Findings Of Fact C & W Sales, Inc., was licensed as a dealer in agricultural products under license No. 1367 and was so licensed at all times here relevant. At the time of the incorporation of C & W Sales, Inc., Henry T. Watson was listed as an officer (President) and director of the company. The company was run by Philip A. Roberts, the brother-in-law of Watson. Roberts applied on behalf of C & W Sales, Inc., to FFB for an agriculture bond in the amount of $20,000 for the period 5/19/79 until 5/19/80 (Exhibit 1) . As a condition for issuing this bond FFB required and obtained a general agreement of indemnity from Roberts and Watson and their wives (Exhibit 2) which was executed on 2 May 1979. In addition to agreeing to save Florida Farm Bureau harmless from all claims arising out of the bond paragraph 14 provided: That this indemnity is continuing and will apply to any and all bonds, as provided in the opening paragraph of this Agreement which the Company may have executed or procured the execution of from time to time, and over an indefinite period of years; however, any Indemnitor may by written notice to the Company at its Home Office, Gainesville, Florida disavow his liability as to bond(s) which may be executed by the Company subsequent to fifteen days after receipt by the Company of such notice. Agriculture bond (Exhibit 4) was issued on 5/19/79 for one year and upon expiration on 5/19/80 the bond was renewed for an additional period of one year (Exhibit 5). Subsequent to the expiration of the 1979-80 bond (Exhibit 4) and reissuance of the 1980-81 bond (Exhibit 5) but within the prescribed time for submitting a claim against the agriculture dealer and his bond, John T. Brantley, Jr., filed a claim against C & W Sales in the amount of $8,317.05 for payment owed on a transaction which occurred during the 1979-80 period. When C & W Sales failed to pay or respond to the Commissioner of Agriculture's demands for payment, claim was made on the 1979-80 bond and FFB remitted to the Commissioner of Agriculture a check for the Brantley claim (Exhibit 6). Around February 1980 Watson became disenchanted with Roberts' running of C & W Sales, Inc. and wanted out. He told Roberts to get someone to buy his (Watson) stock and to get his name out of the company. Roberts said he would. Watson never advised FFB that he would no longer be an indemnitor under the bond. During the period covered by the bond year beginning 5/19/80 claims against C & W Sales, Inc., were submitted to the Commissioner of Agriculture by Henry L. Watson in the amount of $32,326.50; Hugh D. Martin in the amount of $1,932.80; Jesse J. Wilson in the amount of $1,490.00; John T. Brantley, Jr., in the amount of $15,024.40; and Philip Dean and Willie Bass in the amount of $4,919.13, for a total of $55,692.83. The Commissioner of Agriculture notified C & W Sales of these claims and advised them of the opportunity to contest the validity of the claims. No response was received from C & W Sales and Roberts appears to have departed the area to parts unknown. An order demanding payment was submitted to C & W Sales and when payment of these claims was not made, FFB, as surety on the bond, was notified by the department of its surety on the bond, was notified by the department of its obligation under the bond and a demand for payment of $20,000 to the department was made. There is no dispute regarding the accuracy or validly of the claims against C & W Sales contained in Finding 7 above. Nor does FFB contest its liability under the agriculture bond it issued for the 1980-81 bond year. However, FFB claimed an equitable setoff for the percentage of the $20,000 that would go to Watson. This setoff is claimed by virtue of Watson's indemnity agreement. By the stipulation the parties have agreed that the FFB is entitled to the pro rata share of the $20,000 to Watson.
Conclusions THIS CAUSE, arising under Florida’s “Agricultural License and Bond Law” (Sections 604.15-604.34), Florida Statutes, came before the Commissioner of Agriculture of the State of Florida for consideration and final agency action. On August 26, 2009, the Petitioner, Dixie Growers, Inc., an Agent for producers of Florida agricultural products as defined by Section 604.15(10), Florida Statutes, timely filed an administrative claim pursuant to Section 604.21, Florida Statutes, to collect $176,869.20 (including the $50 claim filing fee) for strawberries they sold to Respondent, a licensed dealer in agricultural products. Respondent’s license for the time in question was supported by a surety bond required by Section 604.20, Florida Statutes, written by Lincoln General Insurance Company in the amount of $100,000. On September 2, 2009, a Notice of Filing of an Amended Claim was mailed to Respondent and Co-Respondent. The September 2, 2009 certified claim mailing to the Respondent was returned by the United States postal service on October 5, 2009 marked “UNCLAIMED”. A second certified mailing was sent by the Department to the Respondent at another address of record on October 9, 2009 and it was received by the Respondent on October 23, 2009. On November 10, 2009, the Respondent filed an ANSWER OF RESPONDENT with an attachment to the Department and requested a hearing. Accordingly, this case was referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings (“DOAH”) for a administrative hearing in accordance with the provisions of Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes. DOAH issued a NOTICE OF HEARING on December 2, 2009 for a hearing to be held on February 25, 2010. The hearing was held with DOAH on February 25, 2010 and the Administrative Law Judge (the “ALJ”) entered her RECOMMENDED ORDER (“R.O.”) on March 24, 2010, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit “A”, to which neither party filed written exceptions with this Department. Upon the consideration of the foregoing and being otherwise fully advised in the premises, it is ORDERED: The Department adopts the ALJ’s R.O. in toto including the following technical corrections to the R.O.: 1. In the caption on page one (1) of the R.O. the Respondent is shown as America Growers, Inc. and it should read American Growers, Inc. 2. On page one (1), paragraph (1) of the R.O., it states Counsel for Respondent, the witness and court reporter appeared ... . It should read Counsel for Petitioner, the witness and court reporter appeared ... . 3. On page two (2) under PRELIMINARY STATEMENT, paragraph (2), it states Petitioner filed a response on the Department’s form titled, .... It should read Respondent filed a response on the Department’s form titled ... . 4. On page three (3) under FINDINGS OF FACT, paragraph number one (1), it states; Petitioner, Dixie Growers, Inc., is a producer of agricultural products in Florida, i.e.., strawberries. It should read; Petitioner, Dixie Growers, Inc., is an Agent for the Producer(s) of agricultural products in Florida, i.e., strawberries. 5. On page five (5), paragraph eleven (11), under CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, it states; Petitioner is a “producer” of agricultural products as defined in subsection 604. 15(9), Florida Statutes. It should read; Petitioner is a “producer’s agent” for the producer(s) of agricultural products as defined in subsection 604.15(10), Florida Statutes. The ALJ’s recommendation that the Respondent, American Growers, Inc., pay Petitioner, $176,819.20 and the $50 filing fee is hereby adopted. For purposes of this Final Order consistent with the requirements of Sections 604.21(7) and (8), Florida Statutes, the ALJ’s recommendation is modified to include that payment shall be made within fifteen (15) days after this Final Order is adopted. In the event Respondent fails to pay Petitioner $176,869.20 within fifteen (15) days of the Final Order, Lincoln General Insurance Company, as Surety for Respondent, is hereby ordered to provide payment under the conditions and provisions of the Bond to CHARLES H. BRONSON, COMMISSIONER OF AGRICULTURE AND CONSUMER SERVICES, as Obligee on the Bond. The Department will notify the Surety in the event it (the Surety) is required to pay. This Order is final and effective on the date filed with the Agency Clerk of the Department. Any party to these proceedings adversely affected by this Final Order is entitled to seek review of this Final Order pursuant to Section 120.68, Florida Statutes (2002) and Rule 9.110, Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure (2003). Review proceedings must be instituted by filing a petition or notice of appeal with the Agency Clerk, 5" Floor, Mayo Building, Tallahassee, FL 32399-0800. A copy of the petition for review or notice of appeal, accompanied by the filing fees prescribed by law must also be filed with the appropriate District Court of Appeal within thirty (30) days of the date this Final Order was filed with the Agency Clerk. = DONE AND ORDERED this27_ day of Frrnach , 2010. TERRY L.’RHODES Assistant Commissioner of Agriculture WA. Filed with Agency Clerk this”? _ day of Bel , 2010. Agency Clerk COPIES FURNISHED TO: Judge Carolyn S. Holifield Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (Certified Receipt No. 7160 3901 9848 8028 7649) Mr. Glenn C. Thomason, Registered Agent American Growers, Inc. P. O. Box 1207 Loxahatchee, FL 33470 (Certified Receipt No. 7160 3901 9848 8028 7656) Ms. Rene Herder, Surety Bond Claims Lincoln General Insurance Company 4902 Eisenhower Blvd., Suite 155 Tampa, FL 33634 (Certified Receipt No. 7160 3901 9848 8028 7663) Mr. John Northrop, Surety Bond Claims Lincoln General Insurance Company 4902 Eisenhower Blvd., Suite 155 Tampa, FL 33634 (Certified Receipt No. 7160 3901 9848 8028 9230) Gregg E. Hutt, Attorney for Petitioner Dixie Growers, Inc. TRENAM, KEMKER, SCHARF, BARKIN, FRYE, O’NEILL & MULLIS, P.A. 101 East Kennedy Boulevard, Suite 2700 P. O. Box 1102 Tampa, FL 33601-1102 (Certified Receipt No. 7160 3901 9848 8028 9247) Ms. Linda Terry Lawton, Vice President Dixie Growers, Inc. P. O. Box 1686 Plant City, FL 33564-1686 (Certified Receipt No. 7160 3901 9848 8028 9254) Steven Hall, Attorney Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services, Suite 520 Mayo Building, M-11 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0800 Mr. Mark Moritz and Mr. Brad Robson, Field Representatives
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioners' rate filing numbered FCP 07-08928 should be approved.
Findings Of Fact FFB Casualty and FFB General are both stock insurance companies which are domiciled in Florida. FFB General is a wholly-owned subsidiary of FFB Casualty, which in turn is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Company of Jackson, Mississippi (SFB Casualty). FFB is headquartered in Gainesville, Florida, and its insurance products are sold exclusively in Florida. FFB only insures members of the Florida Farm Bureau Federation, a non-profit organization. On June 8, 2006, FFB made a rate filing for their homeowners' line of business seeking a significant rate increase with an effective date of December 1, 2006, in OIR file number 06-07515. Due to the size of the requested rate increase a public hearing was held on August 16, 2006, in Gainesville, Florida, in accordance with the requirement of Section 627.0629, Florida Statutes (2006), which provides that "[a]ny rate filing that is based in whole or in part on data from a computer model may not exceed 15 percent unless there is a public hearing." § 627.0629(7), Fla. Stat. (2006). At the public hearing, Burt Gindy, FFB's vice president of Government Affairs and Compliance, commenced the presentation of FFB by stating: "Okay, then, simply put, this filing is all about catastrophe reinsurance cost." Later in the public hearing, Mr. Gindy stated: "The homeowners' rate filings before you, FCP 06-07515, seeks to recognize the increase in profit catastrophe reinsurance costs that have escalated due to increasing hurricane activity." Mr. Gindy talked about the typical amount of reinsurance sought by FFB, stating: "We typically insure to a 250 year event, this year we've only been able to insure capacity and cost wise to about 160 year capacity. We know AM Best looks at that and we want to keep our AM Best ratings." Insurers, including FFB, generally measure and evaluate their potential losses from hurricanes and other extreme events in terms of probable maximum loss (PML), an estimate of the dollar amount of losses that an insurer will experience at a given probability. For example, a one-percent probability of experiencing a loss greater than a certain amount equals a 100 year or one-in-100 year PML. This does not mean that the insurer is expected to incur the 100 year PML only once every 100 years; it means that in any given year there is a one-percent chance of the insurer incurring a loss of that magnitude. When Mr. Gindy indicated that FFB had typically insured to a 250 year event, he meant that FFB insured for a 0.25 percent chance of loss of a certain magnitude occurring in any given year. On September 25, 2006, the Office approved a rate increase for FFB of +43.8 percent with an effective date of December 1, 2006. Because rate filings are prospective, the rate increase, with an effective date of December 1, 2006, appeared calculated to pay for FFB's 2007 reinsurance program. Since the mid-1990's, FFB has purchased a portion of its reinsurance coverage from the Florida Hurricane Catastrophe Fund (CAT Fund), as required by law.1/ The CAT Fund is a public entity which provides a statutorily specified layer of reinsurance at a substantially lower cost than the private market because of the CAT Fund's non-profit structure and tax exempt status. The effective date of CAT Fund coverage is June 1. FFB normally purchased the remainder of its reinsurance from private reinsurers for one-year terms, which are generally effective on January 1. Through 2006, FFB purchased a significant portion of its reinsurance from its parent company, SFB Casualty, and purchased other layers of coverage from American Ag. Starting in 2007, SFB Casualty no longer provided reinsurance for FFB, and FFB purchased coverage in the global market with the assistance of AON with whom FFB had worked for many years as SFB Casualty's broker. FFB generally begins planning in the summer for its purchase of reinsurance to be effective for the next January 1 by gathering FFB's exposure date (i.e., how many houses FFB insured, where they are located and how much they cost, etc.), which data FFB runs through its own and Alliance Insurance Research (AIR) computer models to estimate FFB's anticipated hurricane losses and PML's. FFB then determines its desired reinsurance structure, including its retention (i.e., amount of losses that could be absorbed by FFB), and sends this information to reinsurance markets in the Fall. After receiving and vetting quotes seeking the most advantageous terms, FFB negotiates its reinsurance program, and most of its reinsurance agreements are bound by December for a January 1 effective date. FFB sometimes makes adjustments to its reinsurance program after January 1 to obtain additional coverage at more favorable prices, subject to market conditions, or to make adjustments due to changes in the CAT Fund. However, the general goal of the company is to always place the lion's share of the reinsurance program by the beginning of the year. By January 1, 2007, FFB had placed the majority of its reinsurance program for 2007. The cost for FFB private reinsurance in January 2007 was $65,984,426. Recognizing a crisis in homeowners' insurance premiums, on January 9, 2007, the Florida Legislature issued a Joint Proclamation to convene a special session pursuant to Article III, Section (3)(c), Florida Constitution, and Section 11.011, Florida Statutes (2006), to commence on January 16, 2007, for the "sole and exclusive purpose" to consider the following: Legislation to reduce current property insurance premiums in Florida; Legislation to reduce the future growth of property insurance premiums in Florida; Legislation to improve availability and stability of property insurance in Florida; Legislation relating to building codes in Florida. The special session convened on January 16, 2007, and on January 22, 2007, the Legislature enacted Chapter 2007, Laws of Florida (Chapter 2007-1), which was signed into law by the Governor on January 25, 2007. One of the primary features of the legislation was a massive expansion of the CAT Fund. Prior to the enactment of Chapter 2007-1, the CAT Fund had an industry-wide capacity of approximately $16 billion for those carriers writing property insurance in the State of Florida. As a result of the enactment of Chapter 2007-1 and the expansion of the CAT Fund, industry-wide coverage went from approximately $16 billion to approximately $28 billion. It was the intent of the Legislature that the expansion of the CAT Fund would result in a rate filing that reflected "savings or reduction in loss exposure to the insurer." Chapter 2007-1 required the Office to issue an order specifying the date or dates on which the required rate filings were to be made and be effective "in order to provide rate relief to policyholders as soon as practicable." By March 15, 2007, the Office was required to calculate a presumed factor or factors to be used in the rate filings required by Chapter 2007-1 to reflect the impact to rates based on the changes to the CAT Fund. The Office issued Informational Memorandum OIR-07-06M, which describes the procedure for the rate filings required by Chapter 2007-1 and provides in relevant part: The purpose of this memorandum is to provide guidance regarding filing procedures for the "Presumed Factors" filing and the subsequent "True-Up" filing. During the 2007 Special Session, the Florida Legislature passed House Bill 1A (HB 1A) requiring every residential property insurer to make a filing with the Office of Insurance Regulation (Office) to reflect the savings or reduction in loss exposure to the insurer. On February 19, the Office issued an order advising residential insurers to make rate filings to include the new discount factors mandated by HB 1A. The new discount factors required in HB 1A have been calculated by the Office and all residential property insurers must make a rate filing incorporating the new savings on or before March 15, 2007. Information related to the presumed factors can be found at http://www.floir.com/HotTopics.htm. The procedure for submitting the "Presumed Factors" filing as prescribed in Section 3 of HB 1A and the True-Up" filing as prescribed in the Office's "Presumed Factors" order can be found in the applicable attachments and are summarized below. A filing adopting the Office's "Presumed Factors" (Short Form). This filing shall reflect the effects of the "Presumed Factors" on the rates currently in effect and shall be made on a "file and use" basis. The filing shall be limited to the effects of the "Presumed Factors" on rates currently in effect, and the elimination of the 25% rapid cash buildup portion of the insurer's Florida Hurricane Catastrophe Fund premium.