The Issue The question presented here concerns the entitlement of the Petitioner, Theodore D. Walker to be approved to serve as Chief of Security, Palm Beach Jai Alai, Palm Beach County, Florida, in the face of the Director, Division of Pari- Mutuel Wagering's disapproval of that request.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner in this cause, Theodore D. Walker, has made application to serve as Chief of Security for the Fronton, Inc., in its fronton known as Palm Beach Jai Alai, Palm Beach County, Florida, for the seasons 1980-81. This request has been denied by the Respondent in the person of the Director of the Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering. The justification for this denial is premised upon the alleged conflict of interest between the employment responsibilities of the Petitioner in his part- time employment as Chief of Security at the Palm Beach Fronton and his primary duty responsibilities as Lead Investigator in the State Attorney's office, Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Palm Beach County, Florida, which is the State Attorney's office with jurisdiction over the County in which the Palm Beach Jai Alai is located. As authority for his denial, the Director has referred to Rule Subsections, 7E-3.03(11) and (12), Florida Administrative Code. 1/ The Petitioner has held seasonal employment as a security officer with the Fronton, Inc. in its West Palm Beach facility from 1965 until the Director's denial of approval which occurred on August 26, 1988. Beginning in 1972, Petitioner had been approved as Chief of Security at the aforementioned fronton. Walker has worked as an investigator in the State Attorney's office, Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, continuously beginning in 1973, and at the time he was hired in his primary employment as investigator, he held the secondary employment as Chief of Security with the Palm Beach Fronton. The Honorable David Bludworth, State Attorney, Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, knew of Mr. Walker's secondary employment as Chief of Security for the fronton when Walker was hired. Over the years, Walker has been promoted from the position of investigator to the position of Lead investigator. Presently his duties for the State Attorney's office involve assisting the attorneys in that office in the preparation of their cases for trial; original investigations that do not have their origins with other law enforcement agencies, in particular "white collar" crime, including public officials and law enforcement personnel and the primary responsibility to head up the "organized" crime unit of that State Attorney's office. In connection with his duties, the Petitioner is granted arrest powers and carries a weapon. As a full-time employee of the State, Walker is paid by the State of Florida. His salary is approximately $23,888 per year in contrast to his salary as a Chief of Security which has been in the amount of $14,888 for tax year, constituted of two meetings (seasons) at the fronton. (Pending the outcome of these matters, the Respondent's secondary employment with the Palm Beach Fronton, is that of floor supervisor at an undisclosed amount of compensation.) Walker's responsibilities as Chief of Security for the fronton include the hiring and supervising of security officers; the security of the physical plant at the fronton, to include the ejection of unruly patrons with the assistance of local law enforcement; initial contact with individuals over betting disputes which are ultimately referred to the Respondent; initial investigation of irregularities involving the computer system utilized by the fronton in running its facility; supervision of watchmen; initial investigation of matters involving betting on credit; investigation of shortages of money involving employees of the Fronton end prohibiting prostitutes and "book makers" from plying their trades on the fronton premises. In connection with his duties as Chief of Security, the Petitioner has no special expertise in the field of computers. When the Director of the Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering disapproved the Respondent's request to serve as Chief of Security for the Fronton, Inc., he contended and continues to hold that belief, that the Petitioner's dual employment as Investigator for the State Attorney's office and as Chief of Security for the fronton, would serve to undermine public confidence in the integrity of the sport of jai alai and, therefore, was not in the best interest of the pari-mutuel industry. Consequently there was ample cause to reject Walker's request, according to the Director. In elaborating on his position, the Director expressed the opinion that law enforcement type officials should not be allowed to hold secondary employment in a fronton in a capacity as security official within the same geographical area in which the individual applicant has law enforcement responsibilities. To that end, six to eight other individuals, excluding the Petitioner, have also been disapproved as security officials at pari-mutuel wagering establishments, following the Walker disapproval. Gary Rutledge, Director of the Division of Pari- Mutuel Wagering in stating the reasons for denying Walker's request, goes on to say that the Chief of Security is a primary person responsible for detecting violations of law at the fronton and Rutledge has a concern that those matters might not be investigated by the Chief of Security or that the appearance might be created that the matters might not be investigated. Moreover, the Director worries about the potential flow of information from the State Attorney's office to the fronton, in particular, when there is, in his mind, the aura of "organized crime" which surrounds the pari- mutuel wagering industry. In response to concerns referred to above, neither the Petitioner nor the Respondent has shown any acts of impropriety on the part of Walker in serving in the capacity as Investigator for the State Attorney's office or in his part-time employment as Chief of Security for the Fronton, Inc., or do they have any reason to suspect that Walker is less than a man of utmost integrity in his profession and in his private life. There was, however, one instance in 1978, in which a fire occurred at the Palm Beach Fronton and State Attorney Bludworth made the judgment not to allow Walker to serve as State Attorney Investigator on that case, in which arson was suspected. This decision on Bludworth's part was made to protect against the appearance that might be created that as investigator to the prosecutor, some special knowledge and advantage could possibly be afforded to Walker in his role as Chief of Security for the fronton. Although Walker was above reproach in this matter, the State Attorney lost the advantage of his services as investigator in a circumstance wherein other law enforcement officials felt that it would have been extremely helpful to have Walker serving in his primary duty as State Attorney Investigator in attempting to solve the arson case. This instance points up the viability of the Director's argument on the issue of public confidence in the industry, in particular, in avoiding the appearance of fraud or dishonesty in that industry, and it is no less valid in the face of Walker's insistence that he would step down in future cases such as the 1978 incident and the State Attorney's indication that he would give serious consideration to the role that Walker would play in investigations involving incidences at the fronton in West Palm Beach. As stated before, criminal acts have occurred at the fronton and it is a reasonable expectation those events shall take place in the future. Alleged conflict of interest is the only ground upon which the Petitioner has been denied his request to act as Chief of Security at the Palm Beach Fronton. There has been some suggestion concerning a rumor that the Director had denied the application based upon a lack of good moral character on the part of the Petitioner and the ensuing effect that this has had on the community, and in particular, the black community in Palm Beach County of which the Petitioner is a member; however, Director Rutledge has never offered lack of good moral character as a reason for denying the permit application, and his decision to deny Walker's application was not racially motivated.
Findings Of Fact After the motion for continuance was again denied, petitioners declined to offer any evidence and petitioners announced that they would be pursuing certain supposed federal remedies.
The Issue Whether Respondent has committed an unlawful employment practice in violation of Chapter 760, Florida Statutes, and if so, what remedy should be ordered?
Findings Of Fact Bonita Sneiderman, a/k/a Bonita Mattingly (Ms. Mattingly), is a Caucasian female born March 17, 1953. At the time of the events complained about in this proceeding, Ms. Mattingly was 53 years old. Ms. Mattingly was then known as Ms. Sneiderman and was single. Ms. Mattingly married and changed her name shortly before the hearing in this case. Dillards, Inc., is a corporation that operates a chain of department stores, referred to as Dillards. In many of the Dillards stores, there are styling salons. The Dillards department store at the Orange Park Mall in Orange Park, Florida is referred to as Store #232. During the time period relevant to this case, Susan Konstantatos was the Salon Manager of the salon at Store #232. On July 26, 2005, Ms. Konstantatos attended a manager's meeting, in which she received and discussed new policies for the salons. One such policy dealt with the schedules for salon employees and stated that all new hires would work five-day, full-time schedules. This policy, however, did not necessarily apply to employees already employed at the salons. For example, employees that worked in the Iveys salon before Dillards took over what used to be the Iveys store were considered to be "grandfathered in." Dillards honored whatever scheduling terms the employees had negotiated when taking their positions with Iveys. George Craywick, Cynthia Anderson and Marie Cox were three such salon employees. In September 2005, Ms. Mattingly applied for and received a position as a hair stylist in Dillards Store #232. Her application for employment with the store indicates that she applied for a full-time position. The application also indicates that she was hired for a full-time position. On September 21, 2005, Petitioner attended a new employee orientation session and signed the new employee orientation sheet, acknowledging that she had received orientation on Respondent's Associate Work Rules and Attendance Policy. Petitioner also signed an Associate Acknowledgment Form indicating that she received and understood Respondent's Associate Work Rules and General Policies. The Associate Work Rules and General Policies for Dillards reiterated the importance of attendance and provided notice that a "no show" would not be tolerated and would result in termination of employment. Among the stylists' job duties was an activity called "instant eventing." Instant eventing was an activity designed to generate interest in using the salon's services. Stylists could choose the type of instant eventing they would perform, such as handing out business cards, setting up a paraffin wax table and offering demonstrations, or setting up a color table with hair color swatches. Petitioner's chosen method of instant eventing involved setting up the paraffin wax demonstration. Instant eventing not only created interest in the salon, but hopefully helped new stylists to establish a following for their services. Stylists were expected to participate in instant eventing when they had no appointments. As a consequence, the more customers a stylist had, the less time he or she had to devote to instant eventing and the less stylists were expected to participate in the activity. Petitioner complains that George Craywick was not required to instant event and claims that she never saw him participate in any instant eventing activity. Mr. Craywick had more customers than any other stylist working at the Dillards salon. As a result of the number of repeat customers he served, he did not have the need for or the opportunity to engage in the same amount of instant eventing that Petitioner had. There is evidence that Mr. Craywick participated in a color table as an instant event, but it is unclear whether his participation in this activity was during the time that Petitioner was employed. Petitioner admitted that while she never saw Mr. Craywick participate in instant eventing, she had no knowledge as to whether he participated at times when she was not working with him. During May 2006, all of the salon's stylists at Store #232 were scheduled to work five days per week and one Sunday per month. When an employee worked on Sunday, Ms. Konstantatos attempted to schedule another day off for the employee during that week. Often the day off would be Monday, but the coverage needs of the