The Issue The issue to be resolved in this proceeding is whether Petitioner, a foster home operator, committed violations of the Florida Statutes and the Florida Administrative Code, as alleged by Respondent, sufficient to justify Respondent's refusal to renew Petitioner's license.
Findings Of Fact On December 20, 1999, Petitioner applied for renewal of her license to operate a foster care home. The license was due to expire on February 15, 2000. Respondent's investigation of the application was eventually concluded on June 15, 2000. By letter dated August 10, 2000, Petitioner was notified of Respondent's decision that, as a consequence of the Florida abuse report finding that Petitioner had failed to provide adequate food and medical care to children in her care, her home would not be re-licensed as a foster home. At final hearing, Petitioner's testimony established that she did not intend to again operate a foster home. Her desire in requesting a hearing was simply "to clear her good name" from the allegations contained in Florida abuse report number 1999-124723. She further admitted that her personal physician opposed renewal of her license due to Petitioner's heart condition. Petitioner offered copies of medical reports from a medical practitioner as proof that allegations of the abuse report were incorrect. Specifically, it is found that the medical records proffered at best show only that the children were taken to a doctor on specific occasions and does little to rebut the abuse report’s allegations of inadequate food and medical care. Further, testimony of Respondent’s employees at final hearing established that Petitioner’s son, a convicted felon without exemption status, had been residing in the home. Pursuant to applicable statutes, such a resident in the home also prevents re-licensure.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, and the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, it is recommended that a final order be entered confirming the denial of Petitioner’s license to operate a foster home. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of November, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DON W. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of November, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Ralph McMurphy, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services 1601 West Gulf Atlantic Highway Wildwood, Florida 34785-8158 Stephanie Reeves 1707 Birchwood Circle Apartment 1 Leesburg, Florida 34748 Virginia A. Daire, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204B Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Josie Tomayo, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioners should be issued a family foster home license.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the testimony, exhibits, and stipulated facts in the Joint Stipulation, the following Findings of Fact are made: Parties and Process Petitioners, who are husband and wife, submitted an application for licensure as a family foster home. Although this was an application for initial licensure, Petitioners were previously licensed as a foster home from August 2013 to October 2019.1 The Department is the state agency responsible for licensing foster care parents and foster homes, pursuant to section 409.175, Florida Statutes, and Florida Administrative Code Chapter 65C-45. Petitioners voluntarily relinquished their foster home license on or about October 28, 2019, around the time two female foster children, S.W. and H.C.S., were removed from their care. It is unclear whether the children were removed because of an abuse investigation related to H.C.S., or whether they were removed because Petitioners closed their home to foster children. Regardless, Mrs. Gilio testified that they let their license lapse because they needed a break after fostering H.C.S. The Department administers foster care licensing by contracting with third-party private entities. In Circuit 13, where Petitioners are located, the Department contracted with Eckerd Community Alternatives, doing business as Eckerd Connects (Eckerd), to be the agency responsible for facilitating foster care licensing. Eckerd has subcontracted with Children's Home Network (CHN) to facilitate foster care licensing. 1 Petitioners had previously been denied a foster care license in 2009. At the time relevant to Petitioners, the Department used the "attestation" model of foster home licensing. In this model, a private licensing agency with whom the Department has contracted will conduct a home study on the foster home applicants and attest to the applicants' fitness to be licensed. The Department does not have the discretion to deny the license once the licensing agency has attested to the appropriateness of the applicants, except if they have been named as caregivers in three or more abuse reports within five years. If there are such abuse reports, the Department is required to review those reports and make a final decision regarding the application. There is no requirement that the reports result in a finding of actual abuse for them to be reviewed by the Department.2 Although it is unclear when Petitioners submitted their application for the foster care license in this case, sometime in late 2019, CHN conducted and compiled a Unified Home Study (home study), which included Petitioners' background screening; previous reports of abuse, abandonment, or neglect involving the applicants, and references from all adult children. The home study was reviewed at a meeting on December 19, 2019, by Eckerd, through the Committee. The Committee considered the application, home study, and licensing packet and heard from various agency staff. Petitioners were also allowed to voice comments and concerns at this meeting. Had the Committee approved the application, it would have been sent to the Department along with an attestation that stated the foster home meets all requirements for licensure and a foster home license is issued by the Department. However, the Committee unanimously voted not to recommend approval of a foster home license to Petitioners. 2 The categories of findings for an abuse report are "no indicator," "not substantiated," and "verified." "No indicator" means there was no credible evidence to support a determination of abuse. "Not substantiated" means there is evidence, but it does not meet the standard of being a preponderance to support that a specific harm is the result of abuse. "Verified" means that there is a preponderance of credible evidence which results in a determination that a specific harm was a result of abuse. Frank Prado, Suncoast Regional Managing Director for the Department, ultimately decided to deny Petitioners' application for a family foster home license due to their prior parenting experiences, the multiple abuse reports regarding their home, and the recommendation of the Committee. Mr. Prado expressed concern about the nature of the abuse reports and Petitioners' admission that they used corporal punishment on a child they adopted from the foster care system in the presence of other foster children. Petitioners' Parenting History Petitioners have seven children: one is the biological son of Mr. Gilio; another is the biological son of Mrs. Gilio; and five were adopted through the foster care system in Florida. Of these seven children, six are now adults. Three of the adopted children, Jay, Sean, and Jameson, are biological brothers who Petitioners adopted in 2001. Shawna, who was adopted around 2003, is the only adopted daughter. The Petitioners' one minor child, H.G., is a nine-year-old boy and the only child who resides in their home. H.G. suffers from oppositional defiance disorder. Petitioners admitted they adopted Shawna after there had been allegations of inappropriate behavior made against Jay, by a young girl who lived next door to Petitioners. Later, while they were living with Petitioners, Jay, Sean, and Jameson were arrested for sexually abusing Shawna at different times. As a result, one or more of the sons were court-ordered to not be around Shawna, and the other brothers were required to undergo treatment and never returned to Petitioners' home. During the hearing, both Petitioners seem to blame Shawna, who was nine years old when the sexual abuse by Jay in their home allegedly began, for disrupting their home. They accused her of being "not remorseful" and "highly sexualized." Regarding the abuse by Sean and Jameson, which occurred when Shawna was approximately 12 years old, Mr. Gilio stated Shawna thought it was okay to have sex with boys, and it was "hard to watch every minute of the day if they're, you know, having sex." When Shawna was about 19 years old, she filed a "Petition for Injunction for Protection Against Domestic Violence" against Mr. Gilio in circuit court. The Petition outlined allegations of past sexual comments and inappropriate disciplinary behavior from 2007 to 2012, while she lived with Petitioners. Mr. Gilio denied at the hearing having any knowledge about the Petition against him, but admitted he made comments about Shawna's breasts. As part of the application and home study process, the CHN collected references from Petitioners' former foster children and adult children. Shawna (Petitioners' only adopted daughter) gave them a negative reference and specifically stated she would not want female foster children to live with Petitioners. Reports of Abuse Petitioners were involved in 24 abuse reports during their time of licensure between 2013 and 2019. During the past five years, Petitioners were named as either alleged perpetrators or caregivers responsible in eight reports that were made to the Florida Child Abuse Hotline (Hotline). Of those eight reports, five of them named Mr. Gilio as the alleged perpetrator causing a physical injury, one report named Mr. Gilio as the