The Issue Whether Petitioner's application for an environmental resource permit to remove two canal plugs in the Cahill canal system should be granted or denied.
Findings Of Fact The proposed project On March 19, 1998, Petitioner Cahill submitted a permit application to the Department to remove two canal plugs in the Cahill Pines and Palms subdivision on Big Pine key. A backhoe would be used to dredge and lower the plugs to a depth of minus five feet mean low water (-5 ft. MLW) for the purpose of providing boating access to the properties now isolated from open water. The Cahill canal system is located within class III waters of the state which open into Pine Channel, a natural waterbody designated as Outstanding Florida Waters (OFW). In 1991 and 1995 Petitioner Cahill submitted permit applications to the Department to remove the same two canal plugs. Those applications were initially denied and the denials were litigated in formal administrative hearings. Those hearings resulted in Department final orders denying both applications.3 Background4 In July, 1991, the Department received a permit application requesting the removal of two canal plugs down to a depth of minus five-and-a-half feet NGVD. A formal administrative hearing was conducted on March 3 and 4, 1994, in Key West, Florida, before Stuart M. Lerner, a duly designated Hearing Officer (now Administrative Law Judge) of the Division of Administrative Hearings. That initial permit application denial was based upon water quality considerations and the project's failure to meet the public interest test. On May 17, 1995, Petitioner submitted a permit application to the Department which was denied. The basis for the permit denial was that the project was substantially similar to the previously litigated project. On April 23, 1996, a second formal administrative hearing was held in Key West, Florida, before Administrative Law Judge Susan B. Kirkland. Judge Kirkland found that the 1995 permit application did not address the issues raised by the Department in the first administrative hearing. Judge Kirkland also concluded that the 1995 application should be denied on the basis of res judicata. The Department entered a Final Order on September 12, 1996, concluding that the doctrine of res judicata applied to support the denial of Petitioner's 1995 application. New facts/changed conditions In all material aspects, the proposed dredging activity in the current permit application is identical to the previously proposed dredging activity. Petitioner Cahill seeks to lower the two canal plugs to allow boat access. The documents submitted in support of the current application do not propose any significant changes to what was proposed in the two prior applications. Petitioner Cahill provided copies of provisions of the Monroe County Comprehensive Plan, the Florida Keys National Marine Sanctuary Management Plan and two Monroe County Ordinances, in support of the current permit application. This information does not constitute new facts or changed conditions sufficient to characterize the proposed project as substantially different from the previously denied applications. Petitioner Cahill provided a list of "enhancements" in the current permit application seeking to provide reasonable assurance for issuance of an environmental resource permit. These proposed "enhancements" are not binding on the Petitioner Cahill's members and do not constitute such new facts or changed conditions as to make the project substantially different from the previously denied applications. The differences between the current application and the two previously denied applications are primarily cosmetic differences. The substance of the matter is unchanged in any material detail.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be issued in this case denying Petitioner's pending application for an environmental resource permit. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of March, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MICHAEL M. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of March, 1998.
The Issue The issue for determination in this case is whether Rules 28-25.004 and 28-25.006(1), Florida Administrative Code, are vague and arbitrary as defined in Sections 120.52(8)(d) and (e), Florida Statutes, and therefore constitute an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, SEWELL CORKRAN, is a resident of Collier County, Florida, and past President of the Collier County Audubon Society. Petitioner’s standing to bring this action was not contested. Respondent, ADMINISTRATION COMMISSION, is the agency of the State of Florida vested with the statutory authority for the promulgation of Rules 28-25.002, et seq., Florida Administrative Code, pertaining to conservation and development within the Big Cypress Area. The DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITY AFFAIRS (hereinafter AGENCY) is duly authorized to represent the ADMINISTRATION COMMISSION in these proceedings. Rules 28-25.004 and 28-25-006(1), Florida