Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent was a registered farm labor contractor whose Social Security number is 266-30-9569. Respondent worked as a farm labor contractor only during the potato season which usually begins in March or April. Therefore, Respondent did not apply for certification as a farm labor contractor until March 31, 1986 even though his previous certification as a farm labor contractor had expired on December 31, 1985. There was credible evidence that Respondent had been using a 1968 Chevrolet vehicle to transport farm workers which carried a valid inspection sticker and was covered by Respondent's liability insurance. The 1968 Chevrolet "broke down" and was replaced by a 1974 Dodge Van on May 6, 1986 which had passed inspection on May 6, 1986 and added to Respondent's liability insurance policy on the same date. There was credible evidence that a valid inspection certificate and insurance certificate for the 1974 Dodge Van had been furnished to Petitioner's local office in Palatka on May 1986 but was not received in Petitioner's Tallahassee Office where the official files are maintained until a later date. On May 6, 1986, Respondent was cited for failure to have the 1974 Dodge Van properly insured and inspected. There were other violations cited but the Petitioner resolved those in favor of Respondent. There was credible evidence that Respondent had operated as a farm labor contractor for a substantial number of years without being cited for any violations under the Farm Labor Registration Law, Chapter 450, Part III, Florida Statutes. Respondent is a farm labor contractor as that term is defined in Section 450.2(1), Florida Statutes.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record and the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that the Petitioner, enter a Final Order dismissing all charges filed against the Respondent. Respectfully submitted and entered this 9th day of July, 1987, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of July, 1987. COPIES FURNISHED: Moses E. Williams, Esquire Department of Labor and Security Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Willis Glover 21 North Main Street Crescent City, Florida 32012 Hugo Menendez, Secretary Department of Labor and Employment Security 206 Berkeley Building 2590 Executive Center Circle, East Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2152
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral testimony and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant facts are found: At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Petitioners were producers of agricultural products in the State of Florida as defined in Section 604.15(5), Florida Statutes (1983). At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent GMS was a licensed dealer in agricultural products as defined by Section 604.15(1), Florida Statutes (1983), issued license no. 936 by the Department and bonded by Commercial Union Insurance Company (Commercial) in the sum of $50,000.00 - Bond No. CZ 7117346. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent Commercial was authorized to do business in the State of Florida. The complaint filed by Petitioner was timely filed in accordance with Section 604.21(1), Florida Statutes (1983). Prior to Petitioners selling or delivering any watermelons (melons) to Respondent GMS, Petitioners and Respondent GMS entered into a verbal contract whereby: (a) Petitioners would harvest and load their melons on trucks furnished by Respondent GMS at Petitioners' farm; (b) the loading, grading and inspection, if any, was to be supervised by, and the responsibility of Respondent GMS or its agent; (c) the melons were to be U.S. No. 1 grade; (d) the melons were purchased F.O.B. Petitioner's farm subject to acceptance by Respondent GMS, with title and risk of loss passing to Respondent GMS at point of shipment (See Transcript Page 95 lines 5-7); (e) the price was left open subject to Petitioners being paid the market price for the melons at place of shipment on the day of shipment as determined by Respondent GMS less one (1) or two (2) cent sales charge, depending on the price; and requiring Respondent GMS to notify Petitioners on a daily basis of that price and; (f) the settlement was to be made by Respondent GMS within a reasonable time after the sale of the melons by Respondent GMS. Respondent GMS was not acting as Petitioners agent in the sale of the melons for the account of the Petitioners on a net return basis nor was it acting as a negotiating broker between the Petitioners and the buyers. Respondent GMS did not make the type of accounting to Petitioners as required by Section 604.22, Florida Statutes had it been their agent. Although Respondent GMS purchased over twenty (20) loads of melons from the Petitioners, there are only ten (10) loads of melons in dispute and they are represented by track report numbers 536 dated April 29, 1985, 534 dated April 30, 1985, 2363 and 537, dated May 1, 1985, 2379, 2386 and 538 dated May 2, 1985, and 2385, 2412 and 2387 dated May 3, 1985. Jennings W. Starling (Starling) was the agent of Respondent GMS responsible for loading; grading- inspecting and accepting and approving the loads of melons for shipment that Respondent GMS was purchasing from Petitioners during the 1985 melon season. Petitioners and Starling were both aware that some of the melons had hollow hearth a conditions if known, would cause the melons to be rejected. Aware of this condition in the melons, Starling allowed Petitioners to load the melons on the truck furnished by Respondent GMS. Starling rejected from 20 percent to 40 percent of the melons harvested and brought in from Petitioners' fields before accepting and approving a load for shipment. Starling accepted and approved for shipment all ten (10) of the disputed loads of melons. On a daily basis, Robert E. McDaniel, Sr., one of the Petitioners, would contact the office of Respondent GMS in Lakeland Florida to obtain the price being paid that day by Respondent GMS to Petitioners but was not always successful, however, he would within a day or two obtain the price for a particular day. Robert E. McDaniel did obtain the price to be paid by Respondent GMS for the ten (10) disputed loads and informed his son Robert E. McDaniel, Jr. of those prices. The prices quoted to Robert E. McDaniel, Sr. by Respondent GMS on the ten (10) disputed loads were 12 cents, 10 cents, 8 cents, 8 cents, 8 cents, 8 cents, 8 cents, 7 cents, 7 cents, and 7 cents on tract reports number 536, 534, 2363, 537, 2379, 2386, 538, 2385, 2412 and 2387, respectively. No written record of their prices was produced at the hearing but the testimony of Robert E. McDaniel Sr. concerning these prices was the most credible evidence presented. After the melons were shipped, sometimes as much as one week after, a track report was given to Robert E. McDaniel Jr. by Starling for initialing. Sometimes a price would be indicated on the track report but this price was based on selling price at point of destination and not the market price at point of shipment. Also, the letters "H.H." would also appear on the track report which, according to the testimony of Starling, indicated hollow heart but the evidence was insufficient to prove that Starling had rejected these loads for shipment because of a hollow heart condition in the melons. The loads in question were paid for by Respondent GMS based on a price at point of destination under its drafts no. 831912 and 851311. The amount in dispute is as follows: DATE TRACK NET AMOUNT AMOUNT SHIPPED
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law recited herein, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent GMS be ordered to pay to the Petitioners the sum of $11.212.31. It is further RECOMMENDED that if Respondent GMS fails to timely pay the Petitioners as ordered, then Respondent Commercial be ordered to pay the Department as required by Section 604.21, Florida Statutes (1983) and that the Department reimburse the Petitioners in accordance with Section 604.21, Florida Statutes (1983). Respectfully submitted and entered this 13th day of June, 1986, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. Hearings Hearings WILLIAM R. CAVE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative this 13th day of June, 1986.
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent was a registered farm labor contractor as that term is defined in Section 450.28(1), Florida Statutes with Social Security number 426-98-6045 and certificate number 06506 with an expiration date of March 31, 1987. On November 20, 1986, at 8:30 a.m. at a road block north of Zolfo Springs, Florida at the intersection of State Highway number 64 and U.S. Highway number 17 in Hardee County, Florida a 1978 Ford pickup truck registered to Edgar T. Coleman, Post Office Box 5, Umatilla, Florida, license number 778 ETK, Vehicle Identification Number F15HKACA8834, driven by Joe Carl Stephens, was found to be transporting seven (7) farm workers. There was no application for certification for either Joe Carl Stephens or Edgar T. Coleman posted in the 1978 Ford pickup truck referred to in paragraph 2 and the truck at that time was not registered with Petitioner under Chapter 450, Florida Statutes. Although Joe Carl Stephens later obtained certification as a farm labor contractor, he was not a certified farm labor contract as that term is defined in Section 450.28(1), Florida Statutes at the time he was stopped in the road block. At the time Larry Coker, Compliance Officer, prepared the complaint against Joe Carl Stephens, approximately 8:30 a.m., November 20, 1986, there was no evidence filed with Petitioner showing the 1978 Ford pick-up being covered by the liability insurance policy of Respondent or Joe Carl Stephens. Additionally, the Petitioner had no evidence that the truck had been inspected for compliance with the requirements and specifications established in Section 316.620, Florida Statutes and there was no valid inspection sticker displayed on the truck. An inspection of the truck at the road block revealed that: (a) the seats for the passenger in the back of the truck were not secured; (b) the camper top covering the bed of the truck was less than 60 inches above the floor; (c) the tailgate (exit for workers in back) would not close properly and was held closed with a rope and; (d) there was no communication device between the back area of truck and front area of the truck where driver was located. At 1:00 p.m. on November 20, 1986, Edgar T. Coleman arrived at Petitioner's Wauchula, Florida office with an inspection certificate and, although undated, there was credible evidence that it was completed on November 20, 1986 after the complaint was filed, and an insurance binder completed at 11:00 a.m. on November 20, 1986 adding Respondent's 1978 Ford truck identified in paragraph 2 above to his existing vehicle liability insurance policy. At 1:00 p.m. on November 20, 1986, Larry Coker filed a Farm Labor Contractor Registration Complaint on Respondent listing violations under Sections 450.33(4)(a),(5) and (9) and 450.35, Florida Statutes. Although there was evidence that Joe Carl Stephens was employed by Respondent and that Respondent paid the fee of $35.00 to Petitioner for Stephens to obtain his farm labor contractor's certificate, there was credible testimony from Respondent that he was not contracting with Stephens as a farm labor contractor as that term is defined in Section 450.28(1), Florida Statutes on November 20, 1986 but was dealing with Stephens as a farm worker and there was no extra compensation being paid to Stephens for driving the truck. There was insufficient evidence to show that Respondent was contracting with Stephens as a farm labor contractor. There was credible evidence that Respondent at all times material to this proceeding had hired, supervised and transported more than one (1) farm worker and had received compensation for such activities.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record and the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that the Petitioner, enter a Final Order assessing an administrative fine of $750.00 against Respondent for violation of the requirements of Section 450.33(4)(a), (5) and (9), Florida Statutes and dismissing the charges of violating Section 450.35, Florida Statutes. Respectfully submitted and entered this 10th day of July, 1987, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of July, 1987. COPIES FURNISHED: Moses E. Williams, Esquire Department of Labor and Security Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mr. Edgar Coleman Post Office Box 5 Umatilla, Florida Hugo Menendez, Secretary Department of Labor and Employment Security 206 Berkeley Building 2590 Executive Center Circle, East Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2152
The Issue Whether the Petitioner proved the elements necessary to demonstrate that she was subject to an unlawful employment practice as a result of Respondent, Bradford County Farm Bureau, maintaining a sexually-hostile work environment.
