The Issue The ultimate issue to be resolved in this proceeding is whether the Department of Environmental Regulation should issue a permit to Broward County authorizing construction of the proposed Cell 14 extension of the Broward County landfill located in the Town of Davie, Florida. Broward County and the Department of Environmental Regulation contend that Broward County has provided reasonable assurance that the proposed facility will meet the requirements of the Department's rules and regulations and not cause pollution in contravention of the Department's standards. The Town of Davie contends that the proposed facility will not meet the Department's requirements and will result in pollution in contravention of the Department's standards.
Findings Of Fact Broward County presently operates a landfill known as the Davie Landfill on a tract of land comprising 200 acres within the Town of Davie, Broward County, Florida. The existing sanitary landfill includes 13 cells which cover approximately 20 acres on the northeastern portion of the site. The landfill had an original design elevation of50 feet. The Department of Environmental Regulation, in a separate permitting proceeding, has authorized an increase to the height of the existing landfill to 90 feet. The permit authorizing increasing the height of the existing landfill has been challenged by the Town of Davie and is the subject of a separate proceeding before the Division of Administrative Hearings. The site which includes the landfill also has a sludge lagoon and trash landfill located in close proximity to the sanitary landfill. The sludge lagoon was used until sometime in 1981 for disposal of septic tank clean-out, sludges, grease trap waste, and wastewater treatments. The trash landfill was designed primarily for disposal of yard trash. The existing landfill has vertical side slopes of 3.5 to l. In other words, the height of the landfill increases along sides by i foot for every 3.5 feet traveled horizontally. Through this application, Broward County is seeking approval to expand its sanitary landfill by adding a proposed Cell 14. Cell 14 would constitute a Class I landfill since it will receive in excess of 20 tons of solid waste per day. The proposed Cell 14 would be constructed along the existing western face of Cells 1 through 13. It would ultimately be constructed to a height of 90 feet and would be capped with an impervious substance. The western side slope of the proposed cell would also be 3.5 to 1. Cell 14 would cover approximately 11 acres, bringing the total size of the sanitary landfill to just over 30 acres. With Cell 14, the sanitary landfill would continue to operate until approximately 1986. Containing leachate and preventing it from entering surface or ground waters is a most important consideration in determining whether to permit sanitary landfills. Leachate is water that has passed through refuse and been contaminated by the refuse. If significant amounts of leachate from Cell 14 enters into surface and ground waters, violations of the Department's water quality standards would be likely. Several features have been designed into Cell 14 to prevent introduction of leachate into surface and ground waters. The base of the cell would have a high density polyethylene liner to prevent percolation of Leachate that collects at the bottom of the cell into groundwater. A leachate collection system consisting of pipes and manholes has been devised. As leachate collects at the base of the cell, it will be dumped into tank trucks and carried to nearby wastewater disposal plants where it will be treated. A stormwater collection system has been designed so that initial stormwater runoff will be pumped to the leachate collection system and tested. If significant pollutants are contained in the stormwater runoff, it can continue to be pumped into the leachate collection system and ultimately removed to off-site treatment plants. If there are not significant pollutants in the runoff, runoff will be collected in a swale system and ultimately percolate into groundwater. Water that leaves the site in this manner is not likely to cause violations of Department of Environmental Regulation standards either in surface or ground waters. Numerous technological advances have occurred since Cells 1 through 13 of the Davie Landfill were designed and constructed. These cells have a designed-in leachate collection system. The system presently functions adequately, except that the liners under the earlier cells appear to be breaking down. It is apparent that the liner under Cells 1 through 4 has deteriorated to the extent that all leachate from these cells is not collected in the leachate collection system, but enters the groundwater below the landfill. Leachate from a landfill of this sort and magnitude that enters groundwater is likely to cause pollution in violation of the Department's standards. Leachate is presently entering the groundwater from Cells 1 through 4. The nature of the liner under the remaining original cells is not known. It is thought to be made of asphalt. Many forms of asphalt, obviously including the kind that was used to line Cells 1 through 4, are not capable of containing Leachate for an extended period of time. If the liner breaks down, the leachate collection system under all of the original cells will no longer function, and leachate will enter the groundwater, causing violations of Department of Environmental Regulation standards. There will not be an impervious liner between the existing cells of the Davie Landfill and the proposed Cell 14. It has been estimated that the cost of such a liner would be prohibitive. There will be limerock placed between the existing cells and the proposed cell; however, limerock is permeable. Some Leachate from Cell 14 will seep into the existing cells. Some of the leachate from the proposed Cell 14 that enters the existing Cells 1 through 4 will find its way into groundwater under the landfill. Leachate that enters the remaining cells will also find its way into groundwater if the liner under these cells breaks down as the liner under Cells 1 through 4 has broken down. If Leachate from the proposed Cell 14 enters groundwater under the site of the landfill, it is likely to cause pollution in violation of Department of Environmental Regulation standards. Groundwater in the area of the Davie Landfill flows generally from the northwest to the southeast. Some of the groundwater from the site of the sanitary landfill is likely to find its way into a canal which is located just to the south of the site. this is the C-11 Canal. If leachate from the proposed Cell 14 enters groundwater under the site of the landfill, it is likely to ultimately cause violations of Department of Environmental Regulation standards in the C-11 Canal. Except for the fact that the liners under the existing cells of the sanitary landfill are subject to deterioration, the leachate collection system can function appropriately. The leachate collection system for the proposed Cell 14 can also function without allowing introduction of leachate into surface and ground waters. The leachate collection systems utilize pipes that are presently buried under the existing landfill and will be further buried by the construction of Cell 14. The pipes that are presently being used, and are proposed to be used, are designed to withstand pressure greater than would be imposed on them. Furthermore, they are being placed in such a manner (surrounded by rock and utilizing ball joints) as to reduce the pressure imposed upon them. It is possible that one of the pipes could break and that leachate could thus escape from the Leachate collection system. This possibility is not a likely one, however, given the design parameters of the pipes and the nature of their installation. The fact that the leachate collection system for existing cells of the Davie Landfill would be buried under the proposed Cell 14 does not raise a significant danger that the system will break down. Again, the design parameters of the pipes and the nature of their installation render breakage unlikely. The sludge pit that is located just to the southwest of the sanitary landfill and the trash landfill that is located just to the south of the sanitary landfill offer potentially severe threats to the integrity of ground and surface waters on and off of the site. The sludge pit is a hazardous waste site. The trash landfill is not designed to prevent substances placed on the landfill from percolating into groundwater. It does not appear that construction of the proposed Cell 14 addition to the sanitary landfill would increase the risk of pollution that the sludge pit and trash landfill present. It does not appear that construction of the proposed Cell 14 would cause significant additional surface or ground water flows that would increase the risk of material from the sludge pit or the trash landfill from entering surface or ground waters. The applicant has failed to provide reasonable assurance that its proposed addition to the Davie Landfill will not result in violations of Department of Environmental Regulation standards contained in Chapters 17-3, 17- 4, and 17-7, Florida Administrative Code. While the proposed cell has been designed with appropriate liners and with an appropriate leachate collection system, its location abutting an existing landfill which does not have an adequate liner preventing percolation of leachate into groundwater increases the risk of that occurring. It appears that the only means of preventing or reducing that risk is either to close off the existing cells, or to place a liner between the existing cells and any addition in order to prevent flows of Leachate from new landfill activities into the existing cells.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Philip G. Nicholson, does business as Allstate Termite Control. The Respondent holds a pest control identification card issued by the Office of Entomology of the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services. On or about September 23, 1977, the Respondent entered into a subterranean termite control contract and service agreement with Roland E. Cooley and Alma P. Cooley with respect to the Cooleys' residence in Lake Worth, Florida. The chemical specified for use on the contract was chlordane. On or about that same date, the Respondent entered into a contract with Roland E. Cooley and Alma P. Cooley to perform a dry wood termite attic prevention treatment on the Cooley's residence. The chemical specified in the dry wood contract was "dri die". Only hearsay testimony was offered to establish what, if any, representations the Respondent made to the Cooleys to induce them to enter into the contracts. The work performed by the Respondent on the Cooleys' residence was not sufficient to provide the protection specified in the contracts, and in the case of the dry wood treatment, was unnecessary. The Cooleys' residence is constructed on a concrete slab. With such structures, the chlordane label, which governs use of the chemical, requires that all voids in hollow masonry units of the foundation be treated at the rate of at least one gallon per five linear feet of wall. It is thus necessary to drill each masonry block so that the chemical can be injected into it. Hollow masonry blocks were used in constructing the foundation of the Cooley house. Only one drill hole was made on the north side of the house into the masonry blocks, and none were made on the south side. If each of the masonry units had been treated as required, drill holes would have been placed at every eighteen inches along the foundation. This was not done, and the treatment for subterranean termite control was thus not in accordance with the label on the chemical, and was substandard. The treatment was inadequate to provide the Cooleys with the protection provided in the subterranean termite control contract. As to the dri die treatment at the Cooley house, the sort of treatment specified would not give the Cooleys any significant termite protection, since it would only protect them from dry wood termites in their attic. It is not a sort of treatment that is ordinarily performed. In order to be performed effectively, however, the dri die must be applied in accordance with the label which gives directions for its use. It is required that all wood surfaces be covered with the chemical at a recommended rate of one pound per one thousand square feet of area. At the Cooley residence, dri die was placed in the area, however, it was placed in a small pile in one part of the attic. It was not evenly spread, all wood surfaces were not covered, and insufficient chemical was utilized. The treatment specified would have provided the Cooleys only with dry wood termite prevention in the one part of the attic where the chemical was piled. The treatment was not in accordance with the label instructions, and was substandard. On or about September 27, 1977, the Respondent entered into a subterranean termite control contract and service agreement with Mr. and Mrs. Walter J. Delaney, for their residence in Lake Worth, Florida. The type of chemical specified for use in the contract was chlordane. The contract sets out the street address and zip code of the Delaneys' residence, but does not state the city. The address set out on the contract is sufficient to establish the location of the Delaneys' residence. Only hearsay evidence was offered at the final hearing to indicate what, if any, representations the Respondent made to the Delaneys in order to induce them to enter into the contract. The work performed by the Respondent on the Delaney home was insufficient to comport with the label instructions for application of chlordane, was substandard, and did not provide the Delaneys with the protection specified in the contract. The Delaneys' home is of concrete slab on-ground construction. The foundation is constructed of hollow masonry units. The voids in the hollow masonry units were not each treated as required on the chlordane label. Only one drill hole was made on the south side of the house and none were made on the north side. Several drill holes were made on the other sides of the house, however, four of them were fake, in other words they did not go all the way through the slab. On or about September 28, 1977, the Respondent entered into a subterranean termite control contract and service agreement with Mrs. Ann Sahlem, for her residence in West Palm Beach, Florida. The chemical specified for use in the contract was chlordane. Only hearsay evidence was offered to establish what representations, if any, were made by the Respondent to induce Mrs. Sahlem to enter into the contract. The work performed by the Respondent on the Sahlem residence did not comport with the label instructions for us of chlordane, was substandard, and was not sufficient to provide Mrs. Sahlem with the protection specified in the contract. The Sahlem residence is constructed on an on-ground concrete slab. The foundation is constructed of hollow masonry units. The voids in each of the hollow masonry units were not filled as required by the chlordane label. No drill holes were made on the west side of the home, and only one was made on the east side. On the north side of the home the holes were too far apart to treat all of the voids. The address set out on the Sahlem contract does not give the city of Mrs. Sahlem's residence although it does give the street address and zip code. The address as given is sufficient to identify the residence. On or about September 30, 1977, the Respondent entered into a subterranean termite control contract and service agreement, and a dry wood termite attic prevention treatment agreement with Mrs. Elizabeth A. Hughes. The chemical specified for use in the subterranean termite control contract was chlordane. The chemical specified in the dry wood termite prevention treatment was "dri die". The contracts were for Mrs. Hughes' residence in Lake Worth, Florida. The contracts do not specify the city of Mrs. Hughes' residence, although the street address and zip code are set out. The address as set out is sufficient to adequately