Findings Of Fact In April, 1986, Lee was employed by HRS as a secretary in the Human Services Program Office. She reported to work on April 25, 1986, which was a payday. On the next regular day of work (April 28, 1986), Lee telephoned her office to request leave, explaining that her daughter had sprained her ankle and had to be taken to the doctor. Leave for this day was approved. Lee did not report to work on April 29, 30, or May 1, 1986, and she did not speak to her supervisor, Charles Lauria, on any of these dates to request leave. She testified that her sister notified the office that she was taking more leave, but the sister was not at the hearing to verify this statement. Lee did not report to work on May 2, 5, 6, 7 or 8, 1986, all of which were normal work days. Lee did not contact her supervisor or her office during this period. Charles Lauria was Lee's supervisor. When he had not heard from Lee by May 7, 1986, he reported to the local personnel office that Lee had abandoned her job and should be terminated. Lauria had previously warned Lee that failure to appear at work without prior approval could result in disciplinary action or termination. Lee signed a disciplinary memorandum indicating that she should personally contact Lauria in the event she would have to miss work for any reason. The HRS personnel office (David Porter) recommended to the District Administrator that Lee be terminated for violating the abandonment provision of the HRS personnel rules. On May 7, 1986, a letter of termination was mailed to Lee, notifying her that she had been terminated as of this date. On May 9, 1986, Lee reported to work. May 9 was a payday, the first payday since Lee's last appearance at work on April 25, 1986. She was given verbal notice of her termination at this time. Lee was aware of the abandonment provision in the HRS rules. She had acknowledged receipt of a copy of the rules upon commencing work at HRS. She had previously had problems regarding attendance, and had been counseled as to the importance of personally contacting her supervisor when she could not report for work. Lee missed seven consecutive days of work prior to being terminated by HRS. HRS attempted to contact Lee prior to terminating her, but was unable to locate her.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Administration enter a Final Order terminating the employment of the Respondent, Rebanner Lee, from her position as a secretary in the Human Services Program Office, for abandonment, pursuant to Rule 22A-7.010(2), Florida Administrative Code, effective May 7, 1987. THIS Recommended Order entered on this 19th day of November, 1986, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM B. THOMAS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of November, 1986. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 86-2072 The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties in this case. Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by the Petitioner: 1-11. Accepted. Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by the Respondent: Accepted, but prior authorization to take leave had not been granted. These are argumentative and not proposed factual findings. They are thus rejected. COPIES FURNISHED: William Page, Jr. Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Steven W. Huss Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services General Counsel 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Gilda Lambert, Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Augustus D. Aikens Department of Administration General Counsel 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 R. Bruce McKibben, Jr., Esquire 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Rebanner Lee, in pro se Post Office Box 192 Starke, Florida 32091
Findings Of Fact John Keene was elected Clerk of the Court for Clay County, Florida, in November, 1988, and was reelected in 1992. He has served as Clerk of the Court at all times relevant to this proceeding. Ronald Stotler served on the Board of County Commissioners for Clay County (Board) from 1982 to 1992, and served as Chairman of the Board from approximately November, 1991 to November, 1992. Based on his experience as a County Commissioner, he is familiar with the preparation and implementation of the Clay County budget. After going off the Board, he remained interested and active in Clay County politics. As Clerk of the Court, Mr. Keene is the chief financial officer of Clay County. With the assistance of his financial director, he prepares the tentative budget to be presented to the Board. The Clerk's revenue projections are based on various factors including advalorem tax assessments, fine and foreiture and license funds, and State funding. Preparation of the budget requires projection of revenues and expenditures six to eight months prior to realization of those revenues or expenditures. The Board must approve the budget and can make changes to the budget presented by the Clerk. The budget estimates for the 1992-1993 fiscal year, which included estimates of cash carried forward, were prepared by the Finance Director at that time, Arnold Herwick, who had served as Finance Director since 1975. The budget for the 1992-1993 fiscal year was approved by the Board, chaired then by Commissioner Stotler. In the fall of 1992, Arnold Herwick became ill and was unable to remain with the County as Finance Director. Sometime in October, 1992, Donald Moore contacted Mr. Keene to apply for the vacant position. Mr. Moore was the managing partner of a local CPA firm, Jones, Moore, Johnston, and Williams (Jones-Moore). His firm specialized in governmental accounting and auditing, tax, and write-up work. In the summer of 1992, the Jones-Moore firm had been awarded a four-year contract to do audit work for the Board beginning September 30, 1992. Mr. Moore's partner, Walter Johnston, did the actual work on the audit, not Mr. Moore. Mr. Keene notified Mr. Moore in November, 1992, that he would be hired as Finance Director. Beginning, December 1, 1992, Mr. Moore began working part- time as the Finance Director in order to assist the County with the purchase of a local utility. On December 8, 1992, Mr. Keene introduced Mr. Moore as the new finance director at a public meeting of the Board. In mid December, 1992, Mr. Moore sold his practice to the accounting firm of Magers, Nichols. Walter Johnston joined the Magers, Nichols firm and continued working on the Board's audit. On December 15, 1992, the Jones-Moore firm ceased all billable activities and started the process of collecting and paying on its accounts. As part of the sale of the Jones-Moore firm, Mr. Moore was to continue to receive a portion of the collections on his client list, which included governmental clients. Mr. Moore and the Magers, Nichols firm agreed that Mr. Moore would not receive any compensation related to the audit contract with Clay County; however, this portion of the agreement was not memorialized until approximately a year after the original agreement. In January, 1993, the Magers, Nichols firm was renamed Magers, Nichols, Moore, and Johnston. The "Moore" in the firm name referred to Donald Moore. The Magers, Nichols, Moore and Johnston firm had unilaterally and temporarily issued one share of the firm in Mr. Moore's name in order to be able use Mr. Moore's name in the firm name. Mr. Moore did not sign for the share and was unaware that he had been issued a share. However, Mr. Moore did concede the original agreement called for him to purchase a share in the newly formed Magers, Nichols firm. Mr. Moore was listed in the State Board of Accountancy Records as a partner or shareholder in the Magers, Nichols, Moore and Johnston firm. The Jones-Moore firm received the following payments related to the audit for the Board: (a) $2,000 by check dated 10-13-92 for work performed through 9-30-92; (b) $1,200 by check dated 11-10-92 for work performed through 10-31-92; (c) $15,000 by check dated 12-22-92 for work performed through 11-30- 92; and (d) $2,780 by check dated 1-26-92 for work performed through 12-31-92. According to Mr. Moore, the Jones-Moore firm stopped performing actual work by December 15, 1992; thus, the January check would have been for work performed prior to December 15. The Magers, Nichols, Moore and Johnston firm received the following payments related to the audit contract for the Board which had been awarded to the Jones-Moore firm: $3,000 by check dated February 23, 1993 and $2,475 by check dated April 13, 1993. Mr. Moore did not receive any compensation for work performed after December 15, 1992, relating to the Board audit. Mr. Moore was officially sworn in as Finance Director on January 5, 1993, at which time he began his full-time duties as Finance Director. In February 1993, Mr. Moore determined that the audit work for the Board previously provided by the Jones-Moore firm should be assigned to a firm with which he had no prior relationship. He identified Duval & Company as the accounting firm rated highest by the Board during the summer of 1992 that was still in existence in 1993. When the Jones-Moore firm was awarded the contract in the summer of 1992, the Board had ranked three CPA firms, with the Jones- Moore being first and the Duval firm being third. The second firm dissolved after the award. Mr. Moore discussed the matter with Mr. Keene, who instructed him to contact the Duval firm to determine if the firm would be willing to accept an assignment of the contract. On February 4, 1993, Mr. Moore wrote a memorandum to Mr. Keene indicating that because of public perception that the audit contract should be assigned and that the Duval firm had agreed to finish the audit at no cost to the County. On February 9, 1993, at a regular public meeting, the Board approved the transfer and assignment of the audit contract to Duval & Company. The audit was completed and delivered to the Board in March, 1993. The cover letter to the audit was dated January 23, 1993, which represented the last date that substantial field work was done. In January, 1993, Mr. Keene reviewed a cash fund balance report for the 1991-1992 fiscal year and detected account balances that were lower than expected. He compared the last check run of the 1991-1992 fiscal year with the previous year and found the check run was 1.2 million dollars greater in the 1991-1992 fiscal year. In February, 1993, Mr. Keene notified the Board of the possible 1.2 million dollar difference. In March, 1993, Mr. Keene received the audit of the 1991-1992 fiscal year and compared the adopted budget to the actual budget. The comparison revealed that revenue in the form of cash carried forward was overestimated by Mr. Herwick in the amount of 7.6 million dollars. Mr. Keene prepared a proposal for the Board in which he recommended, among other things, that the County reduce its expenditures by 2.9 million dollars in order to balance the