[2/] The procedures for submitting this type of "Presumed Factors" filing can be found in Attachment A. A filing that uses, but does not strictly adopt the "Presumed Factors" (Long Form). A "Presumed Factors" filing that uses the factors to reflect a rate decrease to take into account the "Presumed Factors" shall be made on a "use and file" basis and shall provide all the information used in preparing the filing including copies of all reinsurance treaties. Such a filing is subject to credits and refunds if the rate reductions are determined inadequate. This type of filing shall also be limited to the effects of the "Presumed Factors" on the rates currently in effect and the elimination of the 25% rapid cash buildup portion of the insurer's Florida Hurricane Catastrophe Fund premium and must be accompanied by a sworn statement from the chief executive officer or chief financial officer and actuary responsible for preparing the filing. The procedures for submitting this type of "Presumed Factors" filing can be found in Attachment B. A "True-Up" Filing as required by the Office's "Presumed Factors" order. After making the "Presumed Factors" filing, insurers shall make a "True-Up" filing pursuant to the "file and use" provisions of s. 627.062(2)(a)1, Florida Statutes, that is a complete rate filing to reflect the savings or reductions in loss exposure to the insurer due to all the provisions of HB 1A and the anticipated 2007 reinsurance program. The procedure for submitting the "True Up" filing is identical to the annual rate filing procedures in I-file, except the appropriate selections now read as "Rates Only Including 'True Up' Filings Pursuant to the 'Presumed Factors' Order" or "Rate & Rule Including 'True Up' Filings Pursuant to the 'Presumed Factors' Order." On March 1, 2007, the Office issued its "Presumed Rating Factors" report, which estimated an overall statewide savings of 24.3 percent attributed to the changes to the CAT Fund made in Section 2 of Chapter 2007-1. The Presumed Factors included the savings from the new reinsurance made available to insurers under Chapter 2007-1 and the savings due to the elimination of the 25 percent rapid cash buildup provision of prior law. On March 15, 2007, FFB made their Presumed Factors filing using the "short form" process described in Informational Memorandum OIR-07-06M. FFB requested and received approval of an overall homeowners' insurance rate decrease of -24.5 percent. The effective date of the filings was to be June 1, 2007. On May 9, 2007, FFB made their "True Up" filing, which is at issue in this case. The first filing sought a rate increase of +26.8 percent, which when combined with the Presumed Factor filing would have resulted in a rate decrease for their policyholders of -3.6 percent. The effective date selected by FFB for their "True-Up" filing was October 1, 2007. On May 14, 2007, the Office acknowledged receipt of FFB's rate filing. In return, the Office asked 51 questions seeking catastrophe model support information in accordance with Section 627.0628, Florida Statutes (2006). The Office also requested that FFB update its statewide rate indications. On May 21, 2007, FFB responded to the Office's May 14, 2007, request by providing a document prepared by Applied Insurance Research (AIR) concerning the AIR model, which FFB had used in its calculations supporting its rate filing. On May 25, 2007, FFB updated the statewide indications and further amended their filing to divide the HO forms and the HXL Form 9. On June 22, 2007, FFB revised the May 9, 2007, filing, claiming that the revision had resulted from the "delay of Florida Farm Bureau Filing 07-15 (OIR Filing FCP 07-03807), the renegotiation of [their] 2007 reinsurance program, a systems restraint not previously accounted for, and to follow up after the March 15, 2004, effective rate filing." The effect of the amendment was that FFB was now seeking a +30.3 percent rate increase, which when combined with their Presumed Factor filing would have resulted in a rate decrease for their policyholders of -1.6 percent. Following its review of the amended filing, the Office asked a number of questions on July 2, 2007. FFB provided additional information in response to the questions on July 8, 2007. On July 10, 2007, a public hearing was held in Tallahassee, Florida, in accordance with Section 627.0629, Florida Statutes (2007),3/ to discuss the rate increase requested by FFB. By letter dated July 17, 2007, and forwarded to FFB on July 19, 2007, the Office issued its Notice of Intent to Disapprove the filing of FFB. The Office listed 12 deficiencies as its grounds for denying the rate filing. The parties have stipulated that items 7, 8, 11, and 12 of the NOI are no longer in issue. The remaining reasons for denial are listed below: The rate filing and requested rate fail to reflect a reduction in policyholder premiums consistent with the expansion of the Florida Hurricane Catastrophe Fund coverage contrary to the intent and requirements of HB1A. Company has not provided sufficient support that the reinsurance cost in the filing reflecting coverage levels, reinsurance premium amounts and expected recoveries does not result in excessive reinsurance cost related to services rendered not permitted per Section 627.062, F.S. Company has not provided sufficient support that Florida Hurricane Catastrophe Fund cost filing is consistent with tax exempt status of the fund. Company failed to completely respond to the Office questions for required disclosure of all assumptions and factors used by the Hurricane model as required by Section 627.0628, F.S. Company has failed to support use of model for Catastrophe losses other than hurricane. Company has failed to support that loss trend is not excessive. * * * Company has failed to support the trend procedure used to adjust hurricane model losses is appropriate and consistent with premium trending in the indications. Company has failed to support the allocation of reinsurance cost to territory in their territorial indications. DEFICIENCY 1: FAILURE TO REFLECT A REDUCTION IN POLICYHOLDER PREMIUMS CONSISTENT WITH THE EXPANSION OF THE CAT FUND FFB received a healthy rate increase in December 2006, ostensibly to alleviate the industry-wide increase in the reinsurance premiums. FFB had the majority of its reinsurance coverage in place by January 2007, and the reinsurance placed FFB at a one-in-190 year PML. FFB had intended to purchase additional reinsurance during 2007 in order to get the PML level closer to the one-in-250 year PML, which had been its goal in previous years. In January 2007, FFB had reinsurance with the CAT Fund, American Ag, and other private reinsurance providers brokered through AON. Chapter 2007-1 provided that the rate change had to consider the available coverage options provided by the expansion of the CAT Fund and provided that any additional cost for private reinsurance that duplicates the coverages offered by the CAT Fund could not be factored in determining the change in the rate. FFB estimates that $25,127,526 of its January 1, 2007, reinsurance premium duplicated the less expensive coverage available from the newly expanded CAT Fund. The estimated premiums for the CAT Fund coverage available after the enactment of Chapter 2007-1 were $7,555,058. The reinsurance treaty between FFB and American Ag contained a provision which allowed FFB to essentially cancel coverage which was duplicative of coverage provided by the CAT Fund as a result of legislative changes. FFB did not have such a provision in its treaties with its other private reinsurers. FFB's Third Master layer of reinsurance was placed with American Ag who, in turn, reinsured that coverage in the private reinsurance market. FFB was able to renegotiate the Third Master layer to remove the CAT Fund overlap because the contract required American Ag's reinsurers to amend the contract if the CAT Fund was amended. The First High reinsurance layer was placed through FFB's broker, AON, with a number of other private reinsurers. Since the treaties with these private reinsurers did not contain a provision similar to the American Ag treaty, these private insurers were unwilling to reduce the coverage with FFB to eliminate duplication from the CAT Fund. FFB had contracted to pay $15,750,000 for it First High coverage. The CAT Fund coverage would have eliminated all but $1.75 million of that premium. FFB had already paid a portion of the $15.75-million premium to it private insurers, and the reinsurers were resisting refunding the premium. FFB offered to purchase a third event coverage for the First High and to add a new top layer of $50 million coverage in return for a reduction of First High premium of several million dollars. The effective date of the renegotiated First High and the new Third High reinsurance contracts were made retroactive to January 1, 2007. FFB purchased a $30 million aggregate following the enactment of Chapter 2007-1 and the renegotiation of their reinsurance program. The increased reinsurance coverage resulting from the renegotiations with the private reinsurers brought FFB's PML more in line with its one-in-250 year goal. In order to determine the amount of reinsurance to purchase to bring it to its one-in-250 year goal, FFB used a near term sensitivity analyses on the AIR model "as a benchmark for its PML determinations and reinsurance program purchases." The near term sensitivity analysis was used in "response to requirements from rating agencies, such as A.M. Best." According to FFB, the use of the near sensitivity analyses "exceeds that of the normal '10K standard' event set and is used in preparation for A.M. Best's annual rating agency review, as required." FFB "believe[d] the version 8.2 representation of near term sensitivity to be overstated, but use[d] this analysis as required by A.M. Best." The use of the near term sensitivity model would result in an increase of the amount of reinsurance needed to reach the one-in-250 year PML. The increase in reinsurance coverage is being borne by the policyholders. As stated by Mark Crawshaw, FFB's expert witness: Generally, the more reinsurance FFB buys, the greater financial security FFB offers its policyholders. However, this greater security comes at a cost of greater reinsurance premiums which are passed on to the policyholders. In other words, there is a trade-off between the level of financial security and the cost of that security to policyholders. The Best's Financial Strength Ratings provide an objective basis for quantifying and evaluating this trade- off. FFB has failed to comply with the intent of the Legislature in Chapter 2007-1. It has failed to reflect in its rate filing the savings in the form of reduction in premiums to the policyholders that would be realized from the expansion of the CAT Fund and the reduction in CAT Fund premiums. DEFICIENCY 2: FAILURE TO PROVIDE SUPPORT THAT REINSURANCE COSTS DOES NOT RESULT IN EXCESSIVE REINSURANCE COST Item 2 addresses the Office's assertion that FFB has not provided sufficient support that the reinsurance cost in the rate filing reflecting coverage levels, premium amounts and expected recoveries does not result in excessive reinsurance cost related to services rendered. In reviewing the rate filing of FFB, the Office determined that FFB's reinsurance costs were significantly higher than the rest of the market. More significantly, the amount of catastrophe recoveries was both unsupported and understated. FFB's support for recoveries in the filing was reliance upon the AIR model, with the only information based on FFB's data for one month. Although believing that a recovery percentage of less than ten percent was an inadequate return given the cost of the reinsurance, the actuary for the Office was unable to independently verify the recoveries. FFB has failed to demonstrate that its reinsurance costs are not excessive related to the services rendered by the reinsurers. DEFICIENCY 3: FAILURE TO PROVIDE SUPPORT THAT THE CAT FUND COST IN THE FILING IS CONSISTENT WITH THE TAX EXEMPT STATUS OF THE CAT FUND Item 3 addresses the Office's assertion that FFB has not provided sufficient support to show that the CAT Fund cost is consistent with the tax exempt status of the CAT Fund. The CAT Fund makes no profit and as a tax exempt entity, has a very large investment income credit. The result is that the CAT Fund will basically pay more for losses to the insurance companies than they will collect in reinsurance premiums. In its rate filing, FFB did not consider the larger recoveries from the CAT Fund that would result from the CAT Fund's tax exempt status and did not provide sufficient support why the tax exempt status of the CAT Fund was not considered. DEFICIENCY 4: FAILURE TO DISCLOSE ALL ASSUMPTIONS AND FACTORS RELATING TO THE USE OF THE AIR MODEL Item 4 addresses the Office's assertion that FFB failed to provide access to all assumptions and factors in the AIR model which FFB used in its rate filing. Section 627.0628, Florida Statutes, provides that an insurer may use a model in a rating filing to determine hurricane loss factors when the model has been determined by the Florida Commission on Hurricane Loss Projection Methodology (Commission) to be accurate and reliable to determine hurricane loss factors, and the Office and the Consumer Advocate appointed, pursuant to Section 627.0613, Florida Statutes, have "access to all the assumptions and factors that were used in developing the . . . model . . . and are not precluded from disclosing such information in a rate proceeding." The AIR model 8.0 used by FFB has been determined acceptable by the Commission for projecting hurricane loss costs in rate filings. Thus, the issue remaining is whether the Office and the Consumer Advocate had access to the assumptions and factors used in developing the model. On May 14, 2007, after the Office received FFB's initial rate filing, the Office sent FFB a standard questionnaire consisting of 51 questions concerning the AIR model which FFB utilized. The same questionnaire is sent to all insurers who use models in their rate filings. As of the final hearing, no insurer has ever answered all the questions to the satisfaction of the Office. In other words, no insurer has physically given the Office all the assumptions and factors that were used in developing the model. This information is proprietary and is not given to the insurer by the company providing the model. The information is available only from the company providing the model. FFB asked AIR to respond to the questions. FFB provided the response prepared by AIR to the Office on May 24, 2007. Some of the responses provided that AIR would make the information available to the Office for review and would work with the Office to provide the information in an acceptable format. Because much of the information is proprietary and confidential, AIR was not willing to relinquish possession of the information to the Office. AIR has an office in Tallahassee, and staff of the Office could review the materials at the Tallahassee Office. By letter dated July 3, 2007, the Office advised FFB that the responses to the catastrophe model questionnaire were incomplete. On July 9, 2007, FFB provided the following response concerning the catastrophe model information requested: Florida Farm Bureau has provided the Office with all the formulas and functions available to us by AIR Worldwide, Inc. The catastrophe models are proprietary by their very nature and require extreme care in disclosure. The AIR model used in this filing was reviewed and accepted by the Florida Commission on Hurricane Loss Projection Methodology (Commission). Additionally, the AIR models are widely used and accepted in the insurance, reinsurance, and capital markets. Reasonability measures are taken and maintained by AIR and Florida Farm Bureau as explained in the IFILE Catastrophe Model Questionnaire. AIR Worldwide, Inc. has worked with and will continue to work with and will continue to be available to the Office regarding their catastrophe models. In complete cooperation with the Office, AIR has extended the availability of their personnel and models to the Office for review, including all formulas and functions, at their Tallahassee office. It is not the intent of AIR or Florida Farm Bureau to conceal any relevant or necessary information from the Office; the proprietary nature of the information simply demands that all protections are in place to keep trade secret information inside the AIR office and out of the public domain. Florida Farm Bureau has submitted its exposure data as requested by the Office to run in the public hurricane model. Although we do not have access to the inner workings of this model and cannot validate its results or methodologies, the Office seems comfortable with its results and has used its results as a reasonability check versus our results in past filings. The Office takes the position that making the information available at the Tallahassee office of AIR is not sufficient and does not provide access to the assumptions and factors requested by the Office. Thus, the Office did not avail itself of the opportunity to go to the AIR office in Tallahassee and review the information. The Office takes the position that FFB did not provide to the Consumer Advocate access to the assumptions and factors used in developing the AIR model. There was no evidence presented that the Consumer Advocate requested such information. In past filings, where no insurer has supplied the requested proprietary information concerning the catastrophe models used, the Office has used the Public Model to test the reasonability of the losses projected by the insurer using a vendor model such as AIR. In the instant case, the Office did submit the data provided by FFB to be inputted in the Public Model. The results of the Public Model showed approximately $5 million more in potential losses than FFB indicated in its rate filing based on the AIR Model. DEFICIENCY 5: FAILURE TO SUPPORT USE OF MODEL FOR CATASTROPHE LOSSES OTHER THAN HURRICANE The Office objected to the modeled figures used by FFB as support for its non-hurricane losses. The expert for FFB provided an analysis for non-hurricane catastrophe losses using FFB's actual historical losses without relying on the results of the model. The actuary for the Office conceded that FFB's expert used a reasonable analysis and the more common method of supporting the non-hurricane catastrophe losses. FFB has provided support through its expert at final hearing for the non-hurricane catastrophe losses. Therefore, the fifth deficiency is not viable and cannot serve as a basis for disapproving the rate filing. DEFICIENCY 6: FAILURE TO SUPPORT THAT LOSS TREND IS NOT EXCESSIVE In its Proposed Recommended Order the Office conceded that the methodology used by FFB's expert at the final hearing with respect to the loss trend was appropriate. Therefore, FFB has provided support that its loss trend is not excessive. DEFICIENCY 9: FAILURE TO SUPPORT THAT THE TREND PROCEDURE USED TO ADJUST HURRICANE MODEL LOSSES IS APPROPRIATE AND CONSISTENT WITH PREMIUM TRENDING IN INDICATIONS In its Proposed Recommended Order, the Office conceded that the methodology used by FFB's expert at the final hearing with respect to premium trending was appropriate. Therefore, FFB has provided support for a zero-percent loss ratio trend by assuming that the hurricane loss trend and the reinsurance premium trend were equal. DEFICIENCY 10: FAILURE TO SUPPORT THE ALLOCATION OF REINSURANCE COST TO TERRITORY IN TERRITORIAL INDICATIONS The tenth deficiency deals with FFB's allocation of the cost of reinsurance on a county-by-county basis. FFB allocated their cost of reinsurance by using the largest 200 storms in their model, rather than the entire 10,000 storm set. The 200 largest storms would invariably be in the more coastal counties and could lead to the coastal counties subsidizing the inland counties, which would be unfair discrimination. The use of the 200 largest storms as opposed to the 10,000 storm set does not support FFB's allocation of reinsurance cost to territory in their indications. In its Amended Petition, FFB alleges that the Office relied on an unadopted rule as a basis to support the NOI. Specifically, FFB alleges that the Office is interpreting Chapter 2007-1 [T]o essentially freeze insurers' reinsurance coverage levels and costs at whatever was already filed and approved for such insurers at the time HB 1A became effective (essentially the reinsurance coverage levels and costs for 2006), unless the change in 2007 reinsurance coverage levels or costs would result in a rate decrease. The Office does not interpret Chapter 2007-1 in the manner asserted by FFB. Chapter 2007-1 does not prohibit an insurer from having a greater amount of reinsurance in 2007 than it did in 2006, but Chapter 2007-1 does require that any savings that resulted from the expansion of the CAT Fund and reduced premiums of the CAT Fund be passed along to the policyholders.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered disapproving FFB's rate filing. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of April, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUSAN B. HARRELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of April, 2008.
