims. After some negotiation, D.F.’s attorney agreed to an examination by a psychiatrist. On September 3, 2010, Dr. R.J. Mignone, a board- certified psychiatrist practicing in Sarasota, evaluated D.F. at Petitioners' request. Dr. Mignone’s 35-page report included a detailed narrative of D.F.’s treatment history, Dr. Mignone’s examination, and his impressions and recommendations. In brief answers to a series of questions propounded by Petitioners, Dr. Mignone concluded that D.F.'s industrial accident was not "the major contributing cause" for the psychiatric care he had been receiving at FINR/Oppidan. Dr. Mignone found no DSM-IV Axis I psychiatric injury to D.F. and concluded that D.F.’s treatment at FINR/Oppidan was actually "psychiatrically contraindicated." Dr. Mignone concluded that it would be appropriate to discharge D.F. from Oppidan with the understanding that some regression should be expected once his “Axis II characteropathy” ceased to be reinforced by the inpatient setting. Dr. Mignone believed that D.F.'s medical professionals had been guilty of "walking on eggshells" in their treatment of him and that D.F.'s "acting out" behavior had been a major factor in FINR/Oppidan's program design. Dr. Mignone concluded that because D.F.’s condition was unrelated to his work injury, all of the treatment he had received at FINR and Oppidan constituted overutilization. After a great deal more legal jockeying, a second peer review was performed by Dr. Thomas Goldschmidt on January 7, 2011. Dr. Goldschmidt is a specialist in neurology and psychiatry, and was specifically recommended by Dr. Mignone to perform an examination of D.F. However, because D.F.’s attorney declined to allow the examination, Dr. Goldschmidt’s opinion was based on his review of the medical record and Dr. Mignone’s evaluation. He summarized his findings as follows: The claimant experienced MTBI [mild traumatic brain injury] on May 9, 2003. He reported loss of consciousness for seconds and was able to drive himself home afterwards. Serial evaluations over time have chronicled multiple normal CT brain scans, normal forty-eight hour EEG monitoring suggesting PNES [psychogenic nonepileptic seizures, i.e., seizures with a psychological cause], symptom exaggeration/malingering on neuropsychological testing, pertinacious somatic preoccupation with trait characterological disturbance consistent with passive-dependent underpinnings, and counter-therapeutic institutionalization at OPPIDAN. As such, the claimant’s clinical course has iatrogenically served to enhance his misguided perception of being “brain injured” in pursuit of satisfying his formidable but chronically frustrated dependency needs. Furthermore, his clinical course is atypical for MTBI and cannot be objectivity [sic] reconciled with the neuropsychological or clinical data provided for my review. From a non-organic perspective, the claimant has parlayed his seven year old MTBI into a state of invalidism largely facilitated by OPPIDAN. In effect, his illness-behavior has been iatrogenically perpetuated by reinforcing the notion of “brain injury” and treatment of psychogenic-mediated symptomatology unrelated to his 2003 work injury. Negotiations continued and a private mediation resulted in a negotiated settlement between Petitioners and D.F. The parties agreed that Petitioners would no longer be responsible for workers’ compensation benefits as of the date the agreement was signed, though D.F. would continue to receive payments for lost wages and supplemental benefits. It was agreed that Petitioners would cease making payments to FINR/Oppidan on August 30, 2011, the date that D.F.’s residency would discontinue. In light of Petitioners’ suspicions regarding D.F.’s possible malingering, it is reasonable to ask why they never disallowed or adjusted any of the bills generated by FINR/Oppidan’s treatment of D.F. Mr. Stern testified that Petitioners did not unilaterally disallow payment out of fear that FINR/Oppidan might retaliate against D.F. by immediately discharging him, thereby risking another suicide attempt and possible tort liability for Petitioners.4/ Petitioners also feared that unilateral disallowance of payments could negatively affect their ongoing negotiations with D.F.’s counsel regarding voluntary discharge from Oppidan. On January 28, 2011, Petitioners filed the Reimbursement Petition with the Department, naming FINR and Oppidan as respondents and expressly disclaiming any direct reimbursement dispute with D.F. The Reimbursement Petition recited the history of D.F.’s treatment. It did not name a specific instance of overutilization; rather, it stated that all of D.F.’s treatment by FINR and Oppidan constituted overutilization. The Reimbursement Petition requested that the Department, “in accordance with Section 440.13(6), Florida Statutes . . . disallow the payment of services previously paid by the