budget. He presented his proposal to each Board member individually and to the Board's Budget and Finance Committee as a group on April 21, 1993. On or about April 22, 1993, Mr. Keene referred the budget matter to the State Attorney's Office to determine whether Mr. Herwick's errors resulted from malicious intent. On April 27, and May 11, 1993, the Board held public meetings and discussed, among other things, the Budget and Finance Committee's recommendation concerning handling the budget shortfall. On June 10 and 17, 1993, concerned citizens met at the office of attorney Terry Jones to discuss the budget issues and to prepare statements to be presented at the June 22 meeting of the Board. Mae Byers and Eugene Alphonse were among the persons at the meetings. Mr.Stotler did not attend the meetings. On June 18, 1993, the accounting firm of Purvis & Gray, at Mr.Keene's request, verified the legality and appropriateness of the proposals offered by Mr.Keene to resolve the budget shortfall. On June 22, 1993, at a regular public meeting, the Board considered and approved Mr.Keene's recommendations to cure the budget shortfall by a vote of 4-1, with Commissioner Jett voting in opposition. Mrs. Byers, Mr. Alphonse and others made presentations at the meeting in opposition to Mr. Keene's recommendations. At Board meetings on July 13 and August 12, 1993, the Board, Mr. Keene and citizens discussed the 1992-1993 budget shortfall and ways to avoid future shortfalls. On September 3, 1993, Mr. Keene wrote the State Attorney, Harry Shorestein, a letter offering support for any investigation and encouraging a grand jury inquiry if such an inquiry was found to be necessary. In the fall of 1993, Mr. Stotler called Patricia Surman, who was a CPA and had been employed as an internal auditor for the Clerk's Office prior to her dismissal. Mr. Stotler was inquiring about the budget shortfall and the hiring of Donald Moore. Ms. Surman informed Mr. Stotler that her understanding was that the budget error resulted from the revenues collected falling short of the estimates and that Mr. Moore had handled the transfer of the county audit correctly under accounting practices. On September 20, 1993, Mrs. Byers invited Mr. Stotler to a private meeting to discuss a presentation to State Attorney Harry Shorestein concerning the budget issues. Mr. Alphonse and others also attended the meeting. During the meeting the issue of media coverage was discussed. Mr. Stotler stated that he did not want to make the visit to the State Attorney a media event. After the September 20 meeting but prior to the actual meeting with the State Attorney, Mr. Stotler and Mrs. Byers prepared an addendum to the presentation to the State Attorney. Mr. Stotler discussed the budget issue with Mrs. Byers and Commissioner Jett on several occasions. Mr. Stotler, Mrs. Byers, and Mr. Jett are friends and political allies. On September 30, 1993, a group of citizens, including Mr. Stotler, Mr. Alphonse, and Mrs. Byers, met with Harry Shorestein to discuss the budget issues and to request an audit. Unbeknownst to Mr. Stotler at the time, Mrs. Byers had contacted several television stations and newspapers concerning the meeting, resulting in extensive media coverage of the meeting. After the September 30 meeting, Mr. Shorestein advised Mr. Stotler that he would refer the matter to either the Governor's office or the Joint Legislative Auditing Committee. Within one or two weeks, Mr. Shorestein did convey the citizen group's concerns to Terry Shoffstall, Staff Director for the Joint Legislative Auditing Committee. On October 4, 1993, Mr. Keene sent a letter to the Auditor General of the State of Florida explaining the circumstances of the budget shortfall and investigations surrounding it. Further the letter encouraged an audit by the Auditor General's Office, if it found one necessary. On October 7, 1993, Mr. Keene sent a letter to the Joint Legislative Auditing Committee along with a packet of information concerning the budget issues. He requested that the Auditor General's Office perform an audit of Clay County's financial records and procedures, stating, "[t]he purpose of this audit should not be to lay the blame, but to restore public confidence in Clay County government by a factual statement of financial conditions and procedural review." Shortly thereafter, Mr. Stotler spoke to Mr. Shoffstall, who advised Mr. Stotler that he may wish to consider contacting the Commission on Ethics. In a letter dated August 12, 1994, Mr. Shoffstall reiterated his previous comments and stated: Committee staff has reviewed your concerns, along with information contained in the 1993, as well as 1992, audit reports. Some of the concerns you raised address possible violations of the Code of Ethics for Public Officers and Employees, pertaining to the actions of the independent auditors and the Finance Director. The Commission on Ethics is statutorily charged with the responsibility of investigating alleged violations of the Code of Ethics, Part III, Chapter 112, Florida Statutes. I suggest that you contact the Commission if you would like to obtain information on how to initiate a formal complaint. On October 5, 1993, Mr. Keene called a press conference during which he again made a presentation explaining the budget measures taken and confirming the soundness of the County's budget and financial condition. On October 12, 1993, at a public meeting of the Board, Mr. Keene presented the fiscal budget for the prior eleven months and explained how he had corrected the prior overestimates made by the previous Finance Director. In October of 1993, Mr. Keene discovered that an audit by the Auditor General would cost the County $40,000 to $50,000. At that time Mr. Keene approached the Clay County Legislative Delegation and requested that the Auditor General's audit be delayed until after the results of the County's regular, annual independent audit were made known in March of 1994. The Clay County delegation requested that the audit be delayed. Mr. Stotler was unaware that Mr. Keene's reason for asking for the delay of the Auditor General's audit was based on the costs of the audit. Mr. Stotler was concerned about the delay and expressed his concern to others. In November, 1993, Mr. Stotler wrote to Representative Joseph Tedder of the Joint Legislative Auditing Committee requesting him to consider the citizen's concern over the need for an audit. On December 2, 1993, Mr. Stotler wrote a letter to the Department of Business and Professional Regulation (DBPR), requesting an investigation of alleged inappropriate conduct on the part of Donald Moore. As a result a formal investigation was begun. Mr. Stotler also filed a similar complaint with DBPR against Steve Duval, the accountant who was performing the Board's 1991-1992 audit as a result of the assignment of the contract from the Jones-Moore firm. After their investigation, DBPR found no inappropriate conduct by Mr. Moore. On February 3, 1994, Mr. Stotler and Mrs. Byers met with State Attorney Shorestein who did not commit to doing anything about the issues they raised. On February 4, 1994, Mr. Stotler filed a Complaint with the Commission on Ethics (Commission) against Mr. Moore as Finance Director for Clay County, asserting independence and conflict of interest issues relating to Mr. Moore's hiring, the transfer of the independent audit responsibilities from the Jones- Moore firm to the Duval firm, and payments to Mr. Moore's former and successor CPA firms. On February 4, 1993, Mr. Stotler filed an identical Complaint with the Commission against Mr. Keene as Clerk of the Court of Clay County. Prior to filing the Complaint against Mr. Keene, Mr. Stotler's attorney reviewed the Complaint and advised Mr. Stotler that the Ethics Commission was the appropriate place to take his concerns, that Mr. Stotler's concerns were valid, and that his concerns were not frivolous. Mr. Stotler had discussed the budget issues and the assigning of the audit contract from the Moore-Jones firm to the Duval firm with Eugene Alphonse, who is a Certified Public Accountant practicing in Clay County. Mr. Alphonse had some concerns about the accounting ethics concerning the hiring of Mr. Moore. Unbeknownst to Mr. Stotler at the time of their discussions and prior to his filing the Ethics Complaint against Mr. Keene, Mr. Alphonse had been employed by Mr. Moore and Mr. Duval and had been fired by both men. Mr. Stotler was also unaware that Mr. Alphonse had also filed complaints with the Department of Professional Regulation against Mr. Duval and those complaints had been dismissed. Prior to the filing of the Complaint against Mr. Keene, Mrs. Byers told Mr. Stotler that she and Mr. Jett had discussed the payments to the Magers, Nichols firm with the Sheriff and that the Sheriff had indicated there could be possible criminal fraud involved. Prior to filing the Complaint against Mr. Keene, Mr. Stotler did not discuss the issues with Mr. Keene, Mr. Moore, Steve Duval, anyone from the Jones-Moore firm, or anyone from the Magers, Nichols firm. On February 22, 1994, the Executive Director of the Commission reviewed Mr. Stotler's Complaint against Mr. Keene and concluded that the allegations failed to indicate a possible ethics violation by Mr. Keene. As a result, the Executive Director recommended that the Complaint be dismissed as legally insufficient without investigation. On March 10, 1994, the Commission adopted the recommendation of the Executive Director and dismissed the Complaint for failure of legal sufficiency. The Commission also dismissed the Complaint filed by Mr. Stotler against Mr. Moore. In March, 1994, the independent audit of the 1992-1993 fiscal year was completed by Duval & Company. The audit was an "unqualified report" which meant it was a clean audit with no reportable conditions, comments, or recommendations. On March 15, 1995, the accounting firm of Purvis & Gray, at the request of Mr. Keene, reviewed and confirmed the findings of Duval & Company's audit of the 1992-1993 fiscal year. Mr. Keene incurred legal fees and costs totaling $33, 264.21 relating to the Ethics Complaint filed by Mr. Stotler and in the prosecution of the fee petition. As of February 25, 1994, the legal costs relating to the Complaint and this proceeding totalled $3,155.21. The total amount for reasonable fees for legal services is $30,109.00. Mr. Keene retained the firm of Marks, Gray, Conroy & Gibbs to represent him in this matter. Bill Thompson of that firm spent 45.8 hours representing Mr. Keene and Mr. Barbour spent 179 hours representing Mr. Keene. Law clerks spent 9 hours and paralegals spent 16.2 hours. The amount of time spent by the firm is reasonable. A reasonable hourly rate for Mr. Thompson is $150, for Mr. Barbour is $130, for law clerks is $60, and for paralegals is $45.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered denying John Keene's petition for attorney's fees and costs against Ronald Stotler. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of September, 1995, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUSAN B. KIRKLAND, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of September, 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 94-1907FE To comply with the requirements of Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes (1993), the following rulings are made on the parties' proposed findings of fact: Keene's Proposed Findings of Fact. Paragraph 1: The first and last sentences are accepted in substance. The second sentence is rejected as unnecessary. Paragraph 2: Rejected as unnecessary. Paragraph 3: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 4: The first sentence is accepted. The remainder is rejected as unnecessary. Paragraph 5: The first sentence is accepted in substance. The remainder is rejected as unnecessary. Paragraph 6: The first two sentences are accepted in substance. The remainder is rejected as unnecessary. Paragraph 7: The first sentence is accepted in substance. The remainder is rejected as unnecessary. Paragraph 8: The first sentence is accepted in substance. The remainder is rejected as unnecessary. Paragraph 9: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 10: The first two sentences are accepted in substances. The remainder is rejected as unnecessary. Paragraphs 11-17: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 18: Accepted in substance except as to being dissolved. The firm was not legally dissolved. Paragraphs 19-22: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 23: The last sentence is rejected as constituting a conclusion of law. The remainder is accepted in substance. Paragraphs 24-25: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 26: Rejected as constituting argument. Paragraphs 27-41: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 42: Rejected as unnecessary. Paragraphs 43-49: Accepted in substance. Paragraphs 50-52: Rejected as subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 53: Accepted in substance. Paragraphs 54-55: Rejected as subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 56: Accepted in substance. Paragraphs 57-62: Rejected as subordinate to the facts found. Paragraphs 63-64: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 65: Accepted in substance except as to the purpose of the meeting. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the budget issues. Paragraph 66: The last sentence is accepted in substance. The remainder is rejected as not supported by the evidence if it refers to the original packet of information discussed at the meeting at Mr. Myers home. Paragraph 67: The first sentence is accepted in substance. The remainder is rejected as not supported by the evidence. Mr. Stotler testified that he reviewed and considered documents that were presented to him and to which he had access. Paragraph 68: Accepted that that was Mr. Conroy's testimony but rejected as to the truth of the testimony based on the greater weight of the evidence. Paragraph 69: Accepted in substance to the extent that Stotler, Byers, and Alphonse were part of a group that went to the State Attorney's office to discuss the budget issues. Rejected as not supported by the greater weight of the evidence that Stotler led the group. The last sentence is accepted in substance. Paragraph 70: Rejected as constituting argument. Paragraph 71: Accepted in substance. Paragraphs 72: Rejected as subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 73-76: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 77: Rejected as unnecessary. Paragraph 78: The first two sentences are accepted in substance. The remainder is rejected as not supported by the greater weight of the evidence. Mr. Stotler was unaware of Mr. Alphonse's employments and the filing of the complaints when Mr. Stotler filed the Ethics Complaint. Paragraph 79: Accepted in substance that they met with the State Attorney but rejected that the State Attorney confirmed that an investigation was still under consideration. The State Attorney did not commit to do anything. Paragraph 80: Rejected as subordinate to the facts found. Paragraphs 81-82: Accepted in substance. Paragraphs 83: The first portion of the paragraph is accepted in substance. The remainder is rejected as not supported by the evidence because Mr. Stotler did have his attorney review the compliant before it was filed. Paragraph 84: Rejected. Mr. Stotler consulted his attorney. Paragraph 85: Rejected as subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 86: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 87: Rejected as subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 88: The first part of the paragraph is rejected as not supported by the evidence. Mr. Stotler did scan Chapter 119 prior to filing the complaint. The remainder is subordinate to the facts found. Paragraphs 90-92: Accepted in substance. Paragraphs 93-94: Rejected as constituting argument. Paragraph 95: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 96: Rejected as constituting argument. Paragraph 97: Rejected that any negative media attention resulted from the efforts of Mr. Jett, Mrs. Byers, Mr. Alphonse or Mr. Stotler. The last sentence is rejected as subordinate to the facts found. Paragraphs 98-99: Rejected as not supported by the greater weight of the evidence. Paragraph 100: Rejected as constituting argument. Paragraph 101: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 102: Accepted in substance that the discussion concerned the checks to the Magers, Nichols firm but rejected that it was an investigation of Mr. Keene. Paragraphs 103-105: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 106: Rejected as constituting argument. Paragraph 107: Rejected as not supported by the greater weight of the evidence. Paragraphs 108-115: Accepted in substance. Stotler's Proposed Findings of Fact. (Stotler's Findings of Fact are not numbered; however, they are addressed in the order that they appear.) Paragraph 1: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 2: The first sentence is rejected as constituting argument. The remainder is accepted in substance. Paragraph 3: Rejected as unnecessary. Paragraph 4: Rejected as constituting argument. Paragraph 5: The last sentence is rejected to the extent that the Clerk's office calculated all the revenue projections. Some of the information was provided by the State. The remainder is accepted in substance. Paragraph 6: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 7: The last sentence is rejected as unnecessary. The remainder is accepted in substance. Paragraph 8: Sentences 5 and 6 are accepted in substance. The fourth sentence is rejected as constituting argument. The remainder is rejected as unnecessary. Paragraph 9: Sentences 1, 2, 4 are accepted in substance. Sentence 5 is rejected as constituting argument. Sentence 3 is rejected as unnecessary. Paragraph 10: Rejected as constituting argument. Paragraph 11: Rejected as subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 12: The first part of the first sentence is accepted in substance. The second part of the first sentence is rejected to the extent that it implies that legally the last day of existence was December 31, 1992. The second sentence is accepted in substance. The third sentence is rejected as not supported by the evidence to the extent that it implies that Mr. Moore received compensation relating to the Board audit for work performed after December 15, 1992. Paragraph 13: Accepted in substance to the extent that in January, 1993, he did receive payment for audit work for the Board performed by the Jones-Moore firm through December 15, 1992 and that he was working part time for Clerk in December, 1992. He did not continue to receive payment for the Board audit work performed after December 15, 1992. Paragraph 14: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 15: Rejected as unnecessary. Paragraph 16: The first sentence is accepted in substance. The second sentence is accepted in substance except as to the last portion which is rejected as unnecessary. The third, fourth, and sixth sentences are accepted in substance. The fifth and seventh sentences are rejected as constituting argument. Paragraph 17: The first sentence is accepted in substance. The remainder is rejected as constituting argument. Paragraph 18: The first sentence is subordinate to the facts found. The remainder is rejected as constituting argument. Paragraph 19: The first sentence is rejected to the extent that it implies there was a conflict. The second sentence is rejected as constituting argument. Paragraph 20: The first and fourth sentences are accepted in substance. The quotation is rejected as unnecessary. The third sentence is rejected as constituting argument. The fifth sentence is rejected as constituting argument. Paragraph 21: The first sentence is accepted in substance. The remainder is rejected as constituting argument. Paragraph 22: The first sentence is accepted in substance. The remainder is rejected as constituting argument. Paragraph 23: The fourth sentence is accepted in substance. The remainder is rejected as constituting argument. Paragraph 24: Accepted to the extent that the audit report reflects the last date of the field work; the remainder is rejected as constituting argument. Paragraph 25-28: Rejected as constituting argument. Paragraph 29: The last sentence is accepted in substance. The remainder is rejected as constituting argument. Paragraph 30: The first sentence is rejected as constituting argument. The remainder is accepted in substance. Paragraphs 31-37: Rejected as constituting argument. Paragraphs 38-41: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 42: The first sentence is rejected as constituting argument. The remainder is rejected as unnecessary. Paragraph 43: The last is rejected. Sheriff Lancaster's deposition was not filed. The remainder is accepted in substance. Paragraph 44: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 45: Rejected as constituting argument. COPIES FURNISHED: Carrie Stillman Complaint Coordinator Commission on Ethics Post Office Box 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709 William L. Thompson, Jr. Esquire Jeptha F. Barbour, Esquire Post Office Box 447 Jacksonville, Florida 32201 Robert L. McLeod, II, Esquire First Union Bank Building 24 Cathedral Place, Suite 500 St. Augustine, Florida 32084 Bonnie Williams Executive Director Florida Commission On Ethics Post Office Drawer 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709 Phil Claypool, Esquire General Counsel Ethics Commission 2822 Remington Green Circle, Suite 101 Post Office Drawer 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709
The Issue Did Respondent, Highlands County Board of County Commissioners (County), discriminate against Petitioner, Annette Whitner, on account of her age?
