The Issue The issue is whether the City of Winter Springs' (City's) plan amendment adopted by Ordinance No. 2005-29 on June 12, 2006, is in compliance.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: The Parties The City was incorporated in 1959 and is located just inside Seminole County in a highly developed area surrounded by the City of Oviedo to its east, the City of Casselberry to the south, the City of Longwood to the west, Lake Jesup to the north, and the City of Orlando a few miles to the southwest. The City adopted the amendment in question. The Department is the state land planning agency charged with the responsibility for reviewing plan amendments of local governments, such as the City. Keewin is a Florida corporation and has a contract to purchase the property that is the subject of the challenged plan amendment. It offered comments in support of the plan amendment during the adoption process. The Association is a Florida Homeowners Association operating as a not-for-profit corporation under Section 720.301, Florida Statutes. It currently comprises approximately 1,378 residential units on 550 acres within the City, including single-family attached and detached dwellings, apartments, and condominiums. The Association is made up of nineteen separate subassociations of residents; however, the Association serves as the "master association." One of the subassociations (Greens Point) lies "a stone's throw" to the east from the subject property, while the others lie further east, separated from the subject property by another residential subdivision known as Wildwood (which is not a part of the Association). Wildwood has a MDR land use category, which is the same land use being sought for the Keewin property. Besides five miles of nature trails, the Association also owns and maintains five parks, a tennis facility, a pool, and a clubhouse. A representative of the Association offered comments, recommendations, or objections to the City during the adoption of the amendment. As a property owner within the City who submitted objections to the plan amendment during its adoption process, the Association meets the definition of an affected person under Section 163.3184(1)(a), Florida Statutes, and accordingly has standing. As discussed below, however, the City and Intervenor (but not the Department) argue that the Association still lacks standing because its Board of Directors never authorized the filing of the initial Petition in this matter. Background In 2005 the City began consideration of an application by Keewin (on behalf of the current owner, Dittmer Properties, Inc.) to change the land use on the 47.7-acre tract of property. The land use change was also accompanied by a proposed change in the zoning of the property; however, that matter is not of concern here. The amendment was initially considered and approved by the City Commission at a meeting conducted on February 13, 2006. An amendment transmittal package was then sent to the Department for its review. After the Department issued an Objections, Recommendations, and Comments Report (ORC Report) on April 20, 2006, which noted four specific objections to the map change, the City provided further information to the Department to resolve these concerns. On June 12, 2006, the City voted to adopt Ordinance No. 2005-29, which approved the map change in issue. On August 4, 2006, the Department published in the Seminole County Edition of the Orlando Sentinel its Notice of Intent to Find the City of Winter Springs Comprehensive Plan Amendment in Compliance. Sometime in September 2006, the Association filed its initial Petition for a hearing to contest the plan amendment. The Petition was apparently dismissed without prejudice by the Department, with leave to file an amended petition. On September 25, 2006, the Association filed its Amended Petition raising the following objections: the new land use would be incompatible with the surrounding land uses; the land use change "further erodes" the City's ability to meet the requirements in its Plan for industrial uses; the amendment will have a "negative overcrowding impact on schools, particularly Highlands Elementary"; the amendment will cause overcrowding of the nearby roadways; the amendment will negatively impact the City's level of service standards for recreational facilities; and the amendment conflicts with various provisions within Florida Administrative Code Rule Chapter 9J-5 and Section 163.3177, Florida Statutes. Authorization by the Board of Directors Citing various provisions within the Articles of Incorporation and the By-Laws, and the sometimes conflicting testimony of two members of the Association's Board of Directors, the City and Intervenor have argued extensively in their Joint Proposed Recommended Order that the Association's Board of Directors did not formally authorize its outside counsel to file the initial Petition in this matter. They point out that under the By-Laws, in order for the Board of Directors to initiate a legal action, as it did here, prior to the filing of a petition, it must have either had a vote of the majority of the Directors at a meeting at which a quorum was present or consent in writing by all members of the Board of Directors. See Art. VI, §§ 6.5 and 6.8, By-Laws. They further contend that the president of the Board of Directors, Paige N. Hinton, had no authority, as she assumed she did here, to advise another member of the Board of Directors, Helga R. Schwarz, that Ms. Schwarz could authorize outside counsel to file a petition with the Department. The affairs of the Association are managed by a Board of Directors made up of seven members. See Art. V, § 5.1, By- Laws. When this matter arose, Ms. Hinton served as president of the Board of Directors while Ms. Schwarz served as its secretary and a member. Both testified at the final hearing. When the plan amendment was first being processed and considered by the City in its early stages, a number of Association residents approached members of the Board of Directors and voiced their concerns with the proposal. Based upon those concerns, the Board of Directors held a special meeting on January 13, 2006, to discuss the issue. All seven directors were present at the meeting. A copy of the minutes of that meeting has been received in evidence as Respondents' Exhibit 3. The minutes are normally prepared by Bonnie J. Whidden, a full-time employee who serves as property manager, and "are not required to be detailed." After preparation by Ms. Whidden, the minutes are then reviewed at the following month's meeting and approved for form. There is no indication in the record that the Board of Director's outside counsel attended the meeting in question. The minutes reflect that the following action was taken at that meeting: The Board discussed the implications facing The Highlands if the Dittmer parcel were to be rezoned from light industrial to medium density residential as proposed by Keewin Real Property. Discussion ensued on impacts to The Highlands' recreational amenities, neighborhood roads, school capacities, and other concerns. The Board agreed that the proposed change in zoning was not in the best interest of The Highlands. The Board agreed to hold a community town hall meeting on the Keewin Large Scale Plan Amendment for The Highlands' residents in order to provide residents with information and to seek their input and feedback prior to the public hearing. The Board discussed committing funds for Clayton & McCulloh's legal services to represent The Highlands' interests on this issue. A motion was made to empower Ms. Schwarz to work with Clayton & McCulloh on this matter and to represent the Association at any city meeting related to the Dittmer rezoning. The motion was seconded and passed unanimously. Discussion ensued regarding having Clayton & McCulloh represent the Association at the city's public hearing on February 13, 2006. Ms. Schwarz would discuss the matter with counsel and apprise Ms. Hinton. Although the minutes refer primarily to the Association's opposition to the rezoning of the property, it is fair to infer that the Board of Directors was opposed to both the rezoning of the property and a change in the land use on the FLUM. According to Ms. Hinton, the Association intended that Ms. Schwarz act as the Board of Director's "primary point of contact with Clayton & McCulloh [its outside counsel] should [the Association] need to petition the [S]tate, and also to speak on behalf of the Association at City [C]ommission meetings for the City of Winter Springs." However, authorization to file a petition with the Department was not discussed at the meeting nor voted on. This is because it would have been premature to do so at that point as the amendment had not yet even been formally considered or adopted by the City. As the minutes disclose, the Board of Directors directed that Ms. Schwarz, a long-time resident and its secretary, represent the Association "at all city meetings" and to liason with its outside counsel. Acting on those instructions, she attended the February 13, 2006, meeting of the City Commission, when the Commission voted to transmit the amendment package to the Department for its preliminary review, and the meeting on June 12, 2006, when the map change was finally approved. (She also attended several meetings of the City Planning and Zoning Board, which presumably considered the zoning change.) At least twice, Ms. Schwarz presented oral objections on behalf of the Association at City Commission meetings. On an undisclosed date before the Association's initial petition was filed, Ms. Hinton spoke with Ms. Schwarz by telephone and advised Ms. Schwarz that pursuant to the Board's decision on January 13, 2006, Ms. Schwarz should instruct its outside counsel to file a petition challenging the new amendment. This information was given to outside counsel, who presumably filed the initial Petition, which was later amended on September 25, 2006. After the January 13 meeting, the Board of Directors was given a number of "updates" concerning the status of the plan amendment throughout the adoption and Department review process, including advice that a petition had been filed by outside counsel with the Department. However, no other formal action was taken by the Board concerning this matter before the initial petition was filed in September 2006. On advice of outside counsel, on November 16, 2006, a special closed meeting of the Board of Directors was called by Ms. Hinton to discuss "pending legal matters," including ratification of the Petition that had previously been filed. One reason for calling this meeting was the fact that the issue of whether the Board of Directors had authorized the petition to be filed had just arisen during the course of discovery for the hearing. A copy of those minutes is not of record since they were not reviewed and approved until the Board of Directors held its December 2006 meeting. Although the record is somewhat confusing (due to conflicting testimony) as to what action was taken at the meeting, it is clear that the Board of Directors (of whom six were present) orally ratified the filing of the Petition by "unanimous consensus." The Amendment The amendment consists only of a change in the FLUM on the subject property from Industrial to MDR. There are no accompanying changes to the text of the Plan. The property is currently vacant, but carries an Industrial land use and PUD zoning. The land uses surrounding the subject property are industrial to the north (across Shepard Road), medium density residential (including multi-family units) to the east, industrial and low density residential to the south, and predominately industrial and commercial to the west. There are "public lands" on the southeast side of the property. Less than one thousand feet west of the subject property and running in a north-south direction is U.S. Highway 17-92, a major arterial roadway maintained by the State. (Just across that road is the City of Longwood.) Shepard Road, a two- lane collector road which runs in an east-west direction, adjoins the northern boundary of the subject property and part of the Association and eventually exits to the west into U.S. Highway 17-92 at a major intersection with a traffic signal. Petitioner's Objections Petitioner has challenged the amendment based on compatibility, need, schools, roads, recreational facilities, and alleged violations of various provisions of Florida Administrative Code Rule Chapter 9J-5 and Chapter 163, Part II, Florida Statutes. There are no challenges to the amendments based upon internal inconsistency with the City's plan, inconsistency with the East Central Florida Planning Council's Strategic Regional Policy Plan, or inconsistency with the State Comprehensive Plan. Compatibility. The Amended Petition contains allegations that the MDR designation is incompatible with surrounding land uses, and, in particular, with the Association property that is located to the east of the subject property that is designated as MDR on the FLUM. The ORC Report raised an objection regarding land use compatibility of the amendment with the industrial land use designation to the west. The concern was that the amendment was not supported by data and analysis demonstrating that the amendment was compatible with the industrial use. In response to the objection, the City set forth Plan provisions that require buffering and also provided a Development Agreement in which the developer agreed to build a buffer between the amendment site and the industrial properties to the west. By doing so, the City adequately responded to the objection by indicating that the subject property would contain a buffer to address the potential compatibility concerns with the adjoining industrial property. The MDR designation on the subject property provides a transition from the commercial and industrial uses fronting U.S. Highway 17-92 and is compatible with the MDR to the east. Thus, the MDR use on the subject property is appropriate as a transitional use between the residential to the east and the industrial and commercial properties to the west that front U.S. Highway 17-92. Based on the evidence, it is fairly debatable that the MDR land use is compatible with the industrial use to the west and the MDR to the east. Need for Industrial Lands The Amended Petition alleges that the change from Industrial to MDR "further erodes" the ability of the City to meet requirements in its plan for industrial uses. There is no Plan policy that calls for a certain number of acres of industrial property. Rather, the Plan contains an analysis of the existing industrial acreage and a projection for future acres. Looking only at the industrial land use category, the City has 170 acres, and the plan amendment reduces that number by 47 acres or approximately twenty-eight percent. However, industrial is allowed in other future land use categories besides the industrial category. Moreover, the industrial land use designation has been on the property since at least 1991, but has remained vacant. Thus, the appropriateness of the industrial designation at this location did not come to fruition. By contrast, the City's analysis indicated a need for approximately 328 additional acres of MDR land. The FLUM change on the Keewin property furthers the need for that land use. Also, as found above, the subject property is an appropriate location for the MDR because it serves as a transition, and the property had remained vacant under the industrial future land use designation since 1991. Coordination With Schools The Association has also contended that