salon would control. Mr. Craywick often worked on his scheduled days off at Ms. Konstantatos' request to ensure overage for the salon. Others sometimes did the same. Petitioner was scheduled to work Sunday, May 7, 2006. On or about May 1, 2006, Ms. Konstantatos checked the posted schedule and saw that Petitioner's name had been crossed off the schedule for Monday, May 8, 2006. Ms. Konstantatos had not removed Petitioner from the schedule and assumed that Petitioner had crossed her name off because she was working Sunday. Ms. Konstantatos needed Petitioner to work Monday, May 8, 2006, in order to ensure that the salon was adequately staffed. Petitioner had not worked the previous Monday. Ms. Konstantatos left Petitioner a note stating that Petitioner needed to work on Monday, May 8, 2006. After receiving the note, Petitioner called Ms. Konstantatos on Wednesday, May 3, 2006, and told her she could not work on Monday because she had made arrangements to go out of town that day. Petitioner's regular day off is Tuesday. Ms. Konstantatos advised that she needed Petitioner to work Monday to make sure that there was proper coverage for the salon, but that she could give Petitioner Wednesday off so that her days off would be consecutive. Petitioner insisted that she could not work on Monday, May 8, 2006. Ms. Konstantatos informed her that if she did not work on Monday, she would be considered to have abandoned her job and her employment would be terminated. Whether or not she worked on Monday, May 8, 2006, remained Petitioner's choice. Petitioner worked Thursday through Saturday, May 4-6, 2006. On Saturday evening, Petitioner packed up her belongings and left a note indicating that she had arranged for someone else to cover her shift on Sunday and would not be at work on Monday. She never returned to work because she considered herself to have been fired. On May 11, 2007, Respondent terminated Respondent for job abandonment. Between September 2005 and May 2006, Respondent terminated several other salon employees for job abandonment or excessive absenteeism. Those employees were both male and female, married and single. Their ages ranged from 21 to 35. After Petitioner's termination, Ms. Konstantatos hired Debra Doss as a stylist. At the time she was hired, Ms. Doss was a 49-year-old single female.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the facts found and conclusions of law reached, it is RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered dismissing Petitioner's complaint of discrimination. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of October, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LISA SHEARER NELSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of October, 2007. COPIES FURNISHED: Bonita Y. Mattingly 2040 Wells Road, Apartment 2-E Orange Park, Florida 32073 Grant D. Petersen, Esquire Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P.C. 100 North Tampa Street, Suite 3600 Tampa, Florida 33602 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact Respondent is the state agency responsible for the licensure of community association managers. Petitioner, Anthony G. DiCarlo, submitted to Respondent an Application for Licensure as a Community Association Manager dated August 25, 1992. Respondent issued a Notice and Order of Rejection of the application on February 2, 1993. Licensure as a community association manager is required for a person performing in the State of Florida community association management services to one or more associations containing 50 units or having an annual budget or budgets in excess of $100,000. The purpose of the community association manager licensing and regulation statute is to protect the public in general, and community association members in particular. The statute is a consumer protection measure designed to provide some assurance to associations that a licensed manager will be trustworthy and have a certain level of competence. A community association manager performs duties which require specialized knowledge, judgment, and managerial skill. The community association manager typically manages the financial affairs of a community association, including the accounts receivable and the accounts payable. The manager usually writes checks, disburses association funds, invests the reserve funds, prepares the budget, and monitors the budget. Depending on the size of the association, a community association manager may have access to substantial sums of money in the form of cash, credit cards, and checking accounts. Some community association managers manage associations with a large number of absentee owners. Because of lessened oversight, those managers often have increased authority and responsibility. Pursuant to Section 468.433(4), Florida Statutes, an applicant must possess good moral character and pass an examination to be entitled to licensure as a community association manager. Rule 7D-55.004(3), Florida Administrative Code, has been duly adopted by Respondent and provides, in pertinent part, as follows: (3) Good Moral Character. (a) When the application has been determined to be in acceptable form, the division shall evaluate the application and make approp- riate inquiry to determine the applicant's moral character. For the purpose of this rule the division shall consider the follow- ing factors as bearing upon good moral character: The affirmation of at least three char- acter references furnished by the applicant for 3 years or longer . . . The completion of a criminal history check by the Florida Department of Law En- forcement that reveals no convictions of a felony or of a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude. . . . * * * Other relevant information generated in the course of the application process which bears upon the applicant's moral character. * * * (5) If upon completion of its evaluation of the moral character of an applicant, the division concludes that the applicant does not posses good moral character, the division shall proceed as provided in rule 7D-55.001 (1), Florida Administrative Code. Rule 7D-55.0011(1), Florida Administrative Code, provides as follows: The division, prior to taking final agency action which may adversely affect the substantial interests of a person, including but not limited to the denial of a license application, shall notify that person of the intended agency action and of his right to a formal hearing or an informal proceeding as provided by section 120.57, Florida Statutes, and chapter 7-4, Florida Admini- strative Code. Faye Mayberry, bureau chief of Respondent's Bureau of Condominiums, testified as to Respondent's policies. It is Respondent's policy to determine that an applicant has good moral character before permitting the applicant to sit for the licensure examination. Respondent has consistently denied licensure to applicants who have committed a theft-related felony or who have shown a pattern of disregard for the law. Respondent does not consider such facts to be a permanent bar to application, but it has adopted no policy as to the evidence of rehabilitation an applicant must establish following the conviction(s) before Respondent will determine that an applicant has been rehabilitated. Instead, Respondent makes a determination as to whether an applicant has established that he has good moral character on a case by case basis. Respondent considers all information that has been made available to it in making its determination. Item 14 on the form application for licensure requires the applicant to answer the following: "Have you ever been convicted of a crime, found guilty, or entered a plea of nolo contendre (no contest) even if adjudication was withheld?" Petitioner answered that question in the affirmative. Thereafter the form instructs an applicant who has answered the question in the affirmative to ". . . attach your complete signed statement of the charges and facts, together with the dates, name and location of the court in which the proceedings were held or are pending." In response to those instructions, Petitioner submitted the following: U.S. Federal Court - Newark, New Jersey 8/11/81 Transporting securities taken by fraud across state lines. Sentenced to five (5) years probation. Awarded early term- ination. County Court - Broward County, Florida 1/8/84 Grand Theft. Sentenced to eighteen (18) months probation. Awarded early term- ination. County Court - Broward County, Florida 3/23/89 Grand Theft. Sentenced to seven (7) years probation. Awarded early termination. On September 24, 1992, Sharon L. Guthrie, Supervisor of Education for Respondent's Bureau of Condominiums, wrote Petitioner about his application and stated, in part, as follows: As part of the application process, the Division is required to make appropriate inquiries to determine the applicant's moral character. Rule 7D-55.004(4), Florida Admini- strative Code, requires the Division to com- plete the moral character evaluation within 30 days after receiving the criminal history check. After reviewing the information on record with the Florida Department of Law Enforcement, it appears that your application was not complete with regard to your criminal history. Based on this information, we are unable to approve your application for licen- sure; however, if you notify us, in writing, that you would like to waive the requirement that the Division complete its evaluation within 30 days, we will continue our evalua- tion of your moral character. In addition, you must provide a complete, signed state- ment of the charges and facts, together with the dates, name and location of the court in which the proceedings were held, and copies of any pertinent court records. In response to the letter of September 24, 1992, Petitioner waived the 30 day requirement and enclosed a copy of the information he had submitted along with his application. He provided no additional information about his criminal history. Ms. Mayberry made the recommendation to Henry M. Solares, Director of the Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominium and Mobile Homes, that Petitioner's application be denied. Ms. Mayberry considered all the information Petitioner submitted in support of his application. There were three reasons for Ms. Mayberry's initial recommendation to deny the application. First, Petitioner had committed three felonies involving theft. Respondent considers theft to directly reflect on the ability of a community association manager to honestly fulfill his or her duties since the manager has the responsibility of managing the association's finances and has access to bank accounts and credit cards. Second, Ms. Mayberry considered that the last crime was committed relatively recently. Third, Ms. Mayberry considered that the multiple convictions indicated a pattern of disregard for the law by Petitioner. Mr. Solares accepted Ms. Mayberry's recommendation and entered on behalf of Respondent on February 2, 1993, a Notice and Order of Rejection, which notified Respondent that Respondent intended to reject his application and provided him with notices as to his rights to contest the intended action. The order found that Petitioner failed to demonstrate his eligibility for licensure as a community association manager. The order provided, in part, as follows: . . . Specifically, in violation of Rule 7D-55.004(3)(a), Florida Administrative Code, relevant information has been generated in the course of the application process which indicates that you have failed to demonstrate good moral character for the following reason: Your criminal history reveals that you have been convicted of a felony directly related to the ability to perform the duties of a community association manager, and you have failed to provide, or been unable to provide, sufficient information to establish your good moral character notwithstanding your conviction. Thereafter, Petitioner timely challenged the intended agency action and this proceeding followed. At the formal hearing, evidence was presented that was not available to Respondent when the initial decision was made to deny the application. This evidence elaborated on Petitioner's criminal history and pertained to efforts by Petitioner to rehabilitate himself. Between 1975 and 1980, Petitioner was employed in a position of trust as an administrator at a New Jersey rehabilitation hospital. During that period of employment, Petitioner embezzled money from his employer by falsifying the hospital's accounts to reflect overpayments and deposited the overpayment in his personal bank account in New Jersey. He then transported the embezzled funds across state lines to his personal bank account in New York. On August 11, 1981, Petitioner entered a plea of guilty in federal court in Newark, New Jersey, of the felony offense of the interstate transportation of securities taken by fraud. He was sentenced to 10 years imprisonment, but the sentence was suspended and he was placed on probation for a period of five years, which he successfully completed. Petitioner contends that his abuse of