Findings Of Fact At all times material to this proceeding, Petitioner was employed by Respondent, Bradford County Farm Bureau (BCFB or Respondent). She worked for the BCFB from December 15, 2006 until January 1, 2012. The BCFB is an organization created to work for and provide support to farmers in Bradford County. The BCFB has its office in Starke, Florida. At all times relevant to this proceeding, James Gaskins was the President of the BCFB Board of Directors. He served in that capacity as an unpaid volunteer. The alleged actions of Mr. Gaskins towards the Petitioner form the basis for her claim of employment discrimination. Section 760.10(1), provides that: It is an unlawful employment practice for an employer: To discharge or to fail or refuse to hire any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual?s race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age, handicap, or marital status. To limit, segregate, or classify employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities, or adversely affect any individual?s status as an employee, because of such individual?s race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age, handicap, or marital status. Section 760.02(7) defines "employer" as follows: „Employer? means any person employing 15 or more employees for each working day in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, and any agent of such a person. The threshold issue in this proceeding is whether the BCFB had the requisite number of employees to bring it under the jurisdiction of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 as Petitioner?s “employer.” If Petitioner fails in her proof of that issue, any discussion of acts that may have constituted sexual harassment or resulted in the creation of a sexually- hostile work environment become superfluous and unnecessary. Facts Regarding the BCFB as an “Employer” At all times relevant to this proceeding, the BCFB had two paid employees. Ms. Griffith was the office manager and bookkeeper. Ms. Linzy was a part-time secretary and receptionist, although she worked full-time when Ms. Griffith was out. Ms. Linzy retired in October, 2012. In addition to the foregoing employees, the BCFB has a five-member board of directors. Although Mr. Gaskins, who was a member of the Board, served as an unpaid volunteer, there was no evidence as to whether the remaining members were paid for their services. For purposes of this Recommended Order, it will be presumed that they were. Based solely on the number of its employees, BCFB is not an “employer” as defined by section 760.10. Therefore, in order to prove the threshold element of her claim for relief, Petitioner must establish that employees of other entities should be imputed to the BCFB due to integrated activities or common control of BCFB?s operations or employees. Petitioner presented evidence of the relationship between the BCFB, the Florida Farm Bureau, and the Florida Farm Bureau Insurance Company (FFBIC) to establish the requisite integration or common control necessary to impute their employees to the BCFB. Florida Farm Bureau The Florida Farm Bureau has more than 15 employees. The Florida Farm Bureau has a mission similar to that of the BCFB of providing goods, services, and other assistance to farmers, though on a state-wide basis. Each county in Florida has an independent county farm bureau. The Florida Farm Bureau has no common corporate identity with the BCFB. The BCFB is incorporated as a legal entity unto itself. The Florida Farm Bureau and the BCFB have no common officers, directors, or employees. The Florida Farm Bureau does not share or comingle bank accounts with the BCFB. The BCFB maintains its own finances, and has a bank account with the Capital City Bank Group. The Florida Farm Bureau has no operational control over the BCFB. The BCFB Board of Directors makes all employment decisions for the BCFB, has exclusive authority to hire and fire employees of the BCFB, and has exclusive control over the pay and the terms and conditions of BCFB employees. Employees of the BCFB are paid by the BCFB, and not by the Florida Farm Bureau. The Florida Farm Bureau has the telephone numbers of all of the county farm bureaus, and can transfer calls received by the Florida Farm Bureau to any of the county farm bureaus. Other than that, as stated by Ms. Linzy, the county farm bureaus “are all on their own.” Florida Farm Bureau Insurance Company The Florida Farm Bureau Insurance Company is affiliated with the Florida Farm Bureau. The nature and extent of the relationship between those entities was not established. The relationship between those two entities does not affect their relationship, or lack thereof, with the BCFB. Petitioner introduced no evidence as to the FFBIC?s total number of employees. The FFBIC has no common officers or directors with the BCFB, nor do they share or comingle bank accounts. Brent Huber and Travis McAllister are insurance agents authorized to transact business on behalf of the FFBIC. They are self-employed independent contractors. Mr. Huber does business as “Brent Huber, Inc.” Neither Mr. Huber nor Mr. McAllister is an employee of the FFBIC. Mr. Huber is not employed by the BCFB, and does not perform duties on behalf of the BCFB. The evidence suggests that Mr. McAllister?s status, vis-à-vis the BCFB, is the same as that of Mr. Huber. Local FFBIC agents are selected by the FFBIC. Given the close relationship with local farmers/customers, the FFBIC selection of a local agent must be ratified by the county farm bureau in the county in which the agent is to transact business. Once ratified, an FFBIC agent cannot be terminated by the county farm bureaus. Mr. Huber and Mr. McAllister, having been appointed to transact business in Bradford County as agents of the FFBIC, maintain an office at the BCFB office in Starke. There being only four persons in the office, the relationship among them was friendly and informal. Mr. Huber described the group as “tight-knit” and “like a family.” Mr. Huber had no supervisory control over Petitioner or her work schedule. Due to the small size of the BCFB office, and limited number of persons to staff the office, Ms. Griffith?s absences would cause problems for the office as a whole. However, Mr. Huber never evaluated Ms. Griffith?s performance and never disciplined Ms. Griffith. The FFBIC provided sexual harassment, employment discrimination, workers? compensation, and minimum wage informational signs that were placed in the BCFB office break room. Those signs were “shared” between the Florida Farm Bureau Insurance Company and the BCFB. Thus, the BCFB did not maintain a separate set of signs. The BCFB office has a single telephone number, and calls are routed internally. If Mr. Huber was out of the office, Petitioner or Ms. Linzy would take messages for him. If Mr. Huber was alone in the office, he would answer the telephone. Petitioner or Ms. Linzy would occasionally make appointments for Mr. Huber, and assist him when clients visited the office. Mr. Huber did not pay Petitioner or Ms. Linzy for those services. At some point, Mr. Huber and Ms. Griffith determined that it would be mutually advantageous if Ms. Griffith were allowed to speak with FFBIC customers about insurance when Mr. Huber was out of the office. To facilitate that arrangement, Ms. Griffith, at Mr. Huber?s suggestion, obtained a license as a customer service representative, which allowed her to sell policies under Mr. Huber?s insurance agent license. The customer service representative license was not a requirement of Ms. Griffith?s position with the BCFB. Ms. Griffith would sell insurance policies only when Mr. Huber was out of the office. Mr. Huber compensated Ms. Griffith for writing insurance policies through “Brent Huber, Inc.” Ms. Griffith continued to be paid as a full-time employee of the BCFB because she thought the BCFB “would be OK with it.”