the amendment "will have a negative overcrowding impact on schools, particularly Highlands Elementary," which lies just north of Shepard Road and serves the Association residents. Unless elected by local option, local governments are not required to have a school facilities element in their comprehensive plans at this time, are not required to have a level of service (LOS) standard in their plan for school facilities, and are not required to implement school concurrency. The City has not elected the local option of school concurrency. At this time, the Department requires only coordination of the plan amendment with the Seminole County School Board (School Board) so that the School Board and the City have a general understanding of the potential implications of the plan amendment. The ORC Report contained an objection regarding coordination of the amendment with the School Board. In response to the objection, the City indicated that it provided notice of the amendment to the School Board and an additional opportunity for School Board comment. The City also provided an analysis from the School Board indicating that the amendment would generate only 76 students. Additionally, in the Development Agreement between the City and the Developer, the Developer agreed to pay $1,235.00 for each residential unit to the School Board in addition to the school impact fees required for each residential unit. The Agreement for this mitigation represents an additional step toward helping to address what is the understanding of the impact on schools and is a further indication of coordination between the land use and school planning. The Department does not currently have a standard to use to measure the adequacy of the dollar amount since school concurrency is not required at this time. Therefore, the City has not established LOS standards. Given these considerations, it is fairly debatable that the City has demonstrated adequate coordination with the School Board regarding school facilities. Impact on Transportation The Association further contends that the LOS on public streets serving the Association's members and serving property owned by the Association will deteriorate. It also contends that traffic flowing from the subject property will overcrowd and/or negatively impact the Association. In support of these contentions, the Association presented the testimony of Harry A. Burns, Jr., a professional engineer, regarding potential traffic impacts based upon his review of the Plan and transportation element. According to the Plan, the segment of U.S. Highway 17-92 north of Shepard Road is currently operating at LOS F, which is below the adopted LOS standard. As noted earlier, U.S. Highway 17-92 is a major arterial very close to the subject property. Although the Plan indicates that U.S. Highway 17-92 is slated for a six-lane project by 2010, the Plan also indicates that it is anticipated the LOS will still remain at F. Mr. Burns opined that Shepard Road and Sheoah Boulevard, a minor two-lane collector road which winds through the Association in a north-south direction, will be "impacted" by the MDR land use designation. He concluded that a traffic study should be done for Sheoah Boulevard because it is a collector road and is in the amendment's impact area. Although he testified that Shepard road would be impacted, he had no information indicating that Shepard Road would be negatively impacted. Also, he did not know whether the plan amendment would result in a reduction in the operating LOS for Shepard Road and Sheoah Boulevard. Petitioner's expert also opined that traffic generated by a change in the land use would have a different trip distribution than traffic generated by industrial. He testified that, from a traffic circulation standpoint, it was likely that residential traffic would be more willing to travel east through the Association than would industrial traffic because the industrial traffic would prefer to access the nearby U.S. Highway 17-92 to the immediate west. He further opined that there were not "attractors" for industrial traffic to travel east through the Association. He admitted, however, that the City's Town Center as well as the Greenway toll road (State Road 417) were located to the east of the subject property. Although the expert believed that the trip generation characteristics of an industrial land use would be different than those for a residential land use, he agreed that he would need to model the trip distribution to accurately determine where the traffic would go. The witness had not done that prior to the hearing. Data and analysis relative to traffic impacts were submitted to the Department by the City and the Florida Department of Transportation (FDOT). Based upon its review of the plan amendment, on March 22, 2006, FDOT provided a letter to the Department in which it determined that an Industrial land use would generate 7,176 average daily trips (ADT) and 1,308 PM (afternoon) peak hour trips. On the other hand, a MDR designation would generate only 3,936 ADT and 394 PM peak hour trips, resulting in a decrease of 3,240 average daily trips. This is a substantial reduction. All experts in this case agreed with the FDOT's assessment. FDOT further concluded that because the "amendment would result in a decrease in daily trips . . . FDOT has no comments on this amendment." The letter did not raise any concerns regarding impacts to U.S. Highway 17-92, a state road under its jurisdiction. The City Engineer and the City's expert planner established that a further traffic study or analysis at this stage was unnecessary because the land use change resulted in a substantial decrease in trips. In addition, the Department's planner opined that reducing the trip generation potential from the amendment parcel is a strategy to reduce the potential traffic on the road network that, in combination with other actions, can have a significant effect on helping improve the coordination between land use and transportation relative to the operating LOS on the roadways. Due to the specific nature and context of this particular amendment, he also agreed that no further general planning or transportation analysis was warranted at this stage. In fact, the reduction helps the Plan better coordinate land use and transportation in terms of the potential trips that might occur on the road system. Coordination of land use and transportation facilities was appropriately addressed at the plan amendment stage through the significant reduction in trip generation potential on the property. Finally, although Petitioner's expert pointed out that the City's Plan indicates that even with scheduled improvements the segment of U.S. Highway 17-92 north of Shepard Road will have deficiencies by the year 2010, he could not say that the amendment would cause LOS deficiencies on that road or indicate with any degree of precision the effect the amendment would have on the LOS. As noted above, he did not perform a traffic analysis of the amendment. Given these considerations, it is found that Petitioner did not demonstrate beyond fair debate that the amendment will result in LOS deficiencies on U.S. Highway 17-92, Shepard Road, or Sheoah Boulevard. Further, it failed to prove beyond fair debate that the amendment is not in compliance with respect to transportation issues. Open Space and Recreational Land and Facilities Contrary to the Association's assertion, the plan amendment will not impact or adversely affect the City's LOS standards for recreational facilities. There have been increased recreational facilities in the City since the Plan was written, which has increased the LOS that is available, and there is no LOS deficiency for parks through the year 2010. Indeed, the LOS will be met even if park lands are not built on the subject property. The Development Agreement between Keewin and the City requires Keewin to include park lands on the subject property. The Agreement specifically provides a paragraph on "Parks and Recreation" which includes the following language in paragraph 4: In accordance with Winter Springs Code Section 20-354 and other applicable provisions of the City’s Comprehensive Plan and Code, the Developer agrees to dedicate an appropriate amount of land as a park for the residents of the Project. Such park shall have recreational facilities built in accordance with the standards of the National Recreational Association. In addition, such park shall be protected through deed restrictions . . . which shall ensure the preservation of its intended use, the payment of future taxes, and the maintenance of the park and facilities for a safe, healthy and attractive living environment. The park shall be included in the phasing plan, if any, and shall be constructed and fully improved by Developer at an equivalent or greater rate than the construction of the residential structures for which it serves. Therefore, the subject property will provide its own park and recreation area on-site. There is sufficient land on the site to accommodate on-site park facilities based on the residential densities that might be allowed on the subject property. The Department established that the land use is being adequately coordinated with recreational facilities. There is appropriate coordination between the land use and recreational facilities, and the residents of the subject property would not have to make use of any other city park facilities. Petitioner acknowledges that the Developer's Agreement indicates that the Developer will provide for a park; however, Petitioner still complains that there is not enough detail about the parks to be provided on-site. However, there is no requirement at this stage of the process that such a degree of specificity for parks be provided. The evidence supports a finding that a change to MDR is compatible with adjacent land uses and will have no impact on private parks and recreation areas on adjacent lands. There is insufficient evidence to support a finding that the plan amendment will impact the Association. Indeed, the subject property will have two City parks that service the area and a 315-acre county-owned community park facility less than a mile from the subject property. Consistency With Rule and Statutory Provisions The Amended Petition alleges that the amendment is inconsistent with various provisions of Florida Administrative Code Rule Chapter 9J-5 and Chapter 163, Florida Statutes. However, Petitioner did not present any testimony addressing any of the rule or statutory provisions. Conversely, the evidence presented by Respondents and Intervenor demonstrates that the amendment is consistent with these provisions. Accordingly, it is found that the amendment is not inconsistent with Florida Administrative Code Rules 9J-5.006(3)(b)1., 9J-5.006(2)(a), 9J- 5.006(3)(c)2. and 3., 9J-5.016(1)(a) and (b), 9J-5.016(2)(b), 9J-5.016(3)(b)1. and 5., 9J-5.016(3)(c)5., 9J-5.0055(2)(a), and 9J-5.0055(3)(b) and (d), and Section 163.3177(3), (6)(a) and (e), Florida Statutes, as alleged in the Amended Petition. Trespass and Vandalism Concerns Finally, Petitioner has alleged that residential development of the subject property will increase the unauthorized use of its private recreational facilities and amenities, as well as increase vandalism to its personal property by non-residents. However, allegations regarding potential trespass and unauthorized use of recreational facilities on nearby lands is not a compliance issue under Chapter 163, Florida Statutes. Issues Under Section 120.595(1), Florida Statutes In its Amended Petition filed on September 25, 2006, the Association raised five grounds for determining the plan amendment to be not in compliance: increased traffic that would impact the Association's members; school overcrowding, and particularly the elementary school just north of Shepard Road; inadequate open space and recreation land and facilities, including unauthorized use of Association facilities, as a result of the new development's residents and children; reduced industrial zoning; and inconsistencies with various provisions within Florida Administrative Code Rule Chapter 9J-5 and Chapter 163, Florida Statutes. There is no evidence that the Association has ever participated in a prior proceeding involving the City or Keewin and the same project. The Association representative, Ms. Schwarz, acknowledged that before the Amended Petition was filed, the Association did not consult with any experts regarding the issues raised in that filing. According to Ms. Schwarz, the allegations represented concerns expressed by various members of the Association to the Board of Directors. Most of these concerns are specifically reflected in the minutes of the meeting held on January 13, 2006. However, the Association did consult with outside counsel in drafting the issues in the Petition. This is evidenced by the fact that at least three of the concerns in the Amended Petition (traffic, school overcrowding, and inadequate open space and recreational facilities) were previously discussed in detail in a letter from outside counsel to the City on February 7, 2006, or just before the City Commission initially met to consider the amendment. Although the case was originally scheduled to be heard in February 2007, on October 31, 2006, Intervenor filed its demand for an expeditious hearing under Section 163.3189(3), Florida Statutes. Accordingly, by Order dated November 1, 2006, this case was rescheduled to be heard on November 29, 2006, under the mandatory fast track timelines in that statute. Because of this short timeframe, Association counsel represented during a status conference on November 10, 2006, that he was experiencing difficulty in interviewing and hiring outside experts on such short notice, particularly with the intervening Thanksgiving holidays. This was confirmed by Ms. Hinton at final hearing, who represented that if the hearing had been held in February 2007, the Association had planned on hiring a number of experts. Even so, on short notice, the Association was able to engage the services of a professional engineer who offered expert testimony on the traffic issue. The remainder of its evidence was presented through lay witnesses, by cross- examination of the other parties' experts, and by documentation. No direct evidence was affirmatively presented on the issue of whether the plan amendment was in conflict with various provisions of Department rules or Florida Statutes. As to all other issues, even though the Association did not prevail on any of its claims, it did present some evidence, albeit minimal in some respects, in support of its position. There is no evidence, direct or circumstantial, to support a finding that the Association's primary motive in filing its Petition was to simply harass the City or developer, delay the project (which will be built on the property after the land use change is approved and building permits obtained), or needlessly increase the cost of litigation for those parties.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Community Affairs enter a final order determining that the plan amendment adopted by Ordinance No. 2005-29 is in compliance. Jurisdiction is retained to consider the City's Motion for Sanctions Against Petitioner and Intervenor's Motion for Sanctions, Fees and Costs filed under Sections 120.569(2) and 163.3184(12), Florida Statutes, if renewed within 30 days after issuance of the final order. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of January, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DONALD R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd of January, 2007.
