The Issue Whether Respondent Five Brothers Produce Inc. is indebted to Petitioner for agricultural products and, if so, in what amount?
Findings Of Fact Petitioner grows tomatoes on its farm in Dade County. Jack Wishart is in charge of the farm's operations. Five Brothers Produce, Inc., is a dealer in agricultural products. At all times material hereto, Pete Johnson was responsible for buying and selling produce for Five Brothers. He was assisted by Robert Barbare. On Friday, January 19, 1990, Johnson met with Wishart at Petitioner's farm. During their meeting, they discussed the possibility of Five Brothers purchasing all of Petitioner's 6x7 tomatoes. They ultimately entered into a verbal agreement concerning the matter. Under the terms of the agreement, Five Brothers agreed to purchase from Petitioner, and Petitioner agreed to sell to Five Brothers, Petitioner's supply of 6x7 tomatoes, which consisted of 293 packages, for $26.00 a package. At the time, tomatoes were in scarce supply because of the damage that had been done to the South Florida tomato crop by the freeze of the prior month. As a result, the market price for U.S.#1 grade 6x7 tomatoes was $32.00 a package. Wishhart agreed to a lower price for Petitioner's 6x7 tomatoes because they were U.S.#2 grade. The 293 packages of tomatoes were delivered to Five Brothers on the following day, Saturday, January 20, 1990. Johnson had purchased the tomatoes for Five Brothers to resell to a customer in Atlanta, Georgia. Upon inspecting the tomatoes after their arrival at Five Brothers' loading dock in Florida City, Johnson determined that they did not meet the needs of this particular customer because, in Johnson's opinion, they were too ripe to be shipped out of state. Johnson thereupon telephoned Wishart to tell him that the tomatoes were not suitable for his Atlanta customer. Later that same day, January 20, 1990, pursuant to Johnson's instructions, Barbare, Five Brothers' "late night clerk," contacted Wishart and advised him that Five Brothers wanted to return the tomatoes to Petitioner. The gates of Petitioner's farm were closed, and Wishart so informed Barbare. He then asked Barbare to store the tomatoes in Five Brothers' cooler until they could be returned to Petitioner's farm. Barbare agreed to do so. Approximately a day or two later, Barbare again telephoned Wishart. He told Wishart that Five Brothers had found a customer to whom it could sell the tomatoes, which were still in Five Brothers' cooler. Wishart, in response, stated that Petitioner would lower its sale price and "take $20.00," instead of $26.00 as previously agreed, for the tomatoes. 1/ On Monday, January 22, 1990, Five Brothers consummated a deal with Leo Genecco & Sons, Inc., (Genecco) of Rochester, New York, which agreed to purchase the tomatoes from Five Brothers. 2/ The tomatoes were priced "open," that is, the price of the tomatoes was to be established after the sale. Five Brothers ultimately received $3,149.75 ($10.75 a package) for the 293 packages of 6x7 tomatoes it had sold to Genecco. It thereupon sent a check in that amount to Petitioner as payment for these tomatoes. In the transaction at issue in the instant case, Five Brothers was not acting as a broker or agent for Petitioner. It purchased the tomatoes from Petitioner. The sales price was initially $26.00 a package and was later reduced to $20.00 a package. Accordingly, for the 293 packages of tomatoes Petitioner sold Five Brothers, it should have received from Five Bothers $5,860.00, $2,710.25 more than it was paid.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby recommended that the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services enter a final order (1) finding that Five Brothers is indebted to Petitioner in the amount of $2,710.25, (2) directing Five Brothers to make payment to Petitioner in the amount of $2,710.25 within 15 days following the issuance of the order, and (3) announcing that, if such payment is not timely made, the Department will seek recovery from the Florida Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co., Five Brother's surety. RECOMMENDED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 18th day of March, 1991. STUART M. LERNER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of March, 1991. COPIES FURNISHED: Jack Wishart Pine Islands Farms, Inc. Post Office Box 247 Goulds, Florida 33170 Pete Johnson Five Brothers Produce, Inc. Post Office Box 3592 Florida City, Florida 33034 Florida Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. 5700 Southwest 34th Street Gainesville, Florida 32608 Bob Crawford Commissioner of Agriculture The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Richard Tritschler, Esquire General Counsel Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services 515 Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 Brenda Hyatt, Chief Bureau of Licensing and Bond Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services 508 Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800
The Issue Whether, under the provisions of sections 604.15 - 604.34, Florida Statutes, Lester Towell Distributors, Inc., is entitled to recover $2,098 for agricultural products ordered by and delivered to VBJ Packing, Inc
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made. Lester Towell is a dealer in Florida-grown agricultural products. VBJ is a dealer in Florida-grown agricultural products. On May 22, 1995, VBJ placed an order with Lester Towell to purchase a quantity of extra-large green bell peppers. Lester Towell delivered 200 boxes of such peppers to VBJ on May 23, 1995. To fill this order, Lester Towell purchased 63 boxes of peppers from producer Ott Farms, Inc., in Estero, Florida, and 137 boxes from producer Thomas Produce, in Boca Raton, Florida. Lester Towell did not act as agent for these producers; it purchased the products outright. On May 22, 1995, VBJ placed an order with Lester Towell to purchase a quantity of yellow corn. Lester Towell delivered 100 boxes of such corn to VBJ on May 24, 1995. To fill this order, Lester Towell purchased 100 boxes of corn from producer Wilkinson-Cooper, in Belle Glade, Florida. Lester Towell did not act as agent for this producer; it purchased the products outright. On May 24, 1995, VBJ placed an order with Lester Towell to purchase a quantity of jalapeno peppers, white corn, and red radishes. Lester Towell delivered two boxes of jalapeno peppers, 26 boxes of white corn, and 20 boxes of red radishes to VBJ on May 25, 1995. To fill this order, Lester Towell purchased 2 boxes of jalapeno peppers from producer Ott Farms, Inc., in Estero, Florida, and 26 boxes of white corn and 20 boxes of red radishes from producer American Growers in Belle Glade, Florida. Lester Towell did not act as agent for these producers; it purchased the products outright. Lester Towell filed its complaint with the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services ("Department") pursuant to the provisions of section 604.21(1), Florida Statutes, because VBJ did not pay for the products identified above. There is, however, no evidence to establish that Lester Towell was a producer or the agent or representative of a producer with respect to the products for which it seeks payment. It is, therefore, not a "person" entitled to file a complaint with the Department against VBJ and its surety.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services enter a final order dismissing the complaint of Lester Towell Distributors, Inc. DONE AND ENTERED this 3nd day of July 1996 in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. PATRICIA HART MALONO Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of July 1996
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Respondent is guilty of discrimination in employment on the basis of race in connection with the terms and conditions of employment of Petitioner.