The Issue The issue addressed in this proceeding is whether Respondent's life, life and health and general lines insurance agent's licenses should be suspended, revoked, or otherwise disciplined for violations of Chapter 626, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is currently licensed in this state as a life agent, as a health agent, as a life and health agent, and as a general lines agent. A general lines license permits him to sell most kinds of insurance in Florida, as well as sign policies and manage other insurance salespersons. Respondent has held a general lines license since 1988. Respondent was first licensed as a solicitor in 1985 or 1986. Mr. Weeks has never been fined or suspended in connection with his insurance licenses and his insurance licenses have never been suspended or revoked or disciplined in any manner. Respondent worked for Farm Bureau from 1985 until 1991 selling home, automobile, life and health insurance. He never sold any surplus lines insurance while employed at Farm Bureau. In November, 1991, Mr. Weeks started communicating with Arthur J. Gallagher & Company about its poultry insurance program. Mr. Weeks first became aware of Arthur J. Gallagher & Company and its poultry insurance program when a customer of his at Farm Bureau told him about it. He reviewed that customer's policy and was impressed by it because he knew that the poultry industry in Florida had virtually no insurance or inadequate insurance available to it. The Gallagher poultry program offered all risk insurance protection to poultry farms with replacement value protection and income protection. The insurance was significantly better than any other poultry insurance product in Florida. The program was underwritten by Lloyds of London as surplus lines insurance and sold by Arthur J. Gallagher & Company who was the managing general agent for Lloyds. By late 1991, Mr. Weeks was interested in going into business for himself. In January, 1992, Mr. Weeks established Weeks Insurance Agency in Chipley, Florida. He only operated Weeks Insurance Agency for a few months before he went to work for Morris, Temple and Company, in April, 1992. Initially, he worked on a part-time basis, while he phased out his business. He commenced full-time employment with Morris, Temple in August, 1992. During the time he was self-employed Mr. Weeks wished to sell Gallagher & Company's poultry insurance. He contacted Gallagher and spoke primarily to Julie Schatz. Julie Schatz negotiated with Lloyds to write property coverage. She was assigned the poultry program to develop it into a nationwide program. However, she has no knowledge as to the duties and responsibilities of a surplus lines agent. However, it is Gallagher's policy to correspond with the states and its affiliate in each state to make sure that commissions or fees are being properly charged. Initially, Gallagher provided Mr. Weeks with an agent's package consisting of a brochure and a document entitled "Sub-Agent Guidelines." The Sub-Agent Guidelines provided Mr. Weeks with instructions as to what his duties were in the program. On January 23, 1992, Mr. Weeks received a letter from Gallagher dated January 20, 1992, appointing him as a sub-agent and authorizing him to sell poultry insurance (Appointment Letter). Mr. Weeks contracted with Arthur J. Gallagher as a sub-agent because he was not licensed as a surplus lines agent. He was working under the license of Gallagher's surplus lines agent in Tampa, Florida. Arthur J. Gallagher & Company was the company Mr. Weeks dealt with exclusively. They generated the policies, the declaration sheets, and all of the paperwork associated with the program. The Gallagher Poultry Department bound the coverage and had the policies and declaration pages completed in Texas and countersigned in Miami. Gallagher then mailed the notices directly to the insured. On January 23, 1992, upon receiving the appointment letter, Mr. Weeks called the Florida Department of Insurance to find out if his license was adequate to sell poultry insurance and what he could charge or not charge as a fee. He was passed from person to person until he "finally wound up" with a person Mr. Weeks believes was Ms. Shirley Kerns. He made it clear to Ms. Kerns that he was speaking about a fee he would charge as opposed to a commission. She told him that the question was not within her department, but she knew where to find an answer and that he should call her back in about thirty minutes. He called her back in about thirty minutes. The person believed to be Ms. Kerns assured him that his 220 license was adequate and that he could probably collect his fees up front. She advised him that he needed to make sure that he notified the client that he was charging him a fee. She suggested that a good practice would be to notify the clients in writing to avoid an argument later. As a result of this conversation, Mr. Weeks decided to send out invoices showing his fee. She referred him to another office because she did not know about the amount of fees he could charge. Mr. Weeks was transferred to Jeff Overstreet, a very new Insurance Specialist III at the Department of Insurance at the time. Mr. Overstreet's duties involved answering insurance questions over the telephone or finding who in the Department the caller should talk to. Mr. Overstreet told Mr. Weeks that the amount of commission was a matter of contract between agent and company. He was not sure about the maximum charge on any particular product, so Mr. Overstreet referred him to Mr. Battaglin, an actuary in the property and casualty division of the Department of Insurance. Mr. Battaglin told him that Florida does not regulate surplus lines insurance, whatsoever. During these conversations with the Department, Mr. Weeks' wife was sitting next to him helping him. He gave her an analysis of the conversations and she wrote them down at the time of the conversations. The notes taken by his wife are set down on the Appointment Letter. Because Mr. Weeks was not completely satisfied with the answers given by the Department of Insurance, he had his wife call and ask the same questions to the same people, and she received the same answers. It was clear from the evidence presented that none of these Department people recall talking to Mr. Weeks or his wife. However, their inability to recall 1991 telephone conversations is understandable due to the passage of time. Additionally, as to the person believed to be Ms. Kern's, Respondent may very well have spoken to someone else with a similar sounding name or have gotten the name wrong. In any event, Mr. Weeks testimony about the inquiries he made to the Department regarding charging fees is believed. Mr. Weeks informed Julie Schatz of the information he received from the Department and she felt the charge of an agency fee by Mr. Weeks was appropriate. Therefore, Gallagher and Company authorized the agency fee charged by Mr. Weeks for the insurance and should have disclosed the information on the declaration page for the insurance. See Section 626.930, Florida Statutes. Mr. Weeks sold Gallagher & Company insurance to at least seven (7) customers in northwest Florida. Mr. Weeks charged each customer a fee between ten and fifteen cents per hundred dollars in coverage which he added to premium of forty cents per hundred dollars, depending on the size of the premium. His idea as to the amount of fee to charge came from a policy he had seen in Graceville, Florida, written directly by Gallagher. He discussed the determination of the amount of his charges with Julie Schatz at Gallagher and she had no problem with the amount. Mr. Weeks met with each potential customer in person, explained the program and went over each item of cost for the insurance item by item, including his fee, on a piece of paper. As part of his explanation he told the customer that Lloyds was not a part of the Florida Guaranty Association, but he felt like it was a safe program. He then mailed every customer an invoice after returning to his office based upon the computations he had done in their presence. The invoices for the seven (7) sales of poultry insurance at issue demonstrate the following: Each item of cost is set forth on a separate line, including the agency fee. An initial payment is set forth as a line item on each invoice, except for the Mitchem Invoice. All are dated. The earliest date is February 13, 1992, and the latest date is May 30, 1992. Each invoice states the name and address of the applicant and the amount of coverage applied for. The date on the invoices represents the date that the insured's policy was to be effective, not the date it was created. However, in some cases these dates were the same. Mr. Weeks had met W.E. Bartlett while he was an agent for Farm Bureau. Mr. Weeks called Mr. Bartlett about the poultry insurance program and arranged a meeting. Mr. Bartlett's only interest seemed to be the cost. However, Mr. Weeks went through his entire presentation including the costs and agency fee. Around May 16, 1992, Bartlett was sent an invoice detailing all the costs for the insurance. The invoice included a charge of $199.50 which was listed as an agency fee. Respondent acknowledges on the face of the invoice, receipt of $828.50 in cash including the $199.50 agency fee. Clifton Parrish was referred to Mr. Weeks. Mr. Weeks went through his entire presentation including the costs and agency fee. Mr. Parrish's total cost for the Gallagher poultry program was $1,600 less than his current insurance. Around March 10, 1992, Mr. Parrish was sent an invoice. The invoice included a charge of $305.00 which was listed as an agency fee. Respondent acknowledges on the face of the invoice, receipt of the $305.00 agency fee by check number 1204. Cleo and Mayme DePriest had received a letter from Showell Farms describing Gallagher's poultry insurance. However, Mr. Weeks was referred to them by a neighbor. The DePriest's had received notice that their current coverage would not be renewed. Mr. Weeks went through his entire presentation including the costs and agency fee. Around May 30, 1992, Mr. Weeks sent them an invoice. fee. 35. The invoice included a charge of $456.00 which was listed as an agency cash 36. and Respondent acknowledges on the face of the invoice, receipt of $260.00 $440.00 by check for a total of $700.00, including the $456.00 agency fee. 37. Mr. Weeks met Ms. Ella Smith out at the Smith poultry houses and then explained the program to her and Mr. Smith at the residence. Mr. Smith tried to bargain with him to reduce his fee. Around February 15, 1992, he sent them a detailed invoice. The invoice included a charge of $360.00 which was listed as an agency fee. Respondent acknowledges on the face of the invoice, receipt of the $360.00 agency fee as part of check number 0958. Monroe Smith was a customer that called Mr. Weeks as a result of a letter to from Showell Farms describing the Gallagher poultry insurance. Mr. Weeks explained the poultry insurance to him including the costs and agency fee. He paid Mr. Weeks his fee. Around April 1, 1992, Respondent issued an invoice to Monroe Smith, Jr. of DeFuniak Springs, Florida for a surplus lines policy providing poultry house coverage. The invoice included a charge of $184.50 which was listed as an agency fee. Respondent acknowledges on the face of the invoice, receipt of the $184.50 agency fee by check number 1196. Mr. Weeks knew Wendell Mitchem prior to getting into the insurance business. The Lloyds policy would reduce his costs for poultry insurance to about one-third of what he had been paying. Mr. Mitchem wanted to write a check before he had time to explain the whole program. However, Mr. Weeks explained the insurance to him anyway, including the costs and the agency fee. Around February 3, 1992, Mr. Mitchem received a detailed invoice issued to Farm Credit Services of DeFuniak Springs, Florida. Farm Credit required the insurance coverage as Mr. Mitchen's creditor. The invoice included a charge of $220.00 which was listed as an agency fee. Respondent acknowledges on the face of the invoice, receipt of $192.00 as partial payment of the agency fee. Mr. Robert Helmes called Mr. Weeks. Mr. Helmes had practically no insurance, and the insurance he did have was so expensive he could not afford it. Mr. Helmes had a bad year, and money was tight. His insurance was not sufficient to replace his chicken houses if they were destroyed. Mr. Weeks gave his entire presentation for the insurance and Mr. Helmes bought the insurance. The insurance program he bought from Mr. Weeks increased his coverage extensively and reduced his premiums substantially. Mr. Weeks collected his agency fee and, around March 24, 1992, sent Mr. Helmes an invoice. The invoice included a charge of $240.00 which was listed as an agency fee. Respondent acknowledges on the face of the invoice, receipt of the $240.00 agency fee by check number 1RH. Mr. Weeks provided copies of all of the invoices to Gallagher until April, 1992, when Gallagher notified his office that Gallagher did not have any need for the invoices. Mr. Weeks considered his fee to be part of the premium or authorized charges for the insurance and expected them to be printed on the declaration page of the poultry policies. Mr. Weeks became upset with Gallagher & Company because he knew that not putting his charges on the declaration sheet of the policy was going to cause confusion. He called Ms. Schatz about the discrepancy. Ms. Schatz assured him that the difference could be explained simply if an insured questioned it. On June 1, 1992, Gallagher notified Mr. Weeks about their concern over the agency fee for the first time and terminated his representation. Julie Schatz made the decision to terminate Mr. Weeks' sub-agency appointment. The only reason Ms. Schatz gave him for his termination was excessive commission charges. In June, 1994, Mr. Weeks was terminated from his employment with Morris, Temple and Company because the large insurance companies, for which Morris, Temple served as managing agent, notified Morris, Temple that Mr. Weeks was no longer allowed to sell their products because of the complaint filed in this cause. The Department has taken no action against Gallagher with regard to the alleged illegal charges by Mr. Weeks or its failure to disclose those charges on the declaration page for the insurance. The agent's fee was charged by Clinton Weeks without knowing that the fee was not being disclosed by Gallagher on the declaration page for the insurance. Therefore, Clinton Weeks, did not knowingly collect a charge not disclosed in the insurance policies. The actions of Mr. Weeks in charging the agency fee were not willful or intentional violations of the law, they were not dishonest, unfair, deceptive or fraudulent, and they did not demonstrate that Mr. Weeks was unfit, untrustworthy, or that he lacked adequate knowledge or competence to be a general lines agent. Mr. Weeks acted in good faith on the information he received from the Department and on his belief that Gallagher & Company had authorized the fee charge for the insurance he was selling on its behalf. Given these facts, Respondent did not violate any provisions of Chapter 626, Florida Statutes and the Administrative Complaint should be dismissed.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and the Conclusions of Law, it is accordingly, RECOMMENDED that Respondent, Clinton Emmett Weeks, be found not guilty of the violations set forth in the Administrative Complaint and that the Administrative Complaint be dismissed. DONE and ENTERED this 16th day of May, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE CLEAVINGER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of May, 1995. APPENDIX The facts contained in paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, 21, 23, 24, 25, 27, 28, 29, 31, 32, 33, 35, 36 and 37 of Petitioner's proposed findings of fact are adopted in substance, insofar as material. The facts contained in paragraphs 5, 6, 10, 14, 18, 22, 26, 30 and 38, of Petitioner's proposed Findings of fact were not shown by the evidence or were subordinate. 3. Paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 30, 31 a-d, 32, 33, 34, 36, 37, 38 and 39 of Respondent's proposed findings of fact are adopted in substance, insofar as material. 4. The facts contained in paragraphs 23, 31e and 35 of Respondent's proposed findings of fact are subordinate. COPIES FURNISHED: Edward W. Dougherty, Jr., Esq. Igler & Dougherty, P.A. 1501 Park Ave. E Tallahassee, FL 32301 John R. Dunphy, Esq. Division of Legal Services 612 Larson Bldg. 200 E. Gaines St. Tallahassee, FL 32399-0333 Bill Nelson State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, FL 32399-0300 Dan Sumner Acting General Counsel Dept. of Insurance The Capitol, PL-11 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0300
The Issue Whether Respondent is indebted to Petitioners for agricultural products and, if so, in what amount?
Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following Findings of Fact are made: The Parties Petitioners are producers and sellers of tomatoes. They own and operate Sunfresh Farms in Florida City, Florida. Respondent is a dealer in agricultural products. The Controversy The instant case involves two separate transactions involving the sale of tomatoes pursuant to verbal agreements between Petitioners (as the sellers) and Respondent (as the buyer). Both transactions occurred in January of 1995. The First Transaction (Petitioners' Invoice Number 5270) Under the terms of the first of these two verbal agreements (First Agreement), Respondent agreed to purchase from Petitioners, and Petitioners agreed to sell to Respondent (FOB), 96 boxes of cherry tomatoes for $12.65 a box (which was the market price at the time). In accordance with the terms of the First Agreement, Petitioners delivered 96 boxes of cherry tomatoes to Respondent (at Petitioners' loading dock) on January 23, 1995. Respondent accepted the delivery. Respondent sold these 96 boxes of cherry tomatoes to a local produce house, which subsequently sold the tomatoes to another local produce house. The tomatoes were eventually sold to a company in Grand Rapids, Michigan. On January 28, 1995, five days after Petitioners had delivered the 96 boxes of cherry tomatoes to Respondent, the tomatoes were inspected in Grand Rapids, Michigan. According to the inspection certificate, the inspection revealed: "Decay (3 to 28 percent)(mostly early, some advanced stages);" "Checksum;" and "Average approximately 85 percent light red to red." Petitioners have yet to be paid any of $1,214.40 Respondent owes them (under the terms of the First Agreement) for the 96 boxes of cherry tomatoes they delivered to Respondent in accordance with the terms of the agreement. The Second Transaction (Petitioners' Invoice Number 5299) Under the terms of the second verbal agreement at issue in the instant case (Second Agreement), Respondent agreed to purchase from Petitioners, and Petitioners agreed to sell to Respondent (FOB), 132 boxes of ("no grade") cherry tomatoes for $12.65 a box. In accordance with the terms of the Second Agreement, Petitioners delivered 132 boxes of cherry tomatoes to Respondent (at Petitioners' loading dock) on January 27, 1995. Respondent accepted the delivery. Respondent sold 84 of these 132 boxes of cherry tomatoes to a Florida produce house, which subsequently sold the tomatoes to a company in Houston, Texas. These 84 boxes of cherry tomatoes were inspected in Houston, Texas, on January 31, 1995, four days after Petitioners had delivered them to Respondent. The defects found during the inspection were noted on the inspection certificate. Petitioners have yet to be paid in full for the 132 boxes of cherry tomatoes they delivered to Respondent in accordance with the terms of the Second Agreement. Respondent tendered payment (in the form of a check) in the amount of $811.20, but Petitioners refused to accept such payment because it did not represent the full amount ($1,669.80) Respondent owed them (under the terms of the Second Agreement) for these cherry tomatoes. (Although they have not endorsed or cashed the check, Petitioners are still holding it in their possession.)
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a final order (1) finding that Respondent is indebted to Petitioners in the amount of $2,884.20, (2) directing Respondent to make payment to Petitioners in the amount of $2,884.20 within 15 days following the issuance of the order, (3) indicating that the $811.20 check that was previously tendered to Petitioners by Respondent (and is still in Petitioners' possession) will be considered partial payment of this $2,884.20 indebtedness, if Respondent advises Petitioners, in writing, that it desires the check to be used for such purpose and if it provides Petitioners written assurance that the check is still a valid negotiable instrument; and (4) announcing that if payment in full of this $2,884.20 indebtedness is not timely made, the Department will seek recovery from the Farm Bureau, Respondent's surety. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 2nd day of February, 1996. STUART M. LERNER, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of February, 1996.
The Issue Whether Petitioners' proposed rates are justified pursuant to the requirements of Section 627.062, Florida Statutes, or whether the Department of Financial Services, Office of Insurance Regulation (OIR) was correct in denying the requested rate increases.
Findings Of Fact The Hartford companies are property and casualty insurers transacting insurance in the State of Florida pursuant to valid certificates of authority and the Florida Insurance Code. Two types of personal lines insurance filings submitted by Hartford to the OIR are at issue in this proceeding: two filings for homeowners insurance (Case Nos. 07-5185 and 07-5186) and two filings for dwelling fire insurance (Case Nos. 07-5187 and 07- 5188). Hartford's substantial interests are affected by the notices disapproving the filings in this case. Homeowners insurance includes coverage for a variety of perils in and around a home, is usually purchased by a homeowner, and covers both the structure and the contents of a home. Dwelling/fire insurance is usually purchased by the owners of properties that are leased or rented to others, and provides coverage for the structure only. Both types of insurance cover damage caused by hurricanes. The New Legislation and its Requirements In a special session held in January 2007, the Florida Legislature enacted changes to the Florida Hurricane Catastrophe Fund (CAT Fund), as reflected in Chapter 2007-1, Laws of Florida. The special session was precipitated by a perceived crisis regarding the cost and availability of homeowners insurance after the 2004 and 2005 hurricane seasons. As a result of the substantial number of claims incurred after multiple severe hurricanes each of these years, changes in the insurance marketplace resulted in some insurance companies withdrawing from the Florida market, others non-renewing policies, one company becoming insolvent, and the cost for reinsurance available to all insurers rising dramatically. One of the primary features of the legislation was an expansion of the CAT Fund. The CAT Fund was established in 1993 after Hurricane Andrew to provide reinsurance to insurers for property insurance written in Florida at a price significantly less than the private market. The CAT Fund is a non-profit entity and is tax exempt. Prior to the enactment of Chapter 2007-1, the CAT Fund had an industry-wide capacity of approximately $16 million. The purpose of the changes enacted by the Legislature was to reduce the cost of reinsurance and thereby reduce the cost of property insurance in the state. As a result of Chapter 2007-1, the industry-wide capacity of the CAT Fund was increased to $28 billion, and insurers were given an opportunity to purchase an additional layer of reinsurance, referred to as the TICL layer (temporary increase in coverage limit), from the CAT Fund. Section 3 of Chapter 2007-1 required insurers to submit a filing to the OIR for policies written after June 1, 2007, that took into account a "presumed factor" calculated by OIR and that purported to reflect savings created by the law. The new law delegated to the OIR the duty to specify by Order the date such filings, referred to as "presumed factor filings" had to be made. On February 19, 2007, the OIR issued Order No. 89321-07. The Order required insurers to make a filing by March 15, 2007, which either adopted presumed factors published by the OIR or used the presumed factors and reflected a rate decrease taking the presumed factors into account. The presumed factors were the amounts the OIR calculated as the average savings created by Chapter 2007-1, and insurers were required to reduce their rates by an amount equal to the impact of the presumed factors. The OIR published the presumed factors on March 1, 2007. In its March 15, 2007, filings, Hartford adopted the presumed factors published by OIR. As a result, Hartford reduced its rates, effective June 1, 2007, on the products at issue in these filings by the following percentages: Case No. 07-5185 homeowners product: 17.7% Case No. 07-5186 homeowners product: 21.9% Case No. 07-5187 dwelling/fire product: 8.7% Case No. 07-5188 dwelling/fire product: 6.2% The Order also required that insurers submit a "True-Up Filing" pursuant to Section 627.026(2)(a)1., Florida Statutes. The filing was to be a complete rate filing that included the company's actual reinsurance costs and programs. Hartford's filings at issue in these proceedings are its True-Up Filings. The True-Up Filings Hartford submitted its True-Up filings June 15, 2007. The rate filings were certified as required by Section 627.062(9), Florida Statutes. The filings were amended August 8, 2007. Hartford's True Up Filings, as amended, request the following increases in rates over those reflected in the March 15, 2007, presumed factor filings: Case No. 07-5185 homeowners product: 22.0% Case No. 07-5186 homeowners product: 31.6% Case No. 07-5187 dwelling and fire product: 69.0% Case No. 07-5188 dwelling and fire product: 35.9% The net effects of Hartford's proposed rate filings result in the following increases over the rates in place before the Presumed Factor Filings: Case No. 07-5185 homeowners product: .4% Case No. 07-5186 homeowners product: 2.8% Case No. 07-5187 dwelling/fire product: 54.3% Case No. 07-5188 dwelling/fire product: 27.5% Case Nos. 07-5185 and 07-5186 (homeowners) affect approximately 92,000 insurance policies. Case Nos. 07-5187 and 07-5188 (dwelling/fire) affect approximately 2,550 policies. A public hearing was conducted on the filings August 16, 2007. Representatives from Hartford were not notified prior to the public hearing what concerns the OIR might have with the filings. Following the hearing, on August 20, 2007, Petitioners provided by letter and supporting documentation additional information related to the filings in an effort to address questions raised at the public hearing. The OIR did not issue clarification letters to Hartford concerning any of the information provided or any deficiencies in the filings before issuing its Notices of Intent to Disapprove the True-Up Filings. All four filings were reviewed on behalf of the OIR by Allan Schwartz. Mr. Schwartz reviewed only the True-Up Filings and did not review any previous filings submitted by Hartford with respect to the four product lines. On September 10, 2007, the OIR issued Notices of Intent to Disapprove each of the filings at issue in this case. The reasons give for disapproving the two homeowners filings are identical and are as follows: Having reviewed the information submitted, the Office finds that this filing does not provide sufficient documentation or justification to demonstrate that the proposed rate(s) comply with the standards of the appropriate statute(s) and rules(s) including demonstrating that the proposed rates are not excessive, inadequate, or unfairly discriminatory. The deficiencies include but are not limited to: The premium trends are too low and are not reflective of the historical pattern of premium trends. The loss trends are too high and are not reflective of the historical pattern of loss trends. The loss trends are based on an unexplained and undocumented method using "modeled" frequency and severity as opposed to actual frequency and severity. The loss trends are excessive and inconsistent compared to other sources of loss trends such as Fast Track data. The catastrophe hurricane losses, ALAE and ULAE amounts are excessive and not supported. The catastrophe non-hurricane losses, ALAE and ULAE amounts are excessive and not supported. The particular time period from 1992 to 2006 used to calculate these values has not been justified. There has been no explanation of why the extraordinarily high reported losses for 1992 and 1993 should be expected to occur in the future. The underwriting profit and contingency factors are excessive and not supported. Various components underlying the calculation of the underwriting profit and contingency factors, including but not limited to the return on surplus, premium to surplus ratio, investment income and tax rate are not supported or justified. The underwriting expenses and other expenses are excessive and not supported. The non-FHCF reinsurance costs are excessive and not supported. The FHCF reinsurance costs are excessive and not supported. The fact that no new business is being written has not been taken into account. No explanation has been provided as too [sic] Hartford believes it is reasonable to return such a low percentage of premium in the form of loss payments to policyholders. For example, for the building policy forms, only about 40% of the premium requested by Hartford is expected to be returned to policyholders in the form of loss payments. As a result of the deficiencies set forth above, the Office finds that the proposed rate(s) are not justified, and must be deemed excessive and therefore, the Office intends to disapprove the above-referenced filing. The Notices of Intent to Disapprove the two dwelling/fire filings each list nine deficiencies. Seven of the nine (numbers 1-6 and 8) are the same as deficiencies listed for the homeowners filings. The remaining deficiencies named for Case No. 07-5187 are as follows: 7. The credibility standard and credibility value are not supported. 9. No explanation has been provided as too (sic) why Hartford believes it needs such a large rate increase currently, when the cumulative rate change implemented by Hartford for this program from 2001 to 2006 was an increase of only about 10%. The deficiencies listed for Case No. 07-5188 are the same as those listed for Case No. 07-5187, with the exception that with respect to deficiency number 9, the rate change implemented for the program in Case No. 07-5188 from 2001 to 2006 was a decrease of about -3%. Documentation Required for the Filings Florida's regulatory framework, consistent with most states, requires that insurance rates not be inadequate, excessive, or unfairly discriminatory. In making a determination concerning whether a proposed rate complies with this standard, the OIR is charged with considering certain enumerated factors in accordance with generally accepted and reasonable actuarial techniques. Chapter 2007-1 also amended Section 627.062, Florida Statutes, to add a certification requirement. The amendment requires the chief executive officer or chief financial officer and chief actuary of a property insurer to certify under oath that they have reviewed the rate filing; that to their knowledge, the rate filing does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which the statements were made, not misleading; that based on their knowledge, the information in the filing fairly presents the basis of the rate filing for the period presented; and that the rate filing reflects all premium savings reasonably expected to result from legislative enactments and are in accordance with generally accepted and reasonable actuarial techniques. § 627.062(9)(a), Fla. Stat. (2007). Actuarial Standards of Practice 9 and 41 govern documentation by an actuary. Relevant sections of Standard of Practice 9 provide: Extent of documentation - . . . Appropriate records, worksheets, and other documentation of the actuary's work should be maintained by the actuary and retained for a reasonable length of time. Documentation should be sufficient for another actuary practicing in the same field to evaluate the work. The documentation should describe clearly the sources of data, material assumptions, and methods. Any material changes in sources of data, assumptions, or methods from the last analysis should be documented. The actuary should explain the reason(s) for and describe the impact of the changes. Prevention of misuse - . . . The actuary should take reasonable steps to ensure that an actuarial work product is presented fairly, that the presentation as a whole is clear in its actuarial aspects, and that the actuary is identified as the source of the actuarial aspects, and that the actuary is available to answer questions.. . . . * * * 5.5 Availability of documentation- Documentation should be available to the actuary's client or employer, and it should be made available to other persons when the client or employer so requests, assuming appropriate compensation, and provided such availability is not otherwise improper. . . . In determining the appropriate level of documentation for the proposed rate filings, Petitioner relied on its communications with OIR, as well as its understanding of what has been required in the past. This reliance is reasonable