The Issue The issues in this case, as set forth in the Prehearing Stipulation, are as follows: Whether Respondent was terminated from the State Medicaid Program; [Case No. 14-2488, Count I] Whether Respondent failed to update his practitioner profile within fifteen days of the filing of the order terminating him from the State Medicaid Program; [Case No. 14-2488, Count II] Whether Respondent exercised influence within the patient-physician relationship with T.J.[1/] for the purposes of engaging in sexual activity and/or whether Respondent engaged in sexual conduct with T.J.; [Case No. 14-1342, Counts I & II] Whether Respondent exercised influence within the patient-physician relationship with M.B. for the purposes of engaging in sexual activity and/or whether Respondent engaged in sexual conduct with M.B.; [Case No. 14-1343, Counts I & II] Whether Respondent exercised influence within the patient-physician relationship with C.J. for the purposes of engaging in sexual activity and/or whether Respondent engaged in sexual conduct with C.J.; [Case No. 14-1343, Counts I & II] Whether Respondent exercised influence within the patient-physician relationship with D.K. for the purposes of engaging in sexual activity and/or whether Respondent engaged in sexual conduct with D.K.; [Case No. 14-1343, Counts I & II] Whether Respondent exercised influence within the patient-physician relationship with A.H. for the purposes of engaging in sexual activity and/or whether Respondent engaged in sexual conduct with A.H.; [Case No. 14-1343, Counts I & II] and Whether Respondent exercised influence within the patient-physician relationship with S.D. for the purposes of engaging in sexual activity and/or whether Respondent engaged in sexual conduct with S.D. [Case No. 14-1343, Counts I & II]
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Department of Health, Board of Medicine (the “Department”) is the State agency responsible for licensing and monitoring physicians in the State of Florida. The Department regulates the practice of medicine in accordance with section 20.43 and chapters 456 and 458, Florida Statutes. Unless specifically stated otherwise herein, all references to Florida Statutes will be to the 2014 codification. Respondent is a licensed Florida physician, certified in the area of pain management, holding license number ME 97134. At all times relevant hereto, Respondent was practicing medicine at one of two locations: the Back Authority for Contemporary Knowledge, (a pain management clinic known as the “Back Center” located in Melbourne, Florida); and Advantacare (in its Altamonte Springs and Daytona Beach offices). Respondent was employed at the Back Center from January 2008 through September 2011, and at Advantacare from March 2012 through April 2013. Respondent provided pain management services for numerous patients during his tenure at each of the clinics. While at the Back Center, he saw 50 to 60 patients per day in an 8-hour workday, doing about 15 medication injections per day. At Advantacare he was seeing about 30 patients per day. By all accounts, Respondent is a skilled and proficient pain management physician. At Advantacare, Respondent would see patients for regular office visits at the Altamonte Springs office on Monday, Tuesday, Thursday, and Friday; Wednesday would be set aside for administering injections under a fluoroscope, described as sort of a C-shaped X-ray machine, performed at the Daytona Beach office. None of the sexual behavior alleged in the Administrative Complaints occurred during injections performed under fluoroscope. A general policy existed at the Back Center that required physicians to have another facility employee (medical technician, nurse, other) present in an examination room when a physician was providing care to a patient not of the same gender as the doctor. This “chaperone” policy is standard in the health care industry. There is no credible evidence that Respondent was ever shown the Back Center’s policy in writing, although it is probable the policy was accessible on the website of the entity (Osler Corporation) that owned the Back Center for a period of time. As a practicing physician, Respondent was also presumed to be aware of and to follow the chaperone policy and he admitted knowing about the policy in general. Respondent was, however, verbally apprised of the policy by his supervisor, Dr. Hynes, by the clinic operations manager, Mr. Pachkoski, and by the chief administrative officer, Cathy Bird. Respondent acknowledged that it was best to have another person in the examination room if he was providing treatment to a female patient. If no chaperone was available, it was his stated practice to keep the door open. Respondent did not feel like assistants were always available to chaperone, but neither his supervisor (Dr. Hynes) nor a co-physician (Dr. Zaidi) remembers Respondent complaining that staff was not available at the Back Center. The testimony of all six complainants in this case contradicts Respondent’s contention; each of them said they were treated by Respondent (alone) in a room with the door closed. When asked directly whether he ever treated female patients at the Back Center in a room with the door closed, Respondent admitted that it happened on occasion. The best and most persuasive evidence in this case is that a chaperone policy did exist and that Respondent did not follow the policy. Between September 2008 and January 2013, Respondent treated six female patients who are the subjects of the Department’s Administrative Complaint. Each of the patients is identified only by their initials in an attempt to maintain their confidentiality and privacy. The six patients will be addressed in chronological order based on the dates of their alleged mistreatment by Respondent. Patient S.D. Patient S.D. was a patient of Respondent between September and December 2008. S.D.’s status as a patient was stipulated to by the parties.2/ While she was Respondent’s patient, S.D. was also an employee of the Back Center. During the period of time Respondent was treating S.D., they engaged in a series of emails which could be construed as very sexual in nature. For example, on September 23, 2008, Respondent and S.D. had the following email exchange: S.D. – “You buying Dinner….Or am I your [f***ing] dinner????”Respondent – “What do you think? I want u as breakfast, lunch and dinner. My precious love.” S.D. – Ok so what am I going to eat LOL??? Let me guess a protein shake”Respondent – “If I shake it hard enough yes.” Then, on September 25, the two had this email exchange:Respondent – “NO I WANT U TO FEED ME!!! AND NO YOU R NOT GOING THERE!!! ABSOLUTELY NOT!!! I’M UR MAN AND I SAY NO.”S.D. – “Then act like it and stop flirting with the [f***ing] skank!”Respondent – “WHY? GETTING JEALOUS SWEETHEART?”S.D. - “No I guess I have no reason to be.” Respondent – “EXACTLY, YOU HAD ME AT LUNCH AND LEFT TO GO TO WORK. SO YOU CAN’T SAY ANYTHING, PRECIOUS.” Respondent denies that the exchange of emails with S.D. suggests anything of a sexual nature. He said, e.g., that in his Iranian culture, talking about eating someone was tantamount to saying you cared deeply for them. Respondent’s denial of the sexual nature of the emails is not persuasive. S.D. did not testify at final hearing nor was her testimony preserved by way of a deposition transcript. The Department offered into evidence an exhibit comprised of various emails between S.D. and Respondent, two of which were discussed above. At least one co-worker, Lizamar Korfhage (a physician’s assistant at the Back Center), heard S.D. yell loudly in the office--as S.D. was being terminated from employment--that she (S.D.) and Respondent were having sexual relations. Cathy Bird, former chief administrative officer at the Back Center, had discussed the alleged affair with S.D. during several conversations before S.D.'s employment with the Back Center ended. Bird also talked with Respondent about the situation after S.D. was fired from the Back Center. Respondent was concerned that S.D. would tell Respondent’s wife about the affair and sought Bird’s guidance in the matter. Based upon the entirety of the clear and convincing evidence presented, Respondent was involved in a sexual relationship with S.D. at some point in time when S.D. was also a patient of the Back Center. Patient T.J. Patient T.J. was a 37-year-old patient when she saw Respondent at the Back Center on October 29, 2010. T.J. had seen Respondent professionally some 16 or so times previously. No inappropriate conduct had occurred on any of those visits. On the October 29 visit, T.J. was escorted into an examination room by a nurse as usual. Respondent came in and, after examining her, suggested that trigger point injections might help alleviate her pain, which she described as being a “2” on a scale of 1 to 10.3/ She agreed to the plan of treatment. Respondent had T.J. sit on an armless stool and lean her arms and head onto a desk. Respondent stood on her left side and began administering injections into her neck. As he leaned against her body, T.J. felt what she described as Respondent’s erect penis rubbing on her upper arm or shoulder. She felt like Respondent was intentionally rubbing her in what she later concluded to be a sexual manner. When he finished the injections, Respondent did not act any differently than usual. T.J. felt like something “weird” had just happened, but decided not to report it because she was not completely sure about her perceptions. Respondent, in contradiction to T.J.’s testimony, said he generally stayed four to five inches away from his patient when administering the injections, but would sometimes come into contact with them. T.J. returned for a follow up visit on November 24, 2010, receiving another injection by Respondent. She reported no misconduct by Respondent on that date. On December 23, 2010, T.J. returned to the Back Center for additional treatment. This time, her pain was radiating all the way down to her buttocks area and was described as a “3” out of 10. She was again escorted to an examination room to wait for Respondent. Respondent came in and closed the door, as was his usual practice during T.J.’s visits. After examining her, Respondent suggested injections for sacroiliac joint pain. T.J. was told to lie on the examination table on her left side. Respondent had T.J. lower her jeans to just below her knees. She had her left leg out straight and her right leg bent at the knee and across her left leg. Respondent then began to press his fingers on different parts of her inner thigh searching for the source of her pain. The pain was centered between her knee and buttocks area, and Respondent made an injection in that area. Respondent then had T.J. roll over to her right side as he pulled the table slightly away from the wall and placed himself between the wall and the table. Respondent began pushing on her inner thigh again, starting at her knee and moving upward toward her buttocks. As he did that, his tone of voice changed and he began panting. He continued to touch and probe her thighs as his hands went higher until he ultimately touched her vagina. T.J. immediately said, “That’s it” and quickly got off the examination table and pulled up her jeans. Respondent appeared sweaty and red-faced, looking to T.J. like a person who had just engaged in sex. T.J. then began to consider whether Respondent’s behavior during the October 29, 2010, visit had indeed been sexual in nature as well. She concluded that it was, and decided not to see Respondent for treatment in the future. She did not, however, report either of the incidents to the Back Center immediately. She ultimately did so, telling physician's assistant Korfhage about the incident some 10 months later. After seeing a report on television in 2013 that Respondent had been accused by another patient of sexual misconduct, she decided to make a report to the police about her own experiences with Respondent. When the police did not prosecute, she contacted an attorney in order to file a civil action against Respondent. T.J. appeared to be honest and forthright during her appearance at final hearing. Her testimony about her version of the events was credible, clear, and convincing. In his testimony at final hearing, Respondent did not specifically refute T.J.’s testimony so much as he explained how his normal process would not allow for the kind of touching T.J. alleged to have occurred. Respondent did not specifically or directly deny touching patient T.J.’s vagina, saying only that there would be no reason to do so. Patient D.K. (also known as D.W.) D.K. was a regular patient of Respondent and the Back Center. She had an appointment on January 13, 2011, to see Respondent for pain she was experiencing in her lower back and sides. On previous visits to the Back Center, Respondent had done localized injections to help D.K. deal with the pain. On those visits, she had simply rolled her pants down below her waist and leaned against the examination table in order for Respondent to do the injections. On the January 13 visit, she was told to lie on the table and pull her jeans down to her knees while Respondent went to prepare the medications. Respondent returned, closing the door as he came into the room. Respondent began injecting medications into her back and both sides. He then moved lower and administered injections into her thighs although she had not complained about any pain in that area. Respondent then moved her jeans down to her ankles and began administering injections into her calves. While he was injecting her, she felt him rubbing his erect penis against her thighs and heard his breathing get heavier. She could also feel Respondent lean closer to her and felt his breath on her thighs as he injected her calves. After the injections were complete, D.K. said Respondent was sweating, flushed, and “looked like my husband after we’ve had intercourse.” D.K. left the office and returned to her car. She immediately began to mentally process what had occurred to her, but did not immediately tell anyone at the Back Center. She was shocked and upset by the event but waited a few days before telling her husband what had happened. She then reported the events to someone at the Back Center. The Back Center asked her to come in so she could discuss the situation with Dr. Hynes, medical director of the Back Center. Later, D.K. made a complaint to local law enforcement about the incident. D.K. has also contacted an attorney to look into filing a civil lawsuit against Respondent. In response to the complaint by D.K., Dr. Hynes mandated that Respondent have a medical assistant with him during any contact with female patients. Despite the prohibition, Respondent continued to see female patients in an examination room without others present. He was confronted several times by the site operations manager about this violation, but Respondent did not change his behavior. D.K. was a credible witness. She provided a clear and unequivocal description of what transpired during her visit to the Back Center on January 13, 2011. Patient C.J. Patient C.J. presented to the Back Center experiencing pain as a result of shrapnel wounds received while she was serving in the U.S. Army in Afghanistan. C.J. did not testify at final hearing so her physical demeanor could not be assessed. Her deposition transcript was admitted into evidence over objection. In May 2011, C.J. was referred to the Back Center by her treating physician at Patrick Air Force Base. She took the referral, called the Back Center, and was assigned to Respondent for pain management services. C.J. went to the Back Center on May 4, 2011. She was experiencing significant pain and was physically uncomfortable. C.J. was processed in by a receptionist and then led to an examination room by a female employee. The employee took C.J.’s blood pressure, gathered some personal information, and left the room. On that date, C.J. was wearing jeans, a blouse, and open- toed shoes. She had on “full underwear” that day. Respondent came into the room and examined C.J. as she sat on the examining table. He advised C.J. that an injection might benefit her. As C.J. remembered it, the injection was to be in the side of her neck, and then in her back or hip. Respondent left the room to obtain the medications as C.J. waited. Upon his return to the room, Respondent injected Depo- Medrol 40 mg, Toradol 30 mg, Lidocaine 2% 0.5 mL, and Marcaine 0.5 mL into the left side of her neck. After the initial injection, Respondent left the room while the medication took effect. C.J. began to feel very relaxed and sleepy. Respondent recollects that C.J. complained of feeling light-headed, but does not believe any medication he injected would have