identify the location of Mrs. Hughes' residence. No evidence was offered from which it could be concluded that the Respondent made any misrepresentations to Mrs. Hughes to induce her to enter into the contracts. The work performed under the contracts was, however, not in accordance with the label instructions for chlordane and dri die treatments, was substandard, and was not sufficient to provide the treatment specified in the contracts. Mrs. Hughes' home is constructed on a concrete slab. The foundation is constructed of hollow masonry units. The voids in the masonry units were not each treated as required on the chlordane directions. Furthermore, the drill holes were made three feet above the ground along one wall, and five feet above the ground along another wall, which would be insufficient to allow introduction of the chemicals below the concrete slab. The dri die was not distributed evenly over the attic wood surfaces as required on the dri die label. An insufficient amount of the chemical was utilized, and it was placed at one spot in the attic. The dri die treatment was unnecessary, and even if it had been advisable, it was not accomplished in a manner which would provide any useful protection to Mrs. Hughes. On or about October 27, 1977, the Respondent entered into a subterranean termite control contract and service agreement with Mrs.. Fred J. Schultz. The contract was for Mrs. Schultz's residence in Lake Worth, Florida. No direct evidence was offered to establish what, if any, representations were made by the Respondent to induce Mrs. Schultz to enter into the contract. It appears that the contract was solicited and performed by employees of the Respondent, and not by him directly, although he signed the contract and was responsible for the work. The chemical specified for use in the contract is Gold Crest, 72%, which is a trade name for chlordane. The work performed by the Respondent did not comport with the label instructions for use of chlordane, was substandard, and was not sufficient to provide the protection specified in the contract. The Sdchultz's home is constructed on piers with a crawl space. The instructions for application of chlordane contained in the label provide that in treating such structures it is necessary to either rod or dig a narrow trench to the top of the footing along the inside of the foundation walls, around all piers, sewers, pipes, and conduits; and to rod or dig a narrow trench to the top of the footing along the outside of the foundation wall. The Respondent, or his employees who performed the work at the Schultz residence did not make any trenches whatever, and did not even enter the crawl space below the Schultz's home in order to treat the piers. No evidence was presented from which it could be determined that the Respondent performed any dry wood termite treatment on the Schultz's residence. No evidence was presented from which it could be determined that any such work that may have been performed was done improperly, or that it was accomplished with or without a contract. On or about October 21, 1977, the Respondent entered into a subterranean termite control contract and service agreement with Mrs. Hulda Radke. The contract related to Mrs. Radke's residence in West Palm Beach, Florida. The chemical specified for use in the contract was chlordane. The Respondent also entered into contracts to perform home repairs for Mrs. Radke. No evidence was offered from which it could be concluded that the Respondent made any misrepresentations in order to induce Mrs. Radke to enter into the contract for termite control. The termite control work performed by the Respondent on Mrs. Radke's residence did not comport with the label instructions for use of chlordane, was substandard, and was not sufficient to provide the protection specified in the contract. Mrs. Radke's home was of pier constructions with a crawl space. No trenches were made, and the chemical was not trenched or rodded around each pier, and around each foundation wall. The chemical was broadcast along the top of the soil, but was not placed below the surface. The label instructions specify that a chemical should not be broadcast sprayed. On or about October 26, 1977 the Respondent entered into a subterranean termite control contract and service agreement with Mrs. Charles Thompson, for her residence in West Palm Beach, Florida. The chemical specified for use in the contract was chlordane. No direct evidence was offered to establish what, if any, representations were made by the Respondent to induce Mrs. Thompson to enter into the contract. The work performed by the Respondent on the Thompson residence did not comport with the label instructions for use of chlordane, was substandard, and was insufficient to provide the protection specified in the contract. The Thompson residence is of pier and crawl space construction. No trenches or rodding was done as specified on the chlordane label, and each pier was not treated. The address set out on the Thompson contract is insufficient. It gives only a street address, and no city or zip code. The Respondent testified that he used a process known as "long rodding" to treat under concrete slabs. Long rodding is a method whereby the end of a spray assembly is extended, and chemicals introduced under a slab. It is used typically where hollow masonry is not used in constructing the foundation. The process does not work well because the end of the rod cannot be adequately controlled. Even if this process were utilized, the chlordane label would required that all voids in hollow masonry units be treated. Failure to treat each of the voids would render the treatment substandard. It appears that since these incidents occurred, the Respondent has performed numerous termite control contracts in Hillsborough and Pinellas counties without complaint.
Findings Of Fact An administrative complaint was filed against Respondent Earl W. Adams, a registered real estate broker on July 27, 1977. Respondent holds license no. 0148042. The complaint alleged: That Mildred Muranyi contacted Respondent in May, 1976, for this services to locate investment property. Respondent suggested that Mrs. Muranyi consider the motel business and specifically the Seascape Motel owned by Joseph J. Brex and his wife. That Respondent drafted a contract under which Mrs. Muranyi agreed to purchase the Seascape Motel; that at the insistence of Mrs. Muranyi Respondent Adams placed a provision in the contract relating to termite inspection; that Respondent stated that he would have the Seascape Motel inspected for termites on behalf of Mrs. Muranyi; that at Respondent's request Broker Dorothy Kincel instructed Mr. Ken Treat of Terminix Pest Control to inspect the Seascape Motel; that upon beginning the inspection, evidence of termites and termite damage was found and this information was brought to the attention of Respondent whereupon Respondent contacted Mr. Baughn Kestetter of R.W. Collins Pest Control and requested a termite inspection of the Seascape Motel; that Respondent instructed the pest control agent to inspect only certain units of the Motel; that thereafter Respondent requested a clearance letter from Mr. Kerstetter regarding termites and was thereupon advised that inasmuch as the inspection was incomplete, no clearance letter would be given. That on or about June 16, 1976, Respondent wrote Mrs. Muranyi and advised her that the Seascape Motel had been inspected by Collins Pest Control for termites and no evidence of any infestation was located; that in reliance upon the representations of Respondent Mrs. Muranyi, on July 12, 1976 closed the sale and purchased the Seascape Motel. The Hearing Officer finds: The subject property, the Seascape Motel, was inspected by two termite companies, one company, Ken Treat of Terminix Pest Control began inspection and the inspector found termites present and notified the owner of the property. No Evidence was produced to show that Respondent had notice of the finding of the termites. A second pest control company, R.W. Collins Pest Control, was contacted but could not make a complete inspection of the property for the reason that part of the units were not available to the inspector. The inspector notified Respondent Adams that he could not write a clearance letter inasmuch as all units had not been inspected. The original contract had been changed by the parties to state that the property was sold in "as is condition." A letter of June 16, 1976 from Respondent Adams to the purchaser, Mrs. Milly Muranyi gave notice that no full termite inspection had been made. The Respondent, however, appears to be less than candid inasmuch as the broker stated in part "I would do nothing, I wouldn't do anything else regarding termite inspection prior to closing . . ." It is inconceivable that a person with knowledge of damage that can be done by termites could in good faith state that he would close a deal for himself in which the termite damage was unknown. Mr. Adams has dealt with coastal property which is subject to termite damage and it is good business practice to determine any damage that might be done to any structure before purchased. (a) Petitioner contends: that the representations and activities of the Respondent amounted to a fraud on the purchaser; that once evidence of termite damage to the property for sale was discovered by one firm the inspection was cancelled; that the inspection by the second pest control company was limited to portions of the property that were not infected by termites. (b) Respondent contends: that at the time the contract was signed the property was being bought in "as is condition" and that the contract shows a waiver of the termite clause and was initialled by the parties; that the purchasers were represented by a competent attorney; that the condition of the contract was not predicated upon "termites or not termites" and that the price of the motel had been lowered from the original asking price.
Recommendation Dismiss the complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of September, 1978, in Tallahassee, Florida. DELPHENE C. STRICKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Kenneth Meer, Esquire Florida Real Estate Commission 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32801 Earl W. Adams 206 Sand Dollar North Indialantic, Florida 32903
Findings Of Fact Reimbursement Program The Florida Legislature created the Petroleum Contamination Site Cleanup Program to encourage responsible persons with adequate financial ability to conduct site rehabilitation and seek reimbursement in lieu of the state conducting cleanup. Section 376.3071(12), Florida Statutes (1993). Site owners and operators or their designees become entitled to reimbursement from the Inland Protection Trust Fund (IPTF) of their allowable costs at reasonable rates after completing a program task. Section 376.3071(12)(b), Florida Statutes. The costs of site rehabilitation must be actual and reasonable. Section 376.3071(12)(d), Florida Statutes. "Allowable" costs are those which are associated with work that is appropriate for cleanup tasks, i.e. whether the cost represents work that is technically necessary for the program task and otherwise not in violation of reimbursement limitations prescribed by statute or rule. In order for costs to be reimbursable, an applicant must convert charges in an application into applicable units and rates. Rule 17-773.100(5), Florida Administrative Code. DEP has a predominate rate schedule to determine whether a specific allowable cost is reasonable. DEP bases its predominate rates on a study of average rates that contractors charge for a particular task. In addition, DEP reviews each application to determine whether the overall cost and the methods used to perform the work are reasonable. DEP must also evaluate each application to determine whether a charge is an actual cost of a project. Contractors or subcontractors do not actually incur a fully reimbursable cost when they promise the site owner or its designee that they will perform work for an amount less than other professionals would charge, then allow the site owner or its designee to file a claim for reimbursement at or near the predominate rate. Such an agreement creates a back flow of funds to the site owner or its designee. This is true even though the charges are within the range of DEP's predominate rates. DEP never intended the rate schedule to create an entitlement to reimbursement regardless of the cost that contractors and subcontractors actually incur. Requests for reimbursement must apply to costs which are "integral" to site rehabilitation. Rule 17-773.100(2), Florida Administrative Code. "Integral" costs are those which are essential to completion of site rehabilitation. Rule 17-773.200(2)(11), Florida Administrative Code. After integral costs have been identified and incorporated on a units and rates basis in an invoice, the invoice may be marked up at two levels. These markups are subject to certain limitations: There can be no more than two levels of markups or handling fees applied to contractor, subcontractor or vendor invoices (Rule 17-773.350(9), F.A.C.); There can be no markups or handling fees in excess of 15 percent for each level of allowable markup applied to contractor, subcontractor or vendor invoices (Rule 17-773.350(10), F.A.C.); and There can be no markups or handling fees applied to invoices between any two entities which have a financial, familial, or beneficial relationship with each other (Rule 17-773.350(11), F.A.C.). In order to be reimbursable, costs must have been actually "incurred." Rule 17-773.700, Florida Administrative Code. "Incurred" means that allowable costs have been paid. Rule 17-773.200(9), Florida Administrative Code. A contractor must pay all invoices generated by a subcontractor at 100 percent of their face value prior to submission of an application in order to qualify those invoices for reimbursement. When a contractor pays a subcontractor's invoices, the contractor paying those invoices may apply the first-tier markup. Prior to submitting a reimbursement application, a funder or "the person responsible for contamination site rehabilitation" (PRFCSR) must pay the contractor for its invoices and markup. Then, the funder may apply the second- tier markup and submit the reimbursement application to DEP. DEP does not contest the second level of markup in these applications. DEP rules restrict reimbursement when parties within the usual "chain" of reimbursement (PRFCSR or funder, contractor and subcontractor) have financial, beneficial or familial relationships with each other or the site owner. These terms are defined in Rules 17-773.200(1), 17-773.200(6), 17- 773.200(7), Florida Administrative Code. The application form requires disclosure of such relationships through the Program Task and Site Identification Form. DEP's rules and written guidelines do not address or apply to activities, including financing arrangements, occurring outside of the chain of reimbursement if an applicant does not include charges for such activities in an application. Heretofore, DEP has not deducted finance costs that an applicant does not include as a line item in a reimbursement application. DEP must perform financial audits to ensure compliance with Chapter 376, Florida Statutes, and to certify site rehabilitation costs. Rule 17- 773.300(1), Florida Administrative Code. DEP performs this audit function: (a) to establish that the PRFCSR incurred the cost; (b) to determine that adequate documentation supports the claimed costs as incurred; and (c) and to review the reasonableness and allowance of the costs. The audit staff interprets the term "incurred" to mean that the applicant paid the costs included in the reimbursement application. DEP's audit staff usually does not inquire as to the level of a PRFCSR's financing where the application contains no line-item financing charges. However, the audit staff makes appropriate inquiries depending on the facts and events surrounding an individual application. Pursuant to Rule 17-773.350(4)(e), Florida Administrative Code, "[i]nterest or carrying charges of any kind with the