Findings Of Fact At the time of the alleged discrimination, Ms. Whitner was 71 years old. Ms. Whitner claims that the County discriminated against her by not interviewing her for its business services director position due to her age. Ms. Whitner claims that she was discriminated against because the position required an applicant to be a Certified Public Accountant (CPA). She argues that older people are less likely to hold a CPA certification. The weight of the credible evidence did not establish this claim. Ms. Whitner did not establish any connection between possessing a CPA certification and age. On November 10, 2014, the County posted the position online. It was a newly created position, established as part of a reorganization by the County. Because of previous audit errors and the departments the position would oversee, the County determined the minimum qualifications for the position should be: Bachelor’s degree with major course work in public administration, business administration, accounting, finance or related field and possession of Certified Public Accountant (CPA) professional certification or equivalent is required. Master degree in business administration, finance management, public administration, or related discipline is preferred. In determining the equivalent to a CPA, the County referred to the Guide for Certifications for Accounting, Finance and Operations Management (Guide). This was a reasonable non- discriminatory decision. Based on the Guide, the County determined a Certified Government Auditing Professional, Certified Governmental Financial Manager, and Certified Internal Auditor would constitute an equivalent to a CPA certification. The certifications were deemed equivalent because they required similar education, experience, and completion of an examination, similar to one taken for a CPA certification. The closing date for all applicants was December 15, 2014. Ms. Whitner submitted her application near midnight of December 15. Ms. Whitner is not a CPA. In addition, Ms. Whitner did not follow the instructions on the application. She scratched out the instructions on the application and wrote “first” above where it read “current or most recent employer.” Ms. Whitner’s application contained typed and handwritten information. Ms. Whitner’s application did not provide her complete work history as the application instructed. In one of the fields of employment, after 1992, Ms. Whitner wrote “various employers.” Ms. Whitner’s application left an unexplained gap in work history, from 1992 to the present. Ms. Whitner’s application included copies of her Bachelor of Science in Business Administration degree, Master of Public Affairs degree, certification as a Certified District Manager, Certificate of Recognition from the Indiana Executive Program, and a letter of reference from Al Grieshaber, General Manager at Sun ‘N Lake of Sebring, dated February 8, 2010. Ms. Whitner’s application indicated she had a certification as a Certified Professional Government Accountant. Ms. Whitner asserts that a certification as a Certified Professional Government Accountant should be equivalent to a CPA certification. However, the Guide does not include a certification for a Certified Professional Government Accountant as a CPA equivalent, nor does the County consider it equivalent. Additionally, Ms. Whitner did not attach a copy of her certification or provide persuasive evidence of the certification criteria and their similarity to CPA criteria. The County could not determine if Ms. Whitner had worked since 1992. Ms. Whitner argues that her letter of reference from Al Grieshaber demonstrated her employment since 1992. However, the letter did not include the dates Ms. Whitner worked, the position held, or her duties and the type of work she performed at Sun ‘N Lake of Sebring. Randal Vosburg, Assistant County Administrator, was involved in the hiring and selection process for the position. The primary criteria he was looking for when reviewing the applications was whether the applicant had a CPA. Mr. Vosburg did not have any contact with Ms. Whitner and did not know her age when reviewing her application. Mr. Vosburg did not consider Ms. Whitner’s age when reviewing her application. The County did not select Ms. Whitner for an interview because she was not a CPA and did not possess a certificate that is equivalent to a CPA certification. Additionally, Ms. Whitner presented an unprofessional application, did not provide a complete work history so that there appeared to be more than a twenty-year gap in employment, and did not follow the instructions on the employment application. These were all reasonable non-discriminatory bases for deciding not to interview Ms. Whitner. On January 5, 2015, Ms. Whitner submitted an addendum to her employment application. This was after the application deadline and after the County had selected candidates to interview. Ms. Whitner’s addendum did not provide documentation or certification that she possessed a CPA certification or the equivalent. The County selected Tanya Cannady and Stanoil Raley for interviews. Both possessed CPAs. Both were reasonably deemed to be more qualified than Ms. Whitner. A panel of three people interviewed Ms. Cannady and Mr. Raley. Randal Vosburg, June Fisher, County Administrator, and Mark Hill, then-Development Services Director, served on the panel. Ms. Cannady performed much better than Mr. Raley during the interview. Additionally, Ms. Cannady’s work experience was more relevant to the position than Mr. Raley’s work experience. The County selected Ms. Cannady for the position because she met the requirement of having a minimum of five-years of progressively responsible relevant experience, was a CPA, and was more qualified than Mr. Raley and the other applicants. The County offered the position to Ms. Cannady. She did not accept the offer and withdrew her application. On August 5, 2015, the County re-posted the position online. The county changed the CPA requirement from “required” to “preferred” because the County was having trouble finding CPA applicants. Ms. Whitner did not reapply for the position. The County conducted additional interviews and selected Tasha Morgan. Ms. Morgan was female and was a CPA. The preponderance of the credible, persuasive evidence did not establish that the County discriminated against Ms. Whitner due to her age. The preponderance of the credible, persuasive evidence established that the County had legitimate non-discriminatory reasons for not interviewing Ms. Whitner.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent YWCA is a nonprofit corporation that sponsors educational, social, and recreational programs. The YWCA's purpose states that it is a "movement rooted in the Christian faith"; however, expressed belief in Christianity is not required for membership in the YWCA or for employment by the YWCA. Its membership is comprised of adult women seventeen years of age and older. The personnel policy of the YWCA expressly states that: "Equal employment opportunity and affirmative action will be applied in recruitment, hiring, compensation, fringe benefits, staff development, and training, promotion, and any other condition of employment regardless of race, color, religion, sex, handicap, age, national origin, or any other nonperformance factors." (Emphasis added.) Regarding termination, the personnel policy of the YWCA expressly states that: "Reasons for staff termination must be carefully documented. They should be based upon objective performance appraisals, which in turn are based upon job descriptions, work plans, and performance standards. Except in cases of reorganization/retrenchment or termination for cause, a probationary period for work improvement must be provided, followed by another performance appraisal." The YWCA of West Palm Beach operates three facilities: Central and Residence, the Mamie Adair Branch, and the Recreation Center. The Mamie Adair Branch primarily serves the black community in West Palm Beach and includes a day-care facility. The Petitioner, Davis, was hired as the Branch Executive of the Mamie Adair Branch of the YWCA, effective July 21, 1980, at a starting salary of $12,000.00. The Petitioner was given copies of the YWCA's personnel policy, affirmative action plan, and job description. She was not given notice of particular standards of behavior to which she was required to conform away from the job. As branch Executive she was supervised by the Executive Director, Jo Prout. The Petitioner successfully completed her initial 90-day probationary period, and her annual salary was increased by five percent to $12,600.00. In October 1981, however, the Petitioner received her annual evaluation and was again placed on three months probations due primarily to an unsatisfactory working relationship with the Branch Committee. The Petitioner had a bad attitude and was antagonistic. The Petitioner became pregnant but did not immediately disclose the fact of her pregnancy. In approximately December, 1981, the Petitioner confided to a coworker that she was pregnant and the coworker, in turn, told the YWCA's Executive Director, Jo Prout, that the Petitioner was pregnant. The YWCA's Executive Director was concerned that the Petitioner's relationship with the Branch Committee would be severely adversely affected if the Committee found out the Petitioner was pregnant and unmarried. Because of this concern, the Executive Director removed the Petitioner from her position as Branch Executive, effective December 31, 1981. The Petitioner would not have been removed from her position on December 31, 1981, but for the fact that she was pregnant and unmarried. Prior to removing the Petitioner from her position as Branch Executive, the Executive Director did not attempt less drastic alternatives such as asking the Petitioner not to discuss or disclose her marital status or asking the Petitioner to take a leave of absence. Prior to her removal, the Petitioner had not discussed the fact that she was pregnant and unmarried with members of the Branch Committee or with the YWCA membership in general. At no time had the Petitioner advocated unwed motherhood as an alternative life- style or otherwise advocated or espoused principles contrary to her understanding of Christianity. In the past, certain employees of the YWCA whose on-the-job