caused that to happen. Respondent later returned to the room and prepared to give C.J. another injection into her hip area. She sat up on the table as Respondent pulled one end of the table slightly away from the wall.4/ After moving the table, Respondent had C.J. lie down on her side, lift her blouse, and unbuckle her jeans. She then slid her jeans and underwear down past her hips as directed. At that point, Respondent began injecting a solution into C.J.’s hip. As the injection was proceeding, she felt Respondent slide his hand over her hip and “in my groin area.” While doing that, Respondent’s crotch was pressed against C.J.’s buttocks. C.J. felt what she believed to be Respondent’s erect penis pushing against her buttocks as he administered the injection. After the injection was completed, Respondent came around from behind the table and told C.J. she would need to come see him again in a few weeks. C.J. got up from the table and began to realize that “something was not right” about the treatment she had just received. When C.J. went to the front desk to check out, she asked a nurse to identify the medications which had been injected but was unable to get that information. C.J. then left the Back Center and immediately called her nurse case manager at Patrick Air Force Base to report what had occurred. Her nurse advised C.J. to call 911 to report the incident; C.J. did so as she walked out to her car in the parking lot. A policeman arrived some 20 minutes later and took her statement. The officer then went inside to talk to Respondent. He said Respondent appeared to be surprised and shocked by C.J.’s allegation. The police decided not to file any charges against Respondent based on C.J.’s complaint. The reporting police officer (Middendorf) seemed to question C.J.’s veracity or truthfulness on the day of the incident. He said C.J. was upset and seemed lethargic, except when she was talking on the telephone to “one of her superiors.” According to Middendorf, C.J. acted consistent with someone who may be under the influence of drugs. He did acknowledge that C.J. had just come out of a pain management clinic. Middendorf also felt C.J. was either confused or not telling the truth concerning where Respondent had allegedly touched her. C.J., who was obviously distraught at the time, indicated both her pubic area and her outer thigh when she told Middendorf that Respondent had touched her “groin.” Middendorf challenged her about that and C.J. became defensive and argumentative. He did not provide any credible testimony as to why he believed she might be lying to him. His statement that C.J.’s voice changed when she was talking to her office on the phone is not conclusive evidence that she was not telling him the truth. C.J. never returned to the Back Center. She obtained pain management treatment elsewhere. Inasmuch as C.J.’s demeanor could not be judged because she did not appear in person, her testimony must be considered using other factors. In this case, the testimony was very similar to the facts described by other patients of Respondent concerning their treatment by him. The events as described by C.J. were believable and convincing, especially when compared to the allegations by other alleged victims. Neither C.J. nor any of the other alleged victims/complainants has talked to other alleged victims about their experiences, so there does not appear to be any collusion between the victims. Patient M.B. Patient M.B. was already a regular patient at the Back Center when she first saw Respondent on July 7, 2011. Respondent’s notes in M.B.’s chart indicate the patient was presenting for “initial evaluation” that day, but that was not correct; she had already been seen several times by other physicians at the Back Center. M.B. had chronic lumbalgia (low back pain) and lower extremity dysesthesia (a burning sensation) which was increasing progressively. Respondent examined M.B., discussed his findings, and scheduled a follow-up appointment for August 2, 2011, at which time he gave her an injection of 1% Xylocaine with approximately 30 ml of Lidocaine 1% on both of her side hips. He also injected a block with a solution containing 2 ml of Marcaine 0.5%, 2 ml of Lidocaine 2%, and 2 ml of Depo- Medrol 80 mg into M.B.’s joints. M.B. reported no suspicious or untoward behavior by Respondent during the July 7 and August 2 appointments. On August 29, 2011, M.B. returned to see Respondent. She presented with pain in her hips and left side. Nurse Bobbi McDonald escorted M.B. to the examination room and took her vital signs before leaving. Respondent came into the room, alone, and closed the door. At that visit, M.B. was wearing khaki mid-thigh cargo shorts, a blouse that tied around her neck, and bikini underwear. Respondent asked about her pain, touched points on her body to identify the exact pain locations, and adjusted her back manually. He then suggested injection of a steroid as a stop-gap measure prior to scheduling her for a fluoroscope injection later. M.B. agreed to the plan. Respondent left the examination room to get the medication. When he returned, he was alone and again he closed the door. Respondent told M.B. to pull her shorts down below her waist and to cover herself with a paper gown. She pulled her shorts and underwear down about halfway across her buttocks, which was lower than she would normally pull them for fluoroscope injections. Respondent began to clean the area for the injection and asked M.B. to pull her garments down further, below her buttocks. Respondent then pulled the table out from the wall and he went between the table and the wall. He injected M.B.’s hip about five times with a solution containing Depo Medrol 80, Toradol 60, Lidocaine, and Marcaine 1 ml. As he injected her, M.B. could feel Respondent’s groin touching her hip. She could feel what she believed to be Respondent’s erect penis rubbing against her in a back and forth motion. By this time, her paper gown had fallen off, exposing her buttocks and vaginal area. After the last injection, M.B. felt Respondent’s fingers touching her vagina. As she pushed upward to get off the table, M.B. felt Respondent touch her vagina again. She got off the table, pulled up her pants, and sat down as the doctor began talking to her. M.B. did not say anything to Respondent. She immediately believed that she had been sexually assaulted, but was too confused and shocked to say anything to anyone. M.B. did not initially report Respondent’s behavior to the Back Center. She later reported her allegations to the Melbourne Police Department and also filed a civil lawsuit against Respondent and the Back Center. (M.B. would continue to return to the Back Center, but did not see Respondent again for any of her treatments.) M.B.’s testimony was not as immediately believable as that of some of the other witnesses. Based on her personality, fear of the process, or some other factor, she seemed to be fairly emotionless in describing the incident. However, inasmuch as her testimony was corroborated by what other patients had experienced, her clearly enunciated statements are convincing. Further, M.B. exhibited extreme visual cues as to her intense dislike for Respondent at the final hearing. The testimony of M.B. alone would not be clear and convincing evidence of any wrongdoing by Respondent. However, her testimony is corroboration of and support for the testimony of other victims. Respondent's employment at the Back Center was terminated shortly after M.B.'s appointment with him. There is no evidence as to Respondent's employment from September 2011 until he went to Advantacare in March 2012. Patient A.H. Patient A.H. presented to Advantacare (Daytona Beach office) on January 9, 2013, in an effort to address pain she was suffering as a result of an automobile accident that occurred in October 2012. She wanted to reduce her pain while also reducing the amount of medications she was taking. A.H. had a job which required driving, so she needed to be as drug-free as possible. A.H. was escorted to the examination room. She remembers that Respondent came in, closed the door, and propped it shut. Respondent remembers the door to that room being open, that it would open by itself unless something was placed against it. The medical technician assigned to Respondent said the door did not have any problems, but it would always be half open. There is no corroborated evidence as to whether the door to the room was open, closed, or ajar when A.H. was being examined. Respondent examined A.H. and began to show her some exercises and stretches that he thought might alleviate some of her pain. As she was sitting in a chair being shown how to stretch, A.H. felt Respondent’s erect penis pushing against her back. She quickly told Respondent “I’ve got it” in order to stop his actions. She got up quickly and moved to another chair in the office. A.H. clearly described what she had felt and had no confusion or doubt about what happened. Her testimony about the incident was credible. Respondent then told A.H. to lie on the table on her side with her arms stretched out in front of her. Despite what had just happened, A.H. complied with his directions.5/ When she got into position, Respondent had A.H. move her body over to the very edge of the table and began to manipulate her back. As his hands continued down her back, she felt his hands go down inside her panties. As this happened, she could feel Respondent “humping” her, grinding his groin area against her backside. Respondent then told A.H. to change positions on the table, moving her feet to the opposite end. Amazingly, she again complied with his instructions. Respondent began touching her upper thigh near her vagina and “did the same thing he had done before.” At that, A.H. quickly moved off the table and onto a chair, where she sat rigid and refused to move. Respondent seemed calm and relaxed, showing no sign of having acted inappropriately. A.H. did not tell anyone at Advantacare about the incident on that day because she could not fully grasp what had happened. As she began to understand the situation better, she was worried about reporting the incident because it would be her word against the doctor’s. A.H. did tell another doctor (Dr. Jacobson) about the incident when she saw him the next day for a regularly scheduled appointment. Dr. Jacobson had been an employee with Advantacare and presumably relayed A.H.’s allegations to the center. A.H. also reported the incident to the Board of Health and to law enforcement. She later contacted an attorney about filing a civil lawsuit against Respondent. A.H. did not return to Advantacare for treatment after this event because of the traumatic impact of the incident. Respondent has no independent recollection of A.H. as a patient, but said he did not touch her inappropriately. A.H.’s testimony was believable. She was a credible witness and articulated her testimony clearly. It is strange that A.H. would continue to obey Respondent even after he had touched her inappropriately, but she was obviously a compliant person, especially as it relates to physicians. Respondent’s defenses to allegations by patients Respondent claims he never saw a written chaperone policy at the Back Center but that he knew that it existed. According to him, there was insufficient staff available to make it possible to comply with the policy. Respondent’s testimony in this regard is rejected as being contrary to better, more persuasive evidence. Respondent said he was on several medications for “five or six years” prior to the final hearing, including Zoloft for mild depression, Lisinopril for hypertension, and Toprol for hypertension. One of the possible side effects of those medications is impotence or erectile dysfunction. However, during the time he was taking these drugs, Respondent fathered his two children. There is no competent evidence that Respondent suffered from impotence or erectile dysfunction during the time of any of the allegations about sexual misconduct. Respondent usually wore a lab coat when treating patients. The coat is long and had large pockets in the front, at about groin level. Respondent would keep empty syringes in his coat pocket. He suggests that female patients who said they felt his erect penis were actually feeling the syringes. His suggestion is not very plausible or persuasive. Respondent demonstrated at final hearing the normal physical stance he took when doing an injection of a patient in an examination room setting. He suggested that his body would be turned at a 45-degree angle from the patient rather than facing them directly, thus eliminating the possibility of full frontal contact with the patient. He also said that he generally stood four or five inches away from the patient, but might come into contact with the patient occasionally. Neither the statements nor his demonstration were persuasive. Respondent’s contention is that each and every one of the patients who alleged sexual misconduct was lying. He suggests that patient D.K. was overweight and thus would not have sexually aroused him. Also, he maintains that her description of the injections being performed while Respondent was rubbing against her would have necessarily resulted in horrible pain at best or a broken needle at worst. He claims that since patient M.B. was married to a policeman, she would have necessarily taken photographs of her numerous injections to preserve a record and she would have complained immediately. Her failure to do so, he suggests, impugns her testimony. Respondent contends that patient T.J.’s tardiness in reporting her allegations suggests the allegations were false. Respondent refutes A.H.’s allegations on the basis that there was a disagreement as to the physical layout of the medical office. Respondent contends there is no evidence that patient S.D. (his alleged lover) was his patient, even though there is a stipulation to that effect. Despite these speculative defenses, the evidence presented by the alleged victims is credible and accepted as fact. Failure to update practitioner profile A letter dated March 27, 2013, advising Respondent of his termination from participation in the Medicaid Program, was mailed to Respondent at two separate addresses: 2222 South Harbor City Boulevard, Suite 610, Melbourne, Florida 32901, i.e., the address of the Back Center, and 930 South Harbor City Boulevard, Melbourne, Florida 32901, the address for Osler (the company with whom the Back Center merged at some point in time). The letter to 2222 South Harbor City Boulevard was received on April 1, 2013, and an acknowledgement was signed by Chandra Carrender, a Back Center employee. Respondent’s employment with the Back Center had been terminated some 16 months previously, i.e., in August 2011. The letter mailed to 930 Harbor City Boulevard was returned as undeliverable. The termination letter provided Respondent notice of his right to contest the decision. He was given 21 days from receipt of the letter to file a Petition if he wanted to challenge the termination. Respondent did not file a challenge, so on or about June 21, 2013, a Termination Final Order was filed by the Agency for Health Care Administration (AHCA), setting forth Respondent’s termination from participation in the Florida Medicaid Program. The termination was issued pursuant to section 409.913, Florida Statutes. By law, Respondent was required to update his Florida practitioner profile within 15 days of receipt of the Termination Final Order. The Termination Final Order was mailed to Respondent, return receipt requested, at two different addresses: The 930 South Harbor City Boulevard address and the 2222 South Harbor City Boulevard address. Respondent denies having received the letter or TFO until just prior to the formal administrative hearing in this matter. Licensed physicians in the State of Florida are required to maintain a current address of record with the Agency for Health Care Administration (AHCA) and the Department of Health. Neither Respondent nor the Department provided evidence as to what Respondent’s official address of record was at the time the TFO and the letter were sent to Respondent at the two Harbor City Boulevard addresses. According to the deposition testimony of Michael West of the AHCA Medicaid Program Integrity office, the notices were sent to Respondent’s “address of record” per section 409.913(6), Florida Statutes. West’s testimony, however, did not specify what address that was. It might be logically presumed that one or both of the Harbor City Boulevard addresses were the “address of record,” because that is where the notices were mailed. However, there is no clear and convincing evidence as to Respondent’s official address of record at the time the