The Issue Whether Respondent committed the offenses alleged and, if so, what disciplinary action should imposed.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Timothy Ingold, has been employed by the PCSO for seventeen years. In November 1994, Ingold was a sergeant with the PCSO, a position in which he had worked since 1993. On November 19, 1994, Ingold worked the shift which began about midnight and included the early morning hours of November 20, 1994. On this particular evening, Ingold was assigned to Squad Two in the Pinellas Park/Largo area. This assignment required Ingold to supervise six deputies. Ingold is the current president of Local Lodge 43 of the Fraternal Organization of Police (FOP) and has served in this capacity for eight years. As president of FOP, Ingold sometimes files legal actions against the Sheriff on behalf of deputies. Robert Paver has been general counsel to the FOP Local Lodge 43 for approximately seven (7) years and is considered by Ingold to be a personal friend. In the fall of 1994, Mr. Paver was married to Michelle Paver. Ingold knew Michelle Paver because prior to November 1994, Ingold and his wife sometimes socialized with Robert Paver and his wife, Michelle Paver. Prior to November 1994, Mr. Paver confided in Ingold about marital problems he was experiencing with Michelle Paver. This included issues relating to Mrs. Paver's relationship with some of her students. The events which are the subject of this case occurred during the late evening hours of November 19, 1994, and into the early morning hours of November 20, 1994. Deputy Roger Reed was a deputy with the PCSO and on duty the evening and early morning of November 19 and 20, 1994. While on patrol in the early morning hours of November 20, 1994, Deputy Reed observed a white male run out to the highway. When the white male saw Deputy Reed's cruiser stop, he attempted to flee. Immediately thereafter, Deputy Reed turned his car around, chased the subject, and apprehended him. Deputy Reed investigated and detained the subject for suspicion of night prowling. During the course of this investigation on November 20, 1994, Deputy Reed learned that the subject was a sixteen year old juvenile. After his initial investigation, Deputy Reed made a radio request for supervisory assistance. When this request was made, Sergeant Scheffer, Deputy Reed's assigned supervisor, was busy and could not immediately respond to the request. Due to Sergeant Scheffer's unavailability, Ingold reported to the scene in response to Deputy Reed's request for supervisory assistance. When Ingold arrived at the scene, Deputy Reed was there along with the juvenile who was in the back seat of the cruiser. Also present at the scene were Pinellas Park police officer, Joseph Waulk; PCSO Deputy, Stephanie Archer; the juvenile's mother, Laura Hearn; and Michelle Paver. Upon Ingold's arrival at the scene, Deputy Reed conveyed to him the events that had occurred relative to the incident involving the juvenile. Ingold discussed with Deputy Reed the elements of a night prowling offense and advised Deputy Reed to arrest the juvenile for night prowling. Deputy Reed further indicated to Ingold that while interviewing the juvenile, he had come in contact with two women. According to Deputy Reed, one of the women was the juvenile's mother and the other woman had introduced herself to Deputy Reed as "Mrs. Robert Paver." Ingold recognized the woman as Michelle Paver, the wife of Robert Paver. During this conversation Deputy Reed indicated to Ingold that he suspected that "something" was going on between the juvenile and Mrs. Paver; that Mrs. Paver had claimed that she was the juvenile's “ROR” (release on recognizance) officer or had some type of custodial obligation or arrangement with respect to the juvenile and wanted him released to her; and that he believed Mrs. Paver was trying to intimidate him and influence the investigation by identifying herself as the wife of Robert Paver, president of the FOP. Based upon Deputy Reed's account of the events that had occurred, Ingold told Deputy Reed to put the information in a report and forward it to the PCSO's Crimes Against Children (CAC) Unit. The CAC Unit handles cases involving crimes perpetrated against juveniles, including crimes which involve sex between adults and juveniles. During his conversation with Deputy Reed, Ingold volunteered pertinent information about the Pavers including the fact that there was a pending divorce between the Pavers. Shortly after being called to the scene, Ingold also revealed information regarding the Pavers to Sergeant Ferdon. Specifically, Ingold told him about the Pavers' pending divorce and that, according to Mr. Paver, Michelle Paver had been observed one evening being out with a juvenile. After leaving the scene of the incident, Ingold drove north on 49th Street until he reached the PCSO's Technical Services Building. While driving to this facility, Ingold attempted to telephone Michelle Paver's estranged husband, Robert Paver. Ingold first attempted to reach Mr. Paver by calling him on his home telephone. After receiving no answer, Ingold left a message on the answering machine, "Pick it up." Ingold next attempted to reach Mr. Paver by calling his pager number. Finally, Ingold called Mr. Paver's house again, and after receiving no answer, left a message asking him to call Ingold. Ingold testified that the reason he called Mr. Paver was to obtain information on the ROR status of Mrs. Paver with regard to the juvenile and to have Mr. Paver to instruct his wife to "knock it off" with regard to her attempting to obstruct justice. The ROR status or custodial status of the juvenile in no way effected Ingold’s direction to Deputy Reed to arrest the juvenile and take him to jail. Shortly after Ingold left the scene, Sergeant Scheffer, Deputy Reed’s supervisor, arrived on the scene and assumed supervisory responsibilities with respect to the investigation. Deputy Reed took the juvenile to jail, but officials at the jail would not accept him. After Ingold's three unsuccessful attempts to contact Mr. Paver, Deputy Reed called Sergeant Ingold on the radio, saying that he needed to talk to him. Ingold agreed to meet Deputy Reed at a Shell station on the corner of 49th Street and Ulmerton Road in Largo. When they met at the Shell station shortly thereafter, Deputy Reed indicated to Ingold that the juvenile had told him that he had been having sexual intercourse with Michelle Paver. During the course of the conversation between Ingold and Deputy Reed at the Shell station, Mr. Paver called Ingold on Ingold's PCSO cellular telephone. Ingold advised Mr. Paver that he was busy and would have to call him back. Ingold then advised Deputy Reed to conduct a thorough interview of the juvenile and "to work this back through your sergeant." After meeting with Deputy Reed at the Shell station, Ingold received another call from Mr. Paver. During that conversation, Ingold informed Mr. Paver that Michelle Paver had been present at the time and location where a juvenile was arrested. Moreover, Ingold inquired as to whether Mrs. Paver had ROR status with regard to the juvenile and also advised Mr. Paver that Mrs. Paver was "obstructing justice" by using her husband's name and/or his association with the FOP. With regard to the inquiry regarding Michelle Paver's ROR status, Mr. Paver responded that "you know as much as I do." After failing to obtain this information from Mr. Paver, Ingold made no other attempts to acquire information about Mrs. Paver’s ROR status. Because of the suspicion of a possible sex crime involving Mrs. Paver and the juvenile, the PCSO's Crimes Against Children (CAC) Unit became involved in the case. Although first contacted about the case on November 20, 1994, the CAC did not begin its investigation until November 21, 1994, because the case failed to meet the criteria for immediate attention. Sergeant Stefanie Campbell of CAC received the case and also assigned Deputy Lori Fagan of that unit to the case. As part of the CAC Unit investigation, a decision was made to interview Ingold. Sergeant Campbell contacted Ingold and requested that he come in for an interview on November 23, 1994. In order to appear at the interview as requested, Ingold changed a previously scheduled commitment. The interview was conducted on November 23, 1994, by Sergeant Campbell and was attended by Deputy Fagan, who took notes during the interview. The meeting during which the interview was conducted lasted between forty- five minutes and one hour. Other than Deputy Fagan's notes, the meeting was not recorded. Deputy Fagan did not testify at hearing and her notes were not offered into evidence. The interview consisted of Sergeant Campbell asking questions to Sergeant Ingold. Ingold responded to all questions that were asked of him. At the conclusion of her questioning, Sergeant Campbell asked Ingold if he wanted to add anything to what he had already stated. Ingold did not have any other information to add to the interview. During the course of their friendship, Robert Paver had discussed with Ingold various concerns he had regarding Michelle Paver's conduct. Many of Mr. Paver's concerns that were shared with Ingold during the course of their friendship involved Michelle Paver's relationship with students that she taught and did not necessarily focus on one