The Issue The issue presented is whether Petitioner is entitled to a consumer certificate of exemption as a religious institution.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Greater Miami Jewish Cemetery Association, Inc., is a Florida not-for-profit corporation chartered on June 23, 1931, and is an exempt organization under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. Petitioner is a non-stock membership corporation which has three constituent members, namely, Beth David Congregation of Miami, Florida; Beth El Congregation of Miami Beach, Florida; and Beth Jacob Congregation of Miami Beach, Florida, which synagogues are existing Florida not-for-profit corporations exempt from taxation under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. Petitioner maintains and operates two cemeteries in Miami, Dade County, Florida, which are dedicated to burial of members of its constituent member synagogues and other persons of the Hebrew faith, including free burial plots for indigent persons of the Hebrew faith, and, as such, have been classified under the State of Florida Funeral and Cemeteries Act as "church cemeteries." It is a religious obligation of the Hebrew faith to provide for and bury the dead. It is usual for synagogues to maintain cemeteries for their members. No synagogue is located on the premises of Petitioner because some Jews are forbidden to be on the grounds near dead bodies. Accordingly, Jewish cemeteries do not have synagogues on the premises, and, conversely, synagogues do not have cemeteries on their premises, as some churches do. Petitioner does have, however, a room or chapel area where religious services are conducted by Petitioner's constituent members, the three synagogues. Those religious services and activities conducted there include burial services, services on religious holy days, and memorial services.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered granting Petitioner's application for a consumer certificate of exemption. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of September, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of September, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Max R. Silver, Esquire Silver & Silver 150 Southeast Second Avenue, Suite 500 Miami, Florida 33131 William B. Nickell, Esquire Department of Revenue 501 South Calhoun Street, Suite 304 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Linda Lettera, General Counsel Department of Revenue 204 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Larry Fuchs, Executive Director Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399
Recommendation In light of the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department issue a final order dismissing Petitioner’s amended petition on the grounds that Petitioner lacks standing to administratively challenge the Department’s decision not to disapprove McLaughlin’s proposed appointment to Sunniland’s board of directors and that the Department, having failed to act within the time frame prescribed by Rule 3C-100.0385, Florida Administrative Code, does not have the authority to reconsider its decision and issue a letter of disapproval, as requested by Petitioner.16 DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of April, 1997, in Tallahassee, Florida. STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of April 1997.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: Petitioner, Tel-World Ministries (petitioner), is a private, non-profit association formed on January 24, 1996. According to its articles of association, petitioner was formed "to operate for the advancement of religion, religious education and charitable purposes, by the distribution of its funds for such purposes, and in particularly to promote understanding and truth and save soul's in Christ Jesus." Its president is Frederick J. Hoffman, a resident of Holly Hill, Florida. Respondent, Department of Revenue (DOR), is charged with the responsibility of administering and implementing the Florida Revenue Act of 1949, as amended. It has the specific task of collecting sales taxes and enforcing the State Tax Code and rules. By law, certain transactions are exempt from the state sales and use tax. Among these are sales or lease transactions by qualified "charitable" or "religious" institutions. In order for an organization to be entitled to an exemption, it must make application with DOR for a consumer's certificate of exemption and demonstrate that it is a qualified religious or charitble organization within the meaning of the law. Once the application is approved, the certificate entitles the holder to make tax-exempt purchases that are otherwise taxable under Chapter 212, Florida Statutes. Claiming that it was entitled to a certificate of exemption as either a religious or charitable organization, petitioner filed an application with DOR on an undisclosed date in early 1996. The application itself has not been offered into evidence. After requesting additional information, on April 26, 1996, DOR preliminarily disapproved the application on the grounds petitioner did not qualify under the statutory definition of a religious institution, and it did not have as its primary purpose one of seven defined charitable purposes set forth in the law. Thereafter, petitioner filed a request for hearing to contest this decision. In its request for hearing, petitioner contended, among other things, that DOR had failed to consider the legislative intent of the law, failed to consider an amendment to the application, and failed to properly interpret its own rules and the general law. Petitioner agrees it is not a church but rather is a ministry. It has no building or established physical location from which it provides charitable or religious services. As described by its president at hearing, its president, and perhaps two other officers, go to other churches, primarily the Seventh Day Adventist Church, and they "assist" the pastors of those churches by giving "input" at mass, prayer, and Bible study classes. The association also disseminates religious materials, including brochures and the like. Under Section 212.08(7)(o)2.b., Florida Statutes, a charitable institution is generally defined as an entity which holds a current exemption from the federal income tax under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. The entity must also have as its "sole or primary function" the provision of, or raising funds for organizations which provide, one of seven defined charitable services, if a reasonable percentage of such services is provided free of charge, or at a substantially reduced cost, to persons who are unable to pay for such services. The parties agree that petitioner has a current exemption from the federal income tax under section 501(c)(3) and, in this respect, it meets the statutory requirements. Petitioner contends that its sole or primary function is to provide services of the type that fall within the charitable purpose defined in subparagraph (IV) of the statute. That purpose is defined as being "(s)ocial welfare services including adoption placement, child care, community care for the elderly, and other social welfare services which clearly and substantially benefit a client population which is disadvantaged or suffers a hardship." According to petitioner, it does God's work at other churches by assisting those churches' pastors in saving souls, and thus these services fall within the broad definition of "social welfare services." However, within the narrow context of the statutory exemption, and when the term "social welfare services" is given its plain and ordinary meaning, religious or spiritual activities do not qualify as "charitable" services. In general terms, to qualify as a religious institution, an entity must be (a) a church, synagogue, or established physical place for worship at which nonprofit religious services and activities are regularly conducted and carried on, (b) a nonprofit corporation the sole purpose of which is to provide free transportation services to church members and