and is consistent with both the statutory and rule provisions governing the filings. Use of the RMS Catastrophic Loss Projection Model In order to estimate future losses in a rate filing, an insurer must estimate catastrophic and non-catastrophic losses. Hartford's projected catastrophic losses in the filings are based upon information provided from the Risk Management Solutions (RMS) catastrophic loss projection model, version 5.1a. Hartford's actuaries rely on this model, consistent with the standards governing actuarial practice, and their reliance is reasonable. Catastrophe loss projection models may be used in the preparation of insurance filings, if they have been considered by and accepted by the Florida Commission on Hurricane Loss Projection Methodology (the Hurricane Commission). The Hurricane Commission determined that the RMS model, version 5.1a was acceptable for projecting hurricane loss costs for personal residential rate filings on May 17, 2006. In addition to approval by the Hurricane Commission, use of the model is appropriate "only if the office and the consumer advocate appointed pursuant to s. 627.0613 have access to all of the assumptions and factors that were used in developing the actuarial methods, principles, standards, models, or output ranges, and are not precluded from disclosing such information in a rate proceeding." §627.0628(3)(c), Fla. Stat. Both the Consumer Advocate and a staff person from the OIR are members of the Hurricane Commission. In that context, both have the ability to make on-site visits to the modeling companies, and to ask any questions they choose regarding the models. Both OIR's representative and the Consumer Advocate participated in the meetings and had the same opportunity as other commissioners to ask any question they wished about RMS 5.1a. The Hurricane Commission members, including the Consumer Advocate, clearly have access to the information identified in Section 627.0628(3)(c). However, there are restrictions on the Hurricane Commission members' ability to share the information received regarding trade secrets disclosed by the modeling companies. For that reason, the Commission's deliberations are not, standing alone, sufficient to determine that the Office of Insurance Regulation has access. In this case, credible evidence was submitted to show that RMS officials met with staff from the Office in July and October 2006 to discuss the model. RMS offered to provide any of its trade secret information to the OIR, subject to a non- disclosure agreement to protect its dissemination to competitors. RMS also opened an office in Tallahassee and invited OIR staff to examine any parts of the model they wished. In addition, both RMS and Hartford have answered extensive questionnaires prepared by OIR regarding the RMS model, and Hartford has offered to assist OIR in gathering any additional information it requires. Most of the questions posed by OIR involve the same areas reviewed by the Commission. RMS' representative also testified at hearing that RMS would not object to disclosure of the assumptions during the hearing itself if necessary. Finally, OIR Exhibit 1 is the Florida Hurricane Catastrophe Fund 2007 Ratemaking Formula Report. The Executive Summary from the report explains how rates were recommended for the Florida Hurricane Catastrophic Fund (CAT Fund) for the 2007- 2008 contract year. The report stated that the RMS model, as well as three other models accepted by the Hurricane Commission, were used for determining expected aggregate losses to the CAT Fund reinsurance layer. Three models, including the RMS model, were also used for analysis of detailed allocation to type of business, territory, construction and deductible, as well as special coverage questions. The models were compared in detail and given equal weight. The report notes that these three models were also used in 1999-2006 ratemaking. The report is prepared by Paragon Strategic Solutions, Inc., an independent consultant selected by the State Board of Administration, in accordance with Section 215.555(5), Florida Statutes. While OIR did not prepare the report, they show no hesitation in accepting and relying on the report and the modeled information it contains in these proceedings. Indeed, one of OIR's criticisms is Hartford's failure to use the report with respect to CAT Fund loss recovery estimates. Based upon the evidence presented at hearing, it is found that the OIR and Consumer Advocate were provided access to the factors and assumptions used in the RMS model, as contemplated by Section 627.0628. The Alleged Deficiencies in the Homeowners Filings1/ A rate is an estimate of the expected value of future costs. It provides for all costs associated with the transfer of risk. A rate is reasonable and not excessive, inadequate or unfairly discriminatory if it is an actuarially sound estimate of the expected value of all future costs associated with an individual risk transfer. In preparing a filing, an actuary identifies the time period that its proposed rates are expected to be in effect. Because ratemaking is prospective, it involves determining the financial value of future contingent events. For the rate filings in question, actuaries for Hartford developed their rate indications by first considering trended premium, which reflects changes in premium revenue based on a variety of factors, including construction costs and the value of the buildings insured. Trended premium is the best estimate of the premium revenue that will be collected if the current rates remain in effect for the time period the filing is expected to be in place. Expenses associated with writing and servicing the business, the reinsurance costs to support the business and an allowance for profit are subtracted from the trended premium. The remainder is what would be available to pay losses. This approach to ratemaking, which is used by Hartford, is a standard actuarial approach to present the information for a rate indication. As part of the process, expected claims and the cost to service and settle those claims is also projected. These calculations show the amount of money that would be available to pay claims if no changes are made in the rates and how much increased premium is necessary to cover claims. The additional amount of premium reflects not only claims payments but also taxes, licenses and fees that are tied to the amount of premium. The first deficiency identified by OIR is that "the premium trends are too low and are not reflective of the historical pattern of premium trends." In determining the premium trend in each filing, Hartford used data from the previous five years and fit an exponential trend to the historical pattern, which is a standard actuarial technique. Hartford also looked at the factors affecting the more recent years, which were higher. For example, the peak in premium trend in 2006 was a result of the cost increases driven by the 2004 and 2005 hurricanes, and the peak in demand for labor and construction supplies not matched by supply. Costs were coming down going into 2007, and Hartford believed that 2006 was out of pattern from what they could anticipate seeing in the future. The premium trends reflected in Hartford's filings are reasonable, reflective of historical patterns, and based on standard actuarial techniques. The second identified deficiency with respect to the homeowner filings was that the loss trends are too high and are not reflective of the historical pattern of loss trends. A loss trend reflects the amount an insurance company expects the cost of claims to change. It consists of a frequency trend, which is the number of claims the insurance company expects to receive, and a severity trend, which is the average cost per claim. The loss trend compares historical data used in the filing with the future time period when the new rates are expected to be in effect. Hartford's loss trends were estimated using a generalized linear model, projecting frequency and severity separately. The model was based on 20 quarters of historical information. The more credible testimony presented indicates that the loss trends were actuarially appropriate. The third identified deficiency is that the loss trends are based on an unexplained and undocumented method using "modeled" frequency and severity as opposed to actual frequency and severity. As noted above, the generalized linear model uses actual, historical data. Sufficient documentation was provided in the filing, coupled with Hartford's August 20, 2007, letter. The method used to determine loss trends is reasonable and is consistent with standard actuarial practice. The fourth identified deficiency is that loss trends are excessive and inconsistent compared to other sources of loss trends, such as Fast Track data. Saying that the loss trends are excessive is a reiteration of the claim that they are too high, already addressed with respect to deficiency number two. Fast Track data is data provided by the Insurance Services Office. It uses unaudited information and is prepared on a "quick turnaround" basis. Fast Track data is based on paid claims rather than incurred claims data, and upon a broad number of companies with different claims settlement practices. Because it relies on paid claims, there is a time lag in the information provided. Hartford did not rely on Fast Track data, but instead relied upon its own data for calculating loss trends. Given the volume of business involved, Hartford had enough data to rely on for projecting future losses. Moreover, Respondents point to no statutory or rule requirement to use Fast Track data. The filings are not deficient on this basis. The fifth identified deficiency in the Notice of Intent to Disapprove is that catastrophe hurricane losses, ALAE and ULAE amounts are excessive and not supported. ALAE stands for "allocated loss adjustment expenses," and represents the costs the company incurs to settle a claim and that can be attributed to that particular claim, such as legal bills, court costs, experts and engineering reports. By contrast, ULAE stands for "unallocated loss adjustment expense" and represents the remainder of claims settlement costs that cannot be linked to a specific claim, such as office space, salaries and general overhead. Part of the OIR's objection with respect to this deficiency relates to the use of the RMS model. As stated above at paragraphs 25-33, the use of the RMS model is reasonable. With respect to ALAE, Hartford analyzed both nationwide data (4.4%) and Florida data (4.8%) and selected an ALAE load between the two (4.6%). This choice benefits Florida policyholders. It is reasonable to select between the national and Florida historical figures, given the amount of actual hurricane data available during the period used. With respect to ULAE, the factors used were based upon directions received from Ken Ritzenthaler, an actuary with OIR, in a previous filing. The prior discussions with Mr. Ritzenthaler are referenced in the exhibits to the filing. The more credible evidence demonstrates that the ALAE and ULAE expenses with respect to catastrophic hurricane losses are sufficiently documented in Hartford's filings and are based on reasonable actuarial judgment. The sixth identified deficiency is that the catastrophe non-hurricane losses, ALAE and ULAE amounts are excessive and not supported. According to OIR, the particular time period from 1992 to 2006 used to calculate these values has not been justified, and there has been no explanation of why the extraordinarily high reported losses for 1992 and 1993 should be expected to occur in the future. OIR's complaint with respect to non-hurricane losses is based upon the number of years of data included. While the RMS model was used for hurricane losses, there is no model for non- hurricane losses, so Hartford used its historical data. This becomes important because in both 1992 and 1993, there were unusual storms that caused significant losses. Hartford's data begins with 1992 and goes through 2006, which means approximately fifteen years worth of data is used. Hartford's explanation for choosing that time period is that hurricane models were first used in 1992, and it was at that time that non-hurricane losses had to be separated from hurricane losses. Thus, it was the first year that Hartford had the data in the right form and sufficient detail to use in a rate filing. Petitioners have submitted rate filings in the past that begin non-hurricane, ALAE and ULAE losses with 1992, increasing the number of years included in the data with each filing. Prior filings using this data have been approved by OIR. It is preferable to use thirty years of experience for this calculation. However, there was no testimony that such a time-frame is actuarially or statutorily required, and OIR's suggestion that these two high-loss years should be ignored is not based upon any identified actuarial standard. Hartford attempted to mitigate the effect of the severe losses in 1992 and 1993 by capping the losses for those years, as opposed to relying on the actual losses.2/ The methodology used by Hartford was reasonable and appropriate. No other basis was identified by the OIR to support this stated deficiency. The seventh identified deficiency is that the underwriting profit and contingency factors are excessive and not supported. The underwriting profit factor is the amount of income, expressed as a percentage of premium, that an insurance company needs from premium in excess of losses, settlement costs and other expenses in order to generate a fair rate of return on its capital necessary to support its Florida exposures for the applicable line of business. Hartford's proposed underwriting profit factor for its largest homeowners filing is 15.3%. Section 627.062(2)(b), Florida Statutes, contemplates the allowance of a reasonable rate of return, commensurate with the risk to which the insurance company exposes its capital and surplus. Section 627.062(2)(b)4., Florida Statutes, authorizes the adoption of rules to specify the manner in which insurers shall calculate investment income attributable to classes of insurance written in Florida, and the manner in which investment income shall be used in the calculation of insurance rates. The subsection specifically indicates that the manner in which investment income shall be used in the calculation of insurance rates shall contemplate allowances for an underwriting profit factor. Florida Administrative Code Rule 69O-170.003 is entitled "Calculation of Investment Income," and the stated purpose of this rule is as follows: (1) The purpose of this rule is to specify the manner in which insurers shall calculate investment income attributable to insurance policies in Florida and the manner in which such investment income is used in the calculation of insurance rates by the development of an underwriting profit and contingency factor compatible with a reasonable rate of return. (Emphasis supplied). Mr. Schwartz relied on the contents of this rule in determining that the underwriting profit factor in Hartford's filings was too high, in that Florida Administrative Code Rule 69O-170.003(6)(a) and (7) specifies that: (6)(a) . . . An underwriting profit and contingency factor greater than the quantity 5% is prima facie evidence of an excessive expected rate of return and unacceptable, unless supporting evidence is presented demonstrating that an underwriting profit and contingency factor included in the filing that is greater than this quantity is necessary for the insurer to earn a reasonable rate of return. In such case, the criteria presented as determined by criteria in subsection (7) shall be used by the Office of Insurance Regulation in evaluating this supporting evidence. * * * An underwriting profit and contingency factor calculated in accordance with this rule is considered to be compatible with a reasonable expected rate of return on net worth. If a determination must be made as to whether an expected rate of return is reasonable, the following criteria shall be used in that determination. An expected rate of return for Florida business is to be considered reasonable if, when sustained by the insurer for its business during the period for which the rates under scrutiny are in effect, it neither threatens the insurer's solvency nor makes the insurer more attractive to policyholders or investors from a corporate financial perspective than the same insurer would be had this rule not been implemented, all other variables being equal; or Alternatively, the expected rate of return for Florida business is to be considered reasonable if it is commensurate with the rate of return anticipated for other industries having corresponding risk and it is sufficient to assure confidence in the financial integrity of the