Petitioner[s] and reimburse Petitioners all sums paid.” The Reimbursement Petition also requested the return of payments made by Petitioners in accordance with section 440.13(11)(a).5/ Attached to the Reimbursement Petition was a copy of DFS Form 3160-0023, entitled “Petition for Resolution of Reimbursement Dispute,” executed by Wal-Mart and Sedgwick. Just below the title of DFS Form 3160-0023 is the following statement: “A Petition for Resolution of Reimbursement Dispute must be served on the Agency within 30 days after the Petitioner’s receipt of a notice of disallowance or adjustment of payment, pursuant to 69L-31.008, Florida Administrative Code.” Section 440.13(7)(a) likewise provides, in relevant part: Any health care provider, carrier, or employer who elects to contest the disallowance or adjustment of payment by a carrier under subsection (6) must, within 30 days after receipt of notice of disallowance or adjustment of payment, petition the department to resolve the dispute. The petitioner must serve a copy of the petition on the carrier and on all affected parties by certified mail. The petition must be accompanied by all documents and records that support the allegations contained in the petition. Failure of a petitioner to submit such documentation to the department results in dismissal of the petition. FINR and Oppidan filed a Motion to Dismiss the Reimbursement Petition arguing that jurisdiction for a reimbursement review can be invoked only where a medical bill has been disallowed or adjusted for payment. They further argued that Petitioners could not invoke the Department’s jurisdiction to conduct a mandatory utilization review under section 440.13(6) because of that subsection’s provision that if a carrier finds that overutilization of medical services has occurred, the carrier “must disallow or adjust payment for such services.” FINR/Oppidan argued that the dispute mechanism afforded a carrier under section 440.13 is limited to disallowing or adjusting a payment, which triggers the filing of a petition by the health care provider and a response from the carrier. Given that the Sedgwick did not disallow or adjust any payments, the Reimbursement Petition should be dismissed. As a result of the Reimbursement Petition, the Department initiated an investigation of FINR/Oppidan and of Dr. Villalba individually as medical director of FINR/Oppidan pursuant to section 440.13(11). Eric Lloyd, who at the time was program administrator of the office of medical services in the Division of Workers’ Compensation, testified that the Department did not then have a formalized method for reporting provider violations and that the language of 440.13(7) makes it clear that only a health care provider may pursue a petition for resolution of a reimbursement dispute. Mr. Lloyd stated that the Department therefore treated the Reimbursement Petition as a report of provider violation and converted the matter into a review under section 440.13(11). Delays in the resolution of the audit were caused by the need to advertise for and contract the services of an Expert Medical Advisor (“EMA”) pursuant to section 440.13(9). The Department’s initial contracting efforts were futile. Two contracted EMAs disqualified themselves for conflicts of interest. The Department finally engaged the services of a certified EMA, Dr. Imfeld, a specialist in the field of physical medicine and rehabilitation. Dr. Imfeld reviewed D.F.'s medical records from FINR/Oppidan, as well as the reports from the various doctors that were provided to the Department by the parties. Petitioners provided documents pursuant to a “Health Care Provider Violation Referral Document Request” issued by the Department on March 31, 2011, and a “Health Care Provider Violation Referral Document Request Addendum” issued by the Department on April 4, 2011. Both documents required the carrier to submit various forms of documentation. The Department’s initial document request states that the Reimbursement Petition alleged “that services rendered by Dr. Jorge Villalba, M.D. (hereinafter “Provider”), for the treatment rendered to the above referenced injured employee while an inpatient at FINR/OPPIDAN was in excess of established practice parameters and protocols of treatment established in Chapter 440, Florida Statutes.” In fact, the Reimbursement Petition made its allegations against FINR and Oppidan as institutions. Dr. Villalba was not mentioned by name in the Reimbursement Petition. The only reference to him was a statement that “[b]oth entities seemingly have the same medical director or attending physician.” Pamela Macon, bureau chief of the bureau of monitoring and audit in the Division of Workers’ Compensation, conceded at the hearing that it was her office that decided to include Dr. Villalba in the investigation because he was the medical director of the facilities. The language of the document