student. Prior to CAC interview, Mr. Paver had advised and expressed concern to Ingold about the following: (1) Mrs. Paver's having allowed a juvenile to spend the night at her residence; (2) Mrs. Paver's seeking some type of custodial arrangement regarding a child; (3) Mrs. Paver's socializing and spending a lot of time with one of her students could put her in a position where the student could make allegations against her; (4) Mrs. Paver's having been observed by a St. Petersburg Beach police officer with a male, who she later revealed to Mr. Paver was one of her students; and (5) the amount of money Mrs. Paver was spending on her students. During the CAC interview, Sergeant Campbell asked Ingold about his knowledge concerning Mrs. Paver's being followed by a private investigator. Ingold was not aware at the time of the CAC interview that a private investigator had been retained to follow Mrs. Paver. Therefore, any questions regarding his knowledge about a private investigator following Mrs. Paver could not be answered by Ingold. Although at the time of the interview Ingold had been informed by Mr. Paver that Mrs. Paver had been observed on the beach by a police officer, he did not connect this situation to a question from Sergeant Campbell about a private investigator. Ingold did, however, disclose during the CAC interview that Mrs. Paver had been observed on the beach with someone she later identified as one of her students. During the CAC interview, Ingold informed Sergeant Campbell and Deputy Fagan that he had been told that Mrs. Paver had sought some type of custodial status regarding a juvenile. With regard to gifts, although Ingold did not use the term gift, he told the CAC investigators that according to Mr. Paver, Michelle Paver spent a lot of time and money on some of her students. Also, Ingold volunteered to CAC investigators that because of the time and money Michelle Paver spent on her students, he and Mr. Paver referred to the students as her "pet projects." Moreover, during the CAC interview, Ingold told the investigators that Mr. Paver had expressed concern that Michelle Paver's socializing and spending a lot of time with one of her students could result in the student's making allegations against her. Ingold did not volunteer to the CAC investigators that Michelle Paver had been seen out with the juvenile arrested on November 20, 1994, prior to that date. However, even though Ingold had been told that Michelle Paver had been previously seen out with someone, it was not established that Ingold, in fact, knew whether that person was the juvenile involved in the November 20, 1994 incident. At some time prior to November 1994, Mr. Paver had indicated to Ingold that one of Mrs. Paver’s students had spent the night at her residence. Ingold had no knowledge of who the student was or the circumstances surrounding this event. However, during the interview, Ingold did not volunteer this information to the investigators nor did either of them ask him any questions regarding this matter. Based upon his conduct on November 20, 1994, and his perceived lack of cooperation with CAC investigators during the November 23, 1994 interview, an administrative investigation was commenced against Ingold. During the course of the investigation, sworn statements were taken by the Administrative Investigations Bureau. An investigative report was prepared and presented, without recommendation or conclusion, to Ingold's Chain of Command Board. The head of the Board was Major Quentin Vaughn. The Chain of Command Board considered the evidence, and withdrew a more serious charge against Ingold regarding a lack of truthfulness. However, consistent with the unanimous recommendation of the Chain of Command Board, the Sheriff charged Ingold with violating PCSO rules relating to security of agency business, cooperation, and performance of duty. Pursuant to PCSO General Orders B-15 and C-1, the disciplinary point calculation for Sergeant Ingold was fifty-five points. The range of discipline for fifty-five (55) points is from a five-day suspension to termination. The Chain of Command Board voted unanimously to recommend a five-day suspension and Sheriff Rice upheld this recommendation.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Everett S. Rice, Pinellas County Florida, enter a final order (1) finding that Respondent Timothy Ingold violated PCSO Rules C-1, V, B, 9 and C-1,V C, 5b; (2) dismissing the charge that Respondent Ingold violated PCSO Rule C-1, V, C, 2; and (3) reducing Respondent's five-day suspension without pay to a three day suspension without pay. DONE and ENTERED this 23rd day of June, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CAROLYN S. HOLIFIELD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of June, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: James M. Craig, Esquire 205 Brush Street Post Office Box 1427 Tampa, Florida 33601 Edward D. Foreman, Esquire Suite 300 100 Second Avenue North St. Petersburg Florida 33701 William Repper, Chairperson Pinellas County Sheriff’s Civil Service Board Post Office Box 539 Clearwater, Florida 34617 Jean H. Kwall, Esquire Pinellas County Sheriff’s Office Post Office Drawer 2500 Largo, Florida 34649-2500 B. Norris Rickey, Esquire Office of Pinellas County Attorney 315 Court Street Clearwater, Florida 34616
Findings Of Fact On June 19, 1991, Dale McClellan was convicted of a one count violation of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act for conduct that occurred on or before August 8, 1986. Dale McClellan's conviction arose out of an investigation initiated by the Florida Attorney General in 1987 into possible bid rigging of school requirements contracts in Florida by thirteen dairies and distributors. In 1988, the Attorney General filed a civil action against these 13 dairies and distributors. In 1987, the United States Attorney General began an investigation into the same conduct pursuant to the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. Pursuant to paragraphs 287.133(3)(a) and (b), Florida Statutes, M & B Products, Inc. and Dale McClellan made timely notification to the Department of Management Services (DMS) and provided details of the convictions. On September 6, 1995, DMS issued a notice of intent pursuant to Subparagraph 287.133(3)(e)1., Florida Statutes. On September 29, 1995, pursuant to Subparagraph 287.133(3)(e)2., Florida Statutes, M & B Products, Inc. and Dale McClellan timely filed a petition for formal administrative hearing pursuant to subsection 120.57(1), Florida Statutes, to determine whether it is in the public interest for M & B Products, Inc. and Dale McClellan to be placed on the State of Florida Convicted Vendor List. Subparagraph 287.133(3)(e)3., Florida Statutes, establishes factors which, if applicable to a convicted vendor, will mitigate against placement of that vendor upon the convicted vendor list. Section 287.133(3)(e)3.e., Florida Statutes, establishes "cooperation with a State or Federal investigation into a public entity case as a mitigating factor against placement on the convicted vendor list." Dale McClellan was notified of an Investigative Demand by the Attorney General's Office in 1987. On December 14, 1987, Phillip Hall, Esquire, a representative of the Attorney General, State of Florida, reviewed records of two companies operated by Dale McClellan. These records were voluntarily produced by Mr. McClellan. Subsequent to Phillip Hall reviewing business records of Dale McClellan, copies of a portion of said records were voluntarily provided to the Florida Attorney General's Office. Dale McClellan met with representatives of the Attorney General's Office in January of 1988 and gave a statement in cooperation of their investigation, to Richard Arnold, Esquire, and Assistant Attorney General Jerome Hoffman. In November 1987, Dale McClellan cooperated with the Federal Grand Jury in Atlanta, Georgia, producing ten (10) boxes of records in response to a subpoena directed at his business. In March 1991, prior to his conviction in Federal Court, Dale McClellan cooperated with Federal Prosecutors at a meeting arranged by them in Atlanta, Georgia. Section 287.133(3)(e)3.d., Florida Statutes, provides prompt payment of any damages or penalty as the result of the conviction as a mitigating factor against placement on the convicted vendor list. Dale McClellan paid a penalty of $2,500.00 imposed by Judge William Castagna, on June 19, 1991. Section 287.133(3)(e)3.e., Florida Statutes, establishes the nature and details of the public entity crime as a mitigatory factor. Dale McClellan's violation consisted of supplying milk to 11 schools in Hillsborough County, Florida, through his company, M & B Dairy. Dale McClellan in the 1985-86 school year supplied 210 cases of half-pint milk cartons per day at a gross profit of less than one cent per carton. M & B Dairy went out of business in 1988. Pet, Inc., Southland Corporation, Borden, Inc. and Land-O-Sun Dairies, Inc., defendants in the federal court case (each convicted and fined several million dollars, sold tens of millions of dollars worth of milk to schools and federal government installations. Dale McClellan's involvement, in comparison, was very minor. Section 287.133(e)(e)3.e., Florida Statutes, establishes disassociation from other persons or affiliates convicted of public entity crimes as a