exception of those outlined in Rule 17-773.650(1), F.A.C." are not reimbursable. The exceptions to the payment of interest set forth in Rule 17-773.650(1), Florida Administrative Code, are not at issue here. An interest rate charge on short-term borrowed capital from an unrelated third-party source is a "cost of doing business." DEP's predominate rates are fully loaded. They include a variable for all direct and indirect business overhead costs such as rent, utilities and personnel costs. DEP includes the cost of short-term borrowed capital in the direct and indirect overhead components of the fully-loaded personnel rates. Rule 17-773.700(5)(a), Florida Administrative Code. Petitioners PRFCSRs are entitled to make application for reimbursement of allowable markups and costs of site rehabilitation that they incur. In these consolidated cases, the site owners or operators designated either Petitioner ET or Petitioner SEI as PRFCSR. The PRFCSR is typically referred to as the "funder" in the reimbursement chain. Petitioner ET is a trust formed in 1993 and domiciled in Bermuda. It acts as American Factors Group, Inc.'s (AFG discussed below) conduit for funds that finance activities associated with Florida's petroleum contamination site cleanup program. The named beneficiaries of the trust are those contractors and subcontractors entitled to payment of costs for activities integral to site rehabilitation and for allowable markups of such costs. The sole trustee of ET is Western Investors Fiduciary, Ltd. (WIFL). WIFL is also the owner and a beneficiary of ET. Any profit that ET derives from funding petroleum contamination site cleanup flows through WIFL to investors who provide funds to finance site rehabilitation. American Environmental Enterprises, Inc. (AEE, discussed below) provided the investment funds for the reimbursement applications at issue here. WIFL is a limited liability corporation created and domiciled in Bermuda. The officers of WIFL are: William R. Robins, President; John G. Engler, Vice-President; and Peter Bougner, Secretary. The directors and shareholders of WIFL are: William R. Robins, John G. Engler, Paul H. DeCoster, Alec R. Anderson and Nicholas Johnson. Petitioner SEI is a corporation incorporated and operating under Florida law. Organized in 1994, SEI acts as AFG's conduit for funds to finance activities associated with Florida's petroleum contamination cleanup program. The officers and directors of SEI are: William R. Robins, President; John G. Engler, Executive Vice President; and Paul H. DeCoster, Secretary. William R. Robins is the sole shareholder of SEI. ET filed the petition for administrative hearing on behalf of SEI in at least four cases: Case Numbers 96-405, 96-425, 96-433, 96-437. Respondent DEP is the agency charged with the duty to administer the IPTF and Chapter 376, Florida Statutes. Financing Entities American Factors Group, Inc. (AFG) is a privately held corporation incorporated and operating under New Jersey law. AFG is not a party to this proceeding. AFG, acts as the servicing agent for contracts associated with factoring activities and other types of financing operations. AFG, through one of its divisions, Environmental Factors (EF), entered into factoring contracts with: (a) Gator Environmental, Inc. (Gator), general contractor; and (b) Tower Environmental, Inc. (Tower), prime subcontractor. Through these agreements, EF or its assignee bought the rights of Gator and Tower to future reimbursement payments at a percentage of the face value of the relevant invoices. The officers of AFG are: William R. Robins, President; John G. Engler, Vice President; and Paul H. DeCoster, Secretary. Bleak House, Inc. (Texas) owns the stock of AFG. American Environmental Enterprises, Inc. (AEE) is incorporated and operating under Nevada law. AEE is not a party to this proceeding. AEE, as the assignee under the EF contracts, is a third-party provider of capital to various entities in the reimbursement process. The officers of AEE are: William R. Robins, President; John G. Engler, Vice-President; and Paul H. DeCoster, Secretary. Bleak House, Inc., (Nevada) owns the stock of AEE. Bleak House, Inc., (Nevada) is incorporated and operating under Nevada law. Bleak House, Inc. (Texas) is incorporated and operating under Texas law. Officers of both corporations are William R. Robins, President; John G. Engler, Vice President; and Paul H. DeCoster, Secretary. Magazine Funding, Inc. owns the stock of both Bleak House corporations. Magazine Funding, Inc. is incorporated and operating under Nevada law. Officers of Magazine Funding, Inc. are William R. Robins, President; John G. Engler, Vice-President; and Paul H. DeCoster, Secretary. Family Food Garden, Inc. owns the stock of Magazine Funding, Inc. Family Food Garden, Inc. is incorporated and operating under Massachusetts law. Officers of Family Food Garden, Inc., are William R. Robins, President; and Paul H. DeCoster, Secretary. Six shareholders own the stock of Family Food Garden, Inc. None of these shareholders are related by familial ties to the officers or directors of the aforementioned companies or any relative thereof. Each of these companies -- ET, SEI, WIFL, AEE and AFG (including EF) share common officers and directors. Each of the companies maintain their own books and business records, file their own tax returns, and maintain records in accordance with the laws of the jurisdiction in which they were established. They operate pursuant to their respective bylaws or trust documents. ET, WIFL, and SEI do not have common assets with AEE or AFG (including EF). ET, WIFL and SEI do not have a beneficial, financial, or familial relationship with AEE or AFG (including EF) as Rule 17-773.200, Florida Administrative Code, defines those terms. Despite the facial organizational and structural integrity of ET, WIFL, SEI, AEE and AFG, the officers and directors of AFG and/or AEE created ET, WIFL, and SEI, in large part, for the benefit of AFG and/or AEE as a means to invest funds in petroleum contamination site cleanup programs. The officers and directors of AFG specifically created SEI to meet the needs of AFG's Florida investors. The purpose of each funder is to maximize the profits of AFG and its investors. AFG has other investment vehicles (funders) which it uses at times depending on the needs of its investors. AFG waits until the last instance before deciding which entity it will designate as funder in any particular factoring scenario. AFG usually does not make that decision until the day AFG's designated funder issues a funder's authorization to the general contractor. At the hearing, Mr. Stephen Parrish, a vice president of AFG, testified as the party representative for ET and SEI. ET, WIFL and SEI have no employees. EF or AFG responded to DEP's request for Petitioners to provide additional information about the financing scheme utilized here using stationary bearing EF's or AFG's letterhead. At least five of these letters written on SEI's behalf, refer to ET, an affiliate of AEE, as the funder. Nineteen of the letters written on ET's behalf refer to ET, an affiliate of AEE, as the funder. The greater weight of the evidence indicates that AFG and/or AEE negotiated less than arms-length contractual agreements with ET, WIFL, and SEI. Petitioners admit that they are "affiliates" of AEE and AFG through contractual agreements. However, there are no written factoring contracts between Petitioners and AFG such as the ones that exist between AFG, Gator and Tower. The only documented evidence of agreements between Petitioners and AFG are transactional based bills of sale representing the sale to AEE of Petitioners' right to receive reimbursement from IPTF. AFG created these bills of sale for bookkeeping purposes. AFG did not even go to the trouble of tailoring the form for the bills of sale for their stated purpose. For all practical purposes, Petitioners are under the management and control of AEE and AFG. Petitioners and AFG disclosed their affiliation in meetings with DEP staff and through correspondence and other documentation, including but not limited to: (a) letter to DEP dated July 13, 1994 from AFG's counsel; (b) Addendum to Certification Affidavit signed by a certified public accountant in each application; (c) funder's authorization form; (d) letters sent to DEP between August 14, 1995 and November 19, 1996. Factoring and the Factoring Transactions Factoring is the purchase and sale of an asset, such as an account receivable, at a discount. An account receivable reflects the costs that a business charges after rendering a service but before the entity responsible for payment pays for that service. When a contractor completes a rehabilitation task, the contractor's invoice is an account receivable until it receives payment. In these consolidated cases, AEE provided short-term capital to Gator and Tower at an interest rate equal to the discount percentage of the relevant invoice (account receivable). Gator and Tower did not sell their account receivables to AEE. Instead, AEE, as the assignee of EF, purchased a contractual right to receive Gator's and Tower's reimbursement payments. In exchange, AEE advanced them a discounted amount of their invoices. The discounted amount of each invoice represents a loan from AEE to Gator and Tower. The difference between the face amount of the invoices and the discounted amount of the invoices represents interest. A discount percentage and an interest rate are equivalent. The amount of the discount represents interest on the loans or advances provided by AEE. It is an interest expense to the contractor or subcontractor. The amount that Gator and Tower actually incurred is the discounted amount of their invoices. The Factoring Agreements On or about April 25, 1994, EF and Tower entered into a Prime Subcontractor Factoring Agreement which set forth the terms under which EF or its assignee would finance Tower's site remediation work. At that time, the parties to the contract anticipated that EF would retain a general contractor to perform on-site remediation services with Tower acting as prime subcontractor. In the contract, Tower agreed to sell to EF its right to receive payments from the general contractor at a percentage of the underlying invoices. Subsequent to the execution of April 1994 Prime Subcontractor Factoring Agreement, Tower experienced financial difficulties resulting in its inability to pay subcontractors for work that they performed under non-EF contracts. These financial difficulties made it impossible for Tower to meet its payroll that was due in two weeks. Tower and its subcontractors under the non-EF contracts approached AFG and EF requesting financial assistance to resolve Tower's financial difficulties and to ensure that the subcontractors would be paid for their work. At that time, the program tasks under these non-EF contracts were complete or substantially complete. Given the preexisting contractual relationship between EF and Tower on other projects, AFG determined that it could use a similar financing arrangement to resolve Tower's financial problems. Such an arrangement also would protect AFG's investment in projects being conducted under the EF-Tower contracts. On or about July 8, 1994, EF and Tower executed an addendum to the April 1994 Prime Subcontractor Factoring Agreement. This addendum applied to projects that were not covered by the original Prime Subcontractor Factoring Agreement. The addendum required Tower to sell to EF Tower's right to receive payments from the general contractor. In return, EF agreed to advance Tower a discounted amount equal to 97 percent of the face amount of Tower's invoices. Tower agreed to pay EF 100 percent of the face amount of the invoices upon receipt of payments from the general contractor. The discounted amount of each invoice represents a loan from AEE to Tower. Late in 1993 or early in 1994, Gator began negotiating a contract with EF to provide general contracting services for on-site remediation work on unspecified Florida projects being financed by EF. Gator began serving as general contractor on some of these unspecified projects prior to the execution of a contract. On or about July 8, 1994, EF and Gator entered into a General Contractor Factoring Agreement. In this contract, EF agreed to provide financing for projects on which Gator served as general contractor. Gator agreed to sell to EF its right to receive payments from the funder (ET or SEI) at a percentage of Gator's underlying invoices. On or about July 13, 1994, EF and Gator entered into an Addendum to the July 8, 1994 General Contractor Factoring Agreement. This addendum applied to projects which were not covered under the original General Contractor Factoring Agreement. The addendum required Gator to sell to EF Gator's right to receive payments from the funder (ET or SEI). In return, EF agreed to advance Gator a discounted amount equal to 88 percent of the face amount of Gator's invoices. Gator agreed to pay EF 100 percent of the face amount of the invoices upon receipt of payments from the funder. The discounted amount on each invoice represents a loan from AEE to Gator. Gator and Tower negotiated the respective factoring contracts and addenda thereto at arms-length. Pursuant to the terms of these contracts, EF assigned to AEE the rights to payments due to Tower from Gator and to Gator from ET or SEI. ET and SEI were not named parties to these contracts. The factoring contracts and the corresponding addenda apply to the reimbursement applications at issue here. Pursuant to those agreements, the following interrelated transactions took place though not necessarily in this order. First, Tower provided EF with a Site Certification Affidavit for a certain project. Tower also sent Gator a complete reimbursement application for the project and an invoice for Tower's services and the services of its subcontractors and vendors. Next, EF designated either ET or SEI as the funder. The funder then sent Gator a funder's authorization form. This form acknowledged that EF was an affiliate of the funder. It is the only documented evidence of a contract between the funder and Gator. Gator's receipt of the form constituted authorization for Gator to perform work on the project subject to reimbursement for all reimbursable costs and paid subcontractor invoices. Within two days of receiving the funder's authorization for a project, Gator issued Tower a subcontract/purchase order. Gator notified EF and the funder of such issuance. Upon receipt of the subcontract/purchase order, Tower sold to AEE (at a discount) Tower's right to receive full payment from Gator. A bill of sale evidenced this transaction. Tower agreed to repay AEE the face amount of Tower's invoice upon receipt of payment from Gator. Tower executed an agreement indemnifying the funder and guaranteeing the performance of all services and the delivery of all goods. Tower agreed to a reserve trust fund deposit as security for the ultimate reimbursement payment from the IPTF. Within four days of receiving the complete reimbursement application from Tower and within two days of receiving the funder's authorization, Gator and a certified public accountant (retained by EF) were supposed to review all supporting documentation on the project. The stated purpose of this review was to determine whether the invoices of Tower and its subcontractors were reimbursable under DEP guidelines. As to 30 of the instant applications, Tower completed the on-site work before Gator became involved. In those cases, Gator performed a minimal due diligence review, if any, of Tower's on-site work. This included comparing Tower's technical and administrative files with the applications prepared by Tower. Without Gator's minimal review and risk assessment on these 30 applications, EF would not have included them as projects covered by the addenda to the factoring contracts. As to 15 of the instant applications, Petitioners claim that Gator not only reviewed Tower's work product but also, issued subcontractor/purchase orders selected and scheduled subcontractors, and made on-site visits. However, there is no persuasive record evidence as to