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is Cumbie Concrete Construction Company. B. T. Cumbie has been Respondent's president since the company's inception in 1978. Prior to economic difficulties which caused Respondent to cease most business activities in September of 1991, Respondent employed as many as 150 persons, had a fleet of approximately 129 vehicles and construction equipment valued in excess of two million dollars. Respondent was significantly affected by the economic recession in 1990 and 1991. In the latter part of 1990, Respondent was experiencing a major slowdown in work and began cutting back work crews and slowly going out of business. At the beginning of September, 1991, Respondent effectively ceased all operations, dismissed all employees and sold all equipment. The business was then started again, doing just basic concrete work as opposed to previous large-scale projects. This renewal of Respondent's business activities began approximately in May of 1992, although some small finishing up of prior jobs had been done prior to that time. Personal principles of Respondent's president led to this direction of the company, as opposed to the filing of bankruptcy by the company. Petitioner could have had no reasonable expectation of employment after September 6, 1991, when all other employees, inclusive of corporate officers, were dismissed. Respondent has employed hundreds of employees since its inception. At any given time, 50 percent of the employees have been black. Employees have routinely been assigned to multiracial crews based upon skills of employees and needs of the particular work crew. Respondent has never had a charge of discrimination levied against it. Petitioner, Henry L. Thomas is black. He was employed by Respondent as a concrete finisher at a rate of $7.00 per hour from May 4, 1989, until his discharge on January 9, 1991. Considered an apprentice finisher in terms of skill level, he never applied for the position of supervisor or foreman with Respondent. Petitioner has never felt any instance of discrimination during his 20 months of employment, other than the incident which forms the basis of this proceeding. No other concrete finishers were hired by Respondent from the time of Petitioner's dismissal and the September, 1991 cessation of business. On January 9, 1991, Alex Smith was the project manager for Respondent's project at a mushroom plant in Gadsden County, Florida. Smith learned from the representative for the overall project's general contractor, Johan Bult, that two of Respondent's employees were allegedly selling drugs at the job site and that the general contractor wanted those employees removed from the premises or the sheriff would be called. The two employees in question were Petitioner and a white individual known as Donald "Chip" Hines. Hines was employed by Respondent on June 8, 1990, as a laborer at the rate of $5.00 per hour. Prior to January 9, 1991, Hines' work record reflects no documented incidences of tardiness and only three absences, all of which were excused. He was not the subject of complaints by any past or present foreman employed by Respondent. By way of contrast with Hines' work record, Petitioner was absent 19 times in the space of 20 months employment with Respondent. Petitioner was on probation in the state of Georgia from his conviction as an habitual offender at the time he began his employment. Petitioner's assertion that all of his absences were related to his need to report to his probation officer in Georgia is not credited in view of the multiple absences reflected in work attendance records for some months and virtually no absences in other months. Petitioner also asserts that he never failed to come to work without first calling by telephone and checking in with Respondent's offices. However, the work records list two absences, October 21, 1989, and May 29, 1990, as having occurred without permission and without Petitioner having checked in with his employer. Two absentee reports note that Petitioner was also absent on two occasions due to car trouble, contrary to Petitioner's assertion that he was never absent for these reasons. Petitioner was frequently provided transportation to and from job sites in the course of his employment by foremen and others employed by Respondent. Only one absentee report reflects Petitioner's absence from work for matters connected with the judicial system. With regard to Petitioner's judicial probationary status, Respondent provided a letter to Petitioner's probationary officer on January 13, 1990, certifying Petitioner's employment. Smith checked with Respondent's office regarding Bult's complaint and was told to lay the two employees off. Smith spoke with Petitioner and told him about the complaint and the directive to lay the men off. Smith instructed the foreman at the site to call Hines, who had taken the day off, and inform him. Smith then provided Petitioner with a ride back to Respondent's office where Petitioner's car was located. Enroute, Petitioner denied that he had sold any drugs at the Quincy Farms site. While Petitioner now contends that Hines was selling drugs and that he personally observed him selling drugs, he did not provide that information to Respondent's supervisory personnel at the time of the two men's dismissal from employment. Respondent's president specifically made the decision to terminate the two men's employment since they could not be returned to that job site. In conjunction with that termination action, he also attempted placement of both men with other work crews. He did not force their employment on any foreman who was reticent to cooperate since to do so would, in his opinion, destroy the team function of a crew and create even bigger problems for Respondent. While in Respondent's employment, Petitioner worked for a foreman named Lloyd Cruce who, Petitioner maintained at final hearing, never made any comments about his absenteeism, tardiness or his "mouth". Petitioner's testimony on this point is not credited in view of the direct and candid testimony of Cruce, who no longer works for Cumbie Concrete, to the effect that he had repeated problems with Petitioner's absenteeism and attitude, noting that for the period March 6 to May 1, 1990, Petitioner was absent eight separate times. As a consequence, Cruce submitted papers to Respondent's president requesting the firing of Petitioner for his absenteeism and attitude. Respondent's president elected at that time to place Petitioner with another crew. After the employment termination of Hines and Petitioner, Smith assisted the efforts of Respondent's president to place the two men with Respondent work crews on other jobs by also checking with foremen regarding possible placement. Smith spoke with Tommy Simkins, Randy Langston and may have talked with Bill Chason. Randy Langston advised Smith that since he had a forming crew which involved skilled carpenters, he was not interested in taking Donald Hines because he was a laborer and lacked necessary skills for his crew. Langston did not want Petitioner on his crew because Petitioner's lack of necessary skills, his inability to get along with people and his use of inappropriate language would cause problems for his crew. As noted by Langston, Petitioner was quite vocal and it was a "hassle" to get Petitioner to do anything. Langston was familiar with both Donald Hines and Petitioner as his crew has previously supplemented their crew for a time at Quincy Farms. Tommy Simpkins accepted Donald Hines on his crew. Two other laborers, David Martinez, an Hispanic, was transferred to the Quincy Farms crew and Lonzo Murray, a black or African-American, was temporarily transferred to that crew. Simpkins had more workers on his crew than he needed and did not need a concrete finisher on his crew. He also noted past problems with Petitioner being late to work and having difficulty with obtaining transportation to the job site. Even though Simpkins had made him a lead worker on occasion in the past, Petitioner had a hard time getting along with other people. Following an argument between Petitioner and a Respondent project manager, Steve Griffin, a job site on May 31, 1990, Petitioner was sent home because of the noticeable smell of alcohol on his breath. Petitioner had been late reporting to work on that day, not showing up until approximately 10:00 a.m., and then was sent home at 12:30 p.m., following the argument with Griffin. Petitioner's assertion that he went home sick that day after working all morning is not credited in view of alcohol smell observed on his breath by Tommy Simpkins and the fact that he was paid for only two and one-half hours of work on May 31, 1990, contrary to his claim of being paid for one-half day. Petitioner's assertion that Simpkins, following Petitioner's dismissal from employment, denied writing Petitioner up for having alcohol on his breath is not credited in view Simpkins' testimony that he did, in fact, write Petitioner up for that incident and that he had smelled the alcohol on his breath. Simpkins, in a confrontation with Petitioner after the employment termination action, did tell Petitioner he couldn't recall the incident. Simpkins explained that he did this because Petitioner was in a highly agitated state at the time, hollering at him in the garage area of Respondent's facility about the incident and that he, Simpkins, did not understand what Petitioner was talking about. The record of the incident, the absentee report, unquestionably bears Simpkins' signature which he has never denied affixing to the report. In view of the demeanor and candor of the two men while testifying, Simpkins' version of the incident is clearly more creditable and consistent with the evidence. Respondent's president spoke with both Bill Chason and Steve Griffin, whose crews used finishers and laborers, relative to placing Donald Hines and Petitioner. He learned that both Chason and Griffin had had prior problems with Petitioner and did not want him on their crews. The testimony of Chason, a Respondent foreman, establishes that Petitioner created trouble and started arguments between crew members when those crews needed to operate as a team. Petitioner had a specific disagreement with Chason concerning Petitioner's refusal to run a