The Issue The issue presented for decision herein is whether or not Respondent exhibited financial mismanagement, misconduct, diversion, gross negligence or incompetence, failed to properly supervise a construction project in violation of sections 489.129(1)(h), (j) and (m); 489.119 and 489.105(4), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Based upon my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, documentary evidence received and the entire record compiled herein, I make the following relevant factual findings: At times material herein, Respondent was a certified general contractor in Florida having been issued license number CG C016802. On November 27, 1985, Respondent contracted with Dr. Blaine Woods, a chiropractor, to construct a residence at Lot 188, Whispering Woods Subdivision, 8020 NW 47th Drive, Coral Springs, Florida for a price of $248,307.00. According to the terms of the contract, the construction was to be completed in five months. (Petitioner's Composite Exhibit 16, Article 2) Construction commenced on the Woods' residence during December, 1985. During construction, Dr. Woods made draw payments to Respondent totaling $211,44.00 or approximately 85% of the contract price. The contract provided that the final draw payment, amounting to 15% of the contract price, was to be paid upon issuance of a Certificate of Occupancy (CO). During the latter stages of construction, Respondent frequently was on the job site by himself. On several occasions, Dr. Woods personally assisted Respondent in the construction. Dr. Woods had contracted to sell his home when construction commenced on his new home. He sold it in early August and was forced to move. Based on that fact, a temporary CO was issued on August 1, 1986 and Dr. Woods moved into the new home on August 2, 1986. As of August 2, many of the contract items had not been installed or were defective including: the pool heater, two shower enclosures, cabinets in a game room, spa decking and floor tile at the entrances, three garage door openers, 13 ceiling fans, pantry shelving, a roof that leaks, numerous electrical outlet problems and the pool deck which was not installed as Respondent agreed by the contract. Upon occupying the home, Dr. Woods began receiving phone calls and personal visits from subcontractors and materialmen who had supplied either services or materials, demanding payment. The majority of the subcontractors had been told by Respondent that they could not be paid because Dr. Woods had not paid him. Over the next several weeks, approximately twenty (20) subcontractors and materialmen approached Dr. Woods for payment of invoices totaling $71,451.37. Dr. Woods attempted, unsuccessfully, to have the subcontractors return to the house to finish the work. As a result, Dr. Woods was forced to hire additional subcontractors to complete his home. Dr. Woods spent a majority of the $37,000 final draw reserve completing his home. Eleven liens have been filed against the Woods residence as a result of Respondent's failure to pay subcontractors and/or materialmen. Dr. Woods, through legal counsel, was able to remove most of the liens filed against his home based on legal technicalities. However, in so doing, he incurred legal fees in the amount of $12,791.76. At the time of hearing, four outstanding liens remained on the Woods' residence. Jerry Hicks, a licensed architect and general contractor in Florida, was tendered as an expert in the areas of architecture and contracting. Hicks opined that Respondent significantly underbid the Woods' residence and was therefore grossly negligent or incompetent for entering into a contract which he could not perform. (Deposition of Jerry Hicks, Petitioner's Exhibit 5). Julio Aldecocea, also a licensed architect and general contractor, was tendered as an expert in the fields of architecture and general contracting. Aldecocea also opined that when Respondent found himself unable to pay subcontractors because he underbid the project, he committed gross negligence or incompetence in entering into a contract he could not perform. Aldecocea noted that it is standard procedure for contractors to monitor the progress of a job to ensure that costs are running within budget and to take corrective measures if costs begin to exceed budget. Respondent, by failing to take this step, committed financial mismanagement when he let outstanding bills to subcontractors in the amount of $71,451.37 remain unpaid. During the hearing, Respondent admitted that he expected to make a profit of approximately $24,000.00 on the Woods residence when he entered into the contract. Based on the amount of money outstanding to subcontractors and materialmen, Aldecocea opined that it was misconduct for Respondent to tell the subcontractors and supplies that they cannot be paid because Dr. Woods had not paid the final draw when he had been, in fact, paid. Valid liens have been recorded against Dr. Woods' property for supplies and services ordered by Respondent for the Woods' project. Respondent has received funds from Woods to pay for those suppliers and services. Respondent failed to remove the liens from the Woods' property. Respondent admitted, in a telephone conversation with Dr. and Mrs. Woods, that he could not pay subcontractors because he had made an investment which "went down the tubes". (Testimony of Dr. and Mrs. Woods). Respondent appeared and testified that the Woods' residence was, in his opinion, more than what they had paid for and therefore he was due excess monies for items over and above what he contracted for. In the areas where there deficiencies, Respondent contends that such items were "service items" which were routine in any newly built house and could have been easily repaired if afforded an opportunity. In this regard, Respondent alluded to several areas where the Woods got more than they bargained for. Specifically, he mentioned that the property had to be regraded and needed a retention area and he refused to pay Mr. Allen, manager of Coral Springs Property Services Incorporated, for the additional grading and paving that was needed. Respondent also contends that the pool was larger than what was contracted for and that the Woods ordered several plants and shrubbery from Tropical Trees which was over and above the amount allotted under the contract. Finally, Respondent contends that the driveway was larger than what was called for in the plans and therefore he would not pay the difference which resulted from his having to build a larger driveway. Respondent, as a certified general contractor, was familiar with the manner in which a change order could be instituted in the contract and no change orders were completed respecting the above-referenced items. (Petitioner's Exhibits 11 and 12) Moreover, the Woods made a change in the contract and a change order was written for a brick wall and a sum of $4,941.00 was added to the contract price. Respondent was aware of this procedure and did not avail himself of the opportunity to effect a change order as provided in the contract. Since Respondent knew, or should have known that the proper procedure to be reimbursed for a charge in the plans, which is over and above what was originally included in the contract, is through the use of a change order, his claims that the Woods received more than they bargained for is without merit.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether a small scale amendment to the Cooper City comprehensive plan adopted pursuant to Section 163.3187(1)(c), Florida Statutes, is "in compliance."
Findings Of Fact The Parties. Petitioner, The Sunshine Ranches Homeowners Association, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as the “Homeowners Association ") is a not-for-profit corporation. The Homeowners Association has members who reside within the residential area known as Sunshine Ranches, located in Broward County. The address of the principal office of the Homeowners Association is 12400 Flamingo Road, Fort Lauderdale, Broward County, Florida. (Stipulated Facts). The Homeowners Association was formed on or about December 4, 1968. The Homeowners Association is involved in working for the betterment of residents and land owners within Sunshine Ranches to secure political, social, and economic improvement within Sunshine Ranches. Petitioner, Charles F. Seip, resides at 4661 Southwest 128th Avenue, Fort Lauderdale, Florida. Mr. Seip lives two blocks west of the parcel of property which is the subject of this proceeding. Mr. Seip has lived at his current location for 26.5 years. (Stipulated Facts). Petitioner, Anthony E. Coulson, resides at 4710 Southwest 126th Avenue, Fort Lauderdale, Florida. Mr. Coulson lives approximately four blocks from the subject property. (Stipulated Facts). Petitioner, Jeffrey Price, resides at 5001 Southwest 126th Avenue, Fort Lauderdale, Florida. Mr. Price lives approximately four blocks west of the subject property. (Stipulated Facts). Each Petitioner submitted oral and written objections to the City of Cooper City during the review and adoption proceedings conducted by the City of Cooper City on the adoption of the comprehensive plan amendment which is the subject of this proceeding. Petitioners submitted objections to the Cooper City Planning and Zoning Board and the City of Cooper City Commission. The parties stipulated that Petitioners are "affected persons." Respondent, the City of Cooper City (hereinafter referred to as the "City"), is a municipality of the State of Florida. The City is located in Broward County, Florida. The City is a "local government" as defined in Section 163.3164(13), Florida Statutes. The City's address is 9090 Southwest 50th Place, Cooper City, Broward County, Florida. (Stipulated Facts). Intervenor, George H. Lange, Trustee, is the representative of a trust that owns the property which is the subject of the amendment at issue in this proceeding. The Amendment. By Ordinance Number 96-10-3, the City adopted an amendment, L.L.U.P.A. 96-S-1 (hereinafter referred to as the "Plan Amendment") to the Cooper City Land Use Plan. (Stipulated Facts). The Plan Amendment was adopted on October 22, 1996. (Stipulated Facts). Also adopted with the Plan Amendment was a Development Agreement establishing conditions for the development of the property which is the subject of the Plan Amendment (hereinafter referred to as the "Subject Property"). The Plan Amendment was also identified as Ordinance Number PS96-15 in some notices published by the City. (Stipulated Facts). The Plan Amendment changes the land use designation of approximately 8.45 acres of land from "Estate Residential" to "Commercial" for the eastern 3.82 acres and to "Community Facility" for the western 4 acres. (Stipulated Facts). The Plan Amendment is a "small scale amendment" pursuant to Section 163.3187(1(c), Florida Statutes. Therefore, the Plan Amendment was not reviewed by the Department of Community Affairs. (Stipulated Facts). The petition challenging the Plan Amendment was filed with the Division of Administrative Hearings within 30 days of October 22, 1996, the date the Plan Amendment was adopted. (Stipulated Facts). The City and Its Comprehensive Plan. The City is a relatively small municipality located in southwestern Broward County. Geographically, the City consists of approximately six-and-a-quarter square miles. The City is located directly to the east of Sunshine Ranches. The City and Sunshine Ranches are bounded on the north and south by the same roads: Griffin Road and Orange Road in the north; and Sheridan Street in the South. The western boundary of the City either abuts Sunshine Ranches or is separated by Flamingo Road. The City is bounded on the north by the Town of Davie. It is bounded on the south by Pembroke Pines. The City adopted the Cooper City Comprehensive Plan in 1991 (hereinafter referred to as the "Plan"). It consists of Volumes I, II, and III. Volume I contains the text of the Plan. Volumes II and III contain the data and analysis for the Plan. Pursuant to a Compliance Agreement entered into between the City and the Department of Community Affairs, the Plan was found to be "in compliance" as defined in Chapter 163, Part II, Florida Statutes. The City's Evaluation and Appraisal Report. The City was required to submit an Evaluation and Appraisal Report to the Department of Community Affairs on or before March 11, 1996. At the time of the formal hearing of this case, the City had prepared a draft of its Evaluation and Appraisal Report. See Respondent's and Intervenor's Exhibit 5. The draft of the City's Evaluation and Appraisal Report had not, however, been filed with the Department of Community Affairs. Sunshine Ranches. Sunshine Ranches is an unincorporated area of Broward County. It is generally bounded by the following roads: On the north by Orange Road and Griffin Road; On the south by Sheridan Street; On the west by Volunteer Road (148th Avenue); and On the east by Flamingo Road. Griffin Road abuts the entire length of the northern boundary of Sunshine Ranches. Orange Road is located immediately to the north of Griffin Road. The two roads are separated by a canal which runs the entire length of the northern boundary of Sunshine Ranches. The area to the north of Orange Road and Griffin Road is largely undeveloped. Flamingo Road on the eastern boundary