behavior was contrary to Christian principles received job discipline but were not removed from their positions. A desk clerk at the YWCA's residence, for example, who was found to have stolen property from residence guests was not discharged. The removal of the Petitioner from her position by the YWCA because she was pregnant and unmarried was not justified by the business necessity rule because: A requirement to conduct one's life, including one's off-the-job activities, according to Christian principles, was not disclosed to the Petitioner or to other employees; The YWCA did not discipline or discharge other employees for conduct which conflicted with the YWCA's alleged requirement to conduct one's life by Christian principles; and The YWCA did not show that a requirement of all employees to conduct their lives by Christian principles has a manifest relationship to the employment in question. Then the Petitioner was removed from the Branch Executive position, she was transferred to the position of center consultant for gymnastics. The position of the center consultant for gymnastics to which the Petitioner was transferred was a demotion in that the Petitioner went from an administrative to a non-administrative position. The transfer also changed the Petitioner's employment status from full-time employee to part-time employee with a 25 percent decrease in earned income and a lunch "hour" reduced to 30 minutes. The petitioner's new position as center consultant was a temporary one designated to last no longer than five months. Petitioner was removed from probationary status as a result of the transfer. The position of center consultant to which the Petitioner was transferred was not a legitimate position. The position did not exist prior to December 31, 1981, the date the Petitioner was transferred. No job description was ever written for this position, despite the fact that the YWCA personnel policy required job descriptions. The Petitioner was verbally assigned job tasks inconsistent with her title of center consultant, including cleaning toilets at the gymnastics center. The position was eliminated on February 16, 1982, approximately six weeks after it was created, allegedly due to financial streamlining. The YWCA committed an unlawful employment act against the Petitioner, discriminating against her on the basis of sex and marital status by removing her from her position as Branch Executive because she was pregnant and unmarried. Moreover, this transfer was not justified by business necessity. Because the YWCA committed an unlawful employment act against the Petitioner, the Petitioner could be entitled to be reinstated to her former position or to a comparable position and could also be entitled to recover lost wages and fringe benefits, plus interest thereon, from the date of the wrongful act, December 31, 1981, to November 31, 1982, the date she was hired by the Lutheran Ministries, set off by any interim earnings and reduced by the Petitioner's unemployment compensation benefits plus her reasonable attorney's fees and costs. Regarding reinstatement, the Petitioner has been and is now willing and able to be reinstated to her former position as Branch Executive or to a comparable administrative position. The employer's argument that the Petitioner is not entitled to reinstatement because she was an unsatisfactory employee is rejected for the following reasons: The employer's allegations that the Petitioner will not satisfactorily perform her job if reinstated are too speculative and any doubts about the Petitioner's entitlement to reinstatement should be resolved in favor of the victim of discrimination; and In the event that the Petitioner's job performance upon reinstatement is not satisfactory, the employer may avail itself of the procedures set forth in its personnel policy to improve the Petitioner's performance or discharge her for unsatisfactory job performance. However, reinstatement may not be feasible in this case due to the fact that another employee has been placed in the Petitioner's former position. If the Petitioner is not reinstated to a comparable administrative position, then she should be compensated by the award of six months front pay in lieu of reinstatement. The Petitioner is entitled to damages in the amount of $13,551, which represents a back pay award of $11,000 plus 10 percent interest, six months front pay in the amount of $6,000, minus $1,575 for salary paid from January 1, 1982 - February 16, 1982, including two weeks severance pay and $2,974 in unemployment compensation benefits. The Petitioner is also entitled to costs of $232.65 and attorneys fees totaling $5,000.
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant findings of fact are made: The Department, an executive agency of the State of Florida, is an employer as that term is defined in Section 760.01(6), Florida Statutes. Vickers is a black male who at all times material to this proceeding was employed by the Department. Vickers was first hired as a COI at the Mayo Correctional Institution, Lafayette County, Florida, on or about October 30, 1987, and transferred to the Madison Correctional Institution, Madison County, Florida, on or about February 19, 1988. At all times material to this proceeding, Vickers held permanent status within the Career Service System, enacted and authorized under the laws of Florida. On April 28, 1989, Vickers was promoted from COI in food service to COII in food service. Vickers was placed on a nine-month probationary status insofar as the promotion was concerned. Vickers was selected for this promotion over two other white candidates. The interview team consisted of Eric Holt, Cathy Leggett and Aubrey Dean. Then-Superintendent, Terry Hicks selected Vickers for the promotion on the recommendation of the review committee. In the position of COII in food service, Vickers was responsible for supervising staff and inmates in the preparation of food at the Madison Correctional Institution. Vickers would supervise as many as three correctional officers and as many as 20-30inmates. Among those under Vicker's supervision was COI, Janice Lingenfelter and inmate Jeffery Lausin. On or about August 15, 1989, Lingenfelter made a complaint to COII Nellie Cunningham that Vickers had been sexually harassing her. Lingenfelter then made a written complaint to Hicks, who then requested that an inspector from the Department's Inspector General's Office be assigned to investigate the allegations. CO Inspector II William Dotson was assigned to investigate the allegations made by Lingenfelter. Dotson began his investigation on August 17, 1989, by interviewing several witnesses including Lingenfelter, Cunningham, Lausin and Vickers. Dotson's investigative report was completed and sent for review to the Inspector General of the Department on October 3, 1989. It was determined through Dotson's investigation that there was evidence to support Lingenfelter's claim of sexual harassment against Vickers and a failure by Vickers to maintain a professional relationship with staff and inmates under his supervision. Dotson's report was sent to Hicks at Madison Correctional Institution sometime between October 4, 1989 and November 1, 1989. By letter dated November 1, 1989, Vickers was notified that disciplinary charges were being brought against him for violating certain Department rules pertaining to sexual harassment and failure to maintain a professional relationship with inmates under his supervision. That letter, signed by Hicks, also advised Vickers of his right to request a conference, prior to any final action being taken, at which he could present evidence to refute or explain the charges against him. Vickers requested and was given a conference held on November 28, 1989. At that conference, Vickers was represented by counsel and presented a statement to Hicks regarding the charges against him. Vickers was notified by letter dated December 6, 1989 that he would be suspended for five days without pay for his violation of the rules cited in the charging letter of November 1, 1989. On or about August 18, 1989, Vickers was reassigned from food service to security. Hicks made this reassignment due to the investigation into allegations of sexual harassment against Vickers which had originated in food service. After reviewing Dotson's investigative report, and after hearing Vickers' response to the charges against him, Hicks made the decision to demote from COII to COI. The demotion was effective December 15, 1989. At the time of the demotion, Vickers was in probationary status as a COII. Hicks determined that Vickers had exhibited an inability to properly supervise the inmates and staff under his supervision. An inmate in food service had patted a female correctional officer in food service (Lingenfelter) on the buttocks. Hicks attributed this lack of discipline on the part of the inmate to poor supervision by Vickers. On or about December 15, 1989, Vickers was given a below standards performance appraisal written by Eric Holt, his supervisor. On the front of the appraisal was the indication that it was a probationary appraisal. Personnel Manager Leggett told Hicks that it should be a special performance appraisal rather than probationary, but Hicks did not change the appraisal prior to giving it to Vickers. This performance appraisal was incorrectly titled "probationary" rather than "special", and later determined to be invalid. Vickers was not given an annual performance appraisal on his anniversary date (October 30, 1989) because he was in a probationary status. While the failure to give a timely and appropriate employee performance appraisal may be a violation of the Career Service System Rules, Chapter 22A-9, Florida Administrative Code, this not would prohibit the Department from demoting an employee who is on probationary status because of a promotion, if there were legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the demotion. Vickers has never received a Performance Appraisal wherein he was rated at less than an "Achieves Level", other than the Performance Appraisal entitled "probationary" which was later determined to be invalid for reasons other than the rating of Vickers' performance. Vickers appealed his suspension and demotion to the Public Employees Relations Commission (PERC). A hearing was held, since it was