Termination Final Order was mailed. The statutory section referred to by West states: Any notice required to be given to a provider under this section is presumed to be sufficient notice if sent to the address last shown on the provider enrollment file. It is the responsibility of the provider to furnish and keep the agency informed of the provider’s current address. United States Postal Service proof of mailing or certified or registered mailing of such notice to the provider at the address shown on the provider enrollment file constitutes sufficient proof of notice. Any notice required to be given to the agency by this section must be sent to the agency at an address designated by rule. Respondent did not update his Florida practitioner profile because he claims never to have received a copy of the TFO or the letter. Neither Respondent nor the Department provided direct evidence of Respondent’s “address last shown on the provider enrollment file” as of March 27, 2013.6/ Other factual considerations Respondent was terminated from employment at the Back Center in September 2011. The termination occurred as follows: T.J. reported the alleged October 29, 2010 incident in April 2011. Dr. Hynes was already aware of another incident (from D.K. in January 2011). Dr. Hynes met with Respondent to discuss his alleged behavior. Respondent denied the allegations, saying that people just seem to like him and take advantage of him. He said the patients were lying about the incidents. Dr. Hynes mandated at that time that Respondent have a chaperone in the examining room with every female patient. Rather than being allowed to exercise “medical judgment” like other doctors in the clinic, Respondent was ordered to always use a chaperone with all female patients. After patient C.J.’s allegations came to light in May 2011, Dr. Hynes told Respondent that three times was enough; something had to be done. The Back Center commenced preparation of a termination letter. The letter was to tell Respondent that, pursuant to his Employment Agreement, the Back Center was providing him the 180-day notice of termination of employment “without cause.” The purpose of that letter was to allow Respondent time to find a job and not have a blemish on his record. One of the bases for the termination letter was that Respondent had been referred to the Physicians Recovery Network (PRN) for counseling to address his behavior. Dr. Hynes presumed Respondent was obtaining that counseling. However, when C.J. reported the incident on May 4, 2011, Dr. Hynes found out that Respondent had not been going to PRN as he had previously indicated. At about the time the 180-day letter was being drafted, another incident (by patient M.B.) was reported to the Back Center. Upon hearing of that allegation, Dr. Hynes verbally fired Respondent, effective immediately, with cause. The 180-day letter was not actually delivered to Respondent until after the verbal termination, so the letter was moot when it arrived. Respondent did not tell his next employer, Advantacare, that he had been terminated from employment by the Back Center. He also did not advise Advantacare about the sexual allegations made by patients at the Back Center. In summary, Respondent engaged in activities of a sexual nature with patients at the Back Center in December 2010, January 2011, May 2011, and August 2011 (in addition to his relations with S.D. in 2008–2010). He engaged in sexually related touching of a patient at Advantacare in January 2013. His employment with the Back Center was terminated in September 2011; his employment with Advantacare was terminated in April 2013. Former patients of Respondent expressed dismay that he was being charged with the violations set forth in the Administrative Complaint. They found Respondent to be a caring and professional doctor. It is clear Respondent did not treat all his patients the same way he treated the victims identified herein. Some of his co-workers said they did not see Respondent engage in any of the alleged actions. They did not receive any complaints from other patients. Respondent obviously has a stellar reputation with some of his patients and co-workers. That status, however, does not excuse his behavior with the victims in the present cases. It is also alleged that Bobbi McDonald was a rumor-mongerer and a liar. She appeared credible at final hearing and there is no competent, substantial evidence to support the dispersions cast by others. It should be noted that several witnesses identified by Respondent were displeased with the manner in which they were questioned by Department personnel prior to the final hearing. The witnesses expressed extreme discomfort when Department employees (attorneys) suggested that Respondent was “an addict” or a sociopath. While a state agency is bound to pursue all claims against individuals which it is responsible for licensing and monitoring, it is improper to harangue or disparage such persons in order to sway potential witnesses’ testimony. Upon full review of the evidence in this case, the potential witnesses who complained about the Department’s aggressive nature did not provide substantive testimony on the issues of this case. Thus, any harm which may have resulted from the Department’s statements would not affect the final decision herein.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Department of Health revoking Respondent, Albert Esmailzadeh, M.D.’s license to practice medicine in the State of Florida. It is further RECOMMENDED that the final order assess the cost of investigating and prosecuting this case, and that payment of such costs be assessed against Respondent, Albert Esmailzadeh, M.D. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of November, 2014, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S R. BRUCE MCKIBBEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of November, 2014.
The Issue Kindred Hospitals East, LLC ("Kindred") and Select Specialty Hospital-Palm Beach, Inc. ("Select-Palm Beach"), filed applications for Certificates of Need ("CONs") with the Agency for Health Care Administration ("AHCA" or the "Agency") seeking approval for the establishment of long-term care hospitals ("LTCHs") in Palm Beach County, AHCA District 9. Select-Palm Beach's application, CON No. 9661, seeks approval for the establishment of a 60-bed freestanding LTCH in "east central" Palm Beach County about 20 miles south of Kindred's planned location. Kindred's application, CON No. 9662, seeks approval for the establishment of a 70-bed LTCH in the "north central" portion of the county. The ultimate issue in this case is whether either or both applications should be approved by the Agency.
Findings Of Fact Long Term Care Hospitals Of the four classes of facilities licensed as hospitals by the Agency, "Class I or general hospitals," includes: General acute care hospitals with an average length of stay of 25 days or less for all beds; Long term care hospitals, which meet the provisions of subsection 59A-3.065(27), F.A.C.; and, Rural hospitals designated under Section 395, Part III, F.S. Fla. Admin. Code R. 59A-3.252(1)(a). This proceeding concerns CON applications for the second of Florida's Class I or general hospitals: LTCHs. A critically ill patient may be admitted and treated in a general acute care hospital, but, if the patient cannot be stabilized or discharged to a lower level of care on the continuum of care within a relatively short time, the patient may be discharged to an LTCH. An LTCH patient is almost always "critically catastrophically ill or ha[s] been." (Tr. 23). Typically, an LTCH patient is medically unstable, requires extensive nursing care with physician oversight, and often requires extensive technological support. The LTCH patient usually fits into one or more of four categories. One category is patients in need of pulmonary/respiratory services. Usually ventilator dependent, these types of LTCH patients have other needs as well that requires "complex comprehensive ventilator weaning in addition to meeting ... other needs." (Tr. 26). A second category is patients in need of wound care whose wound is life-threatening. Frequently compromised by inadequate nutrition, these types of LTCH patients are often diabetic. There are a number of typical factors that may account for the seriousness of the wound patient's condition. The job of the staff at the LTCH in such a case is to attend to the wound and all the other medical problems of the patient that have extended the time required for care of the wound. A third category is patients with some sort of neuro-trauma. These patients may have had a stroke and are often elderly; if younger, they may be victims of a car accident or some other serious trauma. They typically have multiple body systems that require medical treatment, broken bones and a closed head injury for example, that have made them "very sick and complex." (Tr. 27). The fourth category is referred to by the broad nomenclature of "medically complex" although it is a subset of the population of LTCH patients all of whom are medically complex. The condition of the patients in this fourth category involves two or more body systems. The patients usually present at the LTCH with "renal failure ... [and] with another medical condition ... that requires a ventilator ..." Id. In short, LTCHs provide extended medical and rehabilitative care to patients with multiple, chronic, and/or clinically complex acute medical conditions that usually require care for a relatively extended period of time. To meet the definition of an LTCH a facility must have an average length of inpatient stay ("ALOS") greater than 25 days for all hospital beds. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 59A-3.065(34). The staffs at general acute care hospitals and LTCHs have different orientations. With a staff oriented toward a patient population with a much shorter ALOS, the general acute care hospital setting may not be appropriate for a patient who qualifies for LTCH services. The staff at a general acute care hospital frequently judges success by a patient getting well in a relatively short time. It is often difficult for general acute care hospital staff to sustain the interest and effort necessary to serve the LTCH patient well precisely because of the staff's expectation that the patient will improve is not met in a timely fashion. As time goes by, that expectation continues to be frustrated, a discouragement to staff. The LTCH is unlike other specialized health care settings. The complex, medical, nursing, and therapeutic requirements necessary to serve the LTCH patient may be beyond the capability of the traditional comprehensive medical rehabilitation ("CMR") hospital, nursing home, skilled nursing facility ("SNF"), or, the skilled nursing unit ("SNU"). CMR units and hospitals are rarely, if ever, appropriate for the LTCH patient. Almost invariably, LTCH patients are not able to tolerate the minimum three (3) hours of therapy per day associated with CMR. The primary focus of LTCHs, moreover, is to provide continued acute medical treatment to the patient that may not yet be stable, with the ultimate goal of getting the patient on the road to recovery. In comparison, the CMR hospital treats medically stable patients consistent with its primary focus of restoring functional capabilities, a more advanced step in the continuum of care. Services provided in LTCHs are distinct from those provided in SNFs or SNUs. The latter are not oriented generally to patients who need daily physician visits or the intense nursing services or observations needed by an LTCH patient. Most nursing and clinical personnel in SNFs and SNUs are not experienced with the unique psychosocial needs of long-term acute care patients and their families. An LTCH is distinguished within the healthcare continuum by the high level of care the patient requires, the interdisciplinary treatment model it follows, and the duration of the patient's hospitalization. Within the continuum of care, LTCHs occupy a niche between traditional acute care hospitals that provide initial hospitalization care on a short-term basis and post-acute care facilities such as nursing homes, SNFs, SNUs, and comprehensive medical rehabilitation facilities. Medicare has long recognized LTCHs as a distinct level of care within the health care continuum. The federal government's prospective payment system ("PPS") now treats the LTCH level of service as distinct with its "own DRG system and ... [its] own case rate reimbursement." (Tr. 108). Under the LTCH PPS, each patient is assigned an LTC- DRG (different than the DRG under the general hospital DRG system) with a corresponding payment rate that is weighted based on the patient diagnosis and acuity. The Parties The Agency is the state agency responsible for administering the CON Program and licensing LTCHs and other hospital facilities pursuant to the authority of Health Facility and Services Development Act, Sections 408.031-408.045, Florida Statutes. Select-Palm Beach is the applicant for a free-standing 60-bed LTCH in "east Central Palm Beach County," Select Ex. 1, stamped page 12, near JFK Medical Center in AHCA District 9. Its application, CON No. 9661, was denied by the Agency. Select-Palm Beach is a wholly owned subsidiary of Select Medical Corporation, which provides long term acute care services at 83 LTCHs in 24 states, four of which are freestanding hospitals. The other 79 are each "hospitals-in-a- hospital" ("HIH" or "LTCH HIH"). Kindred is the applicant for a 70-bed LTCH to be located in the north central portion of Palm Beach County in AHCA District 9. Its application, CON No. 9662, was denied by the Agency. Kindred is a wholly owned subsidiary of Kindred Healthcare, Inc. ("Kindred Healthcare"). Kindred Healthcare operates 73 LTCHs, 59 of which are freestanding, according to the testimony of Mr. Novak. See Tr. 56-57. Kindred Healthcare has been operating LTCHs since 1985 and has operated them in Florida for more than 15 years. At the time of the submission of Kindred's application, Kindred Healthcare's six LTCHs in Florida were Kindred-North Florida, a 60-bed LTCH in Pinellas County, AHCA District 5; Kindred-Central Tampa, with 102 beds, and Kindred-Bay Area- Tampa, with 73 beds, both in Hillsborough County, in AHCA District 6; Kindred-Ft. Lauderdale with 64 beds and Kindred- Hollywood with 124 beds, both in Broward County, ACHA District 10; and Kindred-Coral Gables, with 53 beds, in Dade County, AHCA District 11. The Applications and AHCA's Review The applications were submitted in the first application cycle of 2003. Select-Palm Beach's application is CON No. 9661; Kindred's is CON No. 9662. Select-Palm Beach estimates its total project costs to be $12,856,139. Select-Palm Beach has not yet acquired the site for its proposed LTCH, but did include in its application a map showing three priority site locations, with its preferred site, designated "Site 1," located near JFK Medical Center. At $12,937,419, Kindred's estimate of its project cost is slightly more than Select-Palm Beach's. The exact site of Kindred's proposed LTCH had not been determined at the time of hearing. Kindred's preference, however, is to locate in the West Palm Beach area in the general vicinity of St. Mary's Hospital, in the northern portion of Palm Beach County along the I-95 corridor. This is approximately 15 to 20 miles north of Select's preferred location for its LTCH. There is no LTCH in the five-county service area that comprises District 9: Indian River, Okeechobee, St. Lucie, Martin, and Palm Beach Counties. There are two LTCHs in adjacent District 10 (to the south). They have a total of 188 beds and an average occupancy of 80 percent. The Agency views LTCH care as a district-wide service primarily for Medicare patients. At the time of the filing of the applications, the population in District 9 was over 1.6 million, including about 400,000 in the age cohort 65 and over. About 70 percent of the District 9 population lives in Palm Beach County. More than 70 percent of the District's general acute care hospitals are located in that county. Kindred's preferred location for its LTCH is approximately 40 to 50 miles from the closest District 10 LTCH; Select-Palm Beach is approximately 25 to 35 miles from the closest District 10 LTCH. The locations of Select Palm-Beach's and Kindred's proposed LTCHs are complementary. The SAAR Following its review of the two applications, AHCA issued its State Agency Action Report ("SAAR"). Section G., of the report, entitled "RECOMMENDATION," states: "Deny Con #9661 and CON #9662." Agency Ex. 2, p. 43. On June 11, 2003, the report was signed by Karen Rivera, Health Services and Facilities Consultant Supervisor Certificate of Need, and Mr. Gregg as the Chief of the Bureau of Health Facility Regulation. It contained a section entitled "Authorization for Agency Action" that states, "[a]uthorized representatives of the Agency for Health Care Administration adopted the recommendations contained herein and released the State Agency Action Report." Agency Ex. 2, p. 44. The adoption of the recommendations is the functional equivalent of preliminary denial of the applications. In Section F. of the SAAR under the heading of "Need," (Agency Ex. 2, p. 40), the Agency explained its primary bases for denial; it concluded that the applicants had not shown need for an LTCH in AHCA District 9. The discussions for the two, although not precisely identical, are quite similar: Select Specialty Hospital-Palm Beach, Inc.