mitigating factor in determining whether to place a person or entity on the convicted vendor list. Dale McClellan has not associated with any person convicted of a public entity crime. Section 287.133(3)(e)e.g., Florida Statutes, establishes self policing by the person to prevent public entity crimes as a mitigating factor in determining whether to place a person or entity on the convicted vendor list. M & B Products, Inc. has instituted policies that prohibit any employee from discussing, even casually, the bidding on or bidding strategies concerning school requirements contracts. In addition, Dale McClellan has resigned as an officer in M & B Products, Inc. Section 287.133(3)(e)e.j., Florida Statutes, states that the need of public entities for additional competition in the procurement of goods and services in their respective markets is a mitigating factor in determining whether to place a person on the convicted vendor list. Since the conclusion of the State and Federal investigation, many suppliers and distributors have discontinued business and there is a great need for competition in this area. M & B Products, Inc. is a significant factor in providing such competition and has helped lower prices in the areas where it supplies his product. Section 287.133(3)(e)3.e., Florida Statutes, establishes good citizenship as a mitigating factor, in determining whether to place a person on the convicted vendor list. In May 1991, Dale McClellan received a Certificate of Recognition from the Hillsborough County Sheriff's Office for his support of law enforcement and crime prevention. Dale McClellan has assisted persons addicted to alcohol by helping through a church sponsored Alcoholics Anonymous program, and helped found "301 House," an AA program in East Hillsborough County. He is still active in helping and counselling alcoholics.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent is a Public Employer within the meaning of Florida Statutes Section 447.203(2). Lloyd A. Perry was formerly an employee of the Respondent, and a public employee within the meaning of Florida Statutes Section 447.203(3). Dana E. Pratt was formerly an employee of the Respondent, and a public employee within the meaning of Florida Statutes Section 447.203(3). Prior to February 17, 1976, Lloyd A. Perry was employed by the Citrus County Road Department for a period of over four years. Immediately prior to the time that his employment was terminated, Perry was a roller operator. Except for rare occasions when he performed work as a flagman, or other work in conjunction with his roller work, Perry operated a tandem road roller. For the several months prior to February, 1976, Perry had continuously operated the same roller machine. Prior to February, 1976, none of Perry's supervisors informed him that his work was unsatisfactory, reprimanded him for performing work in an unsatisfactory manner, or indicated to him in any way that his job was in jeopardy for unsatisfactory performance of his duties. Dana E. Pratt had been employed by the Citrus County Road Department for approximately five years prior to February, 1976. For four years prior to that date he had been a motor grader operator. Pratt had annually received formal evaluations and his evaluations had always been very good. Prior to February, 1976, Pratt had never been criticized for below average or unsatisfactory work. He had never received any written reprimand for unsatisfactory performance on the job. From approximately December, 1973 until February, 1976, Perry had operated the newest grader machine in use by the Citrus County Road Department. No one else had operated the machine since it was acquired by the Citrus County Road Department. During February, 1976, Thomas Hutchinson was the Citrus County Road Superintendent. William Hitt was thee Assistant Road Superintendent. Hutchinson and Hitt served under the direction of the Citrus County Board of County Commissioners. Perry, Pratt, and numerous other employees of the Citrus County Road Department had, prior to February, 1976, become dissatisfied with conditions in the Road Department, primarily the manner of direction given the department by Hutchinson and Hitt. On Sunday, February 8, 1976, Perry drafted a petition specifying numerous grievances against Hutchinson and Hitt. It was his intention to secure the signatures of employees of the Road Department on the petition, and to present it to the Board of County Commissioners. Perry sought the assistance of County Commissioner DeBusk in drafting the petition. DeBusk offered several suggestions and his daughter typed the petition for Perry. Perry secured six or seven signatures on that Sunday. He was the first person to sign the petition, and Dana Pratt was the third. On Monday, February 9, Pratt informed his office that he had business to attend to and would not be at work that day. He did not claim sick leave for the time he missed. Prior to work and during the lunch hour he called as many employees of the Road Department as he could. After working hours he waited at a business establishment called the "Country Store" which was located in close proximity to the place where Road Department employees checked out of work. Forty-six employees of the Road Department signed the petition. Dana Pratt assisted in soliciting people to sign the petition. There was no evidence offered at the hearing from which it could be determined that those persons signing the petition did so other than freely and voluntarily. On Tuesday, February 10, 1976, Perry called his supervisor, Mr. Hutchinson, and told him that he had business to attend to. Hutchinson asked him if he was going to solicit more signatures. Perry told him that he was not. The Board of County Commissioners was meeting on that date, and Perry presented the petition to the Board. Members of the Board discussed the petition at length during the meeting. One commissioner asked Perry if he was big enough to go back to work and forget about the matter. Perry said that he was. On February 11, 1976 Perry returned to work at the regular time. Rather than being assigned to his regular duty as a roller operator, he was assigned to flag traffic for a grader operator. He continued in that capacity until Tuesday, February 17. On that date, at approximately 11:00 or 11:30 A.M. Tom Morton, the grader foreman, informed Perry that his employment was terminated as of 1:00 P.M. on that date. Both Morton and William Hitt told Perry that they did not know why he was fired. Dana Pratt attended the County Commission meeting on February 10. He was asked about whether he threatened a Road Department employee named Langley with respect to signing the petition. Pratt told the County Commission that he did not threaten Langley, and no evidence was offered at the hearing to establish that he did. On February 12, 1976, Pratt used the new grader machine that he had been using for some time prior thereto. At the end of that day his supervisors informed him that he would be using the oldest machine in the Department thereafter. He began using it on February 13. It took some time to get it started on that date. It also took some time to get it started on Monday, February 16. This was an old machine, and had been difficult to start for some years prior to the time that it was assigned to Pratt. At 12:30 on February 17, 1976, Tom Morton informed Pratt that his employment was terminated as of 1:00 P.M. on that date. Pratt was never given any reasons for his termination. On February 17, 1976, the Citrus County Board of County Commissioners acted to terminate the employment of Perry and Pratt. These actions were taken upon the recommendation of Mr. Hutchinson. Ostensibly the reason for Pratt's termination was that he had marked out on sick leave on a day when he was not sick. Ostensibly the reason for Perry's termination was that he had been missing from the job for approximately an hour. The evidence would not support a finding that Perry and Pratt were fired for these reasons. These reasons offered by Hutchinson, and followed by the Board of County Commissioners, were used as a ruse. On February 18, 1976, the day after Pratt and Perry were fired, Hutchinson called a meeting of all employees of the Road Department. Hutchinson told the employees that he had nothing to do with the termination, but he also told them that he would tolerate no more petitions and that if anyone did not like working conditions at the Road Department they could leave. He said that he had four County Commissioners in his pocket, and he reminded the employees that unemployment in Citrus County was high. He told the employees that he would take care of any petitions they distributed. During the week the petition was distributed, Hutchinson told one employee of the Road Department, James Johnson, that Johnson could be put in jail for signing the petition. During that same week he told his assistant superintendent, William Hitt, that all of the men who signed the petition had to go. After Perry and Pratt were fired, Hutchinson told Hitt that he got two, and he would get the rest. The basis for Hutchinson's recommendation to the Board of County Commissioners that Perry and Pratt be terminated was the fact that they participated in the distribution of the petition, and presenting it to the Board of County Commissioners. There was no evidence offerred at the hearing to indicate that any members of the Board of County Commissioners knew Hutchinson was presenting false reasons for the terminations; however, they did act to adopt the recommendation. The Board of County Commissioners did know that Pratt and Perry were among the leaders in distributing the petition highly critical of Hutchinson's work, and was clearly on notice that Hutchinson may have ulterior motives in recommending their dismissal.