vibrator machine at a McDonald's job site. Chason talked with Petitioner on several occasions about his attitude. When asked by both Alex Smith and Respondent's president about putting Petitioner on his crew, Chason stated he didn't want Petitioner because his attitude caused too much trouble. Chason's testimony was reiterated in similar form by others who had observed Petitioner at work. Smith observed Petitioner while working at Quincy Farms and questioned his demeanor, noting he would get angry and agitated quite easily. Langston similarly testified as did Simpkins who noted that Petitioner always had difficulty getting along with other crew members. Lloyd Cruce noted that Petitioner had an attitude problem at work. Past and present foremen employed by Respondent noted that they never observed any discrimination being practiced nor race entering into employment or employee decisions. As previously noted, even Petitioner acknowledged that with the exception of the specific incident which is the subject of these proceedings, he had never experienced any discrimination while working for Respondent nor felt he was treated badly. Petitioner presented the testimony of his friend and former roommate, John Randle, who worked as a laborer for Respondent from August of 1989 to November of 1990, for the proposition that Bill Chason had once stated that he wanted Petitioner to work for him on his crew. Randle asserted that he worked with Petitioner, by virtue of temporary assignment to the crew on which Petitioner worked, three or four times a month for approximately seven months. Chason, however, noted that Mr. Randle worked on his crew on a permanent basis the entire time he was employed by Respondent and was not temporarily assigned to a crew three or four times a month for seven months. Chason further denied Randle's averment that he, Chason, had stated at the Quincy Farms site that he wanted Petitioner on his crew. The testimony of Randle is not credited in view of his demeanor while testifying and the inconsistency of that testimony with testimony of Chason, Simpkins and other individuals. Respondent did not have a sophisticated personnel office with persons assigned the job of creating and keeping records. Further, the nature of the work performed by Respondent's crews is such that foremen are often at a specific location of activity at the job site, away from their company vehicles where their paperwork would be kept. As a consequence, they often do not write up infractions such as tardiness. In Petitioner's situation, for example, he was absent without permission on October 21, 1989, a fact noted on his time sheet, but the required absentee report was never filled out by the foreman. Petitioner conceded to being late to work on occasion. In the Tallahassee area there is a significant problem with obtaining workers. Replacing a worker is difficult, particularly in light of the delay occasioned by finding a qualified replacement worker. Construction projects all have built-in dollar penalties for failure to complete a job on time. A construction company is better served by keeping someone if there is any way of doing it, rather than simply dismissing an employee. As a result, the requirement of Respondent's employee manual specifying dismissal after three absences was not enforced during Petitioner's tenure. Respondent's dismissal of Petitioner has not evolved over time. As established by the proof presented at hearing, Petitioner and Donald Hines were let go on January 9, 1991, because the company which employed Respondent to do work at the Quincy Farms mushroom plant effectively barred Petitioner and Donald Hines from that job site with the allegation of illicit activity by the two men and the threat to call the sheriff if they reappeared there. Further, the complaint against the two men came at a time when Respondent, already experiencing a critical cessation of project activity, could not afford to jeopardize retention of a vitally important project. The level of concern evidenced by Johan Bult's company is amply demonstrated by the fact that after the alleged drug selling incident, all construction workers were barred from the Quincy Farms employee lunch counter area. Respondent, with no specific proof that any drug transactions actually occurred at Quincy Farms, sought to place both persons on other crews. Respondent, throughout the process that ultimately resulted in the instant hearing, set forth the basic work record of Petitioner, including his absences, the May 31, 1990 incident and, contrary to Petitioner's assertion, the problems with his attitude. In a May 10, 1991, letter to the Florida Commission on Human Relations, Respondent clearly noted that Quincy Farms stated that Petitioner and Hines had been observed selling drugs on the job site, would not be able to work on their project and that both men were told to leave the job site and go home. Subsequently, the employment of each individual was reviewed and Petitioner's file revealed he had missed work on numerous occasions and had been reprimanded for coming to work with alcohol on his breath, while Hines' file revealed he had missed only three days in seven months of employment. The letter further notes that it was determined that it would be best that Petitioner not be placed with another crew "due to prior problems." Petitioner was not similarly situated to Donald Hines relative to position and work history. Hines commenced work for Respondent on or about June 8, 1990, and, prior to January 9, 1991, he had no incidences of tardiness, of alcohol being noted on his breath at work, of failure to report without permission, and no evident adverse work habits or problems on the job. Petitioner seeks damages of $13,000.75, an amount equal to his wages for calendar year 1990. Petitioner's employment with Respondent ended on January 9, 1991, and he concedes that everyone in Respondent's employ was dismissed in the beginning of September 1991. He drew unemployment compensation charged to Respondent from January 1991, to August of 1991, in quarterly amounts of $1,016.00, $1,524.00, and $762.00. Thereafter, Petitioner worked throughout all of August, 1991, to February, 1992, at $7.50 an hour for another employer. Then, from February of 1992, until a month prior to the final hearing, he drew unemployment compensation charged to that employer. He also conceded that shortly after February of 1992, he worked full time for a construction business for approximately six months at the rate of $8.00 per hour which was paid to him in cash, while he was drawing unemployment compensation.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of March, 1993, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DON W. DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of March, 1993. APPENDIX The following constitutes my specific rulings, in accordance with Section 120.59, Florida Statutes, on proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties. Petitioner's Proposed Findings 1.-4. Accepted. 5. Rejected, not supported by weight of the evidence. 6.-8. Rejected, subordinate to HO findings. 9.-10. Adopted, though not verbatim. 11.-12. Rejected, not supported by weight of the evidence. 13.-18. Accepted. 19.-24. Rejected, subordinate to HO findings. 25.-37. Rejected, relevancy. 38.-39. Rejected, not supported weight of the evidence. 40. Accepted. 41.-47. Rejected, relevancy. 48.-59. Accepted. Rejected, argumentative. Accepted. 62.-66. Rejected, subordinate to HO findings. 67.-68. Rejected, not supported by weight of the evidence. 69.-72. Rejected, relevancy. 73. Accepted. 74.-78. Rejected, subordinate to HO findings. 79.-81. Accepted. 82.-88. Rejected, relevancy. 89.-91. Accepted. 92. Rejected, not supported by weight of the evidence. 93.-94. Accepted. Rejected, not supported by weight of the evidence. Accepted. Rejected, relevancy. 98.-102. Accepted, but not verbatim. Rejected, credibility. Rejected, subordinate to HO findings. 105.- 107. Rejected, credibility. 108.-109. Rejected, relevance. 110.-111. Rejected, credibility. 112.-113. Accepted. 114. Accepted. 115. Rejected, credibility. 116. Accepted. 117. Accepted. 118. Rejected, not supported by weight of the evidence. 119. Rejected, unnecessary. 120.-121. Accepted. 122.-125. Rejected, subordinate to HO findings. Respondent's Proposed Findings 1.-5. Accepted. 6. Rejected, relevancy. 7.-9. Accepted. 10.-11. Rejected, unnecessary. 12. Subordinate to Hearing Officer's findings on this point. 13.-35. Accepted, but not verbatim. COPIES FURNISHED: Mary C. O'Rourke, Esquire West College Avenue Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Harold F. X. Purnell, Esquire Post Office Box 551 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-0551 Margaret Jones Clerk Florida Commission On Human Relations John Knox Road Suite 240 / Building F Tallahassee, FL 32399-1925 Dana Baird, Esq. General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Suite 240 / Building F Tallahassee, FL 32399-1925
The Issue Whether Petitioner is entitled to a fixed payment for moving expenses as a relocation benefit.