attendees, (c) a "state, district or other governing or administrative office whose function is to assist or regulate the customary activities of religious organizations or members within the state or district organization," or (d) a corporation qualified as nonprofit under section 501(c)(3) that owns or operates a Florida television station. Petitioner has no "established physical place for worship," its sole purpose is not to provide free transportation services to church members and attendees, and it does not operate a television station. Thus, it cannot qualify under the first, second and fourth parts of the definition. Petitioner's president contends, however, that he represents the "state office" of Tel-World Ministries, and therefore the association meets that part of the test. It is noted that the only "office" within the entity is that found in Holly Hill and it is not a part of a larger organization. Under DOR policy, in order to pass muster as a state, district or administrative office, petitioner must be a part of a larger organization and, within the hierarchy of that larger organization, assist or regulate the activities of those beneath it in the organizational hierarchy. This interpretation of the law is found in prior agency orders and is deemed to be reasonable. Because petitioner does not comport with this policy, it cannot qualify as a "state administrative office" within the meaning of the law. In summary, while petitioner submitted evidence to show that it is engaged in laudable religious efforts, the entity itself does not qualify as a religious or charitable institution for tax purposes, and thus it is not entitled to a consumer certificate of exemption.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that respondent enter a Final Order denying petitioner's application for a consumer certificate of exemption as a religious or charitable institution. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of August, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of August, 1996. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER Respondent: Respondent's proposed findings, while substantially altered, have been adopted in substance. COPIES FURNISHED: Larry Fuchs, Executive Director Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100 Linda Lettera, General Counsel Department of Revenue 204 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100 Frederick J. Hoffman 1728 Derbyshire Road Holly Hill, Florida 32117 William B. Nickell, Esquire Department of Revenue Post Office Box 6668 Tallahassee, Florida 32314-6668
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner, Affordable Home Ownership Corporation, is eligible for a consumer certificate of exemption as a charitable institution pursuant to Section 212.08(7)(o), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Affordable Home Ownership Corporation (hereinafter referred to as "AHO"), is a Florida nonprofit corporation. Respondent, the Department of Revenue (hereinafter referred to as the "Department"), is an agency of the State of Florida. Among other things, the Department is charged with responsibility for implementing and administering Florida tax laws, including Chapter 212, Florida Statutes. During 1996, AHO submitted an application for an exemption under Chapter 212, Florida Statutes, as a charitable organization. According to the Articles of Corporation of AHO, its purpose is: To raise the economic, educational and social levels of the underprivileged residents of Lake City (Columbia County), Florida, and its trade area, who are substantially underemployed and have low income, by fostering and promoting community-wide interest and concern for the problems of such residents, and to that end; Racial tension, prejudice, and discrimination of economic and otherwise may be eliminated; Sickness, poverty and crime may be lessened and; Educational and economic opportunities may be expanded among the residents of Lake City (Columbia County), Florida, and its trade area. To expand the opportunities available to said residents to own, manage, and operate business enterprises in economically underprivileged or depressed areas; to assist said residents and groups in developing management skills necessary for the successful operation of business enterprises; to provide financial support for the successful operation of business enterprises by said residents and to assist said residents in obtaining such financial support from other sources. To aid, support and assist by gifts, contributions or otherwise, other corporations, community chests, funds and foundations organized and operated exclusively for charitable, religious, scientific, literary or educational purposes, no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private shareholders or individuals, and no substantial part of the activities of which is carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting to influence legislation. To do any and all lawful activities which may be necessary, useful or desirable for the furtherance, accomplishment, fostering or attainment of the foregoing purposes, either directly or indirectly, and either along or in conjunction or cooperation with others, whether such others be persons or organizations of any kind or nature such as corporations, firms, associations, trust, institutions, foundations, or governmental bureaus, departments or agencies. The Department conceded in its proposed recommended order that AHO meets the requirement for exemption in this matter that it be designated a Section 501(c)(3) charitable organization by the United States Internal Revenue Service. The services provided by AHO are provided without charge to its clients. Those services include recruiting families who are qualified for federal home loans who are committed and able to provide their time and labor to construct their own housing. AHO brings several such families together to share the labor and effort necessary to build housing for each family. Each family shares in the labor of constructing the home of each other family in the group. AHO assists the families prepare mortgage applications necessary to receive federally subsidized loans and provides credit counseling necessary for families to qualify for such loans. Once a family qualifies for a loan, AHO assists in the selection of house plans, the selection of construction materials, the organization of the family groups, teaches general construction techniques and assists with all aspects of completing construction of housing. AHO also assists in bookkeeping necessary to administer mortgage loans. AHO does not act as a general contractor. Nor does AHO provide construction labor or materials, or the funds necessary for construction. AHO receives administrative grants through the state's Housing Finance Agency as a Community Housing Development Organization. AHO's expenses in providing its services are entirely expenses of the organization. AHO's total expenditures are for its day-to-day operations. No funds are expended directly for clients.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered by the Department of Revenue denying the certificate of exemption sough by Affordable Home Ownership Corporation. DONE AND ORDERED this 2nd day of June, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. LARRY J. SARTIN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this this 2nd day of June, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Rufus L. Smith Executive Director, A.H.O.C. Affordable Home Ownership Corporation Post Office Box 7347 Lake City, Florida 32055 Kevin J. ODonnell Assistant General Counsel Department of Revenue Post Office Box 6668 Tallahassee, Florida 32314-6668 Linda Lettera General Counsel Department of Revenue 204 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Larry Fuchs Executive Director Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100
The Issue Whether Petitioner qualifies for the renewal of a consumer certificate of exemption as a qualified religious organization pursuant to Section 212.08(7)(o), Florida Statutes?