determined that PERC did have jurisdiction to review Vicker's suspension but not his demotion. Under the personnel rules governing state employees, a person who is in probationary status in a class may not appeal his or her demotion from that class. After hearing and weighing the evidence and argument of both parties, the Hearing Officer entered a Recommended Order dated March 2, 1990 wherein it was found that the Department had proven the charges against Vickers by a preponderance of the evidence, and therefore, just cause existed for discipline. The Hearing Officer also determined that the five-day suspension should not be reduced, specifically citing the seriousness of the offense as it related to his duties and responsibilities. A Final Order was issued by PERC on May 2, 1990 adopting the Hearing Officer's Recommended Order in its entirety and dismissing Vicker's appeal. Approximately January 3, 1990, interviews were held to fill the position of COII in food service from which Vickers had been demoted. Of the eleven applicants, two were black males, one was a black female, five were white males, and three were white females. One of the black males cancelled his interview, while the other "declined F.S." (food service). The black female was promoted to a position with the Hamilton Correctional Institution. Larry Pickels, a qualified white male, was selected for the position. Neither the "invalid Performance Appraisal" nor Hick's decision to demote Vickers were motivated by Vickers' race or sex, to wit: black and male. The Department has produced sufficient admissible evidence to show that it had a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for demoting Vickers.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, accordingly, recommended that the Commission enter a Final Order finding that Petitioner, Curtis Vickers, was not demoted due to his race or sex in violation of Section 760.10, Florida Statute, and that the Petition for Relief be dismissed. RECOMMENDED this 19th day of February, 1992, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this day of February, 1992. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 91-5279 The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties in this case. Specific Rulings On Proposed Findings Of Fact Submitted by the Petitioner The following proposed findings of fact are adopted in substance as modified in the Recommended Order. The number in parenthesis is the finding(s) of fact which so adopts the proposed finding(s) of fact: 1(1); 2(2,3); 3(4); 4(14); 5(2,19); 6(11); 7(7,18); 8(7); 11(10); 12(17); 13-14(16); 15-16(15); 18(14); 19(12); 20-21(14); 27(7,8); 31(16). Proposed findings of fact 9 and 10 are a restatement of testimony rather than a finding of fact, but see Finding of Fact 8. Proposed findings of fact 17, 28 and 32 are unnecessary. Proposed findings of fact 22-26, and 33 are neither material nor relevant. Proposed findings of fact 29 and 30 are more in the way of an argument than findings of fact. Proposed finding of fact 34 is neither material nor relevant, unless it is shown that Vikers' demotion was discriminatorily movitated. Specific Rulings On Proposed Findings Of Fact Submitted by the Respondent 1. The following proposed findings of fact are adopted in substance as modified in the Recommended Order. The number inparenthesis is the finding(s) of fact which so adopts the proposed finding(s) of fact: 1(2); 2(4,5); 3-14(6,7,8,9,10, 11,12,13,14,17,18 and 19, respectively). COPIES FURNISHED: Margaret Jones, Clerk Human Relations Commission 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, FL 32399-1570 Dana Baird, Esquire General Counsel 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahssee, FL 32399-1570 Gary L. Asbell, Esquire McMurry & Asbell 1357 East Lafayette Street Suite C Tallahassee, FL 32301 Harry K. Singletary, Jr. Secretary Department of Corrections 2601 Blairstone Road Tallahassee, FL 32399-2500 Louis A. Vargas, Esquire General Counsel Department of Corrections 2601 Blairstone Road Tallahassee, FL 32399-2500 Ernest L. Reddick, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Florida Department of Corrections 2601 Blairstone Road Tallahassee, FL 32399-2500
Findings Of Fact Dwight S. Cenac, Respondent, holds certificate No. 3639 as a Certified Public Accountant in the State of Florida. On 2 September 1977 he requested an exemption from the continuing education program required of public accountants to retain their certificate (Exhibit 2). Therein he stated he was not practicing public accounting, the exemption was granted and Respondent's registration card has been endorsed with a statement that Respondent's certificate to practice public accounting in Florida is inoperative. Following his graduation from college in 1970 Respondent worked for the accounting firm of Ernst and Ernst for two years and attained his certificate in 1973. He was employed with Blue Cross of Florida from 1973 until 1977 when he was employed by a health care provider in Puerto Rico to help set up their procedures to improve Medicare and Medicaid payments for services they provided. His understanding of the Medicare regulations and procedures acquired while working at Blue Cross, coupled with the conditions he found in Puerto Rico, led Respondent to believe that many health care providers had need for special consulting in conjunction with their financial record keeping. Health Care Management Consulting, Inc. (HCMC) was formed in 1977 with Respondent as the sole shareholder. In order to acquaint providers with the services he proposed, Respondent prepared a proposal (Exhibit 1) which was sent to health care providers. As a certified public accountant he could not do this without violating the laws and regulations proscribing solicitation by Florida practitioners. In order to overcome this potential problem, Respondent, on 2 September 1977, (by Exhibit 2), notified Petitioner that he was no longer performing public accounting. As the owner and principal operator of HCMC, Respondent does not hold himself out as a CPA, such information is not included in his letterhead or business cards, office or telephone directory or in any public place. His certificates as a Certified Public Accountant are hanging on the wall of his office, but none of his clients ever visit his office. In addition to Respondent, HCMC employs two other consultants who previously worked for Blue Cross, as well as a secretary. Neither of the other two consultants is a certified public accountant, but both perform services for clients similar to those services performed by Respondent. They, as well as Respondent, obtained the special expertise they offer to health care providers while working in the intermediary field between the government and the provider. HCMC provides specialized services not provided by public accountants such as setting up books and records for health care providers, preparing cost reports, providing assistance in setting rates and general familiarity with Medicare rules and regulations. Many of the services provided by HCMC, inasmuch as they involve financial records, are the same type services provided by Florida practitioners. Respondent, by submitting the HCMC Proposal to hospitals, nursing homes and other health care providers is both advertising and soliciting business. HCMC has submitted copies of its Proposal (Exhibit 1) to over 300 hospitals in Florida, and has obtained business previously performed by Florida practitioners. In the Proposal (Exhibit 1) HCMC offers services on a contingent fee basis. These services offered include reimbursement and recoupment of Medicare funds, and the fee paid HCMC is a percentage of the additional funds obtained as a result of the services provided by HCMC. Many of HCMC's services involve increasing reimbursement to the health care provider from Medicare and Medicaid sources. No audits unrelated to Medicare or Medicaid are performed, and financial statements prepared by HCMC do not refer to generally accepted accounting principles and generally accepted auditing standards, nor do they purport to express or disclaim an opinion as to the fairness of the presentation. The work performed by Respondent as an employee of HCMC would not constitute the practice of public accounting if performed by a non-certified person. The other employees of HCMC providing consulting services to health care providers similar to that provided by Respondent, are not in violation of Chapter 473, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact In recommending that the Public Employees Relations Commission uphold HRS' demotion of petitioner Linda Cook Allen, PERC Hearing Officer Rix wrote: In the instant case, HRS demoted Allen without conducting a special performance appraisal as required by rule 22A-9.009. Rather, Allen was demoted pursuant to HRS Regulation No. 60-10 Section 5(a)(2). This section provides that: As related to this regulation, an employee shall not be demoted as a form of disciplinary action. Rather, this type of action may be used to remove an employee from his class when the employee fails to perform his assigned duties at a satisfactory level. There must be specific documented reasons for such demotion supported by employee performance appraisals and/or documented counseling sessions. See (Exhibit A-10). In short, Powell evaluated Allen's performance over a nine- week period and then initiated action to demote Allen because Powell perceived that Allen was not carrying out her job duties competently. The evidence demonstrates that Powell conducted several counselling sessions with Allen over the nine-week period, which Powell documented pursuant to the above-cited regulation. Recommended Order, page 11. Adopting the Recommended Order, PERC upheld petitioner's demotion from pay grade 19 to pay grade 15, on account of numerous performance deficiencies. The letter HRS sent Ms. Allen notifying her of her demotion made no mention of HRS Regulation No. 60-10. HRS does not have any policy or general practice to rely on "documented counseling sessions" in lieu of employee evaluations before demotions. On September 17, 1990, HRS had in fact prepared a written employee appraisal detailing petitioner's derelictions as a protective investigator, HRS Exhibit No. 3, but petitioner prevailed on a grievance she pursued in connection with the evaluation.