Recommendation Upon the consideration of the facts found and conclusions of law reached, it is RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered by the Florida Commission on Human Relations that, based upon Petitioner's failure to meet her burden of proof to establish that Respondent, Bradford County Farm Bureau, is an “employer” as defined in section 760.02(7), the Employment Complaint of Discrimination be dismissed. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of May, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S E. GARY EARLY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of May, 2013. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations Suite 100 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Robert E. Larkin, III, Esquire Allen, Norton and Blue, P.A. Suite 100 906 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Jamison Jessup 557 Noremac Avenue Deltona, Florida 32738 Cheyanne Costilla, Interim General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations Suite 100 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact During late 1987 and early 1988, the Respondent, Javier Melendez, was registered by the Petitioner, the Department of Labor and Employment Security (DLES), as a farm labor contractor with authorization to transport migrant and seasonal farm workers. In March, 1988, Melendez applied to renew his registration as a farm labor contractor. On or about April 5, 1988, the DLES entered a Final Order imposing $1400 of fines on Melendez for two violations: one, a violation of Section 450.33(5), Florida Statutes, and Rule 38B-4.005(1), Florida Administrative Code, for not carrying required liability insurance on the 1979 Ford van in which he was transporting migrant and seasonal farm workers on December 10, 1987; the second, a violation of Section 450.33(9), Florida Statutes, and Rule 38B-4.004(5), Florida Administrative Code, for not having a current valid inspection on the same vehicle on the same day. Melendez did not take steps to bring his 1979 Ford van into compliance with the requirements for using it to transport migrant and seasonal farm workers. On January 11, 1988, another registered farm labor contractor named Emmett Hunter was using a 1975 Ford van that Melendez owned and had loaned to Hunter for a rental charge to transport migrant and seasonal farm workers. The 1975 Ford van did not have required liability insurance for use in transporting migrant and seasonal farm workers. Melendez still has not brought either of the two vans into compliance with the requirements for use in transporting migrant and seasonal farm workers. Melendez has paid no part of the $1400 of fines that were imposed by Final Order in April 1988. Melendez did not appear at the final hearing in this case.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings Of Fact and Conclusions Of Law, it is recommended that the Petitioner, the Department of Labor and Employment Security, enter a final order denying the application of the Respondent, Javier Melendez, for renewal of his certificate of registration as a farm labor contractor. RECOMMENDED this 3rd day of August, 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of August, 1988. COPIES FURNISHED: Moses E. Williams, Esquire Department of Labor and Employment Security Suite 117, Montgomery Building 2590 Executive Center Circle, East Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2152 Mr. Javier Melendez Post Office Box 2052 Haines City, Florida 33844 Hugo Menendez, Secretary Department of Labor and Employment Security 206 Berkeley Building 2590 Executive Center Circle, East Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2152 Kenneth Hart, Esquire General Counsel 131 Montgomery Building 2562 Executive Center Circle, East Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2152
The Issue The issue is whether respondent should have a $1,000 civil penalty imposed for allegedly violating Section 450.30, Florida Statutes (1989) and Rule 38H-11.003, Florida Administrative Code (1989) by acting as a farm labor contractor without a certificate of registration.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: This controversy arose on May 1, 1989, when Don R. Symonette, who is a compliance officer with petitioner, Department of Labor and Employment Security, Division of Labor, Employment, and Training (Division), made an inspection of a farm owned by Ovid Barnett some seven or eight miles east of Immokalee, Florida. The testimony as to what transpired during the course of the inspection is sharply in dispute. In resolving these conflicts, the undersigned has accepted the more credible and persuasive testimony, and that testimony is embodied in the findings below. As Symonette drove by the farm that day, he observed a crew of approximately eighteen workers picking bell peppers in a field. Thereafter, Symonette drove his vehicle onto the premises for the purpose of determining if pertinent statutes and Division rules were being followed. He initially observed respondent, Abel Flores (Abel), standing by a pickup truck in the same field where the laborers were harvesting the peppers. The two were acquainted from several meetings over the prior years. Symonette asked respondent what he was doing, and respondent answered that he was helping his brother, Alfredo, who is a registered farm labor contractor. Respondent also volunteered that he was being paid by his brother and received approximately $40 per day in compensation. Abel further acknowledged, and the Division records show, that he is not certified as a farm labor contractor. At that point, Symonette decided to give Abel the benefit of the doubt and to interview respondent's brother, Alfredo, who was supervising a crew in an adjacent field. During the course of the interview, Alfredo advised Symonette that he (Alfredo) was the supervisor in charge of the crew and it was he who had contracted with the farm to supply the workers. Even so, Symonette concluded that because Abel was the only person standing in the other field, he was "supervising" the other crew and was doing so without a certificate of registration. Accordingly, Symonette filled out a summary of violations which cited Abel for failing to register as a contractor. After discussing the summary with Abel, Symonette had Abel sign the document. He also prepared a site review and inspection check list which Abel reviewed and signed. On April 27, 1990, or almost a year later, the Division issued an administrative complaint charging Abel with acting as a farm labor contractor without having a certificate of registration. On June 7, 1990, Symonette sent by mail a form to Ovid Barnett requesting information regarding Abel's employment. On an undisclosed date, the form was returned to Symonette and contains what purports to be Barnett's signature. However, the contents of the completed form are hearsay in nature and cannot serve as the basis for a finding of fact. Moreover, even if the response was not hearsay, it fails to disclose the nature of Abel's employment with the farm and whether the hourly compensation allegedly given Abel was being paid at the time the form was completed in June 1990 or when the inspection occurred thirteen months earlier. In this regard, it is noted that at hearing Abel produced pay stubs from April and May 1989 which indicate that his salary was either $4.325 per hour or $5.00 per hour, depending on whether he was driving a tractor in the fields or a truck from the fields to the packing house. The former amount is the same as was being paid a number of other farm workers whose job responsibilities were not disclosed. Abel's testimony on compensation is accepted as being credible and comports with the statement made by Abel to Symonette that he was being paid around $40 per day for a full day's work. All compensation received by Abel was from his employer, Ovid Barnett. In some cases, he was paid by check from the farm, and in other cases, he was paid by his brother who had in turn been paid by the farm. To the extent the allegation is relevant, there is insufficient evidence to establish that Abel received double compensation during May 1989 by being paid by both his brother and Barnett at the same time. To bolster Abel's contention that he was not acting as a farm labor contractor on May 1, 1989, a supervisor at Barnett's farm established that Abel was driving trucks between the field and the packing house when the inspection occurred, and as such, it was necessary for Abel to stand by his truck while the workers loaded the truck with produce. As a driver, Abel had the responsibility of overseeing the loading of produce on his truck and, when necessary, to direct the workers on how to properly do so. It is noted that at hearing, Symonette did not describe the activities being performed by Abel except that Abel was simply "standing" around his truck and "appeared" to be supervising the work crew. Accordingly, it is found that Abel was not performing the duties of a farm labor contractor on May 1, 1989.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered dismissing the administrative complaint, with prejudice. DONE and ENTERED this 20th day of August, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of August, 1990. APPENDIX Petitioner: 1-3 Partially adopted in finding of fact 2. 4. Partially adopted in finding of fact 4. Note - Where a finding has been partially used, the remainder has been rejected as being irrelevant, cumulative, a conclusion of law, unnecessary, subordinate, or not supported by the evidence. Copies Furnished: Hugo Menendez, Secretary Department of Labor and Employment Security 307 Hartman Building 2012 Capital Circle, S.E. Tallahassee, FL 32399-0658 Moses E. Williams, Esquire 307 Hartman Building 2012 Capital Circle, S. E. Tallahassee, FL 32399-0658 Abel Flores P. O. Box 1611 Immokalee, FL 33934 Steven D. Barron, Esquire 307 Hartman Building 2012 Capital Circle, S. E. Tallahassee, FL 32399-0658
The Issue Whether State Farm Fire and Casualty Company and State Farm General Insurance Company ("State Farm") made a material misrepresentation or material error in connection with the rate filing that is the subject of this proceeding. For the purpose of this proceeding, a misrepresentation or error would be material if it resulted in the Department approving "ex-wind" (meaning without windstorm coverage) homeowners insurance rates that are excessive for policyholders whose wind coverage is being non-renewed in Dade, Broward and Pinellas Counties.