alcohol during these years contributed to his theft from his employer. The total sum he stole over this extended period of time was not established. On March 9, 1984, Petitioner entered a plea of guilty in Circuit Court in and for Broward County, Florida, to a felony charge of grand theft based on a shoplifting incident. He was adjudged guilty and placed on probation for a period of 18 months. Among the terms of probation was the requirement that he attend AA meetings three times per week. Petitioner successfully completed his probation which included the requirement that he attended AA meetings at Broward Alcoholic Rehabilitative Counseling. Petitioner thereafter resumed his prior abuse of alcohol and cocaine. On March 23, 1989, Petitioner entered a plea of guilty in Circuit Court in and for Broward County, Florida, to two felony counts of grand theft. These thefts occurred over a two year period while Petitioner was employed by Anesthesiology Associates between 1986 and 1988. Using tactics similar to those he used in New Jersey, Petitioner embezzled over $100,000 from his employer. Petitioner was sentenced to seven years probation. The terms of probation included a requirement for community service, payment of restitution, and treatment for drug and alcohol addiction. Petitioner made full restitution over a 21 month period to Anesthesiology Associates, performed 350 hours of community service, and successfully completed the court ordered treatment for alcohol and drug addiction. On January 8, 1991, Petitioner's probation was terminated. On September 19, 1991, the Florida Office of Executive Clemency restored Petitioner's civil rights, except for the right to possess or own a firearm, which were lost by the felony convictions. Petitioner asserts that his criminal activities were the product, in part, to his addiction to alcohol and to cocaine. These addictions resulted, according to Petitioner, because of stress associated with a congenital heart condition. Petitioner underwent open heart surgery in March 1987 to correct this defect. He nevertheless continued to abuse alcohol and cocaine after his surgery. His surgery occurred while he was employed by Anesthesiology Associates, and he continued to embezzle funds from his employer until he was caught. While Petitioner's addictions may have been a contributing factor to his criminal activity, the record in this proceeding fails to establish that his addictions caused his criminal activities. Petitioner was a long time abuser of alcohol and began abusing cocaine when he moved to Florida in 1981. Petitioner has received treatment for his addictions on at least two occasions. The first occasion was as a condition to his probation following the 1984 conviction of grand theft. The second was following the discovery of his thefts from Anesthesiology Associates. Petitioner began extensive alcohol and substance abuse counseling and treatment on an outpatient basis from Clinical Provider Organization, Inc., a private outpatient psychiatric/ psychological clinic in Broward County. He was admitted on November 11, 1988, and discharged on March 20, 1989. Dr. Christopher J. Fichera was the clinical director who supervised Petitioner's involvement in the program, supervised the staff counsellors dealing with him, and treated him on an individual basis. Carol L. Disher, a certified addictions specialist, was the staff person who led Petitioner's group therapy sessions at Clinical Provider Organization. Both Dr. Fichera and Ms. Disher were of the opinion that Petitioner had successfully completed their program. Petitioner was discharged because he had completed the program and because of the condition of probation following the 1989 conviction required that Petitioner participate in an inpatient program. Mr. Cipolla and Rabbi Gross continue to provide support for Petitioner. Although both of these witnesses see Petitioner on a periodic basis, neither has observed any indication that Petitioner has resumed abusing alcohol or cocaine. The greater weight of the evidence establishes that Petitioner is successfully recovering from his addiction to alcohol and cocaine and that he has been alcohol and cocaine free for approximately five and a half years. Petitioner asserts that the testimony of Dr. Fichera and Ms. Disher link the Petitioner's criminal conviction to his alcohol and/or substance abuse. While their testimony may be construed in generalities to support that contention, it is clear that Dr. Fichera was unaware of Petitioner's conviction in New Jersey or his 1984 conviction in Florida. Dr. Fichera learned of the first two convictions when his deposition was taken in connection with this proceeding. Dr. Fichera was of the opinion that the information was significant and may reflect underlying character problems in addition to the addictions. An applicant is required to submit with his or her application three character references on forms supplied by Respondent. Attached to Petitioner's application were completed character reference forms from Beverly Baran, Michael Cipolla, and Rabbi Milton J. Gross. Each of Petitioner's character references testified at the formal hearing and each was of the opinion that Petitioner was presently of good moral character. Beverly Baran and her husband, who is an anesthesiologist, were shareholders in Anesthesiology Associates and met Petitioner when he became employed as the business manager for that business. Ms. Baran and her husband became very friendly with Petitioner and his wife. Ms. Baran was aware of Petitioner's embezzlement from Anesthesiology Associates, but she was unaware of the first two felony convictions. She was told for the first time at the formal hearing of the two prior felony convictions. Ms. Baran testified that she considers Petitioner to presently be of good moral character, and based that opinion on his rehabilitation from alcohol and cocaine. Michael Cipolla was Petitioner's sponsor at AA. He had known Petitioner for approximately eight years as of the formal hearing, and was of the opinion that Petitioner had been alcohol and cocaine free for approximately five and a half years. Mr. Cipolla was of the opinion that Petitioner was presently of good moral character. Mr. Cipolla sees Petitioner on an irregular basis. He testified that he sees him sometimes once a month, sometimes three or four times a month, and sometimes every other month. Rabbi Milton Gross had known Petitioner for approximately 10 years at the time of the formal hearing. Rabbi Gross has provided spiritual counseling to Petitioner at different times. Rabbi Gross was aware of Petitioner's alcohol and cocaine addiction and his past criminal behavior. Rabbi Gross knew of Petitioner's rehabilitation efforts and considered Petitioner to presently be of good moral character. Rabbi Gross sees Petitioner approximately once every three weeks. There was minimal evidence as to Petitioner's employment since his discharge from Anesthesiology Associates.1 Petitioner's generalized testimony as to his employment does not establish the extent of his responsibilities or the extent to which he had access to his employer's financial records, bank accounts, and credit cards. Consequently, the testimony that there have been no allegations of embezzlement since 1988 is insufficient to establish that there has been a change in Petitioner's character. The character witnesses who testified on Petitioner's behalf established that Petitioner has made commendable efforts to rehabilitate himself from alcohol and cocaine addiction. While the sincerity of these witnesses cannot be doubted, their opinion testimony assumed that all of Petitioner's criminal activity was caused by his addiction to alcohol and/or his addiction to cocaine. There was no competent, persuasive evidence to support that assumption, and this testimony does not establish that Petitioner has the moral character to honestly perform the duties and responsibilities of a community association manager. Ms. Mayberry, who attended the formal hearing on behalf of Respondent, was still of the opinion that the application should be denied following the presentation of Petitioner's evidence at the formal hearing. Her initial reasons for rejecting the application had not changed. Ms. Mayberry gave as an additional reason for rejecting the application what she considered evidence of Petitioner's lack of candor during his application process. Respondent asserts that Petitioner was not candid about his cocaine addiction in response to questions posed by Respondent's counsel at his deposition, and that he did not submit evidence of his rehabilitation with his application because it would reveal his prior addiction to cocaine. While he was not as forthcoming as one might expect, Petitioner did not lie in response to questions about his addiction and rehabilitation. He indicated in several responses that there was an alcohol and substance abuse problem, but he was not directly asked during the deposition about the nature and extent of his addiction. The argument that Petitioner attempted to hide his cocaine addiction is weakened when one considers that the deposition of Dr. Fichera, during which Petitioner's addiction to cocaine was fully discussed, was taken at the instance of the Petitioner. While Petitioner's application made no reference to his addictions or to his rehabilitation therefrom the application form did not solicit that information. It is concluded that Petitioner did not demonstrate a lack of candor by his application or during his deposition that establishes a lack of good moral character.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a final order which denies Petitioner's application as a community association manager. DONE AND ORDERED this 10th day of August, 1993, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of August, 1993.
Findings Of Fact On October 23, 1978, Petitioner was hired as secretary to W. J. Crist, president of Hygroponics, Inc. On February 26, 1979, W. J. Crist evaluated Petitioner's overall job performance as "good." With respect to cooperation, the Petitioner was rated in the category of "cooperates very well," the highest rating possible for that category of performance. With respect to job knowledge, she was rated as showing "unusual capacity," also the highest rating possible for that category of performance. On March 5, 1979, Petitioner received an increase in salary from $4.18 per hour to $4.51 per hour, based in part upon her increased responsibilities and in part upon demonstrated merit. Following is Hygroponics, Inc.'s office staff organization chart dated May 2, 1979: HYGROPONICS, INC. OFFICE STAFF ORGANIZATION CHART | President | /| W. J. Crist |\ / | | \ / | \ \ \ | Purch. Agent | | Controller | \ | Technical Service | | Dick Destival | | James Jobe |" \ | Dick Jeffery | | | | | "" \ | | " / | | " "\ | " / | | " \" | " / | | " \ " | " / | | " \ " | " / | | " \ " | " / | | " \ " | " / | | "\ "| | Marsha | | Liz | | Nell | | Arlene | | Carolyn | | Betsy | | | | | | | | | | | | | /|\ Direct lines of authority. Answerable to this person at all times " Indirect lines of authority. Answerable for secondary duties and when direct lines are not available. The above organizational chart does not include the company's chief executive officer. On occasion, members of the company's secretarial staff went directly to the chief executive officer with employment-related problems. In September, 1979, after James Jobe, the controller referenced in the above chart, left the company's employ, W. J. Crist, the company president, advised Petitioner that she was to become office manager. After that time, Petitioner assumed many of the duties of office manager. Petitioner inquired when she would receive a raise commensurate with her increased responsibilities, and was advised that this would be accomplished after the company hired a new controller. Emmett Singleton was hired to fill the position of controller on October 29, 1979. On December 11, 1979, Petitioner formally became acting office manager. On that date Petitioner was evaluated by Emmett Singleton, who rated Petitioner highest in the areas of decision-making and ability to organize, and lowest in the areas of acceptability and responsibility. Specifically, Singleton made the following comments concerning Petitioner's job performance: "Has difficulty in establishing satisfactory relationships with people"; "Average leader, conventional in manner and enthusiasm, conveys ideas but does not motivate group"; "Has problem with admitting an error or fault"; "Reluctant to accept job responsibilities. Supervision and follow-up often required"; "Considers job an eight to five task with scheduled breaks reguardless [sic] of status of workload"; "Employee is preoccupied with the position rather than a concern for getting the job done"; and, "Employee resents being monitored or controlled. Sometimes uncooperative and slow to respond to direction." In addition, members of the company management group, other than Emmett Singleton, commented on