(CON #9661): The applicant's two methodological approaches to demonstrate need are not supported by any specific discharge studies or other data, including DRG admission criteria from area hospitals regarding potential need. The applicant also failed to provide any supporting documentation from area physicians or other providers regarding potential referrals. It was further not demonstrated that patients that qualify for LTCH services are not currently being served or that an access problem exists for residents in District 9. Kindred Hospitals East, L.L.C. (CON #9662): The various methodological approaches presented are not supported by any specific DRG admission criteria from area hospitals suggesting potential need. The applicant provided numerous letters of support for the project from area hospitals, physicians and case managers. However, the number of potential referrals of patients needing LTCH services was not quantified. It was further not demonstrated that patients that qualify for LTCH services are not currently being served or that an access problem exists for residents in District 9. Id. At hearing, the Agency's witness professed no disagreement with the SAAR and continued to maintain the same bases contained in the SAAR for the denials of the two applications The SAAR took no issue with either applicant's ability to provide quality care. It concluded that funding for each applicant was likely to be available and that each project appeared to be financially feasible once operating. The SAAR further stated that there were no major architectural concerns regarding Kindred's proposed facility design, but noted reservations regarding the need for further study and revision of Select Palm-Beach's proposed surgery/procedure wing, as well as cost uncertainties for Select Palm Beach because of such potential revisions. By the time of final hearing, however, the parties had stipulated to the reasonableness of each applicant's proposed costs and methods of construction. The parties stipulated to the satisfaction of a number of the statutory CON criteria by the two applicants. The parties agreed that the applications complied with the content and review process requirements of sections 408.037 and 409.039, Florida Statutes, with one exception. Select reserved the issue of the lack of a Year 2 of Schedule 6, (Staffing) in Kindred's application. The form of Schedule 6 provided by AHCA to Kindred (unlike other schedules of the application) does not clearly indicate that a second year of staffing data must be provided. The remainder of the criteria stipulated and the positions of the parties as articulated in testimony at hearing and in the proposed orders that were submitted leave need as the sole issue of consequence with one exception: whether Kindred has demonstrated that its project is financially feasible in the long term. Kindred's Long Term Financial Feasibility Select-Palm Beach contends that Kindred's project is not financially feasible in the long term for two reasons. They relate to Kindred's application and are stated in Select Palm Beach's proposed order: Kindred understated property taxes[;] Kindred completely fails to include in its expenses on Schedule 8, patient medical assistance trust fund (PMATF) taxes [citation omitted]. Proposed Recommended Order of Select-Palm Beach, Inc., p. 32, Finding of Fact 97. Raised after the proceeding began at DOAH by Select- Palm Beach, these two issues were not considered by AHCA when it conducted its review of Kindred's application because the issues were not apparent from the face of the application. AHCA's Review of Kindred's Application Kindred emerged from a Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings on April 20, 2001, under a plan of reorganization. With respect to the events that led to the bankruptcy proceeding and the need to review prior financial statements, AHCA made the following finding in the SAAR: Under the plan [of reorganization], the applicant [Kindred] adopted the fresh start accounting provision of SOP 90-7. Under fresh start accounting, a new reporting entity is created and the recorded amounts of assets and liabilities are adjusted to reflect their estimated fair values. Accordingly, the prior period financial statements are not comparable to the current period statements and will not be considered in this analysis. Agency Ex. 2, p. 30. The financial statements provided by Kindred as part of its application show that Kindred Healthcare, Kindred's parent, is a financially strong company. The information contained in Kindred's CON application filed in 2003 included Kindred Healthcare's financial statements from the preceding calendar year. Kindred Healthcare's Consolidated Statement of Operations for the year ended December 31, 2002, showed "Income from Operations" to be more than $33 million, and net cash provided by operating activities (cash flow) of over $248 million for the period. Its Consolidated Balance Sheet as of December 31, 2002, showed cash and cash equivalents of over $244 million and total assets of over $1.6 billion. In light of the information contained in Kindred's CON application, the SAAR concluded with regard to short term financial feasibility: Based on the audited financial statements of the applicant, cash on hand and cash flows, if they continue at the current level, would be sufficient to fund this project as proposed. Funding for all capital projects, with the support of its parent, is likely to be available as needed. Agency Ex. 2, p. 30 (emphasis supplied). The SAAR recognized that Kindred projected a "year two operating loss for the hospital of $287,215." Agency Ex. 2, p. Nonetheless, the SAAR concludes on the issue of financial feasibility, "[w]ith continued operational support from the parent company, this project [Kindred's] is considered financially feasible." Id. The Agency did not have the information, however, at the time it reviewed Kindred's application that Kindred understated property taxes and omitted the Public Medicaid Trust Fund and Medical Assistance Trust Fund ("PMATF") "provider tax" of 1.5 percent that would be imposed on Kindred's anticipated revenues of $11,635,919 as contended by Select-Palm Beach. Consistent with Select Palm-Beach's general contentions about property taxes and PMATF taxes, "Kindred acknowledges that it likely understated taxes to be incurred in the operation of its facility." Kindred's Proposed Recommended Order, paragraph 50, p. 19. The parties agree, moreover, that the omitted PMATF tax is reasonably projected to be $175,000. They do not agree, however, as to the impact of the PMATF tax on year two operating loss. The difference between the two (approximately $43,000) is attributable to a corporate income tax benefit deduction claimed by Kindred so that the combination of the application's projected loss, the omitted PMATF tax, and the deduction yields a year two operating loss of approximately $419,000. Without taking into consideration the income tax benefit, Select-Palm Beach contends that adding in the PMATF tax produces a loss of $462,000. Kindred and Select-Palm Beach also disagree over the projection of property taxes by approximately $50,000. Kindred projects that the property taxes in year two of operation will be approximately $225,000 instead of the $49,400 listed in the application. Select-Palm Beach projects that they will be $50,000 higher at approximately $275,000. Whether Kindred's or Select-Palm Beach's figures are right, Kindred makes two points. First, if year two revenues and expenses, adjusted for underestimated and omitted taxes, are examined on a quarterly basis, the fourth quarter of year two has a better bottom line than the earlier quarters. Not only will the fourth quarter bottom line be better, but, using Kindred's figures, the fourth quarter of year two of operations is profitable. Second, and most importantly given the Agency's willingness to credit Kindred with financial support from its parent, Kindred's application included in its application an interest figure of $1.2 million for year one of operation and $1.03 million for year two. Kindred claims in its proposed recommended order that "[i]n reality ... this project will incur no interest expense as Kindred intends to fund the project out of cash on hand, or operating capital, and would not have to borrow money to construct the project." Id., at paragraph 54, p. 20. Through the testimony of John Grant, Director of Planning and Development for Kindred's parent, Kindred Healthcare, Kindred indicated at hearing that its parent might, indeed, fund the project: A ... Kindred [Healthcare] would likely fund this project out of operating capital. Like I said, in the first nine months of this year Kindred had operating cash flow of approximately $180 million. So it's not as if we would have to actually borrow money to complete a project like this. Q And what was the interest expense that you had budgeted in Year Two for this facility? A $1,032,000. Q ... so is it your statement then that this facility would not owe any interest back to the parent company? A That's correct. Tr. 221-222 (emphasis supplied). If the "financing interest" expense is excluded from Kindred's statement of projected expenses in Schedule 8 of the CON application, using Kindred's revised projections, the project shows a profit of approximately $612,0002 for the second year of operation. If Select-Palm Beach's figures and bottom line loss excludes the "finances interest" expense, the elimination of the expense yields of profit for year two of operations in excess of $500,000. If the support of Kindred's parent is considered as the Agency has signaled its willingness to do and provided that the project is, in fact, funded by Kindred Healthcare rather than financed through some other means that would cause Kindred to incur interest expense, Kindred's project is financially feasible in the long term. With the exception of the issue regarding Kindred's long term financial feasibility, as stated above, taken together, the stipulation and agreements of the parties, the Agency's preliminary review contained in the SAAR, and the evidence at hearing, all distill the issues in this case to one overarching issue left to be resolved by this Recommended Order: need for long term care hospital beds in District 9. Need for the Proposals From AHCA's perspective prior to the hearing, the only issue in dispute with respect to the two applications is need. This point was made clear by Mr. Gregg's testimony at hearing in answer to a question posed by counsel for Select-Palm Beach: Q. ... Assuming there was sufficient need for 130 beds in the district is there any reason why both applicants shouldn't be approved in this case, assuming that need? A. No. (Tr. 398). Both applicants contend that the application each submitted is superior to the other. Neither, however, at this point in the proceeding, has any objection to approval of the other application provided its own application is approved. Consistent with its position that both applications may be approved, Select-Palm Beach presented testimony through its health care planner Patricia Greenberg3 that there was need in District 9 for both applicants' projects. Her testimony, moreover, rehabilitated the single Kindred methodology of three that yielded numeric need less than the 130 beds proposed by both applications: Q ... you do believe that there is a need for both in the district. A I believe there's a need for two facilities in the district. Q It could support two facilities? A Oh, absolutely. Q And the disagreement primarily relates to the conservative approach of Kindred in terms of not factoring in out-migration and the narrowing the DRG categories? A Correct. ... Kindred actually had three models. Two of them support both facilities, but it's the GMLOS model that I typically rely on, and it didn't on the surface support both facilities. That's why I reconciled the two, and I believe that's the difference, is just the 50 DRGs and not including the out-migration. That would boost their need above the 130, and two facilities would give people alternatives, it would foster competition, and it would really improve access in that market. Tr. 150-51. Need for the applications, therefore, is the paramount issue in this case. Since both applicants are qualified to operate an LTCH in Florida, if need is proven for the 130 beds, then with the exception of Kindred's long term financial feasibility, all parties agree that there is no further issue: both applications should be granted. No Agency Numeric Need Methodology The Agency has not established a numeric need methodology for LTCH services. Consequently, it does not publish a fixed-need pool for LTCHs. Nor does the Agency have "any policy upon which to determine need for the proposed beds or service." See Fla. Admin. Code R. 59C-1.008(2)(e)1. Florida Administrative Code Rule 59C-1.008(2), which governs "Fixed Need Pools" (the "Fixed Need Pools Rule") states that if "no agency policy exist" with regard to a needs assessment methodology: [T]he applicant will be responsible for demonstrating need through a needs assessment methodology which must include, at a minimum, consideration of the following topics, except where they are inconsistent with the applicable statutory or rule criteria: Population demographics and dynamics; Availability, utilization and quality of like services in the district, subdistrict or both; Medical treatment trends; and Market conditions. Fla. Admin. Code R. 59C-1.008(2)(e)2. The Fixed Need Pools Rule goes on to elaborate in subparagraph (e)3 that "[t]he existence of unmet need will not be based solely on the absence of a health service, health care facility, or beds in the district, subdistrict, region or proposed service area." Population, Demographics and Dynamics The first of the four topics to be addressed when an applicant is responsible for demonstrating need through a needs assessment methodology is "population, demographics and dynamics." The Agency has not defined service areas for LTCHs. Nonetheless, from a health planning perspective, it views LTCH services as being provided district-wide primarily for Medicare patients. Consistent with the Agency's view, Select-Palm Beach identified the entire district, that is, all of AHCA District 9, as its service area. It identified Palm Beach County, one of the five counties in AHCA District 9, as its primary service area. In identifying the service area for Select-Palm Beach, Ms. Greenberg drew data from various sources: population estimates for Palm Beach County and surrounding areas; the number of acute care hospital beds in the area; the number of LTCH beds in the area; the types of patients treated at acute care hospitals; and the lengths of stay of the patients treated at those hospitals. AHCA District 9 has more elderly than any other district in the State, and Palm Beach County has more than any other county except for Dade. Palm Beach County residents comprise 71% of the District 9 population. It is reasonably projected that the elderly population (the "65 and over" age cohort) in Palm Beach County is projected to grow at the rate of 8 percent by 2008. The "65 and over" age cohort is significant because the members of that cohort are most likely to utilize hospital services, including LTCH services. Its members are most likely to suffer complications from illness and surgical procedures and more likely to have co-morbidity conditions that require long- term acute care. Persons over 65 years of age comprise approximately 80 percent of the patient population of LTCH facilities. Both Select-Palm Beach and Kindred project that approximately 80 percent of their admissions will come from Medicare patients. Since 90 percent of admissions to an LTCH come from acute care facilities, most of the patient days expected at Select-Palm Beach's proposed LTCH will originate from residents in its primary service area, Palm Beach County. When looking at