The Issue The issue is whether Respondent Three Rivers Legal Services engaged in unlawful employment practices with regard to Petitioner.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner Attorney Kaimowitz was born on May 5, 1935. He attended the University of Wisconsin, served in the U. S. Army, and was a journalist early in his career. He worked to obtain voting rights for African-Americans in the Deep South as a volunteer for the Congress of Racial Equality in the summer of 1964. He attended law school at New York University and while attending law school worked for the New York Civil Liberties Union as an investigator. Upon graduating from law school in 1967, he applied for membership in the New York State Bar Association and was eventually admitted. He was employed as a staff attorney with the Center on Social Welfare Policy and Law in New York City. He was suspended from that position. In 1970 he was awarded a Reginald Heber Smith Fellowship which took him to Michigan Legal Services in Detroit, Michigan. He remained there until he took a sabbatical so that he could complete a Legal Services Corporation Research Fellowship in 1979 and 1980, which was located at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. He could have returned to his employment at Michigan Legal Services but instead sued that entity. He also sued Pennsylvania Legal Services, Legal Services of North Carolina, and the Mental Health Law Project of the District of Columbia for alleged age discrimination in hiring. From December 1980 until 1984 he was employed as associate counsel for the Puerto Rican Legal Defense and Education Fund in New York and Connecticut. He left there because of a "labor dispute." In March of 1985 he was hired as director of the Greater Orlando Area Legal Services (GOALS). He was fired in 1986. He sued GOALS, and obtained a financial settlement. Subsequently he applied for jobs with Broward County Legal Services and Central Florida Legal Services. When he was turned down for those jobs, he sued both entities based on age discrimination. The action against Central Florida Legal Services ended in 1999 or 2000 with a confidential settlement involving the payment of money to Attorney Kaimowitz. At some point he also entered into a confidential settlement with Broward County Legal Services. Attorney Kaimowitz claims that the suits he filed against various legal services programs were based on his personal mission to reform the hiring practices of legal services programs, and he avers that he has been on that mission since 1980. Although he claims to have instituted these suits for altruistic motives, many of them resulted in monetary settlements that benefited him personally. None of these suits were tried to the point that a verdict resulted. After being fired by GOALS he obtained a master's in communications from the University of Central Florida in 1988. While attending school he worked as a journalist for the "Orlando Weekly," a publication targeted to African-Americans in the Orlando area. Subsequently Attorney Kaimowitz represented African- Americans in civil rights actions, including employment discrimination in the Orlando area. He was in private practice of law at that time although he had no office. In 1989 or 1990 a court assessed fees against him for engaging in frivolous litigation. Attorney Kaimowitz moved to Gainesville because his domestic partner was seeking a Ph.D. at the University of Florida. From May 14, 1999, until February 7, 2002, he worked for Alachua County as an investigator into citizen complaints of discrimination in housing and public accommodation. He was terminated from that job because of accusations of "serious misconduct." He claimed his discharge from this job was in retaliation for whistle blowing. He sued, and received a monetary settlement. He subsequently and unsuccessfully sought employment with the City of Gainesville, the University of Florida, and with the State of Florida. He had a dispute with the University of Florida based on the University's failure to publish written material that he submitted. He filed suits pro se based on age discrimination against Gainesville for failing to hire him and against the University of Florida and the Florida Board of Regents because of the publication dispute and because they refused to hire him. The suit against the Board of Regents was settled by a monetary payment to him of a confidential sum, according to Attorney Kaimowitz. In 1997, Judge Maurice Paul, a U. S. District Judge, entered an order forbidding Attorney Kaimowitz from filing pro se lawsuits in his court. Prior to 2003, Attorney Kaimowitz was disciplined by the Florida Supreme Court on two occasions. A Florida Bar report dated January 29, 2002, reported a finding on January 3, 2002, of professional misconduct. He was reprimanded for making a statement he knew to be false or with reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity concerning the integrity of a judge. He had been previously reprimanded by the Florida Supreme Court in 1998. Attorney Kaimowitz is proud that he has filed countless motions to disqualify judges. He claims he has succeeded in disqualifying, at one time or another, every judge in the Middle District of Florida, and several in the Eighth Judicial Circuit, which includes the Gainesville area. Attorney Kaimowitz agrees with the notion that he is, "the most well-known offensive personality in the Eighth Judicial Circuit," but asserts that this reputation was not fully achieved until 2004. This self-characterization is accepted based on the evidence adduced in this case. Attorney Kaimowitz suffered a hearing loss and began using hearing aids in 1992. It is found as a fact that he hears well enough to try a case, which was demonstrated in this case. At his request, counsel table was moved close to the bench. He subsequently announced that this accommodated his hearing deficiency. Attorney Kaimowitz was arrested for causing a disturbance in a Gainesville City Commission meeting in 2002. He is very proud of being arrested. On November 16, 2004, Eighth Judicial Circuit Judge Larry Gibbs Turner entered an order entitled Sentence on Judgment of Guilty of Direct and In-Direct Criminal Contempt, following a Judgment of Guilty of eight separate allegations of direct and indirect criminal contempt on October 13, 2004. This Order recited the following language: A review of the fifteen (15) volumes of the record in this cause clearly demonstrates that throughout these proceedings Mr. Kaimowitz carefully, willfully, and with calculation and premeditation abused his status as a lawyer/pro se litigant in filing repetitious and frivolous pleadings including, but not limited to, his repeated motions to recuse every judge associated with this case. Mr. Kaimowitz's most recent effort to recuse this undersigned judge was framed by his GABE KAIMOWITZ'S APPLICATION TO DISQUALIFY JUDGE LARRY G. TURNER, FROM TAKING ANY FURTHER ACTION IN THIS MATTER - LAWFUL OR UNLAWFUL - BECAUSE THE JURIST HAS BEEN AND CURRENTLY APPARENTLY IS AN EMPLOYEE OF THE FLORIDA BOARD OF REGENTS, AND/OR ITS SUCCESSOR RESPONSIBLE FOR THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA AND AFFIDAVIT/CERTIFICATE WITH GABE KAIMOWITZ'S APPLICATION TO DISQUALIFY JUDGE LARRY G. TURNER, FROM TAKING ANY FURTHER ACTION IN THIS MATTER - LAWFUL OR UNLAWFUL - BECAUSE THE JURIST HAS BEEN AND CURRENTLY APPARENTLY IS AN EMPLOYEE OF THE FLORIDA BOARD OF REGENTS, AN/OR ITS SUCCESSOR RESPONSIBLE FOR THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA. The motions/applications seeking recusal of each of the judges in this cause provide ample evidence of Mr. Kaimowitz's "style" of litigation in which he intentionally confuses, obfuscates, insults, defames, and makes scurrilous and unsubstantiated claims against parties, judges, witnesses, and others related and unrelated to the litigation. Further evidence is found in his VERIFIED MOTION FOR ARREST OF JUDGMENT BASED ON FRAUD COMMITTED UPON THIS COURT. Beginning at page 10 of that motion Mr. Kaimowitz claims that he ". . . has learned that repeated motions for recusal as evidence pours in eventually tends to work in his favor. For instance, after Judge Jopling finally recused himself, Kaimowitz had little difficulty resolving at mediation the underlying cases. They were assigned to Judge Turner at the time, but all he did was agree to the parties' stipulated willingness to proceed to mediation." Over the following several pages, Mr. Kaimowitz recites his history of recusal litigation in other state and federal cases. Judge Turner permanently enjoined Attorney Kaimowitz from filing further pro se litigation in the county and circuit courts of the Eighth Judicial Circuit. Although Judge Turner based his finding on Kaimowitz v. The Florida Board of Regents, Eighth Circuit Case No. 01-1996-CA-3260, he noted a number of cases involving Attorney Kaimowitz going back to 1996, including Eighth Judicial Circuit Case No. 01-2003-CA-2400-A, Gabe Kaimowitz v. Gainesville, Florida, and the Gainesville Sun, in which Judge Toby S. Monaco outlined abuses as a basis for his dismissal of Attorney Kaimowitz's Complaint with prejudice. The Respondent and Its Executive Director, Allison Thompson TRLS exists pursuant to Title 42 U. S. Code, § 2996 et seq. It is governed, inter alia, by Title 45, Code of Federal Regulations, § 1600.1, et seq. Its mission is to provide equal access to the system of justice so that those who are otherwise unable to afford adequate counsel may have high quality legal assistance to seek redress of grievances. It receives funding from the Legal Services Corporation in Washington, D.C., the Florida Bar Foundation, United Way, and other local and national government sources. TRLS is headquartered in Gainesville, Florida, and serves eleven mostly rural counties surrounding Alachua County, as well as Alachua County. It works with other volunteer agencies and with pro bono attorneys. It is essential to the success of TRLS that it maintain cordial relations with the community and the bar. Ms. Thompson hires all of the TRLS management team. TRLS does not use an application form when seeking applicants for jobs. Advertisements for positions solicit resumes. TRLS does not maintain a "pool" of applicants for any particular job. The number of employees at TRLS fluctuates depending on funding. The racial, age, and gender composition of TRLS personnel from May 2003 to May 2004, was as follows: Whites 20 Blacks 19 Asian 2 Hispanic 2 Male 11 Female 32 Of the above, the oldest was born in 1947. Three of the above were born in that year. Since 2003, new attorney hires, (including law school graduates not admitted) were as follows: Whites 10 Blacks 6 Asian 0 Hispanic 1 Male 4 Female 13 Of these, the oldest was born in 1958. TRLS has hired, since Ms. Thompson has been Executive Director, at least one person who was over the age of 70. TRLS does not have quotas or a diversity plan that requires certain races, genders, or ages to