this evaluation that Petitioner "alienates co-workers," "Has experienced confusion in the scheduling of grower school," and expressed concern with Petitioner's "attitude." The controller noted on the evaluation form that he planned ". . .to work closely with [Petitioner] for the next 60 days and make an assessment during this time as to whether on [sic] not suited for office manager." Finally, Mr. Singleton noted on Petitioner's performance review form that Petitioner ". . .is classified as Acting Office Manager and is on probation with reguard[sic] to classification. No change in rate of pay is being made at this time. Employee will be reevaluated in 60 days on or about 2/10/80." In order to improve her skills in the area of acceptability and responsibility, Petitioner requested that Mr. Singleton issue a memorandum clarifying the lines of her authority especially since her subordinates had not been advised that she had been given supervisory responsibility over them. Her request was denied at that time because Singleton wanted to first determine whether she could handle the position. On January 12, 1980, Singleton reevaluated Petitioner's job performance. According to Singleton's rating, Petitioner had improved in the areas of acceptability and responsibility, which had been her weak points in the evaluation performed one month earlier. On this same day, Petitioner was reclassified from acting office manager to office manager, and received an increase in pay to $821.60 per month, retroactive to November 1, 1979. Petitioner also assumed the duties of payroll clerk and accounts payable in addition to the duties of office manager. Shortly after receiving this promotion, Petitioner advised employees of Hygroponics, Inc., that she was pregnant. W. J. Crist and Emmett Singleton acknowledged her pregnancy, and the latter inquired concerning her intentions regarding her employment. Petitioner responded that she intended to continue working for the company, and to return to work after the birth of her child. Hygroponics, Inc., had no maternity leave policy. No other female employee had ever given notice of pregnancy and stated her intention to return to work following childbirth. However, at least two other employees had become pregnant during the term of their employment with Hygroponics, Inc. One of these employees, in fact, suffered two miscarriages during her term of employment, and continued working with the company. Another female worker became pregnant, gave birth to a child, and returned to work without ever advising the company or the company ever being aware that she had been pregnant until after she had returned to work. On January 30, 1980, Petitioner submitted a memorandum to Eugene Crist, the company's chief executive officer. The memorandum suggested changes regarding the responsibilities of certain of the office personnel under her supervision. Petitioner had previously discussed these suggested changes with Emmett Singleton, her immediate supervisor, who advised her that he thought her suggestions were a good idea. At the time the memorandum was submitted to the company's chief executive officer, W. J. Crist, the president of the company, was out of the state. On January 30, 1980, Eugene Crist showed the memorandum to Emmett Singleton. The memorandum was then returned to Petitioner by the company's chief executive officer with a notation that the matters contained in the memorandum should be handled through Singleton. Two days later, on February 1, 1980, Singleton asked Petitioner for the memorandum. When Petitioner could not locate the memorandum, and offered to discuss the details of it with Singleton, Singleton advised her that there was no basis for conversation if she could not produce the memorandum. As noted above, Singleton had seen and read the memorandum two days previously when it was shown to him by Eugene Crist. Upon W. J. Crist's return to Florida, Singleton advised him that Petitioner had submitted a memorandum directly to the company's chief executive officer, and that when Singleton asked Petitioner to see the memorandum, she advised him that she had misplaced it. On February 8, 1980, W. J. Crist circulated a memorandum to the Hygroponics, Inc., executive staff concerning Petitioner's ". . .insubordination, poor attitude [and] defiance of executive orders. This memorandum provided, in part, as follows: It is my understanding that Carolyn recently drafted a memorandum on her proposed changes in office duties for many people, changes in accounting procedures, etc. I have been informed that she: "by-passed you, her immediate superior and by-passed me, her next-in-line superior." and delivered this memo directly to Gene, our CEO. Then when Gene informed her to "discuss the memo directly with you," she advised you "she did not even have the memo anymore." I find these actions, on Carolyn's part very distressing and feel we must take disciplinary actions with her. So - what are the problems. Her "uncooperative" and "attitude" problems outlined in your personnel evaluation of her on December 11, 1979 (which she acknowledged) when you put her "on probation," the first time, still persist. She demonstrated anything but teamwork in by-passing her two immediate superiors and going directly to our CEO. This is very bad for an employee to do but even worse for her since she is suppose [sic] to be a leader of our people in her slot as Office Manager. Her disregarding Gene's directive to discuss the memo with you was corrected only by your insistance[sic] that the two of you discuss it. Her statement to you that "she no longer had the memo" is also distressing. Has she destroyed it? This additional negative certainly weakens her argument that "she went directly to Gene because he was going out.[sic] (Original emphasis.) The above-referenced memorandum solicited the views of the company's executive staff as to whether to terminate Petitioner, discipline her in some fashion, or give her an opportunity to resign. The decision was unanimous among all five members of the executive staff to terminate Petitioner. No member of the executive staff questioned Petitioner before concurring in the decision to discharge her. Such a memorandum of concurrence was not the company's standard practice in discharging employees, which generally was for the discharge decision to be made by the employee's supervisor alone. Hygroponics, Inc., was, at all times material to this proceeding, a rather small organization, numbering at the most approximately fifty employees. As a result, many of the internal functions of the company were informal in nature. For example, there were no strict lines of authority for secretarial staff to air grievances or make suggestions. There was, however, a generalized procedure for employees to approach their immediate supervisor with any employment-related problems. There is no direct substantive evidence in the record in this cause from which it can be concluded that Petitioner was terminated from her employment because she was either female or pregnant. Further, whatever circumstantial evidence there is in this record to support such a contention is overcome by Respondent's demonstration that Petitioner was at best an employee of average ability who management viewed at times to be a problem employee. It appears, therefore, that the reason for Petitioner's discharge was an accumulation of events, culminating in her memorandum of January 30, 1980, being submitted to the company chief executive officer, and not for any reason relating to her sex.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be entered by the State of Florida, Commission on Human Relations, dismissing the Petition for Relief, and denying the relief requested therein, with prejudice. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of March, 1983, at Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM E. WILLIAMS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of March, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: James H. White, Jr., Esquire 229 McKenzie Avenue Panama City, Florida 32401 John F. Daniel, Esquire Post Office Box 2522 Panama City, Florida 32401 Dana Baird, Esquire Florida Commission on Human Relations 2562 Executive Center Circle, East Suite 100, Montgomery Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Richard E. Williams Executive Director Florida Commission on Human Relations 2562 Executive Center Circle, East Suite 100, Montgomery Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issues for determination are whether Respondent, by holding himself out as an expert witness and testifying as an expert witness, engaged in the unlicensed practice of engineering.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is a 1993 graduate of the University of Florida with a Bachelor of Science in electrical and computer engineering and is pursuing a Ph.D. in safety engineering from Kennedy Western University. Respondent is not a licensed professional engineer in Florida. Respondent is a member of three professional organizations: 1) Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers (IEEE); 2) Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE); and 3) Accident Reconstruction Network (ARC). IEEE and SAE require a degree in engineering for membership, but do not require professional licensure. Generally, professional organizations for engineers require an engineering degree from an accredited engineering program, but do not require licensure as a condition of membership. Thus, membership in a professional organization such as IEEE does not tend to indicate that a member holds a license to practice engineering. No competent evidence was presented that Respondent uses engineering designations, titles and devices tending to indicate that Respondent holds an active license as an engineer in Florida. Respondent has gained experience in the areas of mechanical and electrical engineering through education, and training. He holds himself out as experienced and qualified to provide expert witness services in many fields related to engineering basic principles. Respondent gained much of his engineering experience in positions that are exempt from the licensure requirement. Respondent does not hold himself out as a professional, or licensed engineer. Graduates of accredited engineering programs are commonly referred to as “engineers” by universities and potential employers. Respondent purports to possess expertise as a forensic consultant, accident reconstructionist, and forensic computer expert. Respondent does not hold himself out as an “engineer” or a “licensed” or “professional” engineer. Attorney Debra Wall (“Wall”) retained Respondent to provide expert witness services in the Tennessee Case. In providing such services, Respondent never held himself out as a licensed engineer or as a professional engineer. In seeking to obtain an expert witness, Wall did not initially put any weight on professional licensure as a requirement to provide expert testimony. Respondent generated two written reports and was deposed regarding these reports in the Tennessee Case. Respondent’s expert witness testimony consisted only of giving opinions based on observation, not on engineering theory or testing. Respondent performed no calculations in support of his opinions in the Tennessee Case. Respondent’s opinions were directed to a discrete litigation event – the Tennessee Case - and do not implicate the health, safety, or welfare of the public in general, or to the citizens of Florida in particular. Engineering analysis consists of complex scientific analysis of collected data or material. In a case like the Tennessee Case, engineering analysis would consist of the performance of scientific discovery based upon mathematics, physics, or engineering and/or a statistical evaluation of seatbelts for the make and model of automobile in question to determine seatbelt-related failure modes and rates. Respondent’s written reports in the Tennessee Case do not contain engineering analysis; rather, they are based only upon observation and opinion. Respondent’s opinions in the Tennessee Case do not constitute engineering analysis.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a final order dismissing the Administrative Complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of March, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DON W. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of March, 2006. COPIES FURNISHED: Bruce A. Campbell, Esquire Florida Engineers Management Corporation 2507 Callaway Road, Suite 200 Tallahassee, Florida 32303 William H. Hollimon, Esquire Moyle, Flanigan, Katz, Raymond, White and Krasker, P.A. The Perkins House 118 North Gadsden Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Josefina Tamayo, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202 Paul J. Martin, Executive Director Board of Professional Engineers Department of Business and Professional Regulation 2507 Callaway Road, Suite 200 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-5267 Doug Sunshine, Esquire Vice President for Legal Affairs Florida Engineers Management Corporation 2507 Callaway Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303-5267