insurer so as to maintain its credit and, if a stock insurer, to attract capital, or if a mutual or reciprocal insurer, to accumulate surplus reasonably necessary to support growth in Florida premium volume reasonably expected during the time the rates under scrutiny are in effect. Mr. Schwartz also testified that the last published underwriting profit and contingency factor published by OIR was 3.7%, well below what is identified in Hartford's filings. Hartford counters that reliance on the rule is a misapplication of the rule (with no explanation why), is inconsistent with OIR's treatment of the profit factors in their previous filings, and ignores the language of Section 627.062(2)(b)11., Florida Statutes. No evidence was presented to show whether the expected rate of return threatens Hartford's solvency or makes them more attractive to policyholders or investors from a corporate financial perspective than they would have been if Rule 69O- 170.003 was not implemented. Likewise, it was not demonstrated that the expected rate of return for Florida business is commensurate with the rate of return for other industries having corresponding risk and is necessary to assure confidence in the financial integrity of the insurer in order to maintain its credit and to attract capital. While the position taken by OIR with respect to Hartford's filings may be inconsistent with the position taken in past filings, that cannot be determined on this record. The prior filings, and the communications Hartford had with OIR with regard to those filings, are not included in the exhibits in this case. There is no way to determine whether Petitioners chose to present evidence in the context of prior filings consistent with the criteria in Rule 69O-170.003, or whether OIR approved the underwriting profit and contingency factor despite Rule 69O- 170.003. Having an underwriting profit factor that is considered excessive will result in a higher rate indication. Therefore, it is found that the seventh identified deficiency in the Notices of Intent to Disapprove for the homeowners filings and the second identified deficiency in the Notices of Intent to Disapprove for the dwelling/fire filings is sustained. The eighth identified deficiency is that various components underlying the calculation of the underwriting profit and contingency factors, including but not limited to the return on surplus, premium to surplus ratio, investment income and tax rate are not supported or justified. Return on surplus is the total net income that would result from the underwriting income and the investment income contributions relative to the amount of capital that is exposed. Surplus is necessary in addition to income expected from premium, to insure that claims will be paid should losses in a particular year exceed premium and income earned on premium. Hartford's expected return on surplus in these filings is 15%. The return on surplus is clearly tied to the underwriting profit factor, although the percentages are not necessarily the same. It follows, however, that if the underwriting income and contingency factor is excessive, then the return on surplus may also be too high. Hartford has not demonstrated that the return on surplus can stand, independent of a finding that the underwriting profit and contingency factor is excessive. Premium-to-surplus ratio is a measure of the number of dollars of premium Hartford writes relative to the amount of surplus that is supporting that exposure. Hartford's premium-to- surplus ratio in the AARP homeowners filing is 1.08, which means that if Hartford wrote $108 of premium, it would allocate $100 of surplus to support that premium.3/ The premium-to-surplus ratio is reasonable, given the amount of risk associated with homeowners insurance in Florida. The OIR's position regarding investment income and tax rates are related. The criticism is that the filing used a low- risk investment rate based on a LIBOR (London Interbank Offering Rate), which is a standard in the investment community for risk- free or low-risk yield calculations. The filing also used a full 35% income tax rate applied to the yield. Evidence was presented to show that, if the actual portfolio numbers and corresponding lower tax rate were used in the filings, the rate after taxes would be the same. The problem, however, is that Section 627.062(2)(b)4., Florida Statutes, requires the OIR to consider investment income reasonably expected by the insurer, "consistent with the insurer's investment practices," which assumes actual practices. While the evidence at hearing regarding Hartford's investments using its actual portfolio yield may result in a similar bottom line, the assumptions used in the filing are not based on Petitioner's actual investment practices. As a result, the tax rate identified in the filing is also not the actual tax rate that has been paid by Hartford. The greater weight of the evidence indicates the data used is not consistent with the requirements of Section 627.062(2)(b)4., Florida Statutes. Therefore, the eighth deficiency is sustained to the extent that the filing does not adequately support the return on surplus, investment income and tax rate. The ninth identified deficiency is that the underwriting expenses and other expenses are excessive and not supported. Hartford used the most recent three years of actual expense data, analyzed them and made expense selections based on actuarial judgment. The use of the three-year time frame was both reasonable and consistent with common ratemaking practices. Likewise, the commission rates reflected in the agency filings are also reasonable. The tenth identified deficiency is that the non-FHCF (or private) reinsurance costs are excessive and not supported. The criticism regarding private reinsurance purchases is three- fold: 1) that Hartford paid too much for their reinsurance coverage; 2) that Hartford purchases their reinsurance coverage on a nationwide basis as opposed to purchasing coverage for Florida only; and 3) that the percentage of the reinsurance coverage allocated to Florida is too high. Hartford buys private reinsurance in order to write business in areas that are exposed to catastrophes. It buys reinsurance from approximately 40 different reinsurers in a competitive, arm's-length process and does not buy reinsurance from corporate affiliates. Hartford used the "net cost" of insurance in its filings, an approach that is appropriate and consistent with standard actuarial practices. Hartford also used the RMS model to estimate the expected reinsurance recoveries, which are subtracted from the premium costs. Hartford buys private catastrophic reinsurance on a nationwide basis to protect against losses from hurricanes, earthquakes and terrorism, and allocates a portion of those costs to Florida. Testimony was presented, and is accepted as credible, that attempting to purchase reinsurance from private vendors for Florida alone would not be cost-effective. The cost of reinsurance, excluding a layer of reinsurance that covers only the Northeast region of the country and is not reflected in calculating costs for Florida, is approximately $113 million. Hartford retains the first $250 million in catastrophe risk for any single event, which means losses from an event must exceed that amount before the company recovers from any reinsurer. In 2006, Hartford raised its retention of losses from $175 million to $250 million in an effort to reduce the cost of reinsurance. Hartford purchases reinsurance in "layers," which cover losses based on the amount of total losses Hartford incurs in various events. Hartford allocates approximately 65% of the private reinsurance costs (excluding the Northeast layer) to Florida in the AARP homeowners filing. Only 6-7% of Hartford's homeowners policies are written in Florida. The amount Hartford paid for reinsurance from private vendors is reasonable, given the market climate in which the insurance was purchased. Hartford has demonstrated that the process by which the reinsurance was purchased resulted in a price that was clearly the result of an arms-length transaction with the aim of securing the best price possible. Likewise, the determination to purchase reinsurance on a nationwide basis as opposed to a state-by-state program allows Hartford to purchase reinsurance at a better rate, and is more cost-effective. Purchasing reinsurance in this manner, and then allocating an appropriate percentage to Florida, is a reasonable approach. With respect to the allocation of a percentage of reinsurance cost to Florida, OIR argues that, given that Florida represents only 6-7% of Hartford's homeowner insurance business, allocation of 65% of the reinsurance costs to Florida is per se unreasonable. However, the more logical approach is to examine what percentage of the overall catastrophic loss is attributable to Florida, and allocate reinsurance costs accordingly. After carefully examining both the testimony of all of the witnesses and the exhibits presented in this case, the undersigned cannot conclude that the allocation of 65% of the private reinsurance costs is reasonable, and will not result in an excessive rate.4/ The eleventh identified deficiency is that the FHCF (or CAT Fund) reinsurance costs are excessive and not supported. Hartford purchases both the traditional layer of CAT Fund coverage, which is addressed in a separate filing and not reflected in these filings, and the TICL layer made available pursuant to Chapter 2007-1, Laws of Florida. Hartford removed the costs of its previously purchased private reinsurance that overlapped with the TICL layer and those costs are not reflected in these filings and have not been passed on to Florida policyholders. In estimating the amount of premium Hartford would pay for the TICL coverage, it relied on information provided by Paragon, a consulting firm that calculates the rates for the CAT Fund. As noted in finding of fact number 31, the RMS model, along with three other models accepted by the Hurricane Commission, were used by Paragon for determining expected aggregate losses to the CAT Fund reinsurance layer, clearly a crucial factor in determining the rate for the CAT fund. Hartford did not use the loss recoveries calculated by Paragon, but instead estimated the total amount of premium it would pay for the TICL coverage and subtracted the expected loss recoveries based on the RMS model alone. The expected loss recoveries under the RMS model standing alone were 60% of the loss recovery estimate calculated by Paragon when using all four models. Hartford claimed that its use of the RMS model was necessary for consistency. However, it pointed to no actuarial standard that would support its position with respect to this particular issue. Moreover, given that the premium used as calculated by Paragon used all four models, it is actually inconsistent to use one number which was determined based on all four models (the Paragon-based premium estimate) for one half of this particular calculation and then subtract another number using only one model for the other half (the loss recoveries rate) in order to determine the net premium. To do so fails to take into account the unique nature of the CAT fund, in terms of its low expenses and tax-exempt status. Accordingly, it is found that the CAT-Fund reinsurance costs for the TICL layer are excessive. The twelfth identified deficiency is that Hartford did not consider in the filing that no new business is being written. OIR's explanation of this asserted deficiency is that the costs associated with writing new business are generally higher than that associated with writing renewals. Therefore, according to OIR, failure to make adjustments to their historical experience to reflect the current mix of business, means that the costs included in the filing would be excessive. Hartford began restricting the writing of new business for these filings in 2002. Ultimately, no new business for the AARP program was written after November 2006 and no new business was written for the agency program after June 2006. Credible evidence was presented to demonstrate that a very low percentage of new business has been written over the period of time used for demonstrating Hartford's historical losses. As a result, the effect of no longer writing new business is already reflected in the data used to determine expenses. No additional adjustment in the filing was necessary in this regard. The thirteenth identified deficiency is that no explanation has been provided as to why Hartford believes it is reasonable to return such a low percentage of premium in the form of loss payments to policyholders. For example, for the building policy forms, OIR states that only about 40% of the premium requested by Hartford is expected to be returned to policyholders in the form of loss payments. OIR pointed to no actuarial standard that would require a specific explanation regarding how much of the premium should be returned to policyholders. Nor was any statutory or rule reference supplied to support the contention that such an explanation was required. Finally, the more credible evidence presented indicates that the correct percentage is 44%. In any event, this criticism is not a basis for finding a deficiency in the filing. Alleged Deficiencies in the Dwelling/Fire Filings The seventh deficiency identified in the dwelling/fire filings, not reflected in the homeowner filings, is that the credibility standard and credibility values are not supported. Credibility is the concept of identifying how much weight to put on a particular set of information relative to other potential information. Credibility value is determined by applying the "square root rule" to the credibility value, a commonly used actuarial approach to credibility. Hartford used the credibility standard of 40,000 earned house years in these filings. This credibility standard has been the standard within the industry for personal property filings for over forty years and has been used in prior filings submitted to OIR. Mr. Schwartz testified that his criticism with respect to the credibility standard and credibility values is that Hartford did not explain why they used that particular standard. However, Florida Administrative Code Rule 69O-170.0135 discusses those items that must be included in the Actuarial Memorandum for a filing. With respect to credibility standards and values, Rule 69O-170.0135(2)(e)5., provides that the basis need only be explained when the standard has changed from the previous filing. Given that no change has been made in these filings with respect to the credibility standard, this criticism is not a valid basis for issuing a Notice of Intent to Disapprove. The ninth deficiency in the Notice relating to the dwelling/fire filing in Case No. 07-5187 provides: "No explanation has been provided as too (sic) why Hartford believes it needs such a large rate increase currently, when the cumulative rate change implemented by Hartford for this program from 2001 to 2006 was an increase of only about 10%." With respect to Case No. 07-5188, the deficiency is essentially the same, except the cumulative rate change identified for the same period of time is a decrease of about -3%. Testimony established that the dwelling/fire rate increases were larger than those identified for the homeowners filings because Hartford did not seek rate increases for these lines for several years. The decision not to seek increases was not based on the adequacy of current rates. Rather, the decision was based on an internal determination that, based on the relatively small number of policies involved in these two filings, the amount of increased premium reflected in a rate increase was not sufficient to incur the costs associated with preparing the filings. Mr. Schwartz pointed to no authority, either in statute, rule, or Actuarial Standard, that requires the explanation he desired. He acknowledged that he understood the basis of how Hartford reached the rate increase they are requesting. The failure to provide the explanation Mr. Schwartz was seeking is not a valid basis for a Notice of Intent to Disapprove.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the facts found and conclusions of law reached, it is RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered that disapproves the rate filings in Case Nos. 07-5185 and 07-5186 based upon the deficiencies numbered 7,8,10 and 11 in the Notices of Intent to Disapprove, and that disapproves the rate filings in Case Nos. 07-5187 and 07-5188 based on the deficiencies numbered 2,3,5 and in the Notices of Intent to Disapprove. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of March 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LISA SHEARER NELSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of March, 2008.