requests plainly reflects an attempt to impute to Petitioners the Department’s own decision at the outset of the investigation to focus on Dr. Villalba individually. The end result of the investigation was that charges were brought against Dr. Villalba, but not against FINR or Oppidan as institutions. As explained more fully below, the case against Dr. Villalba was settled. No case was ever brought against the institutions. The following colloquy at the hearing is between Ms. Macon and counsel for Petitioners: Q. And as I understand it, you added Dr. Villalba to the case because he would have been, as the medical director, responsible for any medical care that was provided within the facility and he then should be responsible? A. Yes. Q. That’s why you added him? A. Correct. Q. But then you changed your mind and determined that he wasn’t involved with it at all, so you weren’t going to give – you weren’t going to penalize him? A. Right, that he didn’t render the direct care. Q. Okay. Did you ever make a determination who did the direct care? A. Not to my knowledge, no. Mr. Lloyd testified as to a policy dispute within the agency as to whether a “health care provider” violation may be brought only against individual health care providers or whether a facility can also be found in violation and sanctioned. He acknowledged that the statutory term “health care provider” explicitly includes health care facilities, but cited the difficulty involved in disciplining a facility such as FINR, which treats multiple injured workers. If the Department bars an entire facility, it would affect not just the individual injured worker whose treatment is in question but any others the facility is treating now or in the future.6/ In his report, dated August 12, 2013, Dr. Imfeld concluded that while D.F.'s 2003 accident resulted in a mild traumatic brain injury, it did not cause a seizure disorder or Parkinson's disease. He further concluded that all of the inpatient treatment from FINR/Oppidan was excessive and not medically necessary. On September 23, 2013, the Department entered its “Report of Health Care Provider Investigation and Notice of Intent to Impose Penalties Pursuant to §440.13, F.S.”7/ The Notice of Intent was directed to Dr. Villalba individually and stated as follows, in relevant part: The record in this matter, corroborated by the EMA opinion, evidences certain care that was neither medically necessary nor clinically appropriate for D.F.'s compensable condition. Accordingly, the Department finds that because of your role at FINR and OPPIDAN, you have directly or indirectly engaged in a pattern or practice of overutilization or a violation of Chapter 440, Florida Statutes, in the treatment rendered to D.F. Dr. Villalba filed a Petition for Formal Administrative Hearing on October 7, 2013, in response to the Notice of Intent. The Department and Dr. Villalba agreed to hold the case in abeyance rather than forward it to DOAH. The case was ultimately settled, the parties entering into a Settlement Stipulation for Consent Order on May 13, 2014. The settlement provided that the Department would withdraw and dismiss its Notice of Intent and that Dr. Villalba would withdraw and dismiss his petition for an administrative hearing with prejudice. Mr. Lloyd testified that after the Notice of Intent was filed against Dr. Villalba, the Department received a Recommended Order from an Administrative Law Judge in another DOAH case in which the Department had issued a Notice of Intent against an individual physician for overutilization. The Recommended Order was “pretty critical of the Department and the process that was involved,” and the Department felt obliged to enter a settlement for attorney’s fees. Mr. Lloyd testified that the Department believed Dr. Villalba’s case had “the same shortcomings” as that earlier case. Mr. Lloyd stated that this belief played a large role in the decision to settle with Dr. Villalba in lieu of trying to prove a difficult case of overutilization in a formal proceeding. Wal-Mart and Sedgwick were given no notice of the settlement negotiations or the entry of the Settlement Stipulation for Consent Order between the Department and Dr. Villalba. Mr. Lloyd testified that there is no statutory obligation for the Department to apprise the complainant of the status of the Department’s investigations. On March 23, 2015, the Department issued an order titled “Workers’ Compensation Medical Services Reimbursement Dispute Dismissal” that purported to dispose of the Reimbursement Petition filed by Wal-Mart and Sedgwick on January 28, 2011. The order provided as follows, in relevant part: There is no information to suggest that Wal- Mart, Inc. or Sedgwick CMS discontinued authorization for treatment and care for [D.F.] by the Respondent herein during the specified dates of service. * * * The issues raised by Wal-Mart, Inc. and Sedgwick CMS are utilization review issues, not appropriate for resolution in reimbursement dispute resolution proceedings under section 440.13(7), Florida Statutes. The utilization issues were resolved by the Department in its MSS Case No. ROV00039 and Department Case No. 143376 [i.e., the case against Dr. Villalba that was dismissed via Consent Order]. Therefore, this Petition for Resolution of Reimbursement Dispute in MMS Case No. 20110531-001 is hereby DISMISSED.