caregiver responsible for a burn on a foster child, and one report named Mr. Gilio as an alleged perpetrator of sexual abuse against a foster child. Mrs. Gilio was named as an alleged perpetrator of asphyxiation as to a foster child. Seven of the reports in the last five years against Petitioners were closed with no indicators of abuse. One of the abuse reports was closed with a "not substantiated" finding of physical injury. In this report, Mr. Gilio was the alleged perpetrator and the victim was H.G., Petitioners' minor adopted son. Additionally, after Petitioners let their foster license lapse in October 2019, a subsequent report was made against Mr. Gilio for improper contact with a former foster daughter. This incident was discussed at the Committee meeting, but it was unclear if this allegation was ever investigated. Corporal Punishment According to the Department's rules, discussed below, foster parents are forbidden to engage in corporal punishments of any kind. In 2019, there were two reports alleging Mr. Gilio of causing physical injury by corporal punishment on H.G. At the time, there were other foster children in the household. Technically, Mr. Gilio was allowed to use corporal punishment on H.G. because he was no longer a foster child and had been adopted from foster care. If a parent uses corporal punishment on a child, there can be no findings of abuse unless the child suffered temporary or permanent disfigurement. However, foster care providers are not permitted to use corporal punishment. More than one witness at the hearing had concerns about the use of corporal punishment against H.G. because of his operational defiance disorder and because other foster children (who may have been victims of physical abuse) were in the household. Brendale Perkins, who is a foster parent herself and serves on the Hillsborough County Family Partnership Alliance, an organization that supports licensed foster parents, testified she witnessed Mr. Gilio treating a foster child in his care roughly. At the time, she was concerned because this was not the way children in foster care (who may have previously been victims of abuse) should be treated. She did not, however, report it to any authorities. The Department established through testimony that the policy against using corporal punishment is taught to all potential foster families. Mr. Gilio, however, denied ever being instructed not to use corporal punishment against foster children or while foster children were in the home. He also claimed that H.G.'s therapist had never recommended any specific punishment techniques. The undersigned finds Mr. Gilio's testimony not credible. Cooperation with Fostering Partners The Department established that decisions regarding foster children are made within a "system of care" which includes input from case managers, guardian ad litem (GAL), and support service providers. The relationship between Petitioners and others working as part of this system during the time of fostering was not ideal; it was described by witnesses as "tense" and "disgruntled." One witness, a supervisor at CHN, testified Mr. Gilio was not receptive or flexible when partnering with other agencies, and was not always open to providing information when questioned. As an example, Petitioners fired a therapist without consulting with the CHN staff or the GAL for the child. At the final hearing, Mr. Gilio continued to claim he did nothing wrong by not consulting with others in the system regarding this decision. Kristin Edwardson, a child protection investigator for the Hillsborough County Sheriff's Office, was tasked with investigating the reports of abuse and neglect against Petitioners that had been reported to the Hotline. She testified she was concerned with the level of cooperation they provided her and other investigators. Although they ultimately would cooperate, Petitioners made it difficult for the investigators and would often "push back" and make the situation more stressful. She described Mr. Gilio as being disrespectful, belittling, and dismissive of her. Licensing Review Committee On December 19, 2020, the Committee, made up of eight individuals, was convened to review Petitioners' application for a foster home license. When determining whether a family should receive a foster home license, the Committee is to evaluate the applicants' background, parenting experience, references from community partners, and the family's openness and willingness to partner. Sheila DelCastillo, a regional trainer with the GAL program, was a Committee member. She had prior knowledge of Petitioners from a report that a foster child's room in Petitioners' home smelled strongly of urine during a home visit and that GAL staff had found a prescription bottle beside the child’s bed that belonged to Mr. Gilio. With regards to Petitioners' application, she read the licensing review packet and home study that contained numerous abuse reports. Ms. DelCastillo was concerned about the 24 abuse reports Petitioners’ received during their time of licensure, the negative reference from Shawna, their use of corporal punishment on H.G., and Petitioners' downplaying of the events that led to multiple abuse reports. Michelle Costley, a licensing director with CHN in charge of level 2 traditional foster homes, also served on the Committee. Ms. Costley has 14 years of experience, with seven of those years spent in foster care licensing. As director of licensing, Ms. Costley was concerned about the number of abuse reports received regarding Petitioners; Mr. Gilio's inability to be open and flexible when working in partnership with other agencies; and the needs of Petitioners' child, H.G. She was also concerned about Petitioners' decision to fire a therapist of a foster child without consulting the GAL or the other individuals involved with that child. Regarding the alleged abuse, Ms. Costley was concerned that most of the reports regarding Petitioners involved allegations of physical abuse, inappropriate touch of a sexual nature, or sexual abuse, with most alleged victims being younger than eight years old. She explained that even though these reports could not be "verified," these types of allegations are harder to establish because testimony by children of that age often is unreliable and there usually must be evidence of physical injury, which no longer is present by the time the alleged abuse is investigated. Ms. Perkins also served on the Committee. Ms. Perkins served as a foster parent mentor, working with foster parents to help them build co- parenting strategies and navigate the system of care. She has been a licensed foster parent for 13 years and has adopted 11 children from foster care. As stated earlier, she was familiar with Petitioners from the Hillsborough County Family Partnership Alliance meetings. Ms. Perkins was concerned with the number of abuse reports with similar allegations, but different victims. She also discussed Petitioners' use of corporal punishment, noting that they could have been using verbal de-escalation methods instead of corporal punishment due to the traumatic histories of many foster care children. Ms. Edwardson also served on the Committee. In addition to her personal interactions with Petitioners, Ms. Edwardson was concerned about the totality of the information presented to the Committee regarding the abuse reports and Mr. Gilio's lack of cooperation. She noted that although they were not substantiated, the number and nature of the reports related to young children were of concern. Based on the Committee notes and transcript of the meeting, Petitioners were allowed to respond to the Committee's questions at the December 2019 meeting. They argued that none of the abuse reports were proven true and any injuries were not their fault. They seemed more concerned about who made the abuse reports and why the abuse reports were called in than whether the foster children were protected in their care. For example, although Mr. Gilio admitted to hitting H.G. with a stick twice as big as a pencil, he denied any bruising was caused by the stick. A report of a burn on another child was explained by Mr. Gilio as an accident that occurred while he was teaching her how to iron; he could not understand why this was reported as possible abuse. Ms. Gilio explained that H.C.S. was a very active child which resulted in her needing stitches and requiring restraint. After hearing from Petitioners, the Committee members discussed their concerns that Petitioners were not forthcoming about the various abuse incidents, and would not take responsibility for any of the injuries or issues raised by the abuse reports. All eight members voted to not move Petitioners' application forward.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Department of Children and Families denying a family foster home license to Petitioners, Mary and James Gilio. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of November, 2020, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S HETAL DESAI Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of November, 2020. COPIES FURNISHED: Anthony Duran, Esquire Tison Law Group 9312 North Armenia Avenue Tampa, Florida 33612 (eServed) Deanne Cherisse Fields, Esquire Department of Children and Families 9393 North Florida Avenue Tampa, Florida 33612 (eServed) Lacey Kantor, Esquire Department of Children and Families Building 2, Room 204Z 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 (eServed) Javier A. Enriquez, General Counsel Department of Children and Families Building 2, Room 204F 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 (eServed) Chad Poppell, Secretary Department of Children and Families Building 1, Room 202 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 (eServed)
The Issue Whether Petitioner’s application for licensure as a foster home should be granted.