be given preference in hiring. TRLS is guided in this regard by Title 45, Code of Federal Regulations, § 1616.1, et seq. Specifically, Title 45, Code of Federal Regulations, § 1616.6 requires that TRLS adopt, "employment qualifications, procedures, and policies that meet the requirements of applicable laws prohibiting discrimination in employment, and shall take affirmative action to insure equal employment opportunity." The hiring record of TRLS, taken as a whole, demonstrates compliance with this requirement and does not indicate any pattern of discrimination. Ms. Thompson has been the executive director of TRLS since 1996. She is an African-American. She graduated from the University of Florida Law School and was admitted to the Florida Bar in 1974. She has extensive experience in the delivery of legal services to the poor. She worked for Tampa Legal Services beginning in 1973. It became a Legal Services Corporation program while she was employed there. She began working for Rhode Island Legal Services in 1976, practicing primarily family law. Ms. Thompson worked for Philadelphia Legal Services for five years and then, beginning in 1982, worked for a number of years in the U. S. Virgin Islands where she was litigation director. She was appointed Executive Director of TRLS in December of 1996. Job applications with TRLS in 2003 and earlier Attorney Kaimowitz applied for a managing attorney position with TRLS in 1997. Ms. Thompson interviewed him and determined that he was an "interesting person" but was not the type of person who would work well with others. She concluded he would be difficult to manage. She noted that if she had a job which did not require working well with others, she might wish to hire him in the future. Attorney Kaimowitz applied for a job as a staff attorney in 2001. He received a letter dated May 13, 2001, from Ms. Thompson, advising him that he was not selected and that she would keep his resume on file. Attorney Kaimowitz responded to this letter with a letter dated August 15, 2001, that pointed out two settlements he had received from legal services programs in Florida based on their alleged discrimination against him because of his age. He also discussed his whistle blowing with regard to GOALS and stated, "I include this information to indicate that when there really is a will, there is a way." Ms. Thompson took this as a threat. Attorney Kaimowitz applied for a job as a managing attorney in the TRLS Lake City office in 2002. He was not interviewed for that position. TRLS advertised for a fair housing attorney and a fair housing testing coordinator in various publications during April 2003. Attorney Kaimowitz applied for both of these jobs. He interviewed with Ms. Thompson and Mary O'Rourke, a staff attorney with TRLS, on May 30, 2003. Ms. Thompson asked Ms. O'Rourke to sit in as a witness to the interview because she was concerned that Attorney Kaimowitz would sue TRLS if she did not hire him. Initially, Attorney Kaimowitz expressed an interest in both the fair housing attorney job and the fair housing testing coordinator job. However, during the interview Attorney Kaimowitz stated that he did not wish to apply for the fair housing attorney position, but wished to be considered only as an applicant for the fair housing testing coordinator position. The occupant of this position was expected to supervise individuals who would determine if discrimination in housing was occurring. Attorney Kaimowitz claimed during his testimony that he told Ms. Thompson and Ms. O'Rourke that his ability to hear was impaired. He claimed he told them he required an accommodation for his hearing loss. He stated that he had a discussion with Ms. O'Rourke during the interview about an electronic system where a court reporter would record words spoken, and the words would be displayed on a monitor so that he could read what was being said. Attorney Kaimowitz appeared at the interview wearing one hearing aid. Ms. Thompson said that Attorney Kaimowitz said that one of his hearing aids was "in the shop." Ms. Thompson testified that he announced during the interview that his hearing loss was corrected by his hearing aids. Ms. Thompson said it was clear that he had no difficulty in understanding her with only one hearing aid. In no event did she perceive him as being hearing impaired. Ms. O'Rourke stated that the conversation claimed by Attorney Kaimowitz regarding an electronic monitor system to aid hearing never occurred. Based on Ms. O'Rourke's testimony, Ms. Thompson's testimony, and Attorney Kaimowitz's credibility, which is addressed in detail below, it is found that at the time of this interview Attorney Kaimowitz did not claim the need for an accommodation based on an alleged hearing impairment and he was not perceived as being hearing impaired. Ms. Thompson wanted employees at TRLS who would maintain a good relationship with the local bar. Even though the housing testing coordinator position was not a job requiring the incumbent to be a licensed attorney, it is not helpful for TRLS to have employees who are at odds with the local bar or community. She was looking for an employee who was a team player, who could get along with the other employees at TRLS, the local bar, and with persons in the community. She also wanted someone with good references. The fair housing testing coordinator required training in Jacksonville. Ms. Thompson believed Attorney Kaimowitz could not be trained because, "He already knew everything." She believed he couldn't take orders. She was troubled because he had no references from people who had supervised him. Although attorneys who have their own practice cannot give references of supervisors, they usually can give a judge or judges as a reference, but Attorney Kaimowitz did not provide any judges as references. Attorney Kaimowitz provided a co-plaintiff in a lawsuit and a professor named Joe Little as references. Ms. Thompson called Professor Little but did not feel it would be worthwhile calling his co-plaintiff, who was embroiled in a lawsuit at the time. She was concerned because Attorney Kaimowitz told her, with regard to references, "everyone in Gainesville was suspect." Moreover, he did not provide any references from his time as director of GOALS, which was a job where he had a supervisor who could comment on his work. Ms. Thompson was aware of Attorney Kaimowitz's arrest during a Gainesville City Commission meeting, and was aware of at least one of his Florida Supreme Court reprimands at the time she decided not to hire him. She was also aware that he would occasionally write in "black English," and she found that offensive. She believed him to be a disruptive force. She stated she would not hire him if he was "the last man on earth." She stated that an equally obnoxious black man would often apply for positions at TRLS, and she would not hire him for the same general reasons that she would not hire Attorney Kaimowitz. Ms. Thompson thought Attorney Kaimowitz would be a liability to her organization. She noted that, "He makes comments without any basis. He makes sweeping comments when he knows nothing. He doesn't even check." Brenda Scafadi was eventually hired for the housing testing coordinator. She was, at the time, a 50-year-old white woman who had a disability in the form of fibromyalgia. She was not an attorney. She was hired because she was perceived to be a team player and she had good references. Ms. Scafadi resigned after about eight months and was replaced by Steve Malu, a 50-year-old Nigerian, who also was not an attorney. Attorney Kaimowitz was a person Ms. Thompson had personally known for about six years at the time of the interview. She also knew about him from his letters to the "Gainesville Sun" and numerous e-mails he sent to her and to others. She was aware of his reputation in the community. She refused to hire him because she did not believe he would be a good employee. Neither his age, nor his race, nor his claimed hearing loss was a factor in her decision. Attorney Kaimowitz received a letter from Ms. Thompson dated July 22, 2003, advising him that she had, "decided to offer the position to different applicants who I thought would be more appropriate for our needs." The Americorps positions On August 1, 2004, Americorps positions in Gainesville and Jacksonville were advertised. These jobs were targeted at inexperienced attorneys and paid "living expenses" and a promise of scholarship help rather than a salary. During the evening of August 2, 2004, Ms. Thompson offered testimony before the Gainesville City Commission. After her testimony she departed, although the meeting continued. After exiting the building, she heard footsteps behind her and turned to see Attorney Kaimowitz following her. There were no other people in the area. He stated that he wanted to "mediate our situation" but was informed by Ms. Thompson that there was nothing to mediate because she did not discriminate. She told him she was tired of him making disparaging comments about her program and her staff. Attorney Kaimowitz expressed an interest in the Americorps positions in an e-mail to Ms. Thompson dated August 5, 2004, which was in the nature of a resume. In this letter he said, "I certainly will refrain from any action I suggested I might take through this month of August, so that we can see if we can reach an accommodation in that time." Ms. Thompson regarded this as a threat. Ms. Thompson did not interview him for the Americorps positions because the "resume" e-mail of August 5, 2004, did not match the requirements of the job. Three of the positions were designed for attorneys TRLS could train so that they could recruit students from the law school to assist in the delivery of services. The other two positions required no litigation skills and were designed to provide limited legal services over the telephone to a large volume of clients. Another reason Ms. Thompson found Attorney Kaimowitz to be unsuitable for this job were statements he made to her, such as claiming she hired an "incompetent black male." She had seen, and was familiar with, another widely circulated writing in which he stated, "The real 'piece of work' is Three Rivers Legal Services, and their foolish young attorney of color Glorimil Walker, everyone's favorite minority attorney since she speaks her mind--even if it is against the adults and children at University Centre." The Americorps attorneys hired during this period, instead of Attorney Kaimowitz, included Shelly E. Beach, who was a 26-year-old white female, Melissa B. Long, a 29-year-old black female, and Julie A. Santioni, a 26-year-old white female. Ms. Thompson, and TRLS did not discriminate or retaliate against Mr. Kaimowitz in refusing him an Americorps position. He was not hired because the job was unsuitable for him and because he was unsuitable for employment at TRLS. Retaliation Attorney Kaimowitz's original claim of retaliation was based on his view that TRLS would not hire him because he had sued Central