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to this proceeding Petitioner, Food Spot #29, was a displaced business eligible for a commercial or self-move, and actual reasonable re-establishment expenses. Food Spot #29 was located in Broward County at 8350 Griffin Road. Food Spot #29 was owned by the following persons and entities in the following percentages: (a) Mindy Harris-Wilner--12 percent, (b) Stuart Harris-- 12 percent, (c) Andrea Shosfy--12 percent, (d) Larry J. Harris--12 percent, (e) EH Trust--26 percent, and (f) DH Trust--26 percent. Food Spot #39 and Food Spot #48 are located in Broward County and are owned by the same persons and entities in the same percentages as Food Spot #29. These businesses are not being acquired by Respondent and are similar to Food Spot #29. Food Spot #34 was located in Broward County and was condemned and taken by the Department of Transportation three or four years prior to final hearing. It was not in existence at the time Food Spot #29 was closed. Food Spot #63 is located in Broward County and was opened several months after Food Spot #29 was closed. A Food Spot Store located on University Drive in Plantation was also condemned and taken by the Department of Transportation. The store was already taken at the time that Food Spot #29 was closed. In determining whether a displaced business is part of a commercial enterprise having more than three other entities which are not being acquired by the Respondent, Respondent does not include businesses which were not in existence at the time of the displacement of the business requesting the fixed payment. The parties stipulated that the amount of the fixed payment at issue is $20,000. The officers and directors of Food Spot #29 were Ernest E. Harris, Larry J. Harris, Dolores L. Harris, Elliot J. Deutsch and Bruce S. Wilner. The officers and directors of Food Spot #55, which is an active corporation, are Ernest Harris, Larry J. Harris, Delores Harris, and Bruce S. Wilner. The officer and directors of Food Spot #56, which is an active corporation, are Ernest Harris, Larry J. Harris, Dolores Harris, and Bruce S. Wilner. The officers and directors of Food Spot #60, which is an active corporation, are Ernest Harris, Delores A. Harris, Bruce S. Wilner, and Larry J. Harris. The officers and directors of Food Spot #62, which is an active corporation, are Ernest Harris, Larry J. Harris, Dolores Harris, and Bruce S. Wilner. No evidence was presented to establish the ownership of Food Spot #s 55, 56, 60, and 62.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered awarding Food Spot #29 $20,000 as a fixed payment for moving expenses. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of February, 1995, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUSAN B. KIRKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of February, 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 93-4474 To comply with the requirements of Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes (1993), the following rulings are made on the parties' proposed findings of fact: Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact. Paragraphs 1-2: Accepted in substance. Paragraphs 3-4: Rejected as constituting conclusions of law. Paragraph 5: Rejected as irrelevant as to what the name may imply. The standard which must be met is actual ownership, whether the business is being acquired by Respondent, and whether the business activities are similar. Paragraph 6: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 7: Rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. Paragraph 8: Rejected as irrelevant. Food Spot #29 admitted that the ownership of #29, #39 and #48 were the same. Paragraph 9: Rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. COPIES FURNISHED: Charles G. Gardner Assistant General Counsel Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street, MS-58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 James R. Clodfelter Acquisition Consultant Enterprises, Inc. Boca Bank Corporate Center 7000 West Palmetto Park Road Suite 503 Boca Raton Florida 33433 Ben G. Watts, Secretary Attn: Diedre Grubbs, M.S. 58 Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Thornton J. Williams General Counsel Department of Transportation 562 Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450
Findings Of Fact Pursuant to a prehearing stipulation executed by the parties on July 22, 1982, the facts in this case are essentially not in dispute. The prehearing stipulation establishes the following facts concerning the allegations contained in the Administrative Complaint: Respondent Novoa is a certified air conditioning contractor having been issued license number CAC010132 and CAC010132. Respondent's address is 30 S. W. 67th Court, Miami, Florida 33144. At all times material hereto, Respondent was associated with and was the qualifying licensee for Baker Service Company, Inc., d/b/a Dade Air Conditioning and Appliance Service, 11651 N.W. 7th Avenue, Miami, Florida 33168. Respondent's responsibilities in said company were to pull permits and supervise installation of air conditioning systems in return for a salary of $100.00 per week. Petitioner has no evidence that Respondent did not fulfill that particular function for the company he qualified. However, Petitioner asserted and Respondent admitted that the company was also involved in soliciting service contracts for which it maintained a fleet of trucks and personnel to sell and solicit said contracts and to perform the obligations requested under the contracts. Petitioner asserted and Respondent admitted that it was not his function in the company to take any part in the business concerned with the service contracts. The Respondent completed a "Certification Change of Status Application" on or about December 14, 1978, and submitted it to the Department of Professional and Occupational Regulation, Florida Construction Industry Licensing Board. The Respondent signed an affidavit which is part of the application, certifying as true and accurate his answers on the application. Respondent asserted that the Certification Change of Status Application was prepared for his signature by personnel within Baker Service Company, Inc., who represented to him the truth of the contents thereof. Petitioner has no information contrary to Respondent's assertion. The Certification Change of Status Application contained false information in that it listed only Frank Baker as President of the company without listing the company's Secretary, Frank Baker III, and Albert Crooke, Vice President of the company. Respondent alleged and Petitioner has no evidence to the contrary, that he did not know of the involvement of Frank Baker III and Albert Crooke as officers of the corporation and only inadvertently filed false information with the Department. Baker Service Company, Inc. entered into many service contracts with certain named parties who are listed in and made a part of the Administrative Complaint by the attachment of Exhibit A thereto, all of whom had service contracts similar to Petitioner's Exhibit 3. Baker Service Company, Inc. was to provide air conditioning and other major appliance service pursuant to said contracts and did not perform its obligations thereunder, even though the company was paid and received funds to perform such service. The Respondent admitted that he did not take any active part in supervising the operation of Baker Service Company, Inc., with regard to their maintenance and service contract business and therefore used his registration to evade the contracting license law in violation of Section 489.129(1)(f) Florida Statutes. However, Petitioner admitted that this violation is of a technical nature. Respondent admitted that he obtained his registration by the filing of a false application, but asserted that he was not aware of its misrepresentation at the time of filing. Petitioner admitted it had no information with which to prove the Respondent knew the application was false when filed. Respondent admitted that his qualification of Baker Service Company, Inc., the execution of the numerous service contracts, and abandonment of the same by Baker Service Company, Inc., constitutes violations of Section 489.129(1)(k), Florida Statutes, and Chapter 10 , Code of Metropolitan Dade County, Section 10-22G, by failing to fulfill contractual obligations.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered by the Construction Industry Licensing Board finding that the Respondent Novoa committed technical violations of Sections 489.129(1)(f) and (k), Florida Statutes, and imposing a $500.00 administrative fine and a private reprimand. DONE and ORDERED this 29th day of September, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida. SHARYN L. SMITH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of September, 1982. COPIES FURNISHED: Michael J. Cohen, Esquire Suite 101 2715 E. Oakland Park Boulevard Ft. Lauderdale, Florida 33306 Rodolfo Sorondo, Jr., Esquire Suite 1101 Peninsula Federal Building Miami, Florida 33131 James Linnan, Executive Director Florida Construction Industry Licensing Board Post Office Box 2 Jacksonville, Florida 32202 Samuel R. Shorstein, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER ================================================================= STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF PROFESSIONAL REGULATION CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY LICENSING BOARD DEPARTMENT OF PROFESSIONAL REGULATION/CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY LICENSING BOARD, Petitioner, vs. DPR Case No. 0012267 DOAH Case No. 81-2477 JOSE E. NOVOA 30 SW 67th Court Miami, Florida 33144 C & S Air, Inc. CA C010132 Post Office Box 43-2094 Miami, Florida 33144 Baker Service Company CA CA10132(deleted) Respondent. /
The Issue The issue presented is whether the bid of Intervenor Velda Farms, Inc., is responsive to and complies with Respondent's Invitation to Bid No. SB 97C-85R.