the migration pattern for patients at acute care facilities within Palm Beach County, the majority (90 percent) come from Palm Beach County residents. Thus, Select- Palm Beach's projected primary service area is reasonable. Just as Select-Palm Beach, Kindred proposes to serve the entire District. Kindred proposes that its facility be based in Palm Beach County because of the percentage of the district's population in the county as well as because more than 70% of the district's general acute care hospitals are in the county. Its selection of the District as its service area, consistent with the Agency's view, is reasonable. Currently there are no LTCHs in District 9. Availability, Utilization and Quality of Like Services The second topic is "availability, utilization and quality of like services." There are no "like" services available to District residents in the District. Select-Palm Beach and Kindred, therefore, contend that they meet the criteria of the second topic. There are like services in other AHCA Districts. For example, AHCA District 10 has at total of 188 beds at two Kindred facilities in Fort Lauderdale and Hollywood. The Agency, however, did not present evidence of their quality, that they were available or to what extent they are utilized by the residents of AHCA District 9. Medical Treatment Trends The third topic is medical treatment trends. Caring for patients with chronic and long term care needs is becoming increasingly more important as the population ages and as medical technology continues to emerge that prolongs life expectancies. Through treatment provided the medically complex and critically ill with state of the art mechanical ventilators, metabolic analyzers, and breathing monitors, LTCHs meet needs beyond the capability of the typical general acute care hospitals. In this way, LTCHs fill a niche in the continuum of care that addresses the needs of a small but growing patient population. Treatment for these patients in an LTCH, who otherwise would be cared for without adequate reimbursement to the general acute care hospital or moved to an alternative setting with staff and services inadequate to meet their needs, is a medical trend. Market Conditions The fourth topic to be addressed by the applicant is market conditions. The federal government's development of a distinctive prospective payment system for LTCHs (LTC-DRG), has created a market condition favorable to LTCHs. General acute care hospitals face substantial losses for the medically complex patient who uses far greater resources than expected on the basis of individual diagnoses. Medicare covers between 80 and 85 percent of LTCH patients. The remaining patients are covered by private insurance, managed care and Medicaid. LTCH programs allow for shorter lengths of stay in a general acute care facility, reduces re-admissions and provide more discharges to home. These benefits are increasingly recognized. Numeric Need Analysis Kindred presented a set of needs assessment methodologies that yielded numeric need for the beds applied for by Kindred. Select-Palm Beach did the same. Unlike Kindred, however, all of the needs assessment methodologies presented by Select-Palm Beach demonstrated numeric need in excess of the 130 beds proposed by both applications. Select-Palm Beach's methodologies, overall, are superior to Kindred's. Select-Palm Beach used two sets of needs assessment methodologies and sensitivity testing of one of the sets that confirmed the methodology's reasonableness. The two sets or needs assessment methodologies are: (1) a use rate methodology and (2) length of stay methodologies. The use rate methodology yielded projected bed need for Palm Beach County alone in excess of the 130 beds proposed by the two applicants. For the year "7/05 - 6/06" the bed need is projected to be 256; for the year "7/06 - 6/07" the bed need is projected to be 261; and, for the year "7/07 - 6/08" the bed need is projected to be 266. See Select Ex. 1, Bates Stamp p. 000036 and the testimony of Ms. Greenberg at tr. 114. If the use rate analysis had been re-computed to include two districts whose data was excluded from the analysis, the bed need yielded for Palm Beach County alone was 175 beds, a numeric need still in excess of the 130 beds proposed by both applicants. The use rate methodology is reasonable.4 The length of stay methodologies are also reasonable. These two methodologies also yielded numeric need for beds in excess of the 130 beds proposed. The two methodologies yielded need for 167 beds and 250 beds. Agency Denial The Agency's general concerns about LTCHs are not without basis. For many years, there were almost no LTCH CON applications filed with the Agency. A change occurred in 2002. The change in the LTCH environment in the last few years put AHCA in the position of having "to adapt to a rapidly changing situation in terms of [Agency] understanding of what has been going on in recent years with long-term care hospitals." (Tr. 358.) "... [I]n the last couple of years long-term care hospital applications have become [AHCA's] most common type of application." (Tr. 359.) At the time of the upsurge in applications, there was "virtually nothing ... in the academic literature about long- term care hospitals ... that could [provide] ... an understanding of what was going on ... [nor was there anything] in the peer reviewed literature that addressed long-term care hospitals" id., and the health care planning issues that affected them. Two MedPAC reports came out, one in 2003 and another in 2004. The 2003 report conveyed the information that the federal government was unable to identify patients appropriate for LTCH services, services that are overwhelmingly Medicare funded, because of overlap of LTCH services with other types of services. The 2004 report gave an account of the federal government decision to change its payment policy for a type of long-term care hospitals that are known as "hospitals-within- hospitals" (tr. 368) so that "hospitals within hospitals as of this past summer [2004] can now only treat 25 percent of their patients from the host hospital." Id. Both reports roused concerns for AHCA. First, if appropriate LTCH patients cannot be identified and other types of services overlap appropriately with LTCH services, AHCA cannot produce a valid needs assessment methodology. The second produces another concern. In the words of Mr. Gregg, The problem ... with oversupply of long-term care hospital beds is that it creates an incentive for providers to seek patient who are less appropriate for the service. What we know now is that only the sickest patient ... with the most severe conditions are truly appropriate for long-term care hospital placement. * * * ... [T]he MedPAC report most recently shows us that the greatest indicator of utilization of long-term care hospital services is the mere availability of those services. Tr. 368-369. The MedPAC reports, themselves, although marked for identification, were not admitted into evidence. Objections to their admission (in particular, Kindred's) were sustained because they had not been listed by AHCA on the stipulation required by the Pre-hearing Order of Instructions.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be issued by the Agency for Health Care Administration that: approves Select-Palm Beach's application, CON 9661; and approves Kindred's application CON 9662 with the condition that financing of the project be provided by Kindred Healthcare. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of April, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DAVID M. MALONEY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of April, 2005.
The Issue The issue to be resolved in this proceeding concerns whether the Petitioner was harassed because of her race during employment as a registered nurse at Shands at Lakeshore, Inc. (Shands), and whether the Respondent terminated her because of race or for retaliation concerning alleged complaints of harassment.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Valeria Thompkins, was employed as an RN on the medical-surgical unit on the third floor of Shands Lakeshore Hospital in Lake City, Florida, at times pertinent hereto. Each of the Petitioner's shifts began at 7 p.m. and ended at 7 a.m. The Petitioner reported to a "Charge Nurse" who supervised each shift and reported to the Nurse Manager for the unit. The Nurse Manager reported to the hospital’s Director of Nursing. Julia Woods was the Nurse Manager for the Petitioner's unit and Mattie Jones was the Director of Nursing, when the Petitioner was hired in August 2004. Julia Woods was removed by the Nursing Director, Ms. Jones, in September 2005 for performance issues. Jodi Wood replaced her as Nurse Manager for the Petitioner's unit. Julia Woods was removed by Ms. Jones because Ms. Woods had focused too heavily on staffing the unit and failed to properly supervise quality of patient care. When Ms. Jones promoted Jodi Wood, she specifically instructed Ms. Wood to improve the quality of patient care. Ms. Wood verbally counseled the Petitioner for failing to follow doctor's orders concerning administering intravenous antibiotics to a newly-admitted patient, who was suffering from sepsis. This verbal reprimand occurred on September 26, 2005. The failure to administer antibiotics to that patient harmed the patient's care and could have allowed the sepsis, a systemic infection, to become more severe. When the sepsis worsened as a result of failure to administer antibiotics timely, the Respondent was required to transfer that patient to the Intensive Care Unit. The Petitioner admits that she did not administer the ordered antibiotics, but claims that she did not administer them because the Respondent did not provide training explaining when to administer medications ordered to be administered twice per day. This explanation, however, does not raise any issue concerning disparate treatment for racial or other reasons and does not question the imposition of the verbal reprimand. All the nurses hired in August 2004 received the same training from the Respondent, including the Petitioner. The immediate administration of antibiotics is a standard nursing protocol for a patient with sepsis and the Respondent could reasonably presume that it did not need to train a registered nurse in such basic nursing care. It was reasonable for the Respondent to presume that the Petitioner was aware of that standard nursing practice. The Respondent's failure to raise any issue about the Petitioner's training, or orientation training, does not indicate that the verbal discipline was motivated by any illicit purpose, but rather was based upon the inadequate care provided the patient. The Respondent could fairly expect the Petitioner, hired as an RN, to have had adequate training in such standard nursing care or procedure before she was ever employed. The Petitioner ignored a doctor's order to monitor a patient's heart rate with a telemetry unit on October 14, 2005. This was less than a month after the previous verbal warning referenced above. The Petitioner admitted the patient to her unit and signed the patient's chart, noting that all orders above her signature, including the order for telemetry monitoring, had been executed, that is, performed. The Petitioner, however, failed to ensure that a telemetry unit was connected to the patient and did not take any telemetry readings while treating that patient. Ms. Wood presented this incident to Nursing Director Jones, who made an independent review of the events, including a review of the patient's chart. Ms. Jones decided to issue a First Written Corrective Action to the Petitioner because of this incident. The Petitioner's failure to place a telemetry unit on the patient made it impossible for the medical staff to monitor the patient's heart, thereby negatively affecting patient care. The Petitioner admitted that she was to blame for failing to ensure that the telemetry monitoring unit was on the patient. The Petitioner, however, attempted to dispute the First Written Corrective Action by claiming that other nurses, specifically those who had treated the patient in the Intensive Care Unit, were also at fault for failing to place a telemetry monitor on the patient. The Petitioner conceded, however, that Ms. Wood did not supervise any of those unidentified comparator nursing staff and could not therefore recommend discipline of them. Therefore, no question was raised concerning comparative discipline between the Petitioner and the nurses who had treated the patient in the Intensive Care Unit. Further, Ms. Jones is African-American. There is no evidence indicating that she would discipline the Petitioner concerning this mistake because of her race, while allowing employees outside the Petitioner's protected class to escape without discipline, if indeed they had done anything blame- worthy. The Petitioner has thus not provided credible evidence that any similarly-situated employees received disparate treatment with regard to any issue about responsibility for the referenced mistake in the care of this patient. On October 19, 2005, Terry Wayne, a Patient Care Coordinator at Shands, discovered that the Petitioner had administered an intravenous antibiotic, Gentamicin, to a patient who did not have an order for that antibiotic. Ms. Wayne determined that the antibiotic had actually been ordered for the other patient in the same room, but was carelessly administered to the wrong patient by the Petitioner. The Petitioner's error exposed the patient to potentially severe side effects. The error compromised the care of both patients by risking side effects for the patient who received the antibiotic in error, and by allowing the patient who should have received it to thus go untreated. The Petitioner denies administering the Gentamicin to that patient. The Petitioner claims that Jay Nash, the evening charge nurse, had come into the room and administered the antibiotic in an effort to “frame” the Petitioner as a sub- standard nurse. The Petitioner's explanation is not plausible. There is no credible evidence that Mr. Nash would be motivated to engage in such conspiratorial behavior to try to falsely blame the Petitioner. That theory relies heavily on the Petitioner's erroneous belief that Mr. Nash, not Terry Wayne, discovered the medication error. The Petitioner's explanation is simply not credible. It is undisputed that the Patient Care Coordinators, such as Ms. Wayne, were responsible for auditing patient charts to confirm that patients were receiving proper patient care. The Petitioner concedes that she does not know Terry Wayne or what her capacity is with Shands. Thus, there is no way she could know of Terry Wayne's holding any improper motivation to fabricate a medical error and blame it on the Petitioner. Ms. Wayne completed a Medical Error Report when she discovered the improperly administered Gentamicin. This was in accordance with routine Shands protocol. A copy of that report was delivered to the Nurse Manager, by routine policy. When the Nurse Manager, Ms. Wood, received the report, she forwarded it to the Nursing Director, Ms. Jones, and she recommended additional disciplinary action for the Petitioner. Ms. Jones made an independent review of the incident that included a review of the patient's chart and the incident report. Based upon this, Ms. Jones issued a Second Written Corrective Action to the Petitioner. Ms. Wood and Ms. Jones subsequently met with the Petitioner to prepare a development plan to try to improve the Petitioner's repeated patient-care problems. The Respondent routinely prepares development plans for employees who have two Written Corrective Actions, because a third Written Corrective Action in a 12-month period would result in termination. Ms. Wood met with the Petitioner once each week for the first two weeks after the development plan was presented to the Petitioner. Ms. Wood did not meet with the Petitioner the following two weeks because she took a vacation during the holiday season. The Petitioner caused several patient-care problems during the period Ms. Wood was unavailable to meet with her. Between December 13, 2005, and December 27, 2005, the Petitioner provided sub-standard care on at least eleven occasions. Two of these incidents were more serious patient-care problems than the others, because they resulted in a direct injury to one patient and exposed another patient to the risk of very serious infection. The first of the two incidents came to light when the Shands administration received a complaint from a patient, in the third floor medical-surgical unit, that his nurse had roughly removed a dressing for his IV and tore his skin. This complaint was passed on to Ms. Jones