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is an active not-for-profit corporation organized under the laws of the State of Florida. It maintains exempt status under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. The Respondent is the state agency charged with the administration of the tax laws of the State of Florida, including those dealing with the grant or denial of consumer certificates of exemption to qualified organizations. Reverend Roy Harthern is an ordained Assembly of God minister who previously had a career as a minister in several churches in Texas and Florida, as well as founding a Christian magazine and a Christian television station in Florida. The Reverend and Mrs. Harthern are evangelists and Bible teachers. In 1983, Reverend Harthern and his wife, Pauline, founded the organization from which the Reverend and Mrs. Harthern practice an itinerant ministry. They preach in different established churches each week, both inside and outside of the State of Florida and the United States. In the past, Reverend Harthern has had a regular religious show on television. Reverend Harthern also writes, records religious tapes and has a weekly radio program on a station owned by others. Petitioner does not have an established physical place of worship at which nonprofit religious services are regularly held; does not provide transportation for church members or other services; and does not provide services to state prisoners. There has been no substantial change in the type or nature of Petitioner's ministry since its founding in 1983. Respondent issued a certificate of exemption to Petitioner in 1983 as a "religious organization." Petitioner has renewed the exemption, in five-year intervals, ever since. Respondent has never sought to revoke or suspend Petitioner's exempt status since 1983. On July 18, 1997, Petitioner applied to renew its consumer certificate of exemption as a "religious organization." Its previous certificate was issued on October 6, 1992, and was due to expire on October 5, 1997 There has been no substantive changes to the implementing statute during the relevant time period. On October 13, 1997, Respondent issued its Notice of Intent to Deny to Petitioner on the grounds that Petitioner did not have an established physical place of worship at which nonprofit religious services and activities were regularly conducted.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Revenue enter a Final Order denying Petitioner's renewal application for exemption, and the provisions of Section 212.08(7)(o)2.1., Florida Statutes. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of April, 1998, at Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of April, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Roy Harthern, President Roy Harthern Ministries, Inc. Post Office Box 915971 Longwood, Florida 32791 Rex D. Ware, Esquire Department of Revenue Post Office Box 6668 Tallahassee, Florida 32314-6668 Linda Lettera, General Counsel Department of Revenue 204 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100 Larry Fuchs, Executive Director Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100
Findings Of Fact On January 16, 1987, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services notified J. S. By letter that it had received a report of neglect regarding him and advised him of his right to request the report be amended or expunged. J. S. did so but on February 26, 1987, the Department advised him his request for expungement had been denied. Thereafter, J. S. requested a formal hearing which was held by the undersigned on October 27, 1987. After a full, formal hearing on the merits, at which both testimony and documentary exhibits were presented by both parties, the undersigned, on December 1, 1987, entered a Recommended Order in which it was found, as a matter of fact, that while the alleged victim of the neglect was incapable of totally caring for himself, the evidence presented was insufficient to establish that the relationship between the victim and J. S. was a care-giving one or that J. S. had the responsibility to look out for the victim so as to bring him within the purview of the statute. The Department thereafter entered a Final Order consistent with the Recommended Order, amending the classification of the report to "unfounded" and expunging it from the Department records. Evidence introduced at the original formal hearing held herein established that J. S. was an employee, (resident manager) at the Royal Palm Retirement Home in Ft. Myers, Florida. He was not the owner of the facility nor was any evidence introduced to indicate he had any financial interest, other than as an employee, in the facility. Further, he was not engaging in the professional practice of a licensed profession. His relationship with the alleged victim was found to be no more than that of landlord-tenant. The Department's investigation of the alleged neglect, while not completely comprehensive, nonetheless was sufficiently thorough to meet the test of reasonableness.
The Issue Does Petitioner qualify for a consumer's certificate of exemption as a "church" as defined in Rule 12A-1.001(3)(c), Florida Administrative Code, or as a "religious institution" as defined in Section 212.08(7)(o) 2.a., Florida Statutes?
