The Issue Whether Respondent committed the violations alleged in the First Amended Administrative Complaint; and If so, what disciplinary action should be taken against him.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following findings of fact are made: Respondent's Licensure Status Respondent is now, and has been at all times material to the instant case, a Florida-licensed life and health insurance agent. Counts I through VI At all times material to the instant case, Peter DeBello, Inc., d/b/a Emery Richardson Insurance (Corporation), a Florida corporation owned by Respondent's father, operated a general lines insurance agency (Emery Richardson Insurance) located in the state of Florida. The Corporation was formed to manage the assets of Emery Richardson, Inc., which assets Respondent's father had obtained through litigation. Respondent's father delegated to Respondent the authority to manage the affairs of the Corporation. The same day (in 1992) that the Corporation took possession of Emery Richardson, Inc.'s assets, it so notified the Department of Insurance (Department) by telephone. Shortly thereafter, Leo Joy, a Florida-licensed property and casualty insurance agent since 1961, was designated on a Department- provided form as the primary agent for Emery Richardson Insurance at its 240 Commercial Boulevard location in Lauderdale By The Sea, Florida, and the completed form was provided to the Department.3 At no time prior to the commencement of the instant administrative proceeding did Respondent himself personally notify the Department of the identity of Emery Richardson Insurance's primary agent. It was Mr. Joy who (in 1992) filled out the primary agent designation form and submitted it to the Department. Mr. Joy, however, did so on behalf of Respondent, who had verbally designated Mr. Joy as Emery Richardson Insurance's primary agent. Neither Respondent, Mr. Joy, nor any one else, has subsequently used the Department's primary agent designation form to advise the Department of Mr. Joy's continuing status as Emery Richardson Insurance's primary agent. In his capacity as president of the Corporation, Respondent, on behalf of the Corporation, in April of 1994, entered into an agreement (Agreement) with Ulico Casualty Company of Washington, D.C. (Ulico), which provided as follows: WHEREAS, the Applicant (Corporation), a licensed insurance agent and/or insurance broker, has heretofore obtained from the COMPANY (Ulico) or is desirous of obtaining from the COMPANY the placement of insurance for the Applicant's customers or principals, and WHEREAS, the COMPANY, using its facilities, has placed insurance for the Applicant or with whom Applicant has requested the placement of such insurance, NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual promises herein contained, and for other good and valuable consideration, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged. It is mutually AGREED as follows: With reference to the placement of new insurance, Applicant shall submit to the COMPANY a separate application containing the name of each prospective insured, describing the risk to be considered for underwriting and binding. Applicant specifically understands and agrees that Applicant shall have no authority to authorize or write any insurance or bind any risk on behalf of the COMPANY without the prior written approval by a duly authorized representative of the COMPANY. With respect to any insurance heretofore placed with the COMPANY by the Applicant, and with respect to any insurance hereinafter placed by the Applicant, all premiums shall be payable to the COMPANY and such Applicant assumes and agrees to pay the COMPANY premiums on all the policies of insurance heretofore or hereinafter placed by Applicant with the COMPANY in accordance with the current statements rendered to the Applicant by the COMPANY, such payment to be made no later than 30 days after the month of issue of the insurance policy, or due date of any installment if issued on an installment basis, less any credits due to the Applicant for return premium, provided an appropriate credit memorandum therefor has previously been issued by the COMPANY to Applicant. In the absence of such credit memorandum, Applicant shall have no right of counterclaim or setoff with respect to any claimed credits due, but shall be required to establish entitlement to the same in a separate action. Applicant shall have the right, so long as Applicant is not indebted to the COMPANY, to deduct agreed upon commissions on each policy of insurance prior to remitting the remaining premium to the COMPANY. In the event that premiums on behalf of any insured party shall have been financed and refund of financed premiums are required from the COMPANY to the financing institution, Applicant shall forthwith refund and pay to the COMPANY all unearned commissions heretofore received with respect to such financed premiums. In the event that Applicant shall fail to make any payment to the COMPANY which is required to be made pursuant to this Agreement, within the time specified, the COMPANY shall have the right, at any time subsequent to the due date of payment, to cancel any policy on which the premium payments have not been remitted to the COMPANY, without prior notice to the Applicant, by sending notice of cancellation directly to the insured, except that Applicant shall continue to remain liable to the COMPANY for the payment of all premiums earned as of the date of cancellation which are collected by Applicant. Applicant represents that they are duly licensed as an insurance broker or agent for Casualty and Property Insurance as indicated in the States set forth below, and agrees that in the event that any license shall cease, terminate or be cancelled, that the Applicant will promptly notify the COMPANY accordingly. Applicant agrees, where required, to file at Applicant's expense, all necessary affidavits and collect all State or local premium taxes and to pay the same promptly to the respective taxing authorities on all insurance placed with the COMPANY, in accordance with the laws applicable in the State of licensing. No changes or modification of this Agreement shall be valid unless such change or modification is subscribed, in writing, by the COMPANY and Applicant. Ulico is one of approximately 47 insurance companies that Emery Richardson Insurance represents. In the past five years, Emery Richardson Insurance has received from clients in excess of seven or eight million dollars in premium payments, which it has deposited in its various checking accounts and then paid over to these insurance companies. Ulico is the only one of these 47 insurance companies to have experienced "problems" in receiving from Emery Richardson Insurance monies due. These "problems" are detailed below. On June 13, 1994, the Corporation opened a checking account (account no. 458-902279-9, hereinafter referred to as the "Account") with Savings of America at the bank's Hollywood, Florida, branch. The Peter Debello described on the signature card for the Account was Respondent's father. Respondent's father, however, through execution of a power of attorney, had authorized Respondent to act on his behalf in connection with the Account. On August 20, 1996, Respondent drafted and signed four checks drawn on the Account, which were made payable to Ulico: check no. 804, in the amount of $1,729.15, for "Teamsters #769, Policy #BOU 907"; check no. 805, in the amount of $1,071.65, for "Sheet Metal Appr. #32, Policy #CLU 668"; check no. 806, in the amount of $700.00, for "Sheet Metal #32, Policy #CLU 682"; and check no. 807, in the amount of $96.05, for "Painters L.U. 160, Policy #CLU 451." (These policies will hereinafter be referred to as the "Subject Policies.") On January 24, 1997, Respondent drafted and signed a check (check no. 882) drawn on the Account, in the amount of $7,500.00, which was also made payable to Ulico. Check nos. 804, 805, 806, 807,4 and 882 were sent to Ulico as payment for monies the Corporation owed Ulico (pursuant to the Agreement) for insurance coverage obtained from Ulico by the Corporation for its clients (as reflected in invoices Ulico sent the Corporation, which hereinafter will be referred to as the "Subject Invoices").5 At the time that he drafted and signed these checks and submitted them to Ulico, Respondent assumed that there were sufficient funds in the Account to cover the amounts of the checks. In drafting and signing these checks and submitting them to Ulico, Respondent did not make any statements or representations that he knew to be false or misleading. All five checks were returned by Savings of America unpaid, with the explanation, "insufficient funds," stamped on each check.6 (These checks will hereinafter be referred to as the "Dishonored Checks.") Ulico's premium collection manager, Gayle Shuler, spoke with Respondent, as well as with Mr. Joy, "many times" concerning the monies the Corporation owed Ulico. At no time did either Respondent or Mr. Joy indicate that they disputed the Subject Invoices7 (although Respondent and Mr. Joy did contest other invoices that they received from Ulico). Although aware that the Dishonored Checks had