Findings Of Fact The parties in this proceeding have stipulated to the following findings of fact. Based upon a review of the record in this case, these stipulated facts appear to be accurate and are adopted. In December 1995, State Farm submitted a homeowners insurance rate filing effective April 1, 1996, for new business, and May 1, 1996, for renewal business. With regard to the December 1995, homeowners rate filing, the Department of Insurance approved a 13.8 percent statewide rate increase on February 12, 1996. On February 18, 1996, State Farm formally announced that it would non- renew over three years the wind coverage for 62,000 policies in Dade, Broward, and Pinellas Counties in Florida Windstorm Underwriting Association eligible areas. On February 22, 1996, the Department issued a Notice of Withdrawal of Rate Approval ("Notice") to State Farm with regard to homeowner rates approved for Dade, Broward and Pinellas Counties. Subsequent to the issuance of the Notice, the Department requested that State Farm submit to the Department actuarial information giving further consideration to the proposed non-renewal of wind coverage to policyholders in Dade, Broward and Pinellas Counties. The evidence adduced in this matter consisted of an affidavit of Douglas S. Haseltine, a Department actuary, on behalf of the Department, and of pre-filed testimony of Mark Brannon, a State Farm actuary, and of the rate filing that is the subject of this litigation and of certain actuarial information that had been provided by State Farm to the Department pursuant to the request described in paragraph 5 above. The record in this matter otherwise includes the Request For Formal Proceedings filed in this matter by State Farm, with attachments, which include the Notice, and the stipulation filed by the parties on May 31, 1996. The Haseltine affidavit provides in pertinent part that: "For policyholder whose wind coverage is non-renewed, their remaining premium for coverage ex-wind is not excessive." The Brannon testimony and the attachments to it establish the methodology by which State Farm establishes rates for policyholders in different territories throughout Florida for homeowners insurance, including both homeowners insurance policies that included wind coverage and policies that excluded wind coverage (hereinafter "ex-wind policies"). The Brannon testimony also provided that the rate filing did not reflect the distributional changes that would result from the non-renewal plan that was subsequently announced on February 20, 1996. Mr. Brannon further testified that, in his expert opinion, the failure to point out this non-renewal program did not constitute a material error or material misrepresentation because when the filing was made the decision to initiate these non-renewals had not been made, and because: Even if the non-renewal program had been announced prior to December 15, 1995, it would not have changed the rate request. State Farm's original rate request was a 24 percent increase. The approved rate request included a 40 percent wind or hail exclusion discount. This discount applied to the FWUA eligible areas of Dade, Broward and Pinellas Counties. The amount of this discount was not changed by the non-renewal program. Thus, the non-renewal program would not have had a material effect on the filing, even if I had known of the program at the time the filing was made. Mr. Brannon further testified that the rates proposed in the filing are not excessive or unfairly discriminatory, stating: Q: Are the rates you have proposed in this filing excessive or unfairly discriminatory? A: It is my expert opinion that the proposed rates are reasonable and are not excessive or unfairly discriminatory. Specifically, the proposed rates for both those policies which exclude windstorm or hail coverage, and the rates for those policies which include wind- storm or hail coverage, meet the statutory requirements and are not excessive or unfairly discriminatory. It appears that there is no misrepresentation or error in the rate filing itself, because the decision that the Department contends should have been disclosed had, as a matter of fact, not yet been made at the time of the filing. Moreover, if State Farm had an obligation to disclose this decision to the Department prior to the Department's approval of the rate filing, any misrepresentation or error flowing from the failure to disclose would not be material to the filing because the data subsequently provided to the Department and other evidence in this matter show that: Policyholders whose wind coverage will be non-renewed will receive a discount that is actuarially sound and commensurate with the reduction in coverage: and hence, Policyholders whose coverage will be renewed "ex-wind" will not be charged rates that are excessive.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered: (1) finding that there was not a material misrepresentation or material error made by the insurer or contained in the rate filing; and (2) dismissing the Notice. DONE and ENTERED this 18th day of June, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES W. YORK, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of June, 1996. COPIES FURNISHED: Vincent J. Rio, III, Esquire TAYLOR, DAY & RIO Suite 206 311 South Calhoun Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301-1807 Daniel Y. Sumner, Esquire General Counsel Department of Insurance The Larson Building 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1300 Bill Nelson State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant facts are found: Respondent Michael Quintana is currently licensed as a general lines agent in Florida. On or about January 18, 1983, respondent went to the home of Shirley W. McLaughlin for the purpose of soliciting insurance. Mrs. McLaughlin agreed to purchase a homeowners insurance policy and "mortgage" insurance was also discussed. She supplied the necessary information and signed the applications for both the homeowner insurance and the "mortgage" insurance. While she did not desire to purchase what she understood to be strictly "life" insurance, she did understand that what she "was getting at that particular time was protection for the house, period." (TR. 32) She further understood that she was applying for coverage that would pay something if either she or her husband died, and that such would be payable to the beneficiaries. While she was given the opportunity to review all the papers she signed on January 18, 1983, Mrs. McLaughlin apparently did not understand that the premium payments for the "mortgage" insurance would be automatically withdrawn from her bank account. Sometime after her application for homeowners insurance was refused because of a space heater in her home, Mrs. McLaughlin learned from her bank of the automatic withdrawal of premium payments for the "mortgage" insurance. She thereafter cancelled such insurance and all monies were refunded to her. The cover sheet for the "mortgage" insurance policy identifies the policy as a "joint reducing term life insurance policy." The inserted printout setting forth the costs and benefits describes the basic policy as "joint reducing term life (20-year mortgage term) with disability waiver benefit." Agents within the company with which respondent was employed on January 18, 1983, typically refer to such a policy as a "mortgage insurance policy" or a "mortgage cancellation policy," as opposed to a "life insurance policy." The term "mortgage" is used to delineate that a specific policy has been purchased for a specific loss. The beneficiary of such a policy has the option of either paying off the mortgage or using the money for any other purpose.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law recited herein, it is RECOMMENDED that the Administrative Complaint filed on June 11, 1984, be DISMISSED. Respectfully submitted and entered this 25th day of January, 1985, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE D. TREMOR Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of January, 1985. COPIES FURNISHED: William W. Tharpe, Jr. 413-B Larson Building Tallahassee, Fla. 32301 Timothy G. Anderson 620 E. Twigg Street Tampa, Fla. 33602 Bill Gunter Insurance Commissioner The Capitol Tallahassee, Fla. 32301
The Issue In this proceeding, pursuant to Section 120.56(4), Florida Statutes, Petitioner United Property & Casualty Insurance Company ("United") challenges several alleged "statements" of Respondent Department of Insurance (the "Department"), which United alleges are rules as defined in Section 120.52(15), Florida Statutes, that have not been adopted properly and therefore violate Section 120.54(1)(a), Florida Statutes. The statements at issue arise from the Department's interpretation and implementation of statutes that authorize insurers such as United to recoup reimbursement premiums paid to the Florida Hurricane Catastrophe Fund (the "CAT Fund"). United seeks a final order: (1) declaring that some or all of the above alleged statements, in whole or in part, violate Section 120.54(1)(a), Florida Statutes; (2) directing that the Department immediately stop relying on any illegal unadopted rule as a basis for agency action; and (3) awarding reasonable attorneys' fees and costs pursuant to Section 120.595(4)(a), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact The evidence presented at final hearing established the facts that follow. The Parties United is a Florida domiciled property and casualty insurance company that received its Certificate of Authority to write homeowners and dwelling fire insurance in this state on April 2, 1999. As an insurer transacting business in this state, United operates within and subject to the regulatory jurisdiction of the Department, which is the executive branch agency responsible for administering and enforcing the Florida Insurance Code. Rates and Premiums United is required by law to establish rates for the lines of insurance it writes in this state. See Section 627.062, Florida Statutes. A "rate" is "the unit charge by which the measure of exposure or the amount of insurance specified in a policy of insurance or covered thereunder is multiplied to determine the premium." Section 627.041(1), Florida Statutes. The term "premium" means "the consideration paid or to be paid to an insurer for the issuance and delivery of any binder or policy of insurance." Section 627.041(2), Florida Statutes. Thus, simply put, the rate times the amount of coverage equals the cost of insurance, which may then be adjusted further to calculate the total premium to be charged a particular policyholder — by applicable discounts, credits, or surcharges included in the insurer's approved rating plan. See, e.g., Section 627.062(2)(d), (e)4, Florida Statutes. Rates and rating plans must be approved by the Department. See Section 627.062, Florida Statutes. The Department's duty is to disapprove rates that are "excessive, inadequate, or unfairly discriminatory." Id. An appropriate and adequate rate "is supposed to pay all the [insurer's costs]," T-222, and afford the insurer "a reasonable rate of return on [the] classes of insurance written [by that insurer] in this state." Section 627.062(2)(a), Florida Statutes. United's Initial Rate Filings and Take-Out Plan On March 3, 1999, United made two initial rate filings with the Department, one for homeowners insurance and the other for dwelling fire. As United explained in its cover letters to the Department, each line of business constituted a proposed "Take Out Program," meaning that United planned to remove homeowners and dwelling fire policies from the Florida Residential Property and Casualty Joint Underwriting Association ("FRPCJUA"). 