the specific activities or the level of Gator's involvement in on-site work on any one of these 15 applications. When Gator and EF's certified public accountant completed their assessment, Gator prepared a deficiency letter and sent it to all parties. The report advised EF, the funder and Tower whether any of Tower's charges were in excess of the reimbursable amount. Tower could accept or reject any disallowance set forth in the deficiency letter. If there was no problem with a disallowance or within five days of Tower's acceptance of a disallowance, AEE advanced Tower an amount equal to 97 percent of Tower's invoice. Tower used these funds to pay subcontractors and vendors. The discounted amount of Tower's invoice represents the actual cost that Tower incurred. Tower signed a repayment agreement in which it promised to repay AEE the face amount of Tower's invoice upon receipt of payment from Gator. When Tower received the discounted cash advance from AEE, it had to contribute the reserve deposit (to cover any reimbursement shortfalls) to a reserve trust, domiciled in Bermuda, which was affiliated with EF. Tower was a beneficiary of the reserve trust to the extent of its contribution less any monies it owed AEE after the IPTF reimbursed the funder. Meanwhile, Gator sold to AEE (at a discount) Gator's right to receive full payment from the funder. A bill of sale evidenced this transaction. Gator agreed to repay AEE the face amount of Gator's invoice upon receipt of payment from the funder. AEE advanced Gator an amount equal to 88 percent of the face amount of Gator's invoice. The discounted amount of Gator's invoice represent the amount that Gator actually incurred. Gator used these funds to pay Tower the face amount of its invoice. Tower in turn repaid AEE in full. Gator signed a repayment agreement in which it promised to repay AEE the face amount of its invoice upon receipt of payment from the funder. For the 45 applications at issue here, the addendum to the General Contractor Factoring Agreement did not require Gator to deposit any amount in the reserve trust which was domiciled in Bermuda and affiliated with EF. Next, Gator prepared an invoice for its services and the services of Tower and its subcontractors including a 15 percent markup and an application preparation fee. Gator's invoice could not include a charge for "management time." Then, Gator forwarded its invoice and Tower's invoice to the funder together with the complete reimbursement application. In the meantime, ET and SEI sold AEE their right to receive reimbursement from the IPTF at a discount equal to 87 percent of their total invoice amount. A bill of sale for each transaction is the only documented evidence of an agreement between the funders and AEE. ET and SEI agreed to repay AEE for the face amount of their invoices upon receipt of payment from IPTF. The funder prepared an invoice for the face amount of Gator's and Tower's invoices plus a 15 percent markup. Upon receipt of ET's or SEI's invoice, AEE advanced them the discounted amount as agreed. ET or SEI used the funds advanced by AEE to pay Gator the face amount of its invoice. Gator in turn repaid AEE in full. When ET or SEI receive a reimbursement payment from the IPTF, they will remit the total payment to AEE. The total cost for each project increased as the discount percentage and the face amount of each invoice passing up through the chain grew larger. In regards to some applications, the relevant dates on the subcontract/purchase order, Gator invoice, and Tower invoice are the same. It is clear that the turn around time on all of the above referenced transactions, including the time between the payment of the advances by AEE to Gator and Tower and their subsequent repayment of 100 percent of the face amount of an invoice to AEE, was very short--a matter of days or weeks. In Summary, the financing of the pending reimbursement applications involved the following interrelated transactions but not necessarily in this order: AEE as the assignee of EF purchased the right of ET, SEI, Gator and Tower to receive reimbursement for their services at a discount. ET, SEI, Gator and Tower agreed to repay AEE in full. Tower prepared and submitted to Gator an invoice for services provided by Tower and its subcontractors. Tower also prepared and submitted to Gator a reimbursement application for the program task. AEE advanced Tower the agreed upon discount amount. Tower used these funds to pay its subcontractors and vendors. AEE advanced Gator the agreed upon discount amount. Gator used these funds to pay Tower. Tower repaid AEE in full. Gator prepared an invoice for services provided by Gator, Tower and Tower's subcontractors including a 15 percent markup and submitted it with the reimbursement application either to ET or SEI. AEE advanced ET or SEI the discounted amounts as agreed. ET or SEI paid Gator in the full amount of Gator's invoice plus markup. Gator repaid AEE in full. ET or SEI prepared an invoice for its services plus the services of Gator, Tower, and Tower's subcontractors and a 15 percent markup. ET or SEI submitted the reimbursement application to DEP. When ET or SEI receives reimbursement from the IPTF, they will remit the total payment to AEE. The Applications Petitioners filed the 45 applications that are the subject of this proceeding between July 18, 1994 and February 17, 1995. The financing scheme that Petitioners utilized in these applications was unique. Prior to receiving these applications, DEP never had reviewed reimbursement applications using the type of financing scheme at issue here. In fact, the instant cases present a scenario never contemplated by DEP when promulgating rules and developing written policies. DEP has established a list by which it determines whether an applicant is charging a "reasonable rate." DEP developed that list in accordance with Petroleum Cleanup Reimbursement (PCR) Guideline Number 1. PCR 1 establishes a "predominant rate" for costs involved in the site rehabilitation process. The predominant rate may be exceeded by up to 30 percent for personnel charges, and by up to 50 percent for non-personnel charges. Within these ranges, DEP evaluates each application and determines whether the PRFCSR is entitled to reimbursement for "allowable cost" at "reasonable rates." The work performed by Tower was at or near DEP's "predominant" rate. In no instance were Tower's rates near the upper limits of the reasonable rate ceiling. Tower's invoices appear to represent work that was integral to site rehabilitation which was broken down into appropriate units and rates. There is no evidence of "price fixing" between any entities engaged in site rehabilitation. There is no evidence that Tower intentionally inflated the costs of cleanup or of the scope of cleanup services to cover the cost of financing. There are no familial, beneficial or financial relationships, or any other form of affiliation between Tower and its subcontractors. A certified public accountant (CPA) attestation accompanied the applications indicating that Petitioners incurred (paid) all relevant costs. The applications did not include charges associated with the financing arrangements as line items. The CPA attestations referenced an addendum to the Certification Affidavit. The addendum indicated that "American Environmental Enterprises, Inc., an affiliate of the Environmental Trust, has provided financing to certain contractors and subcontractors by factoring invoices which are included within this application." The CPA provided the reference to the addendum in the CPA attestation as an "emphasis of the matter" statement rather then an "exception," or a modification of the CPA's attestation that Petitioners had incurred all costs in the application. The CPA firm performing the attestation services previously informed DEP of its intent with regard to "emphasis of the matter" reports. Nevertheless, the difference between the face amount of an invoice and the discounted amount of that invoice clearly represents interest. This interest was not allowable as an actual and reasonable cost of site remediation because Gator and Tower agreed to accept a lesser amount for their services prior to submittal of the applications. Therefore, they did not actually incur the amount reflected in the face amount of their invoices. DEP's predominate rates and units are fully loaded. Interest rate charges on borrowed capital from unrelated third-party sources are a "cost of doing business." DEP's fully-loaded rates include a variable for all direct and indirect business overhead costs such as rent, utilities and personnel costs. The direct and indirect overhead components of DEP's fully-loaded rates include the cost of short-term "working" capital. However, DEP never intended the predominate rate schedule to entitle an applicant to reimbursement for costs that it did not actually incur. In the instant cases, funds that passed down through the chain from ET or SEI to Gator or from Gator to Tower flowed directly and immediately back to AEE who was affiliated with the funder. Any profit derived by the funder, ET or SEI, will flow directly to AEE and its investors. The amount that Petitioner's actually incurred before they submitted the applications was the amount that AEE advanced to Tower and/or its subcontractors for integral site work plus the actual cost of Gator's allowable services, if any, which were separate and distinct from Tower's work, plus any allowable markup(s). Factoring Policy At the time that Petitioners submitted the subject applications for reimbursement, there was no rule or written guideline governing financing transactions, including factoring, occurring outside of the usual chain of reimbursement. DEP normally did not inquire about such financing so long as an applicant did not pass the costs of such financial transactions to DEP in the application as a line-item cost. There was no policy disallowing reimbursement for the face amount of the invoices when an applicant sold the right to payment, i.e. the receivable, at a discount to a disinterested third-party in an arms- length transaction. Commencing on August 31, 1994, DEP began to develop a policy regarding the use of factoring as a financing mechanism in the reimbursement program. DEP staff exchanged numerous documents regarding the subject of factoring. In one of those documents, Charles Williams, DEP's Reimbursement Administrator indicated that "we absolutely need to have a Big Meeting to decide what to do once and for all." In a November 1994 telephone conversation, DEP provided AFG's counsel with an informal opinion of how DEP would handle a factored application as described by Will Robins of AFG in an earlier meeting with DEP staff. The statement was: that the difference between the amount that a contractor accepted in payment for his services, which was a discounted amount after factoring, . . . and the face value of the invoice which was claimed and marked up in the application was determined to be a carrying charge or interest, which is specifically disallowed for reimbursement in the reimbursement rule. American Factors Group. Inc. and the Environmental Trust v. Department of Environmental Protection, DOAH Case No. 95-0343RU, Final Order issued July 24, 1995. DEP advised AFG's counsel that it would deal with factored applications involving other entities on a case by case basis. On December 20, 1994, John Ruddell, Director of DEP's Division of Waste Management, sought permission from DEP's Policy Coordinating Committee to promulgate a rule amendment to Chapter 62-773, Florida Administrative Code (formerly Chapter 17-773, Florida Administrative Code.) A draft rule accompanied the request. The draft rule was developed in compliance with Chapter 94-311, Section 6, Laws of Florida, which required DEP to revise its reimbursement rule. The draft rule provided that: nothing in this Chapter shall be construed to authorize reimbursement for the face amount of any bill or invoice representing incurred costs when the receivable has been sold at a discount. In all such cases, reimbursement shall be limited to the actual discounted amount accepted by the provider of the goods or services . . . . The draft rule had the effect of prohibiting factoring as a mechanism for financing site rehabilitation work. It did not single out any other type of financing mechanism. DEP did not promulgate the draft rule because the problems with the program were too numerous to correct in a timely fashion by rulemaking. Instead, DEP focused on drafting proposed legislation. In the meantime, DEP requested that Petitioners furnish additional information regarding the instant applications. Between March 1, 1995 and November 17, 1995, ET and SEI responded to DEP's requests with letters bearing AFG's or EF's letterhead. The letters state that prior to filing the applications, ET or SEI paid Gator for the face amount of Gator's invoices plus Gator's markup. Gator then paid the subcontractors for the face amount of their invoices. Prior to these payments, AEE an affiliate of ET, or SEI purchased the right to receive the amount due to Gator from ET and the right to receive the amount due to subcontractors from Gator. In each case, AEE bought the right to receive at a discount. According to the financing scheme, ET or SEI received sufficient funds from AEE to make the payments to Gator. ET or SEI, in turn, were obligated to pay AEE following their receipt of the funds claimed in the reimbursement application. On April 21, 1995, DEP issued a memorandum to DEP application reviewers to guide them in the processing of reimbursement applications. The memorandum indicated that: invoices from subcontractors, vendors, suppliers and/or the general contractor which were paid a factored (e.g., discounted) amount by a third party capital participant (e.g., funder) represents the actual amount incurred by that entity and subsequently by the general contractor. The memorandum directed reviewers to deduct costs in an amount equal to the difference in the face value of an invoice or application and the amount paid for the right to receive payment under that invoice or application. DEP did not direct the policy set forth in the April 21, 1995 memorandum towards any individual company. DEP intended the policy to apply to "any combination of a general contractor, management company, funder and responsible party" in any situation in which a third-party capital provider paid any program participants a factored (discounted) amount of their invoices." The April 21, 1995, policy did not condition DEP's position on factoring on any affiliation between any parties. Between August 14, 1995 and January 19, 1996, DEP took action on the 45 applications that are the subject of this proceeding. As reflected in those notices, DEP denied reimbursement of costs claimed in those applications "as a result of factoring of the supporting invoices" and because "the difference between the face amount of the supporting invoices and the amount factored represents interests or carrying charges which are specifically excluded from reimbursement pursuant to Rule 62-773.350, F.A.C." The notices properly reflect a basis of denial of costs that is consistent with DEP's policy as reflected in the December 20, 1994 draft rule and the April 21, 1995 memorandum. DEP has proven that its policy on factoring is consistent with its legislative mandate to deny reimbursement of costs which are not actual and reasonable. Affiliation Policy Not all out-of-chain affiliations between entities constitute a problem with regard to reimbursement. However, the instant cases presented DEP with unique facts as to the relationship between AEE, AFG, ET, WIFL and SEI which DEP's rules and written policies do cover. The mere existence of common corporate officers does not, in and of itself, cause AFG/AEE, ET, WIFL, and SEI to lose their integrity as separate legal entities, or make them "one and the same." Common officers of corporations are not an element of the term "financial relationship," nor does the concept of common corporate officers appear in the definitions of beneficial relationship, familial relationship, indirect