Findings Of Fact Essential Background. The Respondent, Larry Wayne Lindsay, is and has been at all times pertinent to this case, eligible for licensure as a general lines agent and as a life and health agent. Effective between December 31, 1987, and January 1, 1988 (the written agreement is dated December 24, 1987), Lindsay's Friendly Auto Insurance of Polk County, Inc., formerly Friendly Auto Insurance Agency of Lake Wales, Inc. (Friendly of Lake Wales), and Friendly Auto Insurance of Winter Haven, Inc. (Friendly of Winter Haven), sold their assets, including the leasehold on the Friendly of Winter Haven business location, to Central Florida Insurance Agency of Winter Haven, Inc. (Central), for $500. The Respondent, Larry Wayne Lindsay (Lindsay), signed the agreement on behalf of the sellers. Kimberly Strayer, then Lindsay's fiance, now his wife, is the sole legal owner, officer and director of Central. Effective between December 31, 1987, and January 1, 1988 (the written agreement is dated January 27, 1988), Friendly Auto Insurance of Haines City, Inc. (Friendly of Haines City), sold its assets, including the leasehold on its business location, to Ridge Insurance Agency, Inc. (Ridge), for $200. Lindsay signed the agreement on behalf of the seller. Kimberly Strayer is the sole legal owner, officer and director of Ridge. When it was formed in approximately April of 1984, Lindsay and Ruth Kent were the initial directors of Friendly of Winter Haven. The two of them remained the directors and officers of the corporation through at least January of 1987, according to the corporation's annual reports. At some point before December 31, 1987, Kent transferred all of her interest in the corporation to Lindsay, who became the sole owner, officer and director of the corporation. But the evidence was not clear when Kent transferred her interest to Lindsay or what Lindsay's ownership interest in the corporation was up to the time of the transfer. Lindsay was the full-time agent in charge of Friendly of Winter Haven in March of 1983, according to Department of Insurance records, but the evidence was not clear how long he remained full-time agent in charge. At some point, he was replaced by Thomas Shaw. The evidence was not at all clear who were the owners, directors or officers of Friendly of Lake Wales at any point in time before Lindsay, acting on its behalf, transferred its assets to Central. Robert Seese was its nominal full-time agent in charge starting approximately in July, 1986, until approximately September, 1988, according to the evidence, but he was not actually in charge of the office, had little to do with the business and spent little time at the business. He essentially allowed Friendly of Lake Wales to use his name, license and facsimile stamp. Lindsay also submitted some applications for insurance from the Lake Wales office in the fall of 1987. The evidence was not at all clear when Seese's nominal role as the full-time agent in charge was terminated or who was the full-time agent in charge when Seese was not. When it was formed in approximately September of 1983, Lindsay and Ruth Kent were the initial directors of Friendly of Haines City. The two of them remained the directors and officers of the corporation through at least January of 1987, according to the corporation's annual reports. At some point before December 31, 1987, Kent transferred all of her interest in the corporation to Lindsay, who became the sole owner, officer and director of the corporation. But the evidence was not clear when Kent transferred her interest to Lindsay or what Lindsay's ownership interest in the corporation was up to the time of the transfer. When it was formed in approximately September of 1984, Lindsay and Ruth Kent were the initial directors of Friendly Auto Insurance Agency of Bartow, Inc., (Friendly of Bartow). The two of them remained the directors and officers of the corporation through at least January of 1987, according to the corporation's annual reports. In May, 1987, Lindsay was the full-time agent in charge of Friendly of Bartow, according to Department of Insurance records in evidence. At some point in time, Lindsay transferred all of his interest in the corporation to Kent. But the evidence was not clear when Lindsay ceased acting as full-time agent in charge of Friendly of Bartow, when Lindsay transferred his interest to Kent or what Lindsay's ownership interest in the corporation was up to the time of the transfer. When Central began doing business at the former Friendly of Winter Haven location in January, 1988, Seese transferred his license there and began to pose as its full-time agent in charge. In fact, Seese was not in charge of Central's business, had very little to do with the business and spent practically no time at Central's office. Essentially, all he did was allow Central to use his name, license and facsimile stamp. Lindsay often was at Central giving advice to Strayer and, as a practical matter, acting in the role of the full-time agent in charge of Central. Ridge began doing business at the former Friendly of Haines City location in January, 1988, without having notified the Department of Insurance of the identity of its full-time agent in charge. Strayer testified that Ridge had no full-time agent in charge but conceded that she knew it was illegal to operate without one. In fact, Lindsay spent much of his time at Ridge and essentially ran the office, acting as if he were the full-time agent in charge. Business with the FJUA is produced by agents who are licensed by the FJUA to produce business at a certain location and assigned to a particular insurance company. When they began doing business, neither Ridge nor Central had a relationship with FJUA. Lindsay had been an FJUA producer assigned to State Farm Mutual Insurance Company (State Farm) and licensed to produce business at Friendly of Bartow. Although the evidence is not clear when Lindsay stopped producing FJUA business at Friendly of Bartow, he officially was terminated as a producer at that location on or about April 21, 1988. Seese had been an FJUA producer at Friendly of Lake Wales assigned to State Farm from July, 1987, officially until approximately February 9, 1988. Thomas Shaw, who was the full-time agent in charge of Friendly of Winter Haven, had been an FJUA producer assigned to State Farm at that location--the same location Central later assumed. There is no evidence when or if Shaw officially was terminated as a producer at the Friendly of Winter Haven location. Lindsay knew, and should have known, that Ridge had not yet been licensed by the FJUA to produce FJUA business at its location or that it had been assigned to State Farm. When Ridge began doing business, applications for FJUA insurance coverage first were transmitted to Central to be submitted by Central, over Seese's facsimile stamp, to State Farm. Transactions Alleged Under Counts I Through VIII. On or about January 14, 1988, Ridge took from David Doolin of Davenport, Florida, an application and $70 as a down payment for coverage under the FJUA and bound the coverage. (Count I.) On or about January 20, 1988, Ridge took from Rachel McKenny of Haines City, Florida, an application and $56 as down payment for six months of personal injury protection (PIP) coverage with United States Underwriters (USU) and bound the coverage. When coverage under USU became unavailable, Ridge advanced McKenny $12 to pay for the down payment on a year of coverage under the FJUA. (Count II.) On or about January 12, 1988, Ridge took from Richard Truett of Haines City, an application and $109 as down payment for a year of coverage under the FJUA and bound the coverage. (Count III.) On or about January 13, 1988, Ridge took from Bruce Tish, Jr., an application and $150 as down payment for and with Dairyland Insurance Company and bound the coverage. When Dairyland insurance became unavailable, Ridge advanced Tish $16 for the down payment on a year of coverage with the FJUA. (Count IV.) On or about January 15, 1988, Ridge took from Germaine Collier of Winter Haven an application and $56 as down payment for six months of PIP coverage with USU and bound the coverage. When USU coverage became unavailable, Ridge advanced Collier $2 for the down payment for a year of coverage under the FJUA. (Count V.) On or about January 15, 1988, Ridge took from Callie Robinson, Jr., of Haines City an application and $56 as down payment for six months of PIP coverage with USU and bound the coverage. When the USU coverage became unavailable, Ridge advanced Robinson $2 for the down payment for a year of coverage under the FJUA. (Count VI.) On or about January 15, 1988, Ridge took from James Belcher, through his wife Peggy, an application and $56 as down payment for six months of PIP coverage with USU and bound the coverage. When the USU coverage became unavailable, Ridge advanced Belcher $12 for the down payment for a year of coverage under the FJUA. (Count VII.) On or about January 15, 1988, Ridge took from Gerald Dempsey of Winter Haven an application and $60 as down payment for six months of PIP coverage with USU and bound the coverage. When the USU coverage became unavailable, Ridge submitted the application for a year of coverage under the FJUA (the down payment for which was only $58.) (Count VIII.) It was not proven, as alleged, that Ridge did not secure the necessary money order for the down payment for the FJUA coverage referred to in Counts I through VIII until on or after March 24, 1988, or that Ridge did not submit the applications referred to in Counts I through VIII until on or about April 12, 1988. To the contrary, it never was made clear from the Department's evidence whether the FJUA applications referred to in Counts I through VIII (Petitioner's Exhibits 18 through 25, in evidence) were among the applications received by State Farm for the first time on or about April 12 and 19, 1988, or whether they were among the applications previously submitted to State Farm but returned by State Farm for various reasons. Lindsay's evidence, which is more persuasive, suggests that Ridge transmitted the applications to Central for processing, money orders for the down payments were obtained and Central sent the applications to State Farm within approximately a week from when they were taken by Ridge. According to Lindsay's version of the events that transpired, State Farm rejected the applications once because Seese's facsimile stamp had been used on the applications. (The applications themselves would support Lindsay's version in this respect. Seese's name is signed over a part of the application that appears to have been "whited-out.") State Farm returned the applications and the money orders. Central then repurchased money orders, had Seese sign the applications and re-submitted the applications. For a second time, State Farm rejected and returned the money orders, this time because the effective date of the coverage was before Seese became licensed by the FJUA and assigned to State Farm as agent at the Central location. The applications also support Lindsay's version in this respect because the effective date of the coverage is changed to start coverage one month later, after Seese's February 9, 1988, appointment date. Central re-purchased money orders again, dated March 24, 1988, and submitted the applications for at least the third time on or about April 12, 1988. All of these applicants received coverage as of the revised effective date. Transactions Alleged Under Counts IX And X. On or about March 11, 1988, Ridge, through Lindsay, took from Charles and Erna Bluschke an application and Erna's $236 check for the down payment for a year of FJUA coverage on their 1984 Thunderbird. (Count IX.) Ridge gave the Bluschkes a Florida Automobile Insurance Identification Card indicating that State Farm was the carrier and that the coverage was bound effective March 11, 1988. When the Bluschkes received no paperwork from State Farm or the FJUA within approximately a month, Mr. Bluschke returned to Ridge and talked to Lindsay. Lindsay told him that the paperwork had not come through but should be in "any day." Approximately another month went by without any paperwork, and Bluschke again went to speak to Lindsay. Bluschke was concerned because State Farm had cancelled him previously, and he wanted to know how he could be sure he had coverage. Lindsay responded, "Don't worry, you're covered." In fact, as Lindsay knew, the Bluschkes' application had not been submitted to State Farm. By the time the Bluschkes had applied, Ridge and Central were in the midst of dealing with problems they were having getting older applications accepted by State Farm and had put the Bluschkes' application aside until the older problems were resolved. They also were attempting to be assigned to an FJUA carrier other than State Farm. Indeed, on or about April 12, 1988, certainly by the time of Bluschke's second inquiry, and perhaps even by the time of his first inquiry, Lindsay had submitted an application as Ridge's general lines agent to be licensed to produce for the FJUA and to be assigned to Allstate instead of State Farm. The representations Lindsay made to Bluschke on the first and second inquiries were knowing misrepresentations made for the purpose of concealing from the Bluschkes the actual status of Ridge's relationship to the FJUA and State Farm. After his second inquiry, Bluschke demanded and received a full refund of his $236 down payment. On or about February 12, 1988, Paris and Helen Dalton of Hamilton, Florida, went to Ridge to purchase insurance for a 1979 Pontiac and a 1977 Dodge Van. (Count X.) They completed an FJUA application and paid $409 down. They were given a Florida Automobile Insurance Identification Card indicating that State Farm was the carrier and that coverage was bound effective February 12, 1988. For the same reasons that Ridge did not submit the Bluschke application, Ridge never submitted the Dalton application to State Farm. In March, 1988, after 30 days had passed, Helen Dalton returned to Ridge because the Daltons had not yet received a payment book from State Farm. "Wanda," who worked at Ridge, assured the Daltons that the policy and payment book would come in the mail and that it sometimes took as much as 90 days. Later in March, 1988, the Daltons' bank asked for proof of insurance on their vehicles. Helen Dalton went to Ridge and got from "Wanda" a copy of the binder, signed by Lindsay. "Wanda" told Dalton that Ridge would call the bank. Ridge never called the bank, as the bank informed the Daltons in June, 1988. Helen Dalton again returned to Ridge, and this time a different person working at Ridge told her that "it's hard to get through to State Farm." Helen Dalton called State Farm directly and was told that State Farm never had received the application and that Ridge and Lindsay were not authorized to write FJUA insurance through State Farm. Dalton returned to Ridge and confronted Lindsay directly with this information. Lindsay offered to "re-write" the policy, but Dalton demanded her money back. Lindsay sent Dalton to Central in Winter Haven to have Strayer refund the money, saying he had no authority to write a refund check, and the Daltons finally got their refund on or about June 27, 1988. Transactions Alleged In Count XI. At least from on or before July 1, 1985, continuously until after December 31, 1986, Friendly of Winter Haven, Friendly of Bartow, Friendly of Haines City, and Friendly of Lake Wales arranged customers' premium financing through Time Premium, Inc., of Boca Raton, Florida. As part of each premium finance transaction, the agency submitted to Time Premium, Inc., an agency check representing the down payment received from the customer and an executed premium finance contract. The agencies also collected monthly payments from insureds and forwarded agency checks to Time Premium on behalf of these insureds. From August, 1985, through July, 1986, these corporate agencies wrote approximately $13,000 in checks payable to Time Premium drawn on the agencies' business accounts. Lindsay personally signed in excess of seven thousand dollars worth of these checks. These checks were returned due to insufficient funds. On December 10, 1986, these four corporate agencies, through Lindsay and Ruth Kent as the directors, executed a promissory note in favor of Time Premium, Inc., in the amount of $13,076.34 to satisfy the outstanding indebtedness on the returned checks. The promissory note required repayment at the rate of $500 per month. As of July 1, 1988, only $2,000 had been repaid.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Petitioner, the Department of Insurance and Treasurer, enter a final order finding the Respondent, Larry Wayne Lindsay, guilty of some, but not all, of the violations alleged in the Administrative Complaint in this case, as reflected in this Recommended Order, and suspending, for a period of one year, his general lines, health and life insurance agent licenses and his eligibility to hold those licenses. RECOMMENDED this 22nd of November, 1989, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of November, 1989.
The Issue Whether Highlands has standing to challenge the Department's Emergency Rule 4ER93-20, Florida Administrative Code, and if so, whether Sections 2(d) and 6(a) should be invalidated because they constitute invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority?
Findings Of Fact The Moratorium Statute During Special Session B of 1993 the Florida Legislature passed HB 89- B. The Governor signed the bill into law on June 8, 1993. Now codified as Section 1 of Chapter 93-401, Laws of Florida, the law, in pertinent part, provides as follows: Section 1. Moratorium on cancellation and nonrenewal of residential property coverages.-- * * * (3) MORATORIUM IMPOSED.