Findings Of Fact On August 15, 1996, Respondent The School District of Palm Beach County, Florida (hereinafter "School District") issued an Invitation to Bid entitled "Term Contract for Uncooked Pizza Products," soliciting vendors for the 1996-97 school year. Both Petitioner Jukebox Express Drive-In Restaurants of America, Inc. (hereinafter "Jukebox Express"), and Intervenor Velda Farms, Inc. (hereinafter "Velda Farms"), timely submitted bids. The School District opened the bids on September 11, 1996, and determined that Jukebox Express and Velda Farms, as well as five other vendors, had submitted responsive bids. The School District prepared a list of approved vendors for that contract and included Jukebox Express and Velda Farms and the other responsive vendors on that list. The cafeteria manager for each school in the School District can select any vendor from that approved list to supply pizza products to that school. Jukebox Express timely filed its protest to the School District's determination that Velda Farms should be included on the list of approved vendors for pizza products, alleging that the bid of Velda Farms was not responsive and that Velda Farms is not a responsible bidder as to the subject bid. The School District is purchasing pizza products "off-bid" from Velda Farms during the pendency of this proceeding. Velda Farms does not manufacture or prepare the pizza products it currently supplies and would supply pursuant to the School District's Invitation to Bid. It is the distributor. The pizza is manufactured by Mimmo's Gourmet Pizza, a business currently located in Pompano Beach, Florida. During the 1995-96 school year Mimmo's supplied pizza to the School District through Jukebox Express. That pizza was manufactured by Mimmo's in its Fort Lauderdale location. Jukebox Express stopped supplying Mimmo's pizza to the School District in March 1996 due to deficiencies in the quality of the product. On May 7, 1996, Mimmo's Fort Lauderdale facility was inspected by the Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services. Mimmo's received an overall rating of poor, with several critical sanitation items cited for correction within 48 hours. When the Department returned to that Fort Lauderdale facility on May 28, it discovered that Mimmo's was no longer doing business out of that facility. Instead, Mimmo's had begun doing business out of its Pompano Beach facility. It is from that facility that Mimmo's began supplying pizza products to the School District through Velda Farms in June 1996 and continuing through the time of the final hearing in this cause. No evidence was offered as to when Mimmo's obtained a permit to commence construction of its Pompano Beach facility. The records of the City of Pompano Beach reveal that on April 10, 1996, Mimmo's received approval for temporary electrical service for 30 days to test equipment. That approval did not permit operating a business at the site. That approval for temporary electrical service was never extended or renewed. Mimmo's August 6, 1996, request for a temporary certificate of occupancy for its Pompano Beach facility was denied. On September 12, 1996, Mimmo's Pompano Beach facility was "red-tagged" for failure to have a certificate of occupancy. On the following day Mimmo's applied for and received a temporary certificate of occupancy. Mimmo's did not obtain a final certificate of occupancy from the City until November 7, 1996. On September 19, 1996, the City of Pompano Beach received Mimmo's application for an occupational license which represents that Mimmo's opened for business in September 1996. The City issued an occupational license to Mimmo's that same day. Special Condition H.3. of the subject Invitation to Bid provides as follows: Vendors must have a system in place that provides for quality control and the delivery of product at consistent and specified quality levels. Vendors must have in place a system for safety and sanitation inspections assuring the delivery of product that is free from contamination and product degradation. At the time it submitted its bid and through the time of the final hearing in this cause, Velda Farms had no system in place for quality control of Mimmo's product and had no system in place for safety and sanitation inspections of Mimmo's product. Velda Farms performed no investigation of Mimmo's product or manufacturing facility before it commenced supplying Mimmo's product to the School District. Velda Farms relied solely on the fact that Mimmo's pizza was listed as an approved product in the School District's Invitation to Bid. The School District's employee who prepared the Invitation to Bid included Mimmo's pizza in the approved product list pursuant to oral information given by the director of food services that Mimmo's was tested and accepted as an approved product by the School District in May 1996 for the 1996-97 school year. That same employee is not aware of any written test report to that effect. When Velda Farms submitted its bid to the School District, it attached a letter on Velda Farms stationery which read as follows: As per our conversation, Velda Farms [sic] ability to fulfill the obligations of the Pizza Bid No. SB 97C-85R is contingent upon the following: Mimmo's Pizza's ability to supply the required amounts at the agreed pricing. Mimmo's Pizza's ability to meet the nutritional specifications and requirement of the Palm Beach County School District. I appreciate your understanding in this matter. Should you have any questions, please contact me. The statements in that letter are directly contrary to the requirements contained in Special Condition H.3. of the Invitation to Bid. Indeed, the statements in that letter render the bid submitted by Velda Farms only a conditional offer to supply pizza products. Special Condition B of the Invitation to Bid provides that the contract will be awarded to the lowest and best responsive, responsible multiple bidders. Section 6.14 of the School District's Procurement Department Purchasing Procedures were adopted as School Board policy on November 21, 1995. Section 6.14(5) provides, in part, as follows: Responsible bidder or offeror is defined as a person/firm who has the capability, in all respects, to perform the contract requirements fully and the moral and business integrity and reliability to assure good faith performance. Responsive bidder or offeror is defined as a person/firm who has submitted a bid that conforms in all material respects to the invitation for bids or request for proposals. As to the subject bid, Velda Farms is neither a responsible bidder nor a responsive bidder. Its letter attachment to its bid form represents that Velda Farms does not have the capability to fully perform the contract and that Velda Farms will not assure good faith performance. Further, its bid does not conform in all material respects to the subject Invitation to Bid. Although the School District's Procurement Department Manager suggests that the deficiencies in Velda Farms' bid can be waived by the School Board, those deficiencies are not minor. They are material deficiencies in that they involve the quality of the food in the School District's schools and the price of Velda Farms' bid. No other bidder included a condition giving itself the right to cease performance of its agreement to supply pizza products to the School District. No other bidder was advised by the School District's Procurement Department employees that the bidders could condition their bids in such a fashion. At the time Velda Farms submitted its bid and at the time the bids were opened and the School District announced the award, Mimmo's was operating illegally from a building which had not been approved for occupancy and without benefit of an occupational license. Although Velda Farms may not have known that the pizza product it was supplying to the School District at the time of the bid submittals and bid opening was manufactured without the necessary government approvals, General Condition 19 provides as follows: Legal Requirements: Federal, State, county, and local laws, ordinances, rules, and regulations that in any manner affect the items covered herein apply. Lack of knowledge by the bidder will in no way be a cause for relief from responsibility.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered finding that Intervenor Velda Farms, Inc., is not a responsible or responsive bidder for Respondent The School District of Palm Beach County, Florida's term contract for uncooked pizza products, Bid No. SB 97C-85R, and deleting Intervenor Velda Farms, Inc., from the list of approved multiple bidders under that bid award. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of January, 1997, in Tallahassee, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of January, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Michael B. Small, Esquire Small and Small, P.A. 324 Royal Palm Way, Suite 231 Palm Beach, Florida 33480 Robert A. Rosillo, Esquire Palm Beach County School Board 3318 Forest Hill Boulevard West Palm Beach, Florida 33406-5813 Jim E. Solomon, Esquire Jim E. Solomon and Associates, P.A. 1180 South Powerline Road Suite Nos. 207-209 Pompano Beach, Florida 33069 Dr. Joan Kowal Superintendent of Palm Beach County Schools 3340 Forest Hill Boulevard West Palm Beach, Florida 33406-5869
The Issue Whether Petitioner's bid for Lot III of Bid NO. J88A-924C was responsive to the Invitation to Bid?