interests, material interests, or sources of income. DEP's position at hearing that "affiliation" is a major key to it's position with regard to factoring does not appear in any of the documents in which DEP has either discussed or disseminated information regarding factoring. There are no requirements in DEP's application forms to disclose the nature of the relationships between an applicant and an applicant's source of financing. DEP makes no standard inquiry of funders to disclose the nature of any affiliation between the funder and the provider of capital. Nevertheless, the record supports DEP's position that it can deny reimbursement for costs when a PRFCSR has an "affiliation" with a factoring company outside of the chain of reimbursement under the facts of these cases. It is not contested that ET, WIFL, SEI and AFG and its sister company AEE are affiliated. The greater weight of the evidence indicates that this affiliation goes beyond a mere contractual agreement. AFG, AEE, WIFL (which owns ET and is a trust beneficiary), and SEI have common officers and directors. These officers and directors created ET and SEI primarily for the benefit of AFG and AEE as conduits for investment of funds in Florida's petroleum contamination site rehabilitation program. AFG has other investment vehicles, in addition to ET and SEI, which it can designate as a funder depending on the needs of its investors. AFG usually waits until the last instance to select the funder that it will use in any particular case. AFG often selects the funder on the same day that the funder issues its authorization to the general contractor. The greater weight of the evidence indicates that AFG and/or AEE and the Petitioners did not negotiate the contractual agreements between them at arms-length. A bill of sale evidencing the sale of Petitioners' right to receive reimbursement on each application is the only documented evidence of agreements between Petitioners and AFG or AEE. Any profit derived by ET flows back to AEE through WIFL. ET and SEI are under the management and control of AEE and AFG's officers and directors. For all practical purposes ET and SEI are "one and the same" as AEE and AFG. The affiliation between AEE, AFG, WIFL, ET and SEI is especially troublesome here where AEE advanced the discounted amount of invoices to: (a) Tower so that it could pay its subcontractors in full; (b) Gator so that it could pay Tower in full; and (c) its affiliates, ET and SEI, so that they could pay Gator in full. Gator's and Tower's immediate repayment in the face amount of the invoices to AEE is a back flow of funds (interest) to an entity affiliated with Petitioners. All of these transactions took place before Petitioners filed the instant applications or within a few days thereafter. They create a paper trail indicating that the parties within the "chain" at each level incurred the face amount of the next lowest level. However, the only amount actually incurred at the time Petitioners submitted the applications was the discounted amount of the invoices. Interest or Carrying Charges "Incurred" means that "allowable costs have been paid." (Rule 17- 773.200(9), Florida Administrative Code) Under DEP's rules, the facial meaning of the term is that persons must receive due return for their invoiced goods and services, billed on a units and reasonable rates basis, for allowable costs of site rehabilitation. A finance charge usually does not effect DEP's determination of charges that were "incurred" unless that charge appears as a line-item cost which is not the case here. However, these consolidated cases presented DEP with a new scenario in which Gator and Tower immediately repaid the face amount of their invoices to AEE retaining only the discount amount of their invoices to pay the actual costs of the level below them before submitting the applications. Moreover, they included the carrying charges in the applications as having been "incurred." Case Number 95-403RU, Pick Kwick No. 143, DEP Facility No. 528515448 is a typical example showing how the entities in the chain paid interest charges and included them in the application. In that case, Gator provided Tower with a subcontract/purchase order on July 8, 1994. Tower provided Gator with an invoice in the amount of $17,556.43 on July 8, 1994. Tower's invoice represented services performed in connection with the initial remedial action task at the Pick Kwick No. 143 facility including $269.90 for application preparation. On or about July 8, 1994, Gator provided ET with an invoice in the amount of $20,149.41. This invoice included Gator's 15 percent markup in the amount of $2,592.98 and $269.90 for application preparation. On August 4, 1994, AEE purchased Gator's right to receive payment from ET. AEE advanced Gator $17,696.44 or 88 percent of Gator's invoice. The interest charge on the advance was $2,452.97. On August 4, 1994, AEE purchased Tower's right to receive payment from Gator. AEE advanced Tower $17,029.74 or 97 percent of Tower's invoice. The interest charge on the advance was $526.69. On August 10, 1994, AEE purchased ET's right to receive payment from IPTF. AEE advanced ET $20,831.41 or 87 percent of ET's invoice. The interest charge on the advance was $2,981.93. On August 15, 1994, ET filed the reimbursement application in the amount of $23,813.34. This amount included ET's 15 percent markup on the face amount of Gator's invoice. Prior to filing the application, ET paid Gator, $20,149.41. Gator then paid Tower $17,556.43. Following receipt of payment from ET, Gator repaid AEE $20,149.41. Following receipt of payment from Gator, Tower repaid AEE $17,556.43. Gator and Tower made these repayments within a matter of weeks of the time that AEE advanced funds to them. Calculating simple interest, the annualized interest rate on the loan from AEE to Gator was approximately 144 percent. The annualized interest rate on the loan from AEE to Tower was approximately 36 percent. These were the interest rates, as predetermined by the discount percentage in the addenda to the factoring contracts (Gator at 88 percent and Tower at 97 percent), in approximately 30 of the 45 applications. In the other 15 applications, the Gator sold its right to receive payment at a discount percentage between 87 to 89 percent of the face amount of the invoice. In those cases, Tower sold its right to receive payment at a discount percentage between 95 and 72 percent of the face amount of the invoice. There is no evidence that Petitioners made adjustments to the costs in the applications where Gator and Tower sold their right to payments for a discount percentage at an amount other than as stated in the addenda to the factoring contracts. Analysis of the transactions involved in each of the subject applications clearly shows that the financing scheme utilized here was not equivalent to a "plain vanilla" loan from a disinterested third-party capital provider such as a bank. DEP properly deducted costs from Petitioners' applications that represented interest which Gator and Tower agreed to repay to Petitioners' affiliate, AEE, before Petitioners submitted the applications. The only costs that Gator and Tower actually incurred was the net amount that they received after factoring their invoices. That amount includes the difference between the face amount Gator's and Tower's invoices and the amount that AEE advanced to them. Gator and Tower did not actually incur allowable costs in the amount of the interest paid to AEE when they : (a) agreed to accept reimbursement for their services at a discount; (b) accepted the full amount of their invoices from the next highest level; and (c) passed the full amount of their respective invoices back to AEE. DEP did not envision this type of elaborate factoring plan when it created its simple definition of "incurred" as meaning allowable costs have been paid. It is important for participants in the program to know the "rules of the game." Applicants have to make technical and financial decisions regarding site cleanup. They have to pay all contractors and subcontractors prior to submitting an application. In this case Petitioners' attempts to win DEP's pre-approval of their various factoring proposals were unsuccessful because DEP did not have enough information about the transactions and the relationships of the entities involved. After DEP received additional information from Petitioners, it became abundantly clear that the rules were insufficient to cover the financing scheme presented here. As early as November 4, 1993, Petitioners acknowledged that "the provisions of Rule 170773, F.A.C. do not specifically address the types of situations that arise when providing capital for cleanup activities through funding groups such as AFG." Petitioners revealed their final plan in July of 1994 just before they began filing the applications. At that time, Petitioners knew DEP's concerns. They also knew DEP could not make a decision on an application until they filed the application with DEP. Inconsistent Application of Statutes, Rules and Written Guidelines DEP has authorized financial transactions by which other applicants, after incurring (paying) all costs and filing their applications, sold or pledged their right to future payment to an entity outside the usual reimbursement chain. In those cases, DEP did not deduct interest associated with such transactions. DEP's approval of such transactions came before Petitioners filed their applications in this matter. There is no evidence that those transactions involved the factoring of invoices and an agreement to repay interest before the PRFCSR submitted the applications. Likewise, there is no evidence of an affiliation and less than arms-length negotiation between the funder and the financing company in those cases. The record contains no evidence of an inconsistent application of DEP's statutes, rules or written policies before or after Petitioners filed the instant applications. Reservoir Capital On March 14, 1994, DEP met with Reservoir Capital Corporation (Reservoir) to discuss a change of address notice directing reimbursement orders and checks for Clean America Financial, Inc. (Clean America) applications to a Baltimore, Maryland address. During that meeting Reservoir's counsel informed DEP that Reservoir "paid a percentage, not the full cost, for each application." DEP representative, Paul DiGuisseppe, informed Charles Williams of that conversation by memorandum dated March 15, 1994. Mr. DiGuisseppe later spoke with a representative of Clean America (the funder) and advised him to provide a list of facilities pledged to Reservoir for which notices and payments were to be sent to the Baltimore, Maryland address. On March 30, 1994, Clean America wrote to Charles Williams and Doug Jones, providing a list of sites pledged to Reservoir and directing DEP to send payments to the Baltimore, Maryland address. Among the sites pledged to Reservoir were Curry Station, DEP Facility No. 309103537 and Scardo Automotive, DEP Facility No. 428511319. On June 17, 1994, DEP issued a reimbursement order to Scardo Automotive at the Baltimore, Maryland address. On July 1, 1994, DEP issued a reimbursement order to Curry Station at the Baltimore, Maryland address. These orders did not contain a denial of costs or deductions of interest based upon the disclosed fact that Reservoir had purchased the applications for an amount less than their face value. However, there is no evidence that either of the applicants sold the right to receive reimbursement before submitting the application. Additionally, there is no evidence that Reservoir was affiliated with Clean America. On April 11, 1996, DEP revisited the Reservoir Capital factoring mechanism. In that instance, DEP reviewed a situation in which Reservoir Capital directly paid a subcontractor's invoice in an application that All American Funding (All American) filed. Reservoir had purchased the receivable of All American, and applied part of the purchase price to directly pay a subcontractor. There is no evidence of any "affiliation" between Reservoir and any other entity in the reimbursement chain. Prior to the meeting with Reservoir, DEP intended to deny those costs since it appeared that Reservoir actually paid them rather than the applicant, All American. As a result of that meeting, DEP requested additional information from Reservoir. At the time of hearing in these cases, DEP had not made a decision in that case pending receipt of the requested information. Governor's Bank On March 9, 1994, Governors Bank wrote to Charles Williams requesting that DEP directly remit to Governors Bank any reimbursement due on an application filed by Clean America due to the fact that Clean America "secured its borrowings from the bank with any rights to payment which CAFC has in connection with certain reimbursement applications." On March 30, 1994, Clean America sent a letter to Charles Williams and Doug Jones requesting that the DEP honor the March 9, 1994 letter directing payment to Governor's Bank. On November 4, 1994, Clean America advised DEP that DEP was to remit additional final reimbursements to Governors Bank. The letter advised DEP that "based upon a loan relationship Governor's Bank established with Clean America . . ." reimbursement payments had been assigned to Governors Bank and therefore "all payments and proceeds must be remitted to Governor's Bank." There is no record evidence that Clean America entered into a loan agreement with Governors Bank prior to submittal of the application or that the applications included claims for interest paid to the bank. There is no evidence of any affiliation between Clean America and the bank. The financing mechanism that Petitioners used for these 45 applications is not similar to a "plain vanilla" bank loan where a lender advances funds after an applicant files an application and directs DEP to forward reimbursement payments to a bank lock box. Barriston Environmental Investors L.P. On March 11, 1993, Barriston Environmental Investors, L.P. (Barriston) wrote to John Ruddell, Director of the DEP's Division of Waste Management and described a mechanism of financing by which Barriston (the funder) would obtain funds, at least partially through bank debt, for the payment of subcontractors' site rehabilitation invoices. In the Barriston proposal, the subcontractor would remit an "investment banking fee" of 5 percent of the value of the invoices back to the funder upon payment of 100 percent of the invoices. Barriston's letter acknowledged that this fee would not be reimbursable under the program. In addition, the Barriston funder would receive a commitment fee from the site owner which the Barriston funder would not include in the reimbursement claim. A reference in the letter to the payment of interest on funds advanced on the site owner's behalf does not specify the time frame in which interest would be paid, i.e. before or after the filing of an application. The letter sought DEP's approval and assurance that the payment of 100 percent of the invoices would entitle Barriston to full reimbursement including both markups. Barriston's letter requested an informal response because it realized that DEP had no authority to take official agency action without the submission of an application. On April 9, 1993, DEP responded to the Barriston letter. In its response, DEP stated that the arrangements appeared to be consistent with current statutes and rules and would be eligible for the full reimbursement allowed by DEP's rules. However, there is no record evidence of any official agency action on an application submitted in accordance with Barriston's proposal. Interest Indemnification Interest indemnification encompasses a situation in which a contractor pays interest directly back to a funder during the period of time after submittal of an application but before reimbursement by the IPTF. In June 1995, a DEP employee contacted Petitioners' certified public accountant (CPA) inquiring about the practice and seeking copies of his other clients' interest indemnification contracts. After that conversation, the CPA discussed the matter with another DEP employee