Florida Legal Services and that Ms. Thompson knew and would not hire him because of that lawsuit. Ms. Thompson denied this. Attorney Kaimowitz's second claim of retaliation was based on the complaint to the Commission concerning the refusal of TRLS to hire him for the fair housing testing coordinator position. For reasons that are abundantly clear herein, there were numerous reasons for not hiring him other than retaliation. Attorney Kaimowitz's Credibility Attorney Kaimowitz claims that he applied for the fair housing attorney position as well as the fair housing testing coordinator. Both Ms. Thompson and Ms. O'Rourke stated that at his interview he said he wished to apply only for the fair housing testing coordinator. Attorney Kaimowitz also claims that he informed Ms. Thompson and Ms. O'Rourke at his interview that he was hard of hearing and required an accommodation. Ms. Thompson and Ms. O'Rourke both said that during the interview he asserted that any hearing problems he had were resolved by hearing aids. Attorney Kaimowitz has demonstrated through his pleadings and actions in court, and before this Administrative Law Judge, that he has a low regard for the truth. As an example, he claims to believe in the equality of mankind, but during his examination of Ms. Thompson, he threw a document at her and stated that, "And then you could never find discrimination unless I don't want a nigger in here." As a consequence all issues involving credibility are resolved against Attorney Kaimowitz. That being the case, it is found by a preponderance of the evidence that he did not seek the fair housing attorney position in 2003 and that he did not assert during the interview that he was hard of hearing and thus required an accommodation.
Conclusions For Petitioner: Gabe H. Kaimowitz, Esquire, pro se Post Office Box 140119 Gainesville, Florida 32614-0119 For Respondent: Carla D. Franklin, Esquire 4809 Southwest 91st Terrace Gainesville, Florida 32608
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the petitions be dismissed. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of June, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S HARRY L. HOOPER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of June, 2006. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Carla D. Franklin, Esquire 4809 Southwest 91st Terrace Gainesville, Florida 32608 Gabe H. Kaimowitz, Esquire Post Office Box 140119 Gainesville, Florida 32614-0119 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether Keith Jackson, Ph.D. (‘Petitioner’) should be required to pay FAMU’s claimed overpayment of salary as calculated in the amount of $29,141.57, for the pay periods between July 11, 2008 and December 12, 2008.
Findings Of Fact 1, On or about July 1, 2005, Petitioner executed an employment contract with FAMU to serve as Vice President for Research. The contract executed by Petitioner provides that Petitioner “is subject to the Constitution and Laws of the State of Florida and the United States and the rules, policies, guidelines and procedures of the Board of Governors and the University as now existing or hereafter promulgated.” 2. On July 11, 2008, Petitioner submitted to the University a letter advising that he was resigning from his administrative position with the University as the Vice President for Research. 3. Petitioner's letter of resignation was accepted by the University effective July 11, 2008. 4. Tenure as a faculty member was granted to Petitioner by the University on May 25, 2007. 12
Conclusions This matter is now before Florida Agricultural and Mechanical University Board of Trustees (“FAMU,” “Respondent,” or the “University”) for final agency action.
The Issue The sole issue for determination in this cause is whether the failing grade received by petitioner from Professor Kenneth Vinson in a constitutional law course was a result of arbitrariness, capriciousness or bad faith.
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the relevant oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following facts are found: while enrolled as a student in the Florida State University College of Law, petitioner received a failing grade in constitutional law for the winter quarter of 1975 from his professor, Kenneth Vinson. After discussing his grade with Mr. Vinson, petitioner filed an appeal pursuant to the grade appeal policy of the College of Law. A board comprised of three students determined that there was probable cause for the grade appeal and recommended that the appeal be referred to a full committee for hearing. After some delay apparently resulting from the loss of the report of the student board, a committee consisting of two students and three faculty members was appointed. Mr. Vinson did not attend the hearing, but submitted to the committee a memorandum, attaching thereto a completed examination paper with his written comments concerning the answers given. Petitioner appeared and offered testimony concerning his grade. The committee was also supplied with five or six other completed examinations with grades ranging from "A" to "F". These exams were copied in such a manner that neither the student involved nor the grade assigned were known to the committee. The five members of the committee rated these exams and substantially agreed with the grades assigned by Vinson to each paper. Each member of the committee placed petitioner's exam in the "F" category. In its final report, the committee expressed concern with Vinson's lack of sufficient assistance to them in the articulation of his standards and his lack of cooperation in the grade appeal process. Nevertheless, it was the conclusion of the committee that petitioner's appeal should be denied for the reason that Vinson had recognizable standards of grading and that there was no gross deviation in the application of his standards to petitioner's examination paper. The committee's findings are more fully set forth in a ten page decision which was admitted into evidence at the hearing as Exhibit 3. The examination in dispute is a 38-question, short answer exam, a type traditionally and frequently administered in law school courses. In this type of examination, the objectives of the professor are inherent in the examination questions asked. The weight to be assigned each question on such an examination is not always determined by the professor before grading the papers. A cut sheet or master list of desired answers is difficult to prepare for an essay- type examination in law school. As well as evaluating the student's ability to identify the issues involved in a legal problem, the law school professor also seeks to evaluate the student's knowledge of the substantive law relating to an issue. Thus, if a student deviates from the projected issue, he may lose credit for that but gain credit for a good discussion of the erroneously-selected issue. Often, the law professor is seeking a judgmental or subjective response to a question on an examination. In such situations, the preparation of a master answer to all questions would be futile. Among educators, there appears to be no uniform methodology for grading examinations. Those educators often referred to as behaviorists advocate specific written standards and objectives both for evaluation purposes and to facilitate the student's learning. Others referred to as humanists object to a specific statement of objectives and standards, feeling that such would be too limited and constrictive. The difficulty with a non-written, personal approach to evaluation is the assessment of its validity and replicability as to time and another student. One method of testing the reliability of the grading procedure utilized is to have other persons assign a grade to the completed examination. If two or more persons were to assign the same grade as that originally assigned, this would provide replicability and would indicate that the original grade assigned was reasonable and the method of evaluation was reliable. As noted above, the specific statement of standards and objectives is not universally employed by educators, and its nonuse does not imply unethical behavior or that one's teaching methods are invalid. Professor Vinson has been teaching law school courses for over seven years. It was his testimony that, although the mandatory blind or anonymous grading system was not in effect at the time he graded Petitioner's examination, he in fact did not know whose paper he was grading at the time he assigned a grade to Petitioner's paper. All exam papers were graded by him anonymously. Vinson's method of grading was to review five or six exam papers, get a "feeling" for the type of responses received, assign tentative grades to them and then perhaps change those grades based on his conception of the total class curve. He does not find that a cut sheet or set of model answers is helpful in a short essay type examination. When evaluating a paper for grading purposes, Mr. Vinson stated that he compares students' answers with each other and forms an opinion of the student's understanding of the subject matter and class discussions. When grading papers, he also looks at the students' writing style, knowledge concerning the substance of the course, and understanding of legal processes. He further evaluates the student's ability to recognize issues, manipulate legal jargon and apply cases studied and discussed during the course. Vinson applied the same criteria or standard of evaluation to petitioner's examination as he applied to other examinations. The ultimate grade assigned each paper constituted Vinson's value judgment, based upon his experience as a law school professor, as to that student's knowledge concerning the substance of the course taught by him. While Vinson has no written standards or criteria for evaluating a student's performance on an examination, he feels that his standards are implicit in classroom discussions and that the questions asked on his examinations form the answers to be given. The failing grade assigned to petitioner's examination was a result of Vinson's opinion of petitioner's understanding of the subject matter of the course taught.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law recited above, it is recommended that petitioner's amended petition be dismissed. Respectfully submitted and entered this 17th day of June, 1976, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE D. TREMOR Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of June, 1976. COPIES FURNISHED: President Stanley Marshall Florida State University Tallahassee, Florida 32306 Stanley C. Kiser 3220 Jim Lee Road Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Robert D. Bickel University Attorney Suite 309 Westcott Florida State University Tallahassee, Florida 32306 John D. Carlson State Board of Education 400 Barnett Bank Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services improperly awarded a contract to National Health Laboratories, Inc. for the reasons set forth in the petition.