5/ United also advised the Department that each Manual of Rates and Rules that it was filing was "basically that of the FRPCJUA with some modification to remove extraneous provisions and change names." The parties sometimes have called this type of rate filing a "me too" filing, a descriptive appellation that quickly, if colloquially, conveys the idea that the insurer is taking advantage of the FRPCJUA's already approved rates. On March 3, 1999, the Department's Bureau of Property and Casualty Forms and Rates accepted United's initial homeowners and dwelling fire insurance rates for use. Later, United's rates were approved with an effective date of April 19, 1999. On April 2, 1999, pursuant to a Consent Order with the Department which approved United's take-out plan, United removed approximately 11,500 policies from the FRPCJUA. Each of the policies that United removed from the FRPCJUA is a "covered policy" as defined in Section 215.555(2)(c), Florida Statutes. Consequently, United was required, as is every insurer that writes covered policies in this state, to enter into a "reimbursement contract" with the State Board of Administration, the agency that directs and controls the CAT Fund. Section 215.555(4), Florida Statutes. The CAT Fund and Reimbursement Premiums The legislature created the CAT Fund in November 1993 during a special session that was "called due to a potential crisis in the insurance industry in the aftermath of Hurricane Andrew." 6/ The CAT Fund's purpose was and remains to provide "a stable and ongoing source of reimbursement to insurers for a portion of their catastrophic hurricane losses." Section 215.555(1)(e), Florida Statutes. In consideration for the right to reimbursement from the CAT Fund in the event of a hurricane catastrophe, insurers are required, under their reimbursement contracts, annually to pay into the fund a reimbursement premium. Id.; see also Section 215.555(5), Florida Statutes. Recoupment of Reimbursement Premiums In 1995, the legislature passed a law allowing insurers to recoup reimbursement premiums paid into the CAT Fund. See Chapter 95-276, Laws of Florida. Effective June 14, 1995, this new law, codified as Section 627.062(5), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1996), provided: With respect to a rate filing involving coverage of the type for which the insurer is required to pay a reimbursement premium to the Florida Hurricane Catastrophe Fund, the insurer may recoup the actual amount of reimbursement premium by including in the insurer's rate filing an allowance for the reimbursement premium charged by the Florida Hurricane Catastrophe Fund. In the filing, the insurer must adjust its rates to remove that portion of the rates attributable to catastrophe losses expected to be covered by the Florida Hurricane Catastrophe Fund. In determining what portion of a rate is attributable to catastrophes covered by the Florida Hurricane Catastrophe Fund, the projected recovery from the fund shall be calculated according to the formula specified in s. 215.555(4)(c). During its next regular session, in 1996, the legislature enacted Chapter 96-194, Laws of Florida, which amended Section 627.062(5), Florida Statutes, effective January 1, 1997, to read: With respect to a rate filing involving coverage of the type for which the insurer is required to pay a reimbursement premium to the Florida Hurricane Catastrophe Fund, the insurer may fully recoup in its property insurance premiums any reimbursement premiums paid to the Florida Hurricane Catastrophe Fund, together with reasonable costs of other reinsurance, but may not recoup reinsurance costs that duplicate coverage provided by the Florida Hurricane Catastrophe Fund. Section 627.062(5), Florida Statutes (1997). This version of the section remains in effect today. In 1997, the legislature created yet another new statute addressing the subject of CAT Fund reimbursement premiums. See Chapter 97-55, Laws of Florida. Taking effect on May 9, 1997, Section 672.0629(10), Florida Statutes, provides: A property insurance rate filing that includes any adjustments related to premiums paid to the Florida Hurricane Catastrophe Fund must include a complete calculation of the insurer's catastrophe load, and the information in the filing may not be limited solely to recovery of moneys paid to the fund. The Department's Interpretation and Implementation of the Recoupment Statutes Douglas Hazeltine, an actuary employed by the Department, is the principal regulator regarding recoupment of CAT Fund reimbursement premiums. In that capacity, he is, and at all material times has been, responsible for interpreting and applying Sections 627.062(5) and 627.0629(10), Florida Statutes. Although he denied having a policy-making role at the Department, Mr. Hazeltine testified that his interpretation and application of these particular statutes consistently has been approved by his superiors, with whom (as well as with other colleagues) he has discussed these matters. Accordingly, great weight has been given to Mr. Hazeltine's testimony as an accurate expression of the Department's positions on the meaning and operation of Sections 627.062(5) and 627.0629(10), Florida Statutes (hereafter, collectively, the "Recoupment Statutes"). 7/ The Department takes the view that insurers may pass along the CAT Fund reimbursement premiums to their own policyholders in one of two ways. The first method — which, according to Mr. Hazeltine, is employed by most insurance companies — is to prospectively load the base rates with a CAT Fund Factor (that is, a factor attributable to catastrophic hurricane losses expected to be covered by the CAT Fund, see endnote 3). In the Department's eyes this is simply normal rate-making procedure; the exposure covered by the CAT Fund is built into the insurer's base rates, just as other risks are, as if the insurer itself (rather than the CAT Fund) would pay the portion of any catastrophic hurricane losses expected to be covered by the CAT Fund. The Department does not consider the Recoupment Statutes to either govern or proscribe the accepted practice of prospectively loading base rates with a CAT Fund Factor. The other method is to set base rates that are net of expected recoveries from the CAT Fund (i.e. are not loaded with a CAT Fund Factor) and thereafter to impose a recoupment charge on policyholders to recover for CAT Fund reimbursement premiums paid in the previous year. A recoupment charge is retrospective, in that the insurer is collecting funds to reimburse itself for an expense that it already has paid. As Mr. Hazeltine put it, "recouping refers to something that happened in the past." Transcript of Final Hearing ("T-") 152. That is the "essence of a recoupment." T-220. The term "Recoupment Surcharge" will be used hereafter to refer to a retrospective recoupment charge. The Department considers these two methods of making policyholders pay the CAT Fund reimbursement premiums to be mutually exclusive, in the sense that an insurer must elect to use one method or the other. Thus, according to the Department, an insurer may either prospectively load its base rates to collect in advance for reimbursement premiums that will be paid in the future, or impose a Recoupment Surcharge to recover for the reimbursement premiums after paying them, but it cannot include a CAT Fund Factor in its base rates one year (e.g. 1999) and then impose a Recoupment Surcharge the next (e.g. 2000), else the policyholders would pay twice for the same CAT Fund coverage. The Department's position logically dictates that if an insurer which has been prospectively loading its base rates with a CAT Fund Factor decides to switch to the recoupment method, it must experience a transitional year during which its base rates are reduced by the CAT Fund Factor (because it will recoup the transitional year's reimbursement premiums in the next year) and in which no Recoupment Surcharge is imposed (because the prior year's reimbursement premiums were collected prospectively in the prior year's base rates). 8/ This would have a negative effect on the insurer's cash flow during the transitional year, in relation to the preceding year, which may be one reason why "most companies don't recoup" — although that was not the explanation offered by Mr. Hazeltine. T. 172 (attributing insurers' preference for prospective loading to fact that CAT Fund is "cheap reinsurance"). 9/ The Department's interpretation and application of the Recoupment Statutes is informed by a presumption that every insurer's base rates are prospectively loaded with a CAT Fund Factor unless and until: (a) the insurer makes a recoupment filing pursuant to Section 627.0629(10), Florida Statutes, which demonstrates to the Department that the CAT Fund Factor has been stripped from its base rates, and (b) the Department approves the insurer's recoupment filing, allowing the insurer to impose a Recoupment Surcharge. This presumption is based on the premise that an insurer's rates on file, having already been approved, are adequate and "fully loaded in the Department's opinion." T-223-24; see also T-153, and 170 (Hazeltine: "Whenever a company makes an initial filing, we assume that the rates that are approved -- the Department, we believe the rates that they are charging are fully loaded for all costs and they would remain that way, fully loaded for all costs, until they made a filing to change in some way."). The presumption that an insurer which is not recouping must be prospectively collecting for reimbursement premiums with CAT Fund Factor-loaded base rates is irrebuttable and hence conclusive, as Mr. Hazeltine explained: THE COURT: Can the insurance company overcome that presumption? I mean, if evidence or information is presented, can the insurance company demonstrate inadequacy of its rates by showing, for example, that it isn't -- that it is not prospectively recovering for the CAT Fund premium? THE WITNESS: Well, no, because they have to be. They have to be because there's [sic: should be "they're"] not recouping. So the definition of their rate is that it's prospectively loaded. They somehow have to show -- to recoup, they would have to show that they have an inadequate rate otherwise, and that is why the CAT factor calculation is necessary because they have to show that, without this additional money, they have an inadequate rate. THE COURT: Could they show -- I mean, could they show inadequacy of the rate by demonstrating that there is no catastrophe load in their rate and therefore they're not collecting prospectively? THE WITNESS: No, because the only way there could not be a catastrophe load in their rate is if they had started recouping, if they had already started recouping. Otherwise, it's there, it's implicitly there. T-224-25. 10/ The Department's presumption leads it to the conclusion that any insurer which elects to begin recouping must first adjust its base rates to remove the CAT Fund Factor that is conclusively presumed to be in those rates. T-172 (Hazeltine: Insurers "can come in and recoup, that's allowed, but they have to adjust their base rates."). 