of Sunshine Ranches is a six-lane road with a wide right-of-way. There is also a canal that runs the length of Flamingo Road. The canal separates Flamingo Road from Sunshine Ranches and other parcels of property located west of Flamingo Road. The right- of-way and canal are approximately 270 feet wide. The roads along the north, south, and west of Sunshine Ranches are contiguous with Sunshine Ranches' boundaries. On the east, Flamingo road is contiguous with most of Sunshine Ranches' eastern boundary. There are, however, several parcels of property located west of Flamingo Road which are a part of the City. Sunshine Ranches consists of approximately four square miles of land, or approximately 2,500 acres. Sunshine Ranches is a rural community with a significant number of small and large horse farms. There are also large homesites, the majority of which are five acres or larger. Many homesites have barns on them. A substantial number of homes in Sunshine Acres have animals, such as horses, chickens, and cows. Most of the roads in Sunshine Ranches are dirt roads. There are no sidewalks or traffic lights. There are a few fire hydrants in Sunshine Ranches. Most areas, however, are served by fire wells. There is a volunteer fire department consisting of two vehicles. The vehicles are leased from Broward County. Sunshine Ranches is a unique community in Broward County, both in terms of the size of lots and its rural, equestrian and agricultural character. There are signs at each entrance road into Sunshine Ranches that include the following: "Welcome to Sunshine Ranches: A Rural Estate Community." Most commercial enterprises within Sunshine Ranches are involved in equestrian-related activities. These activities consist of providing boarding facilities, riding schools, and horse training facilities. There is also a plant nursery located in Sunshine Ranches. Horses owned by non-residents of Sunshine Ranches are boarded at facilities in Sunshine Ranches. Non-residents also ride horses at facilities located in Sunshine Ranches. The land use designations for Sunshine Ranches consist of the following: "Rural Ranches," which allows one residential unit per two and one-half acres; and "Rural Estate," which allows one residential unit per one acre. The designation of Sunshine Ranches as Rural Ranches and Rural Estate was accomplished by an amendment to the Broward County comprehensive plan. It was the first area in Broward County to receive these designations. The designations resulted from a study conducted by Broward County to identify, preserve, and protect rural lands from urban encroachment. Property designated Rural Ranches may be used for "Community Facilities" also. Community Facilities include schools, fire stations, churches, etc. Churches require five- acre lots. There are several parcels located along Flamingo Road in Sunshine Ranches which are used by Churches. There are also schools located within Sunshine Ranches. Approximately 90% of Sunshine Ranches is designated Rural Ranches. Approximately 10% of Sunshine Ranches is designated Rural Estate. The portion of Sunshine Ranches designated Rural Estate is located along Giffin Road. Commercial Activities Around Sunshine Ranches. There are only a few commercial sites located near the boundaries of Sunshine Ranches. One is located on the western boundary of Sunshine Ranches at Volunteer Road and Griffin Road. This site is located on the side of Volunteer Road opposite to Sunshine Ranches. The site is, therefore, separated from Sunshine Ranches by the road and a canal. The largest amount of commercial property in the vicinity of Sunshine Ranches is located near the eastern boundary of Sunshine Ranches and Flamingo Road. At the corner of Flamingo Road and Giffin Road, immediately across Flamingo Road from the Subject Property, is Wal-Mart Shopping Center. Abutting Flamingo Road is the parking lot for the shopping center. The shopping center is located to the east of the parking lot. The shopping center is currently separated from Sunshine Ranches by approximately 700 feet of parking lot, the six-lanes of Flamingo Road, the canal located on the west side of Flamingo Road and the Subject Property. Immediately to the south of the Wal-Mart parcel are properties designated "Low 5" and "Low-Medium 10." Both designations allow residential uses. Flamingo Road and the canal on the western side of Flamingo Road act as a buffer between the existing commercial activities on Flamingo Road and Sunshine Ranches. Flamingo Road has historically acted as a dividing line between commercial activities and Sunshine Ranches. Commercial activities have been limited to the eastern side of Flamingo Road. On the west side of Flamingo Road there are several parcels of land which have been annexed as part of the City. None of these parcels are currently approved for commercial uses, however. They are all currently designated for residential ("Estate Residential") or Community Facilities. Most remain undeveloped. The Estate Residential designation allows use of the property for Community Facilities. Immediately to the south of the Subject Property is a 16-acres parcel designated Estate Residential. The largest parcel of property in the City located on the western side of Flamingo Road has been developed under the name of County Glen. There are no commercial sites within County Glen. Steps were taken in developing County Glen to minimize the impact of its higher density on Sunshine Ranches. These steps included restricting the number of traffic lights within the development and a limitation on density of the lots directly abutting Sunshine Ranches to one residential unit per acre. Although County Glen is more urban than Sunshine Ranches, steps were taken to buffer Sunshine Ranches from the impact of the development, consistent with development allowed west of Flamingo Road. The Need for Commercial Property in the City. Volume II of the Plan contains an analysis of the amount of commercial acreage within the City necessary to support the residents of the City. The analysis indicates that the City has one of the lowest ratios of commercial to residential acreage in Broward County. The ratio of commercial property to residential property was 7.2 percent. Although this ratio is lower than the ratio for Broward County, the City and the Department of Community Affairs agreed that the Plan, including the amount of acreage designated for commercial use, was "in compliance." The City has not amended its Plan to change this ratio. The City has adopted two Plan amendments reducing the amount of acreage in the City designated "Commercial" under the Plan. One amendment involved approximately 14.4 acres. The evidence failed to prove the size of the other parcel. Currently, there are a number of parcels of land designated Commercial under the Plan which are vacant. One is known as the Transflorida Bank Plaza. It is located to the east of the Subject Property at the corner of Griffin Road and 100th Avenue. The property was formerly a Winn Dixie Supermarket. Part of the property is still used for commercial uses. Another vacant commercial parcel is located on Pine Island Road across from David Poenick Community Center. This parcel is 6.5 acres. The City has approved use of this property for a 55,000 square-foot Albertson's. Another vacant commercial parcel is located on Stirling Road across from the Cooper City High School. On the east side of Flamingo Road, between Stirling Road and Giffin Road, there is a shopping center known as Countryside Shops. There are vacant parcels to the south and north of this property which could be used for commercial purposes. Finally, there are other vacant commercial parcels located in the central part of the City. The location of commercial property is an important factor in determining whether the property will actually be used. Therefore, the fact that there are vacant commercial properties located in the City fails to prove that there is not a need for the total amount of property designated Commercial under the Plan. Overall, the City has reduced the amount of property designated Commercial under the Plan. The amount of land being classified as Commercial pursuant to the Plan Amendment will not increase the amount of property originally designated Commercial pursuant to the Plan. The "Industrial" land use designation under the Plan allows some uses which may be considered commercial. This was true when the Plan was found to be in compliance, however, and the amount of land designated Commercial was still approved. The evidence failed to prove that the amount of property designated Commercial, including the portion of the property being designated Commercial pursuant to the Plan Amendment, is not supported by the data and analysis that supported the amount of commercial property found to be in compliance under the Plan when it was adopted. In light of the fact that the City has not submitted its Evaluation and Appraisal Report to the Department of Community Affairs for review as required by Section 163.3191, Florida Statutes, the amount of property designated Commercial in the originally approved Plan should not be relied upon to support the Plan Amendment. While the draft of the Evaluation and Appraisal Report prepared by the City indicates a need for additional commercial acreage in the City, the Department of Community Affairs has not reviewed the report. Nor has the City amended the Plan "based on the recommendations contained in the adopted evaluation and appraisal report " Section 163.3191 (4), Florida Statutes. The Subject Property and the Impact of the Plan Amendment. The Subject Property is currently classified as "Estate Residential" in the Plan. This classification allows the use of the Subject Property for residential purposes. The Subject Property is located at the southwestern corner of Flamingo Road and Griffin Road. It is located on the west of Flamingo Road. The Subject Property abuts the northeastern corner of Sunshine Ranches. Under the Plan Amendment, the eastern approximately four acres of the Subject Property will be designated Commercial (hereinafter referred to as the "Commercial Property"). This will be the first property on the west side of Flamingo Road designated for commercial uses. The Commercial Property will be separated from Sunshine Ranches by the remaining 3.82 acres of the Subject Property. This portion of the Subject Property will be designated Community Facilities (hereinafter referred to as the "Community Facilities Property"). The Subject Property abuts an area of Sunshine Ranches which consists of Rural Estate property. This designation makes up approximately 10 percent of the property in Sunshine Ranches. The Plan Amendment allows stormwater facilities required for the Commercial Property and the Community Facilities Property to be located on the Community Facilities Property. I. Compatibility of Land Classifications with Surrounding Classifications; The Impact of the Plan Amendment on Sunshine Ranches. Policy 1.1.3 of the Plan provides that the compatibility of a proposed land use with existing land uses is a primary consideration in determining whether a land use should be allowed. Residential and commercial land uses are not inherently compatible. Despite this fact, residential and commercial land uses often abut each other. Where this occurs, steps can be taken to minimize the negative impact of the commercial use of property on the residential use of adjoining property. Flamingo Road and the adjacent canal provide a good boundary and buffer between rural Sunshine Ranches and the urbanized area of the City. The Plan recognizes this fact by requiring that the City conduct a study of the application of an urban growth boundary line for areas of the City located west of Flamingo Road. Regardless of the size of the Commercial Property, the designation of the Commercial Property for commercial uses would be the first commercially authorized use of property west of Flamingo Road or inside any of the other boundary roads of Sunshine Ranches. Comparing the uses allowed on the Commercial Property with the uses of property in Sunshine Ranches, it is evident that the uses are not compatible. This conclusion, however, does not necessarily mean that the City's approval of the Commercial Property for commercial uses is not "in compliance." Although the uses allowed on the Commercial Property and in Sunshine Ranches are incompatible, there are steps which can be taken to minimize the negative impacts which occur when commercial activities approach residential activities. One of those steps was taken when the City approved the Plan Amendment with the Community Facilities Property located between the Commercial Property and Sunshine Ranches. The Community Facilities Property, in conjunction with other measures, can be an effective buffer between the Commercial Property and Sunshine Ranches. The Development Agreement adopted by the City was adopted, in part, to address compatibility concerns. The Development Agreement eliminates various uses of the Commercial Property which would otherwise be allowed by the City's zoning for commercial parcels. The Development Agreement also provides that the Community Facilities Property will be dedicated to community facilities uses once the development of the Commercial Property