Findings Of Fact By Invitation to Bid mailed March 26, 1993 (ITB), the Dade County Public Health Unit requested bids on an annual contract for the performance of clinical laboratory test services. The Dade County Public Health Unit is under the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS). The contracting agency shall hereafter be referred to as HRS. The ITB called for the opening of bids on April 12, 1993. Six bids were timely submitted. The apparent low bid was submitted by National Health Laboratories, Inc. (NHL). The NHL bid was $202,271. The second low bid was submitted by Continental Medical Laboratory, Inc. (CML). The CML bid was $241,100. HRS issued a notice of intent to award the contract to NHL. CML timely protested. There is no issue as to the responsiveness of the CML bid. The only issue as to the responsiveness of the NHL bid concerns the matters raised by CML. CML's petition alleges that the bid of NHL was defective because the Sworn Statement Pursuant to Section 287.133(3)(a), Florida Statutes, on Public Entity Crimes (Public Entity Crime Affidavit) was incomplete, an agreement attached to the Public Entity Crime Affidavit did not relieve NHL from disqualification concerning CHAMPUS fraud, and NHL should be disqualified from bidding because it failed timely to inform the Department of Management Services of the company's conviction of a public entity crime. Paragraph 10 of the General Conditions of the ITB allows HRS to "waive any minor irregularity or technicality in bids received." However, special conditions provide, in part: PUBLIC ENTITY CRIMES Any person submitting a bid or proposal in response to this invitation must execute the enclosed [Public Entity Affidavit], including proper check(s), in the space(s) provided, and enclose it with the bid/proposal. Failure to complete this form in every detail and submit it with your proposal will result in immediate disqualification of your bid. The Public Entity Crime Affidavit completed by NHL and submitted with its bid was executed and notarized on April 9, 1993. Paragraph six of the form affidavit states: Based on information and belief, the statement which I have marked below is true in relation to the entity submitting this sworn statement. [Indicate which statement applies.] Neither the entity submitting this sworn statement, nor any of its officers, directors, executives, partners, shareholders, employees, members, or agents who are active in the management of the entity, nor any affiliate of the entity has been charged with and convicted of a public entity crime subsequent to July 1, 1989. The entity submitting this sworn statement, or one or more of its officers, directors, executives, partners, shareholders, employees, members, or agents who are active in the management of the entity, or an affiliate of the entity has been charged with and convicted of a public entity crime subsequent to July 1, 1989. The entity submitting this sworn statement, or one or more of its officers, directors, executives, partners, shareholders, employees, members or agents who are active in the management of the entity, or an affiliate of an entity has been charged with and convicted of a public entity crime subsequent to July 1, 1989. However, there has been a subsequent proceeding before a Hearing Officer of the State of Florida, Division of Administrative Hearings and the Final Order entered by the Hearing Officer determined that it was not in the public interest to place the entity submitting this sworn statement on the convicted vendor list. [attach a copy of the final order] The next paragraph of the Public Entity Crime Affidavit form states: I UNDERSTAND THAT THE SUBMISSION OF THIS FORM TO THE CONTRACTING OFFICER FOR THE PUBLIC ENTITY IDENTIFIED IN PARAGRAPH I (ONE) ABOVE IS FOR THAT PUBLIC ENTITY ONLY AND, THAT THIS FORM IS VALID THROUGH DECEMBER 31 OF THE CALENDAR YEAR IN WHICH IT IS FILED. I ALSO UNDERSTAND THAT I AM REQUIRED TO INFORM THE PUBLIC ENTITY PRIOR TO ENTERING INTO A CONTRACT IN EXCESS OF THE THRESHOLD AMOUNT PROVIDED IN SECTION 287.017, FLORIDA STATUTES FOR CATEGORY TWO OF ANY CHANGE IN THE INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THIS FORM. In completing the Public Entity Crime Affidavit, NHL penned in, just over the second alternative that discloses a conviction, "See Attached." The attachment was a copy of an Agreement dated December 31, 1992, between NHL and the "state of Florida" (Settlement Agreement). The agreement was executed by an NHL officer and the Director, Medicaid Fraud Control Unit of the Auditor General Office. The Auditor General's Office is not part of the Department of Management Services. The Settlement Agreement concerns invoices from NHL to the Florida Medicaid program for certain cholesterol and iron tests from January 1, 1987, through November 30, 1992. The Settlement Agreement requires NHL to pay as restitution to the State of Florida $1,470,917. In return, the state of Florida, for itself and on behalf of its agents and assigns, will release and forever discharge NHL, its current or former officers, directors, employees, agents, shareholders, affiliates, assigns and successors from any and all claims, actions, demands or causes of action including penalties or interest against any of them, either civil or criminal, as regards Medicaid reimbursement [for certain cholesterol and iron tests] between January 1, 1987 and November 30, 1992, except that nothing contained in this Settlement Agreement shall preclude the state Medicaid program from seeking recoupment of payments made [for certain cholesterol tests] during the period covered by this Settlement Agreement, subject to the understanding that NHL will contest any such recoupment action on the grounds that such payments were appropriate. The Settlement Agreement also provides: The state of Florida agrees that neither the Settlement Agreement nor any federal criminal conviction or other sanction of the corporation or a current or former officer or employee of NHL as regards claims for Medicaid reimbursement [for certain cholesterol and iron tests] [b]etween January 1, 1987 and November 30, 1992 will be the basis for a state exclusion of NHL from the Florida Medicaid program. NHL is a company that provides laboratory testing nationally and receives payment for many of its services from government sources, such as Medicaid, Medicare, or CHAMPUS. CHAMPUS is the Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services. During the period of 1987 through 1992, NHL supplied certain cholesterol and iron testing, in addition to that specifically requested by the health-care provider, at little or no cost to the health-care provider. But NHL invoiced various government payors at higher rates. On December 18, 1992, NHL entered guilty pleas to two counts of criminal fraud involving these practices as they concern the CHAMPUS program. These pleas were the bases of a conviction and sentence that included a criminal fine of $1,000,000. One or two former officers entered guilty pleas to charges of criminal fraud involving these practices as they concern the Medicaid program. As part of the settlement, NHL paid the United States the sum of $100,000,000. At the same time, NHL was negotiating with various states, including Florida, with respect to the above-described billing practices. On December 8, 1992, the Director of the Medicaid Fraud Control Unit in the Florida Office of the Auditor General wrote a letter to NHL confirming a proposed settlement. The conditions of the settlement are incorporated in the above- described Settlement Agreement. On December 17, 1992, the Assistant Secretary for Medicaid in HRS mailed a letter to NHL agreeing that HRS would not take administrative action for the above-described cholesterol and iron claims submitted for reimbursement by NHL to the Florida Medicaid program. NHL did not inform the Department of Management Services of the guilty plea, conviction, and $1,000,000 criminal fine. However, based probably on information received in early February 1993 from another governmental entity in Florida, the Department of Management Services, on February 8, 1993, sent a letter to NHL advising it that the Department had received information that NHL had been convicted of a public entity crime and requesting copies of the charges and final court action. NHL complied and the Department's investigation is continuing. On February 18, 1993, HRS Deputy Secretary for Health, sent a memorandum to all of the County Public Health Units directors and administrators advising them of concerns about laboratory fraud and attaching a recent report concerning the NHL case. The report described the NHL guilty pleas, conviction, and sentencing, as well as the business practices that led to the prosecution. By memorandum dated March 18, 1993, HRS Assistant Secretary for Medicaid informed HRS Depute Secretary for Health that the Auditor General had entered into the Settlement Agreement. The memorandum states that, on December 17, 1992, the Assistant Secretary signed an agreement with NHL not to terminate it from the Florida Medicaid program, which was the "same treatment afforded many other providers--including [County Public Health Units]--who overbilled the Medicaid program. The Assistant Secretary's memorandum describes the settlement as requiring NHL to make "full restitution," although the $1.4 million in restitution involves only the iron test and the State of Florida and NHL may still litigate whether any reimbursement is due for the cholesterol tests. The failure of NHL to check the second alternative on the Public Entity Crime Affidavit did not confer an economic advantage on NHL in the subject procurement. The material attached to the affidavit sufficiently informed HRS of the criminal conviction of NHL. Likewise, the omission of any mention of CHAMPUS claims in Paragraphs two and three of the Settlement Agreement did not confer any economic advantage on NHL in the procurement. The purpose of mentioning only Medicaid in the Settlement Agreement is that Florida has no jurisdiction over the CHAMPUS program. NHL was concerned only that Florida not terminate NHL's participation in the program over which Florida had jurisdiction--the Medicaid program. These references to "Medicaid reimbursement" are merely descriptive and are not intended to limit the scope of the exoneration purportedly effectuated in the Settlement Agreement.