Recommendation It is, accordingly, ORDERED: The petition for administrative determination of rule by hearing officer is denied. DONE and ENTERED this 26th day of March, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of March, 1992. APPENDIX Petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 1 was neither established nor refuted. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact Nos. 2 through 7 and 11 through 15 have been adopted, in substance, insofar as material. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact Nos. 8, 9 and 10 are properly conclusions of law. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact Nos. 16, 17 and 18 pertain to subordinate matters. COPIES FURNISHED: James C. McCarty, Esquire P.O. Box 2883 Gainesville, FL 32602 Robert L. Powell, Sr., Esquire Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 407 Building One 1323 Winewood Blvd. Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700 Sam Power, Agency Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Blvd. Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700 John Slye, General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Blvd. Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700
Findings Of Fact On approximately May 31, 1985, Petitioner, Maria Dejesus was employed as a public assistance specialist with Respondent, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services. Petitioner continued in that employment through early June, 1986. On Friday, June 6, Petitioner and her children, while enroute to Petitioner's home, were injured in an automobile accident. On Monday, June 9, at approximately 8:30 a.m., Petitioner called Brian Leverrier a public assistance liability supervisor and Respondent's supervisor during that period, and advised that "she had been in an automobile accident and that she would not be in that day because she had to take one of her children to the doctor; ... that she was positive or sure that she would be in to work the next day and that was the end of the conversation." (TR-13). Petitioner did not return to work until the following Tuesday, June 17. During the period between June 9, and June 17. Petitioner did not report to work nor did she call and advise her supervisor on June 10, 11, 12, or 13, that she would not be reporting to work. Petitioner relied on Bayla Lipsitz, a co-worker, to advise her supervisor that she would not be returning to work until Monday, June 16. Mr. Leverrier denied that Bayla Lipsitz advised him that Petitioner would not be returning to work until June 16, and employee Bayla Lipsitz did not appear as a witness in these proceedings. 2/ On Monday, June 16, Petitioner telephoned her supervisor, Brain Leverrier to advise him that she would not return to work until Tuesday, June 17, because her ride did not pick her up. Barbara Chattin, public assistance specialist supervisor, was fielding calls for Mr. Leverrier on June 16, and took Petitioner's phone call. When Petitioner advised Ms. Chattin that she would not return to work until the following day, June 17, Ms. Chattin advised her that she failed to call in everyday as she was supposed to although she (Chattin) would relay her message to Brian Leverrier. On the following day, June 17, Petitioner reported for work and was directed to report to Patty Jolly, Human Services Program Administrator, South Services Area, Economic Services. Ms. Jolly is overall responsible for eight supervisors who in turn supervise approximately 60 odd employees including Petitioner. When Petitioner reported to Ms. Jolly, she was advised that in accordance with personnel rules and regulations, she had abandoned her job based on her lack of contact with her supervisor for more than three days. (TR 37). Petitioner did not offer any explanation or other reason for failing to advise her supervisor of her need to be absent from work. All employees are provided with a copy of HRS's pamphlet entitled Personnel Employee Handbook. (Respondent's Exhibit 1). Respondent acknowledged receipt of that handbook by executing an acknowledgment. (Respondent's Exhibit 3).
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Administration enter a Final Order denying Petitioner's petition for review. RECOMMENDED this 24th day of February, 1987, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of February, 1987.
The Issue Whether Respondent violated Section 112.313(6), Florida Statutes, by engaging in unsolicited and unwanted sexually or romantically oriented behavior toward a subordinate female employee, and if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Gary Latham (Latham), has served as a member of the Florida Parole Commission (Parole Commission) since July 24, 1992. Claretha Billingslea Walker started to work for the Parole Commission on May 1, 1991, as an Administrative Secretary to the General Counsel's Office. At all times pertinent to this Complaint, she was known as Claretha Billingslea and will be so referred to for purposes of this Complaint. Effective May 27, 1994, Ms. Billingslea was promoted to the position of Executive Secretary to Commissioner Judith Wolson. On July 1, 1994, Ms. Wolson became Chairman of the Parole Commission. Ms. Billingslea was promoted to the position of Senior Executive Secretary to the Chairman. When a potential opening arose, Latham and Ms. Billingslea discussed the possibility of Ms. Billingslea accepting a position as the Executive Secretary to Latham. Latham had previously interviewed Ms. Billingslea for an Executive Secretary position in his office approximately two years before. Ms. Billingslea was interested in coming to work for Latham because a number of her duties had been eliminated when Ms. Wolson was made Chairman, but she was concerned about making such a move because she had been with Chairman Wolson's office such a short time. Latham discussed the possibility of transferring Ms. Billingslea to his office with Chairman Wolson and her administrative assistant, Gene Strickland. Both Chairman Wolson and Mr. Strickland agreed that it would be a good opportunity for Ms. Billingslea to learn more about the duties in a Commissioner's office because the work in the Chairman's office was more administrative than that in a Commissioner's office. Neither Mr. Strickland nor Chairman Wolson was dissatisfied with Ms. Billingslea's work. Prior to hiring Ms. Billingslea, Latham also discussed the hiring with his future administrative assistant, Brenda Henry, and with his wife. Effective August 5, 1994, Ms. Billingslea was reassigned to the position of Executive Secretary to Latham. Because there is only one position of Senior Executive Secretary in the Parole Commission (the Chairman's Secretary) this reassignment was nominally a demotion. It did not act as a demotion, however, because Ms. Billingslea's salary and benefits remained unchanged. In her capacity as Executive Secretary to Latham, Ms. Billingslea reported directly to Latham. As a career service employee, Ms. Billingslea could not be unilaterally fired by Latham, but as her direct supervisor Latham could set the wheels in motion for her termination. Ms. Billingslea understood that the Chairman would have to approve her termination. Latham had the authority to assign tasks to Ms. Billingslea and to grant or deny her leave or flex time. From the start of Ms. Billingslea's employment in Latham's office, Latham engaged in comments and behavior of questionable propriety. He told her that he would not be able to get any work done with such a pretty secretary. Ms. Billingslea took this as a joke. On another occasion, one of Ms. Billingslea's male friends complained to her that Latham had been rude to him when he called. She thought Latham might have been upset that she was receiving too many personal calls, but when she asked Latham about it, he told her no, and said, "I guess I'll just have to get used to guys calling all the time with such a pretty secretary." Latham often stared at Ms. Billingslea, looking her up and down. In describing these looks, Ms. Billingslea stated, "The way he looks at me, it is really weird. And it makes me feel uncomfortable, the way he kind of stares and looks me up and down. It will almost be as if he's going to say something, but he never said anything." Once when he was looking at her in this strange way, Ms. Billingslea asked him whether there was something he wanted to say, to which he responded, "No, that was my sexy look." At the time she took it as a joke. One day Latham told Ms. Billingslea that he had been on his way to a friend's house and had gotten lost and ended up on her street. He said that he had gone by her house and that she had a nice place. He asked her why she kept her blinds closed so tightly. Whenever the Florida Parole Commission denies parole, a "947.18" report is completed, justifying the decision not to grant the parole. Procedurally, the Parole Commission will make a decision to grant or deny parole at a meeting. The case is then assigned to a commissioner to prepare a 947.18 report. The report is prepared in the office of the commissioner and two weeks after the initial consideration the case is placed back on the agenda for review and acceptance of the 947.18 report. At its meeting on September 21, 1994, the Parole Commission denied parole for an inmate who had been convicted of sexually abusing his daughters. Latham had been assigned to prepare the 947.18 report. Ms. Henry drafted the report for Ms. Billingslea to type. The report was very sexually explicit. After the report was typed, Ms. Billingslea took it to Latham for his review. Both Latham and Ms. Billingslea commented that it was an interesting case. Latham closed his eyes and in a low voice began to describe the graphic details of the sexual abuse to Ms. Billingslea. Ms. Billingslea later asked Ms. Henry if the file contained any pictures. On September 27, 1994, Latham went into Ms. Billingslea's office and sat down in front of her desk. He informed her that he had "the hots" for her. He told Ms. Billingslea she had done nothing to make him approach her in this way, but that he did not know what had come over him lately, he had been attracted to a lot of young pretty women, and she was just "such a doll." He told her that he had nasty thoughts about her while he taught Sunday School. When she told him that she could not work for him if she were to be with him sexually, he responded that she wouldn't be working for him that he would be working for her. When she told him that she was not interested, he became defensive, stating that he had a lot of political power. His last words to her in that encounter were, "I might not be able to keep my hands to myself." Later the same day, as Ms. Billingslea was preparing to leave work, Latham asked her to stay late. Over and over, he asked her to stay and "be with him," initially standing behind her chair, preventing her from pushing back. Ms. Billingslea took Latham's remarks and actions on September 27 as an invitation to a sexual or romantic relationship, which she had neither solicited or encouraged. Ms. Billingslea did not misunderstand Latham or his intentions. Ms. Billingslea was afraid that her rejection of Latham's advances would cost her her job. She believed that Latham could cause her to be fired. On September 28, 1994, Ms. Billingslea was ill. She called her doctor's office and requested that the doctor call in a prescription for her to a local pharmacy. The doctor's office did call in a prescription. Ms. Billingslea advised Latham that she felt ill to which Latham responded that she had just "better be to work." Ms. Billingslea took this remark as an admonishment not to take sick leave. On October 3, 1994, Ms. Billingslea was late for work. She had tried to call the office to advise that she would be late but no one answered the telephone. On October 3, 1994, Latham expressed concern to Ms. Billingslea that she was abusing or not accurately reporting her leave time. Ms. Billingslea perceived that Latham's attitude toward her became cool after their conversation on September 27. Although Latham had never said anything to Ms. Billingslea about being tardy or being absent from work