is approved. The Development Agreement also includes certain development standards and requirements intended to reduce the impact on Sunshine Ranches due to incompatibility, such as requiring berms and landscaping to buffer the Subject Property from Sunshine Ranches. Horse trails along the Subject Property are to be included in the development. Land development regulations will require that steps be taken in the development of the Subject Property to reduce the negative impact on adjoining property, including Sunshine Ranches. The designation of the Commercial Property for commercial uses could, however, have a "domino affect" on other property located west of Flamingo Road. Once one parcel is approved, it will be difficult for the City not to approve similarly situated parcels. The Plan Amendment will increase the expectation of others who own property west of Flamingo Road that the land- use designation of their property can be changed to Commercial. The evidence, however, failed to prove that there are other parcels of property located west of Flamingo Road which are sufficiently similar to the Subject Property that they would be allowed to be used for commercial purposes. The evidence also failed to prove that any parcels of property located west of Flamingo Road which may be considered in the future for commercial uses cannot have conditions imposed on their use for commercial purposes which will adequately protect Sunshine Ranches from an incompatible use. The Plan Amendment could also negatively impact the ability to use adjoining property for residential purposes. In particular, the sixteen-acre parcel located immediately to the south of the Subject Property will more difficult to develop as residential if the Plan Amendment is approved. The evidence failed to prove, however, that with effective buffering adjoining property cannot be used for residential purposes. The evidence failed to prove that, with proper measures to reduce the impacts of the development on the Subject Property on Sunshine Ranches, the development of the Subject Property allowed by the Plan Amendment would necessarily be incompatible with Sunshine Ranches. The evidence failed to prove that the uses allowed for the Community Facilities Property are incompatible with the uses allowed in Sunshine Ranches. The Availability of Infrastructure. The evidence failed to prove that the Plan Amendment is not in compliance due to the lack of available vehicle trips on roads that would be impacted by development of the Subject Property. This issue, which involves the question of whether development of the Subject Property is consistent with relevant transportation levels of service, is one that should be considered at the time a development order is sought. It is not an issue for consideration in determining whether a land use designation amendment is in compliance. The same conclusion applies to other services such as sewer and water, which currently are available for the Subject Property. Urban Sprawl, the State and Regional Plan, Internal Inconsistency, and Inconsistency with the Broward County Comprehensive Plan. The evidence failed to support allegations concerning urban sprawl, the state and regional plans, internal inconsistencies, and inconsistencies with the Broward County comprehensive plan.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered by the Administration Commission finding the Plan Amendment is invalid because it was adopted in violation of Section 163.3187(6), Florida Statutes, and is not "in compliance." DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of July, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of July, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Richard Grosso, General Counsel Scott SznitRen, Certified Law Intern ENVIRONEMENTAL and LAW USE LAW CENTER, INC. Civil Law Clinic Shepard Broad Law Center Nova Southeastern Center 3305 College Avenue Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33314 Alan Ruf, City Attorney City of Cooper City 9090 Southwest 50th Place Cooper City, Florida 33328 Richard G. Coker, Jr., Esquire BRADY and CORER 1318 Southeast 2nd Avenue Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33316 Barbara Leighty, Clerk Administration Commission Growth Management and Strategic Planning 2105 Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Gregory Smith, Esquire Administration Commission 209 Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0001
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant hereto, respondent, Chester E. Moody, held real estate broker/salesman license number 0061271 issued by petitioner, Department of Professional Regulation, Florida Real Estate Commission. Respondent has been in the real estate business for a number of years. At one time, Respondent owned a parcel of property in Fernandina Beach which he sold to a group of investors in West Palm Beach, Florida. One of those investors was Joseph D. Farish. Moody later was involved in other projects with Farish and the two developed a "compatible, harmonious" relationship. In 1980, Moody became aware of a tract of land in Marion County, Florida known as Orange Lake Estates which he believed to have good investment potential. Knowing that Farish was interested in investment opportunities such as this, Moody approached Farish, who then flew to the project site, inspected it, and decided to make an offer to the owner. A contract was prepared and Moody flew to New York at his own expense to present the contract to the owner. After several counter offers, the contract was accepted and a closing was held in June, 1981. Prior to the actual closing Farish and Moody entered into a written agreement concerning Orange Lake Estates which provided as follows: IT IS HEREBY AGREED between JOSEPH D. FARISH, JR., as Trustee, or his assigns, as the Purchaser of that said property designated as Orange Lake Estates, and CHESTER E. MOODY, as follows: That the said Chester E. Moody is to have exclusive re-sale of all property that is to be developed at the said Orange Lake Estates for a period of three (3) years and is to be paid a commission of seven (7) percent of the gross sales price. That the said Chester E. Moody is to supervise, coordinate and negotiate with the approval of the Buyer for all surveying, engineering, land use planning and building and development and said services are to be inclusive of the aforesaid seven (7 percent) percent commission. That all services, material, etc. are to be paid by the Buyer, including any promotions, public relations and/or advertising, with the approval of the Buyer. DATED: March 10, 1981. The document was prepared by Farish, and executed by both parties. Their understanding was basically that Moody would remain in Marion County, hire the labor, oversee the development, and Farish would provide the cash. Although Moody was to receive a 7 percent commission when the property was purchased by Farish, Moody put the commission in the name of a broker (Chester Sanders) who he intended to work for after the sale was consummated. In lieu of a cash commission, however, Sanders was paid in the form of an old clubhouse that sat on the project. At the closing itself, Moody and Sanders split a $1400 charge for title insurance. The contract for sale provided that Farish would have access to the property prior to closing for the purpose of doing "engineering work, moving, clearing" and the like. The property itself had heavy vegetation and underbrush which needed to be cleared. It also had "mush" areas where access was difficult. In view of this, Moody advised Farish he would need a front-end loader and rubber tire tractors to perform the work. Farish told him to go ahead and rent this equipment. Moody did so at $40 and $25 per hour, respectively. The work began in the spring of 1981 and involved 3 to 4 persons working from 5 to 7 days per week in an effort to get the job completed by the end of the summer. In all, over 200 acres of land were mowed and cleared under Moody's supervision. Early on in the project, Moody visited Farish in West Palm Beach with flow sheets of revenues and costs and projections to advise him of the status of the project. Farish told Moody he did not want to incur as much cost as Moody had projected. Moody advised Farish the minimum cash outlay required would be $50,000 in view of the potential sales of several million dollars. The record is unclear whether Farish agreed or disagreed with this amount of expenditures. On June 11, and July 28, 1983, Farish gave Moody checks in the amount of $2,500 and $20,000, respectively, as an advance towards the $50,000 development cost for the project. Prior to receiving the $20,000 check, Moody had requested $30,000 but Farish told him he only had $20,000 in his account. Of the $22,500, Moody paid $1500 to Moorhead Engineering, a land surveying firm in Ocala, Florida. That firm had been contracted by DENCO, an investment firm owned by Farish, to set iron pins on lot corners in the development and to prepare road plans for the project. The total estimated cost was $7,500. A representative of Moorhead testified that the work was completed, that only $1,500 was paid, and that $6000 is still owed. It subsequently filed a $6000 lien on the property. Moody also paid $500 to Hull-Mozely, a land planning firm, for aerial photograph work, geodetics, zoning, and preparation of a preliminary plan, $420 to Paul Harvey Advertising for constructing an 8' X 24' sign on the property, $4,286.72 to John Frykman for marketing assistance in promoting the venture, $156.19 as personal reimbursement for expenses incurred in staging a barbecue at the development site for promotional purposes, and $19,545.50 to the persons who furnished the heavy equipment and labor services in clearing over 200 acres of land in the spring and summer of 1981. In all, these cash outlays exceeded the $22,500 advanced by Farish, and the excess was personally borne by Moody. He has not been reimbursed by Farish to date. In addition, Moody estimated he had invested an additional $10,000 to $15,000 in the project for which he is entitled to be paid. All expenditures were related to the project and no money was converted for personal use. During this period of time, Farish visited the property site on numerous occasions to check the progress of the work. In September, 1981 Farish sent Moody a letter requesting a formal accounting of all monies expended on the project. Shortly thereafter, Moody drove to West Palm Beach for the purpose of providing Farish an accounting. In this regard, he had prepared a written accounting dated September 28, 1981 outlining the disposition of all funds expended the progress of the project, and anticipated costs to complete the project. Farish refused to meet with him and consequently Moody was unable to give Farish an accounting. Farish later filed suit in Palm Beach County circuit court against Moody in 1952. The suit was subsequently transferred to Alachua County and has lay dormant for many months. Farish also filed a complaint with petitioner which precipitated the filing of the administrative complaint.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is, RECOMMENDED that all charges against respondent be DISMISSED. DONE and ENTERED this 30th day of November, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of November, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: Fred R. Langford, Esquire Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 C. Gary Moody, Esquire Suite E, 605 North East 1st Street Gainesville, Florida 32601 Fred Roche, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Randy Schwartz Assistant Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs Suite 212 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32801