Administrative Code, set forth below, were adopted on November 28, 1973. Stipulated Facts There have been no examples of development in the Big Cypress Area of Critical State Concern such as that described by Petitioner, wherein lands that have been totally altered, have been one-hundred percent developed subsequent to agriculture. Development of ten (10) percent of a site in the Big Cypress Area of Critical State Concern is a reasonably acceptable amount of development. Agency Administration of Rule Chapter 28-25 As indicated above, Rule Chapter 28-25, Florida Administrative Code, was initially promulgated in 1973 pursuant to Section 380.05, Florida Statutes, for the purpose of protection and conservation of the Big Cypress Area of Critical State Concern (ACSC). The challenged agricultural exemption applicable to the Big Cypress ACSC is set forth in Rule 28-25.004, Florida Administrative Code, which provides: Agricultural Exemption. The use of any land for the purpose of growing plants, crops, trees, and other agricultural or forestry products, raising livestock or for other purposes directly related to all such uses are exempt from these regulations. However, whenever any person carries out any activity defined in Section 380, Florida Statutes, as development or applies for a development permit, as defined in Section 380, Florida Statutes, to develop exempted land, these regulations shall apply to such application and to such land. The challenged site alteration provisions of Rule 28- 25.006(1), Florida Administrative Code, limit such development to ten percent providing: Site Alteration. Site alteration shall be limited to 10% of the total site size, and installation of non permeable surfaces shall not exceed 50% of any such area. However, a minimum of 2,500 square feet may be altered on any permitted site. The AGENCY construes Rules 28-25.004 and 28-25.0061, Florida Administrative Code, as complementary. Pursuant to the agency’s construction and application of these rules, if a parcel of land is exempted for agricultural purposes, and is then altered for development purposes as defined in Section 380.04, Florida Statutes (1995), that development, pursuant to Rule 28- 25.006(1), Florida Administrative Code, would be limited to only ten percent of the total site size. Under the agency’s construction and application, the rules are not mutually exclusive, and regardless of an agricultural exemption, development will only be allowed on a maximum of ten percent of the total parcel. The agency makes no distinction made between whether the site is pristine or has been previously disturbed. The construction and application of the rules by the agency has been consistent. In implementing these rules development has been limited to only ten percent of a total site. There is no evidence of any instances in which a site that had been altered under the agricultural exemption was subsequently altered for development purposes to an amount greater than ten percent. There is no evidence that such a subsequent alteration from agriculture to development has ever been attempted. The agency reviews all development orders that are issued in the Big Cypress ACSC based upon established guidelines and standards. The evidence reflects that currently the AGENCY is in the process of appealing a development order issued by Collier County concerning Rule 28-25.006(1), Florida Administrative Code, which involves a request for development of a site previously disturbed by a spoil bank. In that case, the amount of land to be developed was proposed to be in excess of ten percent. The requested conversion was not from agricultural to development, as that term is defined in Section 380.04, Florida Statutes (1995). Because the spoil bank disturbed more than ten percent of the total site, the agency appealed the development order. The record indicates that this appeal is currently going through settlement negotiations wherein development will be limited to ten percent, regardless of the size of the disturbed area created by the spoil bank. The agency considers a number of factors when amending a rule. One of the factors is whether there has been much controversy associated with the rule, which would be one indication that the rule is so vague as to cause confusion in its understanding and inconsistency in its application. This has not been the case where these Big Cypress ACSC rules have been applied. County land development regulations may be stricter then rules promulgated or approved by the AGENCY, pursuant to Rule 28-25.013, Florida Administrative Code, which provides: In case of a conflict between Big Cypress Critical Area regulations and other regulations which are a proper exercise of authority of a governmental jurisdiction, the more restrictive of the provisions shall apply. Collier County’s Land Development Regulation 3.9.6.5.1(7) is more restrictive than Rule 28-25.004, Florida Administrative Code, which deals with the site alteration exemption for agricultural purposes. The