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services enter a final order dismissing the bid protest of Continental Medical Laboratory, Inc. ENTERED on August 24, 1993, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of August, 1993. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 93-3951BID Treatment Accorded Proposed Findings of Respondent and Intervenor 1-8 and 11: adopted or adopted in substance. 9-10 and 12-15: rejected as subordinate. 16-31: adopted or adopted in substance. 32-37: rejected as subordinate and irrelevant. 38-43 and 45-48: rejected as irrelevant and legal argument. 44: adopted. 49-50: adopted as to absence of material variations. 51: rejected as subordinate and recitation of evidence. Treatment Accorded Proposed Findings of Petitioner 1-14 and 16-17: adopted or adopted in substance. 15: rejected as legal argument and unsupported by the appropriate weight of the evidence. 18-21: rejected as subordinate, repetitious, and legal argument. 22-27: adopted in substance. 28: rejected as irrelevant. 29 (first sentence): rejected as repetitious and irrelevant. 29 (second sentence): rejected as unsupported by the appropriate weight of the evidence. 30: adopted, but the period of the delay of DMS review in this case was too short to make any difference. 31: rejected as unsupported by the appropriate weight of the evidence with respect to a delay of such a short duration. 32: rejected as legal argument inviting a remedy far in excess of any remedy provided for or envisioned by 287.133. 33: rejected as legal argument inviting a remedy far in excess of any remedy provided for or envisioned by 287.133, at least under the facts of the present case. 34: rejected as irrelevant. 35: rejected as legal argument and unsupported by the appropriate weight of the evidence. COPIES FURNISHED: Geoffrey Kirk Adorno & Zeder, P.A. 2601 S. Bayshore Dr., Ste. 1600 Miami, Florida 33133 Morton Laitner, District Counsel District 11 Legal Office 401 NW 2d Ave., Ste. N-1014 Miami, Florida 33128 Thomas F. Panza Seann Michael Frazier Panza, Maurer 3081 E. Commercial Blvd., Ste. 200 Ft. Lauderdale, Florida 33308 John Slye, General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Robert L. Powell Agency Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue Whether Respondent, a professional guardian ("PG"), engaged in the violations alleged in the Amended Administrative Complaint; and, if so, what is the appropriate penalty.
Findings Of Fact OPPG was statutorily created, effective March 10, 2016, and charged with oversight of registered professional guardians in Florida, including, but not limited to, "[ e]stablishing disciplinary proceedings, conducting hearings, and taking administrative action pursuant to chapter 120." Prior to that time, the oversight of PGs was the province of the circuit courts in which they were appointed. PGs are appointed by the court to serve as legal decision-makers for persons determined incapacitated by the court (commonly referred to as "wards"), who are unable to make decisions that affect their health, safety, and well-being. PGs are fiduciaries entrusted with the care of the wards that they serve, and, as such, have an implied duty to act in good faith. The proper conduct and management of guardianship cases requires that guardians must be independent and impartial. PGs appear in court on behalf of their ward through an attorney hired by the PG. In order to be appointed as a PG for a particular ward, the PG is required to file an application with the court. Respondent used the services of attorneys Sherry Hazeltine and Ellen Morris to represent her in guardianship and guardian advocate1/ cases. Prior to becoming a PG, Respondent worked with the elderly and had a strong interest in serving children with disabilities and their families. In 2010, Respondent took the requisite 40–hour course, passed an exam, and applied for and was granted registration as a PG for Palm Beach County. Since 2010, Respondent acted as a PG or guardian advocate who was paid for her services, except for cases in which she agreed to serve pro bono. For any case in which Respondent sought compensation as a PG, her billing statement was reviewed by a case manager, the Circuit Court's auditor, and then was approved by the judge assigned to the case. In 2012, prior to the enactment of the statute creating the OPPG for purposes of overseeing PGs, the Circuit Court Clerk's Division of Inspector General ("IG"), Investigator Anthony Palmieri, began an investigation of Respondent and her practices as a PG. Mr. Palmieri believed Respondent had a conflict of interest serving as a PG in the same division in which her husband, Martin H. Colin, served as a judge. Mr. Palmieri also examined Respondent's friendship with her husband's colleague, Judge David French, who presided over some of Respondent's cases. Mr. Palmieri also investigated Respondent's practice of taking retainers before services were rendered in some of her guardianship cases. On December 8, 2017, Mr. Palmieri provided his Investigation Report ("Report") concerning Respondent to OPPG. The Report served as a basis for drafting the Complaint and Amended Complaint in this matter. At no time prior to the initiation of this action by OPPG against Respondent was she notified that the IG's office was concerned about any of her practices as a PG. Possible Conflict of Interest--Judge Colin At all times material hereto, Respondent was married to then Circuit Court Judge Martin H. Colin, who served in the South County Courthouse in the Probate and Guardianship Division until 2015, when he transferred to the Circuit Civil Division. Judge Colin retired in 2016. When Respondent became a PG serving in Palm Beach County, Judge Colin raised the issue of a possible conflict of interest, or appearance of a conflict, with his Chief Judge, Judge Peter Blanc. Judge Blanc told Judge Colin that there would be no conflict, or appearance of conflict, as long as he did not handle Respondent's cases. Further, if any other Circuit Court judge was concerned about a conflict, or perceived conflict, with Respondent serving as a PG in one of their cases, they could recuse themselves. The Probate and Guardianship Division of the Circuit Court handles one of the largest guardianship dockets in Florida. Employees in the Clerk's Office were made aware of the marital relationship between Judge Colin and Respondent, and avoided assigning cases involving Respondent as the PG to Judge Colin. If Respondent entered into an existing case which was previously assigned to Judge Colin, he internally transferred the case to another judge.2/ Judge Colin had no role in appointing Respondent to guardianship cases. Generally the family or the attorney representing the ward designates who they would like to use as a guardian. Prior to the implementation of a random "wheel" process in guardianship cases in 2016, it was up to the judge to designate a PG if one was not designated by the party or their lawyer. No evidence was presented that Judge Colin designated Respondent as a PG for any cases in which he presided. Like the other Circuit Court judges, Judge Colin periodically served as the "duty judge" for purposes of signing routine orders when the presiding judges in cases were unavailable. In this capacity, Judge Colin signed between two to four thousands orders in guardianship and probate cases between 2010, when Respondent became a PG, and 2015, when he changed divisions. OPPG makes much of the fact that over this time, Judge Colin signed seven orders in cases in which Respondent served as the PG. The Amended Complaint, paragraph 12, alleges that, "Respondent failed to take any action to have Judge Colin removed as the judge formally assigned to guardianship and/or guardian advocacy cases to which she was appointed." However, neither Respondent nor Judge Colin had any control of which orders he was tasked to sign as duty judge. Two of the seven orders presented by OPPG do not contain Respondent's name as an individual to be served with a copy of the order. Although Attorney Hazeltine's name appears on the