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that the Department of Financial Services, Division of Workers’ Compensation, issue a final order dismissing the Petition for Formal Administrative Hearing. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of February, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of February, 2016.
The Issue Whether the Agency for Health Care Administration (Agency or Petitioner) is entitled to recover alleged Medicaid overpayments, administrative fines, and investigative, legal, and expert witness costs from Kenneth O. Harden, d/b/a Ken Care, Inc. (Respondent).1/
Findings Of Fact The Agency is the state agency responsible for administering the Florida Medicaid Program (Medicaid). Medicaid is a federally-funded state-administered program that provides health care services to certain qualified individuals. Respondent, Kenneth O. Harden, is an individual who was enrolled as a provider in both the Florida Medicaid Developmental Disabilities Waiver Program (DD Program) and the Florida Medicaid Family Supported Living Waiver Program (FSL Program) at all material times. By enrolling in the Medicaid programs, Respondent agreed to fully comply with all state and federal laws, policies, procedures, and handbooks pertaining to the Medicaid program. Respondent submitted bills to Medicaid while he was enrolled and these bills were processed and paid to Respondent through the Florida Medicaid automated payment system. Claimed services for which Respondent submitted bills and was paid by Medicaid include in-home support, personal care assistance, self-care/home management training, companion support, supported living coaching, and respite care. The Agency is authorized to recover Medicaid overpayments, as appropriate. § 409.913(1)(e), Fla. Stat.4/ One method the agency uses to discover Medicaid overpayments is by auditing billing and payment records of Medicaid providers. Such audits are performed by staff in the Agency's Bureau of Medicaid Program Integrity (MPI). Providers are identified as potential candidates for auditing by a combination of referrals from field offices, data processing offices, and the Agency?s fraud and abuse hotline, and a random audit process.5/ In 2011, Agency Administrator Robi Olmstead identified Respondent as a potential audit candidate through a field office referral. She opened two cases on Respondent, one for each provider number, and assigned the cases to Kristen Koelle, then Program Analyst, for full audits. Ms. Koelle completed the first steps of the audit process according to established protocols. She reviewed Respondent?s provider information and billing to determine what types of services he provided, what types of claims he had submitted, and how much had been paid by Medicaid. In consultation with Ms. Olmstead, Ms. Koelle selected January 1, 2008, through June 30, 2010, as the audit period. During that audit period, Respondent submitted 10,578 claims for 47 recipients alleged to have received services from Respondent through the DD Program, and 2,485 claims for 22 recipients alleged to have received services from Respondent through the FSL Program. When the Agency audits a Medicaid provider for possible overpayments it "must use accepted and valid auditing, accounting, analytical, statistical, or peer-review methods, or combinations thereof. Appropriate statistical methods may include, but are not limited to, sampling and extension to the population . . . and other generally accepted statistical methods." § 409.913(20), Fla. Stat. The audit method used by the Agency depends on the characteristics of the provider and of the claims. For example, where a provider serves thousands of Medicaid recipients during the audit period, but the number of claims for each recipient is small, then the Agency may use a single-stage cluster sampling methodology. Under this approach, a random sample of recipients is selected, and then all claims are examined for the recipient sample group. Alternatively, where there are so many claims per recipient that it would be impractical to review all claims for each recipient or all claims for a sample group of recipients, a two-stage cluster sample methodology may be used. Under this approach, a random sample of recipients is selected, followed by a random selection of sample claims for the recipients in the sample. As a general target, the Agency considers samples of between 5 and 15 claims