Findings Of Fact The Department is the state agency responsible for licensure of foster homes. In carrying out its licensure duties, the Department contracts some license processing functions to FamiliesFirst Network. In turn, FamiliesFirst subcontracts with Children’s Home Society to perform a variety of license processing functions. In this case, Children’s Home Society was the organization that initially reviewed Petitioner’s 2007 licensure application. In 1984, prior to her employment with the Department, Petitioner married a man in the military. Petitioner testified that the marriage was one of convenience for both parties and, while legal, was not a true marriage since the marriage was never consummated. Petitioner’s explanation regarding the benefit each got from the marriage was vague. In essence, Petitioner characterized her marriage as a way for her to get out of financial difficulty. She testified that a soldier approached her and offered to pay her bills if she would marry him so that he could live off base. However, Petitioner legally divorced her husband in 1988 when she learned that he had contracted AIDS. Since at least 1997, Petitioner was employed by the Department. At some point, she was employed as an Economic Self-Sufficiency Specialist I (ESSI). As an ESSI, Petitioner generally handled applications for food stamps and interviewed clients to determine eligibility for food stamps, Medicaid and cash assistance benefits. In 1999, while employed with the Department, Petitioner applied for licensure as a foster home. On the initial licensing application in 1999, Petitioner wrote in the marital history section, “I am single and have never been married.” On the foster family self-study, Petitioner left her marital history blank. Furthermore, Petitioner marked “n/a” for ‘not applicable’ in the section regarding her divorce. That information was incorporated in the initial licensing study compiled by Children’s Home Society on April 28, 1999. Clearly, the statements made by Petitioner in her 1999 application and the information she provided to the Department during the application process were false since she had been married and divorced. Petitioner also completed a licensure self-study form in April 2001. In the sections regarding her marital history, Petitioner marked “n/a” for ‘not applicable,’ incorrectly indicating that she had never been married or, in some manner, the section on marriage did not apply to her. Again, the information was false. In another licensure self-study in September 2001, Petitioner left her marital history blank. Similarly, Petitioner left the marital history section blank on a personal profile form completed by her in 2001. That document was updated in 2003 and the marital history section was again left blank. In March 2003, Petitioner again marked “n/a” in the marital history section of a licensure self-study form. At about the same time, Petitioner also completed a questionnaire as part of the home-study process performed by FamiliesFirst Network. One of the questions called for a box to be checked as to how a previous marriage ended. Petitioner did not check any of the answers or indicate that she had been divorced. The lack of response is particularly troubling since Petitioner had indicated at least once that she had not been married, at least twice that the marital history sections on various forms did not apply to her based on her rationalization that the marriage had never been consummated, and at least once that the divorce history section did not apply to her. However, Petitioner knew that she had been legally married and legally divorced. Indeed, the fact of her divorce was not affected by the lack of consummation of the marriage; her ostensible rationale for not recognizing her marriage was from a religious point of view. These misrepresentations were material to the review of her fitness for licensure. Finally, in her 2005 application, Petitioner did indicate to the person who was processing her application that she was married. The provision of the correct information by Petitioner in 2005 occurred after the processor inquired and pursued questions about Petitioner’s marital history and does not mitigate Petitioner’s past multiple misrepresentations regarding her marital and divorce history. At hearing, Petitioner acknowledged that she provided inconsistent information about her prior marriage. She was concerned that her marriage was coming back to haunt her. She stated, “I didn’t know that it was going to come back and bite me.” However, such concern does not mitigate the fact that Petitioner failed, on multiple occasions, to disclose her divorce and marriage to the Department. As indicated above, Petitioner was also employed by the Department during the time she was seeking licensure as a foster home. Unfortunately, throughout the time that Petitioner was employed, she developed a very troubled relationship with the Department and, in particular, with Katie George, the Department’s General Counsel. Petitioner’s difficulty with the Department resulted in several legal cases against the Department in which Ms. George represented the Department. These cases extended over a five-year period. The cases involved two small claims cases requesting reimbursement for sodas and copying costs that arose out of five other litigations before the Public Employees Relations Commission. The two small-claims lawsuits seeking reimbursement for out-of-pocket expenses, including sodas and photocopies, were dismissed by the Court. The evidence demonstrated that Petitioner was terminated twice by the Department. Petitioner contested her first dismissal before the Public Employees Relations Commission. Petitioner’s first dismissal was overturned by the Public Employees Relations Commission on a legal technicality. The Commission specifically noted that they neither condoned nor agreed with malfeasance in office but had to grant a double- jeopardy type exception since the Department had originally suspended Petitioner for malfeasance in office and then attempted to increase the discipline it had imposed to dismissal of Petitioner. Petitioner was reinstated to her position by the Commission and back pay was ordered. As part of the back-pay case with the Public Employees Relations Commission, the Petitioner was denied reimbursement for private cash advances and private auto insurance expenses that she claimed the Department owed to her as part of her wages. Petitioner’s second termination was for conduct unbecoming a public employee and involved outrageous and bizarre behavior towards a client of the Department who had applied for Medicaid and food stamps. During the incident Petitioner berated, belittled and treated the client so poorly that he was reduced to tears and would not return for food stamps when it was time to renew the same. The client prayed with Petitioner inside her office. The client described Petitioner as chanting and acting so strangely that he abruptly ended the prayer by saying “amen.” Additionally, Petitioner told the client that she understood how he felt and that the Department was out to terminate her because some of her co-workers thought she was crazy. She also told the client the Department had tried, but failed, to terminate her before. The client eventually filed a complaint with the Department regarding Petitioner and her behavior during the interview with the client. Later, Petitioner called the client at his unlisted phone number that she could only have obtained through Departmental records and tried to intimidate the client into changing his complaint or not testifying. Based on this incident and some other incidents regarding Petitioner’s work, the Department dismissed Petitioner a second time. Petitioner, again, contested her dismissal before the Public Employees Relations Commission. The dismissal was upheld by all the Courts who heard the case and eventual appeals. The nature of the litigation and the eventual outcome are illustrated in the Public Employees Relations Commission Hearing Officer’s Recommended Order dated February 10, 2003; the Public Employees Relations Commission Final Order dated March 17, 2003; the per curiam affirmed opinion of the First District Court of Appeal dated February 18, 2004; the Order of the First District Court of Appeal denying rehearing dated April 5, 2004, and the Order of the Supreme Court of Florida dismissing review dated May 19, 2004. In addition, Petitioner filed a federal employment discrimination lawsuit against the Department. The suit was based, in part, on her earlier termination. During the course of the federal litigation, depositions were taken. During those depositions, Ms. George learned that Petitioner had falsified her application with the Department because she had previous jobs from which she had been fired that were not listed on the application. However, the Department was represented by outside risk counsel, who negotiated a $5,000.00 settlement payment to Petitioner. The settlement was accepted by the Department based on the nuisance value of continued litigation of the case. The Department did not admit any discriminatory action towards Petitioner in its termination of her. At some point after her second termination, Petitioner visited Ms. George’s legal office at the Department. Petitioner visited the office to either pick up or deliver some papers. However, testimony was not clear on the exact nature of the visit and what occurred during Petitioner’s visit. Testimony did establish that Petitioner became disruptive in the office towards Ms. George’s legal staff. Petitioner was asked to leave and initially refused. Eventually, Petitioner left the office after Ms. George instructed her staff to call law enforcement. Petitioner also filed a complaint with the Florida Bar regarding Ms. George’s representation of her client. The Bar complaint against Ms. George was dismissed by the Florida Bar. Finally, during this proceeding, Petitioner accused Ms. George of sending law enforcement to Petitioner’s house. Ms. George did not take such action against Petitioner. Given all of these incidents, Petitioner’s troubled employment history and litigation with the Department, the evidence demonstrated that, in the past, Petitioner has not worked cooperatively with the Department and seems to have developed a