been returned due to insufficient funds8 and knowing that Ulico desired payment, Respondent failed to act promptly to remedy the situation. It was not until early 1998, after the commencement of the instant administrative proceeding, that Respondent, on behalf of the Corporation, took steps to address the matter. At that time, using Fidelity Express money orders purchased between February 26, 1998, and March 1, 1998, (which Respondent dated August 26, 1996), Respondent paid Ulico a portion ($1,867.70) of the total amount of the Dishonored Checks. The money orders were sent to Ulico by certified mail, along with a cover letter from Respondent. Respondent "backdated" the money orders to reflect "when [the monies owed Ulico] should have been" paid. He did so without any intent to mislead or deceive. There is no clear and convincing evidence that anyone other than Ulico was injured by Respondent's failure to timely pay over to Ulico the monies Emery Richardson Insurance had received from its clients for the Subject Policies (which monies belonged to Ulico). Respondent's failure to timely make such payments, it appears, was the product of isolated instances of carelessness, neglect and inattention on Respondent's part,9 which, when considered in light of the totality of circumstances, including his problem-free dealings with the other insurance companies Emery Richardson Insurance represents, were not so serious as to demonstrate a lack of fitness, trustworthiness or competency to engage in transactions authorized by his license. Count VII In August of 1986, Respondent visited Gary Faske, Esquire, at Mr. Faske's office in Dade County, Florida. The purpose of the visit was to have Mr. Faske complete the paperwork necessary to add Mr. Faske to his new employer's group major medical insurance policy with Union Bankers Insurance Company. After the paperwork was completed, Respondent left Mr. Faske's office with the completed paperwork, as well as a check from Mr. Faske's employer to cover the cost of adding Mr. Faske to the group policy.10 It is unclear what Respondent did with the paperwork and check after he left Mr. Faske's office. In October of that same year (1986), Mr. Faske took ill and had to be hospitalized on an emergency basis. He assumed that he was covered by his employer's group major medical insurance policy, but he subsequently learned that he was wrong and had to pay between $50,000.00 to $60,000.00 in medical bills. The evidence does not clearly and convincingly establish that Respondent (as opposed to Union Bankers Insurance Company or some other party) was responsible for Mr. Faske not having such coverage. Mr. Faske thereafter filed suit against Respondent and Union Bankers Insurance Company in Dade County Circuit Court. He settled his claim against the insurance company, but was unable to reach an agreement with Respondent. Respondent's case therefore went to trial, following which, on August 12, 1997, a Final Judgment11 was entered against Respondent in the amount of $40,271.00.12 Count VIII By filing an Address Correction Request, dated January 29, 1992, Respondent notified the Department that his new mailing address was 40 Hendricks Isle, Fort Lauderdale, Florida. The Department subsequently sent a letter, dated April 14, 1995, to Respondent at this 40 Hendricks Isle address. Respondent, however, "had just moved from that address," and the letter was returned to the Department stamped, "forward expired." In May of 1995, Respondent advised the Department in writing of his new mailing address. It is unclear whether such written notification was given more than, or within, 30 days from the date Respondent had moved to his new address.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department issue a final order: (1) finding Respondent guilty of the violations noted in the Conclusions of Law of this Recommended Order; (2) penalizing Respondent for having committed these violations by suspending his license for 18 months; and (3) dismissing the remaining allegations of misconduct advanced in the First Amended Administrative Complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of February, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of February, 1999.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: Respondent, Department of Banking and Finance, Division of Finance (Division), is the state agency charged with administering the mortgage brokerage guaranty fund (fund) codified in Sections 494.042 through 494.045, Florida Statutes (1987). Among other things, the Division processes claims for payment from the fund by persons who were parties to a mortgage financing transaction and who have suffered monetary damages as a result of a violation of the law by a licensed mortgage broker. In this case, the perpetrator was Stackhouse Mortgage Corporation (Stackhouse), which held mortgage brokerage license number HB-0006527 from September 19, 1976 through August 31, 1986 and operated at least part of that time in the Brevard County area. In order to perfect a successful claim and be assured of participating in the distribution of moneys from the fund, a person must satisfy a number of statutory criteria within a specified time period after the first notice is filed. This proceeding involves a number of claims by various parties who suffered monetary damages as a result of the illicit acts of Stackhouse. The principal factual issues are whether petitioners, Robert Motes, Machiko Motes, Madge Chesser and Christiane E. Driscoll, all claimants, satisfied the required statutory criteria within the specified time period, and whether the first valid and complete notice of a claim was filed on January 20, 1987 as maintained by the Division, or occurred on a later date as urged by petitioners. These issues are crucial to petitioners' interests since the amount of money to be distributed from the fund for all claimants (on a pro rata basis) is $100,000, and all of that money has been proposed to be distributed to intervenors and other claimants because of the alleged untimeliness of petitioners' claims. The Stackhouse matter first came to the Division's attention on January 20, 1987 when it received by certified mail a letter containing a copy of a complaint filed against Stackhouse by intervenors, Richard S. and Althea M. Rucki, in the circuit court of the eighteenth judicial circuit in and for Brevard County. This filing constituted the first valid and complete notice of the matter. As such, it triggered a two year time period in which other claimants had to file such notice with the Division and then satisfy all statutory criteria in order to share in the first, and in this case the only, distribution of moneys from the fund. Intervenors eventually obtained a summary final judgment against Stackhouse on January 10, 1989 in the amount of $27,200 plus $1,972 in interest, $76 in court costs, and $2,000 in attorney's fees. Copies of the judgment, unsatisfied writ of execution and affidavit of diligent search were filed with the Division on January 19, 1989, or within two years from the date the first notice was filed. After the Rucki notice was filed, a number of claimants, including the other intervenors, filed their notices with the Division within the two year time period and thereafter satisfied all pertinent statutory criteria. Their names, dates of filing their final claims with the Division, and amounts of final judgment, including costs and fees, are listed below in the order in which the claimants filed their first notice with the Division: Claimant Date of Filing Claim Amount of judgment Roberts January 19, 1989 $84,562.30 Rucki January 19, 1989 31,248.00 Gantz January 19, 1989 15,634.28 Carman January 19, 1989 48,767.87 Thomas July 21, 1988 40,103.22 Hahn January 19, 1989 14,165.14 Ulriksson January 18, 1989 14,497.00 Choate January 18, 1989 28,994.00 Anderson December 22, 1988 84,443.20 Resnick December 22, 1988 32,912.22 It is noted that each of the foregoing claimants satisfied all statutory requirements prior to the date of the filing of their respective final claims with the Division. This included the obtaining of a judgment against the debtor, having a writ of execution issued upon the judgment which was later returned unsatisfied, and thereafter having made a reasonable search and inquiry to ascertain whether the judgment debtor possessed any property or other assets to be used in satisfying the judgment. Based upon the judgments obtained by the above claimants, those persons are entitled to distribution from the fund in the following pro rata amounts: Anderson claim - $10,950.00 Resnick claim - 10,950.00 Carman claim - 10,950.00 Thomas claim - 10,950.00 Ulriksson claim - 7,937.83 Choate claim - 10,950.00 Roberts claim - 10,950.00 Gantz claim - 7,697.63 Hahn claim - 7,714.54 Rucki claim - 10,950.00 $100.000.00 On July 27, 1988 petitioners, Robert and Machiko Motes and Madge Chesser, filed their notices with the Division. On August 2, 1988, they were advised by the Division that "the first time period for payment of the Guaranty Fund claims is `two years after the first claim.'" Even so, petitioners did not complete all required statutory steps and file their final claims