prior to September 27 because he did not think that it was a big deal, he began to voice his dissatisfaction with her work hours after she had spurned his advances. Ms. Billingslea went to the Parole Commission's personnel officer, Frank Trueblood. She wanted to take time off from work to look for another job and asked Mr. Trueblood if there was any type of leave request that she could take which could not be denied by Latham. Mr. Trueblood questioned Ms. Billingslea about the underlying nature of her problems and she told him about Latham's actions. Ms. Billingslea did not want to create a problem but wanted to find another job. Mr. Trueblood told Ms. Billingslea that she could file an informal complaint against Latham and that it would remain confidential. On October 5, 1994, Ms. Billingslea filed an informal complaint against Latham. About 5:00 p.m. that day she met with Chairman Wolson, Mr. Strickland and Clay Phillips to discuss the situation. Chairman Wolson told Ms. Billingslea that she would be transferred to another section. Ms. Billingslea did not display eagerness to file a formal complaint against Latham. Latham saw Ms. Billingslea in Chairman Wolson's office and after Ms. Billingslea had left, he asked to speak with Chairman Wolson. Latham wanted to know what was going on but Chairman Wolson would only tell him that Ms. Billingslea was being transferred to Clemency and that Murlene Amison would be transferred to his office as his secretary. At first Latham was upset at the news of the transfer and told Chairman Wolson that it would be setting a dangerous precedent to make the transfer. Latham told Chairman Wolson that he would like to "save face" in the matter and be the one who would offer the transfer to Ms. Amison. Latham then became exuberant about the transfer, closing his fist, punching up with it in a victory signal and saying "yes." He left Chairman's Wolson's office. A few minutes later, Latham returned to Chairman Wolson's office and told her that he thought he had figured out what had happened. He said that Ms. Billingslea had been sexually harassing him and that he had talked with her and explained that he did not want to have an affair with her. This was the first time anyone at the Parole Commission had heard Latham's claim of sexual harassment by Ms. Billingslea. On October 6, 1994, Ms. Billingslea filed a formal complaint against Latham. Latham tried to find out from Mr. Trueblood whether Ms. Billingslea had filed a sexual harassment complaint against him but Mr. Trueblood would not tell him. Effective October 7, 1994, Ms. Billingslea was reassigned to the position of Executive Secretary for the Clemency Section. On October 7, 1994, Latham called Mr. Strickland to his office and thanked Mr. Strickland for the personnel move, indicating that it had "sav[ed] his butt." Latham asked Mr. Strickland to close the door and then told him that he had been attracted to Ms. Billingslea but nothing had happened, and now, because of the move, nothing would happen. Latham wanted to know what was on the paperwork regarding the transfer. Mr. Strickland told him that it indicated a lateral transfer. Latham knew that it was wrong for a supervisor to invite a subordinate employee into a sexual or romantic relationship. Since she has been at the Parole Commission, Ms. Billingslea has never received formal discipline relevant to any fact or issue in this case.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered finding that Gary Latham violated Section 112.313(6), Florida Statutes, and recommending a civil penalty of $4,000 be imposed and public censure and reprimand. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of January, 1996, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUSAN B. KIRKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of January, 1996. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 95-3717E To comply with the requirements of Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes (1993), the following rulings are made on the parties' proposed findings of fact: Advocate's Proposed Findings of Fact. Paragraph 1: The first sentence is accepted. The remainder is rejected as unnecessary. Paragraph 2: Rejected as unnecessary. Paragraphs 3-5: Accepted. Paragraph 6: The first sentence is accepted in substance. The second sentence is accepted. Paragraphs 7-8: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 9: Accepted. Paragraph 10: The first two sentences are accepted in substance. The last sentence is rejected as unnecessary. Paragraph 11: Accepted. Paragraphs 12-19: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 20: Rejected as subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 21: Accepted in substance. Paragraphs 22-25: Accepted. Paragraphs 26-30: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 31: The first two sentences are accepted in substance. The remainder is rejected as subordinate to the facts found. Paragraphs 32-33: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 34: Accepted. Paragraph 35: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 36: Accepted. Paragraph 37: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 38: Rejected as unnecessary. Paragraphs 39-45: Accepted in substance. Paragraphs 46-59: Rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 60: Rejected as not supported by the evidence. Paragraphs 61-64: Accepted in substance. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact. Paragraph 1: Accepted. Paragraph 2: Accepted. Paragraph 3: Accepted. Paragraph 4: The first two sentences are accepted. The last sentence is accepted in substance. Paragraphs 5-6: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 7: Accepted. Paragraph 8: The third and fourth sentences are rejected as subordinate to the facts found. The remainder is accepted in substance. Paragraph 9: The last sentence is accepted. The remainder is accepted in substance. Latham voiced his concerns after the conversation that he had with Ms. Billingslea on September 27. Paragraphs 10-11: Accepted in substance. Paragraphs 12-13: Rejected as unnecessary. Paragraph 14: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 15: Rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 16: The first sentence is accepted in substance. The remainder is rejected as unnecessary. Paragraph 17: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 18: Rejected as unnecessary. Paragraph 19: The last sentence is accepted in substance except the portion about sexual innuendo. The evidence did establish that he did make sexual innuendos to Ms. Billingslea. The remainder is rejected as subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 20: The first sentence is rejected as not supported by the record. The second sentence is accepted to the extent that he never directly asked Ms. Billingslea for sex, but he did imply that he wanted a romantic liaison when he asked her to stay after work and be with him. The third, fourth, and fifth sentences are rejected as subordinate to the facts found. The last sentence is rejected as not supported by the record. Latham did tell Ms. Billingslea that he had a lot of political influence. Paragraph 21: The first sentence is rejected as argument. The second sentence is accepted in substance. The third sentence is accepted to the extent that that is what she thought at the time the incident occurred but later she realized that it was not a joke. The third sentence is accepted to the extent that Latham denied the incidents but rejected to the extent that it implies that the incidents did not happen. Having judged the credibility of the witnesses, I find that the incidents did happen. The last sentence is rejected as not supported by the evidence. Paragraph 22: The first four sentences are accepted in substance. The fifth sentence is rejected as subordinate to the facts found. The last sentence is rejected as not supported by the evidence. Paragraph 23: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 24: The first sentence is accepted in substance as that is what Latham testified but rejected to the extent that it implies that the conversation did not take place. Accepted in substance that Latham got lost while going to a fund raiser but rejected that he did not go by her house and that he did not comment that she had a nice house and that her blinds were shut. Paragraph 25: The first two sentences are rejected as not supported by the evidence. The third sentence is rejected as unnecessary. The last two sentences are rejected as not supported by the evidence. Paragraph 26: The first four sentences are accepted in substance. The last two sentences are rejected as subordinate to the facts found. Paragraphs 27-28: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 29: The first sentence is accepted in substance. The second sentence is accepted in substance as that was Latham's testimony but rejected to the extent that it implies that he did not describe the graphic sexual details of the case. The third sentence is rejected as not supported by the evidence based on the credibility of the witnesses. The fourth sentence is accepted to the extent that Latham made a comment to Ms. Henry that Ms. Billingslea was interested in the case. The last sentence is accepted in substance. Paragraph 30: Rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 31: Having judged the credibility of the witnesses, the paragraph is rejected. Paragraph 32: Accepted that Latham disputes Ms. Billingslea's allegations but rejected that Latham's version is credible. Paragraph 33: Accepted in substance. Paragraphs 34-37: Having judged the credibility of the witnesses, the paragraphs are rejected. Paragraph 38: The first and second sentences are accepted in substance. The last sentence is accepted to the extent that Latham did not intentionally restrain Ms. Billingslea but rejected to the extent that it implies that Latham was not asking Ms. Billingslea to stay after work for the purpose of seeking sexual gratification or favors. The remainder is rejected as subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 39: The first sentence is rejected as constituting argument. The last sentence is rejected as not supported by the evidence. Paragraphs 40-41: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 42: Rejected as constituting argument. Paragraph 43: The first sentence is accepted in substance. The second sentence is rejected as constituting argument. Paragraph 44: The first sentence is accepted in substance. The second sentence is rejected as constituting argument. Paragraph 45: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 46: Rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 47: Rejected as constituting argument. Paragraphs 48-49: Rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 50: Rejected as constituting argument. Paragraphs 51-53: Rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 54: Rejected as constituting argument. Paragraph 55: Rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 56: Rejected as constituting argument. Paragraph 57: The first two sentences are accepted in substance. The third sentence is accepted as that is what Latham said but rejected as being true. Given other witnesses accounts of Ms. Billingslea's appearance on that date, it is inconceivable that Latham could not have known that she was not sick. The last two sentences are subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 58: Rejected as constituting argument. COPIES FURNISHED: Carrie Stillman Complaint Coordinator Commission on Ethics Post Office Box 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709 Mark Herron, Esquire Post Office Box 10555 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-2555 Virlindia Doss Advocate For the Florida Commission on Ethics Department of Legal Affairs PL-01, The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Bonnie Williams Executive Director Florida Commission On Ethics Post Office Drawer 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709 Phil Claypool General Counsel Ethics Commission 2822 Remington Green Circle, Suite 101 Post Office Drawer 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709