Findings Of Fact On June 8, 1988, Respondent issued an Invitation to Bid for BID NO. J88A-GLYC (ITB). The ITB was for the purchase of Indefinite quantities of animal feed for animals used in research. The ITB called for vendors to quote prices for estimated quantities of forty different items. In the past, Respondent had evaluated the bids received in response to similar ITBs based on the total cost for all the items in the ITB. Prior to issuing the ITB, Respondent decided to allow bidders to bid in lots. Therefore, the ITB divided the forty items into three lots. Lot I consisted of eight items; Lot II of two items; and Lot III of thirty items. The ITB contained the following language: GENERAL CONDITIONS * * * 9. AWARDS: As the best interest of the University of Florida may require, the right is reserved to make award(s) by individual item, group of items, all or none, or any combination thereof; to reject any and all bids or waive any minor irregularity or technicality in bids received.... SPECIAL CONDITIONS * * * Items included in this bid may be bid in LOTS as follows: Joint exhibit 1 at pp. 2 and 11. In response to the ITB, Respondent received four bids. The bidders and the totals (rounded to the nearest dollar) of their bids for the items in each lot were as follows: Bidder Lot I Lot II Lot III Boyer's (Petitioner) $53,179 $49,238 $68,018 Brownlee (Intervenor) 53,190 47,880 68,730 Teklad 51,104 47,393 No Bid Jonesville 74,908 69,978 79,247 Petitioner's bid contained a unit price and a total (determined by multiplying the unit price by the ITB's estimated amount of units needed) for thirty-nine of the items. The space where the unit price and total for item 25 of Lot III was blank. Petitioner made a mistake in leaving the space blank; the blank was not left intentionally, and Petitioner's President, who signed the bid, did not know the blank was there until after the bids were opened by Respondent. The evaluation of the bids was done by Ms. Whitley, Respondent's Associate Director of the Purchasing Division, and Dr. Moreland, a Doctor of Veterinary Medicine employed by Respondent. Ms. Whitley and Dr. Moreland determined that the blank for item 25 of Lot III meant that Petitioner could not deliver Item 25 and decided that the contract for Lot III should be awarded to Intervenor, the second lowest bidder for Lot III. On July 5, 1988, after meeting with Dr. Moreland, Ms. Whitley notified the bidders that Teklad would be awarded the contract for Lots I and II, and that Intervenor would be awarded the contract for Lot III. The bid tabulation sheet showing the awards was posted on July 6, 1988. The bid tabulation sheet contained the following language: Notice of Intended Award to: Teklad, Boyer. Failure to file a protest within the time prescribed in Section 120.53(5), Florida Statutes, shall constitute a waiver of proceedings under Chapter 120, Florida Statutes. Also on July 6, 1988, Mr. Boyer, Petitioner's President, came to see Ms. Whitley. Mr. Boyer stated that he intended for the space on Item 25 to be left blank and that he would give Item 25 to Petitioner for free. Based on the statement by Mr. Boyer, Ms. Whitley decided that the contract for Lot III should be awarded to Petitioner, since she felt her duty was to get the best price for Respondent. Therefore, the notice of intent to award was changed in the afternoon of July 6, 1988, and posted on July 7, 1988. On July 7, 1988, Intervenor, Brownlee, filed a protest to the proposed award of Lot III to Petitioner. Ms. Whitley forwarded Brownlee's protest to James Thereoux, Respondent's Director of Purchasing. Mr. Thereoux requested that Joseph T. Barron, Jr., Respondent's Associate General Counsel, review the protest. By memorandum dated September 15, 1988, Mr. Barron advised Mr. Thereoux that the bid should be awarded to Brownlee, as was originally done. Mr. Barron considered the blank space on Petitioner's bid to be the equivalent of Petitioner not bidding on that item. Therefore, Petitioner would be unable to deliver an item in Lot III, in violation of the bid document which required the winning bidder to be able to supply all the items requested. Also, Mr. Barron considered the blank space to give Petitioner an advantage over other bidders, since by not pricing an item, Petitioner's total price for Lot III would be lower than if all items were priced. Mr. Barron did not consider the blank space to be a minor irregularity which could be waived. Based on Mr. Barron's memorandum, Respondent determined that the bid should be awarded to Brownlee. On September 16, 1988, the bidders were advised of this decision and a notice of intended award was posted on September 19, 1988. By letter dated September 19, 1988, Petitioner notified Respondent that it intended to protest the disqualification of its bid. On October 3, 1988, Petitioner filed its formal protest.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent issue a Final Order awarding the contract for Lot III of Invitation to Bid for Bid No. J88A-924C to Intervenor, Brownlee Feed and Seed. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 3rd day of February, 1989, in Tallahassee, Florida. JOSE A. DIEZ-ARGUELLES Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of February, 1989. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 88-5953BID Petitioner's Findings of Fact Petitioner submitted a proposed recommended order which contains unnumbered paragraphs and does not separate findings of fact from conclusions of law. The findings of fact set forth in the proposed order are supported by the evidence. However, the facts that are not set forth in this Recommended Order are irrelevant or subordinate to facts found. Respondent's Findings of Fact 1-3. Irrelevant. 4. Accepted. 5-10. Subordinate to facts found. 11. Accepted. 12-13. Irrelevant. Whether the bid could be awarded by lots is not at issue in this case. See Conclusions of Law section of this RO. Accepted. Irrelevant. Accepted. 17-18. Subordinate to facts found. Accepted. Accepted. Not a finding of fact. Supported by competent evidence but unnecessary to the decision reached. Accepted. 24-25. Subordinate to facts found. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Subordinate to facts found. 30-31. Irrelevant. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Irrelevant. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Irrelevant. See Conclusions of Law. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Supported by competent evidence but unnecessary to the decision reached. Intervenor's Finding of Fact 1. Accepted. COPIES FURNISHED: Joseph T. Barron, Jr., Esquire University of Florida 207 Tigert Hall Gainesville, Florida 32611 Tyrie A. Boyer, Esquire Boyer, Tanzler & Boyer Independent Life Building Suite 3030 Jacksonville, Florida 32602 John P. O'Neal, Esquire Post Office Drawer O Gainesville, Florida 32602 =================================================================