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant findings of fact are made: Friends Housing and Care, Inc. (Petitioner), is a non-profit corporation exempt from federal income tax under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. Petitioner has filed under the fictitious name statute and is doing business under the name Woodmere at Jacarande. Petitioner's Amended Articles of Incorporation dated October 25, 1996, state Petitioner's purposes as follows: To provide elderly families, elderly persons, and handicapped persons housing and related facilities and services specially designed to meet the physical, social, psychological, economic and spiritual needs of the aged and contribute to their health, financial security, happiness and usefulness in longer living. To plan, construct, operate, maintain, and improve housing and related facilities and services for elderly families and elderly persons. To acquire by gift or purchase, hold, sell, convey, assign, mortgage, or lease any property, real or personal, necessary or incident to the provisions of housing and related facilities and services for elderly families and elderly persons. To borrow money and issue evidence of indebtedness in furtherance of any or all of the objects of its business; and to secure loans by mortgage, pledge, deed or trust, or other lien. To engage in any kind of activity, and enter into, perform and carry out contracts of any kind, necessary or in connection with, or incidental to the accomplishment of any one or more of the nonprofit purposes of the corporation. To conduct educational or scientific research on a non-profit basis and to cooperate with foundations, educational institutions, and research centers in promoting same, with the aim of increasing knowledge and enhancing life in our society. To foster and encourage spiritual life and bring the human spirit into intimate relation with the Divine Spirit, to provide definite, organized opportunity for the development of spiritual values and for the renewal of our strength in accordance with generally accepted faith and practice of the Religious Society of Friends. Note 1 of Petitioner's audited financial statements containing the independent auditor's report dated January 8, 1997, states that Petitioner ". . .was created by Friends (Quakers) to plan and develop a Not-for-Profit Condominium Retirement Community in Florida to meet the needs of Friends and others who wish to retire or live in a Quaker-sponsored retirement community in Florida. " Note 3 to the same financial statements indicates that Petitioner's operations have been devoted to raising capital, obtaining financing, purchasing land and beginning construction on the planned retirement community. As reflected in the unaudited financial statement dated April 30, 1997, of the total reflected year-to-date expenses of $820,681: $299,548 went to architectural fees; $71,985 was spent for engineering fees; $84,265 was spent for pre-construction management fees; and $40,331 went to advertising. Only $200 was directed to worship expenses. Neither the audited financial statements nor any of the notes thereto indicate that Petitioner is engaged in any religious activities or worship services. Petitioner's retirement community will comprise 32.7 acres, with a 3.7 acre easement. There will be about 700 condominiums constructed on this acreage. Currently, it is anticipated that the first condominiums will be available for occupancy sometime in 1999. Thus, currently there are no residents residing at the Petitioner's retirement community. Petitioner will be constructing an 80,000 square foot commons building which will contain an "auditorium chapel" consisting of approximately 5,500 square feet. This building has not been constructed. The "auditorium chapel" will be used for "religious purposes and multiple-purposes." It is anticipated that both silent and program services of the Friends (Quaker) faith will be held in the chapel. Other religious faiths would also be included. There will also be located within the commons building a 6,000 square foot dining facility, 4,000 square foot library, a gift shop, beauty and barber shops, post office, banking facility, game rooms, and lounge area. Petitioner sells its condominiums to members of the general public of retirement age, regardless of their religious affiliation or even if they have no religious affiliation. Purchasers do not have to be members of the Friends (Quaker) faith. In fact, the retirement community will be a "non- denominational community." The price of the condominiums ranges from about $82,000 for a one-bedroom (676 square foot) unit, to well over $200,000 for a large (2100 square foot) unit. In addition to the sales price, Petitioner will charge its residents a monthly condominium fee to cover maintenance. An activity or club fee will also be charged by Petitioner to cover residents' social activities and transportation costs. If a resident needs medical attention, Petitioner will provide the care and bill the resident's insurance company for the cost of the care. Several witnesses testified that the meetings held at Petitioner's location were held under the name "Woodmere Friends Fellowship," while other witnesses testified that the meetings held at Petitioner's location were held under the name "Woodmere Fellowship." The newspaper advertisements or other published advertisements advertising meetings at Petitioner's location did not refer to "Woodmere Friends Fellowship" or "Woodmere Fellowship." An advertisement appearing in "Quaker Life" in June 1997, indicated that "All Friends Fellowship" was located at Woodmere at Jacaranda. A newsletter from Petitioner dated January 1997, stated that "Friends Inter-Faith Fellowship" was begun at Woodmere Information Center and that several prospective residents from the Venice/Englewood area had "voiced interest in having a meeting in this area. Presently, these meetings are being held every Sunday evening at 6:30 p.m." Additionally, this newsletter stated that these meetings were consistent with Petitioner's federally-recognized religious affiliation. However, Petitioner is never identified as a church or religious institution in this newsletter. By letter dated February 17, 1997, William R. Martin, Petitioner's Chairman, advised the Department that "[o]ur Worship group is being identified as the Woodmere All Friends Fellowship." In an advertisement dated February 1, 1997, Woodmere at Jacaranda, a Quaker-sponsored, resident-owned retirement community, invites interested people to attend a fellowship hour at 6:00 p.m. the first and third Sunday of each month. This advertisement does not refer to Petitioner as a church or religious institution. The bulletins, advertisements, newsletters, and other evidence submitted by the Petitioner do not refer to Petitioner as a church or religious institution. The hours of operation posted on the doors to Petitioner's premises indicate that Petitioner is open Monday through Friday from 9:00 a.m. to 5:30 p.m., and Saturday from 9:00 a.m. to 1:00 p.m. There were no hours listed for Sunday. Additionally, there was nothing to indicate that worship service or religious activities were being conducted by Petitioner on its premises. Although there are meetings being held at Petitioner's location where religious services or activities are being conducted on a somewhat regular basis, there is insufficient evidence to show that Petitioner is responsible for, and conducting, those religious services or activities. Petitioner's sole purpose is not to provide free transportation services to church members, their families, and other church attendees. Petitioner is not a state, district, or other governing or administrative offices the function of which is to assist or regulate the customary activities of religious organizations or members. Petitioner does not own or operate a Florida television station whose programs are of a religious nature. Petitioner does not provide regular religious services to Florida state prisoners. Friends Housing and Care, Inc., d/b/a Woodmere at Jacaranda is a Quaker-sponsored, resident-owned, retirement community whose primary function is the development and marketing of a retirement community to members of the general public, regardless of religious affiliation. Petitioner intends to use its sales tax exemption primarily to purchase building materials, including those building materials for the condominiums which it produces for sale to the general public, regardless of their religious affiliation.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department enter a final order denying Petitioner's application for sales tax exemption. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of February, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6947 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of February, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Larry Fuchs Executive Director Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100 Linda Lattera General Counsel Department of Revenue 204 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100 Nick Roknich, Esquire Dunlap, Moran, Roknich, and Gibson, P.A. 1819 Main Street, Suite 700 Sarasota, Florida 34236 Ruth Ann Smith, Esquire Department of Revenue Post Office Box 6668 Tallahassee, Florida 32314-6668