with the Division until March 1, 1989, or after the two year period had expired. Petitioner, Christiane E. Driscoll, filed her notice, copy of complaint and final judgment on January 23, 1989. Thereafter, she completed all required statutory steps and filed her final claim with the Division on June 6, 1989. As a consequence, none of petitioners are entitled to share in the first distribution of moneys from the fund. An attorney who once represented Driscoll, Rafael A. Burguet, made inquiry by telephone with a Division employee in either late December 1988 or early January 1989 concerning the steps required to process a claim on behalf of his client. It was his recollection that the Division employee did not advise him that the two year period for perfecting claims was triggered in January 1987. On January 20, 1989, Burguet sent a letter to the Division with a copy of the complaint and final judgment against Stackhouse. In the letter, he requested the Division to "please advise as to what further requirements you may have to file this claim." On January 23, 1989 a Division employee acknowledged by letter that the Division had received the complaint and judgment. The letter contained copies of the relevant portions of the Florida Statutes and advice that "claims for recovery against Stackhouse Mortgage Corporation are currently being forwarded to our Legal Department for the drafting of a Notice of Intent to either grant or deny payment from the Fund." There is no evidence that the Division made any positive representations to Burguet that either mislead him or caused him to delay in filing his claim. Similarly, the Division responded on August 2, 1988 to the initial filing of the Motes and Chesser notices with advice that the time period for complying with the statutory criteria was "two years after the first claim." Although there were subsequent telephone conversations (but no written communications) between their attorney and the Division, there was no evidence that the Division made any positive representations that would mislead petitioners or otherwise cause them to delay processing their claims. Petitioners Motes and Chesser contend that the first valid and complete notice was not received by the Division until May 20, 1987 when intervenor Carman filed a complaint against Stackhouse in circuit court and also filed her claim and copy of the complaint with the Division the same date. Under this theory, the two year period would not expire until May 19, 1989. This contention is based on the fact that the Rucki complaint was filed in circuit court on January 9, 1987 but the claim and copy of the complaint were not filed with the Division until January 20, 1987. Petitioners contend that subsection 494.043(1)(e) requires both acts to be accomplished the same date. However, this construction of the statute is contrary to the manner in which it has been construed by the Division. According to the stipulated testimony of an employee of the Brevard County sheriff's office, if the property to be levied on is not listed on the instructions to levy, the sheriff's office requires a court order prior to filing a return nulla bona. In this case seven claimants obtained such a court order directing the sheriff to furnish a return nulla bona as to the writ of execution. However, petitioners Motes and Chesser did not do so until after the two year time period had expired. The records received in evidence reflect that the initial inquiry made by Robert and Virginia R. Enteen was never pursued and therefore their claim should be denied.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that respondent enter a final order distributing the moneys from the mortgage brokerage guaranty fund in a manner consistent with its proposed agency action entered on June 21, 1989. The requests of petitioners to share in the first distribution of moneys from the fund should be DENIED. DONE and ORDERED this 11th day of December, 1989 in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of December, 1989.
The Issue Whether Respondents committed the offenses set forth in the administrative complaints and the amended administrative complaint and, if so, what action should be taken.
Findings Of Fact On May 26, 1989, the Department of Professional Regulation (now, the Department of Business and Professional Regulation), Board of Auctioneers (Petitioner) licensed Irwin Sherwin (Respondent Sherwin) as an auctioneer. He was issued license number AU 0000720. However, Respondent Sherwin was initially denied licensure. On December 29, 1986, Respondent Sherwin submitted an application for licensure, without examination, as an auctioneer to the Petitioner. By order dated October 22, 1987, the Petitioner denied Respondent Sherwin's application on the basis that Respondent Sherwin had been charged with grand theft. Respondent Sherwin requested an informal hearing on his denial. By final order dated September 14, 1988, and filed September 19, 1988, the Petitioner granted Respondent Sherwin's application, subject to certain special conditions, including payment of a $10,000 fine, posting of a $300,000 auctioneer bond,3 and imposition of a period of probation after licensure, with Respondent Sherwin, during the probation, practicing under the supervision of an approved auctioneer. Subsequently, through agreement made by Respondent Sherwin at Petitioner's meeting held on February 16, 1989, the Petitioner modified the bond requirement by order dated March 4, 1989, and filed March 9, 1989, to include the following: (a) a $10,000 auctioneer bond and a $25,000 auction business bond, within 30 days of February 16, 1989, to permit licensure; and (b) a $25,000 auctioneer bond and a $50,000 auction business bond, within 30 days of the date of the order, in order for Respondent Sherwin to maintain licensure. On or about October 20, 1989, after Respondent Sherwin was licensed by the Petitioner, Respondent Sherwin obtained a $25,000 auctioneer bond from American Bankers Insurance Company of Florida. On November 6, 1989, Respondent Sherwin posted the bond with the Petitioner. On February 19, 1990, Respondent Beach Auction House, Inc. (Respondent Auction House) was licensed by the Petitioner as an auction business. Respondent Auction House was issued license number 0000531. As a condition of licensure, Respondent Auction House was required to obtain a bond for an auction business. On or about December 1, 1989, Respondent Auction House obtained a $25,000 bond as a auction business from American Bankers Insurance Company of Florida, the same surety for Respondent Sherwin. The president of Respondent Auction House was Respondent Sherwin's son, Louis Sherwin. The address for Respondent Auction House was 2009 Northeast 2nd Street, Deerfield Beach, Florida. On December 1, 1993, Respondent Auction House's license became delinquent for failure to renew its license. Respondent Auction House's license has remained delinquent since December 1, 1993. Case No. 95-3710 In August 1974, the North Carolina Auctioneer Licensing Board (North Carolina Auctioneer Board) licensed Respondent Sherwin as an auctioneer and licensed Blowing Rock Auction Galleries, Inc., his business, as an auction firm. On March 14, 1994, in the General Court of Justice, Superior Court Division, Wake County, North Carolina, Case Nos. 94-CRS-2435, 2441, 2443, 2448, pursuant to a plea agreement, Respondent Sherwin pled guilty to two felony counts of embezzlement of state property and two felony counts of embezzlement of county property. The embezzlement related to unpaid sales tax due the State of North Carolina and one of its counties by Respondent Sherwin's business, Blowing Rock Galleries, Inc., for which Respondent Sherwin was responsible under the law of the State of North Carolina. As part of the plea agreement, among other things, Respondent Sherwin was sentenced to 6 years in North Carolina's state prison, but his sentence was suspended, and he was placed on unsupervised probation for 5 years under certain specific conditions. On advice of counsel, Respondent Sherwin entered into the plea agreement.4 The felony convictions against Respondent Sherwin have not been set-aside or voided by a court of competent jurisdiction. By Consent Order dated December 21, 1994, the North Carolina Auctioneer Board took action against Respondent Sherwin and Blowing Rock Auction Galleries, Inc., related to several improprieties, including the embezzlement felonies, under the laws and rules governing auctioneers in the State of North Carolina. As to the improprieties, Respondent Sherwin, his son, Louis Sherwin and Blowing Rock Auction Galleries, Inc., entered into a settlement agreement in which they agreed, among other things, that their licenses, issued by the North Carolina Auctioneer Board, would be surrendered and that their licenses would be considered permanently revoked. By the Consent Order, the North Carolina Auctioneer Board approved the settlement agreement and pursuant to the settlement agreement, ordered, among other things, the surrender of the licenses of Respondent Sherwin, his son, and Blowing Rock Auction Galleries, Inc., subject to the conditions and limitations of the settlement agreement. Case