The Issue The issue is whether Boyer Produce, Inc. and its surety, Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Company, owe petitioner $1,751.80 as alleged in the complaint.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: In July 1993, petitioner, Patricia Thomas, was given authority by her brother to sell all remaining watermelons on his farm located in Citra, Florida. This amounted to approximately one truckload. She eventually sold them to respondent, Boyer Produce, Inc., a dealer (broker) in agricultural products located in Williston, Florida. Its owner and president is Kennedy Boyer (Boyer), who represented his firm in this proceeding. As an agricultural dealer, respondent is required to obtain a license from and post a surety bond with the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services (Department). In this case, the bond has been posted by respondent, Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Company, and is in the amount of $75,000.00. Although the parties had never had business dealings before this transaction, through a mutual acquaintance, Randy Rowe, respondent learned that petitioner was interested in selling her watermelons. After Boyer visited the field and examined three watermelons which he described as "good," Boyer offered to purchase a truckload for 4 per pound if all melons were of the same quality. Thomas declined and counteroffered with a price of 5 per pound. The parties then agreed to split the difference and arrived at a sales price of 4 per pound. During the negotiations, Rowe acted as an intermediary between the parties and observed the formation of the contract as well as the loading of the goods onto the truck. Although the matter is in dispute, it is found that both parties agreed that Thomas would be paid 4 per pound for "good" watermelons delivered. This meant that petitioner would not be paid unless and until the watermelons were delivered to their final destination in "good" condition. In the trade, being in "good condition" meant that the watermelons would meet U. S. Grade No. 1 standards. Respondent also agreed to provide a truck and driver at petitioner's field and to transport the produce to Brooklyn, New York, the final destination. At the same time, petitioner was given the responsibility of loading the watermelons on the truck. To assist petitioner in meeting her up- front labor costs, respondent advanced $500.00 as partial payment for the shipment. Winston Smith was hired by respondent to transport the melons to New York. He arrived at petitioner's field on Saturday, July 16, 1993, and remained there while approximately 46,000 pounds of melons were loaded on an open top flat bed trailer. One of the loaders said the melons were "packed real tight," and four bales of straw were used in packing. According to Rowe, who observed the loading, the watermelons packed that day were in "good" condition, and any nonconforming watermelons were "kicked" off the truck. Also, by way of admission, the driver, as agent for Boyer, acknowledged to Rowe that the melons loaded were in "good" condition. Late that afternoon, a thunderstorm came through the area and, due to lightening, no further loading could be performed. Since around 46,000 pounds had already been loaded, petitioner desired for the truck to be sent on its way north. Smith, however, told petitioner he wanted 50,000 pounds in order to make his trip to New York worthwhile and he would not go with anything less. Acceding to his wishes, petitioner agreed to meet Smith the next morning and load an additional two hundred watermelons, or 4,000 pounds, on the truck. Smith then drove the loaded truck to a nearby motel where he spent the night. That evening it rained, and this resulted in the uncovered watermelons and straw getting wet. The next morning, Smith telephoned petitioner and advised her to meet him at 9:00 a. m. at a local Starvin' Marvin store, which had a weight scale that could certify the weight of the shipment. Petitioner carried two hundred watermelons to the store at 9:00 a. m., but Smith did not arrive. Around noon, she received a call from Smith advising that his truck was broken down at the motel and would not start. The watermelons were then taken to the motel and loaded onto the trailer. In all, 50,040 pounds were loaded. Smith's truck would still not start after the watermelons were loaded, and Smith refused to spend any money out of his own pocket to repair the truck. Not wanting to delay the shipment any longer, petitioner gave Smith $35.00 to have someone assist him in starting the vehicle. In order for the repairs to be made, the loaded trailer had to be jacked up and the truck unhooked from and later rehooked to the trailer. This was accomplished only with great difficulty, and Smith was forced to "jostle" the trailer with the power unit for some two hours altogether. According to Rowe, he warned Smith that such jostling could bruise the melons and "mess them up." Smith was also cautioned early on that he should make the necessary repairs as soon as possible so that the load of watermelons would not continue to sit uncovered in the sun. The truck eventually departed around 9:00 p. m., Sunday evening after the uncovered trailer had sat in the sun all day. The shipment was delivered to Brooklyn on the following Tuesday afternoon or evening, and it was inspected by a government inspector on Wednesday morning. According to the inspection report, which has been received in evidence, the load was split evenly between crimson and jubilee melons, and 23 percent and 21 percent, respectively, of the two types of melons failed to meet grade. No greater than a 12 percent "margin" is allowed on government inspections. Almost all of the defects cited in the report were attributable to the melons being "over-ripe." The buyer in New York rejected the entire shipment as not meeting standards. Respondent then sold the shipment for only $1350.00 resulting in a loss of $350.00 on the transaction. In addition, respondent says the driver (Smith) accepted $1200.00 instead of the $2,000.00 he would have normally charged to transport a load to New York. When petitioner asked for her money a few weeks later, respondent declined, saying the goods had not met specification when delivered to their destination, and if she had any remedy at all, it was against Smith, the driver. If petitioner had been paid 4 per pound for the entire shipment, she would have been entitled to an additional $1,751.80, or a total of $2,251.80. Petitioner contends that the melons failed to meet grade because of the negligence of the driver. More specifically, she says the loaded melons sat in the sun for almost two days, including all day Sunday after being soaked from the Saturday evening rain. If wet melons are exposed to the hot sun for any length of time, they run the risk of "wet burning," which causes decay. But even if this occurred, only 1 percent of the shipment was found to have "decay" by the government inspector. Petitioner also says that by being jostled for two hours on Sunday, the melons were bruised. Again, however, the melons were rejected primarily because they were over-ripe, not bruised. Therefore, and consistent with the findings in the inspection report, it is found that the jostling and wet burning did not have a material impact on the quality of the melons. Respondent contended the melons were close to being fully ripened when they were picked and loaded. In this regard, Charles Strange, Sr. agreed that if the melons sat in the field for another four or five days, they would have started "going bad." By this, it may be reasonably inferred that, unless the melons were loaded and delivered in a timely manner, they would have become over-ripe and would not meet grade within a matter of days. Therefore, a timely delivery of the melons was extremely important, and to the extent respondent's agent, Smith, experienced at least a twenty-four hour delay in delivering the melons through no fault of petitioner, this contributed in part to their failure to meet grade. Petitioner is accordingly entitled to some additional compensation, a fair allocation of which is one-half of the value of the shipment, or $1125.90, less the $500.00 already paid.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services requiring respondent to pay petitioner $625.90 within thirty days from date of the agency's final order. In the event such payment is not timely made, the surety should be liable for such payment. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of December, 1993, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of December, 1993. COPIES FURNISHED: Honorable Bob Crawford Commissioner of Agriculture The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Brenda D. Hyatt, Chief Bureau of Licensing & Bond 508 Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 Richard A. Tritschler, Esquire The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Company Post Office Box 1985 Jackson, Mississippi 39215-1985 Patricia Thomas Post Office Box 522 Archer, Florida 32618 Kennedy Boyer 15A South West 2nd Avenue Williston, Florida 32696
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondents owe Petitioner $13,512.09 for watermelons, as alleged in the Amended Complaint.