service list for these orders, Attorney Hazeltine represented other PGs in addition to Respondent. Seeing Attorney Hazeltine's name alone would be insufficient to alert Judge Colin to his wife's involvement in a case. Further, all of these orders were on routine, uncontested matters. Judge Colin convincingly testified that had he been aware of his wife's involvement in any of these cases, he would not have signed the order to avoid any appearance of impropriety. The Amended Complaint repeatedly asserts that Respondent failed to disclose "the conflict of interest inherent in her relationship to Judge Colin." Respondent denies that there is any inherent conflict due to her marital relationship with Judge Colin. Both Judge Colin and Respondent testified that at no time was any conflict or potential conflict brought to their attention by any litigants, lawyers, other judges, or the IG's office. However, it is undeniable that there would be at minimum an appearance of a conflict if Judge Colin presided over cases to which Respondent was assigned as a PG. As explained by OPPG's experts, Attorney Sketchly and Judge Cohen, the marital privilege protects communications between spouses. If Judge Colin presided over Respondent's cases as a PG, they could have ex-parte communications that would not be discoverable. It is possible that they could discuss the merits of the guardianship case, as well as the fee petition of Respondent as the PG. In fact, this potential for conflict was discussed in Baez v. Koelemij, 960 So. 2d 918, 919 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992), a case in which Judge Colin was directed to be removed on a motion for disqualification because the movant's opposing counsel also represented Judge Colin's then-girlfriend, Respondent. Noting that the judicial canons did not require the disclosure by Judge Colin of his relationship with Respondent because they were not a spouse or a relative of the third degree, the court ruled, "the mere fact that neither the canon nor the rule require disqualification or disclosure where the opposing counsel represented a "girlfriend" of a judge, disqualification is still appropriate where a reasonable litigant would have a well- grounded fear of not receiving a fair trial. While the judicial canons do not apply to PGs, as a fiduciary, PGs have a duty of independence and impartiality. Because of this special role between the PG and ward, the PG should disclose any relationship that creates a conflict or potential conflict of interest. Disclosure must include material facts sufficient to allow a ward, a residual beneficiary, the court, or any other interested party, to make an informed decision regarding the appearance of conflict. Respondent completed an application for appointment in every case for which she served as a PG or guardian advocate. In response to the application form's request to identify spouse, Respondent answered, "Martin H. Colin." According to Respondent, this disclosure was sufficient because the lawyers in the case and the courthouse staff were aware of her marriage to Judge Colin, and the wards were too incapacitated to read or understand the application. However, this simple identification of Judge Colin by his proper name was insufficient to put the ward, their family members, out-of-county lawyers, or other interested persons on notice of the potential conflict. Respondent should have identified her spouse as Judge Martin H. Colin, of the Circuit Court, Probate and Guardianship Division. Significantly, no evidence was presented during the final hearing to demonstrate that Respondent benefited from this failure to adequately disclose her marriage to Judge Colin, or that her wards or other interested parties were in any way harmed. However, failure to adequately disclose a conflict, or appearance of conflict, erodes the public's confidence in the guardianship system. Possible Conflict of Interest--Judge French Prior to Respondent's becoming a PG in 2010, she developed a friendship with her husband's colleague, Judge French, and his then wife. Judge French also served in the Probate and Guardianship Division of the Circuit Court. Respondent and her husband vacationed as the guests of Judge French and his wife on one occasion for a weekend, sometime between 2006 and 2008. The couples also planned a cruise together that did not happen. No other evidence was presented regarding whether Judge French and Respondent socialized on any other occasion. Respondent testified she did not socialize with Judge French. The fact that Respondent and Judge French traveled together one time does not demonstrate a conflict or potential conflict of interest. Accordingly, Respondent had no obligation to disclose a social friendship that she did not believe would pose a conflict. Importantly, although Judge French presided over cases in which Respondent served as a PG or guardian advocate, at no time did he feel he had to remove himself, or otherwise transfer, a case in which Respondent was the PG. Presumably, Judge French believed that despite this social relationship, he could remain impartial and that his relationship with Respondent did not create a conflict or the appearance of a conflict. Improper Taking of Retainers by Respondent PGs have a special relationship with their wards. As a fiduciary, they have a duty of loyalty and an obligation to at all times act in the best interests of their wards, and not for personal gain. See § 744.361, Fla. Stat. PGs are prohibited from borrowing money from their wards. See § 744.454, Fla. Stat. Section 744.108 mandates that guardianship fees must be approved by the court prior to payment. Subsection (1) specifically recognizes that a guardian "is entitled to a reasonable fee for services rendered and reimbursement for costs incurred on behalf of the ward." (emphasis added). This language is in the past tense, and does not make any allowance for payment of advance fees or retainers. According to Attorney Sketchly, Judge Cohen, and Mr. Palmieri, PGs normally prepare periodic bills showing services rendered and the amount of time spent which are submitted to the court. After a bill is reviewed by a case manager and the court auditor, it is then submitted to the presiding judge for approval. Only after the bill is approved by the court can fees be paid to the PG. Attorney Sketchly, Judge Cohen, and Mr. Palmieri, in their combined decades of experience, were not aware of any PGs in Florida taking fees prior to court approval. Respondent's expert, Attorney Amy Beller, also testified that it is never permissible for a PG to take a loan from a ward's estate. In three cases between April 2012 and July 2015,3/ Respondent, acting as a PG or guardian advocate, requested and received "retainers"4/ for future anticipated services, without prior court authorization. Two retainers were taken in the amounts of $1,000.00, and one was taken in the amount of $2,500.00. Respondent had no set business practice to establish on which cases retainers would be sought or for what amount. Respondent had no written retainer agreements with her clients. Respondent testified she did this occasionally when she anticipated there would be a lot of work up front on the case. The retainers charged by Respondent were reflected as a credit on the bills submitted to the Circuit Court for approval. No notation was contained on the bill as to when the retainer was collected. Respondent did not recall whether the retainers were collected prior to her appointment as PG or before services were provided. The bills for these cases in which retainers were taken were ultimately approved by the Circuit Court. Section 744.446(2) provides that: (2) Unless prior approval is obtained by court order, or unless such relationship existed prior to appointment of the guardian and is disclosed to the court in the petition for appointment of guardian, a guardian may not: Have any interest, financial or otherwise, direct or indirect, in any business transaction or activity with the guardianship; Acquire an ownership, possessory, security, or other pecuniary interest adverse to the ward[.] By taking money from the ward prior to providing any services and prior to court approval, Respondent created a conflict of interest. Once Respondent took a retainer from her client, she then had a financial interest at stake in seeing her fees were approved. Attorney Sketchly explained that these retainers appeared to be loans to Respondent. The round numbers, randomly taken as "retainers," without any billing prior to the taking of the retainer, or court authorization, suggest Respondent used "retainers" because she needed the money. This constitutes a breach of fiduciary duty, is contrary to the best interests of the ward, and creates a financial interest in the guardianship, which are prohibited by section 744.446. By using retainers, Respondent abused her power as a guardian.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Elder Affairs, Office of Public and Professional Guardians, issue a final order dismissing this case. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of December, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S MARY LI CREASY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of December, 2018.