Nos. 95-5044 and 95-5046 On March 17, 1994, Tanya Braunshteyn and her husband, Michael Braunshteyn, while on vacation, attended an auction at Respondent Auction House. Respondent Sherwin was present at the auction but did not conduct the auction. The Braunshteyns were successful bidders on a picture or framed sculpture, a ring, and a china set at a total cost of $3,483.30. The Braunshteyns did not purchase the merchandise at that time but left a deposit. The following day the Braunshteyns returned to Respondent Auction House to retrieve and pay for their merchandise. They paid $3,250 in cash as partial payment for the merchandise and received the picture or framed sculpture and the ring, together with a receipt, written descriptions of the merchandise received, and certificates of valuation. Respondent Sherwin agreed that the Braunshteyns could pay the balance, $233.30, for the china by check at a later time and that the china would be shipped to them after receipt of the check. On March 26, 1994, Mrs. Braunshteyn mailed a check to Respondent Sherwin in the amount of $233.30 for the balance on the china. On April 11, 1994, the check cleared her bank. However, the Braunshteyns did not receive the china. They made several telephone calls to Respondent Auction House and spoke with Respondent Sherwin several times inquiring about the china. The Braunshteyns received several different and unsatisfactory reasons as to why the china was not sent to them. On March 18, 1995, approximately 11 months after the balance was paid on the china, the Braunshteyns were again vacationing in Florida. They visited the Respondent Auction House with the specific intent of receiving a refund of the money they paid for the china that they never received. At that time, Respondent Sherwin refunded their money in full for the china. Case No. 95-5045 After inquiry from the Petitioner, by letter dated May 19, 1995, American Bankers Insurance Company notified the Petitioner that Respondent Sherwin's surety bond had been cancelled. The Bond Notice of Cancellation, accompanying the letter, indicates that the auctioneer's bond was cancelled effective November 18, 1990, due to an underwriting decision by the surety. Respondent Sherwin does not dispute that a surety bond was not maintained and in force for either him, as an auctioneer, or for Respondent Auction House, as an auction business.5 Case No. 95-5047 In 1989 Louis Carusillo consigned to Jack Beggs approximately 1000 items of merchandise, including furniture, jade, and sculptures, worth between $600,000 and $800,000. Mr. Beggs owned an auction business located in Sarasota, Florida. Sometime in 1990, without Mr. Carusillo's knowledge or consent, Mr. Beggs re-consigned and delivered a substantial portion of Mr. Carusillo's merchandise to Respondent Sherwin in Blowing Rock, North Carolina. Respondent Sherwin received the merchandise in two or three truckloads at his auction gallery, Blowing Rock Auction Galleries, Inc., in Blowing Rock. At the time of delivery, Respondent Sherwin failed to inventory Mr. Carusillo's merchandise. As a result of the failure to inventory, Mr. Carusillo's merchandise was commingled with merchandise belonging to Respondent Sherwin at Blowing Rock Auction Galleries. All of Mr. Carusillo's merchandise were tagged with his initials on them. At some point in time, Respondent Sherwin noticed Mr. Carusillo's initials on the merchandise. Respondent Sherwin recognized Mr. Carusillo's initials, due to a prior business dealing in years past in which Mr. Carusillo had consigned some merchandise to Respondent Sherwin. In the summer of 1990, Respondent Sherwin telephoned Mr. Carusillo regarding Mr. Carusillo's merchandise at Blowing Rock Auction Galleries received from Mr. Beggs. The telephone conversation with Respondent Sherwin was the first time that Mr. Carusillo had knowledge of the merchandise that he had consigned to Mr. Beggs being delivered to Respondent Sherwin. Mr. Carusillo viewed his past transaction with Respondent Sherwin as unsatisfactory and had no intentions of allowing Respondent Sherwin to possess and sell his merchandise. Mr. Carusillo conveyed his position to Respondent Sherwin. Mr. Carusillo refused to consign any of his merchandise to Respondent Sherwin and refused to sign any written agreement authorizing Respondent Sherwin to sell any of the merchandise. Despite knowing of Mr. Carusillo's position and despite having no written agreement authorizing the sale of any of Mr. Carusillo's merchandise, Respondent Sherwin retained Mr. Carusillo's merchandise and sold some of the merchandise at both Blowing Rock Auction Galleries and at Respondent Auction House. (In the winter of 1990, Respondent Sherwin had Mr. Carusillo's merchandise delivered to Respondent Auction House.) In 1991, Mr. Carusillo filed a civil action against, among others, Respondent Sherwin and his son, Louis Sherwin, in the Circuit Court of Broward County, Florida, Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, Case No. 91-03351. Through the law suit, Mr. Carusillo sought, among other things, the return of his merchandise in the possession of Respondent Sherwin, an injunction to stop further sales of his merchandise by Respondent Sherwin, and an accounting of his merchandise from Respondent Sherwin. An Agreed Temporary Injunction was entered by the Court on February 14, 1991, forbidding, among other things, the sale or removal of Mr. Carusillo's merchandise and ordering an accounting of his merchandise. An Agreed Order as to Replevin was entered by the Court on May 9, 1991, allowing, among other things, Mr. Carusillo to remove his merchandise from Respondent Sherwin's possession. Even though Respondent Sherwin rendered an accounting of Mr. Carusillo's merchandise, the accounting was not satisfactory. Furthermore, even after Mr. Carusillo removed what he thought was all of his merchandise, Respondents sold other merchandise belonging to Mr. Carusillo. After protracted litigation, by an Amended Final Judgment dated April 26, 1995, entered nunc pro tunc August 18, 1994, the Court entered judgment against Respondent Sherwin, his son (Louis Sherwin), and Mr. Beggs. As to Respondent Sherwin and his son, the Court found that they were jointly and severally liable and awarded Mr. Carusillo, among other things, the sum of $468,959.74, which included the following: a total pecuniary loss of $113,639.30 (including interest of $12,167.80), pre- judgment interest of $44,347.28, treble damages for civil theft, which brought the total to $473,959.74, and a credit to Respondent Sherwin and his son, which reduced the total to $468,959.74. The Amended Final Judgment was appealed but was upheld by the appellate court. At the hearing in the instant case, Respondents attempted to show that the monetary loss to Mr. Carusillo, as evidenced by the Amended Final Judgment, was incorrect and improper. However, the evidence presented by Petitioner at hearing was clear and convincing that the monetary judgment entered by the Court should not be disturbed. Respondents failed to present evidence to overcome Petitioner's showing. By Order dated September 27, 1996, the Circuit Court of Broward County directed payment to Mr. Carusillo for the judgment from the Auctioneer Recovery Fund in the amount of Mr. Carusillo's "actual and direct losses occurring subsequent to October 1, 1991." Subsequently, Mr. Carusillo made a claim for payment of the judgment from the Auctioneer Recovery Fund. On December 6, 1996, Petitioner considered Mr. Carusillo's claim. On December 31, 1996, Petitioner entered an order on the claim ordering, among other things, that Mr. Carusillo be paid $94,575 from the Auctioneer Recovery Fund and that $47,287.50 of the $94,575 was attributable to Respondent Sherwin. On or about January 15, 1997, a warrant from the State of Florida was issued for $94,575, representing payment to Mr. Carusillo from the Auctioneer Recovery Fund.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Board of Auctioneers enter a final order: Finding that Irwin Sherwin violated Subsection 468.389(1)(l) and (k), Florida Statutes, of Counts I and II, respectively, in Case No. 95-3710. Finding Beach Auction House violated Subsection 468.389(1)(e), Florida Statutes, in Case No. 95-5044. Finding Irwin Sherwin, d/b/a Beach Auction House, Inc., violated: Subsection 468.389(1)(j), Florida Statutes, of Counts I and II in Case No. 95-5045. Subsection 468.389(1)(e), Florida Statutes, in Case No. 95-5046. Subsection 468.389(1)(j), Florida Statutes, of Count I in Case No. 95-5047. Subsection 468.389(1)(e), Florida Statutes, of Count II in Case No. 95-5047.6 Subsection 468.389(1)(h), Florida Statutes, of Count III in Case No. 95-5047. Subsection 468.389(1)(c), Florida Statutes, of Count V in Case No. 95-5047. Imposing a $8,000 administrative fine against Irwin Sherwin. Imposing a $6,000 administrative fine against Beach Auction House, Inc. Revoking the license of Irwin Sherwin. Revoking the license of Beach Auction House, Inc. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of February, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ERROL H. POWELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of February, 1998.