The Issue Respondent's alleged violations of Sections 475.25(1)(a) and 475.25(1)(c), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact At the time of the alleged statutory violations, Respondent was a registered real estate broker, Certificate No. 0074222, and an officer and active firm member of Roberts and Gilman, Inc., a registered corporate broker, located in Orlando, Florida. Respondent currently is a registered real estate broker under the referenced certificate of registration. (Petitioner's Composite Exhibit 2) On April 16, 1973, Respondent and Roberts and Gilman, Inc. entered into an exclusive right of sale contract, using a standard form contract of the Orlando Winter Park Multiple Listing Service, Inc. Ralph Rogers executed the document as listing salesman for the firm. The sole purpose for this agreement was to place the property in the multiple listing service. Under this agreement, Respondent listed property that he owned in Seminole County for sale at a price of $50,000.00 for a period of six months terminating October 16, 1973. Paragraph 5 of the agreement provided that Respondent, as owner of the property, agreed to pay the realtor a commission of 10 percent of the sales price for the property. Paragraph 8 of the agreement provided that the realtor or any cooperating realtor or other authorized escrow agent was authorized to accept and hold any deposits received in accordance with the laws of the State of Florida, and that if such deposit was forfeited by the prospective purchaser, the realtor could retain 1/2 of the such deposit but not exceeding the total amount of its commission. The property in question had been the subject of a prior listing with Respondent's firm in which Rogers had also been the listing salesman. One offer from a potential purchaser had been made on the property in the amount of $47,500 and at that time Respondent informed Rogers, who was the listing and selling salesman, that in view of the lower purchase price, he would only pay a $2,500.00 commission to Rogers instead of the normal sum of $2,750 representing 55 percent of the 10 percent commission due on a fifty thousand dollar sale. However, this sale was not consummated. (Testimony of Rogers, Roberts, Petitioner's Exhibit 3) On May 7, 1973, Rufus C. Ellis and Gloria B. Ellis, his wife, executed a Contract For Sale and Purchase of Respondent's property for the sum of $47,500.00. The contract was executed by Respondent as seller on May 8, 1973. It reflected that on that date an earnest money deposit of $5,000.00 in the form of a check to "Larry S. Roberts" was received by Thomas O. Ward, Sr., as of Rufus Ellis, to be held in escrow. Ward was a registered salesman for Roberts and Gilman, Inc. The contract further provided in Special Clause G thereof that in the event of a default by the buyer, the deposit could be retained by or for the account of seller, and in Special Clause P it was stated that if the buyer defaulted and he deposit were retained, the amount of the deposit would be divided equally between the realtor and the seller. There was a further clause that the seller acknowledged the employment of "Realtor " and agreed to pay the realtor a commission in accordance with the "commission agreement." However, no realtor was named in this or any other provision of the contract. (Testimony of Ward, Petitioner's Exhibit 4). It was the understanding of Ellis, Respondent, and Ward that the transaction was a personal one of Respondent and unconnected with the firm of Roberts and Gilman, Inc. because Respondent was selling his own property. In addition to the deposit, Ellis made further payment of $5,000.00 to Respondent by check, dated August 1, 1973, as "part payment" on the property. This payment was made because Ellis intended to assume a $10,000.00 loan that Respondent had borrowed on the property. To accomplish this, Respondent deeded the property to Ellis. Subsequently, Ellis suffered financial reverses and found that he could not complete payment of the purchase price. Respondent agreed to and did pay to Ellis $2,500.00 of the $10,000.00 received from him, and Ellis reconveyed the property to the Respondent. At that time, Respondent agreed to pay commissions to the salesmen. Neither of Ellis' two $5,000.00 checks to Respondent had been placed in an escrow account and Respondent previously had used the $10,000.00 to pay other personal obligations. (Testimony of Ellis, Ward, Roberts; Petitioner's Composite Exhibit 5). At the time Ward had presented Ellis' contract to Respondent, the latter had agreed to pay Ward and Rogers a commission of $2,500.00 divided equally between them. Both salesmen were satisfied with this amount. When Respondent failed to receive the full purchase price of the property, he reaffirmed his agreement to pay each salesman $1,250.00, although neither he nor Ward believed that he was legally obligated to do so because of failure of the transaction. On the same day that Respondent and Ellis had met to discuss the disposition of the $10,000.00 paid by Ellis, Rogers asked Respondent for his share of the commission and Respondent told him that he would pay it in a few days. During ensuing months, on various occasions when Rogers asked for his commission payment, Roberts made various promises to pay, conditioned upon his receipt of funds from future sales. Such sales were not shown to have materialized. Several times when Rogers was in Respondent's office and asked for his money, Respondent told him that he did not have it. During this period, Respondent had suffered severe financial problems and was no longer drawing a salary from his firm. In February or March, 1974, Respondent paid Ward $1,250.00 for his share of the commission which was obtained from the cash value of an insurance policy. He did not pay Rogers, however, until after Rogers had filed civil suit and obtained final judgment for the commission in the County Court of Orange County, Florida on February 4, 1976. (Testimony of Roberts, Rogers, Ward, Petitioner's Composite Exhibit 1)
Recommendation That the allegations against Respondent Lawrence S. Roberts be dismissed. DONE and ENTERED this 22nd day of November, 1976, in Tallahassee, Florida. THOMAS C. OLDHAM Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 COPIES FURNISHED: Richard J.R. Parkinson, Esquire Associate Counsel Florida Real Estate Commission 2699 Lee Road Winter Park, Florida 32789 Benjamin T. Shuman, Esquire 1319 West Colonial Drive Orlando, Florida 32804
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services enter a final order that Petitioner, J & L Farms, Inc., take nothing on its complaint and that the respondents, Bloomingdale Landscape Nursery, Inc., and Southeastern Casualty & Indemnity Insurance Company, go hence without day. DONE and ENTERED this 2nd day of March, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 904/488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of March, 1989.
The Issue Whether Respondent violated Subsections 481.325(1)(g), 481.325(1)(j), 481.325(1)(k), and 455.227(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2001), and, if so, what discipline should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact At all material times relevant to this proceeding, Maestre was licensed as a landscape architect in the State of Florida, having been issued license number LA 00001744. Maestre provided landscape architectural services through Tropicare Landscape, Inc. (Tropicare). Tropicare has never possessed a certificate of authorization for the practice of landscape architecture in the State of Florida. Stephen Kidd (Kidd) and his wife Jaqueline Hansen (Hansen) contacted Maestre to help them with a landscaping project in their backyard. Hansen found Maestre using the yellow pages in the telephone directory. Maestre came to the Kidd/Hansen residence sometime in June 2001 to discuss the project. Hansen provided Maestre with a sketch for the design of the project, which included a deck, a koi pond, a stream, and a waterfall. Hansen paid Maestre $40 for the consultation, although she and Kidd understood that the initial consultation was to be free. On June 15, 2001, Kidd and Hansen entered into a contract with Maestre for landscape architectural design services. The cover letter which accompanied the contract was on Tropicare letterhead. The contract provided that Maestre was to "examine surrounding conditions, locate and identify all existing amenities for the purpose of producing the necessary site plan." After the owners approved the preliminary phase, Maestre was to prepare working plans, which were to include the following: Planting: Shall name quantity and size all plantings {proposed & existing}, as well as depicting all proposed site amenities (sitting areas, walkways/deck, pond . . .) for various areas of the project site. Lighting: This plan shall show the location and type of light fixture to be used as decorative landscape lighting. Wiring and routing of electrical circuits are not part of this plan. If practical, this information will be depicted on the captioned planting plan. Layout & Details: As required, for all proposed hard-scape items referenced above, and such elements of the design solution proposed, shall be provided as needed for construction. The contract provided that Maestre may provide other services as requested by the owners such as obtaining subcontractor bids and making changes to completed working drawings. Maestre's role during the project installation was set forth in the contract as follows: Upon authorization of budgets & estimates by Owner, Tropicare Landscapes, Inc., shall implement and contract the Project, as phased by the Owner. The Landscape Architect shall oversee all work in progress. [50% of the Professional Fees disbursed by Owner as shown in Section II.b, shall be credited appropriately towards project installation.] Maestre's hourly fees were to be billed at $45 per hour for the preliminary work and other services and $65 per hour for the working plans. Hansen and Kidd provided Maestre with a copy of the deed restrictions for the subdivision in which the Kidd/Hansen residence was located. Kidd and Hansen received a statement from Maestre dated June 26, 2001, for $287.50, which represented 3.5 hours for site analysis and conceptual plan at $45 per hour and two hours for working drawings and base sheets at $65 per hour. Hansen paid Maestre $300 based on this statement. On his second meeting with Hansen, Maestre provided her with a conceptual plan, which was similar to the drawing that Hansen had originally provided to Maestre, except that Maestre had included gravel in some open areas where Hansen had wanted sod. Maestre sent Kidd and Hansen a statement dated July 5, 2001, for $393.75, which represented 6.25 hours for working drawings of the layout and planting design. Hansen paid Maestre $400 based on this statement. Kidd and Hansen provided Maestre with a copy of the survey of the property after the first site plan was completed. Maestre sent a statement to Kidd and Hansen dated July 10, 2001, in which he charged them $2,391.25, representing a project implementation deposit of $2,115 and 4.25 hours for working drawings for a new layout. Hansen paid Maestre $3,000 based on this statement. By letter dated July 11, 2001, Maestre advised Kidd and Hansen that the $2,115 deposit would be applied toward implementation of the project and that 50 percent of the professional fees paid for the working drawings would be credited toward project implementation. By statement dated July 23, 2001, Maestre charged Kidd and Hansen $650 for the working drawing of the final plan, representing ten hours of work. Hansen paid Maestre $650 based on this statement, bringing the total amount paid to Maestre to $4,390. By mid-August 2001, Hansen became nervous because no physical work was being done on the project. Maestre had not given her a project schedule, and she was uncomfortable with his work on the project. On August 20, 2001, Hansen advised Maestre by telephone that she and her husband no longer desired to continue with the project due to their financial circumstances. Kidd and Hansen were not having financial problems, but Hansen did not want to tell Maestre that they did not trust him. By letter on Tropicare letterhead dated August 20, 2001, Maestre advised Kidd and Hansen that the deposit that had been made for the installation had been applied towards an oriental wooden bridge and bamboo plants. Neither the bridge nor the purchase of the bamboo had been authorized by Hansen or Kidd. The letter included a statement of the costs for the bamboo and bridge and for six hours of additional services for meeting with potential subcontractors and for blueprints. The charge for the bamboo was $2,016, and the charge for the bridge was $372.80. As of the final hearing, Kidd and Hansen have not received either the bridge or the bamboo. By letter dated August 22, 2001, Hansen and Kidd advised Maestre that they were terminating the contract and wanted their money returned minus the money that had been paid for the plans. The correspondence and statements from Maestre to Kidd and Hansen were either on Tropicare's letterhead or a hybrid letterhead which showed both Maestre and Tropicare. It is clear that Tropicare was offering landscape architectural services with Maestre as the registered landscape architect. Maestre produced a layout plan dated August 2, 2001, and a plan with a plant list and construction notes (plant plan) dated June 5, 2001, with revisions on July 10 and 23, 2001. The plans were not in conformance with the deed restrictions for the subdivision in which the Kidd/Hansen residence is located. The deed restrictions required that "no structure of any kind, including but not limited to dwellings, garages, swimming pools, and screened cages, shall be erected nearer . . . than 8 feet from any side lot line, nor nearer than 15 feet from the rear lot line of any lot." The planting plan last revised on July 23, 2001, shows a mansard screened enclosure with eight-foot set backs from the rear lot line and a side line. The layout plan shows a setback of less than five feet from the mansard enclosure and the rear lot line. Both plans are in violation of the deed restrictions which require a 15-foot set back from the rear lot line. The waterfall structure has a five-foot set back from the rear lot line on the layout plan and an eight-foot set back on the planting plan. Both plans are violations of the deed restrictions requiring a 15-foot set back. The planting plan should contain the common names and the botanical names of the plants to be used in the project. The planting plan prepared by Maestre did not contain both the botanical and common names of the plants. The planting plan should specify the size, spacing, quality, and quantity of the plants. Maestre's planting plan did not specify the