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent failed to maintain good moral character as a law enforcement officer and violated provisions of Sections 943.1395(6), 943.1395(7), and 943.13(7), Florida Statutes (2003), and if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact By stipulation of the parties, Respondent was, at all times material to this proceeding, a certified law enforcement officer in the State of Florida, holding certificate number 194615. On May 27, 2003, Dorothy Shelton was a dispatch duty officer at the Havana Police Department in Havana, Florida. The police chief asked Shelton to sit near Respondent in a small room at the police station when he came in to peruse the contents of his personnel file. Respondent arrived, took the folder and sat down near Shelton. When Respondent asked if he could remove papers from the folder, Shelton told him that it was not permitted. Some of the papers in the folder were loose and Respondent asked if he could have copies made of some of the documents. Shelton told him that copies could be made upon Respondent's going nearby to the Havana City Hall, paying the requisite copying fees, obtaining a receipt for same, and returning to the police station. Eventually, Respondent, after more paper shuffling, returned the folder to Shelton and left the police station. As he went out the door, Shelton observed a piece of paper in Respondent’s pocket. Shelton made the deduction that the paper came from the personnel folder and quickly told the duty sergeant that Respondent had removed a piece of paper from the folder. The sergeant immediately looked in the folder, noticed that a returned personal reference questionnaire sent out by the department in the folder was missing. The sergeant immediately proceeded to follow Respondent with the intent of stopping him outside, but discovered that Respondent had left the area. The sergeant then telephoned Respondent’s residence and left a telephonic message for Respondent to return the call. At about 5:00 p.m., that same day, Respondent returned the call. When questioned by the sergeant, Respondent admitted taking the document and later destroying it. At the hearing, Respondent testified that he was motivated to remove the document from the folder because he had a pending job application with the Florida Highway Patrol and the document inappropriately stated he had been “Baker-Acted.” In the course of his testimony, Respondent exhibited remorse and confirmed again a written apology he had written to the Havana police chief. At the hearing, Respondent also defended his actions by relating that he had discussed the matter with the Havana city manager who allegedly told him to go remove the document from the folder. In the absence of testimony by the city manager, Respondent’s testimony in this regard is not credited. The record does not reveal how long Respondent has been a certified law enforcement officer. There is no evidence that Respondent has a prior disciplinary history.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That Petitioner enter a final order placing Respondent's certification as a law enforcement officer on probation for a period of two years upon such reasonable terms and conditions as may be determined by the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of May, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DON W. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of May, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Linton B. Eason, Esquire Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1489 Thompkins W. White, Esquire Igler & Dougherty, P.A. 1501 East Park Avenue Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Michael Ramage, General Counsel Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Rod Caswell, Program Director Division of Criminal Justice Professionalism Services Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
The Issue Whether or not Charles D. Reynolds, on January 7th, 1976, was arrested and charged with DWI, Aggravated Assault, and Resisting Arrest without Violence; the charge of DWI was reduced to driving with an unauthorized blood alcohol level; Charles D. Reynolds plead guilty, was adjudicated guilty and paid a fine of $200 plus court costs; the aggravated assault charge was nol prossed; he plead guilty and was adjudicated guilty of Resisting Arrest without Violence and paid a fine of $250 plus court costs, his license was revoked, and he was sentenced to DWI School; and due to the above misconduct has failed to perform his duties as an educator as described in Section 231.09, Florida Statutes, thereby subjecting himself to the penalties found in Section 231.28, Florida Statutes. Whether or not Charles D. Reynolds, on December 25th, 1976, was arrested and charged with DWI, and resisting arrest with violence; he plead guilty to the lesser including Offense of Assault on a Law Officer, was put on one year's probation, sentenced to spend weekends in Jail for a period of three months beginning June 11th, 1977; he was allowed to vacate the guilty plea and plead nolo contendere to the charge of Assault on a Law Enforcement Officer with the same conditions as the guilty plea; and due to the above misconduct has failed to perform his duties as an educator as described in Section 231.09, Florida Statutes, thereby subjecting himself to the penalties found in Section 231.28, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Charles D. Reynolds, is presently the holder of Florida Teacher's Certificate Number 316529, Graduate Rank III and is employed in the public schools of Duval County, Florida. This cause has been brought for consideration based upon a recommendation by the State of Florida, Department of Education, Professional Practices Council, Executive Committee, dated May 17th, 1977. Upon examination of the recommendation, the Commissioner of Education found probable cause for filing a petition for the suspension of the Respondent's Florida Teacher's Certificate within the meaning of Section 231.28, Florida Statutes, and in accordance with Rule 6A-4.37, F.A.C. This determination was made on May 17th, 1977. On May 23rd, 1977, a petition for the suspension of the Respondent's Florida Teacher's Certificate was filed. The Respondent has filed his answer to the petition and has opposed the entry of an order of suspension. The case has been forwarded to the Division of Administrative Hearings for consideration by correspondence from the Petitioner dated July 14th, 1977. On January 7th, 1976, Respondent, Charles D. Reynolds a/k/a Chuck Daniel Reynolds was involved in an automobile accident in the parking lot of his residence at the Arrowhead Apartments located in Jacksonville, Florida. Officers of the Jacksonville Sheriff's Office investigated the case and in the course of the investigation asked to enter Respondent's apartment to obtain his driver's license. Reynolds was opposed to them entering his apartment, but they did go in. Reynolds went to the bedroom and obtained the license and came back into the living room area. At that point he became angry with the officers and took a swing in the general direction of a Sergeant Branch. The other officers subdued Reynolds and handcuffed him. He was subsequently taken to the hospital for treatment of wounds received in the scuffle. In addition to the events described, Reynolds also made verbal threats against the witnesses to the accident, to the effect that he would get even with them. During the course of this entire exchange, Reynolds appeared intoxicated as evidenced in slurred speech, erratic actions, excitability and a strong odor of the substance alcohol. He continued to be belligerent and kicked the side of the police car while being transported. It should be indicated that the Respondent did not carry out any of the verbal threats that he made. As a result of the incident, the Respondent was charged with DWI, aggravated assault, and resisting arrest without violence. The charge of DWI was reduced to driving with an unauthorized blood alcohol level and a guilty plea was entered for which he was fined in the amount of $200.00. The aggravated assault charge was nol prossed. The further provision of his sentence was that he attend the DWI school. The particulars of this case may be found in the Petitioner's composite exhibit 1 admitted into evidence, which describes the pleas and the judgment and sentence. The Respondent was fined in the amount of $250.00 for his plea of guilty to resisting arrest without violence. The second incident for which Respondent is charged in the Petition for Suspension, pertains to events on December 25th, 1976. On that date officers of the Jacksonville Sheriff's Office were traveling east on 103rd Street, in Jacksonville, Florida. Reynolds was going west, driving with his bright lights on and straying into the oncoming lane in which the officers were driving. The time