The Issue The issues in this case are whether the Respondent, Robert Dugger, committed the violations alleged in an Amended Administrative Complaint, DPBR Case Number 2002-007094, filed by the Petitioner Department of Business and Professional Regulation on April 11, 2006, and, if so, the penalty that should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact The Parties. Petitioner, the Department of Business and Professional Regulation (hereinafter referred to as the "Department"), is the state agency charged with regulating the practice of community association management pursuant to Chapters 455 and 468, Florida Statutes. (Stipulated Fact). Robert Dugger, is and was at the times material to this proceeding a licensed Florida Community Association Manager (hereinafter referred to as a “CAM”), having been issued license number CAM 1148. (Stipulated Fact). At the times material to this proceeding, Mr. Dugger’s address of record was 7401 Beach View Drive, North Bay Village, Florida 33141. Miramar Gardens. At the times material to this proceeding, Mr. Dugger was employed by Timberlake Group, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as “Timberlake”). In his capacity with Timberlake, Mr. Dugger served as the CAM for 30 homeowners’ associations. In particular, Mr. Dugger served as the CAM for Miramar Gardens Townhouse Homeowners’ Association, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as the “Association”). (Stipulated Fact). The Association is made up of approximately 350 homeowner members. The Association was initially created by the Miramar Gardens Townhouse Homeowners Association, Inc., Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions adopted on or about December 16, 1975. By-Laws for the Association were also adopted on December 16, 1975. Article X of the By-Laws provides the following homeowners’ rights concerning the books and records of the Association: The books, records and papers of the Association shall at all times, during reasonable business hours, be subject to inspection by any Member. The Declaration, the Articles and these By-Laws shall be available for inspection by any Member at the principal office of the Association, where copies may be purchased at reasonable cost. Prior to 2001, the Association, along with Vista Verde Townhome Homeowners Association (hereinafter referred to as “Vista Verde”), an adjacent community association, had been placed in receivership and was managed by a civilian board. These events came about due to the dismal state the two communities were in. Crime was rampant, there were no street signs or lights, common areas and alleys were unkempt, there were abandoned vehicles, and the associations for both areas were essentially non-existent. Miami-Dade County had taken over ownership of many homes in the community by foreclosure. Mr. Dugger became involved early with the reorganization and revitalization of the Association and Vista Verde. In 1997, Mr. Dugger was appointed by the receiver as the CAM for the Association and Vista Verde. At the end of 2000, the Association was ready to govern itself. Toward that end, on or about December 21, 2000, the Association and Timberlake, entered into a Management Agreement (hereinafter referred to as the “Management Agreement”). Pursuant to the Management Agreement, Timberlake was designated as the “Exclusive Managing Agent” for the Association commencing January 1, 2001. Among the duties assumed by Timberlake, are the following: 2) MAINTENANCE OF ASSOCIATION FILES: The Manager will collect, organize and maintain in the office of the Manager, all Association information, including but not limited to the Articles of Incorporation, By-Laws, Declaration of, [sic] Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions, site plans, owner lists, correspondence, rules and regulations, blue prints, specifications, corporate minutes, all maintenance and service contracts in effect and the necessary administrative financial information related to the Association. 8) ASSISTANCE TO THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS: The Manager will provide administrative support services to the Board of Directors, to include notifying Directors of Board meetings, circulating minutes of the preceding meeting, as prepared by the Secretary . . . . Timberlake has continued to provide the services of Mr. Dugger as CAM since 2001. During his tenure, street signs and lights have been installed, the common areas have been cleared, and the community has greatly improved. Proposed findings of fact 14 through 19 of Mr. Dugger’s Proposed Recommended Order generally describe Mr. Dugger’s efforts as CAM, the improvement of the community, and Mr. Dugger’s reputation as CAM. Count I: Criminal Violations. During 2003, Mr. Dugger served as a city commissioner for the City of North Bay Village, Florida (hereinafter referred to as the “Village”). On or about December 12, 2003, Mr. Dugger was charged with eight criminal violations in an Information issued in case number F03-33076, in the Circuit Court of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit in and for Miami-Dade County, Florida. The alleged violations arose out of Mr. Dugger’s activities as a city commissioner for the Village. Two of the criminal charges, Counts 2 and 8, are of pertinence to this matter: (a) Count 2 alleges a violation of Section 2-11.1(d), Miami-Dade County Code, and Section 125.69, Florida Statutes; and (b) Count 8 alleges a violation of Section 2-11.1(i), Miami-Dade County Code, and Section 125.69, Florida Statutes. As to Count 2 of the Information, it was more specifically alleged, in pertinent part, as follows: . . . ROBERT A. DUGGER SR., on or about April 08, 2003, in the County and State aforesaid, being a member of THE NORTH BAY VILLAGE COMMISSION, in Miami-Dade County, did vote on a matter presented to said COMMISSION, to wit: ITEM 7A, AN ORDINANCE AMENDING SECTION 152.029 OF THE NORTH BAY VILLAGE CODE OF ORDINANCES (FIRST READING), when said defendant would or might, directly or indirectly, profit or be enhanced by this action of said COMMISSION on said matter, in violation of Miami-Dade County Code s.2.11.1(d) and s. 125.69, Fla. Stat. . . . As to Count 8 of the Information, it was more specifically alleged, in pertinent part, as follows: . . . ROBERT A. DUGGER SR., on or about July 01, 2003, in the County and State aforesaid, being a MUNICIAL OFFICAL to wit: MEMBER OF THE NORTH BAY VILLAGE COMMISSION, in Miami-Dade County, did fail to comply with the financial disclosure requirements of Chapter 112 (Part III) of the Florida Statutes by failing to DISCLOSE ALL LIABILITIES IN PART E. OF FORM 1 STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL INTERESTS FOR 2002, filed with the City Clerk of THE CITY OF NORTH BAY VILLAGE, in violation of Miami-Dade County Code s. 2-11.1(i) and s. 125.69, Fla. Stat. . . . Counts 2 and 8 were based upon the following allegations of the Complaint/Arrest Affidavit: Robert A. Dugger was elected Village Commissioner for the City of North Bay Village on November 19, 2002. On September 21, 2002, Mr. Robert Dugger filed his Statement of Financial Interest for the calendar year 2001, as required by Miami- Dade County ordinance. In Part E of the Statement of Financial Interest (this section is designated for Liabilities – major debts-and asks for the name and address of creditor), Mr. Dugger marked N/A in this section. Commissioner Robert Dugger has substantial indebtedness to Al Coletta that was incurred when Al Coletta assumed the mortgage on one of Dugger’s properties and paid off the mortgage on another. Rachael Dugger admitted these debts under oath during her sworn statement. Commissioner Dugger failed to report these debts on his Statement of Financial Interest. Additionally, on March 15, 2001, a Summary Final Judgement of Foreclosure was ordered and adjudged on behalf International Financial Bank, against Tomin Incorporated, and Robert Dugger and Rachael Dugger personally, in the amount of $1,154,427.50. Following the Judgement on March 15, 2001, title of the property in question was acquire by International Finance Bank on Mary [sic] 2, 2001 and sold to a third party on June 1, 2001. The sale amount of the property was $750,000. A short fall of $404,427.50 remained after the sale and is still unpaid. Commissioner Dugger also failed to report this debt on his Statement of Financial Interest for the year 2001. . . . . Based on Commissioner Robert Dugger’s indebtedness to Al Coletta, he had a Conflict of Interest by voting on matters involving Al Coletta, that came before the North Bay Village Commission, each vote is a separate violation of the Miami-Dade Code, Section 2-11.1(d), a second [degree] misdemeanor. Commissioner Dugger violated the aforementioned Section 2-11.1(d), of the Miami-Dade Code on the following occasions: April 8, 2002, Item 7A, Page 7 of the Regular City Commission Meeting Minutes: A zoning amendment concerning property owned by Al Coletta. Page 14 of the Regular City Commission Meeting Minutes, Commissioner Dugger voted – yes, for approval of the ordinance. . . . . . . . . This action is in violation of Miami-Dade Code, Section 2-11.1(d), a second-degree misdemeanor . . . . Additionally, Commissioner Dugger is in violation of Section 2-11.1(i)(3), Miami- Dade County Conflict of Interest and Code of Ethics Ordinance. This Section required that candidates for County and municipal office must comply with the filing requirements, under Chapter 112, Florida State Statutes. This is a second-degree misdemeanor. . . . Section 2-11.1(d) of the Miami-Dade County Code, prohibits, in pertinent part, the following: Additionally, no person included in the term defined in subsection (b)(1) shall vote on or participate in any way in any matter presented to the Board of County Commissioners if said person has any of the following relationships with any of the persons or entities which would be or might be directly or indirectly affected by any action of the Board of County Commissioners: (i) officer, director, partner, of counsel, consultant, employee, fiduciary or beneficiary; or (ii) stockholder, bondholder, debtor, or creditor, if in any instance the transaction or matter would affect the person defined in subsection (b)(a) in a manner distinct from the manner in which it would affect the public generally. . . . Section 2-11.1(i)(3), of the Miami-Dade County Code, requires that candidates for County and municipal elective office meet the filing requirements of Chapter 112, Part III, Florida Statutes, “at the same time that candidate files qualifying papers.” Section 125.69, Florida Statutes, which provides procedures for the prosecution of county ordinances, states that they are to be prosecuted “in the same manner as misdemeanors are prosecuted.” On July 29, 2005, Mr. Dugger entered a plea of nolo contendere to Counts 2 and 8 of the Information, in case number F03-33076, both second-degree misdemeanor violations of Section 2-11.1 of the Miami-Dade County Code, and Section 125.69, Florida Statutes. (Stipulation of Fact). Mr. Dugger was adjudicated guilty of the violations alleged in Counts 2 and 8, and was ordered to pay $468.00 in fines and costs. Mr. Dugger was, therefore, adjudicated guilty of having voted on a matter in which he had a conflict of interest because the matter involved an individual to whom he was indebted; and of having failed to fully disclose liabilities on financial disclosure forms he was required to file pursuant to Florida law at the time he qualified to run for public office. Neither of the convictions directly involved Mr. Dugger’s practice as a CAM. Nor has the Department made such an argument. Instead, the Department presented expert testimony in support of its position that at least one of the convictions relates to Mr. Dugger’s ability to practice as a CAM. That testimony was convincing. All CAMs are involved in a fiduciary relationship with the associations they manage. It takes little expert testimony to support a finding that such a fiduciary relationship requires trust and integrity. CAMs must be trusted to handle association money, maintain the records of the association, and to deal on behalf of the association with potential and existing vendors. The association must be able to assume that a CAM will fully disclose any possible conflict the CAM may have with the association’s vendors. Mr. Dugger is responsible for billing, writing checks, paying insurance premiums, and maintaining a payment book for the Association. Paragraph 10 of the Management Agreement specifically provides that Timberlake “shall provide financial management services to the Association . . . .” Paragraph D(11)(a) authorizes Timberlake to “solicit and analyze bids for necessary insurance coverage.” Mr. Dugger has similar responsibilities with Vista Verde. Clearly, the Association must be able to trust that Mr. Dugger will carry out