Findings Of Fact One of some 10,000 American-born Sikhs, Harimandir Kaur Khalsa originally became involved with Sikhism, said to be one of the eight major religions of the world, in 1979. Several years ago she took vows to cover her hair, not to cut her hair, and to adhere to a daily spiritual practice called sadhana. An Armidary Sikh, she was ordained a Sikh minister Christmas Day 1991. The parties stipulated to the sincerity of petitioner's religious beliefs. In part, her religious beliefs find expression in her attire. Orthodox Sikhs wear turbans and churidars, a type of legging; and their clothing is white. This mode of dress has symbolic religious significance for Sikhs generally. Turbans are "mandatory." T.93. Dressed as an orthodox Sikh, petitioner Khalsa appeared for a job interview with Putnam County's sanitation director, Joseph Battillo, on or about August 23, 1990. The interview had been arranged after Mrs. Khalsa responded to a newspaper advertisement seeking a "Recycling Director for Putnam County." T.119. Even before she saw the advertisement, she had read about the job and telephoned to inquire. In the interview, Mrs. Khalsa did not tell Mr. Battillo that all the clothes she owned were white, but she did tell him that the way she was dressed was "always the way I dress." T.41. One of Ms. Khalsa's references told the young lady in the Putnam County personnel department who called to inquire about her that "Harimandir always dresses in white . . . because of her religion." T.22. Mr. Battillo understood that Mr. Khalsa wore a turban for religious reasons, although he originally testified that he did not understand (T.122) that the remainder of her outfit was also religiously compelled. (T.111) He eventually conceded that she indicated she wore mostly white "in the context of the conversation that she was a Sikh." T.132. Asked whether it was his "reasonable understanding that the reason she wore white is because she was a Sikh," he answered, "I guess you could assume that." Id. The day after the interview she was surprised to be told over the telephone that the job was hers. (Of six interviewees, she was Mr. Battillo's second choice for the position.) Her experience with graphic arts was an important qualification. Mr. Battillo felt there was some urgency in filling the position: certain deadlines had to be met if grant moneys available to Putnam County were not to be forfeited. Petitioner started working for respondent on August 30, 1990, at an annual salary of $14,400. On her first day on the job, Mr. Battillo summoned her to his office, asked her to shut the door, and told her she would "have to make a few changes" (T.45) in her appearance because "people would have a problem with the way," id., she looked. She told him she did not believe it would be a problem. In her job interview, she had suggested she "would have instant recognition and people would be reminded when they saw [her] to recycle." T.41. When she was hired, Mrs. Khalsa bought an off-white suit, which she wore the second day on the job. The following day, Mr. Battillo thanked her for not wearing all white, again after summoning her to his office and ordering the door closed. He told her she "look[ed] fine from the knees up . . . [but] that the leggins had to go." T.48. He said that she needed to wear colors and that "if you don't change the way you dress, you're not going to be allowed to do your job." T.49. She told him she planned to get new shoes. After leaving his office, she cried. Mrs. Khalsa worked closely with Diane Shoeman, a high school teacher who served as an educational consultant, for about ten hours, developing curriculum on recycling for the Putnam County schools. They enjoyed a good working relationship, which Mrs. Shoeman told Mr. Battillo at the time. On September 18, 1990, when she was in his office on business, Mr. Battillo told her she could not continue dressing as she had been, that it was the same "as if an employee didn't wear a bra to work and he had to tell her to wear a bra." T.52. He told her that, when he had worked in Sarasota, the Mennonite women dressed plainly "but that they wore pastel colors. And couldn't [petitioner] dress that way?" T.53. Mr. Battillo was adamant, and petitioner left his office in tears. He granted her request for a half day off to shop for clothes. The day after she acquired a new pair of shoes, white hose and a blue dress, Mrs. Khalsa wore them to work. When Mr. Battillo asked her if she was comfortable dressed like that, she said she "could live with it" (T.69) even though she felt she was compromising her practice as a Sikh. From then on, she wore white hose rather than churidars as long as she worked for Putnam County, afraid she would lose her job otherwise. The blue dress she wore every few days, even though her mother-in-law was shocked when she first saw it. Mrs. Khalsa met her September 30, 1990, deadline for purchasing certain audiovisual equipment, and for completing numerous other assignments. She drew on her experience as a graphic artist in designing or doing the layout for bookcovers for school children, an educational activities book on recycling, sun visors, bookmarks, decals, magnets, information posters and brochures for which she both wrote the text and "d[id] the art work." T.64. On October 2, 1990, the Monday after meeting the deadline (so avoiding forfeiture of the grant), she was fired by Mr. Battillo, who explained, "I don't like you and I don't like your turban." T.71 Mrs. Khalsa's manner of dress was an important motivating factor for her discharge. During calendar year 1991, Petitioner and her husband together earned approximately $6,000. When he terminated her employment, Mr. Battillo also mentioned friction with the printers with whom Mrs. Khalsa had been dealing. They supposedly resented her asking for proofs, apparently a departure from past practice under County contracts; and were perhaps embarrassed when she pointed out that they had billed for work never done. T.94 When she began work, she was told she "had six months to learn procedures." T.100. Mrs. Khalsa conscientiously sought to comply with County purchasing policies, despite some confusion about just what the policies were in certain particulars. The only "changes" she insisted on without processing change orders were to assure that the county received what the printer had originally agreed to supply, or the equivalent. T.105, 108-9. At hearing, Mr. Battillo testified to complaints about music Mrs. Khalsa listened to at work, but other employees listened to radios at work, and the only other employee in the building where Mrs. Khalsa worked told her at the time that he could not hear music from her office. Mr. Battillo once entered her office to find incense burning, which she extinguished at his request, never to rekindle on the premises. Once, she and her building mate disagreed on the thermostat's setting, she closed her door, shut the cooling vents and opened her windows, until told not to, when she promptly complied.