was approximately 1:30-2:00 a.m. The officers turned around and pursued Reynolds, who at one point in the pursuit pulled off the road to avoid the officers. The officers finally caught Reynolds on Interstate 295 in Duval County, Florida. After making the stop, they removed Reynolds from the car and noted that he had a strong odor of alcohol about his person, and was staggering around. One officer administered so-called field sobriety tests , specifically the finger to nose and balance test. In the finger to nose test the individual tries to place an index finger on his nose while standing in a certain posture. Reynolds was unable to do this and was also unable to stand on one foot in attempting the balance test. The officers felt that Reynolds was driving while under the influence of alcohol; however, being Christmas Day they intended to give Reynolds the opportunity to have someone come and pick him up and drive his car home, and waive charges. When this was explained to Reynolds, Reynolds replied that he wanted to get back in his car, for purposes of driving away. The officers prohibited him from getting in the car, at which point a struggle ensued between the officers and Reynolds for a period of minutes. Most of the struggle was in the traffic lanes of Interstate 295. In the end, Reynolds was charged with DWI, a couple of traffic violations and resisting arrest with violence. After the struggle Reynolds indicated that the officers were going to be sorry for, "screwing with me." He was taken to the Duval County, Florida Jail and booked for the offenses and given a breathalizer examination which showed his reading to be .27 percent blood alcohol level. This reading nay be found in Petitioner's Exhibit 3 admitted into evidence. He entered a plea of guilty to the lesser included offense under resisting arrest with violence, to wit assault on a law enforcement officer. The Court withheld the adjudication of guilt and placed the Respondent on probation for a period of one year on the condition that he spend weekends in jail for a period of three (3) months, beginning on June 11th, 1977, and pay $10.00 per month for cost of supervision. This plea was subsequently withdrawn and the Court allowed a plea of nolo contendere to be entered in lieu of the guilty plea. The Court also allowed a motion to mitigate the sentence, which motion was filed prior to the imposition of the petition for suspension made by the Petitioner in this cause. The Court's Order Granting the Motion to Mitigate was entered subsequent to the Petition for Suspension made by the Petitioner. The probation terms were modified by memorandum of June 9th, 1977, from the Court, deleting the provision to spend weekends in jail. Subsequently, the Respondent was required to spend time working in a program known as the Jacksonville Probation and Restitution Center, working with young offenders. (The Director of that program testified in the hearing and indicated that Mr. Reynolds did an admirable job of assisting in the program.) For the violations alleged on January 6th, 1976 and December 25th, 1976, the Petitioner has charged Respondent with violations of Section 231.09 and .28, F.S. The two incidents will be discussed chronologically in considering whether the Petitioner has proven the violations or not. The first factual incident discussed pertains to the events of January 7th, 1976. In reviewing the events that led to the arrest and charges previously discussed and the subsequent disposition of those charges in terms of a possible substitute violation of Section 231.09, F.S., the only provision of that section which would seen to have any application would be Section 231.09(2) F.S. No other sub-paragraphs of Section 231.09, F.S. seem to have application under the evidential facts established. The subsection that does have application, i.e., Section 231.09(2), F.S. reads as follows: "EXAMPLES FOR PUPILS -- Labor faithfully and earnestly for the advancement of the pupils in their studies, deportment and morals, and embrace every opportunity to inculcate, by precept and example, the principles of truth, honesty and pat- riotism and the practice of every Christian virtue." This provision of the chapter has been considered in the case of Meltzer vs. Board of Public Instruction of Orange County, Florida, etc., et al., 548 F.2d 559 (5th Circuit Court of Appeals), in that opinion the Court held Section 231.09(2), F.S., to be unconstitutional. However, on petition for rehearing and petition for rehearing en banc, reported at 553 F.2d 1008, The United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, granted rehearing with the right for oral agreement and the opportunity to submit supplemental briefs, with the date of the oral agreement to be announced in the future. The rehearing has not been held at the time of this recommended order, to the knowledge of the undersigned. Consequently, the undersigned will report whether the evidential facts as demonstrated established a violation under the language of Section 231.09(2), F.S., with a caveat that this section may not withstand the final order of the Court in Meltzer, supra. Should Section 231.09(2), F.S. be upheld, the acts of being arrested and pleading guilty to driving with an unlawful blood alcohol level and resisting or opposing a police officer without violence constitute violations of Section 231.09(2), F.S., both in terms of the entry of the plea in those two counts and in terms of the underlying evidential facts which led to the plea of guilty. These facts establish that the Respondent failed to labor faithfully and honestly for the advancement of the pupils in their department and morals, in accordance with Section 231.09(2), F.S., assuming this latter section of the law to be constitutional. Again, the evidential facts spoken of are those established in the events reported in the hearing pertaining to the incident of January 7th, 1976, in which Respondent was driving with an unlawful blood alcohol level and resisted the police without violence. In connection with the events of January 7th, 1976, there is a further allegation of a violation of Section 231.28, F.S. In pertinent part, Section 231.28(1), F.S., states that the license can be suspended in accordance with the following language: * * * "(1) It can be shown that such person obtained the teaching certificate by fraudulent means, or has proved to be incompetent to teach or to perform his duties as an employee of the public school system, or to teach in or to operate a private school, or has been guilty of gross immorality or an act involving moral turpitude, or has had his certificate revoked in another state, or has been convicted of a mis- demeanor, felony, or any other criminal charge, other than a minor traffic vio- lation , or upon investigation has been found guilty of personal conduct which seriously reduces his effectiveness as an employee of the school board, or has otherwise violated the provisions of the law, the penalty for which is the revocation of the teaching certificate, or has refused to comply with the re- gulations of the State Board of Education or the school board in the district in which he is employed." In reviewing the language of that section in comparison to the facts established in the events of January 7th, 1976, it is established that Respondent is guilty of a violation of that section because he has plead guilty to driving with an unauthorized blood alcohol level and resisting arrest without violence, which are misdemeanors or other criminal charges, other than minor traffic violations. This activity was also an act involving moral turpitude. No other violations of this section were shown as a result of the matters of January 7th, 1976. Turning to a consideration of the factual matters established in this hearing as it pertains to December 25th, 1976, and in view of the discussion of Section 231.09(2), F.S., pertaining to January 7th, 1976, a violation has been shown. The events of December 25th, 1976, are likewise subject to the caveat pertaining to the case of Meltzer, supra. The events of the arrest and subsequent pleas in Court after the factual events of December 25th, 1976, have shown the Respondent has failed to labor faithfully and honestly to the advancement of pupils and their deportment and morals, by his condition while driving and by his resistance to the authorities who were trying to enforce the laws of the State of Florida. No other violations of Section 231.09, F.S., were shown for the December 25th, 1976 incident. The events of December 25th, 1976, show a violation of Section 231.28(1), F.S., in that the act of the Respondent's driving and resistance to the authorities who were enforcing the laws of the State of Florida were acts involving moral turpitude. Also by the entry of the plea of nolo contendere which the Court accepted in lieu of the guilty plea, the Respondent has been convicted of a misdemeanor other than a minor traffic violation. No other violations of Section 231.28, F.S. were shown for the events of December 25th, 1976. By the guilty plea entered to the offenses of driving with an unlawful blood alcohol level and resistance without violence in the charges of January 7th, 1976, and the nolo contendere plea to the offense of assault on a law enforcement for the events of December 25th, 1976, the Petitioner has made a prima facie proof of grounds for revocation of the Respondent's teaching certificate, as set forth in Section 231.28(3), F.S. These prima facie grounds have not been refuted by the Respondent.