11/ Consequently, the Department construes Section 627.0629(10), Florida Statutes which operates on rate filings that include "any adjustments related to" reimbursement premiums 12/ — as controlling for all first-time recoupment filings. 13/ While the Department interprets Section 627.0629(10), Florida Statutes, to be applicable to all insurers making their first recoupment filings, it also considers the statute to be applicable only to first-time filers. Mr. Hazeltine drew the distinction between first-time and repeat filers: Q Now, you just made reference to a filing like United's for a first-time [recoupment] filing. Is there different information required for a company like United that's a first-time company filing for recoupment as versus some other type of company? A Right. Once the filing has been made and the catastrophe factor has been submitted and the indicated rate has been shown in the filing, any subsequent filings we would just simply need to know that a prior filing had been made so that, if they were going to change the recoupment surcharge from say eight to nine percent, if we knew that they made a prior filing, then we would know that they had adjusted their bases rates, so there wouldn't need to be the laying out of the catastrophe factor. T-149; see also T-225 (Hazeltine: "[W]e get filings in where [insurers] are already recouping, and in that situation we know, when they've filed to change their recoupment, that their base rates are net of the coverage of the CAT Fund. We know that because we handled that in a previous filing."). Thus, in the Department's view as expressed by Mr. Hazeltine, Section 627.0629(10) does not apply to an insurer that seeks to adjust a previously approved Recoupment Surcharge because the Department's approval of the insurer's initial recoupment filing signifies that the CAT Fund Factor was removed from the insurer's base rates, which accordingly need not be adjusted again. 14/ The parties agree (or at least United does not dispute) that an insurer wanting to recoup reimbursement premiums must make a filing with the Department. Both parties refer to the necessary filing as a "recoupment filing." They part company, however, on whether a recoupment filing is a "rate filing." The Department says that a recoupment filing is "a type of rate filing." T-165. United says it is not. This particular dispute is not so much about labels as it is about whether the procedural and substantive requirements that rate filings entail should attach to recoupment filings as well. The Department's position that a recoupment filing is a rate filing matters because it leads to the conclusion that the Department is empowered, pursuant to Section 627.062(2)(b), Florida Statutes, to review a recoupment/rate filing to determine if the overall rate (including the Recoupment Surcharge) is excessive, inadequate, or unfairly discriminatory. This in turn means that the Department can disapprove a recoupment filing for failure to provide sufficient "justification" in support of a proposed Recoupment Surcharge, viewed in the context of the insurer's total rate. See T-169. In addition, if recoupment filings are rate filings as the Department maintains, then the procedural and informational requirements of Rule 4-170.014, Florida Administrative Code (governing all homeowners insurance rate filings), and Rule 4-170.0141, Florida Administrative Code (governing dwelling fire insurance rate filings), might apply to them as well. Indeed, on the premise that recoupment filings are rate filings, the Department believes that all of its requirements for recoupment filings are covered by existing statutes and rules. T-253. However, neither of the Recoupment Statutes, nor any other exiting statute or rule, clearly and unambiguously sets forth a requirement that, in order to exercise its right to fully recoup, an insurer must submit a filing — whether it be called a “rate filing,” “recoupment filing,” or something else — that fully complies with the statutes and rules governing rate filings generally. At bottom, the Department's position that recoupment filings are rate filings is an interpretation of the Recoupment Statutes that can be used, and is being used, as a bootstrap to impose filing requirements that are not specifically stated in either Section 627.062(5) or Section 627.0629(10), Florida Statutes. Moreover, the Department does not require recoupment filings to comply with all of the procedures controlling rate filings generally. As Mr. Hazeltine explained: "A retroactive recoupment is a fairly -- is a less involved filing in a sense because the base rate filing may go through a lot of justification for territorial rates or there may be a lot more detail in a base rate filing." T-172 (Emphasis added). Mr. Hazeltine further described the fundamental data indispensable to a first-time recoupment filing as follows: I think what's really needed is what Mr. Stuart said. In making a recoupment filing, you need simply to show the amount of a factor, which you get by dividing the premium into the -- into the amount to be recouped. That gave him the percentage to load the rate, and you need to show your catastrophe load or the calculation of your rate so that the policyholder doesn't wind up paying twice, because if you included it in your base rates and also as a recoupment, then the policyholder would be paying for the coverage of the Catastrophe Fund twice, both in the base rate and also in the factor. * * * . . . Like I said, all you really need to know and all you -- is the projected premium. You need to know how to compute -- how the company's going to compute its factors, and you need some justification or analysis showing the catastrophe load and the total indicated rate. T-136, 142. The truly essential requirements for an insurer's subsequent recoupment filings are fewer still, as previously discussed, because "there wouldn't need to be the laying out of the catastrophe factor." T-149. There are "many types" of rate filings, said Mr. Hazeltine, and the information required to be supplied depends on the type of filing involved. T-165. The Department's statement that recoupment filings are rate filings does not, in itself, inform would-be filers which of the requirements for rate filings generally must be followed — nor do the statutes or any promulgated rules. The Proposed Rule In 1996, the Department developed a proposed rule concerning the recoupment of reimbursement premiums. Initially published on July 26, 1996, in Volume 22, Number 30 of the Florida Administrative Weekly, page 4243, Proposed Rule 4-170.016 (the “Proposed Rule”) was designed to “provide a streamlined rate revision process for the approval of requests for rates which recoup payments to the Florida Hurricane Catastrophe Fund (FHCF) . . . .” Petitioner’s Exhibit 6. The summary description of the Proposed Rule explained that it provided “specified procedures for submitting rate filings to recoup payments made to the FHCF . . . , adopt[ed] forms by reference and provide[d] limitations on amounts recoverable in a given year.” Id. It is interesting to note that the Proposed Rule appeared in the Florida Law Weekly about two months after the legislature had amended Section 627.062(5), Florida Statutes, but some six months before that amendment would take effect. Thus, at the time the Proposed Rule was published, the law allowed an insurer to recoup the “actual amount of reimbursement premium” by making a rate filing which “adjust[ed] its rates to remove that portion of the rates attributable to catastrophe losses expected to be covered by the” CAT Fund. See Section 627.062(5), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1996). Come January 1, 1997, however, Section 627.062(5) would no longer contain the language just quoted; rather, insurers would be entitled to “fully recoup” any CAT Fund reimbursement premiums they had paid without being subject to an express requirement that base rates be adjusted concomitantly. See Section 627.062(5), Florida Statutes (1997). Perhaps to close this potential loophole, the Proposed Rule incorporated the “lame duck” statutory requirement that base rates be reduced in conjunction with a recoupment filing: “If an insurer chooses to apply a recoupment charge, the insurer’s next rate filing must exclude the portion of the rates attributable to catastrophic losses expected to be covered by the FHCF or must cease collecting and charge [sic ?] rates to cover expected losses.” Petitioner’s Exhibit 7 (Proposed Rule as amended by notice published November 15, 1996, in Volume 22, Number 46, Florida Administrative Weekly, page 6658). The Proposed Rule also contained a subsection on filing requirements which read: Filing Requirements. An insurer seeking approval of an FHCF reimbursement premium recoupment charge must submit three (3) copies of the following: Recoupment of FHCS Reimbursement Premium Worksheet, Form D14-1197(10/96) which is hereby incorporated by reference plus any supporting documentation for varying the charge by territory or class; final manual page(s) which include the recoupment factor and an explanation of how it will be applied; documentation of the FHCF reimbursement premium paid by the insurer; proposed declarations page; and copies of Forms D14-1102, D14-1103, and D14-1104 as incorporated in 4-170.014, or dwelling Forms D14-1193, D14-01194 and D14-1195, as incorporated in 4-170.0141. Petitioner’s Exhibit 7. The Proposed Rule was challenged in a Section 120.56(2), Florida Statutes, proceeding. The Department withdrew the Proposed Rule on February 21, 1997, apparently before the entry of a final order in the challenge (and after the present version of Section 627.062(5) took effect on January 1, 1997). Since then, the Department has not formally adopted, nor has it attempted to adopt through rulemaking, any rules that implement the Recoupment Statutes or otherwise specifically govern recoupment filings. The Memorandum and Worksheet The Proposed Rule may have been gone, but its provisions were not forgotten. On July 29, 1997, J. Steven Roddenberry, then the Bureau Chief of the Bureau of Property and Casualty Forms and Rates, issued a Memorandum and attached worksheet to “all insurance companies authorized to write property and casualty insurance in the State of Florida.” Petitioner’s Exhibit 8. The subjects of this Memorandum were “procedures for the filing of 1996 Florida Hurricane Catastrophe Fund recoupment; [and] filing deadline for 1995 Florida Hurricane Catastrophe Fund recoupment.” Id. Mr. Roddenberry testified that the purpose of this Memorandum was to provide guidance to insurers on how to make recoupment filings for CAT Fund premiums paid in 1996 and to notify them that recoupment filings for 1995 reimbursement premiums needed to be made by September 1, 1997. The July 29, 1997, Memorandum was sent to the approximately 400 insurers writing property and casualty insurance in this state at the time. United did not exist in 1997 and therefore was not an original recipient of the Memorandum. The timing of the Memorandum in relation to statutory developments is interesting. As of July 29, 1997, Section 627.0629(10), Florida Statutes, was a brand new law, having taken effect only a couple months earlier on May 9, 1997. Section 627.0629(10), with its reference to CAT Fund premium- related “adjustments” in a “rate filing,” faintly echoes language that was deleted from former Section 