The Issue The central issues in these cases are the Petitioners' challenges to proposed rules of the Department of Insurance (Department).
Findings Of Fact The Department is the state agency charged with the responsibility to promulgate and enforce rules pursuant to Chapters 624 through 651, Florida Statutes. The Petitioner, FAUA, is an association of automobile insurers whose interests would be substantially affected by the proposed rules, if adopted, as the subject matter of the proposed rules is within the FAUA's general scope of interest and activities. The other Petitioners are premium finance companies licensed pursuant to Chapter 627, Florida Statutes whose interests will also be substantially affected by the proposed rules, if adopted. Mary Russo is a financial examiner/analyst coordinator employed by the Department whose duties involve the regulation of premium finance companies. She has been so employed for approximately six years. Ms. Russo prepared or aided in the preparation of the economic impact statement and the detailed written statement of facts and circumstances drafted in connection with the proposed rules at issue in this proceeding. In pertinent part, the economic impact statement provided: An estimate of the cost or the economic benefit to all persons directly affected by the proposed action. It is anticipated that there will be a minimal increase in cost to a few of the entities regu- lated as some of them will probably need to seek accounting advice and/or computer programming advice to insure that its operations are in compliance with the rule. However, since most entities regulated already comply with this rule, only a few should be affected. RE: Proposed Rule 4-196.002 "Notice of Intent to Cancel to Be Mailed": Estimated cost to the agency-None. Estimated cost or economic benefit to all persons directly affected-cost will depend upon method of providing the required proof of mailing; however, as a matter of sound business practice as well as providing evidence of compliance with the requirements of Section 627.848, F.S., this should (sic) practice should already be in place. This will benefit the insured in assuring compliance with Florida Statutes in the cancellation of financed policies and will benefit the premium finance company in providing a defense in the event an insured brings action for wrongful cancellation of the financed policy alleging that the proper notice was not sent. Estimated impact of proposed action on competition and the open market for employment-none. Analysis of impact on small business-none. * * * Detailed statement of the data and methodology used in making the estimates required by this paragraph-Recent final decision reached by the Supreme Court of Florida in the case of "Insurance Company of North America, Petitioner, vs. Bobby Cooke, etc." wherein the Insurance Company was held liable for wrongfully cancelling an insured's policy. The Court held that "where an insured denies receipt of the notice of intent to cancel required by Section 627.848(1), an insurer who raises the defense of cancellation under Section 627.848 must prove that the premium finance company complied with the provisions of the statute in order to avoid liability under a contract of insurance." * * * The following rules have no cost or benefit to anyone directly affected by the rule, no negative impact on competition, employment, or small business, and no cost or benefit of adopting these rules other than as indicated above: Proposed Rule 4-196.001 "Standard Cancellation Notice" Proposed Rule 4-196.003 "Requirement of Net Worth of Premium Finance Companies" Proposed Rule 4-196.006 "Filing Other Acceptable Collateral in Lieu of Net Worth" * * * 7. Proposed Rule 4-196.010 "Refunds" * * * Proposed Rule 4-196.028 "Right to Cancel for Non-payment of Premium" Proposed Rule 4-196.030 "Definitions" Proposed Rule 4-196.038 "Limit on Additional $20 Service Charge" Proposed Rule 4-196.040 "Assignment of Premium Finance Contracts Permitted for Existing Business or Collateral for Extension of Credit Only" It is the Department's contention that the proposed rules have no economic impact (which the Department defines to mean no additional or new expenses to anyone) because the rules merely clarify and formally implement the Department's policy as it has existed for several years, at least since 1988. Therefore, the Department reasons, if someone has been complying in the past, there should be no changes in operations or new expenses for that entity. Proposed Rule 4-196.001, Florida Administrative Code, seeks to specify that all copies of the standard cancellation notice be printed on pink paper. The insurer only recognizes a cancellation notice if printed on pink paper, therefore, having all copies of the notice in pink will assure that the insurer receives the correct copy. Currently, the insured and the insurer receive pink copies of the notice but the rule has not specified that the premium finance company copy must also be on pink paper. Pink cancellation notices are the industry practice and standard. Proposed Rule 4-196.002, Florida Administrative Code, requires that the proof of mailing for the notice of intent to cancel must be retained in the files so that the Department may verify compliance with Section 627.848, Florida Statutes. This rule makes the retention of the proof specific whereas in the past the Department has merely suggested that the documentation be retained. Proposed Rule 4-196.003, Florida Administrative Code, requires premium finance companies to meet net worth criteria such that even if the standard is met by a means other than a net worth of $35,000, that the company must also be in sound financial condition with a "positive statutory net worth." The Department seeks to assure that premium finance companies are financially sound and maintains that the criteria are necessary and reasonable to meet that goal. Proposed Rule 4-196.006, Florida Administrative Code, identifies the types of collateral the Department will accept for purposes of establishing net worth. Proposed Rule 4-196.009, Florida Administrative Code, seeks to establish guidelines and methods through which the Department will determine whether an entity is eligible for licensure and whether a premium finance company is in an unsound financial condition. Proposed Rule 4-196.010, Florida Administrative Code, seeks to clarify the requirement that refunds must be made within the statutory time limit and that premium finance companies may not charge interest on the balance due under the contract beyond the statutory limit. Proposed Rule 4-196.028, Florida Administrative Code, specifies that an insured's policy may be cancelled for the nonpayment of premium but may not be cancelled for the nonpayment of miscellaneous fees or charges owed to the premium finance company. Proposed Rule 4-196.030, Florida Administrative Code, seeks to clarify the definitions of the following words: "affiliate," "gross amount available," "inducement," "rebates," and "statutory net worth." Proposed Rule 4-196.038, Florida Administrative Code, limits the service charge amount which may be charged for a twelve month period to one $20.00 assessment. Most premium finance contracts are for a period less than twelve months. Premium finance contracts charge a "set up" fee of $20.00 for each finance contract. For purposes of this rule, the "set up" fee would be limited to one $20.00 assessment per customer per twelve month period. Under the proposed rule, "customer" means per individual not per contract. Proposed Rule 4-196.040, Florida Administrative Code, seeks to clarify provisions allowing the assignment of premium finance contracts so that such procedure is not used to circumvent the statute prohibiting rebates to agents. A public hearing on the proposed rules was conducted by the Department on October 11, 1994. The record of the public hearing is set forth in the Department's composite exhibit 1. All changes in the proposed rules have been published by the Department. Section 288.703, Florida Statutes, defines "small business" to be: "Small business" means an independently owned and operated business concern that employs 50 or fewer permanent full-time employees and that has a net worth of not more than $1 million. As applicable to sole proprietorships, the $1 million net worth requirement shall include both personal and business investments. Based upon the record, none of the Petitioners in this cause is a "small business." Based upon the record of this case, together with the record of the public hearing conducted on October 11, 1994, the Department adhered to the procedure for preparation of the economic statement and considered information submitted to the agency regarding specific concerns about the economic impact of the proposed rules. Rule 4-196.001, Florida Administrative Code, as it now exists requires that the premium finance company furnish cancellation notices to the insured and insurer in a designated format, and printed "on a color paper of a shade of pink." The Petitioners have not challenged the existing language of the rule. The Department uses generally accepted accounting principles to determine whether a premium finance company has a net worth of $35,000. The unearned premium serves as the collateral in the premium finance contract. Premium is earned on a pro rated basis. The amount of the premium is divided by the length of time of the term to reach the daily pro rated amount. Unearned interest is refunded based upon the rule of 78s. For an eight month contract, a premium finance company earns 8/36 of the interest the first month, 7/36 of the interest the second month, and so on until all interest is paid. The failure to refund monies due an insured in accordance with the statute constitutes a business practice that would be hazardous to the insurance-buying public.