and Ms. Wood. Ms. Jones reviewed the patient’s chart and determined that the Petitioner had discontinued the IV on the patient in question. The discontinuation of an IV is the only reason to remove the dressing, so Ms. Jones reasonably concluded that the Petitioner was the nurse who tore the patient's skin. The Petitioner admitted treating the patient but denied tearing his skin. She claimed that she removed the first IV and replaced it with a new IV, only to have some other nurse come and discontinue the IV and tear the patient's skin. At the final hearing, however, the Petitioner conceded that she had to discontinue the original IV in order to replace it and that the patient's chart then would show that the Petitioner had discontinued the patient's IV. Therefore, even if the Petitioner was not the nurse who tore the patient's skin, the Petitioner's admission that the patient chart showed that she had discontinued at least one of the patient's I.V.'s creates a non-discriminatory explanation for a good faith belief by Nursing Director Jones that the Petitioner was the nurse who injured the patient. The second serious incident was discovered on December 24, 2005. Dayshift nurse Darlene Hewitt, who had taken over care of patients treated by the Petitioner during the preceding evening, noticed that one of the patients had dark stool dried over the site of his “femoral central line.” Ms. Hewitt had received a report from the Petitioner, only ten minutes before discovering the feces, but the Petitioner had not informed her of the patient's condition. Ms. Hewitt reported the incident to Ms. Wood, who reviewed the patient’s chart and determined that the Petitioner returned to the chart, after the presence of the feces had been discovered, and added false entries, effective 6 a.m. that morning, claiming to have discovered and reported the stool to the succeeding nurse at the shift change. A femoral central line is an I.V. line inserted into the femoral artery in the groin of the patient. It is used to administer prescription medication directly to a patient's heart. A dressing is used to cover the central line insertion point, because any bacteria that contaminate the site could potentially go directly to a patient's heart. A contaminated femoral central line is a serious patient-care issue and exposes the patient to potentially serious health consequences. Ms. Wood reported the incident to Director Jones, along with the other ten incidents of sub-standard patient-care occurring between December 13, 2005, and December 27, 2005. Ms. Jones reviewed each incident independently, and made an examination of each patient chart at issue. She determined that the Petitioner's patient-care practices had not improved. She therefore decided to issue the Petitioner a Third Written Corrective Action. Ms. Woods and Ms. Jones met with the Petitioner on December 28, 2005, to discuss the issues underlying the Third Written Corrective Action. Ms. Jones explained to the Petitioner that the Third Written Corrective Action would result in automatic termination. Ms. Jones offered the Petitioner the opportunity to resign, in lieu of termination, before the Third Written Corrective Action was completed. The Petitioner left the meeting and never responded to Ms. Jones’ offer. The Petitioner maintains that she was terminated. Whether she was terminated or resigned in lieu of termination, or was constructively terminated, is not material to resolution of the issues at hand. In fact, the Petitioner was effectively terminated for providing sub-standard patient care. There is no evidence to suggest that Ms. Jones’ decision to discipline and terminate the Petitioner was based upon race, retaliation for any alleged complaints of harassment, or engaging in any statutorily protected conduct. The Petitioner did not identify any employees outside her protected class that were not disciplined for providing similar sub-standard patient care. The Respondent, however, identified several employees outside the Petitioner's protected class who were disciplined by Ms. Wood for providing poor patient care. When faced with that evidence at hearing, the Petitioner conceded that the Respondent did not terminate her for any improper purpose. The Petitioner also claims to have been harassed by several white co-workers. Co-workers Shannon Poppel, Kim Morris, and Darlene Hewitt were purported by the Petitioner to have harassed her. Those three persons, however, all work on the day shift. The Petitioner worked on the 7 p.m. to 7 a.m. shift. Jay Nash was the only night-shift employee who had been alleged to have mistreated the Petitioner. At hearing, however, the Petitioner conceded that Mr. Nash was not harassing her; rather, she contends he was assigning her more difficult patients than he was assigning other employees. The Petitioner maintains that Poppel, Morris, and Hewitt were very friendly with Nursing Director Wood. The Petitioner suspects they had a social relationship outside the hospital. The Petitioner contends that Poppel, Morris, and Hewitt ignored her and interrupted her when she was attempting to give her report at shift changes. Finally, the Petitioner claims that the three people would stop all conversation whenever she entered a room and, on one occasion, she overheard Director Wood and one of the alleged harassers laughing in Ms. Woods's office when discussing the Petitioner. The Petitioner concedes, however, that none of the alleged harassers ever used any racially derogatory language or made any reference to the Petitioner's race. In fact, she offered no evidence relating the behavior of the three alleged harassers to the Petitioner's race, aside from the fact that the alleged harassers are Caucasian and the Petitioner is African- American. The Petitioner's contention that this behavior was based on race is the Petitioner's own bare, unsupported opinion and is un-persuasive. The Petitioner even concedes that the harassers were friends away from the hospital. Their social relationship, which was not shared with the Petitioner, is a more plausible explanation for any behavior of the alleged harassers than is the race of the Petitioner. This is especially so, given the fact that Nursing Director Wood herself is African-American. The Petitioner has also exaggerated the severity of the alleged harassment, because there was an insufficient temporal opportunity for the alleged harassers to engage in that conduct. The day-shift nurses, including the three alleged harassers, must "punch in" between 6:45 a.m. and 6:52 a.m. for their 12-hour shift, which runs from 7 a.m. to 7 p.m. Generally, the night-shift nurses finish giving reports to the day-shift nurses and leave the hospital by 7:15 a.m. Therefore, at most, Ms. Poppel, Morris, or Hewitt could have interacted with the Petitioner only for a total of about 30 minutes per day. Thus any harassment, if it occurred, would have occurred for only a very short period of time. Moreover, there is no proof that any harassment, based upon race, occurred at all. The Petitioner contends that she complained to Nursing Director Jones about the harassment, but Ms. Jones denies this. Ms. Jones is well-trained in the anti-harassment policy followed by Shands. She had conducted several other investigations into harassment allegations during her tenure as Nursing Director. Her thorough response to those other allegations concerning harassment makes it very unlikely that Ms. Jones would have ignored the Petitioner's alleged complaint, had she made one. Ms. Jones is an African-American woman and, if she had a history, as she does, of actively investigating any allegations of harassment, it is unlikely that she would have disregarded an allegation that an employee felt that she was being harassed because of her race. Therefore, the Petitioner's self-serving opinion that she was being harassed, and her allegation that she had complained about the harassment, lacks credibility and persuasiveness.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Florida Commission on Human Relations denying the petition in its entirety. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of January, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S P. MICHAEL RUFF Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of January, 2010. COPIES FURNISHED: Nancy Toman Baldwin, Esquire Law offices of Nancy Toman Baldwin 309 North East First Street Gainesville, Florida 32601 Marquis W. Heilig, Esquire Thompson, Sizemore, Gonzalez & Hearing, P.A. 201 North Franklin Street, Suite 1600 Tampa, Florida 33602 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Larry Kranert, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Peter Alagona, Jr., is licensed to practice medicine in the State of Florida. He is board-certified in internal medicine with a subspecialty in cardiology and has practiced cardiology since 1981. There is no evidence that the Respondent has been the subject of professional discipline except for this proceeding. In 1989, the Respondent became acquainted with V.P., who worked as a receptionist at a hospital where he had practice privileges. Their work relationship became friendly and, although the Respondent was married and had children, he and V.P. responded to each other's friendly manner by mutual flirtation. At first, their flirting was discrete but later became more open and romantic. The Respondent began to write V.P. notes and greeting cards and send her flowers. In approximately May, 1989, V.P. indicated her willingness to begin an intimate and sexual relationship. The Respondent did not hesitate to oblige her. There is no evidence that the Respondent used a doctor-patient relationship to induce V.P. to engage in sexual activity with him, as alleged. When the sexual relationship began, there was no doctor-patient relationship between them. During her tenure at work at the hospital, V.P. from time to time complained of a rapid heart beat, and one of the four cardiologists at the hospital would respond to her complaint. The Respondent was one of the several doctors who had occasion to respond. No treatment ever was required. V.P.'s heart beat would soon return to normal, and everyone would return to work. No true doctor-patient relationship was established, and neither the Respondent, the other doctors nor V.P. ever thought one had been established. The allegation that the Respondent essentially intentionally used drugs he prescribed for V.P. during the course of their affair to control her and prolong the sexual relationship with V.P. against her will hinges on the following reference in V.P.'s deposition transcript: Q. Just so that I'm clear, did Alagona ever tell you that if you did not have sex with him, he would not write prescriptions for you? A. Those aren't the words. He has made comments about, "Where are you going to get your prescriptions?" Q. When did he make those comments? A. I don't know. During the relationship, at the end of the relationship. Q. Give me some of the circumstances surrounding those comments. A. It was, I'm sure, during an argument or something. I don't know. In view of all the evidence, that allegation is rejected as not proven. It is factual that, in another poor judgment that flowed from the poor judgment in initiating and conducting the affair in the first place, the Respondent began to act as V.P.'s personal physician for limited purposes during the course of the affair. When she complained of migraine headaches, he prescribed pain medication such as Tylox, a Schedule II controlled substance containing oxycodone, and Inderal, a beta-blocker and a legend drug. For stress, he prescribed Valium, which contains diazepam, also a legend drug. Although the Respondent clearly was acting as the doctor in a doctor-patient relationship when he prescribed these drugs, he still did not view himself as acting in that role and did not keep a written record of the drugs or the course of treatment in connection with those prescriptions. The allegation that the Respondent failed to practice medicine in accordance with required standards of care by not ordering the patient to receive mental health counseling but instead inappropriately allowing the patient to remain on Tylox also depends in large part on the testimony of V.P. In view of all the evidence, V.P.'s testimony pertinent to this allegation is rejected. The evidence was that the Respondent repeatedly advised V.P. to seek counseling, albeit not for drug abuse. Until April, 1990, the Respondent was not aware that V.P. was abusing drugs. The Respondent's Tylox prescriptions were not excessive and would not, in and of themselves, have indicated to the Respondent that V.P. was abusing Tylox or inappropriately remaining on Tylox; nor did V.P. exhibit clear signs of drug abuse or addiction prior to April, 1990. However, V.P. apparently was obtaining Tylox and other legend drugs from other sources without the Respondent's knowledge. She was seeing other physicians for the purpose of obtaining prescriptions, and she also was forging the Respondent's and other doctors' names to prescriptions to obtain additional drugs illegally. (One of the doctors whose name she forged predeceased the date of the forged prescription.) In April, 1990, the Respondent was notified that V.P. had been hospitalized for a drug overdose. In response to the request for advice from the attending physician, the Respondent recommended a psychiatrist for counseling. However, V.P. did not cooperate. She attended only one counseling session and refused further counseling. After the overdose hospitalization, the Respondent did not prescribe any more Tylox. However, again without the Respondent's knowledge, V.P. continued to obtain Tylox and other drugs from her other sources. The Respondent's judgment continued to be distorted and poor as a result of his intense sexual and romantic relationship with V.P. He continued to urge V.P. to obtain counseling for several reasons but, again, not specifically for drug abuse. By mid-1990, V.P. had dissolved her marriage, and she began putting pressure on the Respondent to divorce his wife and marry her. She began acting erratically, and her judgment also was poor. During a week- long visit to her family's home during the summer of 1990, she contacted an old boy friend, married him, changed her mind, and began annulment proceedings. By late 1990, V.P. started dating another doctor, and the pressure on both V.P. and the Respondent increased. The Respondent was unable to decide what to do, and the stress got ever greater as V.P. threatened to end the affair with the Respondent. While probably genuinely concerned for V.P.'s welfare, the Respondent probably also believed that, if V.P. got counseling, she would "see the light" and decide not to end their affair. Finally, the Respondent himself felt the need for counseling due to the stress of the affair, and he probably believed that she felt the same stress. Eventually, in early 1991, V.P. followed through on her threat and made it known to the Respondent that she was dropping him and choosing the other doctor. For some time, the Respondent was devastated and continued to try to persuade V.P. to return to him. Meanwhile, V.P. remained less than resolute, holding out to the Respondent some hope that she would return to him if he divorced his wife. Finally, practically an emotional wreck and despairing of any other way to get over his affair with V.P., the Respondent checked himself into an out-of-town residential psychiatric program. He purposely did not tell V.P. where he was, but she found out and, on the day of his discharge, sent him flowers with a card saying that she would never let him go. Eventually, the affair ended, and V.P. married the other doctor soon after.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Board of Medicine enter a final order: (1) finding the Respondent not guilty under Counts I and II but guilty under Count III; (2) placing him on probation for two years; (3) requiring him to take appropriate continuing medical education, if available, dealing with the physician-patient relationship and the prudence of avoiding the dual sexual/physician-patient relationship; and (4) imposing on him an administrative fine in the amount of $2,500. DONE and ENTERED this 7th day of May, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of May, 1996. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 95-2467 To comply with the requirements of Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes (1995), the following rulings are made on the parties' proposed findings of fact: Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact. 1.-5. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. However, as to second sentence of 5., although he cannot now remember when he prescribed Tylox, the Respondent's testimony is accepted that, at the time, and for this extraordinary patient, he was able to bear in mind adequately approximately when and what he last prescribed so as not to expose V.P. to a health risk. 6. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. However, as to the last sentence, although he cannot now remember his prescriptions, the Respondent's testimony is accepted that, at the time, and for this extraordinary patient, he was able to bear in mind adequately when and what he last prescribed so as not to expose V.P. to a health risk. 7.-9. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. Rejected as not proven that patients need to be kept under "surveillance." Otherwise, accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. As to last sentence, rejected as not proven that all "drugs," in all doses, "control a patient's emotional state and level of pain." Accepted that some can, in certain doses, and otherwise accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. Accepted that it is not the only indication; subordinate to facts contrary to those found, and unnecessary. 13.-16. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. Rejected as not proven that the Respondent "did not follow through with V.P.'s medical problems." Otherwise, accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. First two sentences, rejected as not proven; third, accepted that she said it, but subordinate to facts contrary to those found. First sentence, rejected as not proven; rest, accepted that she said it, but subordinate to facts contrary to those found. Rejected as not proven that he reviewed all of the prescription and hospital records. Otherwise, accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. Accepted and incorporated. To the extent not conclusion of law, accepted and incorporated. First sentence, rejected as not proven; second, cumulative; third, in part cumulative and in part rejected as not proven (that he had no justification); fourth, accepted but subordinate to facts contrary to those found (he did some diagnostic testing); and last two rejected as not proven in that the evidence was that V.P. rejected the Respondent's repeated recommendations to her that she seek mental health counseling, but otherwise accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. Last sentence, accepted but not necessary; rest, rejected as not proven. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact. 1.-22. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. Accepted but subordinate. Conclusion of law. Accepted and incorporated. 26.-27. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. Accepted but subordinate and unnecessary. In large part, argument and conclusion of law; in part, accepted but largely subordinate and unnecessary. Rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence that it is "clear . . . that V.P. feels that Alagona left her." (Much of their behavior is difficult to explain, such as why V.P. would act as if she did not want to let Alagona go, while chosing Palay over Alagona.) Otherwise, accepted but largely subordinate and unnecessary. Accepted but largely subordinate and unnecessary. Last sentence of C), rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence that it is "safe to infer that V.P. forged these prescriptions." (The evidence raises the question and possibility of forgery, especially in the absence of testimony on the subject from V.P. and Palay, but it is not "safe to infer.") Otherwise, accepted but largely subordinate and unnecessary. First four sentences, argument and subordinate. Rest, generally accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. (However, while V.P. may have been "in the emotional driver's seat," it does not appear that she knew where she was going.) Accepted but subordinate and unnecessary. Last sentence, rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence in that the Respondent did not suggest psychiatric counseling. Otherwise, accepted but subordinate to facts found, and unnecessary. Second sentence, rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence in that the Respondent did not suggest psychiatric counseling. Otherwise, accepted but subordinate to facts found, and unnecessary. Second sentence, rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence in that the Respondent did not suggest psychiatric counseling. Otherwise, accepted but subordinate to facts found, and unnecessary. As to the third and fourth sentences, there was no evidence as to the nature of doctors' "orders." But, based on the evidence, the Respondent did not "order" counseling. He suggested or recommended it and offered to help her get it, and V.P. declined. If the Respondent had "ordered" counseling, the patient still may or may not have followed his "order." In either case, it would appear that the critical decision is what a physician does in the face of the patient's failure to comply. It would seem that the only thing a physician reasonably can do in this situation is stop prescribing and, if necessary, terminate the physician-patient relationship. As to the rest, accepted but subordinate to facts found, and unnecessary. 39.-42. Accepted but subordinate and unnecessary. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. Accepted but subordinate and unnecessary. Accepted and incorporated. COPIES FURNISHED: Steven Rothenburg, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration Regional Office VI-Legal Division 9325 Bay Plaza, Suite 210 Tampa, Florida 33619 L. D. Murrell, Esquire 319 Clematis Street, Suite 400 West Palm Beach, Florida 33401-4618 Dr. Marm Harris Executive Director Board of Medicine Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Douglas M. Cook, Director Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Jerome W. Hoffman, Esquire General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Respondent committed the offenses set forth in the corrected administrative complaint, and, if so, what action should be taken.
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Kenneth Douglas Glaeser (Respondent) was a licensed physician in the State of Florida, having been issued license number ME 0058606. Respondent's area of specialty is Emergency Medicine. On or about May 30, 1993, at approximately 9:45 p.m., Patient L. H., a 47 year old male, presented to the emergency room (ER) at Parkway Regional Medical Center (PRMC) in Miami, Florida complaining of chest pain. Patient L. H. and his wife were visiting his mother in Miami. At first, Patient L. H. believed he had heartburn, but it would not go away. His mother convinced him to go to the hospital. Patient L. H.'s wife and mother accompanied him to the hospital. His wife parked the vehicle while Patient L. H. and his mother entered the ER. Patient L. H.'s wife completed paperwork for the ER while the ER staff attended to her husband. Patient L. H.'s mother was with him. After completing the paperwork, approximately 10 minutes later, Patient L. H.'s wife joined Patient L. H. and his mother in the examining room. At the time, Respondent was the ER physician on duty at PRMC. Respondent was the only ER physician who attended to Patient L. H. Respondent has no independent recollection of Patient L. H. or what happened during Patient L. H.'s visit to the ER at PRMC. The first goal of an ER physician is to determine if the patient has a life-threatening condition, which, often times than not, involves excluding diagnoses. The second goal of an ER physician is to determine if the patient has a condition which can receive immediate treatment and to provide that immediate treatment whether the condition is life-threatening or not. Respondent obtained Patient L. H.'s history which included the type of pain, description of the pain, location of the pain, associated symptomatology, time frame of the pain (including onset), and past history. Respondent recorded, among other things, that Patient L. H. had chest pressure which radiated bilaterally to his shoulders and a numb left shoulder; that the pain lasted for approximately 10-15 minutes, subsided, and re-occurred 30 minutes later; that Patient L. H. had no shortness of breath, diaphoresis (sweating), nausea or vomiting, or palpitations; and that Patient L. H. had no cardiac history. Respondent's history of Patient L. H. was within that level of care, skill, and treatment which is recognized by a reasonably prudent similar ER physician as being acceptable under similar conditions and circumstances. Respondent performed a physical examination on Patient L. H. The physical examination included taking vital signs and examination of the cardiovascular system, lungs, and pulses of the extremities. Respondent's physical examination was within that level of care, skill, and treatment which is recognized by a reasonably prudent similar ER physician as being acceptable under similar conditions and circumstances. Respondent had laboratory work performed on Patient L. H. Respondent ordered SL (sublingual) nitroglycerine for Patient L. H. But, the nitroglycerine was not administered because Patient L. H. was not complaining of chest pains at the time. The ordering of the nitroglycerine and not administering it until chest pain developed was within that level of care, skill, and treatment which is recognized by a reasonably prudent similar ER physician as being acceptable under similar conditions and circumstances. Respondent ordered diagnostic tests to be performed on Patient L. H. The tests included an electrocardiogram (EKG), a chest x-ray, and cardiac enzymes. Neither Patient L. H.'s wife nor his mother were present during the tests. ER physicians are trained to read EKGs. Generally, a cardiologist is not immediately available to the ER for the reading of EKGs. An ER physician looks for an injury pattern in the EKG, which would evidence an acute cardiac event. Most times, a cardiologist will over-read the EKG a day or two after the EKG is performed on a patient. Respondent's reading of Patient L. H.'s EKG did not show an injury pattern which would evidence an acute cardiac event. Respondent determined that Patient L. H.'s EKG was within normal limits. Even though an abnormality was demonstrated in the EKG, the abnormality could have been a false/positive reading. Respondent's reading of the EKG was within that level of care, skill, and treatment which is recognized by a reasonably prudent similar ER physician as being acceptable under similar conditions and circumstances. A cardiologist over-read Patient L. H.'s EKG after he left PMRC. The cardiologist found a "definite abnormality." Respondent's reading of Patient L. H.'s chest x-ray indicated that it was within normal limits. Respondent's reading of the chest x-ray was within that level of care, skill, and treatment which is recognized by a reasonably prudent similar ER physician as being acceptable under similar conditions and circumstances. Respondent's interpretation of the cardiac enzymes tests (CPK and LDH) indicated that they were within normal limits. If a heart is damaged, often times the enzymes contained in the heart cells will be released, and the cardiac enzymes tests would detect the enzymes. Respondent's interpretation of the cardiac enzymes tests was within that level of care, skill, and treatment which is recognized by a reasonably prudent similar ER physician as being acceptable under similar conditions and circumstances. It is undisputed that based upon Patient L. H.'s history, the physical examination, the tests results, including diagnostic and laboratory results, a recommendation to Patient L. H. by Respondent for admission to PRMC was medically warranted. Admission would allow for monitoring and further evaluation. However, a patient has a right to refuse admission. Respondent discussed his findings with the doctor who was listed as Patient L. H.'s primary physician on the ER record. The primary physician was the private physician, a cardiologist, of Patient L. H.'s mother. The primary physician authorized Respondent to contact the physician on-call. Respondent discussed his findings and his concern with Patient L. H. Respondent recommended to Patient L. H. that he be admitted to PRMC. However, Patient L. H. did not wish to be admitted; he wanted to leave the hospital. Patient L. H. rejected Respondent's recommendation for admission to PRMC. 1/ Patient L. H.'s mother attempted to convince him to agree to admission and remain in the hospital, but he refused. It is undisputed that if a patient refuses admission, the physician should advise the patient of the risks involved and recommend admission. In Patient L. H.'s circumstances, it was medically warranted that Respondent advise Patient L. H. that, if he was not admitted, he could suffer a heart attack and die and recommended admission to Patient L. H. Taking the totality of the circumstances, an inference is drawn and a finding is made that Respondent advised Patient L. H. of the risks involved if he rejected admission and recommended to Patient L. H. that he be admitted. Respondent did not record in the ER record that he advised Patient L. H. of the risks involved in rejecting admission and recommended admission. ER physicians are not medically required to spell-out in the medical record what risks are discussed with a patient and that the patient left against medical advice. It is sufficient that the ER physician explains the risks to the patient. Respondent ordered a GI cocktail (Maalox, Donnatal, and viscous Lidocaine) for Patient L. H. 2/ The GI cocktail was not administered until approximately 12:15 a.m. on May 31, 1993. 3/ The ordering or not of the GI cocktail for or the time in which the GI cocktail was given to Patient L. H. has no effect on the standard of care that Respondent provided to Patient L. H. Respondent diagnosed Patient L. H.'s condition as atypical chest pain. This diagnosis essentially indicates that a number of different things may have been causing Patient L. H. to experience chest pain. Patient L. H. left PRMC on May 31, 1993, at approximately 12:20 a.m. against medial advice even though the ER record indicates that he was discharged. 4/ Before leaving PRMC, Patient L. H. was informed by Respondent to, among other things, follow-up with the primary physician and return to the ER if needed. Neither Patient L. H. nor his wife completed any discharge papers or received discharge instructions. It is not uncommon for a patient to be discharged from a hospital without completing discharge papers or receiving discharge instructions. However, hospitals attempt to prevent such occurrences. When a patient leaves PRMC against medical advice, the patient is requested to complete certain documentation. That documentation was not completed in the case of Patient L. H. However, the absence of the documentation is not considered to evidence that Respondent failed to advise Patient L. H. of the risks involved in rejecting admission and to recommend admission. On May 31, 1993, at approximately 8:45 a.m., Patient L. H. went into cardiac arrest at his mother's home. He was transported to the ER at PRMC by emergency vehicle, where he was pronounced dead. On June 1, 1993, Respondent entered an addendum to the ER notes of May 30 and 31, 1993. The addendum provided, among other things, that Patient L. H. was opposed to admission to PRMC and that, even when Respondent explained the risks to Patient L. H., he continued to oppose admission and wanted to leave. Furthermore, the addendum provided, among other things, that Respondent instructed Patient L. H. to return to the ER if the chest pain returns and to follow-up with the primary physician. An addendum to ER notes by an ER physician is not unusual and is an accepted practice. The Dade County Medical Examiner determined that Patient L. H.'s cause of death was occlusive coronary artery disease. Respondent's medical records justified the course of treatment of Patient L. H. Respondent practiced medicine with that level of care, skill, and treatment which is recognized by a reasonably prudent similar ER physician as being acceptable under similar conditions and circumstances. Respondent is a defendant in a pending civil suit brought by Patient L. H.'s surviving spouse.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Board of Medicine dismiss the corrected administrative complaint. DONE AND ENTERED in this 27th day of January 1997 in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ERROL H. POWELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of January 1997.