difficult and suspicious relationship with it. Based on this history, the evidence did not demonstrate that Petitioner could, presently or in the future, work cooperatively with the Department as a foster parent. The 2007 application was reviewed by Nicola Spear. Ms. Spear works in the licensing section of FamiliesFirst Network. She compiled the November 2007 foster parent licensing home-study on Petitioner. After reviewing the application and completing the home-study, Ms. Spear recommended that Petitioner’s license application be granted by the Department. Ms. Spear was unaware of the Petitioner’s history regarding the Department or her prior statements regarding her marriage and divorce. She subsequently learned the reasons why Petitioner was terminated from her employment with the Department, including inappropriate client interactions. Once the Department learned of Petitioner’s application and the initial recommendation of Ms. Spear, either Ms. George or administrative staff called a meeting with its contractors and Ms. Spear to review the recommendation and provide information regarding Petitioner’s history with the Department. After receiving the information, Ms. Spear changed her recommendation and recommended that Petitioner not be licensed as a foster parent. Ms. Spear testified that while Petitioner was very cooperative during the licensure process, she was concerned that Petitioner might not be able to work cooperatively with the Department or its contracted partners. Mary Martin, a licensing specialist with the Department, received Petitioner’s licensing packet from Ms. Spear. Ms. Martin was made aware that Petitioner had been dismissed from the Department, had a history of difficulties with the Department and of Petitioner’s lack of candor regarding her marriage and divorce. Ms. Martin also learned from Ms. Oakes, a contractor for the Department, that in 2002, Ms. Oakes had instructed her staff to call law enforcement to a visitation between foster children and their parent because Petitioner wanted to participate in the court-ordered closed visit and would not leave the visitation site at Children’s Home Society. However, the contractor who supplied this information did not witness the incident. The person who was present during the alleged incident did not testify at the hearing and all the testimony regarding the incident was based on hearsay. Additionally, Petitioner was not aware that law enforcement had been called since Petitioner voluntarily left the visitation before the police arrived. Given the hearsay nature of the facts surrounding the visitation incident, the incident cannot provide a basis for denial of Petitioner’s application. On the other hand, Ms. Martin found Ms. Peagler hostile to work with during the interview process with her. Ms. Martin did not feel that Petitioner could work cooperatively with the Department and could not be trusted to provide accurate information to the Department. She recommended denial of Petitioner’s 2007 application. Ultimately, Petitioner’s foster home application was denied on February 18, 2008. The basis for denial was her false statements, her history with the Department, and her intolerance and inflexibility with the Department. Currently, Petitioner is self-employed as a provider of services to persons with developmental disabilities. She is licensed through the Agency for Persons with Disabilities (APD). There was no evidence that Petitioner had difficulty working with APD. The evidence also did not show that Petitioner had a long and troubled relationship with APD or that APD was aware of Petitioner’s misrepresentations regarding her marriage and divorce. Robin Woods Reshard testified generally about her friendship with Petitioner. Although she works with school-age children, she never worked with or for the Department. Ms. Reshard primarily knows Petitioner through their Church. She speaks highly of Petitioner, although finds her to be stubborn, at times. She thinks Petitioner would make an excellent foster parent. However, given the facts of this case regarding Petitioner’s multiple litigations with the Department, her general suspiciousness regarding the Department and its personnel, her misrepresentations regarding her marriage and divorce, and her mistreatment of a client of the Department, her good work with APD and Ms. Reshard’s recommendation do not demonstrate that Petitioner can now work cooperatively with the Department or can be trusted by the Department to be honest with it in fostering children. Both of these qualities are necessary for successful licensure as a foster home. Therefore, Petitioner’s application for licensure as a foster home should be denied.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Children and Family Services enter a Final Order denying the application of Robin Peagler for foster home licensure. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of December, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DIANE CLEAVINGER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of December, 2008. COPIES FURNISHED: Eric D. Schurger, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services 160 Governmental Center, Suite 601 Pensacola, Florida 32501-5734 Robin Peagler 1011 West Chase Street Pensacola, Florida 32501 Gregory Venz, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204B 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 George Sheldon, Interim Secretary Department of Children and Family Services Building 1, Room 202 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 John J. Copelan, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue Should Petitioners' application for family foster home license be granted?
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant findings are made: The Department is the agency in the State of Florida responsible for the licensure of family foster homes. Linda Patterson and Robert Patterson (Pattersons), a married couple, applied for licensure as a family foster home. The Pattersons completed the initial training for prospective foster parents in March of 1995. The Department completed a home study on the Pattersons. The results of the home study and background information on the Pattersons, including the Pattersons tenure as foster parents in Connecticut, were considered by the Department before denying the Pattersons' application for licensure as a family foster home for children. On August 24, 1994, the Department issued Notice Of Denial to the Patterson which in pertinent part provides: This letter provides notice to you that your application for a family foster home license is denied, based on Section 409.175(8)(a), Florida Statutes, and Rule 10M-6.023, Florida Administrative Code (FAC). The reasons for this denial are: Mr. Patterson has been charged with numerous law violations in the past. Although none of the law violations auto- matically disqualifies him from fostering, they do reflect a lack of judgment needed to provide adequate care for foster children, indicating an inability to comply with Rule 10-6.023(e). Your home was investigated in August of 1992 because of allegations of sexual abuse on your 18 year old adopted daughter. You admitted inappropriate contact with this child. As a result of this investigation your license was limited, and your home was approved only for males, ages 5 to 11. In April of 1993, your marital coun- selor stated that you have difficulty setting limits with sexuality, and recommended against the placement of any child with a known history of sexual acting out, or approaching puberty. This recommendation was made shortly after an incident of child on child sexual abuse in your home. In September of 1993, a clinical psychologist evaluated you. He stated that Mr. Patterson's ability to control his impulses is "probably" satisfactory, but should not be tested with sexually active adolescent females. He also opined that your family might have some difficulty dealing with sexually abused and acting out children without professional guidance. All of these incidents indicate an inability to comply with Rule 10M-6.023(1)(e), particularly in view of the fact that approxi- mately 85 percent of our foster children fall into the categories of children that should not be placed with Mr. Patterson. Robert Patterson admitted to several law violation between 1960 and 1980. However, most of these violations were misdemeanors and committed while he was a juvenile. There was one felony violation (car theft) by Robert Patterson while he was a juvenile. Robert Patterson admitted that in 1980 he was charged with larceny concerning an alleged fraudulent claim for unemployment compensation to which he pled nolo contendere. Notwithstanding that he pled nolo contendere to the charge, Robert Patterson contended that the unemployment compensation claim was a legal claim. There was no evidence of any further law violations after the nolo contendere plea in 1980. The Pattersons were licensed in Connecticut as foster parents for approximately 10 years. During the time the Pattersons were licensed as a foster home in Connecticut the Patterson home was investigated because of a complaint alleging sexual abuse of a female foster child in the Pattersons' home. Although there was no finding of sexual abuse of this female, Robert Patterson admitted to having unintentionally touched the female's breast and buttocks while they were wrestling. There was another incident where this same female foster child, while inebriated, rubbed Robert Patterson' penis several times. Robert Patterson testified that he felt sexually attracted to this female child, but that he never acted on those feelings. The female child that was the subject of the abuse complaint was not removed from the Pattersons' home, and subsequently the State of Connecticut allowed the Pattersons to adopt this child. After this investigation, the Pattersons requested that their foster care home license be limited to males, ages 5 years to 11 years. This limitation on placement was requested by the Patterson because they felt inadequate to cope with sexually acting out or sexually abused children. The Paterson's marriage counselor in Connecticut advised the Connecticut DCF (the equivalent of Florida DHRS) that the Pattersons had difficulty setting limits with sexuality, and recommended against placement of any child in the Pattersons' home with a known history of sexual acting out, or approaching puberty. Many foster children are victims of sexual abuse and sexual exploitation which causes these foster children to behavior inappropriately. Often the Department is unaware of prior abuse or the resultant behavior when a child is placed in a foster home. A foster parent's ability to deal appropriately with sexually abused and sexually acting out children is a very important attribute, particularly given the number of children in foster care with these difficulties. The Pattersons requested to be licensed for placement of males only, ages 5 years to 11 years. The Department has licensed foster homes with age and sex restrictions on placements. However, the Department attempts to avoid licensing homes with such restrictions. Such restrictions on placement interfere with the Department's statutory duty to keep siblings together, and with the goal of attempting to avoid moving children from foster home to foster home.