The Issue Whether Respondent has violated Section 627.8405, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Capital National Financial Corporation (Capital), is transacting the business of insurance premium financing pursuant to a certificate of authority issued by the Petitioner, Florida Department of Insurance (Department). The Department is responsible for regulating the premium finance business affairs of Capital. On August 30, 1994, the Department issued a Notice of Intent to Non- renew Capital's certificate of authority to transact premium financing in Florida pursuant to Section 627.829, Florida Statutes. As authority for issuing the Notice of Intent to Non-renew, the Department cited two grounds. First, the Department alleged that Capital was illegally financing the purchase of automobile club memberships in conjunction with an insurance transaction, a violation of Section 627.8405, Florida Statutes. Second, the Department alleged that Capital was utilizing a form in conjunction with the premium financing transaction without the requisite Departmental approval, a violation of Section 627.838, Florida Statutes. The parties have stipulated that the only issue to be determined is whether there was a violation of Section 627.8405. Capital finances insurance premiums and has agreed to collect installment payments for automobile club memberships which the insurance agent sells to the customer when the customer is buying automobile insurance. The customer makes a down payment on the automobile club membership. Capital does not advance the remainder of the membership cost to the insurance agent. The customer executes a billing service disclosure form. The billing service disclosure form contains the following language: In conjunction with your insurance, you have purchased through your insurance agent the supplemental service disclosed above. The amount which you are charged for this supplemental service, after deduction of any down payment which you have paid, will be divided equally into monthly installments payable to Capital National Financial Corporation due at the same time, and in addition to, your monthly installment payable to Capital National for the financing of the purchase of your insurance. Capital National is acting as a collection agent for your insurance agent and is not charging any interest or other fee for collecting and processing the amount due for your purchase of this supplemental service. The monthly installment you will pay for the supplemental service will be added to the payment amount for your insurance and this aggregate amount will be reflected on your payment coupon. However, your insurance can not be cancelled by reason of your failure to pay the amount of the monthly installment attributable to the purchase of the supplemental service. The billing service disclosure form used by Capital is executed by the customer on the same day the premium finance agreement is executed. The billing disclosure form is a separate document from the premium finance agreement.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered finding that Capital National Financial Corporation did not violate Section 627.8405, Florida Statutes. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of January, 1996, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUSAN B. KIRKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of January, 1996. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 95-1944 To comply with the requirements of Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, the following rulings are made on the parties' proposed findings of fact: Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact. Paragraphs 1-4: Accepted in substance. Paragraphs 5-19: Rejected as unnecessary. Paragraph 20: Rejected as not supported by the record. Capital disputes that they are "financing" the automobile club fees. Paragraphs 21-23: Accepted in substance. Paragraphs 24-29: Rejected as unnecessary. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact. Paragraphs 1-4: Accepted in substance. Paragraphs 5-6: Rejected as unnecessary. Paragraphs 7-11: Accepted in substance. Paragraphs 12-13: Rejected as unnecessary. COPIES FURNISHED: Alan J. Leifer, Esquire Department of Insurance/Legal Services East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0333 Alberto R. Cardenas, Esquire Matias R. Dorta, Esquire Tew & Garcia-Pedrosa South Biscayne Boulevard Miami, Florida 33131-4336 Bill Nelson State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Dan Sumner Acting General Counsel Department of Insurance The Capitol, PL-11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399
Findings Of Fact From January 15, 1980, until November 30, 1981, Respondent was the only licensed general lines agent at the C&M Insurance Agency of Dade County, located at 1014 Northwest 27th Avenue, Miami, Florida. At the same time, Respondent also sold insurance as Authorized Insurance Agency at The North Miami Flea Market, 14135 Northwest Seventh Avenue, Miami, Florida. While Respondent was the only licensed agent at that C&M address, his contract with C&M Insurance Agency expressly prohibited him and his employees or agents from soliciting or selling any form of insurance. Rather, the contract provided That Respondent was only permitted to use office space to prepare and file income tax returns at the C&M Northwest 27th Avenue address and also at C&M's other offices located on South Dixie Highway and on South State Road Seven. While doing business at the North Miami Flea Market, Respondent held himself out as president of Authorized Insurance Agency. During the same time period, Respondent wrote business at The North Miami Flea Market during the week and not just on weekends. Further, on December 19, 20 and 22, 1920, Respondent wrote business at both The North Miami Flea Market and at the C&M Northwest 27th Avenue address. On September 9, 1981, John G. Holmes completed an application and paid $639 for automobile insurance with National Security Insurance Company. The application was signed by Respondent and contains C&M's Northwest 27th Avenue address. Neither the application nor the insurance premium monies were ever forwarded to National Security Insurance Company. Holmes has never received either insurance coverage on his automobile or a refund of his insurance premium. On October 6, 1981, Antje Kalb purchased an automobile. The salesman at the dealership told her she needed to purchase insurance and gave her the name and telephone number for C&M's Northwest 27th Avenue office. She called C&M, and someone from that Agency came to the dealership. Kalb gave to C&M's representative $783 for full automobile insurance coverage, and the C&M employee gave Kalb a receipt for her premium. The receipt carries the C&M Northwest 27th Avenue address, and the binder given to Kalb carries Respondent's signature. Neither Kalb's application nor her premium payment were ever forwarded to the insurer, Commercial Union Insurance Company, and Kalb has never received either her automobile insurance coverage or a refund of her premium payment. On July 14, 1980, Sidney Sugarman from C&M's South State Road Seven office entered into a written agency agreement with Fortune Insurance Company. Between November 1, 1980, and January 31, 1981, Respondent signed and sent 23 applications for automobile insurance to Fortune Insurance Company, which applications reflected that the business had been written out of C&M's Northwest 27th Avenue address. Fortune issued policies to The insureds based upon those applications. Respondent performed all The acts and duties of a general lines insurance agent for Fortune Insurance Company. On October 24, 1980, Respondent entered into a written agency agreement on behalf of Authorized Insurance Agency with Fortune Insurance Company. Between October 31, 1980, and January 31, 1981, Respondent signed and sent 14 applications for automobile insurance from Authorized Insurance Agency to Fortune Insurance Company. Fortune issued policies to the insureds based upon these applications. Respondent performed all The acts and duties of a general lines insurance agent for Fortune Insurance Company. Respondent was not licensed with Fortune Insurance Company until June 17, 1981. Fortune Insurance Company and Respondent had no brokerage arrangements prior to June 17, 1981; rather, all applications submitted by Respondent to Fortune Insurance Company prior to that date were written as direct contracts and not through any brokerage arrangement.