to confirm his understanding that financing issues were outside of the scope of DEP's review so long as an applicant did not include such charges in the application. Since the June 1995 discussions, DEP has reimbursed applications which were financed through interest indemnification without adjustments for the payment of interest. However, the interest indemnification payments applied to applications after the applicants filed them with DEP to replace long-term interest that IPTF is no longer paying. The applicants were not seeking reimbursement of those payments as incurred costs. Petitioners have not established their entitlement to reimbursement for the factored amounts of their invoices. DEP presented competent evidence to support its "factoring" and "affiliation" policies as applied here. In addition, the evidence indicates that DEP has not inconsistently applied such policies to other similarly situated reimbursement applicants. Petitioners have failed to prove that DEP's denial of costs based upon factoring is not reasonably related to the purpose of reimbursement review and otherwise unsupported by competent evidence. The April 21, 1995 policy statement is a rule as defined in Section 120.52(16), Florida Statutes. DEP was not aware of the need for such a rule when it made the last substantive amendments to Rule 17-773, Florida Administrative Code, in 1993. Nevertheless, DEP demonstrated that the non-rule policy is a reasonable interpretation of Sections 376.3071(12)(b) and 376.3071(12)(d), Florida Statutes. DEP provided an evidentiary basis to support its factoring policy in these consolidated cases. The difference between the face amount of the invoices and their factored amount did not represent allowable costs which were actual and reasonable. DEP deducted the amount of the relevant discount percentage (on a prorated basis) from each invoice submitted by Tower and its subcontractors. There is a discrepancy between the amount that DEP deducted from each invoice (itemized) and the total deduction based on a lump sum in 33 of the 45 cases which DEP did not explain during the hearing. Therefore, before DEP enters a Final Order, it should review the supporting documents to determine the correct deduction in each application. "Value Added" Policy Funders and contractors are entitled to take a markup of paid contractor and subcontractor invoices for allowable costs at reasonable rates. The invoices must represent actual and reasonable costs which are integral to site remediation. Contractors are entitled to a first-tier 15 percent markup for supervising and/or coordinating on-site remediation, for investing capital while awaiting reimbursement by paying subcontractors invoices, and for assuming liability for the performance of the subcontractors. Funders generally are entitled to a second-tier 15 percent markup as an incentive to provide funds to finance the work. Markups are expressly subject to limitations set forth in Section 17- 773.350(9), (10) and (11), Florida Administrative Code. There are no other specific or implied limitations on markups in the rules or written guidelines. Requiring each entity that receives a markup in the reimbursement chain to pay contractor, subcontractor, and vendor invoices helps ensure that each level in the reimbursement chain pays the participant at the next lowest level. In these cases, each level in the reimbursement application chain "technically" paid the next lowest level. DEP policy in effect at the time Petitioners submitted the instant applications for reimbursement was to allow markups of paid invoices at two levels. However, prior to the submission of the instant applications, DEP was not aware of a case where a general contractor claimed a markup for work that was complete before the general contractor became involved in the project. With regard to all of the pending reimbursement applications, Gator applied a 15 percent markup to all of Tower's invoices including the invoices of Tower's subcontractors. With regard to a minimum of 30 of the 45 sites, Gator clearly did not supervise, manage or direct site remediation activities performed by Tower or its subcontractors. In fact, Gator did not become involved until after Tower completed these tasks. In at least 30 of the instant cases, Tower was acting as the general contractor when all of the on-site remediation took place. However, Tower could not apply a 15 percent markup to the invoices for its own services. Gator made it possible for Petitioners to claim the markup on Tower's invoices. As to the 15 sites at which Gator allegedly had some type of involvement with on-site remediation activities, there is no persuasive evidence regarding the specific activities or the level of Gator's involvement on any particular project. On September 1, 1994, Restoration Assistance, an entity under contract with DEP to review reimbursement applications, issued a memorandum to its reviewers directing them to complete their review and do a "total denial" on "Gator Environmental packages." The memorandum advised the reviewers that "Bruce" was drafting canned language to use in DEP's denial statement. On or about April 21, 1995, DEP presented its reviewers with a memorandum setting forth an initial overview of a "value added" policy for markups taken by a "management company" involved in site remediation activities. According to the memorandum, DEP would allow reimbursement of claims for actual project management work and value-added services. The memorandum further provided that DEP would allow markups to a management company which only provided cash-flow services for a majority of the program task period even if the management company performed no other service. However, DEP would deny a markup if the management company provided such services during a "one month time period." DEP intended for the April 21, 1995 memorandum to acquaint DEP reviewers with the emerging DEP policy on markups. DEP's rules and written guidelines do not address the distinction made in the April 21, 1995 memorandum regarding the timing during which a management company could provide cash flow services and still be entitled to a markup. On October 20, 1995, Charles Williams issued a DEP policy memorandum for reviewers to use in reviewing reimbursement applications. Through that memorandum, DEP finalized and implemented the "value added" policy. The memorandum states that: if the 'GC' [general contractor] was involved with the management of the project during the course of the actual work by subcontractors, [DEP] rules do not preclude them from applying a markup. However, if the 'GC' came along after the work was completed by other contractors and their involvement was more of a due diligence exercise to faciltiate (sic) a funding arrangement by a third party, then the 'GC' markup would not be justified, though a markup by the actual funder listed as the PRFCSR could be allowed. Prior to the establishment of the "value added" policy on October 20, 1995, DEP made no inquiry as to whether a contractor provided value added services in order for the contractor to be entitled to a markup. DEP applied the "value added" policy to all pending applications (including the ones at issue here) resulting in a deduction of Gator's markup in all of the subject cases. The Department of Banking and Finance reviewed and issued a report (Comptroller's Report) on the Petroleum Contamination Site Cleanup Reimbursement Program on November 29, 1994. This report addressed the issue of markups in the reimbursement program. The Comptroller's Report recognized that DEP found the multiple markup structure to be beneficial in that it "attracts the involvement of companies whose role in cleanup projects is limited to providing funds to finance the work [and] attracts investors who provide funds which might not otherwise be available--thus facilitating cleanup of contaminated sites." The Comptroller's Report describes a two-tier arrangement involving a "prime contractor engaged to manage the cleanup project" and a "funding entity." The report acknowledges that the prime contractor "might have only limited direct involvement in the cleanup, having engaged subcontractors for most or all of the actual work." The example in the Comptroller's report did not state what DEP's policy would be if a subcontractor had completed all of the actual work before the contractor became involved. Even without this consideration, the report was critical of DEP's allowance of markups on either level. The Petroleum Efficiency Task Force (PETF) issued its final report on financing contractors on August 17, 1994. This report discussed DEP's policy of allowing two markups. In this discussion, the PETF recognized that "funders must be able to rely on the skills and knowledge of contractors to minimize reimbursement shortfalls." The PETF recommended for future consideration that "the Department should provide in rulemaking that contractors who take the first-tier 15 percent markup on subcontracted work must adequately supervise the work." When the PETF issued its report, there was no existing rule that established any level of on site supervision or any other specific criteria for applying one of the two allowable levels of markup, other than paying invoices for integral site rehabilitation work. DEP's rules and written guidelines did not substantively change with regard to the "value added" policy from the April 22, 1993 revision of Chapter 17-773, Florida Administrative Code, to the October 20, 1995 memorandum which established a non-rule limitation on the ability of an entity to apply a markup to paid invoices. Because the rules and written guidelines do not reflect the "value added" policy, a participant in the program would not be aware of it even if the participant requested program information. Gator technically paid 100 percent of the face value of Tower's invoices. Without Gator's involvement, AFG and AEE would not have financed these applications. However, DEP presented persuasive evidence at the hearing to support its position that Gator was not entitled to a markup because Gator's services added no value to site remediation projects. In the instant cases, Gator performed some type of a minimal due diligence review of Tower's site work. Gator allegedly reviewed Tower's technical and administrative files, cross-referenced technical and administrative files with the applications which Tower prepared, made visits to some job sites, and prepared a deficiency letter to determine the appropriateness of the scope of Tower's work. However, all of these functions were repetitious of the work that was performed by Tower and the certified public accountant attesting to the Certification Affidavit. Gator limited the deficiency letters to the question of whether the scope of Tower's services were reimbursable. However, there is no evidence that Tower's deficiency letters resulted in adjustments to costs in the applications as filed by Petitioners. The deficiency letters served only to adjust the discount percentage set forth in the addenda to the factoring contracts. Tower was a qualified engineering consulting firm that employed its own engineers and geologists. Gator's employee that reviewed the technical information in Tower's files was not a Florida professional engineer. He was not qualified as a certified public accountant to determine whether a charge was within DEP's reasonable rates. The Gator employee was a Florida professional geologist but he did not sign and seal the deficiency letter as such. There is no reference in DEP's rules or written policies to a deficiency letter. AFG required Gator to prepare the deficiency letter within two days of the date on which EF provided Gator with the opportunity to review a completed task. This two-day turn around time allegedly afforded efficiency of payment. Gator did not begin its review of an reimbursement application until after Gator received an invoice from Tower. The relevant subcontract/purchase order issued by Gator to Tower, the Tower invoice and the Gator invoice were often prepared on the same day. Gator technically paid Tower's invoices with funds that AEE advanced. Tower used these funds to repay AEE. When Gator received payment from ET or SEI, it passed the funds back to AEE before ET or SEI submitted the applications to DEP or immediately thereafter. Pursuant to the addenda to the factoring contracts, Tower, not Gator, contributed to a reserve trust account which AEE will use to cover any reimbursement shortfalls. Gator indemnified AEE and guaranteed its own work but did not assume a risk of loss on Tower's work. On most if not all of the applications, Gator performed no meaningful management or supervisory functions. The greater weight of the evidence indicates that Gator's primary purpose in these consolidated cases was not to afford AFG a level of comfort as to the appropriate scope of the individual program tasks but to ensure that third-party investors maximized their profits. The "value added" agency statement has the effect of a rule which DEP did not contemplate when it promulgated its rules and written policies. Nevertheless, DEP's decision concerning the value added policy is within the scope of its delegated legislative authority. DEP has proven that reimbursement for Gator's services was not allowable as actual and reasonable costs of site remediation. Therefore, it is not entitled to a first-tier markup. Computer Costs Prior to January 1, 1995, DEP determined the reimbursability of computer costs based upon a "units and rates basis" as provided by Rules 17- 773.100(5), and 17-733.700(2)(d), Florida Administrative Code. DEP evaluated computer costs "as a certain number of hours [at] a reasonable rate." Pursuant to the units and rates rule provisions, there was no rational basis for DEP to deny the computer costs contained in applications filed prior to January 1, 1995. On January 1, 1995, DEP established a policy by which it would disallow in full any computer costs greater than $750. Under that policy, DEP would reimburse in full an applicant's computer costs with supporting invoices of $749 dollars, but disallow in full computer costs with supporting invoices of $751. DEP's reimbursement orders involving more than $750 in computer costs after January 1, 1995 routinely stated that "there was insufficient justification to demonstrate that this computer time was integral to the task or necessary." DEP applied the computer policy to all applications filed and pending review at the time it developed the policy, regardless of when an applicant performed the work or generated the records. DEP applied the January 1, 1995 computer policy to the application in Case No. 95-4606 which ET filed on July 18, 1994. In that case DEP denied $1,456.25 in computer costs allowing no reimbursement for computer time. On April 27, 1995, DEP implemented a new policy by which it evaluated computer costs based upon a calculation of allowable personnel hours per task as opposed to a units and rates basis. Under that policy DEP would evaluate the total allowable personnel hours in a task and limit computer costs to 10 percent of those hours up to a maximum of $750. Under the April 27, 1995 policy, DEP reduced the reimbursement for computer costs to $500 if the reimbursable amount exceeded $750 after DEP made the 10 percent calculation. DEP implemented the April 27, 1995 policy through the use of a calculation work sheet which it provided to its application reviewers. DEP applied the April 27, 1995 computer policy and work sheet to all applications pending review at the time DEP developed the policy, regardless of when the applicant performed the work or generated the records. DEP applied the April 27, 1995, policy in all of the subject cases subsequent to Case No. 95-4606, with the following exceptions: Case Nos. 96- 0432RU, 96-1006 and 96-1009, which had no denial of computer costs; and Case No. 96-1352, in which DEP applied the 10 percent limitation, but reimbursed 896.75 dollars of the computer costs. After implementation of the April 27, 1995 policy, DEP made no effort to adjust the denial of all computer costs in Case No. 95-4606 