all these duties without having any conflict of interest. The Association must be able to assume that Mr. Dugger is acting in its best interest and not his own. In his defense as to the voting of interest conflict charge, Mr. Dugger, prior to the pertinent vote, made disclosure of his relationship with Mr. Coletta, the owner of the property which was the subject of the vote, to the attorney for the City of the Village. The Department failed to prove that Mr. Dugger did not make full disclosure. Mr. Dugger was advised that no conflict existed. Mr. Dugger cast his vote after receiving this advice. Subsequent to the vote, Mr. Dugger sought an opinion from the Miami-Dade County Commission on Ethics & Public Trust (hereinafter referred to as the “Commission”). The Commission, like the city attorney, opined in writing that no conflict of interest existed. Mr. Dugger entered his plea on the two charges in order to avoid the cost of litigation. The evidence, however, failed to prove why prosecutors agreed to accept a plea on only two of the eight counts. Count IV: Alleged Denial of Access to the Records of the Association. During 2003, Miryam Ruiz lived in Miramar Gardens Township and was a member of the Association. While she had been in arrears for 2001 and 2002, presumably in her association dues, she became current when she paid all outstanding dues in March 2003. On March 14, 2003, during normal business hours, Ms. Ruiz went to the office of Timberlake and requested that she be allowed to inspect certain records of the Association. She made her request verbally and in writing, leaving Petitioner’s Exhibit 13 with a Timberlake employee, apparently the receptionist, which listed the documents she wanted to inspect. She was told by the receptionist that she could not see the documents until she had made an appointment to do so. By letter dated Thursday, March 27, 2003, Ms. Ruiz was informed by Mr. Dugger’s wife, Rachel, that Ms. Ruiz could review the documents. She was also told that, “[i]f you would like, call us to make an appointment at your convenience.” On the morning of Monday, March 31, 2003, not having received Ms. Dugger’s March 27th letter, Ms. Ruiz sent a letter by facsimile to Timberlake stating that she would be at the office at 11:00 a.m. that morning to “pick up” the documents. When Ms. Ruiz arrived at the Timberlake office at 11:00 a.m. she was again told that she could not review the documents because she had no appointment. Ms. Ruiz left the office. Later that day, Ms. Ruiz sent a second facsimile letter addressed to Ms. Dugger. Ms. Ruiz ended the letter by informing Ms. Dugger that she would be at the office the next day, April 1, 2003, “for the inspection and copying of records at 9:30 a.m.” On April 1, 2003, Ms. Ruiz returned to the Timberlake office and was again told that the records were not available because no appointment had been made. Ms. Ruiz told the receptionist that she would return on Friday, April 4, 2003, at 9:30 a.m. to inspect the documents. In a letter to Ms. Dugger dated April 1, 2003, she stated that she was confirming the date and time. The evidence failed to prove whether the letter was received prior to April 4, 2003. When Ms. Ruiz arrived at the Timberlake office on April 4, 2003, she was again denied access to the documents and was told by Ms. Dugger that she had no appointment because the date and time suggested by Ms. Ruiz had not been confirmed by Timberlake. Ms. Ruiz left the office. The following day, April 5, 2003, Ms. Ruiz sent a letter by certified mail addressed to Mr. Dugger describing the events leading up to that moment and asking what it would take for her to be allowed to inspect the records. Mr. Dugger did not respond to this letter. In response to Ms. Ruiz’ April 5th letter, a letter dated April 22, 2003, was sent by Ms. Dugger. That letter indicated that the records would be available for inspection at 1:00 p.m. on Tuesday, May 6, 2003. The letter, which was postmarked May 2, 2003, ten days after the date of the letter, was not received by Ms. Ruiz prior to May 6th. Sometime during the month of May 2003, approximately two months after first attempting to review the records of the Association, Ms. Ruiz was finally allowed to inspect the records. Ms. Ruiz, without doubt, had the right to review the records of the Association she had requested. Pursuant to the Management Agreement, Mr. Dugger was required to collect, organize and maintain the records of the Association. The Management Agreement also required that Mr. Dugger was to assist the Board of Directors in their enforcement of the provisions of the “Association documents and rules and regulations ” Pursuant to Article X of the By-Laws of the Association, also quoted, supra, gives Association members the right to inspect and copy all Association documents The right to inspect association documents is not an unfettered one. In light of the duty and responsibility of a CAM to “maintain” records, it is not unreasonable for a CAM to set reasonable safeguards for a member’s review of those records. The Department did not produce evidence to refute the evidence presented by Mr. Dugger concerning the reasonableness of a CAM insisting on being present during the inspection of documents. The evidence also failed to prove that, given the fact that Mr. Dugger is the CAM for as many as 30 associations, he is not always available at his office to supervise a review of documents. The procedure followed with regard to reviews of the Association’s had been announced at an Association meeting. Members were told that anyone who wished to review records could contact the Timberlake office and make an appointment so Mr. Dugger could be present during an inspection, or that a copy of a document could be obtained upon payment for the document. It is clear that not all of the requests to Timberlake made by Ms. Ruiz were totally reasonable: (a) her first request on April 14, 2003, was without any notice; (b) her notice of March 31, 2003, gave only three hours notice; (c) her request for review on April 1, 2003, gave only one day notice; and (d) her request for review on April 4, 2003, gave only 3 days notice. While Ms. Ruiz eventually was allowed to review the documents, it took approximately two months after her initial request had been made. It is also clear that, although she did not always give reasonable notice for appointments she announced, Mr. Dugger (and his employees) could and should have done more to remedy the situation. Mr. Dugger first became aware of the request on March 14, 2003. It took 13 days to respond to that request. When Ms. Ruiz mailed a certified letter to Mr. Dugger dated April 5, 2003, it was not until May 2, almost a month later that a letter in response to that letter was post-marked. Based upon the foregoing, while neither Ms. Ruiz nor Mr. Dugger did much to ameliorate the situation, for at least part of the two months it took Ms. Ruiz to obtain access to the records of the Association, Mr. Dugger “denied” Ms. Ruiz access to the records of the Association. Count VI: Alleged Failure to Maintain Association Records. Pursuant to the Management Agreement entered into by Mr. Dugger with Miramar Gardens, at paragraph D(2), quoted, supra, Mr. Dugger agreed to collect, organize, and maintain all Association documents in the offices of Timberlake. Beginning in 2001, the minutes of meetings of the Association (held jointly with the meeting of Vista Verde) were usually taken by Claudette Brinson, president of the Association. On occasions, they were taken by others. Minutes taken by Ms. Brinson were written by hand and, after the meeting, were taken home with her. On some occasions, Ms. Brinson would ensure that her hand-written minutes were typed at various locations, including Mr. Dugger’s office. When typed at Mr. Dugger’s office, a copy was retained by Mr. Dugger and maintained with the records of the Association. Ms. Brinson’s testimony at hearing as to whether Mr. Dugger was given a copy of all minutes was in conflict. She initially testified that she had provided him with a copy of all minutes. When recalled by Mr. Dugger, she testified that on some occasions, when she did not have the minutes typed at Mr. Dugger’s office, while maintaining a copy at her home, she did not always provide him with a copy. While the latter testimony was more convincing and has been credited, the bottom line is that Mr. Dugger did not maintain a copy of the minutes from all meetings of the Association. At hearing, Mr. Dugger admitted that when he was served an Investigative Subpoena Duces Tecum issued by the Department on or about August 30, 2004, he realized that he did not have all the records the subpoena sought. In particular, Mr. Dugger did not have all of the documents requested in item number 5 of the subpoena: “[t]he minutes of all meetings of the board of directors and of the members of Miramar Gardens Townhouse Homeowners Association, Inc.” Mr. Dugger, therefore, contacted Ms. Brinson and asked her if she could provide a copy of the minutes of Association meetings that he did not have. She was not able to do so within the time Mr. Dugger had to respond to the subpoena. In a letter to the Department dated September 17, 2004, Mr. Dugger indicted the following with regard to the minutes requested in item number 5 of the subpoena: “The Minutes in our possession. Original minute meetings are in the hands of the Receiver, which were retained for his records. Some additional minutes are in the hands of Board members, which we will attempt to locate.” During calendar year 2002, minutes had been kept for meetings held during February, March, April, May, June, July, October, and December. During calendar year 2003, minutes had been kept for meetings held during January, February, March, May, June, July, August, September, October, and November. Finally, during calendar year 2004, minutes were kept for meetings held in January, February, March, April, July, August and September. Mr. Dugger at the time of responding to the Department’s subpoena did not have minutes for all of these meetings. For example, for 2002 he only had minutes for the meetings held in February, March, and June, and for 2003, he only had minutes for the meetings held in January and December. While Ms. Brinson adequately explained why she was not always able to provide a copy of meeting minutes to Mr. Dugger, Mr. Dugger did not provide an adequate explanation as to why he had not made sure that he obtained a copy of all minutes so that he could fulfill his obligation under the Management Agreement. No evidence was presented to suggest that Mr. Dugger’s failure to maintain all minutes was the result of bad faith or any intent on the part of Mr. Dugger to circumvent the rules of the Department or the requirements of the Management Agreement. Prior Discipline Against Mr. Dugger’s CAM License. Mr. Dugger’s CAM license was disciplined in DBPR Case Number 00-02226, pursuant to a Stipulation entered into by the Department and Mr. Dugger which was accepted by Final Order entered on April 9, 2001. The Stipulation provides that Mr. Dugger “neither admits or denies the . . . facts alleged in the Administrative Complaint ”
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Business and Professional Regulation enter a final order finding that Mr. Dugger committed the violations described in this Recommended Order and imposing the following penalties: A stayed suspension of his license for six months, with the stay being lifted should Mr. Dugger be found to have committed any additional violation with regard to his CAM license within two years of the issuance of the final order in this case; An administrative fine in the amount of $1,500.00; Attendance at continuing education classes in records maintenance in an amount to be determined by the Department; and Payment of the costs of this matter. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of January, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. LARRY J. SARTIN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of January, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: Charles Tunnicliff, Esquire Department of Business & Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street, Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202 Philip F. Monte, Esquire Department of Business & Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street, Suite 42 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202 E. Gary Early, Esquire Messer, Caparello & Self, P.A. 2618 Centennial Place Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Ned Luczynski, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Anthony B. Spivey, Executive Director Regulatory Council of Community Association of Managers Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
The Issue Whether Petitioner willfully violated Section 106.021(3), Florida Statutes, which prohibits a candidate from making an expenditure except through the campaign treasurer on 66 separate occasions, and, if so, what is the appropriate penalty.