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered dismissing Count II of the Administrative Complaint filed herein; finding Respondent guilty of The allegations contained in Counts I, III, IV, V and VI of the Administrative Complaint filed herein; and revoking all licenses currently possessed by Respondent and his eligibility to hold a license pursuant to Chapter 626, Florida Statutes. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 19th day of October, 1983, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of October, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: Curtis A. Billingsley, Esquire Department of Insurance 413-B Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mr. Eugene Lipofsky 1851 NE 168th Street North Miami Beach, Florida 33162 The Honorable Bill Gunter Insurance Commissioner and Treasurer The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact On March 19, 1985 petitioner, Michael Scott Symons, became employed as a financial manager with the brokerage firm of Easter Guthmann & Kramer Securities, Inc. (EGK) at 7200 West Camino Real Street, Suite 200, Boca Raton, Florida. In connection with his employment Symons filed an application for registration as an associated person of EGK with respondent, Department of Banking & Finance, Division of Securities (Division). The application was received by the Division on or about March 19, 1985 and was deemed to be complete on April 18, 1985. On that portion of the application entitled "Personal History" Symons gave 5700 Grillet Place, S.W., Fort Myers, Florida 33907 as his home address. He identified EGK's address as being 7200 West Camino Real, Suite 200, Boca Raton, Florida 33433. Although Symons signed the application he stated that EGK had actually submitted the application on his behalf since it was a common practice for brokerage firms to do administrative work on behalf of their employees. This is consistent with an agency rule (3E-600.02(3), F.A.C.) which requires that a securities dealer file and countersign the application for registration on behalf of an associated person. On March 24, 1985, or shortly after he began employment with EGK, Symons moved into an apartment at 6091 Boca Colony Drive, Boca Raton, Florida 33427. Approximately one month later, he began renting Post Office Box 3299 in Boca Raton. Symons did not inform the Division of these changes in address, or otherwise amend his application. On or about July 12, 1985 a Division bureau chief spoke by telephone with the chief financial officer of EGK and asked if EGK would voluntarily withdraw Symons' application. Later that same day, an EGK vice-president telephoned the bureau chief and advised him the firm would not withdraw the application. On July 16, 1985, the Division prepared and dated an Order Denying Application for Registration as an Associated Person. The next day a Division attorney sent a copy by certified mail to Symons' at 5700 Grillett Place, S.W., Fort Myers, Florida. Because Symons' wife had previously provided the post office with a change of address form the envelope containing the order was forwarded from Fort Myers to Post Office Box 3229 in Boca Raton. Certified mail notices were thereafter placed in the box on July 24 and July 31. However, the mail was never claimed. On August 8, 1985 the envelope was returned to the Division. It was received in Tallahassee on August 12, 1985. There is no evidence that Symons was aware the order had been mailed or that he deliberately failed to claim the letter. The agency attorney similarly assumed that Symons had not received a copy. Accordingly, it is found that at this point in time Symon had no knowledge that the July 16 order-was entered, and had been mailed to him in Fort Myers and Boca Raton. On August 19, 1985 the Division attorney again sent a copy of the July 16 order by certified mail to 7200 West Camino Real, Suite 200, Boca Raton. This was the address of EGK. According to the attorney, it was her intention to mail the order to Symons, and not his employer. The order contained the following pertinent language on page 5: Respondent is advised that Respondent may request a hearing to be conducted in accordance with the provisions of Section 120.57, Florida Statutes. A request for such hearing must comply with the provisions of Rule 28-5.201, Florida Administrative Code, and must be filed within twenty-one (21) days after receipt of this order. Otherwise, Respondent will be deemed to have waived all rights to such hearing. The certified mail receipt for the envelope containing the order was apparently signed for by Charlie Shields, an EGK employee. 1/ It eventually reached the desk of EGK's chief financial officer, James Weber, in an unopened envelope on August 23, 1985. Weber opened the envelope and read the enclosed order. He noticed on page five of the order that there was a twenty-one day time frame in which an appeal of the agency denial could be made. Believing that the twenty-one day time frame began on July 16, Weber erroneously concluded that the time to request a hearing had already expired. This was probably because he had never before seen a denial order, and was not familiar with the procedures under Chapter 120, F.S. Weber then showed the order to Edward Guthmann, a principal and vice- president of EGK. Guthmann telephoned an out- of-state attorney seeking advice on how to proceed, and sent a copy of the order to the attorney on August 23. The attorney did not take any action, and returned the order to Guthmann on an undisclosed dated between late August and the middle of September. On September 17 Weber "came to the realization" that under any interpretation of the order the time frame in which to request a hearing had run. He then contacted petitioner's present counsel on September 17 to discuss obtaining legal representation for Symons. Symons has continued using that counsel since that time. A petition for hearing was eventually filed with respondent on October 1, 1985. This petition was denied by agency order entered on October 16, 1985 on the ground Symons had "constructive receipt and notice of the Denial Order at the time of its delivery by U.S. Certified Mail to Respondent's personal address on July 24 1985, and furthermore, deems Respondent to have received actual notice. . . on August 25, 1985, when the Denial Order was claimed and signed for at EGK's address as listed on the application." Neither Weber or Guthmann informed Symons prior to September 15 that they had received the Division order, or that the document even existed. They also did not advise him that they had contacted an out-of-state attorney in August in an effort to obtain advice. In this regard, petitioner had not authorized them to take any action with respect to the denial order, or to seek the advice of an attorney. Symons was unaware of the existence of the denial order prior to September 20, 1985 when he was shown a copy of the order by his employer. Had he been aware of the order prior to September 15, he would have filed a request for a hearing. Even though he did not specifically voice an objection to his employer opening his mail, Symons did not expressly authorize his employer to accept the order or any other notices from respondent. Indeed, Symons considered certified mail to be "a personal thing," and something that "an employer has (no) right to open."
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered finding that petitioner timely requested an administrative hearing to contest respondent's denial of his application for registration as an associated person. DONE and ORDERED this 4th day of December, 1986 in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of December, 1986.