under the January 1, 1995 policy. The only other category in which DEP evaluates reimbursement on a percentage of hours basis, rather than a units and rates basis, is total management costs. DEP's written guidelines and Rule 17-773.350(16), Florida Administrative Code, limit management costs to a percentage of total allowable personnel hours. There are no rules or written guidelines that would limit computer costs based upon criteria other than a units and rates evaluation, or that would support DEP's policies as reflected in the January 1, 1995 and April 27, 1995 policy memoranda. DEP's rules and written guidelines did not substantively change with regard to this issue from the time Petitioners filed the subject applications, to the time DEP established the January 1, 1995 and the April 27, 1995 computer policies. DEP did not issue any PCRs or other written guidelines to place applicants on fair notice of DEP's new policies with regard to computer costs. DEP presented no persuasive evidence at the hearing to support its January 1, 1995 and April 27, 1995 policies. The only basis for the policy was DEP's representation that it developed the policies as a "reasonableness issue" in order to reduce the amount of computer costs that were appearing in reimbursement applications. DEP did not demonstrate that it based the new policies on any calculation of the amount of computer time necessary to perform a remediation task. Once the total computer costs reached $750 dollars, DEP gave no consideration to the scope or complexity of the task. Given the difference in the amounts involved in performing site remediation services (e.g. an application totaling 7,249.75 dollars in Case No. 96-0411RU versus an application totaling 149,080.02 dollars in Case No. 96-0425RU) and the differences in program tasks (see Rule 17-773.500, Florida Administrative Code), a policy establishing a flat numerical limit on computer costs that an applicant may claim in an application is not reasonable. DEP presented no evidence at the hearing to prove the basis for its retroactive application of the policies to work performed and applications submitted prior to the development of the policies. DEP did not attempt to explain the basis for its failure to apply the rules and written guidelines in effect at the time the work was performed or the records generated. Based upon the foregoing, DEP's denial of computer costs in each of these applications is not supported by the statutes, rules and written guidelines in effect at the time the work was performed or the applications were filed. Each application contains information supporting the computer costs. The application Certification Affidavits and CPA attestations demonstrate that Petitioners incurred the computer costs which DEP should reimburse. The reimbursement for computer costs should be in full except to the extent that DEP allocates to a supporting document a prorated share of the amount of a discount on a factored invoice. As a final note, of the computer costs denied in 16 of the 45 reimbursement notices, the sum of the allowances and deductions does not equal the overall claim. The differences ranged from a few dollars to over four hundred dollars. DEP provided no evidence to explain the discrepancy in the amount calculated by DEP in its notices. Miscellaneous Costs Prior to September 27, 1995, DEP reimbursed miscellaneous line-item costs when the applicant furnished support for them in the application. The miscellaneous costs policy as of May 17, 1995 even dispensed with the requirement of supporting invoices when these costs totaled less than 300 dollars. DEP's reviewers are employees of a firm that provides DEP with application review services as an independent contractor. On September 27, 1995, after a meeting with DEP staff, the application reviewers implemented a policy to deny costs for "overhead." Under the new policy, certain items were overhead, including but not limited to: gloves, mason jars, sampling disposables, phone calls, excessive faxes, excessive copying, small hand tools, shipping documents, etc. The application reviewers had to exercise their own discretion as to which items were "overhead" until they received a guideline from DEP. The reviewers decided to approve overhead expenses of less than $50 and deny items for more than $50. The policy continued in existence at least through November 9, 1995. DEP applied the miscellaneous/overhead policy to all of the subject applications, regardless of the date of cleanup work or application submittal. The application reviewers applied the miscellaneous/overhead "policy" without the knowledge of DEP's Reimbursement Administrator, Charles Williams. When Mr. Williams found out about the policy, he "counselled them that they need to reverse that position." The correct policy would allow reimbursement of "miscellaneous/overhead" costs that the reviewers denied in 33 of the 45 applications. DEP made no effort to correct the denial of these costs based upon its erroneously applied policy. DEP presented no persuasive evidence at the hearing to support its application of the miscellaneous/overhead policy in applications submitted prior to the development of the policy. DEP did not explain the basis for its failure to apply the rules and written guidelines in effect at the time the subcontractors performed the work or generated the records. Based upon the foregoing, DEP's denial of miscellaneous/overhead costs in 33 applications in which DEP denied such costs is not supported by the applicable states, rules and written guidelines. Each application contains information supporting the miscellaneous costs. The applications' Certification Affidavits and CPA Attestations demonstrate that Petitioner's incurred the miscellaneous costs. Therefore, DEP should reimburse those miscellaneous costs. The reimbursement should be in full except to the extent that DEP allocates to a supporting document a prorated share of the amount of a discount on a factored invoice. Airfare From June 17, 1993, to sometime prior to January 31, 1996, DEP's policy with regard to the reimbursement of airfare was to pay airfare integral to site rehabilitation when such costs were relatively inexpensive. By no later than January 31, 1996, DEP developed and applied a policy to deny all airfare costs regardless of whether the applicant provided justification. On March 13, 1996, DEP decided that once again it would reimburse airfare with sufficient justification such as a comparison with car travel. DEP considers the changes in reimbursability of airfare as "just procedures to follow," and applicable without regard to the timing of work performed. DEP denied airfare charges in Case No. 96-1353 as overhead charges. DEP's rules and written guidelines did not substantively change with regard to airfare from June 17, 1993, when airfare was reimbursable, to the policy implemented on January 31, 1996, in which airfare was not reimbursable, to March 13, 1996, when airfare was reimbursable once again. DEP issued no PCRs or other written guidelines to place applicants on fair notice of the changes in policy with regard to airfare. DEP has not provided any evidence to support the basis for the fluctuations in its airfare policy. DEP presented no evidence at the hearing to provide the basis for its application of the airfare policy to work performed and applications submitted prior to the development of the changes in policy. DEP did not explain the basis for its failure to apply the rules and written guidelines in effect at the time the subcontractors performed the work or generated the records. Based upon the foregoing, DEP's denial of airfare costs in the application for Case No. 96-1353 is not supported by the applicable rules and written guidelines. The application contains information supporting the miscellaneous costs. The application's Certification Affidavit and CPA Attestation demonstrate that Petitioner ET incurred the airfare costs. Therefore, DEP should reimburse airfare costs in full except to the extent that DEP allocates to a supporting invoice the prorated amount of a discount on a factored invoice. Inconsistent Agency Practice The application of DEP's factoring policy did not treat Petitioners in a manner different from other funders. Heretofore, DEP was not aware of a case where program participants factored their invoices before filing an application and claimed the face amount of those invoices for reimbursement. The affiliation between Petitioners and AFG and/or AEE was also unique. DEP issued a memorandum requiring funders to provide "clarification regarding essential cost documentation" on July 26, 1995. The purpose of this memorandum was to remind application reviewers of the need for a funder to submit an invoice documenting and supporting its line-item claim for the second- tier 15 percent markup. DEP did not intend for this memorandum to limit DEP's ability to inquire about relationships and transactions taking place outside the usual chain of reimbursement when an application on its face refers to a factoring scheme involving an "affiliation" between the factoring company and the funder. DEP does not deduct finance charges when an applicant incurs (pays) all invoices, submits the application, then sells the receivable or agrees to pay long-term interest pending receipt of payment from the IPTF. In the instant cases, Petitioners agreed to accept reimbursement for their services at a discount before they submitted the applications then included the cost of borrowing capital in the application. DEP does not routinely ask questions of other applicants regarding their financing. Nevertheless, under the facts of these cases, DEP would have been remiss in its duty if it had not made such inquiries. DEP's actions in the instant cases are not inconsistent with its actions taken in other cases with other similarly situated entities because there is no evidence that other such cases exist. Bias On August 31, 1994, Bruce French provided Charles Williams with a memorandum in which Mr. French discussed factoring. In his memorandum, Mr. French concluded that DEP could only reimburse the "discount" amount that the factoring company actually incurred/paid the funders. On September 1, 1994, Mr. French had a discussion with someone named "Toni" at McGuinnes Laboratories regarding the laboratories' use of AFG services for financing invoices to Tower. On September 2, 1994, Mr. French related in a memorandum to Charles Williams, his understanding that the laboratory had different price lists for different customers, generally depending on volume of analysis performed and individual payment agreements. Mr. French surmised that the laboratory's price for services "is inflated to deal with AFG's discount price to be paid by AFG." Mr. French concluded that, under those circumstances, AFG's financing arrangements may "represent collusion on behalf of all parties to the application to defraud DEP for the benefit of AFG. That is, prices are 'fixed' prior to performing of services." On September 2, 1994, Mr. Williams responded to Mr. French's memo by indicating that the scenario presented by Mr. French "sounds interesting" and that DEP would "absolutely need to have a Big Meeting to decide what to do once and for all." On September 12, 1994, Mr. French provided information on factoring to Bill Sittig of DEP's Office of the Inspector General and to Mr. Williams. Mr. French included a drawing entitled "The Tangled Web They Weave or the Hidden Discount Line Items and other Fluff, August 31, 1994 Interpretation of Bruce French's Discussion." At the hearing, neither Mr. Sittig nor Mr. Williams remembered seeing the drawing. There is no competent evidence as to the identity of the person creating the drawing. There is no persuasive competent evidence that Mr. French was biased against Petitioners or any other entity utilizing factoring as a mechanism of financing. Moreover, DEP had no direct and demonstrable bias against Petitioners. Timeliness of Agency Action Prior to filing the instant applications, representatives of the funders and AFG presented various financing schemes to DEP for pre-approval. In each proposal, the person speaking for AFG also spoke on behalf of the funders. At all times relevant here, Paul DeCoster was secretary and counsel for AFG. He was also secretary of SEI and a corporate director and shareholder of WIFL. In September of 1993, Mr. DeCoster wrote a letter to DEP describing a proposed financing scheme in which AFG would purchase the account receivables of contractors engaged in site rehabilitation. AFG's plans were in a formative stage at this time. Mr. DeCoster wrote DEP a follow-up letter dated October 4, 1993. This letter states that: the amount of financing required to meet [certain contractor clients'] working capital needs is so large that FEC [a funder] must find large institutional investors to accommodate them. For service of finding such investors, FEC proposes to charge a fee to the contractor client, which would be in addition to the 15 [percent] 'markup' taken by the investor providing the financing. The October 4, 1993 letter disclosed that contractor clients would deposit funds in a trust account as security for the performance of their work. The trust would invest its funds "in accounts receivable purchased from AFG, the parent of FEC, and any income earned by the trust on those investments would inure to the benefit of AFG." The plan that Mr. DeCoster proposed was markedly different from the scheme utilized here. The most noticeable differences are that the subject applications did not involve a finder's fee, FEC as a funder, or the purchase of AFG's accounts receivable by a reserve trust. In October of 1993, Will Robins met with DEP staff to discuss the manner in which the reimbursement program would apply to a proposed financing scheme. In this proposal, AFG would charge contractors an application/initiation fee and/or a commitment fee. The transactions between the entities in the instant applications did not involve an application/initiation fee and/or a commitment fee. When Mr. Robins made his presentation, DEP did not know the specific relationships between the entities involved or Mr. Robins' position as an officer, director, and or shareholder of these entities. After that meeting, counsel for AFG sent DEP a letter dated November 4, 1993. The letter acknowledges that the existing rules did not "specifically address the types of situations that arise when providing capital for cleanup activities through funding groups such as AFG." The letter identifies ET as the proposed funder through which AFG would finance cleanups. According to the letter, ET would incur the costs but AFG would hold the right to receive the ultimate reimbursement payment from the IPTF. The letter clearly reveals DEP's concern that the proposed application/initiation fee was a "kickback" which should be deducted from the funder's markup. In January of 1994, counsel for AFG wrote a letter to DEP describing a financing scheme which differs in some respects from the financing scheme at issue here. This letter states that AFG intended to purchase receivables of the funder and the general contractor at a discount. Under this plan, the general contractor and the funder would claim the two allowable markups. The subcontractors would pay AFG a finder's fee. The letter reveals that AFG, its affiliates, and investors would recover the cash equivalent of both levels of markups plus a fee from subcontractors for funding the high costs of risky projects. The letter states that: since the Department's reimbursement rules do not specifically address the issue of site cleanups that are funded through private sources of capital . . . it is important that we know if there are any obvious or glaring problems with this plan that would cause reimbursement to be withheld otherwise restricted. On July 13, 1994, counsel for AFG wrote DEP to explain some modifications in the details to the proposed plan for the purchase and sale of receivables at a discount. This letter informed DEP that AFG would have a financial affiliation with the funder (ET) which would exist outside the chain of reimbursement and which would have no effect on either the markups or the overall reimbursement amount reflected in any application. All contracts within the chain of reimbursement (between ET, SEI, Gator, Tower, and its subcontractors) would be negotiated in arms-length transactions. The letter states: In this plan the subcontractors will perform their work on the site and will prepare their invoices in a manner consistent with any publicly or privately financed cleanup. Those invoices will be complied and forwarded to the general contractor for its review and the general contractor will add on the markup allowed by rule to the subcontractor's bills. The reimbursement application will then be forwarded to the funder who will ensure that all bills have been paid and who will be identified as the "person responsible for conducting site rehabilitation" on the reimbursement application. The funder will take the second markup allowed by rule, and will submit the reimbursement application to the Department of Environmental Protection for processing. Reimbursement will ultimately be paid by the Department to the funder in accordance with the reimbursement application. At no step in this process will the Department relinquish any authority to review and approve either the scope and nature of the cleanup or the rates charged by the contractors and subcontractors. Petitioners filed the first of their applications with DEP on July 18, 1994, five days after the date of the July 13, 1994 letter. In late November, 1994, after all but 4 of the 45 applications were filed, DEP placed a telephone call to Petitioners' counsel advising him of the position DEP intended to take with regard to his client's financing arrangements. DEP did not provide any written confirmation of that call, or issue any document describing its policy, until April 21, 1995. In each of the above described letters and/or meetings, AFG's attempt to ascertain DEP's position regarding the various proposed financing mechanisms was unsuccessful. However, AFG was aware that DEP could not take a position that represented official agency action until an applicant actually filed an application. At no time did DEP make any affirmative statement which misled Petitioners regarding the acceptability of AFG's proposals. There is no persuasive evidence to support a finding that the agency did not timely respond to the claims for reimbursement.