Recommendation In the course of the hearing, certain witnesses testified as to the Respondent's good character and teaching proficiency. These witnesses were various members of the community and members of the staff of the school in which the Respondent teaches and pupils of the Respondent. Although these witnesses were not aware of the events involved in the incidents of January 7th, 1976, and December 25th, 1976, they were nonetheless impressed with Respondent's abilities as a teacher. In considering their testimony and the testimony offered which established the alleged violations, it is
The Issue Whether Respondent committed an unlawful employment practice in violation of Sections 760.10(1), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Beard Equipment Company, Inc., sells and maintains heavy equipment in Panama City, Florida. The Petitioner, Robert G. Harrison began employment with the Respondent in Panama City, Florida, in September, 1988. The Petitioner was employed as a janitor. Petitioner's duties included running numerous and varied errands which required driving of a motor vehicle. In April of 1989, Petitioner was hospitalized in order to adjust his medication for what he indicated was a bipolar disorder. However, at the hearing, Petitioner produced no expert testimony to establish that he was mentally handicapped or had bipolar disorder. At that time, Respondent became aware that Petitioner had a medical problem. Later, Petitioner was hospitalized in order to adjust his medication on two more occasions in 1989, and twice in 1992. On each occasion the Respondent accommodated Petitioner by making arrangements to hire temporary employees or readjust other employees' duties so that they could perform Petitioner's duties while he was hospitalized. In early 1992, the Respondent's liability insurance company conducted a random audit of employee driving records. The Respondent was notified by its insurance company that no coverage would be provided for any accident where the employee/driver had a DUI conviction. This random audit prompted Respondent to conduct a complete company- wide internal audit of driving records of all employees. The driving record audit resulted in some transfers for those employees for whom driving was an essential part of their job duties, but whose driving records would prohibit them from being covered under Respondent's liability policy. Employees who could not fulfill the duties of a non-driving position were terminated. Respondent could not afford to allow employees to drive who could not be insured by Respondent's liability carrier. The in-house driving record audit revealed that Petitioner had a DUI conviction on his record. Respondent had no other non-driving positions for which the Petitioner was qualified. Respondent was therefore forced to discharge the Petitioner since he could no longer fulfill the duties of his employment. Petitioner was discharged in November of 1992. When Petitioner was terminated, Petitioner was advised by Mark Veal, his supervisor, that the driving record audit had revealed that Petitioner had a DUI conviction, and because he would not be covered under the company insurance policy, they had no alternative but to discharge him. Within a day or so, Petitioner's wife called and requested his discharge letter in writing. Veal prepared the letter, indicating that due to Petitioner's medical history, his operating a motor vehicle would be too much of a liability. Although the real reason for Petitioner's discharge and the reason given him at the time was the DUI conviction, Veal tried to write the discharge letter in such a way as to minimize any embarrassment for the Petitioner due to his DUI conviction. Therefore, the termination letter does not support the conclusion that Respondent discriminated against Petitioner based on a mental handicap. In fact, there was no substantial evidence that Respondent terminated Petitioner based on a mental handicap. The evidence clearly showed Respondent was terminated for his driving record and his lack of qualifications to fill any other non-driving position. Moreover, Petitioner failed to establish that his position was filled by a person not in a protected class or that Respondent is an employer employing more than 15 employees. Given these facts, Petitioner has not established a prima facie case that Respondent committed an unlawful employment practice.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is accordingly, RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order finding that Petitioner did not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he was discriminated against because of his alleged handicap in violation of the Florida Human Rights Act and that the petition be dismissed. DONE AND ORDERED this 22nd day of December, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE CLEAVINGER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of December, 1994.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner Barbara Jerrel, became employed by Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, the Respondent, in May, 1987. She worked as a sales trainee in the field of life and health insurance sales and servicing. She was interviewed and hired by Doreen Blake in the "Gator Branch" office located in Gainesville, Florida. The manager of that office was Jerry Cummings, who was the Petitioner's supervisor. Mr. Cummings initially worked with the Petitioner in training her to solicit life and health insurance business and in making and closing sales of insurance policies both over the telephone and in person. When she initially became employed he accompanied her and supervised her in making sales solicitation calls on potential clients. On one occasion, soon after she was initially hired, the Petitioner maintains that she was working at her computer station in the office when Mr. Cummings sat beside her and began rubbing her arm. She states that she remonstrated with him about this conduct and told him to stop, whereupon he became angry and thenceforth instructed her to call him "Mr. Cummings." Soon after this alleged incident she was sent to a training school for approximately a month to learn the skills and requirements necessary to be a sales representative of Metropolitan Life Insurance Company. She received above average scores on graded work during her school period of instruction and received favorable reports on her leadership and sales ability from her instructors. After her school training was completed, she returned to the Gainesville office to work. On approximately June 23, 1988, she testified that she and Mr. Cummings were riding in her car to an appointment with a client. He was traveling with her in order to assist with her training in meeting and discussing insurance matters with clients and in closing sales. She maintains he began talking about things other than insurance and said "I hope you don't tell your husband what we talk about . . . because it's really making me hot." She also contends that he made a statement to the effect that he "wondered how long it would take before she got him to a motel room." The Petitioner testified that she went home that day and tried to decide whether to quit her job or not. She decided to seek a transfer to the Ocala office, where Mr. Wine was the manager. She conferred with Mr. Wine by phone and he allegedly told her that she could come to his office as a new applicant. In reality, as revealed by Mr. Wine in his own testimony, he did not want her to come to work in his office and did not encourage her to do so. In the meantime, Ms. Jerrel was appointed as a Sales Representative of Metropolitan at the "Gator" branch office in Gainesville, effective June 8, 1987, following her "pre-appointment training." That pre-appointment training provides job applicants with an opportunity to get acquainted with the company's business, to obtain necessary licenses, and enables the management to determine the aptitude of the applicant for the sale of the company's product. She was provided the same training accorded all such individuals after initial hiring. Following her appointment as a Sales Representative in the Gainesville office she continued to receive training and assistance as was provided all those newly appointed. Ms. Jerrel met the initial production requirement so that she could be appointed Sales Representative. However, her performance began to deteriorate in July, 1987. She had written 11 applications for insurance (with Mr. Cummings' assistance) by the time of her appointment as a Sales Representative and wrote five by July 10, 1987. Thereafter, she wrote no business at all for two of the next four weeks. She wrote one application for insurance in the week of August 3, 1987 and none for the next three consecutive weeks. She wrote one application in the week of August 31, and had none thereafter during her employment with the company. The Petitioner alleges that on or about August 28, 1987, Mr. Cummings made a suggestion that the Petitioner and Cummings and another couple "play golf, smoke pot, and go to the beach and make love." Petitioner apparently took offense at that, as it was one of