following conditions, as applicable, shall be addressed as part of and attachments to the agriculture land clearing application: * * * (7) The property owner, or authorized agent, has filed an executed agreement with the development services director, stating that within two years from the date on which the agricultural clearing permit is approved by the development services director, the owner/agent will put the property into a bona fide agricultural use and pursue such activity in a manner conducive to the successful harvesting of its expected crops or products. The agency does not have statutory authorization to regulate agriculture, which is explicitly exempted from the definition of development in Chapter 380, Florida Statutes (1995), in the Big Cypress Area.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Petition filed in this matter is hereby DISMISSED. DONE and ORDERED this 21st day of April, 1997, in Tallahassee, Florida. RICHARD HIXSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of April, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Sewell Corkran 213 9th Avenue South Naples, Florida 33940-6847 Bob Bradley Office of the Governor The Capitol, Suite 209 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0001 Colin M. Roopnarine, Assistant General Counsel Department of Community Affairs 2555 Shumard Oak Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2100 Liz Cloud, Chief Bureau of Administrative Code Department of State The Elliott Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Carroll Webb, Executive Director Administrative Procedures Committee Holland Building, Room 120 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1300
The Issue Whether Grandview Landscaping Services, Inc., is liable to Petitioner for the purchase of landscaping trees; and, if so, in what amount.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Southeastern Trees, LLC (Petitioner or Southeastern Trees), is a Florida Limited Liability Corporation located in Gainesville, Florida, engaged in the business of commercial tree farming. Keith Lerner is the President of Southeastern, and David Lerner is the Vice President. Respondent, Grandview Landscaping Services, Inc. (Respondent or Grandview), is a Florida corporation headquartered in Ocala, Florida, engaged in commercial landscaping. Grandview is licensed by the Department as a dealer in nursery products, flowers, and sod. In August 2015, John Sapp, Grandview’s owner, visited Petitioner’s tree farm and selected 27 live oak trees to purchase. On December 11, 2014, Mr. Sapp returned to Southeastern Trees and took possession of the 27 live oak trees. Mr. Sapp used his own equipment to haul the trees. Petitioner sent an invoice to Respondent on December 11, 2014, in the amount of $5,724.00 for the 27 live oak trees. The invoice term was “net 30,” allowing 30 days for Respondent to pay in full. After 30 days had elapsed without payment, David Lerner contacted Mr. Sapp to request payment. Mr. Lerner also requested the location of the trees in order to place a lien thereon. According to Mr. Lerner, Mr. Sapp refused to divulge the location of the trees. After 60 days had elapsed without payment, Keith Lerner contacted Mr. Sapp via telephone. According to Keith Lerner, he spoke with Mr. Sapp on March 1, 2015, who informed him the trees were beautiful and Mr. Sapp would “get him a check.” Keith Lerner attempted to reach Mr. Sapp via telephone again on March 10, 2015, and left messages with Grandview’s office and on Mr. Sapp’s personal mobile phone. Mr. Lerner did not receive a return call. On March 25, 2015, Petitioner sent Respondent, via certified mail, a letter requesting payment of $5,724.00 for the 27 live oak trees and “any interest available to us beyond the 30 days of credit that were extended to you.” The letter was delivered to both Grandview’s business address and Mr. Sapp’s home address. The certified mail receipts were returned to Southeastern Trees, signed and dated March 26, 2015. Petitioner filed a complaint with the Department on March 31, 2015, against Southeastern Trees. Petitioner paid a filing fee of $50.00 As of the date of the hearing, Southeastern Trees had not responded to Petitioner’s request for payment.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services enter a final order approving the claim of Southeastern Trees, LLC, against Grandview Landscaping Services, Inc., in the amount of $5,774.00. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of October, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S Suzanne Van Wyk Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of October, 2015.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner should be granted an exemption from disqualification from employment with a private contractor providing adult day training to developmentally disabled clients of Respondent.