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law it is recommended that the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services enter a final order denying the Petitioners licensure as a family foster home. RECOMMENDED this 23rd day of September, 1996, at Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of September, 1996. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER CASE NO. 96-1567 The following constitutes my specific rulings, pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the proposed findings of fact submitted by the Department in this case. Petitioners' Proposed Findings of Fact. Petitioners elected not to file any proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. Department's Proposed Findings of Fact. 1. Proposed findings of fact 1 - 19 are adopted in substance as modified in Findings of Fact 1 through 19. COPIES FURNISHED: Gregory D. Venz, Agency Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1317 Winewood Blvd., Bldg. 2, Room 204X Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Richard Doran, General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1317 Winewood Blvd., Room 201 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-07001 Robert and Linda Patterson 8653 Indian Ridge Way Lakeland, Florida 33809 M. Elizabeth Wall, Esquire Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 200 North Kentucky Avenue Lakeland, Florida 33801
The Issue The issue is this case is whether revocation of Respondent's Foster Care license privilege for his past and present conduct, determined by the Department of Children and Family Services (hereinafter Agency) to be inappropriate, was proper under Section 409.175, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Under Section 409.175, Florida Statutes, the Department of Children and Family Services is the State Agency responsible for evaluating, qualifying, licensing, and regulating family foster care homes. On or about November 5, 1999, the Agency, after Mr. Thibodeau's successful completion of the Agency's evaluation and qualifying procedures, determined Mr. Thibodeau to be of good moral character. At all times material to the application process, Mr. Thibodeau answered completely and truthfully each question contained on each standard application form and other documents presented to him by the Agency during the foster care home application process. Based upon its determination, the Agency granted Provisional Certificate of License, No. 1999-110-002, for Substitute Family Home care privilege to Mr. Thibodeau. Thereafter, the Agency placed three minor children in Mr. Thibodeau's home: two teenaged brothers, David M. and Daniel M., and seven-year-old Steve. After an unspecified period of time together, bonding began to develop between the brothers, Daniel and David, and Mr. Thibodeau. As a result of a mutual agreement, Mr. Thibodeau submitted an adoption application to the Agency to become the adoptive parent of the brothers David M. and Daniel M. At all times pertinent hereto, Mr. Thibodeau answered completely and truthfully each question contained in the standard application forms and other documents presented to him by the Agency during the adoption application process. Ms. Georgia Alezras, trainer for the Model Approach to Partnership in Parenting (MAPP) classes and Mr. Kelvin Birdsell, family therapist and continuity specialist, made a home-study visit to the Thibodeau residence at some time between early July and August 15, 2000. Mr. Birdsell testified that he confined his conversations to the brothers, David M. and Daniel M. during the visit. Mr. Birdsell further testified that his conversations with the brothers were separate and away from the presence and hearing of Ms. Alezras and Mr. Thibodeau, who conversed privately. On July 26, 2000, after Mr. Thibodeau submitted his adoption application, and after the home study visit by Ms. Alezras, the Agency received a confidential telephonic abuse report, Petitioner's exhibit number one.1 The abuse report contains an interpolation of the private conversation between Ms. Alezras and Mr. Thibodeau during the earlier home-study visit. Ms. Carolyn Olsen, Family Counselor Supervisor, testified that Ms. Georgia Alezras reported her private conversation with Mr. Thibodeau to her Agency supervisors. The Agency's interpolation of the Alezras-Thibodeau conversation formed the factual allegations contained in the Agency's August 18, 2000, revocation letter. Sergeant Hagerty, Pasco County Sheriff's Office, testified that she and Sergeant O'Conner investigated the abuse allegations, consisting solely of the Agency's interpolation of Ms. Alezras' earlier and prior conversation with Mr. Thibodeau, by checking with authorities in Washington and checking with the National Criminal Information Center (NCIC) with negative results. The removal of the children from Mr. Thibodeau's home was based upon a joint decision to be safe and take a preventative approach in this matter. Petitioner's exhibit number two, a composite of eight letters, contained a "Closing of Foster Home For Children" report form, with a "foster home closing date" of August 18, 2000, and the caseworker and supervisor's signature on the date of August 22, 2000. The report, under "reason for closing" heading, contains the following comments: [H]is license was revoked because he recently divulged information about his past, that, had we known these facts prior to licensing, would have disqualified him to act as a foster parent---namely, he stated that some years ago he left the state of Washington with an unrelated male child without parental or state permission and lived with him for years under false identification. Ms. Georgia Alezras did not testify. Mr. Thibodeau's testimony is the only evidence of the private conversation with Ms. Alezras. Mr. Thibodeau's recollection of his responses to Ms. Alezras' questions was: [I]n 1975 he moved to the State of Washington; in 1976-77 he met Daniel L.; in 1976-77 he left the State of Washington and moved with Daniel to Pennsylvania where Daniel enrolled in school using his Washington school records; Daniel's mother visited them in Pennsylvania and maintained contact by telephone; Daniel, at age nineteen returned to Washington. He used a friend's birth certificate to secure his Pennsylvania driver's license. His video business2 considerations were subsequently dismissed and he advised the Agency of his decision by letter to his caseworker. Ms. Carolyn Olsen, Agency Representative, testified that one member of every MAPP team always asks a general, catchall question of every [foster care parent] applicant: "Is there anything else we need to know [about you], please tell us, [because] we will probably find out?" Ms. Olsen's candor and purpose comes into question on this point. She was not present during the Alezras-Thibodeau private conversation. Ms. Olsen does not know the identity of the team member who would have asked her catchall question nor does she know of a rule, guideline, or checklist requiring that specific question to be asked of every foster care license applicant, and there was no corroboration of her testimony. The Agency presented no evidence in support of its allegation that during the application process, its failure to inquire and Mr. Thibodeau's failure to disclose activities 20 years earlier in his life resulted from negligence or from the malicious intent of Mr. Thibodeau, and materially affect the health and safety of the minor children in his foster care. The Agency has failed to establish that Mr. Thibodeau left Washington with an unrelated minor child without parental consent and obtained false identification for the child. While it is true that Mr. Thibodeau "left Washington with an unrelated minor child," the Agency produced no evidence that his leaving was "without [minor child's] parental consent." Agency's investigators were unable to make contact with either the child or his mother. No investigation was made of the State of Washington's Motor Vehicle Department. No contact was made with the Pennsylvania authorities. Assuming argunendo, the Agency intended upon establishing this element by "an admission by Mr. Thibodeau"; they presented no evidence Mr. Thibodeau, in fact, uttered words to the effect of or acknowledged the comment "without parental consent." The undisputed evidence is Mr. Thibodeau's testimony that the minor child's mother not only approved of the child leaving Washington with him, but she also visited them in Pennsylvania and had telephone conversations with her child during his stay there. On this issue the Agency failed to carry its burden by clear and convincing evidence. Mr. Thibodeau admitted his use of another's birth certificate to secure a Pennsylvania driver's license more than 20 years ago. Since that time, Mr. Thibodeau's conduct, foster care parenting skills, helping problem young boys, and good moral conduct has been, as testified by the several witnesses, exemplary.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Children and Family Services enter a final order reinstating to Stanley Thibodeau his foster care home license privilege. DONE AND ENTERED 21st day of March, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. FRED L. BUCKINE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of March, 2001.