Findings Of Fact Based on the testimony, documentary evidence, entire record of the proceedings, and facts admitted to in the Joint Pre-Hearing Stipulation, the following Findings of Fact are made: Petitioner, Alan Schreiber, was the incumbent candidate for Public Defender, 17th Judicial Circuit, in the 2000 election. Petitioner was unopposed for reelection when qualifying ended on July 21, 2000. Petitioner is an experienced politician serving his seventh term as Public Defender. During the 2000 campaign qualifying period, Petitioner made sixty-six expenditures for which he submitted receipts and received reimbursement from his campaign account. The expenditures for which Petitioner was reimbursed are as follows: Date Merchant Amount 05-01-00 Andrew's Tallahassee $261.00 04-04-00 Andrew's Tallahassee $225.61 12-13-99 Bar Amici/ Cathode Ray $50.40 10-29-99 Bar at Embassy Suite $51.41 06-30-00 Big Louie's $265.01 06-20-00 Big Louie's $145.72 06-27-00 Bimini Boatyard $64.82 05-31-00 Bimini Boatyard $316.49 05-21-00 Bimini Boatyard $70.08 05-18-00 Bimini Boatyard $43.26 12-08-99 Bimini Boatyard $71.66 10-20-99 Bimini Boatyard $47.92 05-04-00 Bravo Italiano $63.86 02-24-00 Bravo Italiano $232.43 02-15-00 Bravo Italiano $52.79 01-31-00 Bravo Italiano $62.86 01-27-00 Bravo Italiano $86.83 06-19-00 Café de Paris $113.34 05-24-00 Café de Paris $70.04 05-16-00 Café de Paris $154.99 05-12-00 Café de Paris $160.94 05-06-00 Café de Paris $136.11 04-13-00 Café de Paris $146.65 03-18-00 Café de Paris $113.09 03-04-00 Café de Paris $144.47 02-23-00 Café de Paris $280.10 02-07-00 Café de Paris $73.27 01-17-00 Café de Paris $193.51 12-27-99 Café de Paris $66.47 11-29-99 Café de Paris $145.60 11-26-99 Café de Paris $230.51 11-24-99 Café de Paris $133.57 11-15-99 Café de Paris $183.97 10-31-99 Café de Paris $105.68 10-22-99 Café de Paris $99.43 10-19-99 Café de Paris $130.76 03-31-00 Café de Paris $182.64 03-15-00 Costco Wholesale $140.96 12-14-99 Costco Wholesale $267.61 10-27-99 Costco Wholesale $231.02 Costco Wholesale $256.87 05-23-00 French Quarter $499.24 11-09-99 French Quarter $81.25 11-09-99 French Quarter $85.02 06-08-00 Georgio's Food and Spirits $193.14 05-11-00 Greek Islands $89.73 06-03-00 Greek Islands $75.25 01-04-00 Greek Islands $70.49 10-29-99 Heavenly Ham $349.66 03-22-00 Houston's $75.54 10-28-99 Mayhue's Liquors $70.02 06-14-00 Mezzanot $102.02 12-01-99 Padrino's Restaurant $61.21 03-17-00 Publix $235.32 12-16-99 Publix $235.32 10-29-99 Publix $212.00 Publix $149.41 05-07-00 Restaurante Botin $146.39 01-04-00 Sage $79.85 12-28-99 Sage $107.89 10-29-99 Salute-Embassy Suites $211.26 03-01-00 TGI Fridays $47.08 05-25-00 Things Remembered $79.49 05-24-00 Things Remembered $296.69 05-21-00 Things Remembered $386.22 01-03-00 Wolfgang Puck Café $138.87 While Petitioner's personal decision to "wine and dine potential donors, supporters and campaign volunteers" at upscale restaurants may have been the genesis of the complaint that caused the Commission's investigation, no evidence was offered that suggested this to be an inappropriate expenditure of campaign funds. Sixteen checks were written by the campaign treasurer from the campaign account to Petitioner to reimburse him for the above expenditures. The campaign treasurer acknowledged that he had misdated one of the sixteen checks. Each check was written on the campaign accounts, was dated, was made payable to Petitioner, and each check listed that the purpose of the expenditure was to reimburse for non- specific campaign expense(s) as follows: Date Check No. Purpose Amount 10-29-99 1003 Reimb.-Campaign party expenses 11-02-99 1004 Reimb.-misc. campaign lunches 11-16-99 1005 Reimb.-misc. campaign lunches $968.38 $536.68 $350.24 11-30-99 1006 Reimb.-misc. campaign dinners 01-06-00 1008 Reimb.-camp. party expenses $509.68 $502.93 01-07-00 1009 Reimb.-misc. camp. dinners $496.50 03-03-00 1015 Reimb.-misc. camp. dinners $566.81 04-04-00 1019 Reimb.-camp. meeting expenses $565.32 04-11-00 1020 Reimb.-camp. party exp. $376.28 04-27-00 1021 Reimb.-misc. camp. dinners $799.23 5-16-00 1023 Reimb.-misc. camp. dinners $679.69 5-18-00 1024 Reimb.- misc. camp. lunches $462.58 5-22-00 1025 Reimb.-novelty items $368.22 5-24-00 1051 Reimb.-misc. camp. lunches $612.58 5-26-16 1054 Reimb.-camp. novelty items $376.16 06-09-00 1055 Reimb.-camp. meals/lunches $386.53 Each of the above-noted reimbursements to Petitioner was listed as an expenditure on Petitioner's campaign treasurer's reports filed with the Division of Elections as follows: Date Name and Address of Purpose Amount Person Receiving Reimbursement 10-29-99 Alan H. Schreiber 855 Orchid Drive Plantation, FL 33317 Reimbursement for campaign party expenses $968.38 11-02-99 Alan H. Schreiber 855 Orchid Drive Plantation, FL 33317 Reimbursement misc. campaign lunches $536.68 11-16-99 Alan H. Schreiber 855 Orchid Drive Plantation, FL 33317 Reimbursement misc. campaign lunches $320.24 11-30-99 Alan H. Schreiber 855 Orchid Drive Plantation, FL 33317 Reimbursement misc. campaign dinners $509.68 01-06-00 Alan H. Schreiber 855 Orchid Drive Plantation, FL 33317 Reimbursement for campaign party expenses $502.93 01-07-00 Alan H. Schreiber 855 Orchid Drive Plantation, FL 33317 Reimbursement misc. campaign dinners $496.50 03-03-00 Alan H. Schreiber 855 Orchid Drive Plantation, FL 33317 Reimbursement misc. campaign dinners $566.81 04-04-00 Alan H. Schreiber 855 Orchid Drive Plantation, FL 33317 Reimbursement campaign meeting expenses $565.32 04-11-00 Alan H. Schreiber 855 Orchid Drive Plantation, FL 33317 Reimbursement for campaign party expenses $376.28 04-27-00 Alan H. Schreiber 855 Orchid Drive Plantation, FL 33317 Reimbursement misc. campaign dinners $799.23 05-16-00 Alan H. Schreiber 855 Orchid Drive Plantation, FL 33317 Reimbursement misc. campaign dinners $697.69 05-18-00 Alan H. Schreiber 855 Orchid Drive Plantation, FL 33317 Reimbursement misc. campaign lunches $462.58 05-22-00 Alan H. Schreiber 855 Orchid Drive Plantation, FL 33317 Reimbursement campaign novelty items $386.22 05-24-00 Alan H. Schreiber 855 Orchid Drive Plantation, FL 33317 Reimbursement misc. campaign lunches $612.58 05-26-00 Alan H. Schreiber 855 Orchid Drive Plantation, FL 33317 Reimbursement misc. campaign novelty dinners $376.16 06-09-00 Alan H. Schreiber 855 Orchid Drive Plantation, FL 33317 Reimbursement misc. campaign lunches $386.53 While the campaign treasurer's report accurately reports reimbursements to Petitioner, because the reimbursements are non-specific and aggregated, it is impossible to determine the actual expense for which reimbursement is made. Stephen Michaelson served as the campaign treasurer for Petitioner's 2000 reelection campaign and had served as deputy treasurer of Petitioner's 1996 campaign. Mr. Michaelson has served a number of candidates in a similar fashion. Prior to filing papers to open the 2000 reelection campaign account, Mr. Michaelson and Petitioner discussed whether it was permissible under Florida law for a candidate to be reimbursed from his campaign account for legitimate, campaign-related expenditures made by him personally in the course of the campaign. Petitioner had experienced difficulty writing campaign checks at restaurants during the 1996 campaign. After the 1996 campaign, Mr. Michaelson had researched the issue and informed Petitioner that he had discovered a "reimbursement statute." Mr. Michaelson also found a 1994 Division of Elections opinion that he believed "to be right on all fours," i.e., the opinion dealt specifically with the issue. The 1994 Division of Elections opinion [DE 94-07] referred to by Mr. Michaelson provides, in pertinent part, as follows: It is also permissible for a candidate to make a purchase with his own personal check or currency if the candidate intends to seek reimbursement from his campaign. However, the purchase does not become a campaign expenditure until such time as the reimbursement is made by campaign check or petty cash through the candidate's campaign treasurer. In 1999, prior to opening his campaign account, Petitioner and Mr. Michaelson again discussed the "reimbursement issue." Mr. Michaelson checked Chapter 106, Florida Statutes, that had been in effect when the 1994 Division of Elections opinion [DE 94-07] had been issued and noted no changes in the statute. In addition, he did a computer search on Florida Statutes Annotated of District and Supreme Court cases and found nothing dealing with the subject that, in his opinion, would warrant a change in the Division of Elections opinion. He checked the Division of Elections website to see if the 1994 opinion was still there and concluded that it was. He did a computer check to see if there were any subsequent Division of Elections opinions that referred to expenditures; finding none, he concluded that the 1994 opinion was still in effect. Based on his review, he advised Petitioner that Petitioner could seek reimbursement from the campaign account for legitimate campaign expenditures that he paid with personal funds. Mr. Michaelson has been a campaign treasurer or deputy campaign treasurer on seven occasions, has, himself, been a candidate, is a lawyer who has practiced criminal defense law for 23 years, and, during his testimony at this formal hearing, demonstrated competency and understanding of the Florida election law/campaign financing law. He gave Petitioner advice on Florida election law/campaign financing law knowing that Petitioner would rely on his advice. Petitioner's reliance on Mr. Micahelson's advice was warranted. In the same general time period during which he opened his reelection campaign account, Petitioner spoke to David Bogenschutz, an attorney in Fort Lauderdale, and asked whether a candidate could incur campaign expenses and then seek reimbursement from his campaign account. Mr. Bogenschutz is a lawyer who has known Petitioner since 1971, whose practice is devoted largely to criminal defense, who had previously advised and represented candidates and public officials in proceedings related to the Florida's election law/campaign financing law, had himself been a candidate, and was believed by Petitioner to be knowledgeable regarding Florida election law/campaign financing law. While Mr. Bogenschutz was reluctant to acknowledge that he was an "expert" in Florida election law, his testimony at this formal hearing demonstrated a satisfactory working knowledge of Florida election law/campaign financing law; it was appropriate for Petitioner to seek his counsel and to be guided by his advice. Mr. Boganschutz advised Petitioner that he saw nothing wrong with his reimbursing himself from his campaign treasury for authorized campaign expenses. He further advised that