per recipient to be reasonable sample sizes for the second stage of two-stage cluster sampling. However, if a given recipient has fewer than 15 claims, a smaller number of claims for that recipient will be selected. Because of the high volume of claims generated by Respondent during the audit period in this case, Ms. Koelle determined with her supervisor that a two-stage cluster sampling methodology would be used. In other words, it was not feasible to review all 13,063 claims generated by the recipients Respondent claimed to have served during the audit period. Using a computer program to carry out the random sampling, the Agency's two-stage cluster sampling software selected a random sample of Respondent?s recipients under both the DD Program and the FSL Program during the audit period. The software generated a list of 30 recipients in the DD Program and 21 recipients in the FSL Program. It then selected a random sample of between 5 and 15 claims for each recipient from Respondent?s paid-claims data in the Agency?s data warehouse for the audit period. For the DD Program, 344 sample claims for the 30 sample recipients were randomly selected from among the 10,578 claims submitted by Respondent during the audit period. For the FSL Program, 256 sample claims for the 21 sample recipients were randomly selected from among the 2,485 claims submitted by Respondent during the audit period. Thereafter, Ms. Koelle prepared a “demand letter” for each of the two programs, informing Respondent that audits had been initiated and requesting that Respondent provide Medicaid- related records to substantiate billing records of the identified recipients, as well as the employment/personnel records or files for any of Respondent?s staff who provided services to Medicaid recipients during the audit period. The letters gave Respondent the standard 21-day period to submit the requested records. Ms. Olmstead reviewed and signed the letters and they were mailed, along with a Provider Questionnaire and Certification of Completeness of Records, to Respondent on July 26, 2011. After requesting and receiving a series of extensions, Respondent complied with the demand letters on September 13, 2011. Respondent delivered to the Agency Medicaid-related records and employee documents, along with the Provider Questionnaires and signed Certificates of Completeness, which certified the accuracy, truthfulness, and completeness of the records submitted. Persons who provide Medicaid services must meet certain minimum qualifications and obtain certain trainings, otherwise the person is deemed “ineligible” or “disqualified” and Medicaid cannot reimburse for services provided by such persons. All persons who provide services directly to Medicaid recipients must also pass a Level 2 background screening. Training and screening requirements for staff of Medicaid providers during the audit period are set forth in the Medicaid Handbook and the DD Handbook. Upon receiving records sent by Respondent in response to the Agency's July 26, 2011, letters, Ms. Koelle first reviewed Respondent's staff files to determine whether each staff member met the necessary requirements to provide Medicaid or Medicaid waiver services. Respondent produced staff files for 30 of the 39 staff members who provided services to randomly-selected recipients during the audit period. Of those 30 files, 16 contained no documentation of core competency training, eight had incomplete or no background screening documentation, one had a disqualifying background screening, and 22 lacked documentation of required training in HIV/AIDS, Infection Control, Zero Tolerance, or CPR during the audit period. In addition, 13 staff files revealed the staff member did not meet the experience or educational requirements for the position held. Next, Ms. Koelle reviewed the documentation Respondent submitted for each recipient against the 344 DD Program claims and 256 FLS program claims in the random sample and recorded her findings on worksheets along with her descriptions of any deficiencies or noted violations of Medicaid law. Ms. Koelle noted numerous violations of Medicaid laws, including, but not limited to, the following: of the 344 DD Program sample claims, 127 were submitted without any supporting documentation, 67 were submitted without a service log to document services provided to the recipient, 36 were submitted for companion services provided to recipients who were ineligible because they either lived in a licensed residential setting or were receiving in-home support services, and 28 were submitted for unauthorized activities provided to recipients. The most common violation, services provided by unauthorized staff, appeared in 243 claims submitted by Respondent. Of the 256 FSL Program sample claims, 50 were submitted without supporting documentation, and 208 were submitted for services provided by unauthorized