Findings Of Fact On or about December 5, 1977, the Respondents, Mr. and Mrs. Vincent A. Morris, filed an application for licensure to operate a foster home in District V of the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services. Carol Parks, a Social Worker employed by the Petitioner and who is in charge of licensing in the Foster Care Section of District V, testified as to the procedures utilized in considering applications for foster home licensure. Ms. Parks testified that once an applicant files, she visits the applicant and goes through the orientation session, familiarizing the applicant with the forms, procedures and in a general manner outlining the standards necessary to obtain a foster home license. Ms. Parks ascertained that the Morrises were married and she additionally checked with the Sheriff's Department and other local law enforcement agencies to determine whether or not the Respondents had been convicted of a felony as an adult. 1/ Based on this search with the various local law enforcement agencies, Ms. Parks found no evidence of a conviction of the Respondents. As stated, the Respondents filed the application on or about December 5, 1977, and a license was granted them during April, 1978. On cross-examination, Ms. Parks failed to recall whether or not she asked the Respondents whether or not there were any outstanding felony convictions against them. She testified that she was satisfied with the manner in which the Respondents operated their facility and confirmed the fact that the Respondents were permitted to adopt a sixth foster child during January of 1979. Esther Morris testified that during the orientation session, Ms. Parks never inquired of her if she had been convicted of a crime. Mrs. Morris inquired of Ms. Parks and other agency personnel of the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services whether or not she could begin to remodel her home when she initially filed her application. She was advised by Ms. Parks and others that she should defer any remodeling until they advised her to proceed. The Morrises later obtained approval from that Department to commence the remodeling of her home, which she did, and expended funds totaling approximately $22,000.00 for preparation of this facility as a foster home facility. Presently, she has six foster children, the last of which was adopted during January, 1979. She testified that Ms. Parks asked her whether or not she or her husband had been to jail and she replied that she had not. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1 is a certified copy of a judgment and sentence indicating that on or about August 11, 1975, Respondent, Esther V. Morris, was convicted of welfare fraud, for which she was fined $500.00. Chapter 10C-10.29(7), Florida Administrative Cede, provides in pertinent part that: "No applicant can be considered who, as an adult, has been convicted of a crime." It is based on this rule that the Petitioner is here seeking to revoke the foster hose license of the Respondents. Inasmuch as the above-mentioned rule makes no mention of or provides any procedure for revocation of a license which has been granted, the undersigned is of the considered opinion that such rule provides no basis upon which the Petitioner can revoke the Respondents' license. Particular note was made of the fact that the Respondents credibly testified that they, at no time, misrepresented to the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services that they were convicted of a crime as an adult. While it is true that the cited rule indicates that no person can be considered who, as an adult, has been convicted of a crime, a different issue is here posed inasmuch as the Respondents are now possessed with a license, a right to which certain due process procedures must be complied with prior to revocation. With these facts in mind, the undersigned is not prepared to read into the above- quoted rule authority which is not contained in said rule. Accordingly, I shall recommend that the Administrative Complaint filed herein be dismissed.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is hereby recommended that the complaint filed herein be DISMISSED. ENTERED this 15th day of March, 1979, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 101 Collins Building MAILING ADDRESS: 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675
The Issue Whether Petitioner Antoinette Scanziani's license as a family foster home should be renewed.
Findings Of Fact Based on the testimony and evidence received at the hearing, the following findings are made: Respondent is the state agency responsible for licensing and regulating family foster homes. Children's Home Society (CHS) is the contract agency in the Central Licensing Zone that directly supervises licenses in that area. Petitioner filed an application to renew her family foster home license on May 26, 2006, which was originally issued for one year in August 2005. Prior to the issuance of her family foster care license on August 19, 2005, Petitioner had completed, inter allia, 30 hours of Models Approach Partnership and Parenting (MAPP) training and signed a Foster Parent Agreement, prepared by CHS, which spells out the duties and obligations of a foster parent. Paragraph 12 of the Agreement specifically states that a foster parent will notify CHS immediately of any change of address. Under Respondent's rules, a family foster care license is not transferable, and a new sanitation inspection and recommendation must be completed before Respondent can issue a new license for the new address. The family foster care license was issued to Petitioner for 5831 Bent Pine Drive, Apartment 300, Orlando, Florida 32822. The first foster child was placed in Petitioner's care on September 1, 2005. In August 2005, Petitioner began a dispute with the rental management company who managed the apartment complex where she lived. This resulted in Petitioner giving the company 60 days' notice that she would not renew her lease after October 31, 2005. The rental company, mean while, would not accept her tender of rental payments for August and September 2005, and initiated eviction proceedings in County Court. Prior to the final hearing, a stipulation was signed by the parties and approved by the County Court. Petitioner moved out of her apartment on October 31, 2005. On November 1, 2005, Petitioner, along with one foster child, moved into a house located at 7741 Fort Sumter Drive, Orlando, Florida 32822. CHS was not notified of this change of address until November 11, 2005. The CHS Dependency Specialist worked diligently with Petitioner to obtain a license for her new residence. DCF issued a new family foster care license for 7741 Fort Sumter Drive, Orlando, Florida 32822 on December 20, 2005. Petitioner maintained an unlicensed foster home from the period of November 1, 2005, through December 20, 2005. Although the foster child residing with Petitioner was not removed from the home, Petitioner was reminded of the need to notify CHS prior to any moves in the future. On April 6, 2006, Petitioner notified CHS that she had moved from her Fort Sumter Drive, Orlando, residence to a residence in Poinciana, Florida (Osceola County) at the end of March 2006. It was subsequently determined that a Writ of Possession for the Orlando residence was issued by the Orange County Court on March 2, 2006. Petitioner testified at the hearing that she moved at the end of March 2006, because of poor maintenance and discriminatory and retaliatory conduct by the landlord. The foster child was not removed from the home and the CHS Dependency Specialist again worked diligently and patiently with Petitioner to obtain a license for her family foster care residence at 127 Conch Drive, Kissimmee, Florida 34759 (Poinciana). Due primarily to Petitioner's lack of cooperation, a completed health inspection of the home was not completed until August 4, 2006. During this time, Petitioner submitted her application for relicensure on May 26, 2006. On July 13, 2006, the CHS Dependency Specialist hand delivered a letter, dated July 11, 2006, to Petitioner reminding her that a face-to-face visit and a walk through of the home was required before recommendation could be given. Petitioner was given a check-list of 16 items which were due to be completed prior to July 16, 2006, or CHS could not recommend renewal of her foster care license. On July 18, 2006, CHS sent Petitioner a follow-up letter. Although another home inspection had taken place on July 17, 2006, it was not a satisfactory home health inspection. In addition, proof of completion of 12 hours of training had not been demonstrated and six other items on the check-list were, also, not completed. The deadline for compliance was extended to August 3, 2006, with a reminder that the existing license expired on August 19, 2006. CHS followed with reminder telephone calls on July 19 and 20, followed by another letter on July 25, 2006, that all remaining items must be completed by August 3, 2006. Petitioner demonstrated compliance with four of the items, but did not provide Radon Test results or proof that her 2A10BC fire extinguisher was tagged and inspected. On August 18, 2006, the foster child, living in Petitioner's home, was removed. On August 19, 2006, Petitioner's family foster care license expired by operation of law, without Petitioner having submitted a completed application package to CHS. On August 28, 2006, Respondent sent Petitioner a notice of intent to deny her application for relicensure. The reasons for the denial were outlined on the four-page letter. Petitioner objected to the notice and requested a formal hearing, and this proceeding followed. From the evidence, it is apparent that CHS worked diligently in helping Petitioner transfer her existing license two times, when Petitioner moved without notifying CHS before the move; and encouraged and worked with Petitioner to complete the application for renewal a month before the expiration of her license. However, due to Petitioner's procrastination and/or resistance, the completed documentation was not sent in to Respondent prior to the expiration of her prior license.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that: Petitioner, Antoinette Scanziani's, application for a renewal of her family foster home license be denied. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of May, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of May, 2007.