size, spacing, quality, or quantity of the plants to be used. The inadequate plant and planting specifications would not have permitted contractors to bid appropriately in the interests of Kidd and Hansen. Maestre's plans should have included specifications of location or of the type, size, and spacing of beams, joists, decking, and fasteners necessary for the construction of the deck structure. The plans prepared by Maestre did not include this information, which would be necessary to bid the deck portion of the project. Plans for water features such as the waterfall for the Kidd/Hansen residence should consider spray height or water fall, free board and operating water levels, water depth, water level and wave action, pool shape, color, materials for pipes and fittings, water volume and pressure, pump sizing, pump types and filtration systems. Maestre's plans did not specify or inadequately specified the characteristics of water flow, the water depth of the pond, pool shape, weir elevations, height of the waterfall, waterfall structure and components, pumping requirements, characteristics of the piping, and pump specifications. Maestre's plans for the deck were inadequate. The plans did not include specifications or details such as type, size, and spacing of beams, joists, decking, and fasteners for the construction of the deck structure. Additionally, the plans did not include the type of deck finish that would be applied after construction. The plans were inadequate in that they did not show how the bamboo screens were to be constructed or the height of the structures. This information would have been necessary to bid the bamboo structure portion of the project. Maestre met with potential subcontractors. The evidence does not clearly and convincingly show that these meetings were improper. However, Maestre did improperly charge Kidd and Hansen for the time he spent meeting with the subcontractors. Maestre charged Kidd and Hansen six hours for meeting with potential subcontractors at the rate of $65 per hour. The contract specified that the rate for such services was $45 per hour.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered finding that Manny F. Maestre violated Subsections 481.325(1)(g) and (j), Florida Statutes (2001); finding that he did not violate Subsections 481.325(1)(k) and 455.227(1)(a), Florida Statutes; imposing an administrative fine of $1,000 for a violation of Subsection 481.325(1)(g), Florida Statutes; imposing an administrative fine of $1,000 for a violation of Subsection 481.325(1)(j), Florida Statutes; issuing a written reprimand; and imposing two years of probation with conditions as the Board of Architecture and Interior Design deems necessary. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of February, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUSAN B. KIRKLAND Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of February, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Manny F. Maestre, Jr. Post Office Box 20816 Bradenton, Florida 34204 Charles J. Pellegrini, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202 Nancy Campiglia, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202 Sherry Landrum, Executive Director Board of Architecture and Interior Design Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
Findings Of Fact Talbott and Drake, Inc. is and was at all times alleged herein a registered real estate broker corporation. William F. Talbott is now and was at all times alleged herein a registered real estate broker and active firm member of Talbott and Drake, Inc. Paul P. Drake is now and was at all times alleged herein a registered real estate broker and active firm member of Talbott and Drake, Inc. Helen C. Drake is now and was at all times alleged herein a registered real estate broker and active firm member of Talbott and Drake, Inc. On or about January 18, 1977, William F. Talbott, on behalf of Talbott and Drake, Inc., negotiated a contract for sale and purchase between the High Ridge Water Company -- John H. McGeary, Jr., sellers, and William Montaltos and Genevieve L. Montaltos, his wife, buyers, for the purchase of lot in a new housing area known as River Forest in the Boca Raton area, Palm Beach County. A copy of said contract, Petitioner's Exhibit 1, is received into the record pursuant to the Stipulation of the parties. Said contract, Petitioner's Exhibit 1, was subject to the declarations of restrictions filed by High Ridge Water Company as seller on June 28, 1976, wherein, in Paragraph 7, the developer retained the right to approve or disapprove the plans and specifications for the construction of any structure, building, fence, wall or sign in the River Forest area. A copy of said declarations of restrictions is received into the record as Petitioner's Exhibit 2, pursuant to the Stipulation of the parties. As a part of the restrictions and provisions of the contract, the purchasers, Mr. and Mrs. Montaltos, were required to use a builder selected from a list of designated builders, approved and designated by Talbott and Drake, Inc. and the High Ridge Water Company. Mr. and Mrs. Montaltos decided to build on the subject property and contacted numerous builders designated by Talbott and Drake, Inc. to submit the bids for the construction of a home on the property. On or about June 9, 1976, the McGeary partnership, as developer of the River Forest area, entered into a joint venture agreement with Group Six Developers Collaborative, Inc., whereby Group Six Developers Collaborative, Inc. purchased lots in the River Forest area and agreed to pay Talbott and Drake, Inc. a five-percent commission on all homes constructed on said lots by Group Six Developers Collaborative, Inc. in the River Forest area. A copy of said joint venture agreement is received into the record as Petitioner's Exhibit 3 pursuant to the Stipulation of the parties. Petitioner's Exhibit 3 recites on the first page of said agreement as follows: WITNESSETH: WHEREAS, by that certain Purchase Agreement intended to be executed this date, BUILDER (Group Six Collaborative, Inc.) is agreeing to purchase certain real property as set forth herein, a copy of which Purchase Agreement is attached hereto as Exhibit 1; . . . (emphasis added) WHEREAS, the parties hereto are desirous of forming a joint venture for the purpose of finan- cing, constructing and selling single family residences upon the property described in Exhibit 1; NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the pro- mises and of the mutual covenants of the parties hereto, and for other good and valuable considera- tion, the parties agree as follows: 9. BROKER. The parties agree that TALBOTT AND DRAKE, INC., a Florida real estate brokerage corporation, shall have an exclusive listing agree- ment with BUILDER, as owner and joint venturer, for the sale of residences to be constructed pursuant to this Agreement, a copy of which Agreement is attached hereto as Exhibit 2. As a commission for their services, which shall include but not be limited to, advertising, manning model houses, showing receiving of deposits, qualifying prospects, assisting in obtaining financing for purchasers, they shall receive five percent (5 percent) of the pur- chase price, according to the provisions contained in Exhibit 2. The joint venture agreement, Petitioner's Exhibit 3, is clearly limited to houses to be constructed on the lots purchased from the McGeary partnership. The agreement does not constitute an agreement to pay Talbott and Drake, Inc. a fee of five percent of the construction cost of any custom home built by one of the designated builders on a lot purchased by an individual. When Mr. and Mrs. Montaltos received the bid statement from Group Six Developers Collaborative, Inc. there was noted thereon: "Add Real Estate Commission as per Talbott and Drake contract." A copy of said bid statement is received into the record as Petitioner's Exhibit 4 pursuant to the Stipulation of the parties. Although Mr. and Mrs. Montaltos were informed that Talbott and Drake, Inc. was to be paid a ten-percent commission by the seller on the sale of the property to Mr. and Mrs. Montaltos, they were at no time informed directly by the Respondents that the builders on the "approved list" were required to pay a five-percent commission to Talbott and Drake, Inc., nor that the said five- percent commission would be passed on to Mr. and Mrs. Montaltos when they contracted with an "approved" builder to construct a home on the subject property. On or about February 4, 1977, William F. Talbott, on behalf of Talbott and Drake, Inc., negotiated the contract for sale and purchase between High Ridge Water Company, as seller, and Donald James Kostuch and Mary Louise Kostuch, his wife, buyers, for purchase of a lot in the River Forest area of Palm Beach County. A copy of said contract is received into the record as Petitioner's Exhibit 5 pursuant to the Stipulation of the parties. Mr. and Mrs. Kostuch were required by the contract to select a builder from an approved list of designated builders approved and supplied by Talbott and Drake, Inc. and seller, High Ridge Water Company. Mr. and Mrs. Kostuch selected Snow Realty and Construction, Inc. from the list supplied by Talbott and Drake, Inc. Snow Realty and Construction, Inc. had an agreement with the McGeary partnership and Talbott and Drake, Inc. similar to that outlined in the joint venture agreement between the McGeary partnership in Group Six Developers Collaborative, Inc., Petitioner's Exhibit 3, whereby Snow Realty and Construction, Inc. agreed to pay Talbott and Drake, Inc. a five-percent commission on any residence that Snow Realty and Construction, Inc. built in the River Forest area. The bid supplied by Snow Realty and Construction, Inc. on March 7, 1977, to Talbott and Drake, Inc. contained a listing of real estate commission to Talbott and Drake, Inc. in the amount of $3,652. A copy of said bid statement is received into the record as Petitioner's Exhibit 6 pursuant to the Stipulation of the parties. The Kostuchs were advised of a five-percent fee to be paid by the builder by a salesman working for another broker who first introduced the Kostuchs to the real property in River Forest. The salesman advised the Kostuchs prior to their entry into the contract for the purchase of the lot in River Forest in which they agreed to limit their choice of builder to one approved by the McGeary partnership and Talbott and Drake, Inc. This disclosure would be sufficient to comply with the provisions of Rule 21V-10.13, Florida Administrative Code, because the fee was revealed by a salesperson involved in the transaction prior to the execution of the contract under which the favor, if any, was granted. Talbott and Drake, Inc., in addition to performing services as listing agent for the sale of homes in River Forest, also functioned as the prime developer in this project pursuant to an agreement with High Ridge Water Company and the McGeary partnership. Regarding the Montaltos' transaction, the limitation of the owners to the use of one of the approved builders constitutes the granting or placement of favor, because it narrows the competition to one of five builders out of all the builders available in the Fort Lauderdale area. The affidavits introduced indicate that, notwithstanding the absence of a written agreement, the designated builders had agreed to pay to Talbott and Drake, Inc. a fee of five percent of the cost of construction of any custom home as compensation for the efforts of Talbott and Drake, Inc. in developing the property. While compensation for these services is reasonable, it still constitutes a fee to be paid Talbott and Drake, Inc. from one of the five designated builders who would benefit from the contract. The potential adverse effect of this arrangement was to transfer a cost generally allocated to the cost of the lot to the cost of the house. Therefore, people shopping for a lot could be misled in the comparison of similar lots in different subdivisions in the absence of being advised of the fee to be paid by the builders to Talbott and Drake, Inc. However, the evidence shows no attempt to keep this fee a secret and thereby mislead buyers. The existence of such a fee is referred to in sales literature prepared by Talbott and Drake, Inc. The Kostuchs were advised of the fee by a participating salesman for another real estate company. The builders set out the fee as a separate cost item as opposed to absorbing it in general costs within their bids. While the Respondents could not produce evidence that the Montaltos' had been advised of the existence of the fee, and the Montaltos' testified that they had not been advised, this appears to be an isolated incident as opposed to a course of conduct. Notwithstanding proof of the above, no evidence is presented that the Montaltos' contracted with a designated builder to build their house, and that a designated builder paid a fee to Talbott and Drake, Inc. To the contrary, the testimony of William Talbott was that the Montaltos' had breached the terms of their contract regarding the use of a designated builder.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law the Hearing Officer recommends that the Florida Real Estate Commission issue a letter of reprimand to Talbott and Drake, Inc. which, in fairness to the Respondents, should set out the specifics of the violation and to further apprise other registrants of the potential dangers of such fee arrangement. DONE and ORDERED this 4th day of June, 1979, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Frederick H. Wilsen, Esquire Florida Real Estate Commission 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Charles M. Holcomb, Esquire 653 Brevard Avenue Post Office Box 1657 Cocoa, Florida 32922