--Effective May 19, 1993, no insurer authorized to transact insurance in this state shall, until the expiration of this section pursuant to subsection (6), cancel or nonrenew any personal lines property insurance policy in this state, or issue any notice of cancellation or nonrenewal, on the basis of risk of hurricane claims. All cancellations or nonrenewals must be substantiated by underwriting rules filed with and accepted for use by the Depart- ment of Insurance, unless inconsistent with the provisions of this section. The Department of Insurance is hereby granted all necessary power to carry out the provisions of this section. Pursuant to the Moratorium Statute, on an emergency basis, the Department promulgated Emergency Rule 20. The Challenged Sections The sections of Emergency Rule 20 Highlands seeks to have invalidated are 2(d) and 6(a): 4ER93-20 Procedures For Applying for Moratorium Exemption and Required Insurer Corrective Action on Previous Notices of Cancellation or Nonrenewal. * * * (2) General Provisions. * * * (d) House Bill 89-B, as enacted at the May 1993 Special Legaislative (sic) Session, revoked all prior approvals issued by the Department, of insurer plans for programs of onrenewals and cancellations, where the non- renewal or cancellation was not effective as of May 19, 1993, notwithstanding that the notice of nonrenewl or cancellation was issued before May 19, 1993. * * * (6) Required Action On Prior Notices of Cancellation. (a) Any insurer which, prior to May 19, 1993, shall have issued any notice of cancellation or nonrenewal, whether approved by the Department or not, upon the basis of risk of hurricane claims, which cancellation or non- renewal was not yet effective as of May 19, 1993, shall revoke said notice and shall not cancel or nonrenew such policy, or if same has been cancelled or non-renewed subsequent to May 19, 1993, shall immediately reinstate coverage without lapse as if there had been no cancellation or nonrenewal. The insurer shall also, by no later than June 10, 1993, mail by first class mail to every policy holder and agent who was sent such notice or whose policy was so cancelled or non-renewed, written advice that the previous notice is withdrawn, and that the coverage will not be cancelled or nonrenewed, or that the coverage is rein- stated, as the case may be. In the event that the renewal premium has not been received because the insured was operating under the impression that the coverage was not renewable, or a premium is due because the insurer has already refunded the unearned premium, the insurer shall allow the insured a reasonable period after receipt of an invoice from the insurer, in which to forward the required premium, and the insurer shall provide coverage during that reasonable period. Insurance and the parties Insurance is defined in Florida as "a contract whereby one undertakes to indemnify another or pay or allow a specified amount or a determinable benefit upon determinable contingencies." Section 624.02, Florida Statutes. A highly regulated business activity, insurance is regulated primarily at the state level. The Department of Insurance, among other powers and duties, enforces the provisions of the Florida Insurance Code against insurers, including Highlands, defined by the Code as, "those persons engaged as indemnitor, surety or contractor in the business of providing insurance." Section 624.02, Florida Statutes. Highlands Insurance Company, domiciled in Texas, is a stock insurance company admitted to transact insurance in Florida as a foreign insurer. After many years of transacting insurance in Florida, Highlands was issued a "new permanent Certificate of Authority" from the Department by letter dated November 22, 1991. The certificate authorized Highlands to write "Homeowner Multi Peril" and "Commercial Multi Peril" lines of business as well as numerous other lines. Pursuant to its Certificate of Authority the standard homeowner's policy issued in Florida by Highlands allowed for cancellation by the homeowner at any time through notice to the company. It allowed for cancellation by Highlands under limited circumstances. And it allowed for non- renewal by written notice within a certain number of days before the policy's expiration date. Reinsurance From the early 1960s through June 30, 1993, Highlands wrote its Florida property and casualty insurance, through a reinsurance facility ("SU Reinsurance Facility") made available by Southern Underwriters, Inc. ("Southern"). Under the terms of the SU Reinsurance Facility, 93.5 percent of homeowners and commercial risks insured by Highlands are reinsured to a large group of reinsurers. Highlands retains only 6.5 percent of its homeowners and commercial lines risks. The SU Reinsurance Facility consists of two principal reinsurance agreements, which, in the aggregate, reinsure 93.5 percent of the liabilities of the homeowners and commercial lines insurance written in Florida by Highlands and its wholly owned subsidiary, Highlands Underwriters Insurance Company ("HUIC"). One agreement is the Quota Share agreement, the other is the Obligatory Surplus agreement. For each homeowners or commercial policy, the risks are ceded pro-rata under the two agreements, 25 percent to the Quota Share and 75 percent to the Obligatory Surplus. Highlands and HUIC retain 16 percent and 5.5 percent, respectively of the 25 percent of total risk attributable to the Quota Share agreement for a total of 5.375 percent of total risk. Highlands retains 1.5 percent of the 75 percent of total risk attributable to the Obligatory Surplus agreement or 1.125 percent of total risk. Highlands exposure to total risk, therefore, is 6.5 percent. The total risk for each policy attributable to Quota Share is 19.625 percent and to Obligatory Surplus 73.875 percent which equals, together, 93.5 percent of total risk. Hurricane Andrew and Claims against Highlands Hurricane Andrew struck Florida on August 24, 1992. The most costly civil disaster in the history of the United States, it caused over 16 billion dollars ($16,000,000,000) in insured losses, alone. As a result of the hurricane, Highlands incurred claims totalling approximately 337.3 million dollars ($337,300,000) under its homeowner and commercial lines policies. Highlands' 6.5 percent share of the losses on these claims was 21.9 million dollars ($21,900,000). The reinsurers' 93.5 percent share of the losses on the claims was 315.4 million dollars ($315,400,000). Highland's 1992 year-end policyholder surplus was 255.4 million dollars ($255,400,000). Thus, the claims incurred by Highlands as the result of Andrew exceeded its 1992 surplus by more than 80 million dollars ($80,000,000). Quota Share Reinsurance Cancellation By letter dated January 15, 1993, Highlands was formally notified that its reinsurers had terminated the Quota Share Facility for policies to be written or renewed on and after July 1, 1993. Highlands was unable to secure reinsurance to replace the terminated reinsurance. Highlands Response to Reinsurance Loss Based on the loss of the Quota Share reinsurance, Highlands notified the Department by letter dated January 22, 1993 (one week after the date of the letter by which Highlands received formal notice of the termination of the Quota Share reinsurance) that it would cease to write "Dwelling and Homeowner's insurance effective May 1, 1993 and after," Pet.'s Ex. 4., that is, that it would "discontinue" the writing of the "Multi Peril Homeowner's" line of insurance, one of the many lines authorized by the Certificate of Authority as shown on the certificate face. The January 22 "Discontinuance" letter was sent, in the words of Highlands' Vice-President for Reinsurance Jose Ferrer, because, "the magnitude of our involvement in Florida especially with Hurricane Andrew was such that we were losing our reinsurance protection, we had to take immediate action to protect our company." (Tr. 36) On January 22, 1993, discontinuance by an insurer from transacting any line of insurance in Florida was governed by Section 624.430, Florida Statutes and Emergency Rule 4ER92-11. Section 624.430, F.S., bears the catchline "Withdrawal of insurer or discontinuance of writing certain classes of insurance." With regard to the action taken by the January 22 letter, (notice of discontinuance of a line), the statute provides, in pertinent part: Any insurer desiring to ... discontinue the writing of any one or multiple kinds or lines of insurance in this state shall give 90 days' notice in writing to the department setting forth its reasons for such action. Rule 4ER92-11, (the "Withdrawal" Rule) entitled "Withdrawal of Insurers From the State," includes discontinuances of any line of property insurance as well as the complete cessation of writing any insurance business in an expansive definition of withdrawal: ... to cease substantially all writing of new or renewal business in this state, or to cease writing substantially all new or renewal business in any line of property insurance in this state; or in either of the two preceding instances, to cut back on new or renewal writings so substantially as to have the effects of a withdrawal. Section (2)(b), 18 Fla. Admin. Weekly 7318 (Nov. 25, 1992). The Withdrawal Rule goes on to interpret Section 624.430 as "authorizing the Department to evaluate the sufficiency of the reasons" for withdrawal (or as in the case of Highlands for discontinuance of one or more lines) and to "impose reasonable terms and conditions regarding withdrawal [including discontinuance] as are necessary to prevent or reasonably ameliorate such adverse consequences." Id. Section 3(c). At no time after Highlands' Notice was received by the Department and before May 1, 1993 did the Department provide a written response, request a meeting, impose conditions upon discontinuance, or otherwise object to or deny Highlands' Notice. In addition to mailing a notice that it would cease to write Homeowner's and Dwelling lines effective May 1, 1993, Highlands began sending out non-renewal notices. Some were sent after May 19, 1993, the effective date of the Moratorium Statute. Highlands began sending non-renewal notices because of the loss of reinsurance and because of its position that the moratorium did not apply to Highlands. It did not matter to Highlands whether Andrew had occurred or not. If the reinsurance had been cancelled without a hurricane, Highlands would have taken exactly the same steps. On the other hand, if the reinsurance had remained in place in the wake of Andrew, Highlands would be writing the same lines and policies it did before Andrew. Mr. Ferrer believed the reinsurance was cancelled, not because of the risk of future hurricane loss, but "as the result of the massive loss from Hurricane Andrew." (Tr. 51) While the obvious inference to be drawn from his belief is that the reinsurer fears the risk of future hurricane loss, that is not the only inference that could be drawn. Massive losses could render a reinsurer incapable of providing any reinsurance to any party under any circumstances, regardless of the risk of future hurricane claims. Nonetheless, Mr. Ferrer testified that if there were no risk of future hurricane loss to homeowners, Highland would continue to write policies it is now refusing to renew: Q ... If there were no risk of hurricane loss, would you write the business? A Yes, if we can include wind on all policies. HEARING OFFICER MALONEY: Could you repeat that answer ... ? A The answer is, if there is no windstorm ability, hurricane ability, we will have no problem writing the policies. (Tr. 54) Thus, Highlands began sending 45-day notices of nonrenewals to its homeowners policy holders, on the basis of its position that it had withdrawn the line in Florida and because it had lost its reinsurance. But Highlands is also not renewing policies which expire during the moratorium because of risk of future hurricane loss. Insurance Crisis in the Aftermath of Andrew The immensity of Andrew's impact to insurers doing business in Florida created an extremely serious situation for the Florida property insurance market. The Legislature described the situation this way: Hurricane Andrew ... has reinforced the need of consumers to have reliable homeowner's insurance coverage; however, the enormous monetary impact to insurers of Hurricane Andrew claims has prompted insurers to propose substantial cancellation or non- renewal of their homeowner's policyholders. ... [T]he massive cancellations and non- renewals announced, proposed, or contemplated by certain insurers constitute a significant danger to the public health, safety and welfare, especially in the context of a new hurricane season, and destabilize the insurance market. (Ch. 93-401, Laws of Florida, Section 1., Pet.'s Ex. 15). Between Hurricane Andrew and May 1993, the Department received notices from 38 insurers seeking to withdraw from homeowners insurance or reduce their exposure for homeowners insurance in the state. Twenty of these insurers filed notices of total withdrawal from the homeowners line. Eighteen sought to impose restrictions on new or renewal homeowners' business. Together the 38 insurers comprise approximately 40 percent of the Florida homeowners market. Of the 18 insurers seeking to impose restrictions, the greatest single source of impact on the Florida market came from the changes proposed by Allstate Insurance Company. Allstate proposed to nonrenew 300,000 homeowners policies in certain coastal counties. The Department scheduled two days of public hearing on Allstate's notice of intent to restrict writings. The first was scheduled to take place in Clearwater on May 17. The second, held in Plantation on May 18, was attended by "[p]robably close to a thousand [people] -- in excess of 500 hundred anyway. There was a lot of people." (Testimony of Witness Kummer, Tr. 148). Complaints from citizens were received expressing that "it was inappropriate for Allstate to be able to cancel their policies and that something should be done to assist in that." Id. at 150. The Department's Response On May 19, 1993, the Department promulgated Emergency Rule 4ER93-18, imposing a moratorium on the cancellation and nonrenewal of personal lines policies including homeowners, as follows: (3)90 Day Moratorium Imposed. As of the effective date of this rule, no insurer authorized to transact insurance in this state shall, for a period of 90 days, cancel or non- renew any personal lines property insurance policy in this state, or issue any notice of cancellation or nonrenewal, on the basis of risk of hurricane claims. All cancellations or nonrewals (sic) must be substantiated by underwriting rules established and in effect on August 23, 1992. The State's Response to the Insurance Crisis a. The Governor's Proclamation and Call for a Special Session. On May 25, 1993, Governor Chiles issued a Proclamation. Addressed "To the Honorable Members of the Florida Senate and Florida House of Representatives," it contains the following pertinent "Whereas" clauses: WHEREAS, the damage resulting from Hurricane Andrew has prompted the insurance industry in Florida to propose substantial cancellation or nonrenewals of homeowner insurance policies, and WHEREAS, it is appropriate to provide a moratorium period to protect Florida's home- owners while a study is conducted to assess the effect of these extraordinary events on the insurance industry which occurred as a result of Hurricane Andrew, and WHEREAS, a study of the commercial viability and competitiveness of the property insurance and re-insurance industry in Florida would provide the Governor and the Legislature with the information needed to assess whether current regulatory statutes should be amended, and WHEREAS, certain additional statutory amend- ments are required to make necessary insurance coverage available to provide fundamental protection to the citizens of this state, and WHEREAS, it is appropriate to amend the pro- clamation of May 13, 1993, to add to the matters considered by the Florida Legislature convened in special session, the implementa- tion of a moratorium on personal lines property insurance cancellations or non- renewals, ... (Pet.'s Ex. 24). The Proclamation convenes the Legislature for the purpose of considering: (a) Legislation to implement and, if necessary extend for [a] period not to exceed 90 additional days, the emergency rule promulgated by the Insurance Commissioner, 4ER93-18. 1993 Special Session B Pursuant to the Governor's May 25, 1993 Proclamation and a May 13, 1993 Proclamation, the 1993 Florida Legislature was called into special session, Special Session B. Finding the public necessity for an orderly property insurance market to be overwhelming, the 1993 Legislature imposed, "for a limited time," a moratorium on cancellation or nonrenewal of personal lines residential property insurance policies, beginning May 19, 1993. Id. The moratorium applies to personal lines residential property insurance. It does not apply to commercial coverages or passenger auto coverages, whether commercial or private. The Legislature allowed an exception from the moratorium for those insurers which "affirmatively demonstrate to the department that the proposed cancellation or nonrenewal is necessary for the insurer to avoid an unreasonable risk of insolvency." Section 1(4), Ch. 93-401, Laws of Florida. If the department determines that the exception affects more than 1 percent of any class of business within the personal lines residential property market, then the department may set a schedule for nonrenewals, cancellation or withdrawal that avoids market disruption. Presumably, the moratorium will cover the 1993 hurricane season. The section of Ch. 93-401, Laws of Florida, that imposes the moratorium is repealed on November 14, 1993. Promulgation of Emergency Rule 20 On June 4, 1993, the Department promulgated Emergency Rule 20, effective the same date. According to the testimony of Hugo John Kummer, Deputy Insurance Commissioner, Emergency Rule 20 embodies three aims: first, to set a procedure for applying for a moratorium exemption allowed by the Moratorium Statute, [set forth in the rule outside Sections 2(d) and 6(a)]; second, to require a notice to update consumers who had received notices of cancellation or nonrenewal with the information that the earlier notices had been rendered temporarily ineffective under the moratorium, [Section 6(a)], and; third, to inform insurers who had entered consent orders with the Department governing the method with which the insurers were with- drawing from the State or restricting coverage, that the approvals by the Department found in the consent orders were overridden by the Moratorium Statute, [Section 2(d)]. (Tr. 136) On this last point, Mr. Kummer's testimony is consistent with the testimony of Douglas Shropshire, Director of the Department's Division of Insurer Regulation, one of two drafters of Emergency Rule 20 and the drafter of Section 2(d). Mr. Shropshire testified that the rule "simply reiterates the statute and provides the procedures for implementing [the Moratorium Statute]." Resp.'s Ex. 11, p. 25. With regard to Section 2(d), Mr. Shropshire testified as follows: Q Now, could you please direct your attention specifically to just the words, "Revoked all prior approvals issued by the Department," and explain how this implements the statute. A It simply repeats what the statute provides. It, basically, reiterates the statute. That moratorium statute, 89-B, essentially freezes all cancellation or nonrenewal action during the pendency of the 89-B moratorium. Q What would be the status of the moratorium, subsequent to November 14th, 1993, as you understand it? A Assuming that no other legislation is enacted that affects the subject at the special session, then prior approvals would be, again, effective, and companies could again being (sic) acting -- they could, basically, pick up where they had left off when the moratorium began. Q All right. What, if any, additional restrictions does the language place upon insurers above the requirements of the statute? A Absolutely, none. It is apparent, therefore, that if the Department's silence in response to Highlands' January 22, 1993 "Discontinuance" Letter constituted an "Approval," it was not the intent of the Department through the promulgation of Section 2(d) of Emergency Rule 20 to revoke that approval. The goal of the Department in promulgating the section was simply to inform parties to Consent Orders that any Department approval contained in the Consent Order had been revoked. Moreover, the Department's intent in using the term "revoke" was not "revoke" in the legal sense of rendered null and void and forever ineffective but more akin to "suspend" in a temporal sense. It was the Department's intent that any prior approval by the Department of a withdrawal or imposition of restrictions by an insurer was simply suspended by the Moratorium Statute temporarily, that is, for the life of moratorium - until November 14, 1993. Likewise, if the Department's silence following the January 22 Discontinuance Letter constituted an "approval," it would be the Department's intent that Section 2(d) would have no effect other than suspending the approval until the repeal of the Moratorium Statute on November 14, 1993. The import of the Department's intent in promulgating Emergency Rule 20 is dependent on whether the rule is ambiguous or plain on its face as concluded below in this order's Conclusions of Law.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, including the stipulation of the parties, the following findings of fact are determined: Petitioner, Charles W. Ward, Jr., is a co-owner, with other members of his family, of a cattle ranch in south Hendry County known as Ward Farms. Respondent, Maddox Brothers Produce, Inc., is a licensed agriculture dealer engaged in the business of brokering agriculture products in the State of Florida. As an agriculture dealer, respondent is subject to the regulatory jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services (Department). One such requirement of the Department is that all dealers post a surety bond with the Department's Division of Licensing and Bond. To this end, respondent has posted a $50,000 surety bond with Fireman's Fund Insurance Company as the surety. In addition to raising livestock, petitioner also grows watermelons on his property. Pursuant to an agreement by the parties, between April 16 and May 15, 1990, respondent harvested and then transported petitioner's watermelons to other destinations outside the state. The parties have stipulated that respondent still owes petitioner $53,980.92 as payment for the watermelons. Respondent has agreed to pay petitioner the above sum of money on or before February 15, 1991, or within fifteen days after the agency's order becomes final, whichever is later. Otherwise, payment shall be made from respondent's bond posted by the surety, Fireman's Fund Insurance Company.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered finding that respondent, a licensed agriculture dealer, is indebted to petitioner in the amount of $53,980.92, and that such debt be satisfied in accordance with the time limitations set forth in this recommended order. Otherwise, Fireman's Fund Insurance Company shall be obligated to pay over to the Department the full amount of the bond, or $50,000. DONE and ENTERED this 24th day of January, 1991, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of January, 1991. COPIES FURNISHED: Charles W. Ward, Jr. Star Route, Box 72 LaBelle, Florida 33440 Patricia Maddox Harper 4253 Kingston Pike Knoxville, Tennessee 37919 Barbara J. Kennedy, Esquire Fireman's Fund Insurance Company Post Office Box 193136 San Francisco, California 94119-3136 Bob Crawford Commissioner of Agriculture The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Richard D. Tritschler, Esquire General Counsel Department of Agriculture 515 Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 Brenda D. Hyatt, Chief Bureau of Licensing & Bond 508 Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800