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the allegations of the Amended Administrative Complaint are correct and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is the state agency charged by statute with regulating the practice of medicine in the State of Florida. At all times material to this case, the Respondent has been a licensed physician in the State of Florida, license #ME 0035994. In August, 1987, the Respondent met with a married couple for treatment of the wife's (patient) recurrent ovarian cysts and pain. The couple were referred to the Respondent for the consultation by another physician. The patient was hospitalized at the time of the consultation. As part of the initial examination of the couple, the Respondent conducted a routine infertility physical and history, including questions related to sexual history and practices. During the examination, the Respondent learned that the couple's sexual activity was infrequent and that the marriage was troubled. The Respondent determined that the cause of the medical problem was related to a fertility medication prescribed by another physician. At that time, and on subsequent occasions, the Respondent advised the couple to obtain marital and sexual counseling. The Respondent did not provide marital or sexual counseling to the couple. After the patient recovered from the ovarian cysts, she consulted with the Respondent in regards to her ongoing fertility and ovulatory problems. The Respondent began administering fertility medication to induce ovulation. The medical treatment was eventually successful and the patient became pregnant. The child was born in 1989. At some point during the fertility treatment, the patient complained to the Respondent of experiencing migraine headaches. The Respondent referred the patient to a neurologist who prescribed narcotic pain relievers. After the birth of the first child, the patient returned to the Respondent for further fertility treatment (apparently in late 1989 or early 1990) in order to conceive a second child. Again, the treatment was successful and the patient became pregnant. The Respondent referred the pregnant patient back to her obstetrician by letter dated April 23, 1990. Beginning in mid-1990, the patient and her husband began to engage in social activities with the Respondent. On occasion, the three had dinner, went swimming with their children, and went to view a fireworks show. The patient had been employed as a pharmaceutical representative, but was interested in changing careers. She expressed an interest to the Respondent in establishing a medical transcription business. The Respondent provided typing work to the patient. By April 23, 1990, the patient was typing letters for the Respondent. The letter from the Respondent to the obstetrician closes, "[p]lease forgive the typographical errors, as I am sure [patient] will be typing this letter." The patient gave birth to the second child on October 26, 1990. After the birth of the second child, the Respondent employed the patient as a medical transcriptionist. She also worked for her obstetrician as a transcriptionist. Based on the suggestion in 1990 by the patient, the Respondent began to employ the patient's husband as a certified public accountant. Throughout the remainder of 1990, the Respondent continued to socialize with the couple. The Respondent was aware that the couple's marriage was troubled. The continuing marital problems of the couple eventually resulted in separation when the patient's husband moved from their home into an apartment. The evidence fails to conclusively establish the date of the separation, but it apparently occurred prior to April, 1991. By April 1991, the patient and the Respondent continued to meet on a social basis. The Respondent was divorced. The patient and her husband remained separated. At times, the Respondent and the patient discussed their marital experiences. During this period, the Respondent and the patient expressed romantic feelings for each other. They began to "date," and the Respondent paid to take the patient to dinners and movies. In April or May of 1991, and continuing thereafter for a period of approximately three and a half years, the patient and the Respondent engaged in consensual sexual activity. It is critical for an obstetrician-gynecologist, as well as for a specialist in reproductive endocrinology, to understand and respect the sexual boundaries between physician and patient. The sexual boundary between a patient and a reproductive endocrinologist must be absolute. In order to receive appropriate medical treatment, the patient is requested to reveal intimate details of her sexual activities and the emotional nature of a marriage. The patient must be able to completely trust the physician. The information is and must remain confidential. From the time of the Respondent's initial examination and history of the patient, through the initiation of the sexual relationship, the Respondent was aware of the marital and sexual problems of the patient and her husband. The Respondent asserts that by the time the sexual relationship began, the physician-patient relationship had been terminated by the letter of April 23, 1990. Based on credited expert testimony, the evidence establishes that the physician-patient relationship continued to exist at the time the sexual activity began. The evidence establishes that the referral of a pregnant patient back to an obstetrician does not terminate the relationship with a fertility specialist, who may again be called upon to render assistance in treatment of continuing fertility problems. The evidence also establishes that prescribing of narcotics necessarily establishes a physician-patient relationship. Subsequent to the letter of April 23, 1990, the Respondent wrote prescriptions to refill narcotic pain medications which the patient had obtained from her neurologist. Although documentary evidence regarding the actual prescriptions is deemed to lack reliability, both the Respondent and the patient acknowledged that the prescriptions were written. The Respondent wrote the refills after the patient, with continuing migraine headaches, complained that she would have to see the prescribing physician and pay for an office visit to get them refilled. Although the Respondent claims to have reviewed an early report done by the neurologist to whom he had referred the patient, there is no evidence that the Respondent did a physical examination at the time he wrote the refill prescription. The evidence establishes that, because a physician can prescribe narcotics, there is potential for abuse by a physician who may attempt to trade drug prescriptions for sexual activity. It is unethical for a physician to induce a patient into sexual activity. Allowing an emotional relationship to begin and develop within the physician-patient relationship constitutes an inducement of the patient into sexual activity. The Respondent failed to maintain sexual boundaries with his patient. He allowed and encouraged an emotional and sexual relationship to develop, and as such, used the physician-patient relationship to engage and induce the patient into sexual activity.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Agency for Health Care Administration enter a Final Order determining that Stephen Ward Weldon has violated Sections 458.329 and 458.331(1)(x), Florida Statutes, reprimanding the Respondent and placing the Respondent on probation for a period of two years. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 28th day of September, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of September, 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 94-6032 To comply with the requirements of Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, the following constitute rulings on proposed findings of facts submitted by the parties. Petitioner The Petitioner's proposed findings of fact are accepted as modified and incorporated in the Recommended Order except as follows: 6. Rejected, unnecessary. 19-20. Rejected, not established by clear and convincing evidence. 22. Rejected, cumulative. 29. Rejected, cumulative. Respondent The Respondent's proposed findings of fact frequently refer to an alleged termination of the physician-patient relationship. Such references are rejected as contrary to the greater weight of credible and persuasive evidence. Otherwise, the proposed findings are accepted as modified and incorporated in the Recommended Order except as follows: 1. Rejected. The prehearing stipulation filed by the parties does not address certification. 9. Rejected as to patient's desire for her marriage to continue, and as to the assertion that her marital difficulty was "unrelated" to the eventual development of her relationship with the Respondent, irrelevant. Rejected, irrelevant. Rejected, recitation of testimony is not a finding of fact. 16-17. Rejected, recitation of testimony is not a finding of fact. 18-20. Rejected, irrelevant. DOAH CASE NO 94-6032 COPIES FURNISHED: Douglas M. Cook, Director Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Harold D. Lewis, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration The Atrium, Suite 301 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4131 Joseph S. Garwood, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration 1940 North Monroe Street, Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Grover Freeman, Esquire 201 East Kennedy, Suite 500 Tampa, Florida 33602-5829
Findings Of Fact The Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS) received a letter of intent (LOI) dated October 21, 1988 from "Ocala Healthcare Associates Joint Venture." That letter of intent provided that the proposed applicant sought to add twenty-five community nursing home beds to its 35 bed facility then under construction, in HRS District 3 in Marion County, Florida. The letter of intent was a prerequisite to filing an application for a certificate of need (CON) authorizing those beds. The October 21, 1988 LOI was accompanied by a "certificate of resolution" of Ocala Healthcare Associates Joint Venture of even date. That resolution was certified by Winston A. Porter. HRS generally does not recognize a joint venture as a legal person or entity capable of applying for and holding a certificate of need, based upon an opinion of its legal counsel and based upon the fact that Chapter 10-5 Florida Administrative Code, at its definition of "applicant" does not include the entity known as a "joint venture." There is no specific prohibition, by statute or rule, against joint ventures holding certificates of need, however, and the Department's witness, Ms. Gordon-Girven also acknowledged that the Department has no specific policy prohibiting issuance of a CON to a joint venture. In any event, on November 23, 1988, "Ocala Healthcare Associates General Partnership" filed an application for a certificate of need pursuant to the previously filed letter of intent. In its letter of December 2, 1988, HRS rejected that application on the basis that "the applicant submitting the application was not the same as the applicant identified in the letter of intent." Upon learning of this, Mr. Winston A. Porter, the owner of the parent entity and chief operating officer of the applicant entity, or general partner, immediately notified HRS that the joint venture named in the letter of intent and the general partnership named in the application were actually one and the same entity and that the use of the term "joint venture" in the letter of intent and resolution was a mere clerical error. In corroboration of this position, in fact, Ocala Healthcare Associates general Partnership (Ocala) had already altered its form from a joint venture to a general partnership by way of "an amendment and conversion of Ocala Healthcare Associates Joint Venture to General Partnership Agreement" entered into and dated December 10, 1987. That conversion agreement had been done at the behest of HRS, based upon its advice to Mr. Porter and Ocala Healthcare Associates, Inc. that the Department did not recognize joint ventures as capable of holding certificates of need. It was thus done to comply with HRS' own requirements. HRS does not license joint ventures to operate nursing homes but does license general partnerships for that purpose. The minimum requirements for the certificate of need application require that the legal name of the applicant and parent corporation be given. Rule 10-5.008(1)(d), Florida Administrative Code quoted below, contains no specific "minimum requirements" regarding how the name of an applicant should be listed on an application nor that it should agree or be the same in all cases as that depicted on the letter of intent. The Rule merely incorporates the application form as to "minimum requirements" by reference. The form, in turn, requires only that the applicant's name be entered, not that the name be the same as that on the letter of intent. Ocala, on its certificate of need application listed its legal name just as it truly is, that is, Ocala Healthcare Associate General Partnership. It, of course, had listed its name by mistake, on the letter of intent as "Ocala Healthcare Associates, Joint Venture." The CON application, however, also indicated that the current general partnership, Ocala Healthcare Associates General Partnership, was indeed the same entity as the former joint venture. Further, HRS was on constructive and actual notice of the change in business form undergone by Ocala at HRS' behest in December, 1987. Be that as it may, however, no rule or policy of the Department specifically states that an application for a CON and the related letter of intent must be filed by exactly the same entity. In fact, however, here the evidence shows that the letter of intent and the application were actually filed by the same entity. The controlling and owning members or partners of Ocala Healthcare Associates General Partnership were listed in the letter of intent, even though it was mistakenly called a joint venture, and were also listed in the application. They were named as, and are, one and the same entities. Further, the minimum requirements depicted in the application form say nothing about the applicant's name and the name depicted in the letter of intent being identical. HRS' position that the letter of intent and the application be identical or filed by the same entity is designed to put potential competitors on notice of who the new attempted market entrant is. Here that purpose was accomplished anyway. Ocala never attempted to mislead anyone by its filing of the letter of intent under the "joint venture" name. The joint venture is owned and controlled by the same entities as the general partnership and the component parts of the joint venture and general partnership are identical. Further, HRS personnel involved with this matter were on notice, both constructively and actually, that the joint venture had been dispensed with and the general partnership had supplanted it. Finally, the agency was not prohibited from notifying Ocala of the apparent discrepancy in the names depicted on the letter of intent and on the application, but it took no such action, even though its certificate of need review personnel were on actual notice that Ocala had altered its business form from that of joint venture to general partnership.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, the evidence of record and the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, it is therefore, RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered accepting Ocala's application for a certificate of need for comparative review with other applicants in the November 1988 batching cycle. DONE AND ORDERED this 2nd day of June, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of June, 1989. APPENDIX Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact: Paragraph 1: Accepted. Paragraphs 2-16: Accepted. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact: Paragraph 1: Accepted. Paragraph 2: Accepted. Paragraph 3: Accepted. Paragraph 4: Accepted. Paragraph 5: Accepted. Paragraph 6: Accepted. Paragraph 7: Rejected as contrary to the preponderant weight of the evidence and as subordinate to the hearing officers findings of fact on this subject matter. Paragraph 8: Rejected as to its' material import and as contrary to the preponderant evidence and subordinate to the hearing officers findings of fact. Paragraph 9: Rejected as not material to resolution of the narrow range of issues in this proceeding. COPIES FURNISHED: R. Bruce McKibben, Jr., DEMPSEY AND GOLDSMITH Post Office Box 10651 Tallahassee, FL 32302 Richard H. Patterson, Assistant General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 2727 Mahan Drive Tallahassee, FL 32308 Sam Power, Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700 Gregory L. Coler, Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700