the bases for the subject action. Upon her commenting about it to another female employee however, that employee, who knew Cummings for a longer period of time than the Petitioner, advised her to disregard it because it was her belief that he was "just joking." The Petitioner also alleged that several days after this incident on or about August 31, 1987, that Cummings was engaged in a conversation with her while kneeling beside her chair where she was working at her computer terminal. She alleges that he put his arm around her shoulder while conversing with her, let his hand rest on her breast and massaged her breast whereupon she states that she stabbed him with her "ink pen." These allegations are of somewhat dubious credibility. The Petitioner herself testified that after the August 31 date, at which the last of the above incidents allegedly occurred, Mr. Cummings still praised her as an employee and predicted that she would get the "Eagle Award." It is also established, by Petitioner's own testimony, that during this period of time in August, 1987, she was undergoing treatment for depression. There is some indication that she was having marital discord with her husband and, indeed, an incident occurred shortly after, on September 10, 1987, which indicates that her relationship with her husband might have interfered somewhat with her job performance. On that date she met agent Michael Ray from the company's Jacksonville office, whom she had known in insurance school. They went to a local establishment where, according to her own testimony, they had a "couple of drinks" whereupon she got sick and went home. Her husband apparently became upset by this episode and shortly thereafter went to the company's Jacksonville office in an attempt to confront agent Ray about apparently interfering with his relationship with his wife, the Petitioner. Later that day, the Petitioner called her own office in Gainesville to warn them that her husband might be coming there armed with a gun. While this is commendable on the Petitioner's part, it does indicate that there was some marital discord which may have interfered with her job performance and together with the fact of her depression and treatment for it, may have influenced her thinking and her perception of what was actually occurring in her encounters with Mr. Cummings. He was described by another employee as a "touchy person" who frequently touched people in an innocent manner while engaged in a conversation with them. These factors, considered together, coupled with Cummings' denial that the incidents occurred, in the case of his allegedly touching the Petitioner's breast, and his testimony that if he touched someone, it was without any wrongful intent, lead the Hearing Officer to find that the incidents either did not occur, that they did not happen in the manner perceived by the Petitioner, or that the motive behind them was misconstrued by the Petitioner. On September 16, 1987, Mr. Cummings offered to try to obtain a transfer for Ms. Jerrel to another office if she would like and offered to give her two weeks in which to decide whether she wanted a transfer and to "tie up loose ends." The Petitioner later refused his offer of a transfer to another office. The offer of transfer, according to the Petitioner, was because of her husband's influence on her performance in her work place, as evidenced, in part, by the incident referenced above. On September 20, a Sunday evening, Ms. Jerrel called manager Cummings at his home. She asked him to meet her at the office. Manager Cummings declined to go to the office, suggesting that they discuss whatever her problem was over the telephone. Ms. Jerrel refused to do that so then Cummings suggested that she come to his home (where his wife would be present) to discuss the matter with him and she declined. Ms. Jerrel then hung up but called back a few minutes later and said that if Manager Cummings refused to meet her at the office then she would file a sexual harassment charge against him. He was taken aback by this statement but then advised her to do what she chose but he was still not going to meet her at the office that evening. Mr. Cummings met with Ms. Jerrel in the branch office the next morning and telephoned his Regional Manager, in Ms. Jerrel's presence, to relay to him the information regarding her claim of sexual harassment. Arrangements were then made, in accordance with established company procedures, in evidence, for Agency Vice President, James Higgins, to meet with Ms. Jerrel on September 24, regarding her claim of sexual harassment. When Mr. Higgins met with her and heard her allegations, he advised her of the company's policy against sexual harassment, and assured her that if the incidents had occurred as alleged, he would correct the situation and there would be no recurrence. He also took that opportunity to discuss with Ms. Jerrel her performance as a sales representative. He advised her that upon review of her performance, he had noted that she had been "blank"; that is, without any sales or production for several weeks. He informed her that that was not a satisfactory performance level. He told her that she would have to produce a satisfactory record of sales accomplishments or her employment would be terminated. As a result of this discussion she agreed to submit an "action plan", delineating in detail what steps she proposed to take to correct her unsatisfactory production level. That action plan included her assurance that she would participate in "telephone prospecting classes" with her supervisor. Mr. Higgins also interviewed Manager Cummings with respect to Ms. Jerrel's allegations of sexual harassment. Mr. Cummings denied them. Mr. Higgins then warned Manager Cummings that if he were found to have engaged in such conduct, his employment would be terminated. Respondent's exhibit 14 is a letter from Mr. Higgins to Manager Cummings delineating the problems with the Petitioner's lack of sales performance. The exhibit contains a detailed discussion of her action plan goals designed to try to correct her lack of production of insurance sales. The letter admonishes Manager Cummings to monitor her performance, particularly her telephone prospecting time and methods, as well as her other prospecting and sales efforts and methods. The letter emphasizes, on the second page, the monitoring and establishment of a schedule of in-office telephone prospecting time, to be monitored by Mr. Cummings. In that letter is a handwritten memorandum of a telephone conversation which Mr. Higgins later had with Mr. Cummings, on the same day the letter went out to Mr. Cummings. Mr. Cummings informed Mr. Higgins that Ms. Jerrel had already missed two scheduled telephone prospecting classes which she had agreed to attend in her "action plan", designed to correct poor sales performance. Since she did not report to the scheduled telephone prospecting class sessions on September 25th and September 28th, Mr. Higgins ordered Manager Cummings to terminate her effective October 1, 1988. The reason for her termination was established to be her low- performance record and her failure to comply with the action plan which she, herself, prepared and submitted, designed to correct her poor sales performance. The termination did not result from the altercation that the Petitioner was involved in with her husband and agent Michael Ray of the Jacksonville branch office. In fact, the Branch Manager, Mr. Cummings' superior, had a discussion of that issue with Mr. Cummings and informed him that the New York home office had indicated that the Petitioner's husband's interference with her job or office operations was not a sufficient reason to terminate her. The company's policies and procedures regarding sexual harassment claims, equal employment opportunity, affirmative action and prevention of unlawful discrimination are in evidence. The record does not reflect that those policies were departed from in the situation at bar.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, and the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, it is, therefore RECOMMENDED: That the petition of Barbara Jerrel be dismissed. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of March, 1990, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of March, 1990. COPIES FURNISHED: Dana Baird, Esq. Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road, Suite 240 Building F Tallahassee, FL 32399-1925 Rodney W. Smith, Esq. P.O. Box 628 Alachua, FL 32615 Wi1liam G. Pappas, Esq. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company One Madison Avenue New York, NY 10010-3690