staff. Ms. Koelle also documented a handful of cases in which the unauthorized staff provided services outside the scope of the recipient?s service plan or overbilled for the services provided. Ms. Koelle found no claims that were allowed under the Medicaid law and, therefore, no claims that merited adjustment. Ms. Koelle completed her review and entered all amounts that she found to be disallowed into the computer program. The program added the figures to find the overpayment amount for the samples, and then extrapolated the overpayment to the entire universe of recipients, according to an established statistical methodology, which yielded the total overpayment amount. The computer program generated a printout showing the exact overpayment amount for each of the claims in the samples, and the total overpayment extended to the population. The figures on the printouts correspond to the figures on the worksheets. Utilizing this methodology, Ms. Koelle determined that Respondent had been overpaid by an amount of $568,250.01 for services in the DD Program, and $162,700.08 for services in the FSL Waiver program. Thereafter, she prepared the Preliminary Audit Reports (Preliminary Audits), describing the methodology applied to determine overpayment and the deficiencies that led to that determination. She attached to the Preliminary Audits the printouts, copies of her worksheets, and a copy of the spreadsheets with staff findings. A provision in the Preliminary Audits explains that Respondent may submit additional documentation to support the sample claims, although such submission may be deemed evidence of previous non- compliance. Ms. Olmstead reviewed, approved, and signed the Preliminary Audits, which were mailed with attachments to Respondent on October 18, 2011. After receiving the Preliminary Audits, Respondent again submitted records and a written response in an effort to further support the sample claims. However, Ms. Koelle determined that the records submitted were duplicates of records previously submitted by Respondent and did not support any change in her findings from the Preliminary Audits. In preparation of the Final Audit Reports, Ms. Koelle, in consultation with Ms. Olmstead, reviewed Respondent's documentation and found that there was insufficient documentation to support any of the sample claims in either the DD Program or the FSL Program. The deficiencies included incomplete or missing staff files, lack of documentation of services, no service authorization, no service logs or service logs that did not meet Medicaid handbook requirements, no monthly summary, and indications that ineligible staff members were providing services. In some instances, the service provided was ineligible as it did not further the recipient?s goals or was an unauthorized activity (e.g., watching a movie). Ms. Koelle recorded her findings in a separate spreadsheet for each audit. The spreadsheets, organized by recipient number, contain the following information for each of the claims in the samples: date of service (DOS), procedure code, procedure description, unit of service (UOS), cost per unit of service, amount paid to Respondent, claim determination (Allow, Adjust, or Deny), review determination, whether there was a document deficiency (Doc. Def.) or a billing amount issue, and the amount of the overpayment for the claim (O/P). Next, Ms. Koelle entered the disallowed amounts into the computer program, which added the amounts together, found the overpayment amount for the sample, and extended the overpayment to the entire population of 10,578 claims in the DD Program and 2,485 claims in the FSL Program. Ultimately, Ms. Koelle prepared the Final Audit Reports (Final Audits), which Ms. Olmstead signed and sent to Respondent on November 21, 2011. Because the records submitted by Respondent in response to the Preliminary Audits did not change the findings, the Final Audits reported the same overpayment amounts as the Preliminary Audits: $568,250.01 in the DD Program and $162,700.08 in the FSL Program. The Final Audits notified Respondent of the total overpayment calculations, described the types of non-compliance found in the sample claims, and explained the methodology employed to select the claims for review and extend the sample overpayment to arrive at the total overpayment amount. The Final Audits also advised Respondent that the Agency intended to recover fines in the amount of $113,650.00 for violations of requirements in the DD Program and $32,540.02 for violations of requirements of the FSL Program. Additionally, the Agency sought a total of $1,437.38 for costs of the two audits. Copies of the worksheets, as well as the two spreadsheets detailing the staff review findings, were attached. Respondent disputed the Final Audits and the Agency referred the matter to the Division. In preparation for the final hearing, the Agency consulted with Dr. Fred