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant findings of fact are made. Cook Brown Farms is a melon farm in Punta Gorda, Florida. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Cook Brown Farms was a "producer" as defined in Subsection 604.15(5), Florida Statutes, of agricultural products in the State of Florida. Melons come within the definition of "agricultural products" as defined in Subsection 604.15(3), Florida Statutes. J.G.L. Produce is a Florida Corporation, owned by John W. Johnson, Jr., and located in Pompano Beach, Florida. At times pertinent to this proceeding, J.G.L. Produce was licensed as a "dealer in agricultural products" as defined in Subsection 604.15(1), Florida Statutes. Andrew J. Cook, a principal owner of Cook Brown Farms, and Mr. Johnson of J.G.L. Produce entered into an oral agreement regarding the sale of watermelons grown at Cook Brown Farms. The core of this case is a dispute concerning the nature of this agreement. Mr. Cook testified that, under the agreement, J.G.L. Produce would purchase the melons at the farm at their daily market price, plus 1/2 cent to cover Cook Brown Farms' cost of picking, sorting, and placing the melons in special bins and in special pallets required by the ultimate purchaser, Kroger Supermarkets. J.G.L. Produce would provide the bins and pallets and would provide the trucks to ship the melons. Mr. Johnson testified that the agreement was not for purchase but for brokerage of the melons. J.G.L. Produce would act as broker of Cook Brown Farms' watermelons, use its best efforts to sell the melons at the highest price available, and pay Cook Brown Farms the proceeds of the sale, minus expenses and a brokerage fee of one cent per pound. Mr. Johnson testified that J.G.L. Produce never took title to or purchased the melons, and that the risk of loss always remained on Cook Brown Farms. Mr. Johnson testified that he approached Mr. Cook about the melons because he had a ready buyer in another local dealer, Delk Produce, which had a longstanding arrangement to provide melons to Kroger. Mr. Johnson agreed with Mr. Cook that the arrangement included the provision of bins and pallets by J.G.L. Produce, though Mr. Johnson stated that the arrangement also called for J.G.L. Produce to retain $0.015 per pound from the amount paid to Cook Brown Farms to cover the cost of the bins and pallets. J.G.L. Produce took approximately 24 truck loads of watermelons from Cook Brown Farms. J.G.L. Produce deducted a one cent per pound brokerage fee from each load of melons it took, except for certain loads noted below, without contemporaneous objection from Cook Brown Farms. The Amended Complaint claims that J.G.L. Produce owes money to Cook Brown Farms for five of the loads taken by J.G.L. Produce. In sum, the Amended Complaint states that J.G.L. Produce owes Cook Brown Farms $19,991.74 for the five loads, less $6,479.65 already paid, for a total owing of $13,512.09. Item One of the Amended Complaint alleges that J.G.L. Produce owes $4,438.54 for a load of 38,596 pounds at a price of $0.115 per pound, sold on April 20, 2000. Item Two of the Amended Complaint alleges that J.G.L. Produce owes $4,625.30 for a load of 40,220 pounds at a price of $0.115 per pound, sold on April 21, 2000. The Amended Complaint alleges that the melons on these two loads were inspected and approved for shipment during loading by Delk Produce employee Freddie Ellis. The Amended Complaint states that Cook Brown Farms was paid in full for the loads on May 3, 2000, but that the contested amounts were deducted from subsequent settlements by J.G.L. Produce. The evidence established that the melons claimed under Item One were initially sold to Delk Produce for delivery to Kroger. On May 3, 2000, J.G.L. Produce paid Cook Brown Farms the amount of $4,438.54, which constituted the price for 38,596 pounds of melons at $0.125 per pound, less $385.96 for the one cent per pound brokerage fee. Jay Delk, the principal of Delk Produce, testified that this load was rejected by Kroger's buyer in Virginia due to "freshness," meaning that the melons were unsuitably green. Mr. Delk stated that the melons were taken to North Carolina to ripen and eventually sold at $0.06 per pound. The final return on this load, less the brokerage fee, was $1,543.84. In its final settlement with Cook Brown Farms on May 26, 2000, J.G.L. Produce deducted the difference between the original payment of $4,438.54 and the final payment of $1,543.84. The evidence established that the melons claimed under Item Two were initially sold to Delk Produce. On May 3, 2000, J.G.L. Produce paid Cook Brown Farms the amount of $5,809.80, which constituted the price for 50,520 pounds of watermelons at $0.125 per pound, less $505.20 for the one cent per pound brokerage fee. Seminole Produce purchased 10,300 pounds of this load at $0.145 per pound, or $1,493.50. The remainder of the load was rejected by Kroger due to freshness and had to be resold at a lesser price of $0.0346 per pound, or $1,391.00. In its final settlement with Cook Brown Farms on May 26, 2000, J.G.L. Produce deducted the difference between the original payment of $5,809.80 and the final payment (after deduction of the brokerage fee) of $2,576.11. The evidence established that the melons claimed under Item Three were sold to Delk Produce. On May 9, 2000, J.G.L. Produce paid Cook Brown Farms the amount of $2,731.30, which constituted the price for 42,020 pounds of watermelons at $0.0675 per pound, less $105.05 for the brokerage fee, reduced to $0.0025 per pound. Mr. Johnson testified that he decided to forego the full brokerage fee to save money for Mr. Cook and his farm, because it was "hurting" due to the rapidly plummeting price for watermelons. Mr. Johnson discovered at this time that Delk Produce had not been retaining the agreed- upon $0.015 per pound to cover the cost of bins and pallets and decided not to lose any more money on that item. In its final settlement with Cook Brown Farms on May 26, 2000, J.G.L. Produce deducted the difference between the original payment of $2,731.30 and $2,206.05, deducting $525.25 from the original payment to cover the cost of the bins and pallets. The evidence established that the melons claimed under Items Four and Five were originally shipped to Wal-Mart in Kentucky on April 29, 2000, and were rejected on the ground that the melons were not packed to specifications. The melons were trucked back to Florida at J.G.L. Produce's expense. The melons claimed under Item Four totaled 41,100 pounds. J.G.L. Produce divided the melons into four loads and sold them to four local dealers at an average price of $0.775 per pound, totaling $3,185.41. J.G.L. Produce deducted its $0.015 charge for bins and pallets, reducing the total to $2,671.51. J.G.L. Produce then deducted $1,750.00 from the total as reimbursement for the freight charge it paid to bring the melons back to Florida after their rejection by Wal-Mart. J.G.L. Produce did not include a brokerage fee. On May 26, 2000, J.G.L. Produce paid the remaining $921.51 to Cook Brown Farms as part of the final settlement. The melons claimed under Item Five totaled 45,600 pounds. J.G.L. Produce sold 2,426 pounds to Seminole Produce at $0.10 per pound, or $242.60. J.G.L. Produce sold the remaining 43,174 pounds to Belle Glade Produce at $0.065 per pound, or $2,800. From the total for Item Five, J.G.L. Produce deducted its $0.015 charge for bins and pallets and $1,950.00 for the freight charge it paid to bring the melons back to Florida after their rejection by Wal-Mart. J.G.L. Produce did not include a brokerage fee on this load of melons. On May 26, 2000, J.G.L. Produce paid the remaining $416.64 to Cook Brown Farms as part of the final settlement. The weight of the credible evidence, excluding the hearsay that was not supported by the direct testimony of Mr. Johnson, leads to the finding that there was a brokerage arrangement between the parties. J.G.L. Produce routinely deducted brokerage fees from its payments, without objection by Cook Brown Farms. This course of dealing strongly indicates a brokerage arrangement. Mr. Cook testified as to prior dealings with J.G.L. Produce, which also involved a brokerage arrangement. The evidence indicated that J.G.L. Produce fully accounted for the five loads of melons at issue, and paid Cook Brown Farms the full amounts due and owing for those loads.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services enter a final order dismissing the Amended Complaint filed by Gin Brown Matthews, d/b/a Cook Brown Farms. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of March, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ___________________________________ LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6947 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of March, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Redland Insurance Company 222 South 15th Street, Suite 600, North Omaha, Nebraska 65102 Brenda D. Hyatt, Bureau Chief Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Mayo Building, Room 508 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 John W. Johnson, President Post Office Box 1123 Pompano Beach, Florida 33061 Harold M. Stevens, Esquire Post Office Drawer 1440 Fort Myers, Florida 33902 Edward L. Myrick, Jr., Esquire Beighley & Myrick, P.A. 1255 West Atlantic Boulevard Suite F-2 Pompano Beach, Florida 33069 Richard D. Tritschler, General Counsel Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Honorable Terry L. Rhodes Commissioner of Agriculture Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810