The Issue The issues for determination are whether the Florida Commission on Human Relations (Commission or FCHR) lacks jurisdiction under Chapter 760, Florida Statutes (2003), over the claims in the Charge of Discrimination because the claims are barred by the doctrines of collateral estoppel and res judicata; the claims are time-barred by Subsections 760.01(1) and (5), Florida Statutes (2003); or both.
Findings Of Fact Respondent employed Petitioner in Respondent's Code Enforcement Division as a Program Coordinator from sometime in November 1999, until Petitioner resigned his employment on June 13, 2003. On April 2, 2002, while Petitioner was employed with Respondent, Petitioner filed identical charges of discrimination simultaneously with the Commission and the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). The charges alleged that Petitioner's employer discriminated against Petitioner on the basis of his race through disparate treatment in pay and promotion, retaliated against Petitioner, and created a hostile work environment for Petitioner. The EEOC assigned case number 150A201984 to the charge of discrimination. On April 29, 2002, the EEOC issued a Dismissal and Notice of Rights. On July 26, 2002, Petitioner filed a civil action in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida. The initial Complaint and subsequent Amended Complaint contained the same allegations as those set forth in the charges of discrimination filed with the Commission and the EEOC. The complaints alleged that Petitioner's employer violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 and the Florida Civil Rights Act by discriminating against Petitioner on the basis of race, through disparate treatment in promotion and pay; by retaliating against Petitioner; and by creating a hostile work environment. On February 12, 2004, Petitioner voluntarily dismissed his racial harassment claims in the federal civil case. On March 17, 2004, the federal court entered a Summary Judgment for the employer on all remaining claims and dismissed Petitioner's case with prejudice. The Summary Judgment expressly includes allegations of discrimination through the date of Petitioner's resignation from Orange County on June 13, 2003. On or about June 10, 2004, Petitioner appealed the Summary Judgment to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. On September 30, 2004, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the Summary Judgment. On April 7, 2004, Petitioner filed the Charge of Discrimination over which the Commission determined it has no jurisdiction. The Charge of Discrimination alleges in its entirety: I believe I have been discriminated against pursuant to Chapter 760 of the Florida Civil Rights Act, and/or Title VII of the Federal Civil Rights Act, and/or the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, and/or the Americans with Disabilities Act as applicable: Once I filed a discrimination complaint (EEOC # 150A201984) I was retaliated against and subjected to disparate treatment because of my race (Black). Specifically, I was subjected to different terms and conditions, demoted and unfairly disciplined. Once I filed my complaint I was not invited to attend bi-weekly senior staff meetings and my job duties were diminished and reassigned to other staff. In addition, the entire Citizen Coordination Section which I supervised was eliminated and I was transferred to another Division in a position that had non-supervisory status. The position provided no opportunity for promotion and had minimal job duties. I was unjustifiably given a written reprimand for rude behavior and being absent without proper notification. After I grieved the reprimand it was reduced to an oral warning. One non-African American supervisor received numerous pay increases and unwarranted promotions. Eventually, he surpassed me in salary. Another non-African American supervisor was paid at a higher salary than myself, but did not qualify for the position and falsified the employment application. I filed a complaint with the Orange County Office of Professional Standards but they failed to conduct a fair and thorough investigation. Once I filed my complaint I was subjected to racial discrimination, retaliation and subjected to a hostile working environment from various members of County Administration which defamed my character and good name after working in County government for six years; thus purposely ruining my career to serve as a public servant in Orange County government. Ultimately, I was constructively discharged on June 13, 2003. Joint Ex. 18. The Commission investigated Petitioner's allegations in the Charge of Discrimination. The Commission provided Petitioner with an opportunity to explain how the allegations differed from the matters that the federal court disposed of in the Summary Judgment. Petitioner responded to the Commission in a timely manner. On July 28, 2004, the Commission determined that it did not have jurisdiction over the claims in the Charge of Discrimination. In relevant part, the Commission specifically stated: The Respondent is an employer within the meaning of one or more of the following laws: (a) the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, as amended, §760, Florida Statutes (2002); (b) Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended; (c) the Age in Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA); and/or (d) the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), however, all jurisdictional requirements for coverage have not been met. Federal case law interpreting Title VII is applicable to cases arising under the Florida Civil Rights Act because the Florida act was patterned after the federal civil rights laws. Florida State University v. Sondel, 685 So. 2d 923, 925 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996). On or about May 17, 2004, the Middle District of Florida, Orlando Division, decided the Complainant's claims against Respondent for discrimination and retaliation on summary judgment and dismissed all claims with prejudice. The failure to promote claim was dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Complainant's complaint consists of substantially the same claims decided by the civil court. A dismissal of claims with prejudice is a final order. See Kobluer v. Group Hospitalization and Medical Services, Inc., 954 F. 2d 705 (11th Cir. 1992). As such, the appellate court has jurisdiction to decide such issues. Id. See also Solar v. Merit Systems Protection Bd., 600 F. Supp. 535 (D.C. Fla. 1985). The Commission does not have the authority to re-investigate and re-decide issues that were decided by the civil court, even if the reason for dismissal was failure to exhaust administrative remedies. See DOAH Docket Sheet filed 9-1-04. The Charge of Discrimination and Petition for Relief in this proceeding do not allege any acts or violations that were not raised in, and ruled on, by the federal court in prior litigation. Several of the allegations refer to matters that occurred more than 365 days before the filing of the Charge of Discrimination on April 7, 2004, including allegations contained in the charges of discrimination that Petitioner filed simultaneously with the Commission and EEOC on April 1, 2002. Other allegations of discrimination, hostile work environment, and retaliation through June 13, 2003, when Petitioner resigned from his employment with Respondent, are included in the Amended Complaint filed in federal court. It is undisputed that the allegations in this proceeding concerning demotion and transfer to a non-supervisory position refer to a transfer to Respondent's Neighborhood Services Division on June 16, 2003. The Summary Judgment expressly states that the Neighborhood Services Division "transfer has also become a part of this suit." The Summary Judgment notes that the transfer to the Neighborhood Services Division is an incident of retaliation alleged by the employee and ruled that the transfer was not retaliatory. Petitioner included the transfer in his Initial Brief to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit and also argued that the elimination of his duties, his exclusion from key meetings, and the closing of the Citizen Coordination Section that he had supervised all supported his retaliation claim. The order affirming the Summary Judgment considered the issue of the alleged retaliatory transfer, the elimination of Petitioner's job duties over time, and an allegedly unwarranted written reprimand, and determined there was no retaliation. The Charge of Discrimination in this proceeding alleges, in relevant part, that the elimination of the Citizen Coordination Section that Petitioner had supervised was discriminatory and/or retaliatory. The order affirming the Summary Judgment considered the issue of the elimination of Petitioner's job duties over time and did not find retaliation. It is undisputed that the allegations in the Charge of Discrimination in this proceeding refer to a written reprimand issued by Petitioner's supervisor in March 2003. The written reprimand was part of the federal litigation, including the employee's Statement of Facts in Response to Orange County's Motion for Summary Judgment and in the employee's supporting exhibits. The order affirming the Summary Judgment specifically referred to the written reprimand and did not determine that the reprimand constituted retaliation. Moreover, neither DOAH nor the Commission has statutory authority to consider allegations concerning the written reprimand because those allegations involve acts that occurred more than one year before the filing of the Charge of Discrimination within the meaning of Subsection 760.11(1), Florida Statutes (2003). It is undisputed that allegations in the Charge of Discrimination in this proceeding concerning disparate pay for two non-African American supervisors referred to higher pay for supervisors, identified in the record as Mr. Robert Hildreth and Mr. Ed Caneda, that occurred in March 2002. The federal civil court previously analyzed Petitioner's claims of pay disparity related to both supervisors. The court found that Petitioner was not similarly situated to either supervisor. The Charge of Discrimination in this proceeding alleges that Respondent subjected Petitioner to a hostile working environment when various members of the Orange County Administration defamed Petitioner's character and good