Findings Of Fact From April 2016 to October 2016, Petitioner Bertha Delaney ("Delaney") was employed by Cypress Place, Inc. ("Cypress"), a private, nonprofit corporation that provides services to developmentally disabled clients, and operates under the regulatory jurisdiction, of Respondent Agency for Persons with Disabilities ("APD"). Delaney was hired by Cypress as a receptionist, and her responsibilities included answering the phones, handling clerical tasks such as maintaining attendance sheets and filing, and assisting other employees as needed. Cypress operates an adult day training program, which offers "adult day training services" to APD clients. Such services include "training services that take place in a nonresidential setting, separate from the home or facility in which the client resides, and are intended to support the participation of clients in daily, meaningful, and valued routines of the community. Such training may be provided in work-like settings that do not meet the definition of supported employment." § 393.063(1), Fla. Stat. There is no persuasive evidence showing that, during her employment with Cypress, Delaney ever had face-to-face contact with a client while performing adult day training services. She was not, therefore, a "direct service provider" as that term is defined in section 393.063(13), Florida Statutes. Delaney did, however, have incidental, in-person interactions with clients, the evidence establishes, occasionally assisting clients in need of immediate help. Thus, although Delaney did not provide training services to clients, she provided some services in the broader sense of "helpful acts." In early August of 2016, an incident involving a client occurred at Cypress's facility, which the Department of Children and Families ("DCF") investigated. In the course of the investigation, the DCF investigator interviewed Delaney and learned that, because the subject client had appeared to be limping on the day in question, Delaney had helped the client walk from the bus to the building. At the time, Delaney had not yet undergone level 2 background screening because Cypress had not instructed her to do so. Rather, in or around April 2016, when she was hired, Cypress had required Delaney to go to the police department for a local criminal background check, which she did. Delaney, in fact, did everything that Cypress asked her to do with regard to background screening. Soon after (and perhaps because of) the DCF investigation, Cypress directed Delaney to submit to a level 2 background review, which she did.1/ And so it happened that in late August 2016, a search of Delaney's criminal history was performed, and the results were forwarded to DCF, which administers the background screening process for APD. By letter dated October 3, 2016, DCF notified Delaney that it had discovered her criminal conviction on a charge of grand theft of the third degree, to which she had pleaded no contest on June 13, 2001. This crime is a "disqualifying offense" under the applicable screening standards, which means that Delaney is ineligible to work as a direct service provider without an exemption from such disqualification. DCF advised Delaney that she needed to quit her job at Cypress and obtain an exemption from disqualification if she wanted to resume working there. Delaney promptly resigned her position with Cypress. Delaney then sought an exemption from disqualification from employment, submitting her Request for Exemption to DCF in November 2016. By letter dated March 17, 2017, APD informed Delaney that it intended to deny her request based solely on the ground that Delaney had "not submitted clear and convincing evidence of [her] rehabilitation." In other words, APD determined as a matter of ultimate fact that Delaney was not rehabilitated, which meant (as a matter of law) that the head of the agency had no discretion to grant an exemption.2/ APD did not, as an alternative basis for its proposed agency action, articulate any rationale for denying the exemption notwithstanding a showing of rehabilitation, assuming arguendo that such had been made. Delaney initiated the instant proceeding, hoping to prove her rehabilitation. The undersigned has considered the evidence as it relates to the statutory criteria for assessing rehabilitation, and makes the following findings of fact as a predicate for the ultimate determination. The Circumstances Surrounding the Criminal Incident. In or around September of 2000, Delaney stole cash receipts from her employer, Blockbuster Video, totaling approximately $13,800.00. She was soon arrested and charged with grand theft of the third degree, a felony offense as defined in section 812.014, Florida Statutes. At the time of the offense, Delaney, then 25 years old, was experiencing financial difficulties raising two young daughters. Although married, Delaney managed the household mostly on her own, as her husband, an interstate truck driver, was often on the road. Exercising what she now acknowledges was poor judgment, Delaney stole her employer's funds to ease her personal financial burden. On June 13, 2001, appearing before the Circuit Court in and for the Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Florida, Delaney entered a plea of nolo contendere to the criminal charge, was convicted by plea (adjudication withheld), and was sentenced to two years' probation with orders to make restitution in the amount of $13,778.00 to Blockbuster. Delaney completed her term of probation and complied with all of the other conditions imposed by the court, including the payment of restitution. The Time Period That Has Elapsed since the Incident. The disqualifying offense was committed about 17 years ago. Delaney thus has had ample time to restore her reputation and usefulness to society as a law abiding citizen following her conviction, and to mature into an older, more responsible adult. The Nature of the Harm Caused to the Victim. Delaney did not cause personal injury to any person in the commission of her crime. She was ordered to make restitution to the victim, and did, although the details of this transaction are not available in the record. Therefore, the economic harm caused by Delaney's theft appears to have been minimal. The History of the Applicant since the Incident. Since her conviction, Delaney has completed a training program to become a patient care technician and obtained a license to practice in Florida as a certified nursing assistant. She has held positions in these fields and performed admirably. Delaney lives with her two adult daughters, son-in-law, grandson, and fiancé; her current family situation is stable, both emotionally and financially. Her civil rights have been restored. She has not reoffended or otherwise run afoul of the law. APD severely faults Delaney for a so-called nondisclosure in her response to a question on the exemption request form concerning previous employment. The form asks the applicant to "provide your employment history for the last three years." Delaney answered, in relevant part, by stating: "I have not been employed for the last three (3) years." She followed this statement by describing employment predating "the last three (3) years" and explaining that an ankle injury in May 2013 (which required multiple surgeries to repair), together with the attendant convalescence and rehabilitation, had kept her out of the workforce for a couple of years. APD argues that Delaney lied about her employment history——it is undisputed that she had, in fact, worked (for Cypress) during the three years preceding her request for an exemption——and that this alleged "lie" proves Delaney had known not only that she was required to undergo level 2 background screening before taking the job with Cypress, but also that such screening would reveal her disqualifying criminal conviction, and that, therefore, to avoid detection, she had worked without being screened, in knowing violation of law. Put aside for the moment the issue of fact regarding whether Delaney "lied" about her employment history. APD's argument (that this "lie" is proof of Delaney's knowing violation of the background screening law) is illogical. For even if (as a matter of fact3/) Delany were required to be screened, and even if (as a matter of law4/) the background screening statutes were personally violable by an applicant or employee, Delaney's allegedly fraudulent answer to the employment history question does not rationally lead to the conclusion that she knew either of these premises to be true. Moreover, as discussed in endnote 1, it is unacceptable for an agency to rely upon an applicant's alleged violation of a regulatory statute as grounds to deny an exemption request where such alleged violation has never been proved in an enforcement proceeding. This is because any person charged with committing a disciplinable offense must be served with an administrative complaint and afforded clear notice of the right to a hearing, at which, if timely requested, the agency must prove the alleged wrongdoing by clear and convincing evidence. APD wants to skip all that and just have the undersigned find here, for the first time, that Delaney clearly violated section 393.0655 by working at Cypress for at least six months without being screened. See Resp.'s PRO at 9. That's not happening. The only relevant finding in this regard, which the undersigned makes, is that Delaney has never been found to have violated section 393.0655 by working at Cypress for at least six months without being screened. As for the alleged "lie," APD's position that Delaney's response to the employment history question was knowingly and intentionally false (by omitting reference to Cypress) does not make sense, because DCF already knew (from investigating an unrelated matter) that Delaney had worked for Cypress, and Delaney knew that DCF was aware of this fact when she filled out the form. That cat was out of the bag. At hearing, Delaney testified credibly and convincingly that she had not intended to mislead DCF. It is clear that she interpreted the question as asking about her employment during the three years before the job from which she had been disqualified (as opposed to