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent's assessment of sales tax against Petitioner pursuant to Section 212.0505, Florida Statutes, should be upheld.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the final hearing and the entire record in this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: By Notice of Assessment and Jeopardy Findings dated October 15, 1990 (the "Assessment"), Respondent, Department of Revenue (Department), determined that taxes imposed under Section 212.0505, Florida Statutes, were due from Petitioner, Jose A. Espino, for the unlawful sale, use, consumption, distribution, manufacture, derivation, production, transportation or storage of a controlled substance, to wit: cocaine. Specifically, the notice provided Petitioner with a "Notice of Assessment of tax, penalty, and interest on the deficiency" as follows: Date of Transaction or Incident (On or About) August 22, 1990 Estimated Retail Price 2 Kilo Cocaine $25,000.00 25% Surcharge [s.212.0505(1)(a), F.S.] $12,500.00 25% Surcharge [s.212.0505(1)(b), F.S.] $ 6,250.00 Penalty of 5% per month, maximum of 25% of Tax and Surcharge Due [s.212.12(2), F.S.] $ 937.50 Additional Penalty of 50% [s.212.12(2), F.S.] $ 0 Interest of 1% per month [s.212.12(3), F.S.], accrues at the rate of $6.16 per day. INTEREST computed thru 9/21/90 $ 49.28 Total Amount Due with this Notice $19,736.78 The factual basis for the Assessment was Petitioner's involvement in the transactions described in Findings of Fact 4-9 below. Petitioner filed a timely Petition to Challenge the Notice of Assessment and Jeopardy Findings. The only basis for the challenge set forth in the Petition was a contention that Petitioner was not engaged in the unlawful transportation of cocaine and that Section 212.0505, Florida Statutes was not applicable under the facts and circumstances of this case. During discovery and at the formal hearing in this case, Petitioner also challenged the estimated retail price used by Respondent in making the calculations set forth in the Assessment. Petitioner has not contested the mathematical accuracy of the Assessment nor has Petitioner contested the form of the Assessment or presented any evidence that the procedures for issuing the Assessment were improper. No evidence was presented that Petitioner has paid the sales tax assessed by Respondent or that the sales tax assessed has been paid by another individual on his behalf. In August of 1990, Petitioner, Jose A. Espino, was the owner of a paint and body shop located at 12524 S.W. 128th Street, Miami, Florida. Petitioner was present at the paint and body shop on August 22, 1990. On this date, he had agreed to meet with an individual who was working as a confidential informant for the Metro-Dade Police Department. Petitioner had previously negotiated with this confidential informant to sell four (4) kilos of cocaine at $30,000 per kilo. On August 22, 1990, Jerry Hull, a senior narcotics detective with the Metro-Dade Police Department, and the confidential informant drove to Petitioner's place of business. Detective Hull was seated on the passenger side of the front seat and observed the Petitioner coming out of the building carrying a maroon utility bag. Petitioner approached the vehicle occupied by Detective Hull and the confidential informant. Detective Hull got out of the vehicle and allowed Petitioner to get into the front seat. Detective Hull got into the back seat and the confidential informant drove the car east on S.W. 128th Street. As the confidential informant drove the vehicle, Detective Hull introduced himself to Petitioner and asked if he "brought the merchandise..." Petitioner stated that he had and inquired if Hull had the money. By his statements, Petitioner acknowledged his readiness to sell the cocaine he brought into the van. After inquiring about the money, Petitioner opened the utility bag he had carried into the van and showed Detective Hull a package. Petitioner gave the package to Hull and opened a cut previously made in the wrapping exposing a white substance inside. Detective Hull asked Petitioner for a sample. Based on his experience, Detective Hull identified the substance in the package as cocaine. Petitioner has, by virtue of the Respondent's Request for Admissions, admitted the substance he was carrying was cocaine. Petitioner told Detective Hull he had two (2) kilograms of cocaine in the bag. The Request for Admissions confirm that Petitioner carried two (2) kilograms of cocaine into the vehicle. Shortly after Petitioner showed Detective Hull the cocaine, a police car pulled up behind the van driven by the confidential informant. The police stopped the van and Petitioner was arrested and charged with trafficking in cocaine. No evidence was presented as to the disposition of the criminal charges. A copy of the police arrest report was forwarded to the Department of Revenue. As noted above, the Department of Revenue issued the Notice of Assessment and Jeopardy Findings on October 15, 1990. This Assessment was issued based upon the information contained in the Metro-Dade Police arrest report. As set forth above, the Assessment was issued in the amount of $19,736.78. The estimated retail price used by the Department of Revenue in calculating the tax due was $12,500 per kilogram. This estimate of retail price was derived from a price list compiled by the Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE). The price appearing in the FDLE report is based upon average prices for various types of illegal narcotics sold throughout Florida. The FDLE price list used by DOR in preparing the Assessment is segregated by the type of drug and by various regions of the state. The price used in this Assessment was based upon the FDLE report compiled from information available as of June 7, 1989 for the Miami region. This region included Dade, Broward and Palm Beach counties and included prices for transactions involving the sale of one (1) kilo or more of cocaine. Thus, the report reflects the economic fact that larger quantity purchases occur at relatively lower prices. The price of cocaine rose sharply between 1989 and 1990. A subsequent update of the FDLE report utilizing information available as of August 1, 1990, revealed prices in the Miami region rose to $22,000 for kilogram size sales of cocaine. Thus, it appears the price used in the Assessment in this case is significantly lower than either the anticipated sales price of the parties ($30,000 per kilo) or the price reported by the FDLE in its later report (August 1, 1990). If anything, the Assessment was based on a conservative estimate of actual retail prices in the Miami area at the time. Petitioner has not provided any persuasive evidence to show the Department of Revenue's estimated price of $12,500 per kilo is inappropriate. Interest on the Assessment continues to accrue at the rate of $6.16 per day since September 28, 1990.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Revenue issue a Final Order in this case concluding that the Petitioner, Jose A. Espino, is liable for taxes, penalties, and interest pursuant to Section 212.0505, Florida Statutes (1989), and assessing the amount of such liability at $19,736.78, plus interest at the rate of $6.11 per day since September 28, 1990. DONE and ENTERED this 31st day of July, 1992, at Tallahassee, Florida. J. STEPHEN MENTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of July, 1992. APPENDIX Both parties have submitted Proposed Recommended Orders. The following constitutes my rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties. The Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact Proposed Finding Paragraph Number in the Findings of Fact of Fact Number in the Recommended Order Where Accepted or Reason for Rejection. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 3 and in the Preliminary Statement. Rejected as constituting legal argument. While the Petition in this case did not challenge the mathematical accuracy of the tax assessment, Petitioner asserted in discovery and at the formal hearing that the estimated retail value utilized by Respondent in making the Assessment was not accurate. This suggestion is rejected. As set forth in Findings of Fact 12 and 13 and Conclusions of Law 12, the estimated retail value utilized by Respondent in this case was reasonable. Rejected as vague and constituting legal argument rather than a Finding of Fact. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 12 and 13. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 5 and addressed in Conclusions of Law 10. The Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact Proposed Finding Paragraph Number in the Findings of Fact of Fact Number in the Recommended Order Where Accepted or Reason for Rejection. Adopted in substance in the Preliminary Statement. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 3. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 3. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 3. Addressed in the Preliminary Statement. 6. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 4. 7. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 5. 8. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 5. 9. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 6. 10. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 7. 11. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 8. 12. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 9. 13. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 10. 14. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 11. 15. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 12. 16. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 13. COPIES FURNISHED: Vicki Weber, General Counsel Department of Revenue 204 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Thomas Herndon, Executive Director Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100 Angel M. Gonzalez, Esquire 28 W. Flagler Street Suite 806 Miami, Florida 33130 James McAuley Assistant Attorney General Tax Section, Capitol Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550