he would research the matter and advise if he saw anything wrong. Mr. Boganschutz reviewed Section 106.021(3) and Subsection 106.07(4)(a)7, Florida Statutes, and Florida Statutes Annotated. He concluded that Subsection 106.07(4)(a)7, Florida Statutes, permitted a candidate to be reimbursed for authorized campaign expenditures from the campaign account and so advised Petitioner. In giving his advise, he did not review Division of Elections Opinion DE 94-07 or a later opinion, DE 97-06, because, while other Division of Elections opinions are found in Florida Statutes Annotated, neither of the referenced opinions is listed in Florida Statutes Annotated. In addition, he felt that the statute regarding reimbursement was so clear that there was no need to do further research. In addition to his discussions with Mr. Michaelson and Mr Bogenschutz, Petitioner conducted his own research and concluded that it was appropriate to pay vendors personally for campaign-related expenses and then be reimbursed from his campaign account for those campaign-related expenses. The qualifying period ended on July 21, 2000, with Petitioner having drawn no opposition. At about the same time, a local newspaper article questioned Petitioner's campaign spending habits and quoted a Division of Elections official saying Petitioner should have been using campaign checks. After reading the newspaper article, Mr. Michaelson called the local Supervisor of Elections who advised him that Division of Elections opinion DE 94-07 had been rescinded by Division of Elections opinion DE 97-06. This caused Mr. Michaelson obvious concern; the qualifying period had ended and, for Petitioner, the election was over. It appeared that he had incorrectly advised Petitioner regarding the propriety of paying campaign-related expenses personally and then seeking reimbursement. Mr. Michaelson then checked his research in an effort to understand how he had missed the rescission of Division of Elections opinion DE 94-07 and discovered that the Division of Elections website did not indicate that opinion DE 94-07 had been rescinded. The Division of Elections, Department of State, maintains a website which includes "Formal Opinions of the Division of Elections." This website lists all opinions from 1987-2000. Intermittently throughout the list of opinions is the notation "rescinded" in highlighted type, indicating that the particular opinion has been rescinded. No such notation appeared in reference to opinion DE 94-07. The 1997 Division of Elections opinion DE 97-06 indicates "Rescinding DE 76-16, 78-2, 88-32, 90-16, and 94-7." This is presented in the same type as the rest of the text and is not highlighted. Mr. Michaelson then used his web browser to search the Division of Elections website that lists these advisory opinions for the words "expenditure" or "reimbursement," the website did not direct him to the 1997 opinion DE 97-06. Division of Elections opinion DE 97-06, which, in part, rescinds Division of Elections opinion DE 94-07, provides in pertinent part, as follows: We held that candidates could make unlimited purchases by personal check as long as they intended for such expenditures to be reported as in-kind contributions. The opinion also stated that the "candidate cannot make such purchases as a campaign expenditure except by means of a campaign check . . . made through the candidate's campaign treasurer." This reasoning has resulted in some confusion as to when and under what circumstances a campaign expenditure or in-kind contribution occurs. Therefore, we rescind DE 94-07. Except for petty cash expenditures allowed under section 106.12, Florida statutes (1995), the only way that a candidate may make a campaign expenditure is by means of bank check drawn on the primary campaign depository, pursuant to section 106.11(1), Florida Statutes (1995). Having said this, we recognize the applicability of section 106.07(4)(a)7, Florida Statutes (1995), which requires that candidates report any reimbursements of authorized expenses from the campaign accounts to themselves. We believe that the purpose of this provision is to cover rare occurrences where the campaign must make an expenditure, but the campaign check book is not available. Such a situation could occur when a bill must be paid and the campaign has not received its first order of checks from the bank, or where, during the course of campaign travel, tolls or other miscellaneous expenses must be paid in cash and the candidate has failed to take the money out of his petty cash fund for such purposes. During the 2000 campaign, Mr. Michaelson maintained possession of the campaign checkbook which was usually kept at his home. On occasion, he would have one or two campaign checks on his person. If Petitioner asked for a campaign check, and Mr. Michaelson had one on his person, he would give it to Petitioner. On occasion, Petitioner would return a campaign check to Mr. Michaelson, indicating that the check was not accepted by a particular vendor. Most of the reimbursements at issue are a result of Petitioner's not having a campaign check with him at the time of a transaction or the vendor's unwillingness to accept a check or campaign check. In most instances the transaction involved purchases by Petitioner at restaurants. TGI Friday's located in Plantation, Florida, does not accept checks. Petitioner made one campaign-related purchase at TGI Friday's for which he was reimbursed from the campaign account. Bimini Boatyard does not generally permit patrons to pay with checks, although exceptions have been made. Petitioner made six campaign related-purchases at Bimini Boatyard for which he was reimbursed from the campaign account. During his 1996 campaign, Petitioner wrote 15 checks directly to Bimini Boatyard for campaign expenditures from the campaign account. Café de Paris and French Quarter have a policy of not accepting checks except when personally approved by the owner or for a special party. The owner indicated he would not accept a campaign check. Petitioner made 20 campaign related-purchases at Café de Paris and three campaign-related purchases at French Quarter for which he was reimbursed from the campaign account. The Sage Restaurant accepts only cash, MasterCard and Visa from restaurant patrons; checks are accepted for catering. The owner opined that had Petitioner called ahead and advised that campaign laws required him to pay by campaign check, she would accept that form of payment. Petitioner made two campaign-related purchases at Sage Restaurant for which he was reimbursed from the campaign account. Bar Amici and Cathode Ray do not accept checks; however, if a candidate advised that the law required payment by campaign check, a check would be reluctantly accepted. Petitioner made one campaign-related purchase at Bar Amici and Cathode Ray for which he was reimbursed from the campaign account. Greek Island Taverna does not accept checks. Petitioner sought reimbursement for three campaign-related expenditures at Greek Island Taverna for which he was reimbursed from the campaign account. Padrino's Restaurant does not accept checks. The owner, who is seldom at the restaurant, indicated that he would accept Petitioner's check. Petitioner made one campaign-related purchase at the Padrino's Restaurant for which he was reimbursed from the campaign account. Andrew's, a Tallahassee restaurant, does not accept checks from restaurant patrons. The manager opined that, if prior arrangements were made, a campaign check might possibly be accepted, but an out-of-town campaign check made it more problematic. Petitioner made two campaign-related expenditures at Andrew's for which he was reimbursed from the campaign account. Connie Evans, Chief, Bureau of Election Records, Division of Elections, Department of State, who has been employed by Division of Elections for 22 years and a bureau chief for five years, was qualified as an expert witness "in the area of Chapter 106 of Florida Statutes," without objection. She opined that Chapter 106, Florida Statutes, requires full disclosure of all contributions and expenditures for the public benefit. Ms. Evans further opined that Division of Elections advisory opinions are only binding on the candidate or organization who sought the opinion. Ms. Evans further opined that the Division of Elections, in applying Division of Elections opinion DE 97-06, considers that it is appropriate for a candidate to seek reimbursement for personal payment of a campaign-related expense at a restaurant when the restaurant refuses to take a check, but that the candidate should not return to the same restaurant knowing that the restaurant will not accept a campaign check in payment. She acknowledged that there is no statutory authority in Chapter 106, Florida Statutes, for this opinion. Ms. Evans further acknowledged that Division of Elections opinion DE 97-06 refers to Subsection 106.07(4)(a)(7), Florida Statutes (which allows reimbursement for campaign- related expenses), and that both DE 97-06 and DE 94-07 advise that it is permissible for candidate to reimburse himself for campaign-related expenses. Ms. Evans opined that the Division of Elections website should have indicated that Division of Elections opinion DE 94-07 had been rescinded in bold type, as is done with the other rescinded opinions. Ms. Evans further opined that, if a candidate were to reimburse himself or another person for authorized campaign- related expenses, it is the position of the Division of Elections that the reimbursement must be made by a campaign check, must be reported on the campaign treasurer's report as an expenditure, and the amount, date, and the purpose of the expenditure must be reported.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Florida Elections Commission enter a final order finding that Petitioner, Alan Schreiber, did not violate the Florida Campaign Financing Law as alleged and dismissing the Order of Probable Cause. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of September, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JEFF B. CLARK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of September, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Mark Herron, Esquire Mark Herron, P.A. Post Office Box 1701 Tallahassee, Florida 32301-1701 Eric M. Lipman, Esquire Florida Elections Commission The Capitol, Room 2002 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Barbara M. Linthicum, Executive Director Florida Elections Commission The Capitol, Room 2002 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Patsy Rushing, Clerk Florida Elections Commission The Capitol, Room 2002 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050