Recommendation It is, therefore, RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Commission on Human Relations order Putnam County to reinstate petitioner and pay her back wages, along with reasonable attorney's fees and costs. DONE and ENTERED this 11th day of February, 1993, at Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of February, 1993. APPENDIX Petitioner's proposed findings of facts Nos. 1-11, 13, 15, 33 and 34 have been adopted, in substance, insofar as material. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact Nos. 12, 14 and 35 pertain to subordinate matters. Respondent's proposed findings of fact were not numbered. COPIES FURNISHED: Matthew P. Farmer, Esquire Farmer & Fitzgerald, P.A. 2910 Bay to Bay Boulevard Suite 214 Tampa, FL 33629 Ronald E. Clark, Esquire P.O. Box 2138 Palatka, FL 32178-2138 Margaret Jones, Clerk Human Relations Commission 325 John Knox Road Building F. Suite 240 Tallahassee, FL 32303-4149 Dana Baird, Esquire General Counsel Human Relations Commission 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, FL 32303-4149
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Maria DeSillers, is the mother of Ronald David DeSillers, Jr. (Ronnie), a minor, now deceased. Because of an illness suffered by her son, respondent solicited, either directly or indirectly, funds for the benefit of her son. On January 29, 1987 respondent opened an account in the Coral Gables Federal Savings and Loan Association under the name "Maria DeSillers as Custodian for Ronald David DeSillers, Jr. under the Florida Uniform Transfers to Minors Act" (custodial account). A deposit of approximately $660,000 was made into the custodial account the same day. The establishment of the account was made under the authority of Chapter 710, Florida Statutes (1987), which governs the transfer of property by gift to minors. Under the statutory scheme set forth in Chapter 496, Florida Statutes (1987), charitable organizations, subject to certain exceptions, must register with petitioner, Department of State, Division of Licensing (Division). Although respondent acknowledges that her actions of soliciting funds constituted a charitable organization as defined by Subsection 496.02(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1987), the parties have stipulated that respondent has never registered as a charitable organization with the Division. On April 29, 1987 Ronnie died intestate (without a will). The balance in the custodial account on the day of his death was $509,912.50. The parties have stipulated that, after Ronnie's death, the following transfers and expenditures were made by respondent from Ronnie's custodial account: On May 13, 1987 respondent transferred $227,971 from the custodial account into a Maria DeSillers account which stated it was in trust for her parents, Manuela and Jose Marchante. On June 20, 1987 respondent paid $400 from the custodial account to Plaza Venetia as a deposit on a rental unit. On June 27, 1987 respondent paid $1,350 from the custodial account to Plaza Venetia. The stipulation does not disclose the purpose of this payment. On July 9 and 10, 1987 respondent made cash withdrawals from the custodial account in the amounts of $7,000 and $3,000, respectively. On July 10, 1987 respondent transferred $158,132 from the account in trust for her parents into a Barnett Bank Account entitled "Maria DeSillers." On January 19, 1988 respondent withdrew $25,000 from the custodial account to pay attorney fees. On December 31, 1987 petitioner subpoenaed the bank records of the custodial account and commenced an investigation into the matter. The investigation culminated in the issuance of an administrative complaint against respondent on January 29, 1988 alleging she had violated Subsection 496.04(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1987), by failing to register with petitioner as a charitable organization after having lost her exemption from registration. That prompted this proceeding. The parties have stipulated that the balance in the custodial account was $262,015.37 on November 18, 1987 and $239,287.93 on February 17, 1988. On March 7, 1988 the circuit court in and for the Eleventh Judicial Circuit, Probate Division, appointed Karen Gievers, Esquire, as curator to protect the remaining assets of Ronnie's estate.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the administrative complaint filed against Maria DeSillers be DISMISSED with prejudice. DONE AND ORDERED this 20th day of June, 1988, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of June, 1988.
The Issue Has Respondent committed an "unlawful employment practice" against Petitioner, pursuant to Chapter 760, Florida Statutes, based upon a Petition for Relief dated October 13, 1997, referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings by the Florida Commission on Human Relations?