Findings Of Fact Junior Martin, Petitioner, is a farmer d/b/a/ Junior Martin Farms in the State of Florida. Bastista Madonia is a farmer doing business in Florida and West Virginia and a licensed broker in Florida and packer of agricultural products d/b/a/ East Coast Brokers and Packers. Madonia holds Florida license no. 3906 supported by bond no. 743F4618 written by Travelers Indemnity Company as surety. In the summer of 1984 James DiMare, Bastista Madonia, and Junior Martin entered into a Farming Agreement (Exhibit 1) to establish a joint venture to grow cherry tomatoes in the fall 1984 farming season and, if successful, to continue this agreement into the spring season. Pursuant to this agreement approximately fifty (50) acres of tomatoes would be grown by Martin. DiMare and Madonia agreed to supply all plants and $500 cash per acre for which they would own 25 percent of the crop and the profits derived therefrom. East Coast Brokers (Madonia) was to supply picking bins and advance all picking money. Two dollars ($2) per package was to be charged for packing and thirty cents ($.30) per package for selling. Costs for growing the tomatoes was approximately $2,250 per acre. With their advance of $500 per acre and providing plants DiMare and Madonia financed approximately 25 percent of the growing cost of which they were to receive 25 percent of the profits. They were also to advance funds to harvest the tomatoes and deliver them to the packing house. In addition, Madonia paid for two (2) deliveries of tomato stakes to Martin's farm. The tomato crop planted in the fall of 1984 froze and was a total loss. DiMare then pulled out of the agreement. The agreement provided that if both parties are satisfied and things are going well by October 15, all parties will continue this venture by planting a spring crop. Madonia offered to contribute DiMare's share as well as his own for a spring Crop and Martin agreed to plant the spring crop. The spring crop was harvested from late March 1985 through late May 1985 (exhibit 4) at a profit. It is from this venture only that Martin bases his claim. In auditing the records, the Department of Agriculture investigator did not consider the transactions involving the fall crop because that had occurred more than nine (9) months before Martin's complaint. Section 604.21(1) Florida Statutes limits the time frame in which a complaint may be brought. Following the harvesting of the spring crop, Martin and Madonia went to Virginia to look into the feasibility of planting a summer crop in Virginia. They obtained suitable land to lease and, under a modification of their agreement, Madonia would put up most of the money required for the land, fertilizer, etc., and would be entitled to 50 percent of the profits. This venture was unsuccessful and resulted in a large loss, none of which has been paid by Martin. This endeavor was not included in the Department of Agriculture's audit because it occurred outside Florida and beyond the jurisdiction of the Florida Department of Agriculture. The parties discussed a fall 1985 crop after the debacle in Virginia and the Respondent advanced $10,000 to Petitioner for this crop (exhibit 16). This crop was never planted and the Petitioner has rendered no accounting for this advance. The endeavors by Madonia and Martin to grow fall and spring crops in Florida and a summer crop in Virginia were ongoing farming operations carried out pursuant to the Farming Agreement (Exhibit 1). As such, the endeavor was a joint farming venture with Martin providing the land (in Florida) and the farming expertise while Madonia provided plants and funds equal to one-fourth of the expenses and the marketing experience to sell the crops. Accordingly this endeavor was exempt from the provisions of Section 604.15-604.34 Florida Statutes, by Section 604.16(1) (Florida Statutes). The audit conducted by the Department of Agriculture (exhibit 6) showed Petitioner was owed $18,401.91 by Madonia as a buyer for the 1985 spring crop only. This figure does not include any advances over and above the $500 per acre advanced to Martin by Madonia for the fall crop 1984, or the advances for the Virginia operation in excess of the amount agreed to be provided by Madonia. Nor does this figure reflect the 25 percent of the profits due Madonia pursuant to the Farming Agreement. The amount Petitioner claims is owed to him by the Respondent for the spring crop is $60,632.86 (exhibit 7). This balance was prepared by Mrs. Martin from her records. Numerous checks endorsed by Petitioner which he received from Madonia were not included in those figures. Although cashed by Petitioner, they did not get into Mrs. Martin's bookkeeping records. Mrs. Martin acknowledged that she was not sure that she properly credited all of the checks she did receive from Madonia to the spring crop account. Accordingly, this figure is totally unreliable. Disregarding the fall 1984 crop and the Virginia episode, and accepting the Department of Agriculture's audit figures of $18,401.91 as the profits on the spring crops, 25 percent should go to Respondent pursuant to the Farming Agreement. This would leave $13,801.43 owed to Petitioner. From this should be deducted, at least, the $10,000 advance given to the Petitioner for the fall crop of 1985 which was never planted. The parties are engaged in civil litigation to resolve the disputes engendered by the farming activities above discussed. In those proceedings, all of the activities in which they participated pursuant to the Farming Agreement can be considered by the tribunal and resolved. Accordingly, that is the proper forum to resolve the disputes here in issue.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent discriminated against Petitioner in refusing to hire him.
Findings Of Fact On July 24, 1991, Respondent posted a Job Posting for the job of Fire Coordinator at an annual salary of $24,566 to $34,619. The County advertised the job in general runs of the Orlando Sentinel and Tampa Tribune, as well as local newspapers. The application deadline was August 14, 1991. Learning of the job opening, Petitioner submitted an application. Based on background and experience, Petitioner was well qualified for the job. Consistent with County practice, either the County Commission or the County Administrator had appointed a Selection Committee. The purpose of the Selection Committee was to interview qualified applicants, rate the applicants, and forward their scores to the County Commission. Because the Fire Coordinator is a department head, only the County Commission had the authority to hire the person for the job. The Selection Committee included the chief of the Avon Park Fire Department, the chiefs of either a volunteer or another municipal fire department within the County, the County Administrator, the County Personnel Director, and the Director of the County Office of Management and Budget. The Selection Committee chose five persons to interview, including Petitioner. During the interviews, the Personnel Director asked Petitioner about his relationship with the City of Avon Park. Petitioner admitted that he was preparing to file a job discrimination complaint against the City because he believed that he had been unfairly terminated due to some legal problems that his wife had had. The Selection Committee rated the applicants after the interviews. Petitioner rated the highest. He was tied for the highest on the Personnel Director's tally sheet. The Selection Committee then forwarded the three top applicants to the County Commission for further action. These were Petitioner, Mr. Larry Butler, and Mr. Paul Goddard. The County Commission is free to disregard the recommendations and recommence advertising for the position. Expressing some discontent with the selections, the County Commission unanimously voted to do just that when it considered the recommendations on September 3, 1991. The Commission directed that advertisements should be placed locally and in a regional edition of the Tampa Tribune, following which the applicants should be reduced to five and brought to the County Commission for interviews. There is little evidence of the reasoning for the County's action. One Commissioner is a former Mayor of the City of Avon Park, and she may have expressed some reservations about Petitioner and another former employee of the City. In any event, the County, on September 4, 1991, again posted the Job Posting for the Fire Coordinator's job. The ads were run as directed by the County Commission. The application deadline was September 20, 1991, which was a Friday. On this round, the job of determining what applicants were sufficiently qualified to be granted interviews was borne by the County Administrator and the County Personnel Director. Receiving 14 applications, they determined that two of the new applicants were qualified to be interviewed. These persons were Mr. Mike McCann and Mr. Tim Eures, who was the son of an applicant from the prior round. However, others were entitled to interviews due to County custom. One custom was that whenever the County Commission rejects the recommendations of a Selection Committee and readvertises the position, the persons earlier recommended are entitled to be interviewed during the second round. This meant that Petitioner was entitled to an interview, as were the two other persons recommended by the Selection Committee during the first round. In this case, Mr. Goddard affirmatively indicated that he did not want to submit to an interview with the County Commission, and Mr. Butler presumably showed no interest in the interview. The other relevant custom in the County required that current County employees be allowed a full interview when they applied for a job. Mr. McCann was in this category, although he also was sufficiently qualified to earn an interview without regard to his current employment by the County. Also, Mr. Hank Eures, the father of Tim Eures and an unsuccessful candidate the first time, was extended an offer to interview with the County Commission because he was a current County employee. The County Administrator and County Personnel Director decided on Monday, September 23, 1991, that Mr. McCann, Mr. Tim Eures, Petitioner, and Mr. Hank Eures were entitled to interviews with the Board of County Commissioners. Following the custom of setting the interview schedule at its next regularly scheduled Commissioners meeting, the Board, on September 24, chose the date and set aside time for the interviews to take place. It chose Tuesday, October 1, 1991. On September 26, 1991, (September 27 for Mr. Hank Eures), the County mailed letters to each of the persons to be interviewed informing them of the date, time, and location of the interviews. The County Personnel Director normally telephones the candidates and gives them the same information, but it is unclear if he did so, or was able to do so, with respect to Petitioner. Petitioner received the September 26 letter on Saturday, September 28. He had since become employed as a long- distance tractor-trailer operator and was booked for a long haul on October 1. He was unable to find a substitute for this job. On Monday, September 30, Petitioner's wife called a County employee and informed her of Petitioner's scheduling problem. She explained that Petitioner could not attend the interviews and asked that his interview be rescheduled for another date. As is customary with interviews, the County Commission refused to accommodate Petitioner, so the interviews proceeded without him as scheduled. Following the interviews, the Commissioners selected Mr. Tim Eures as the new Fire Coordinator. The record does not permit a determination as to Mr. Tim Eures' relative qualifications as compared to those of Petitioner. There is no evidence that Petitioner failed to be hired for the Fire Coordinator position due either to legal problems that his wife was having at the time or due to the filing of a charge of discrimination against Petitioner's prior employer, the City of Avon Park.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. ENTERED on April 20, 1993, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings on April 20, 1993. APPENDIX Treatment Accorded Proposed Findings of Respondent 1-2: rejected as not findings of fact. 3-5: adopted or adopted in substance. 6: rejected as subordinate. 7: adopted or adopted in substance. 8: rejected as subordinate and recitation of evidence. 9-15 (second sentence): adopted or adopted in substance. 15 (third and fourth sentences)-17: rejected as irrelevant. COPIES FURNISHED: Dana Baird, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, FL 32303-4149 Margaret Jones, Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, FL 32303-4149 Robert H. Grizzard, II P.O. Box 992 Lakeland, FL 33802-0992 J. Ross Macbeth County Attorney Highlands County P.O. Box 1926 Sebring, FL 33871-1926