627.062(5), Florida Statutes, (“In the [rate] filing the insurer must adjust its rates to remove that portion . . . attributable to” CAT Fund coverage) (emphasis added). But Section 627.0629(10) does not expressly state, as did both former Section 627.062(5) and the Department’s withdrawn Proposed Rule, that an insurer electing to recoup must adjust its rates to remove the portion attributable to catastrophic losses expected to be covered by the CAT Fund. The Memorandum memorialized the Department’s interpretation of the Recoupment Statutes as requiring recouping insurers to reduce their base rates to make them net of expected CAT Fund recoveries. It stated: As in the past, an insurer may choose to either prospectively make rates sufficient to cover the costs of the FHCF assessment, while accounting for coverage provided by it, or impose a recoupment charge to recover the assessment payments made to the FHCF. If an insurer chooses to impose a recoupment charge, the insurer must exclude from its base rate calculation the expected recoveries covered by the FHCF. An insurer may not recoup 1996 premiums paid unless it has made, or concurrently makes, a base rate filing, the calculation of which excludes recoveries from the FHCF. Petitioner’s Exhibit 8 (emphasis added). The statutory interpretation reflected in the underlined sentence from the July 29, 1997, Memorandum remains current and continues to be followed by the Department. The Memorandum also enumerated certain filing requirements which bore a striking resemblance to the ones that the withdrawn Proposed Rule would have prescribed. It stated: An insurer intending to recoup the 1996 FHCF premiums paid in 1996 must file three copies of the following for each year being recouped: Recoupment of FHCF Reimbursement Premium Charge Worksheet (please see attached); Final manual page(s) which include the recoupment factor and an explanation of how it will be applied; Documentation of the FHCF reimbursement premium paid by the insurer for 1996; Proposed declaration page; A rate filing (if appropriate) containing actuarial support that shows the calculation of the catastrophe load; and Copies of homeowner forms: D14-1102, D14-1103, and D14-1104, as incorporated in 4-170.014, Florida Administrative Code, or dwelling forms D14-1193, D14-01194 and D14- 1195, as incorporated in 4-170.0141, Florida Administrative Code. The Recoupment of FHCF Reimbursement Premium Charge Worksheet (“Worksheet”), which was the subject of the Memorandum’s filing requirement lettered a, is substantially similar to the proposed Form D14-1197 that was the subject of the withdrawn Proposed Rule’s filing requirement lettered a. The filing requirements lettered b, c, and d, respectively, in the Memorandum and in the withdrawn Proposed Rule are substantially identical to one another. The filing requirement lettered f in the Memorandum is substantially identical to the one lettered e in the Proposed Rule. 15/ In short, the Memorandum listed the same five filing requirements that the Proposed Rule had spelled out and added a sixth, lettered e, which incorporated a new obligation imposed by the recently enacted Section 627.0629(10), Florida Statutes. Although written three and a half years ago for particular purposes that have passed into history, the July 29, 1997, Memorandum nevertheless sets forth the procedural and informational requirements for recoupment filings that the Department continues to enforce to this day, as Mr. Roddenberry testified: THE COURT: . . . Mr. Roddenberry, about the memorandum, July 29, 1997, memorandum, does that memorandum set forth what currently are the pieces of information required by the Department when a company submits a retro –- or a recoupment filing? THE WITNESS: If I may, when you say currently, do you mean like today? THE COURT: Like today. THE WITNESS: Yes, sir, I believe, if this information was submitted, it would be considered a complete file. I’m afraid that, if some of this was missing, that it would not be considered a complete file. * * * THE COURT: And they would need to make a complete filing in order to be subject to approval –- if the filing were incomplete, the request would be denied? THE WITNESS: Yes, sir, because if it’s incomplete, it probably doesn’t even get past the person that not literally opens the mail –- there’s two or three steps in there –- but the person that makes the assignments to the actuaries, they go through it, and if the filing is incomplete, if it doesn’t have what the statute and the rules require, then they send it back to the company. We do that now. The Inspector General told us we had to do that. T-250-52. The Worksheet form that must be submitted to comply with the Memorandum’s first-listed filing requirement (lettered a) contains 15 numbered lines of requested information, as follows: Year FHCF Assessment Paid Line(s) of Business: Prior Year’s FHCF Premium Paid $ Prior Year’s Carry-Forward? No / Yes –- If Yes, State Amount $ 5 (3) Plus (4) $ 6 Prior Year’s Florida Direct Written Premium Excluding Ex-Wind Policies $ 7 Ratio (3) / (6) x 100 8 Forecast (One Year’s) Direct Written Premium Excluding Ex-Wind Policies $ 9 Ratio (5) / (8) x 100 % Ratio (7) Plus 5% % Formula Recoupment Surcharge Lesser of (9) or (10) % Selected Surcharge Factor Effective Date AVERAGE IMPACT ON POLICYHOLDERS / / Average Premium at Current Rate Levels $ (11) Multiplied by (14) $ Petitioner’s Exhibit 8 (footnotes omitted). Mr. Roddenberry testified that the Worksheet per se is no longer required, but “the information that is requested on that form would have to be provided either in that format or some other format . . . .” T-253. Mr. Hazeltine asserted that certain items on the Worksheet are no longer required. According to Mr. Hazeltine, the items numbered 7, 10, and 11 all pertained to a limitation on amounts recoverable in a given year that was part of the Proposed Rule and which has since been abandoned; therefore, the information requested in these items is no longer required. Similarly, the information relating to the average impact on policyholders sought in the items numbered 14 and 15 is no longer required, according to Mr. Hazeltine. Line items 4 and 5 are not applicable to first-time filers such as United but might be required of repeat recoupment filers. As for item number 6, Mr. Hazeltine equivocated somewhat: on the one hand he said it was not a required item; on the other he stated that it was necessary to know last year’s premium, but “you could just figure it out if you wanted to.” T-144. And finally, Mr. Hazeltine testified that item number 9 was not necessary — although the information sought in number 9 is simply another way of expressing the Recoupment Surcharge required in number 12. 16/ While Mr. Roddenberry’s testimony contradicted Mr. Hazeltine’s in that he stated all of the information sought in the Worksheet is still required to be submitted, whereas Mr. Hazeltine dismissed many items as unnecessary, the conflict between the two is not as great as it seems at first blush. The items relating to the since-discarded limitation (numbers 7, 10, and 11) and policyholder impact (14 and 15) are essentially irrelevant to the determination of an insurer’s Recoupment Surcharge. The information sought in the remaining line items (with the possible exceptions of numbers 6 and 9, which are either irrelevant or cumulative questions) is fundamental and must be provided. What is clear is this: The Department continues to require that insurers submit all of the relevant information requested in the Worksheet, either on that form itself or in some other format. United's Recoupment Filings Under substantially identical cover letters to the Commissioner of Insurance dated June 5, 2000, United attempted, with regard to its homeowners and dwelling fire programs, respectively, to file for "recoupment of the Florida Hurricane Catastrophe Fund premiums for the period of June 1, 1999 through May 30, 2000 applicable to [United's] 'Take-out' of 'FRPCJUA assumption' business." United informed the Department that it would apply surcharges of 1.168 and 1.2803, respectively, to all homeowners and dwelling fire policies renewed on or after September 1, 2000. In addition to a cover letter, each of United's June 5, 2000, submissions consisted of a completed form entitled "Recoupment of The Florida Hurricane Catastrophe Fund Reimbursement Premium Charge Worksheet,” which was substantially similar to (and contained the same 15 line items as) the Department's Worksheet, together with an "Explanatory Memorandum" that provided additional information on items 1-4, 6, and 8. 17/ On June 13, 2000, The Department returned United's recoupment filings without action for failure to include pages 1 and 2 of Form D14-582 (a transmittal sheet and checklist, respectively), and a return envelope, as required by Rule 4-170.013, Florida Administrative Code, which provides procedures applicable to all rate, rule, underwriting guidelines, and form filings for property and casualty insurance. United re-submitted its recoupment filings, together with the requested information, on June 20, 2000. Mr. Hazeltine acknowledged the Department's receipt of these "recent rate filing[s]" by letter dated June 27. 2000. On August 4, 2000, Mr. Hazeltine notified United that the following additional information was required to complete United's recoupment filings: (1) documentation supporting the amounts intended to be recouped; (2) an explanation as to how those amounts were allocated to line of insurance and program; (3) documentation supporting an explanation as to how United intended to adjust the catastrophe provision in its base rates; and (4) the HRCS diskette for homeowners and the DRCS diskette for dwelling. United responded with a letter from its president, Mr. Stuart, dated August 21, 2000. Included with Mr. Stuart's letter were documents substantiating the fact that United had paid about $1.68 million in reimbursement premiums for 1999 and showing an allocation of this premium expense between homeowners and dwelling. Apparently attempting to satisfy the Department's request for an explanation as to how United intended to adjust the catastrophe provision in its base rates, Mr. Stuart wrote: My understanding is that [United's consultant] Mr. Trafton was advised by Steve Roddenberry, via telephone, that United would have to base the ["me-too" takeout] filing upon the 7/97 FRPCJUA filing rather than use the 1998 filing which included the JUA recoupment within the base rates. Therefore, our ["me-too" takeout] filing has the identical base rates, as does the 7/97 FRPCJUA filing. This appeared logical since United would not incur a FHCF premium charge until late in 1999 for the June 1, 1999 FHCF period. Joint Exhibit 1. Translation: United did not intend to adjust its base rates because it believed those rates were not loaded to account for the CAT Fund reimbursement premiums. Finally, Mr. Stuart informed Mr. Hazeltine that United was "preparing the diskettes as referenced in your letter of August 4th and should provide these within the next two weeks." Id. After receiving Mr. Stuart's letter, Mr. Hazeltine attempted to contact Mr. Stuart, who was on vacation and therefore unavailable, and then reached a consultant for United named Terry Godbold, whom he advised that the Department would disapprove United's recoupment filings unless the requested diskettes were