The Issue The issue in DOAH Case No. 06-0347 is whether the Petitioner, Helena McIntyre (Petitioner) is entitled to the renewal of her foster care license. The issue in DOAH Case No. 06-0537 is whether the Petitioner is entitled to adopt a child placed in her home previously under a foster parent license that has since been denied for renewal (DOAH Case No. 06-0347).
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner has been a licensed foster care parent since 1993. Prior to the instant denial, the Petitioner’s license has been renewed on every occasion. P., a minor, was placed in the Petitioner’s home in 2000. Also in the Petitioner’s home at that time were minor twin brothers, M. and M. In the fall of 2003, the Petitioner became friends with Jimmie Lee Hodgest, a convicted sex offender. Mr. Hodgest pled guilty to three counts of sexual battery on a seven-year old girl. After serving his prison sentence, Mr. Hodgest was released and placed on parole. At all times material to the allegations in these cases, Mr. Hodgest was required to report to his probation officer, Sylvia Diez. According to Ms. Diez, when she became aware of the friendship between Mr. Hodgest and the Petitioner, she asked to meet the Petitioner so that she could explain the offender’s criminal history. Basically, Ms. Diez wanted the Petitioner to understand that she would be checking on Mr. Hodgest to assure he was complying with the terms of his parole. Also, Ms. Diez wanted to verify that Mr. Hodgest would not be left unsupervised with children. To that end Ms. Diez went to the Petitioner’s home to warn the Petitioner about Mr. Hodgest. Ms. Diez saw Mr. Hodgest at the Petitioner’s home on four or five occasions. Most troubling to Ms. Diez, however, was an incident in June of 2004, when she dropped by the Petitioner’s home at 8:21 p.m. and found him alone there. Additionally, on September 29, 2004, at 9:47 p.m., Ms. Diez went to the Petitioner’s home and found her in either a nightgown or housecoat with Mr. Hodgest upstairs in the bedroom area of the home. Mr. Hodgest came downstairs to speak with Ms. Diez. At that time no one represented that the Petitioner and Mr. Hodgest were painting the upstairs. In 2004, Duray Smith conducted an investigation regarding an allegation that the Petitioner allowed a convicted sex offender in her home. Mr. Smith is a Child Protective Investigator employed by the Department. When Mr. Smith interviewed the Petitioner regarding Mr. Hodgest, she admitted knowing the offender but stated that he was merely her yard man. Further, since from the neighbors, the children, and everyone he interviewed, Mr. Smith was unable to verify that the offender was in the home, the allegation was closed with no indicators. Then, in 2005, Mr. Smith received a second allegation of similar conduct. The claim alleged that Mr. Hodgest was frequenting the home such that the children might be at risk. When the 2005 investigation ensued, Mr. Smith interviewed a neighbor who represented that a male did frequent the Petitioner’s home. Mr. Smith was later able to ascertain that the male was Mr. Hodgest. In fact, a child in the home advised Mr. Smith that Mr. Hodgest “naps” at the house. It cannot be determined if Mr. Hodgest did, in fact, take naps at the home. When Mr. Smith confronted the Petitioner with the allegation, she stated that the offender was never at the home unsupervised. The Petitioner admitted that the offender cooked at the home but maintained that she was also in the home at the time (albeit in a different room). From the admissions of the Petitioner (that the offender was inside the home), the comments of others, and his verification that the offender had been frequenting the home for approximately two weeks, Mr. Smith filed a petition to take action to protect the children in the Petitioner’s home. That action removed the foster children from the Petitioner’s home. Mr. Smith believed that all of the children in the Petitioner’s home were at risk of being harmed. There was never an allegation of, or evidence of, any actual physical abuse to the children in the Petitioner’s home. All of the concerns raised by the Department were related to a risk of harm based upon the offender’s past criminal conduct. Mr. Smith’s sole responsibility in this regard was to investigate an allegation and to report on it. Mr. Smith did not investigate the terms of Mr. Hodgest’s probation. Similarly, Mr. Smith did not investigate whether or not the Petitioner’s foster home license should be renewed. Ada Gonzalez, however, was responsible for reviewing the foster home license. When Ms. Gonzalez learned of a second allegation regarding the Petitioner’s home had been confirmed, a staffing was scheduled to consider the status of the Petitioner’s foster home license. According to Ms. Gonzalez, the Petitioner had an affirmative duty to notify the Department of persons within the licensed home who may affect the foster child’s welfare. Ms. Gonzalez was concerned that the Petitioner had been less than candid in disclosing her relationship with the offender and his presence in the Petitioner’s home. The Bilateral Service Agreement between the Department and the Petitioner provided foster parent responsibilities owed to the Department. Those responsibilities included: To notify the department immediately of a potential change in address, living arrangements, martial status, family composition (who is in the home), employment, significant health changes or any other condition that may affect the child’s well being. To notify the department promptly of all contacts the family or any member of the home has with the police or any law enforcement agencies. The Bilateral Service Agreement also provided that: Non-compliance with any of the above provisions may result in administrative action by the department which could include corrective action, suspension, revocation or denial of further licensure pursuant to Chapter 120, Florida Statutes. The Petitioner did not notify the Department that someone who frequented her home was required to be monitored by law enforcement. The Petitioner also did not notify the Department that she had been contacted by Mr. Hodgest’s probation officer. Ms. Gonzalez believed that the Petitioner had an affirmative duty to disclose the probation status of Mr. Hodgest since he was frequently at the home. Following the action initiated by Mr. Smith, the minor children in the Petitioner’s home were removed and a juvenile court judge adjudicated them dependent. The minor child, P., who is the subject of the instant adoption request was placed in another foster home. The Petitioner has denied that the offender was her boyfriend and that he was left unsupervised in the home with the children. The Petitioner acknowledged that she did not notify anyone that Mr. Hodgest was frequently at the home. The weight of the credible evidence dictates a finding that the Petitioner and Mr. Hodgest were not merely in an employer/employee relationship. The Petitioner’s representation that Mr. Hodgest was “the yard man” is not credible. Moreover, the Petitioner knew or should have known that an individual with Mr. Hodgest’s criminal record would be a concern to the Department. As early as 2004, the Petitioner was put on notice that an allegation of concern had been raised. The Petitioner did not remove Mr. Hodgest from access to her home (in fact his visits became more frequent over time), did not acknowledge that Mr. Hodgest could pose a threat to the children in her care, and did not seek counsel from the foster care authorities regarding the offender’s connection to the licensed home.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Children and Family Services enter Final Orders that deny the renewal of the Petitioner’s foster home license and deny the Petitioner’s adoption application. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of February, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S J. D. Parrish Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of February, 2007. COPIES FURNISHED: Gregory Venz, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204B 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 John Copelan, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services Building 8, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Robert Butterworth, Secretary Department of Children and Family Services Building 1, Room 202 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Greer Davis Wallace, Esquire Law Office of Greer Davis Wallace 1450 North Krome Avenue, Suite 101G Florida City, Florida 33034-2400 Rosemarie Rinaldi, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services 401 Northwest Second Avenue, Suite N-1014 Miami, Florida 33128
The Issue May the Department of Children and Family Services (DCF) revoke Respondent's foster home license for violating Section 409.175 (8)(b) 1., Florida Statutes, in that Respondent intentionally or negligently committed acts that materially affected the health and safety of children, to-wit: inadequate supervision of a minor child entrusted to her care?