W. Huffer, a professor in the Department of Statistics at Florida State University with a B.S. in mathematics from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and a Ph.D. in statistics from Stanford University. He has taught and researched statistics for more than 30 years at various institutions of higher learning. Dr. Huffer reviewed the Agency?s Preliminary and Final Audit findings and found one error in the analysis. In each audit, one randomly-selected recipient had submitted only one claim during the audit period. According to the Agency?s overpayment calculation methodology, the second-stage random sample may only be taken from those recipients with two or more claims during the audit period. Therefore, the Agency?s overpayment calculation included one incorrect variable. Dr. Huffer adjusted the formula and recalculated the overpayment with the correct variables for each audit. The result was a modest change to the final overpayment amounts -- a reduction of $8,368.36 for the DD Program and $818.44 for the FSL Program. The final adjusted total overpayments were $559,881.65 for the DD Program and $161,881.64 for the FSL Program. Respondent offered no witnesses and introduced no evidence at the final hearing. Instead of presenting contradictory expert testimony, Respondent attempted to undermine Dr. Huffer's opinions through cross-examination and argument. On cross-examination, Respondent attempted to challenge the reliability of the Agency?s sampling methodology and Dr. Huffer?s calculations. Respondent inquired as to the “authentication” of Dr. Huffer?s results and the requirements for determining when Dr. Huffer?s calculations were final, and insinuated that Dr. Huffer may have been biased because he has consulted with the Agency since 2004. Respondent was not effective in this regard. The methodology and description of two-stage cluster sampling were explained and confirmed at the final hearing by Dr. Huffer, who was accepted as an expert in statistical analysis and methodologies. In addition, the methodology comports with established law. See § 409.913, et seq., Fla. Stat.; Ag. for Health Care Admin v. Custom Mobility, Inc., 995 So. 2d 984 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008), cert. denied, 3 So. 3d 1246 (Fla. 2009). Dr. Huffer was familiar with the case at hand and with the science of random sampling of populations and the analysis of samples, including extension of results to the total population. Dr. Huffer analyzed the sampling method utilized by the Agency in this case with a program he personally developed for that purpose. Dr. Huffer repeated random simulation that recreated the audit circumstances many thousands of times, and found them to be accurate in this case. The software utilized by the Agency determined the amount of overpayments at a 95 percent confidence level. As explained by Dr. Huffer, if the entire procedure is repeated “many times, 95 percent of the time this value that they get to at the end would be less than the true amount” of the overpayment. In other words, the amount the Agency has asked Respondent to repay is most likely lower than the actual overpayment. In sum, Dr. Huffer credibly explained that the Agency?s cluster sampling method is appropriate and that it comports with the technical meaning of random sample and generally accepted statistical methods. Moreover, Dr. Huffer verified the adjusted overpayment amount through professionally accepted methodology. Dr. Huffer's opinions that the audits in this case utilized a correct and reasonable application of two-stage cluster sampling and that the sampling method used in this case was reasonable and comported with generally accepted statistical methods are accepted as credible and accurate.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner, Agency for Health Care Administration, enter a final order requiring Respondent, Kenneth O. Harden, d/b/a Ken Care, Inc., to: Repay the sum of $559,881.65 for claims in the Medicaid Development Disability Waiver Program that did not comply with the requirements of Medicaid laws, rules, and provider handbooks; Repay the sum of $161,881.64 as recoupment of claims in the Medicaid Family and Supported Living Waiver Program which did not comply with the requirements of Medicaid laws, rules, and provider handbooks; Pay interest on the sums of $559,881.65 and $161,881.64 at the rate of 10 percent (10%) per annum from the date of the overpayment determination; Pay a fine of $6,000 per agency action (for a total of $12,000) for violations of the requirements of Medicaid laws, rules, and provider handbooks; and Pay allowable costs of $3,405.71, pursuant to section 509.913(23), Florida Statutes. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of March, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE VAN WYK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of March, 2013.