the three years before completing the exemption request form). She misunderstood the question, to be sure, but it was an honest mistake, and the undersigned can appreciate how a person in Delaney's shoes could conclude that the job from which one has recently been disqualified does not "count" towards her employment history for purposes of seeking an exemption from disqualification. Delaney's testimony in this regard is corroborated by the fact that she submitted to DCF, as part of her exemption request package, two letters of recommendation from employees of Cypress, written on Cypress letterhead, attesting to her good character. These letters, taken together, make it clear that Delaney had recently been an employee of Cypress. Obviously, if Delaney had intended, knowingly, to deceive DCF by concealing her employment with Cypress, she would not have provided these letters. APD argues that one of these letters, from Rashard Williams, which is dated October 27, 2016, does not specifically indicate that Delaney ever worked at Cypress——and thus does not bolster Delaney's testimony that she never intended to conceal the fact that she had. To reach this conclusion one must discount the writer's statement that "Ms. Delaney has proven herself to be reliable, trustworthy, and compassionate both as a person and as an employee." If the Williams letter were the only written recommendation from a Cypress employee, however, the undersigned would consider APD's interpretation to be, while certainly not the best or most reasonable, at least plausible in view of Mr. Williams's additional comments about how well Delaney took care of his grandmother in a capacity, apparently, other than as an employee of Cypress. But the companion to the Williams letter, a recommendation from Mark Chmiel dated October 24, 2016, leaves no room for doubt that Delaney was a recent employee of Cypress. A short, two-sentence excerpt suffices to support this finding: "Bertha is an invaluable addition to our agency [i.e., Cypress,] and she has fulfilled the potential of her position far better than anyone before her. Her moral character is beyond reproach and I have no qualms about trusting her with our clients."5/ The letters of recommendation that Delaney furnished DCF refute the notion that she knowingly omitted Cypress from her employment history with the intent to mislead DCF. They prove, instead, that Delaney took for granted DCF's knowledge of her work for Cypress, for she was certain DCF already knew about it. In turn, that foundational assumption (which, in fact, was true) prompted Delaney to provide a history of her employment during the several years leading up to the job with Cypress. The undersigned finds that Delaney is not guilty of knowingly withholding material information from DCF in response to the question about her previous employment. Finally, the undersigned observes that APD, in its preliminary decision-making, impermissibly allowed speculation and conjecture to take the place of facts. In forming its intent to deny Delaney's application, APD took into account the "possibility that Ms. Delaney was trying to protect Cypress Place from demonstrating that they were in violation of the screening laws" as well as the "possibility that Rashard Williams might have tried to hide the fact [sic6/] that there was a violation of the screening requirements by Cypress Place." Resp.'s PRO at 10 (emphasis added). On the basis of this rank speculation, APD conjectured that "Ms. Delaney was willing to collude with [Cypress employees] in order not to spotlight their violation of the licensing law." Resp.'s PRO at 18. APD proved none of this imaginative guesswork. Circumstances Showing Applicant Poses No Danger. Yvonne Ginsberg, the executive director of Cypress, testified in support of Delaney's application. Ms. Ginsberg stated that Delaney was an "excellent" employee and affirmed that she had "no qualms" about Delaney's returning to work at Cypress once an exemption has been secured. The undersigned credits Ms. Ginsberg's testimony as to Delaney's character. In addition, Delaney submitted the written character references of Messrs. Chmiel and Williams, which were discussed above. These documents credibly attest to Delaney's trustworthiness, integrity, and ethical behavior. The undersigned finds without hesitation that Delaney would likely not present a danger in the future if an exemption from disqualification were granted. Ultimate Factual Determination The undersigned has determined, based on clear and convincing evidence, including sufficient persuasive evidence of rehabilitation, that Delaney should not be disqualified from employment because she is, in fact, rehabilitated.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Persons with Disabilities enter a final order granting Bertha Delaney the exemption from disqualification for which she is, in fact, eligible. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of August, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of August, 2017.