Findings Of Fact R.G. is the biological mother of the infant female, A.G., born out of wedlock. R.G. gave birth to a male child before A.G. That son was taken away from R.G. by DCF. Both A.G. and R.G., while R.G. was yet a minor under the age of 18 years, were adjudicated dependent children, subject to placement by DCF, pending DNA testing of A.G. and two putative fathers. R.G. had been placed with a licensed foster home other than Respondent's licensed foster home. That home requested R.G.'s removal because R.G. would not follow its rules. R.G. with A.G., was then placed in the licensed foster care home of Respondent. Although the placement of A.G. with Respondent raised Respondent's home population to one more live foster child than Respondent's licensed capacity, a situation to which Respondent objected, DCF personnel informed Respondent that the infant A.G. would be counted as part of R.G.'s placement. Therefore, despite A.G. and R.G. being two separate persons, DCF would not consider Respondent to have exceeded her license's capacity. It was not explained on the record how DCF intended to pay board to Respondent for care of A.G., if A.G. were not considered a whole person, but it is clear that DCF personnel resented Respondent's asking how she would be compensated for A.G.'s care. At all times material, R.G. and A.G. were subject to a Circuit Court Order which permitted only "unsupervised day visitation" by R.G. with A.G. (Emphasis in the original). By implication of the Circuit Court Order, and by her own understanding from instructions by DCF personnel, Respondent knew that R.G., the minor mother, was not permitted to have unsupervised night visitation with the dependent infant, A.G. DCF's and Respondent's understanding of the Circuit Court Order was that Respondent, R.G., and A.G. were required to be in Respondent's home after dark, but Respondent was not required to "eyeball" R.G. and A.G. all night, every night, while they were present in Respondent's foster home. Gracie Rager, DCF foster care worker, authorized Respondent to allow R.G. to take A.G. out of Respondent's foster home during the day for unsupervised visitation. Ms. Rager also authorized Respondent to allow R.G. to take A.G. to R.G.'s older natural sister's home to spend some nights, including weekends. R.G.'s older natural sister was married and licensed for foster care. Accordingly, DCF personnel, including Ms. Rager, presumed that the older sister was sufficiently responsible and qualified to provide supervision of R.G. and A.G. at night. DCF reasonably concluded that R.G.'s presence with A.G. in her sister's home at night would constitute supervised night visitation and comply with the Court's Order. Ms. Rager never authorized Respondent to allow R.G. to take A.G. out at night by herself, but Ms. Rager reasonably saw no impediment, including the Circuit Court Order, to R.G. taking A.G. with her anywhere she wanted to take the baby during the day. R.G. openly resented being placed with Respondent because Respondent is Black. R.G. wanted to return, with A.G., to a white foster home placement. As a result, R.G. was never cooperative with Respondent. When R.G. turned 18 years of age, she became openly defiant of Respondent. R.G. insisted that she alone, would do everything for A.G., who was still under two years old. R.G. refused all assistance from Respondent concerning A.G. Respondent asked DCF to remove R.G. and A.G. or at least A.G., from her foster home. DCF had no other placement for them and asked Respondent to keep them until another placement was found. R.G. had a part-time day job. To get there, she would "catch a ride" with others. She would not accept a ride from Respondent. Sometimes, R.G. would take A.G. with her to work and go directly from work, with A.G., to her older, licensed sister's home. On these occasions, R.G. and A.G. might be gone for a night or a weekend. When R.G. did not return to Respondent's foster home, Respondent sometimes called R.G.'s older, licensed sister's home to be sure that R.G. and A.G. had arrived there safely. Sometimes, Respondent asked this sister to call her when R.G. and A.G. arrived. However, Respondent did not always contact R.G.'s older, licensed sister or otherwise check-up on R.G.'s and A.G.'s whereabouts overnight or over a weekend. When R.G. and A.G. returned after a night or weekend away, Respondent did not always check up on where they had been. Respondent was under the impression that a different, adult sister of R.G.'s was also a suitable adult supervisor for after dark, even though that sister was not licensed for foster care. Indeed, there is nothing in the Circuit Court Order requiring that supervised night-time visitation of R.G. with A.G. could not be undertaken by any other adult, regardless of whether that person were licensed for foster care. Respondent never checked to see if R.G. and A.G. were with R.G.'s unlicensed sister. At no time did Respondent report to law enforcement or DCF that R.G. had gone off and failed to return or that R.G. was taking A.G. away on weekends. At some point, R.G.'s authorized and licensed older sister called Ms. Rager and said R.G. had taken A.G. out all night with R.G.'s boyfriend and had not returned. It is unclear from Ms. Rager's testimony whether R.G.'s and A.G.'s departure point for their night or weekend of unsupervised visitation was Respondent's home or R.G.'s licensed sister's home. On February 9, 2001, Ms. Page, a DCF protective investigator, responded to an abuse hotline call and met with Respondent in the lobby of a DCF facility. During her interview of Respondent, Ms. Page knew nothing of where either R.G. or A.G. had been picked up, or how long they had been unsupervised at night, but Ms. Page "understood" from Ms. Rager that R.G. and A.G. had been removed from Respondent's home and that Respondent had come to the DCF facility voluntarily. Ms. Page was particularly concerned because of a comment Respondent made in the course of this interview, to the effect that Respondent guessed she had "handled it all wrong" because she had only asked to have the baby, A.G., removed from her care instead of reporting R.G.'s rebelliousness. DCF Investigator Page testified that she "verified" in an abuse report that Respondent was guilty of neglect by failure to notify authorities of R.G.'s unsupervised night visitation with A.G. There is insufficient evidence to determine of Respondent ever had a chance to challenge the abuse report or if the report was ever "confirmed." There is no evidence R.G. or A.G. suffered harm as a result of this incident.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Children and Family Services enter a final order dismissing charges against Respondent and restoring her foster care license. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of October, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of October, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: David West, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services Post Office Box 390, Mail Stop 3 Gainesville, Florida 32602 Dr. James Brant, Qualified Representative 1140 Durkee Drive, North Jacksonville, Florida 32209 Cheryl Smith Post Office Box 1053 Lake City, Florida 32056 Virginia A. Daire, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204B Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Josie Tomayo, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