name. Petitioner fully addressed the allegations of harassment and hostile work environment in his response to the motion for summary judgment in federal court. Petitioner stipulated to a dismissal with prejudice of his hostile work environment claims, and the federal court ruled that Orange County was the prevailing party on Petitioner's claims for hostile work environment. It is undisputed that the Charge of Discrimination in this proceeding does not contain any allegations concerning the failure to promote Petitioner. However, Petitioner did raise this issue and litigated the issue in federal court. The federal court ruled that Petitioner did not exhaust his administrative remedies concerning allegations that Respondent failed to promote Petitioner and that the claim arose in January 2002, prior to date when Petitioner filed simultaneous claims with the EEOC and FCHR. More than two years passed before Petitioner filed the Charge of Discrimination in this proceeding. Accordingly, Petitioner's claim of promotion discrimination falls outside the statutory one-year filing requirement prescribed in Subsection 760.11(1), Florida Statutes (2003). In any event, the claim that Respondent failed to promote Petitioner is not a new issue that was beyond the scope of the Summary Judgment. It is undisputed that allegations in the Charge of Discrimination in this proceeding concerning the alleged failure of Respondent's Office of Professional Standards (OPS) to conduct a fair and thorough investigation of his discrimination complaint referred to an investigation into Petitioner's complaint in March 2002. OPS issued its final report on July 3, 2002, approximately 21 months before Petitioner filed the Charge of Discrimination in this proceeding. Accordingly, the complaints about the OPS investigation fall outside the statutory one-year filing requirement set out in Subsection 760.11(1), Florida Statutes (2003). The federal litigation included identical allegations concerning the OPS investigation. During the federal case, Petitioner's attorney deposed Mr. William Moore, the manager of OPS, and questioned Mr. Moore extensively about the way OPS investigated Petitioner's complaint. In response to the motion for summary judgment, Petitioner specifically claimed that the investigation undertaken by OPS was unfair and discriminatory. The complaint in the Charge of Discrimination in this proceeding is not a new issue or claim, but is identical to the issue litigated in federal court. Allegations in the Charge of Discrimination that Respondent excluded Petitioner from key meetings refer to events in September 2001. The same allegations were litigated in federal court. Petitioner outlined his allegations to the federal court that allegedly showed his exclusion from key meetings. Petitioner also appealed the issue of exclusion to the appellate court. The Charge of Discrimination presents no new issue, and the issue falls outside the one-year filing requirement in Subsection 760.11(1), Florida Statutes (2003). It is undisputed that the allegation in the Charge of Discrimination that Respondent constructively discharged Petitioner, refers to being demoted, reprimanded, excluded from meetings, and transferred to the Neighborhood Services Division. The allegation of constructive discharge is not a new claim, but is the same claim that was litigated in federal court.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission enter a Final Order dismissing this proceeding for the reasons stated in this Recommended Order. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of January, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of January, 2005. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Susan T. Spradley, Esquire Deborah L. La Fleur, Esquire Gray Robinson, P.A. Post Office Box 3068 Orlando, Florida 32802 Kelvin D. Bodley Post Office Box 680507 Orlando, Florida 32686-0507 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact The Respondent Alam Farzad is a currently licensed medical doctor practicing medicine in Dade County, Florida. The Respondent was first licensed in Florida in 1975. In February, 1972, the Respondent resided in Miami with her husband, Kiumaris Bakshandeh, having moved to the United States from Iran in 1971 where they had both studied medicine and received medical degrees. In February, 1972, the Respondent's sister, Iran Farzad Rafael, was residing in Chicago, Illinois. Prior to February, 1972, the Respondent's sister graduated as a medical doctor in Iran and after moving to the United States, attempted to qualify for eventual licensure by taking an examination for foreign medical graduates administered by the Educational Council for Foreign Medical Graduates (ECFMG). In 1972 a passing grade was required on the examination by a foreign medical graduate in order to become eligible to take medical training in an intern program in the United States. Upon completion of the training for foreign professionals, another examination was required to be passed in order to become licensed in a state. Thus, the examination was a type of qualifying exam, the successful passage of which entitled a foreign graduate to receive medical training in the United States and eventually sit for the state medical licensing exam which was administered to all persons who desired to become licensed physicians. The Respondent's sister took the ECFMG exam three times prior to February, 1972, and failed it each time. At the request of her husband, the Respondent flew to Chicago in February of 1972, to take the ECFMG exam for her sister. The Respondent went to the examination site with the examination entrance papers she had taken from her sister, forged her sister's name at the examination site and took the examination using her sister's name. She subsequently received word from her sister that she had received a passing grade on the examination. The night after taking the examination, the Respondent received a phone call from her husband at her sister's home. During the conversation between the Respondent's husband and sister, the husband requested that the sister perform an abortion on the Respondent in return for her help on the examination. The Respondent's sister refused the husband's request. But for the Respondent taking and passing the ECFMG exam on behalf of her sister, the sister could not have practiced medicine or entered into a residency program. In 1978, the Respondent testified that her sister had practiced medicine in 1976 specializing in physical medicine and rehabilitation. However no official records were submitted by the Petitioner that the Respondent's sister is presently licensed or has been licensed as a physician in Illinois. In 1976, the Respondent's husband used his knowledge concerning the ECFMG examination to coerce the Respondent into signing a property settlement and custody agreement in a pending divorce proceeding. In exchange for agreeing to the property and custody agreement, the Respondent's husband signed an affidavit that would allegedly ensure that no information concerning the 1972 examination would be made public. In early 1978, the Respondent instituted proceedings in the Eleventh Judicial Circuit, Dade County, to set aside the child custody and support provisions contained in the final decree of dissolution of marriage between the Respondent and her husband on the grounds of coercion and duress. Following a lengthy hearing in which numerous witnesses were heard and exhibits entered into evidence, the Circuit Court in March, 1978, granted Respondent's motion to set aside the agreement and awarded custody of the couple's minor child to the Respondent. Dr. Bakshandeh appealed the trial court's decision to the District Court of Appeal, Third District. The court affirmed the trial court noting that there was " . . . an abundance of evidence in the record. . ." to support the Respondent's contention that she had been subjected to coercion and duress by her husband into entering into the agreement and that such coercion and duress constituted "misconduct of an adverse party" which would authorize a trial court to set aside a final judgment. See Bakshandeh v. Bakshandeh, 370 So.2d 417 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1979). The court went on to make, however, the following observation: As a final note, we are disturbed by an undisputed fact which emerges from this record. The wife Dr. Alam Farzad Bakshandeh is a physician licensed to practice medicine in Florida; the husband Kiumaris Bakshandeh is a chief resident urological surgeon for the University of Miami. Both were originally from Iran where they received part of their medical training. The record reveals that in February, 1972, the wife took a medical examination for her sister Iran Farzad Rafael for admission to a medical training program as a foreign physican in the State of Illinois. The examination was given in Chicago wherein the wife used her sister's name, took the exami- nation and passed it. The sister after additional training and examination was ad- mitted to practice medicine in Illinois. There is evidence that the husband urged the wife to take the examination for her sister and thereafter used this indiscretion to blackmail the wife into signing the pro- perty settlement agreement herein. The re- cord does not reflect whether the appropriate medical authorities have been notified of the above facts. We trust that such notifi- cation will be accomplished in the near future. Thereafter, on April 24, 1979, the Clerk of the Third District Court of Appeal forwarded a copy of the court's opinion to the Board of Medical Examiners for appropriate action. This was presumably the first actual notice the Petitioner received concerning the Respondent's actions on behalf of her sister in February, 1972. In July, 1981, a Board of Medical Examiners Probable Cause Panel found probable cause to believe violations of Chapter 458, Florida Statutes existed in this case and an Administrative Complaint was issued and filed against Respondent. Respondent was licensed by the Board of Medical Examiners as a medical physician in approximately February, 1975. The Petitioner filed the Administrative Complaint approximately 9 years after the incident in question occurred. The Petitioner failed to introduce evidence at the final hearing that while exercising due diligence it was unable to discover this incident prior to April, 1979.