received, as well as information on the adjustment of United's catastrophe load. United, however, submitted no further information. As a result, by letter dated September 7, 2000, the Department notified United of its intent to disapprove United's recoupment filings on the ground that United had failed to justify its proposed rates or rate changes. The Department found United's filings to be deficient in the following areas: The rates originally filed were not excessive, inadequate, or unfairly discriminatory. No information, or supporting data, has been supplied in support of this filing to justify changing those rates. Section 627.062(5), Florida Statutes, provides that insurers may recoup reimbursement premiums paid to the Florida Hurricane Catastrophe Fund. However, Section 627.0629(10), Florida Statutes, requires a complete calculation of the insurer's catastrophe load and that the information in the filing not be limited solely to recovery of reimbursement premiums paid to the fund. This filing contains information relating solely to the recovery of moneys paid to the fund. The lack of information provided has been discussed thoroughly with the company during the course of this filing. The HPCS [sic] and DRCS diskettes have not been provided as requested. Joint Exhibit 1. At hearing, Mr. Hazeltine testified that United's failure to provide the diskettes, by itself, (probably) would not have resulted in the disapproval of United's filings. T-189. Are United's Base Rates Net of Expected CAT Fund Recoveries? The question whether United’s base rates are net of recoveries expected from the CAT Fund in the event of a hurricane catastrophe, as the Department has presumed, lies at the heart of United’s claim to be entitled to recoup reimbursement premiums previously paid. It is, therefore, a key question that must be answered in Case No. 00-4212, the Section 120.57 proceeding brought by United to obtain a determination of its substantial interests in recouping premiums paid to the CAT Fund. However, because the merits of United’s claim for recoupment are not directly at issue in this proceeding to challenge alleged unadopted rules, 18/ the dispute regarding the composition of United’s base rates need not be resolved here, except insofar as may be necessary to decide the Department’s attack on United’s standing. The Department contends that United lacks standing to maintain this action because it has not been injured by operation of the alleged unadopted rules, even assuming for argument’s sake that the alleged agency statements are rules by definition, which the Department denies. This argument will be addressed in the legal conclusions below. For the moment, it is sufficient to note that the Department’s position fails to persuade if, as United contends, United’s base rates in fact are not prospectively loaded with a CAT Fund Factor. If United is correct about the composition of its base rates, then it has suffered a substantial injury-in-fact as a result of the Department’s irrebuttable presumption that, unless an insurer is already recouping, its base rates are prospectively loaded. The Department’s standing argument thus implicates, at least to a limited extent, the merits of United’s claim to be entitled to recoup fully the reimbursement premiums it has paid. In view of the need to address this issue without foreclosing or encroaching upon the parties’ respective rights to a full hearing on the merits of United's alleged injury in the appropriate forum, the findings of fact herein on this particular subject are expressly limited so as not to reach beyond the standing issue at hand. Except as specifically decided here, the question whether United’s base rates are prospectively loaded with a CAT Fund Factor is left for, and will need to be litigated fully in, Case No. 4212, which is the proper vehicle for its ultimate resolution on the merits. That said, there is and can be no dispute that United's base rates, as established in its initial rate filings, include a Recoupment Surcharge — of zero. The Premium Calculation Worksheet that United submitted for its homeowners rate filing, in the section dealing with "mandatory additional charges," expressly provides that the CAT Fund Recoupment Surcharge shall be "0." Petitioner’s Exhibit 1. So, too, does the Premium Calculation Worksheet for United's dwelling fire rate filing. Respondent's Exhibit 1. 19/ In his March 3, 1999, cover letter to the Commissioner of Insurance regarding United's homeowners rate filing, United's consultant Mr. Trafton pointed this fact out, explaining: "This [premium calculation] worksheet has been revised to remove, for now, any Assessments for FHCF . . . ." Respondent's Exhibit 1. Mr. Trafton made a similar comment in his cover letter of the same date regarding United's dwelling fire rate filing. Respondent’s Exhibit 1. That United's initial rate filings set a Recoupment Surcharge of zero is consistent with its position that its base rates are not prospectively loaded with a CAT Fund Factor. At the time United made these rate filings, after all, it had paid zero in reimbursement premiums and had nothing to recoup; thus, zero was the most accurate (indeed the only true) number to submit in connection with a Recoupment Surcharge calculation. For that reason, United's representation, in its initial base rate filings, that the amounts to be recouped initially equaled zero cannot be considered the equivalent of a declination of the right to use the recoupment method of recovering CAT Fund premiums. At a minimum, United's filing can reasonably be interpreted as having left the door open to adjusting the stated surcharge of zero to a positive number after reimbursement premiums had been paid, when there would be something to recoup. While not establishing the fact directly, this does raise an inference that United's rates are net of expected CAT Fund recoveries. 20/ This inference was supported by other evidence. Mr. Stuart testified that United had removed the "recoupment charge" from its initial rate filings at the direction of the Department, on the ground that United had not yet paid any reimbursement premiums to the CAT Fund. He also stated that at the time of United's initial rate filings, the company believed that reimbursement for CAT Fund premiums would be achieved on a retrospective basis, using a surcharge to base rates. It was Mr. Stuart's understanding that United's base rates did not include a "CAT Fund recoupment." T-67. Mr. Trafton testified that Mr. Roddenberry had told him in late 1998 that United could not use the "catastrophe protection surcharge that was in the 1998 FRPC JUA rates." T-86. To Mr. Trafton, this meant that United was required to use the FRPCJUA's 1997 base rates because "it goes without saying, if . . . you can't use the catastrophe protection surcharge, you're not using the '98 rates, you're using the '97 rates." T-86. Mr. Trafton testified that as far as he could recall, United's base rates did not "include any credit or factors for expected premiums to be paid to the Catastrophe Fund." T-94. The testimony of Mr. Stuart and Mr. Trafton on the issue of whether United's base rates are prospectively loaded was not rebutted by the Department at hearing (perhaps because the Department conclusively presumes that United's rates are prospectively loaded). But at the same time, their testimony did not directly answer the question whether the 1997 FRPCJUA rates that United adopted were prospectively loaded — a proposition that does not follow necessarily from the premise (which is undisputed) that United's Recoupment Surcharge, as filed, was zero. 21/ Mr. Trafton in particular left the impression that the FRPCJUA's 1997 rates were net of expected CAT Fund recoveries, but he did not say so unambiguously. The conclusion can be deduced from his testimony, but not without difficulty. When Mr. Trafton said that United could not use the "catastrophe protection surcharge" that was "in" the 1998 rates, he might have been referring to a charge that was "built into" (i.e. prospectively loaded in) those rates. 22/ If so, then Mr. Trafton appears to have said (by making it clear that he and the Department perceived a material difference between the two years) that the 1997 rates were not prospectively loaded. (This raises the interesting possibility, not addressed in this record, that the FRPCJUA needed to impose a Recoupment Surcharge in 1998 to recover the past year's reimbursement premiums at the same time it was prospectively loading its base rates to recover in advance for the reimbursement premiums yet to be paid. See endnote 9.) If, on the other hand, Mr. Trafton meant that the FRPCJUA's 1998 rates included a "catastrophe protection surcharge" in addition to the base rates (as a retrospective means of collecting for reimbursement premiums paid), then the implication would be that the 1997 rates were net of expected CAT Fund recoveries, because otherwise the FRPCJUA's recoupment in 1998 would amount to a double recovery. But if this were the case, it is not clear why United could not have used the FRPCJUA's 1998 base rates, which presumably would have been net of expected CAT Fund recoveries, too — unless in 1998 the FRPCJUA were recouping for 1997 reimbursement premiums and also collecting prospectively for 1999 reimbursement premiums, in transition from the recoupment method to the prospective method of recovery. If the assumption is made for argument's sake that the FRPCJUA's 1997 rates were prospectively loaded (from which would follow the conclusion that United's “me-too” rates are prospectively loaded), then it becomes difficult to make sense of Mr. Trafton's and Mr. Stuart's testimony. In that event, the FRPCJUA's 1998 rates could not have included a Recoupment Surcharge (or at least not a full one, see endnote 8). The 1998 rates would have been either net of expected CAT Fund recoveries (in transition from the prospective method to the recoupment method) or prospectively loaded as in 1997. Consequently, the 1997 base rates would have been, respectively, either higher or approximately the same as the 1998 base rates. Not only would either possibility seem to leave no plausible reason for the Department to have directed United to use the 1997 base rates, but also these scenarios contradict the testimony of both Mr. Stuart and Mr. Trafton, each of whom suggested that the 1997 base rates were less generous than the rates in effect in 1998. In sum, the present record establishes that, more likely than not, the FRPCJUA's 1997 base rates were, and therefore United's base rates are, net of expected CAT Fund recoveries. In other words, United's rates are probably not prospectively loaded with a CAT Fund Factor, contrary to the Department's presumption. As explained above, however, the resolution of this case does not demand that a definitive finding of fact be made on this issue. It is enough, for now, to find that United has proved by a preponderance of evidence a reasonable likelihood that, given the opportunity (which it will have in Case No. 00-4212), it can successfully demonstrate that its rates are not prospectively loaded. No more than that is being found at this time. Whether United will succeed on the merits of its claim to be entitled to recoup reimbursement premiums paid to the CAT Fund remains to be seen; nothing decided here is intended to pre-determine the outcome of Case No. 00-4212.