Findings Of Fact Respondent stipulated to jurisdiction, and the evidence demonstrates that by number of employees, Respondent is an "employer" as defined in Chapter 760, Florida Statutes. Respondent is a freight company which ships and receives living nursery stock by truck through a depot/warehouse. Petitioner was employed there from 1993 until June 16, 1995. In the course of formal hearing, Petitioner waived his Charge of Discrimination on the basis of his national origin (United States citizen). (TR-116). There is no evidence the Respondent employs anyone other than United States citizens. The remainder of Petitioner's allegations were that Respondent failed to accommodate one or more handicaps and subjected Petitioner to disparate treatment from similarly situated black employees. Petitioner also related a series of remarks and one personnel action that he considered to be harassing and abusive due to his handicaps. The "handicaps" that Petitioner testified to were high blood pressure, an undefined heart condition requiring medication, "bad knees," and problems with his back. At formal hearing, no medical physician or health care professional corroborated the foregoing conditions. However, it is undisputed that on or about January 9, 1995, Petitioner presented a physician's excuse to Respondent's Warehouse Supervisor, Jeff Bradner. That physician's excuse stated that Petitioner could return to work on that date, working 10 hours per day, 5 days per week, doing medium lifting, that is, "lifting 30 pounds and frequently lifting and/or carrying objects weighing 25 pounds." The excuse further stated that Petitioner was to avoid squatting, kneeling, and climbing. Mr. Bradner informed Eddie Payne, Petitioner's immediate supervisor, that the foregoing January 9, 1995, medical restrictions were to be observed for Petitioner. Attached to both Petitioner's initial Charge of Discrimination and his later Petition for Review was another physician's letter dated January 29, 1993. It stated, in pertinent part: [Petitioner], patient of record, suffers from high blood pressure, anxiety, and arterial coronary disease. These conditions are aggravated by the stress caused by problems he has with his teenage son. Also attached was a March 3, 1994, doctor's letter stating that Petitioner had a spine and knee injury. It contains the same restrictions as the January 9, 1995, letter. Because the 1993 and 1994 letters are part of the record herein, (attached to the Charge of Discrimination and Petition for Relief), I have taken official recognition thereof and find that they supplement or explain Petitioner's oral testimony at formal hearing to the effect that Petitioner was suffering from high blood pressure, anxiety, and arterial coronary disease in 1993, and from a knee injury in 1994. However, these letters were not introduced in evidence at formal hearing, and Petitioner did not testify that he ever presented any such written medical confirmations of these conditions to any of Respondent Employer's supervisory personnel. Mr. Payne and Mr. Bradner denied that any oral or written requests for accommodation had been received from Petitioner other than the January 9, 1995, doctor's excuse listing specific restrictions. Contrary to Petitioner's testimony, Mr. Payne denied knowing of Petitioner's heart condition. There also is no corroboration of Petitioner's testimony that he orally requested any accommodation specifically because of his high blood pressure or heart condition at any material time. Furthermore, and most importantly, the 1993 letter places no restrictions on Petitioner in the workplace, and the 1994 letter imposes the same restrictions as the 1995 letter, which is in evidence. The only medical condition any of his co-workers ever heard Petitioner complain about was his "bad knees." Upon the record as a whole, it is inferred that Eddie Payne also knew Petitioner complained of "bad knees." At all times material, both before January 9, 1995, and afterwards, Petitioner worked for Respondent as a "checker." Checkers have the most physically non-taxing job in Respondent's operation. They make sure that "wheelers" or "loaders" place unloaded freight on pallets in the correct location in the warehouse and that "loaders" load the correct freight from the warehouse or warehouse dock into the correct truck. In this capacity, the bulk of Petitioner's work was carrying a clipboard, making notations thereon, and orally directing others where to put boxes. Petitioner testified that due to his blood pressure and back condition, he "needed" to sit down for 15 minutes' rest every 20 minutes after January 9, 1995. The evidence as a whole does not indicate that Petitioner clearly enunciated this "need" to any supervisor. Moreover, the credible evidence supports the inference that no one could work effectively as a checker while taking 15 minute breaks as frequently as every 20 minutes, because each truck needed to be loaded or unloaded as a component, so as to avoid shipping errors. Therefore, substituting other checkers every 20 minutes would have adversely affected Respondent's business and would constitute an unreasonable accommodation for Petitioner and undue hardship for the Employer. Either substituting another checker or waiting on Petitioner to rest every 20 minutes would have been unduly costly, burdensome, or substantially disruptive and would have altered the nature of Respondent's business. Prior to January 9, 1995, Petitioner worked at least a 40-50 hour week and was paid by the number of hours he worked. Due to the nature of Respondent's business and the hours when freight was received, Petitioner's usual hours before January 9, 1995, were from approximately 4:00-4:30 p.m. until 9:30 a.m. (17- 18 hours) three days a week, mostly Monday, Tuesday and Thursday. At all times material, both before and after January 9, 1995, only twenty-five percent as much freight came in on Wednesdays and Fridays as came in on the other three work days of each week. Therefore, all employees were not needed for a 17-18 hour day on those days, and employees had the option of working at whatever was available on those days to "make their hours" for pay purposes. At all times material, on Wednesdays and Fridays, all employees who wanted to work took turns digging weeds out of the cracks in the Respondent's paved parking lot with a claw on a broom handle or the edge of a shovel; picking the weeds up with a shovel; and throwing them away. Sometimes a blower was used. In accord with the January 9, 1995, physician's written restrictions, Eddie Payne accommodated Petitioner by assigning him to work from 10:00 p.m. until 8:00 a.m., so that Petitioner would only be working 10 hours per day. This assignment had Petitioner working the hours during which the employer needed the most men because those were the hours when the workload was the heaviest. Petitioner complained because Mr. Payne would not let him work his 10 hours from 4:30 p.m. to 2:30 a.m., a less busy time, but he complained only because those hours were more convenient for him. Petitioner related that after January 9, 1995, he was made to lift more than 30 pounds of parking lot weeds at a time, with the shovel, after getting on his hands and knees to dig the weeds out, and always in the hot sun, which aggravated his undisclosed heart condition. He also related that he never got to use the blower like other employees. His testimony on this issue is not credible in light of the contrary testimony of all the other witnesses. Even if credible, Petitioner was not forced to do this work. He was permitted to do