The Issue Whether Respondent violated Sections 627.832(1)(i) and 627.848, Florida Statutes, and if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Alliant Premium Finance Corporation, is a Florida licensed premium finance company domiciled in Florida. Alliant has been licensed to sell premium finance agreements to the general public in Florida since December 16, 1993. William J. Villari has been the president of Alliant since its licensure. In 1995, Petitioner, Department of Insurance, performed a routine regulatory examination of Alliant. During the examination, 15 Alliant files, which had refunds due to insureds within 30 days, were reviewed. Out of the 15 files, 12 were late, ranging from 87 to 329 days late. The Department sent Alliant the Department's 1995 Report of Examination, which gave notice to Alliant that between December 16, 1993, and June 30, 1995, Alliant had violated the insurance code by failing to make refunds within 30 days. Mr. Villari advised the Department by letter dated December 18, 1995, that he was taking steps to ensure that in the future refunds would be made on a timely basis. No disciplinary action was taken by the Department as a result of the 1995 examination. During January 1998, the Department performed another routine regulatory examination of Alliant. The findings of the examination are contained in the Report of Examination for the period from July 1, 1995, to September 30, 1997. As was noted in the report, 11 Alliant accounts were reviewed which had refunds due to insureds within 30 days, and 8 of the 11 accounts were refunded late. The lateness ranged from 5 to 67 days. The report was mailed to Alliant on February 17, 1998. The 1998 examination also revealed that between July 1, 1995, and September 30, 1997, Alliant had failed to maintain certificates of mailing showing that notices of intent to cancel insurance contracts were mailed to insureds ten days before cancellation. The evidence did not show that Alliant had failed to mail the cancellation notices, only that Alliant had failed to maintain certificates showing that the notices had been mailed. Respondent does not dispute that Alliant was late in making refunds as noted in the 1998 Examination Report or that Alliant did not maintain certificates of mailing for the cancellation notices. Alliant disagrees with the penalty proposed by the Department.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered, finding that Alliant Premium Finance Corporation violated Sections 627.832(1)(i) and 627.848(1), Florida Statutes, and imposing a penalty of $2,500 for the violation of Subsection 627.832(1)(i), Florida Statutes, and $250 for the violation of Section 627.848(1), Florida Statutes. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of May, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUSAN B. KIRKLAND Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of May, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Christopher R. Hunt, Esquire Department of Insurance Division of Legal Services 612 Larson Building 200 E. Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0333 William J. Villari, President Alliant Premium Finance Corporation 303 Gardenia Street West Palm Beach, Florida 33401 Honorable Bill Nelson State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner Department of Insurance The Capitol, Plaza Level 2 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Daniel Y. Sumner, General Counsel Department of Insurance The Capitol, Lower Level 26 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
The Issue Whether Len-Tran, Inc., d/b/a Turner Tree and Landscape (Respondent or Len-Tran, Inc.), or its surety company, Great American Insurance Company, is liable to Hibernia Enterprises, LLC, d/b/a Hibernia Nursery (Petitioner or Hibernia), for $16,139.33 in agricultural products delivered to Respondent, plus the $50.00 filing fee for this action.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a Florida limited liability company, whose principal address is 1176 C-478A, Webster, Florida 33597. Petitioner is a producer of agricultural products as defined by section 604.15(5). Petitioner grows and supplies shrubs, trees, and ground covers. At all pertinent times, Respondent, a Florida for- profit corporation, has been a dealer in agricultural products as defined in section 604.15(1), with a principal address of 2504 64th Street Court East, Bradenton, Florida 34208. Respondent has been doing business as, and is the registered owner of, the fictitious name “Turner Tree and Landscape.” Respondent’s president is Darrell Turner and its registered agent is Peter Mackey, Esquire, with the Mackey Law Group in Bradenton, Florida. Darrell Turner is also listed as the president of Turner Tree Farm, Inc., a Florida for-profit corporation, whose principal address is also 2504 64th Street Court East, Bradenton, Florida 34208. Turner Tree Farm, Inc.’s, registered agent is the Mackey Law Group in Bradenton, Florida. During all relevant time periods, Great American Insurance Company, 301 East 4th Street, Cincinnati, Ohio 45202, has been the surety company providing agricultural surety bonds for both Len-Tran, Inc., and Turner Tree Farm, Inc., in favor of the Department as obligee. The agricultural surety bond provided by Great American Insurance Company for Len-Tran, Inc., is Bond No. 3118082. The agricultural surety bond provided by Great American Insurance Company for Turner Tree Farm, Inc., is Bond No. 3118081. From July 20 through August 21, 2015, Petitioner delivered $16,139.33 worth of agricultural products to Len-Tran, Inc. These products were accepted, yet Len-Tran, Inc., has not paid for these products. All of the underlying purchase orders from Respondent to Petitioner for the subject agricultural products, which were delivered and invoiced to Respondent, were prepared on letterhead, entitled "Turner Tree and Landscape, 2504 64th Street Court East, Bradenton FL 34208." Petitioner’s Claim, setting forth the basis of Petitioner's claim against Respondent and its surety, was filed with the Department on November 13, 2015, which is less than six months from the deliveries that form the basis of the claim. Petitioner's Claim listed "Turner Tree and Landscape" on line six of the Agricultural Products Dealer Claim Form, labeled "Legal name of Respondent (Dealer)." The following examples are printed in a parenthetical appearing under line six of the form: "Individual's name, partners names, corporate name, co-op, etc." On line seven of the form, labeled "Trade name of Respondent (d/b/a, fictitious name, etc.)," Petitioner wrote "N/A." Although Petitioner listed "Turner Tree and Landscape" on the wrong line of the form, Petitioner's listing of Turner Tree and Landscape as the “respondent” on the form did not constitute a filing against Turner Tree Farm, Inc. The Department, not Petitioner, decided to serve Petitioner’s Claim on Turner Tree Farm, Inc., instead of Len-Tran, Inc. That decision turned out to be incorrect because “Turner Tree and Landscape” is the fictitious name of Len-Tran, Inc., not Turner Tree Farm, Inc. Nevertheless, the Department served Petitioner’s Claim on Turner Tree Farm, Inc., and Great American Insurance Company on December 9, 2016. Petitioner's Corrected Claim was filed by facsimile with DOAH on February 19, 2016. There is a cover letter to Petitioner's Corrected Claim addressed to the undersigned at DOAH. The cover letter was apparently left off of the facsimile of Petitioner's Corrected Claim that was filed with DOAH because it does not appear on the DOAH docket for this case. The cover letter was received into evidence at the final hearing as the first page of Petitioner's Exhibit P-5. The cover letter, also dated February 19, 2016, states: Case No. 16-0278 Hibernia Enterprises, LLC vs. Turner Tree and Landscape and Great American Ins. Your Honor: When we filled out the paperwork to place a claim on Turner Tree and Landscape's ag bond on the first page #6 Legal name - we printed Turner Tree and Landscape not Len-Tran Inc. Can we please correct #6 and #7 so it states: Legal name of Respondent (Dealer): Len- Tran, Inc. Trade name of Respondent (d/b/a, fictitious name, etc): Turner Tree and Landscape I have enclosed a copy of the original first page filed, corrected first page how it should read and Turners Answer of Respondent. Sincerely, David Counihan President Certificate of Service: Copy emailed and faxed to: Len-Tran, Inc., d/b/a Turner Tree and Landscape In addition to filing Petitioner's Corrected Claim in this case on February 19, 2016, after the final hearing, Petitioner also filed Petitioner's Corrected Claim with the Department on July 6, 2016. Thereafter, as reflected on correspondence from the Department to the undersigned filed in this case on July 11, 2016, as well as attached to Petitioner's Memorandum, the Department served copies of Petitioner's Corrected Claim on Len-Tran, Inc., and Great American Insurance Company by mail on July 7, 2016 (the date of the correspondence). The correspondence attached a copy of the Agricultural Products Dealer Bond No. 3118082, in the amount of $100,000, issued in favor of the Department, as obligee, by "Len-Tran, Inc. dba Turner Tree & Landscape," as principal, and by Great American Insurance Company, as surety. A "Change Rider," was also attached, showing an effective date of the Len-Tran, Inc.'s, bond from July 6, 2015, through July 5, 2016. Since the filing of this case at DOAH, copies of all Orders entered in this case have been provided to Respondent and Great American Insurance Company, and all pleadings and filings in this case have been available for view on DOAH’s website. Respondent, Len-Tran, Inc., d/b/a Turner Tree and Landscape filed Chapter 11 bankruptcy on May 13, 2016. While the automatic stay imposed by federal bankruptcy laws protects Respondent from certain actions during and after its bankruptcy, Great American Insurance Company, as surety for Respondent, is not alleviated from responsibility of payment of the claim, even though Respondent filed bankruptcy.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services enter a final order finding that $16,189.33 ($16,139.33, plus the $50 filing fee) is the amount of indebtedness owed to the Petitioner under either Petitioner's Claim or Petitioner's Corrected Claim, and requiring Great American Insurance Company to pay that amount to the Department to be distributed to Petitioner out of the bond posted by Great American Insurance Company for Len-Tran, Inc. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of December, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JAMES H. PETERSON, III Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of December, 2016.