this "make work" during slow days so that he would earn at least 40 hours per week. Witnesses confirmed that another "make work" project on a single occasion was digging muck out of a ditch. Petitioner testified that he was required to dig more than 30 pounds of muck in each shovelful that he lifted out of the ditch. His description was neither corroborated or refuted, but again, Petitioner was the one who controlled the content of each shovel, and he could have declined to work at that "make work" project. According to Petitioner's time cards, from which information Petitioner received his pay, Petitioner usually worked only 10 hours or less per day after January 9, 1995. Occasionally, he worked more than 10 hours, but less than 11 hours per day. Petitioner and Eddie Payne were fishing buddies outside of work, and on at least one occasion, Eddie Payne treated his subordinates, including Petitioner, to a night-clubbing expedition. Petitioner asserted that on the job, Eddie Payne had used derogatory and profane language to him, on account of his handicaps. Once, when Petitioner wanted to punch-out early, Mr. Payne supposedly said, "Go home if you need to, you crippled old pussy." Once, Mr. Payne allegedly called Petitioner "a crippled old Mother F-----." Mr. Payne denied ever using such language either socially or on the job. Mr. Bradner testified that he had instructed his subordinates against profanity on the job, and related that Mr. Payne had a reputation for not using profanity. No other witness corroborated Petitioner's testimony that any such language had ever been addressed to Petitioner. Petitioner called Matthew Hickox, a co-employee, as a witness. Mr. Hickox related that Petitioner would often "act goofy," by doing a "Quasimodo imitation," twisting his arm, making a face, and dragging one leg behind him. When Petitioner did this, other employees would "make cracks." Petitioner claimed that dragging his leg behind him was evidence of his handicap. Mr. Hickox's opinion was that "disabled don't give you the right to act like a nut and then people not make some comment." Petitioner testified that he had only become entirely disabled since leaving Respondent's employ June 16, 1995. Although Petitioner moved slowly and evidenced pain on rising and sitting, he was able to move around and approach the witness stand at formal hearing. The undersigned observed no twisted arm, facial contortions, or dragging leg. It is inferred from observing the candor and demeanor of all the witnesses, including Petitioner, and from the whole of the evidence, but particularly from Mr. Hickox's testimony, that on such occasions as Petitioner performed his imitation on the job, Mr. Payne or Mr. Bradner may have vehemently ordered Petitioner back to work and warned him to cut out the horseplay. Petitioner claimed to have received only a fifteen-cent per hour raise when other employees received more. According to Petitioner, the other employees, including Mr. Gonzalez, were raised by twenty-five cents per quarter hour for a $1.00 per hour raise. What anyone was being paid before this raise is not in evidence. Since no evidence indicates whether this raise occurred before or after January 9, 1995, when Respondent's management clearly knew of any of Petitioner's restrictions, there was no nexus between the lack of raise and handicap discrimination.2 Petitioner also developed no nexus between this raise and racial discrimination. According to Eddie Payne, Petitioner was a sub-average worker. According to Eddie Payne and Jeff Bradner, they frequently had to instruct Petitioner to resume work. Mr. Bradner related an incident when Petitioner was leaning on a shovel in the parking lot, so Mr. Bradner sarcastically commented, "You're not getting much work done leaning on that shovel," but this motivational comment was not directed at a handicap. No employee testified that any supervisor's instructions to Petitioner, which they observed or overheard, were offensive or otherwise inappropriate. On one occasion, Petitioner was told by Mr. Bradner to stop kicking a "basketball of tape" around; throw it away; and get back to work. No employee other than Petitioner found this instruction offensive. On another occasion, Petitioner was given a written reprimand when a truckload of freight was sent to the wrong location. Petitioner attributed the error to a black "loader" named James Oliver and perceived the reprimand as discriminatory because Mr. Oliver was not reprimanded. Petitioner's superiors reprimanded Petitioner as a formal personnel action instead of Mr. Oliver because they considered Petitioner responsible for the error and resultant costs since Petitioner was in the superior position of checker. Petitioner suffered no loss of pay, hours, or seniority as a result of the reprimand. Petitioner's assertions that he was required to climb tall ladders to change light bulbs in the warehouse, to squat to lift boxes, and to kneel to pull weeds were denied by management witnesses and uncorroborated by Petitioner's witnesses. On one occasion, Petitioner had just come on duty and was having a coke and a cigarette, when Mr. Bradner told him to get to work helping a black loader named "Willie T." unload a truck. On this single occasion, Petitioner may have been asked to lift boxes in excess of 30 pounds, but the boxes also may have weighed as little as 20 pounds. This incident may have occurred before Mr. Bradner knew of Petitioner's medical restrictions on January 9, 1995, but it was probably afterwards. If so, this single incident was contrary to Petitioner's doctor's instructions, but Petitioner admittedly never complained to Mr. Bradner about this one-time incident in terms of "lack of accommodation" for his physical limitations. On the same occasion, Willie T., who already had been loading the truck for three hours, took a coke and cigarette break a half an hour after Petitioner began to help him unload the truck. Willie T. asked Petitioner to join him on his break, which Petitioner did. Mr. Bradner spotted them and instructed Petitioner to return to loading the truck because he felt Petitioner was not entitled to a break after only a half an hour of work, but did feel that Willie T. was entitled to a break after three full hours of work. This was a bona fide business consideration of Respondent. Petitioner failed to establish a nexus of racially discriminatory intent on the basis of this incident. On June 16, 1995, Petitioner was sweeping the warehouse floor, leaving trails of residue behind. Petitioner intended to go back and sweep up the residue, but before he could do so, Mr. Bradner told him that he was leaving trails and that he should do a better job. Petitioner considered this instruction to be demeaning and discriminatory, but he did not reply to Mr. Bradner. Mr. Bradner noted that Petitioner began to do a better job of sweeping, and Mr. Bradner left the area. Petitioner perceived that his co-workers were laughing at the incident and became upset. Petitioner finished sweeping one section of the warehouse and asked Eddie Payne if he could clock-out. He assumed that Eddie Payne knew he was upset because of Mr. Bradner's comment but did not tell him so. Eddie Payne authorized Petitioner to clock-out. Petitioner clocked-out and never returned to work for Respondent
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Human Relations Commission enter a Final Order denying and dismissing the Petition for Relief on all issues. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of October, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of October, 1998.