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing, it is recommended that DEP enter a Final Order in each of these consolidated cases: (a) disallowing reimbursement of the first- tier markup; (b) disallowing reimbursement of any factored invoice in an amount equal to the amount of the discount on that invoice; and (c) allowing reimbursement of costs associated with airfare, computers, and miscellaneous/overhead expenses. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of October, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of October, 1996. COPIES FURNISHED: E. Gary Early, Esquire Christopher R. Haughee, Esquire Akerman, Senterfitt and Eidson, P.A. 216 South Monroe Street, Suite 200 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-2555 W. Douglas Beason, Esquire Betsy F. Hewitt, Esquire Department of Environmental Protection 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2400 Virginia B. Wetherell, Secretary Department of Environmental Protection Douglas Building 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 Perry Odom, Esquire Department of Environmental Protection 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, George H. Hopper, submitted an application for a license to operate a Class "C" wastewater treatment plant to the Respondent on or about April 8, 1977. On November 28, 1977, the Respondent issued a letter of intent to deny the license. This letter of intent was subsequently modified by a letter to petitioner from Respondent dated January 4, 1978. The Respondent, in the above-referenced correspondence, based its letters of intent to deny the Petitioner a Class "C" wastewater treatment plant operator's license based upon two primary grounds. Those grounds are as follows: "This Department has concluded that you have not fulfilled the actual experience requirement of section 17-16.03(2)(b), Florida Administrative Code (F.A.C.), as defined by section 17-16.02(8) F.A.C." (See letter dated November 28, 1977.) "In addition to the above referenced deficiency in actual work experience, it has been noted that you have not completed an approved course related to wastewater treatment plant operation as required by Section 17-16.03(2)(c), Florida Administrative Code." (See letter dated January 4, 1978.) Respecting the second allegation, Petitioner presented testimony during the course of the hearing which, in fact, indicates that he did complete an approved coarse related to wastewater treatment plant operation as required by Section 17-16.03(2)(c), Florida Administrative Code. Additionally, Petitioner presented a diploma supporting this contention. This certificate reflects the fact that the Petitioner satisfactorily completed the course on "Operation of Wastewater Treatment Plants" on or about May 2, 1977. Based thereon, and the testimony of Respondent's certification officer, Robert W. Hall, to the effect that the Respondent did comply with the Code requirement which mandates completion of an approved course related to wastewater treatment plant operation, that ground is no longer a basis for the denial of Petitioner's certification. Petitioner testified, and the other documentary evidence introduced during the coarse of the hearing indicates, that Petitioner was employed from January, 1975, through December 25, 1975, as administrator of the Margate Utility Authority. From December 25, 1975, through February 15, 1976, the Petitioner was employed in a position other than as administrator, his resignation being effective on February 15, 1976. Accordingly, the Petitioner was employed at the Authority for a period in excess of one year. What is at issue, is the Respondent's contention that the Petitioner was not actually performing duties tantamount to fulfillment of the actual experience requirement of Section 17-16.03(2)(b), Florida Administrative Cede, inasmuch as his duties as an administrator were more in the nature of being in charge of the facility, with little practical experience as the term "experience" is meant in Chapter 17 of the Florida Administrative Code. Additionally, it was noted that the Petitioner was re-employed by the City of Margate as a supervisor. During the hearing, the Petitioner outlined his duties as an administrator which included being in charge off the overall operation of the wastewater treatment plant. Petitioner testified that when he was first employed at the Margate Utility Authority, the wastewater treatment plants were not operational. He testified that a water-sewer moratorium had been placed by the Board of Health, citing approximately five violations. Petitioner testified that he instituted numerous changes in the operations of the wastewater treatment facilities which included hiring a contractor to supervise deficiencies in the wastewater treatment plant and its injector systems which were over-pressurized. He testified that within approximately two months of his employment with the Authority, he was able to correct approximately 80 percent of the problems and was able to again make the treatment plant operational. Petitioner testified that he normally worked a five day week; however, he was on duty in excess of forty hours weekly for the resolution of all daily operational problems. Evidence introduced during the course of the hearing reveals that the wastewater treatment facility here involved is fully automated and that the operators have very little to do in terms of manual tasks. In this regard, the Petitioner testified that he was on duty at the facility throughout his employment during the period January, 1975, through December, 1975, to operate the wastewater treatment plant. Additionally, the Petitioner testified that his office, as an administrator, was located in close proximity to the wastewater treatment facilities and he was available to in fact operate the wastewater treatment plant, as needed. Finally, Respondent's certification officer, Robert W. Hall, testified that in his opinion, being available to operate as opposed to actual operation is what is required by the actual experience requirements of the Florida Administrative Code. Based thereon, I shall recommend that the Respondent withdraw its notice of intent to deny Petitioner's application for a Class "C" wastewater treatment plant operator's license.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is hereby, RECOMMENDED: That Petitioner's application for a Class "C" wastewater treatment operator's license be GRANTED. RECOMMENDED this 8th day of May, 1979, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Russell L. Forkey, Esquire 3081 East Commercial Boulevard Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33308 Randall E. Denker, Esquire Department of Environmental Regulation 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether Permit No. DO19-101251 issued to Mr. Vail on July 11, 1985 to construct and operate an on-site wastewater treatment and disposal system should be revoked?
Findings Of Fact Mr. Vail is the owner and operator of a business called the St. George Inn and Restaurant (hereinafter referred to as the "Inn"). The Inn is located at the southeast corner of the intersection of Franklin Boulevard and Pine Avenue on St. George Island, Florida. In May of 1984 Mr. Vail spoke with an employee of the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services about obtaining a permit to construct a septic tank on his property for use by the Inn for the treatment and disposal of wastewater. Mr. Vail was instructed to submit a design of the septic tank for approval. Mr. Vail contracted with McNeill Septic Tank Company for the design and construction of the septic tank. The evidence failed to prove when Mr. Vail applied with the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services for a permit. As of March, 1985, however, Mr. Vail had not received approval or disapproval of his application from the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services. Mr. Vail, therefore, went to the Governor's office to seek help in getting a response. Shortly after contacting the Governor's office, the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services informed Mr. Vail that he needed to obtain a permit from the Department and not from the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services. On or about March 18, 1985, Mr. Vail filed an Application to Operate/Construct Industrial Wastewater Treatment and Disposal Systems (hereinafter referred to as the "Application"), with the Department. The Application was prepared by Brown and Associates Civil Engineers and Land Surveyors, Inc., Mr. Vail's engineering consultant. The Application was certified by Benjamin E. Brown, Professional Engineer. Mr. Vail signed the Application as "owner" and indicated that he was aware of the contents of the Application. In the Application, "St. George Inn Restaurant" is listed as the "Source Name." Under Part II, A of the Application, the applicant is asked to "[d]escribe the nature and extent of the project." In response to this request, the following answer was given: This project will provide a sewage disposal system for a one hundred and fifty (150) seat restaurant on St. George Island. Sizing of the septic tank system is based on 50 GPD/seat and secondary treatment will be provided by the design proposed. Under Part III, A of the Application, the applicant is asked to provide the following information and the following answers were given: Type of Industry Restaurant . . . . 3. Raw Materials and Chemicals Used Food preparation only. Normal Operation 12 hrs/day 7 days/week . . . . If operation is seasonal, explain This restaurant will be used the most during the summer months which corresponds with ocean/beach recreation & the tourist trade. Nowhere in the Application is it indicated that the permit applied for involved anything other than a restaurant. The Application gives no information from which the Department could have known that the proposed wastewater treatment and disposal system would handle waste from guest rooms or an apartment. In the Application Mr. Vail sought approval of a permit to construct and operate a wastewater treatment and disposal system to serve a 150 seat restaurant. In the Application Mr. Vail sought a permit for a system which was to have a design flow of 7,500 gallons per day based on 50 gallons, per seat, per day water usage. An employee of the Department wrote a memorandum dated May 5, 1985, recommending approval of the Application. The Department determined, however, that the size of the property on which the Inn was to be located was not large enough for the drain field necessary to accommodate a 150 seat restaurant. Therefore, Mr. Brown modified the proposed system and resubmitted application data indicating that a 108 seat restaurant would be constructed. The design flow of the new proposal was 2,160 gallons per day based on 20 gallons per seat per day. Mr. Brown had requested that the Department approve a system based upon the newly submitted design flow. The Department and Mr. Brown both agreed that this design flow was adequate; that it was reasonable to anticipate and provide for the treatment and disposal of a maximum of 2,160 gallons per day design flow. The effect of reducing the design flow and the number of seats was to allow a shortened drain field which could be accommodated by the size of the property the Inn was to be located on. On June 27, 1985, Mr. Vail arranged for a notice to be published in the Apalachicola Times. That notice provided, in pertinent part, the following: State of Florida Department of Environmental Regulation Notice of Proposed Agency Action on Permit Application The department gives notice of its intent to issue a permit to Jack Vail to construct a restaurant and on-site wastewater treatment and disposal system [sic] at Franklin Boulevard and Pine Avenue, St. George Island. The treatment consists of grease trap, septic tank, and sand filter followed by disposal into a drainfield. The project meets applicable standards and will not impair the designated use of the underlying ground water. There is no anticipated impact on surface waters or air quality. . . . . This notice was sent to Mr. Vail by the Department and he made arrangements for it to be published. Nowhere in the notice is it indicated that the system to be approved by the Department is for anything other than a restaurant. On July 11, 1985, less than four months after the Application was filed with the Department, the Department issued Permit Number DO19-101251 (hereinafter referred to as the "Permit"). In the cover letter sent with the Permit the Department indicated that the Permit allowed Mr. Vail "to construct and operate a 2,160 gallon per day, on-site wastewater treatment and disposal system serving St. George Inn Restaurant. . . ." The Department also indicates in the Permit that it is for the "St. George Inn Restaurant." The Permit also provides, in pertinent part, the following with regard to the purpose of the Permit: The above named applicant, hereinafter called Permittee, is hereby authorized to perform the work or operate the facility shown on the application and approved drawing(s), plans, and other documents attached hereto or on file with the department and made a part hereof and specifically described as follows: Construct and operate a 108 seat restaurant with an on-site wastewater treatment and disposal system. Wastewater flows shall be a maximum of 2,160 gallons per day generated by domestic facilities and kitchen wastes . . . Construction shall be in accordance with application dated March 18, 1985 and additional information submitted April 29, 1985, specifications and other supporting documents prepared by Brown and Associates and certified by Benjamin E. Brown, P.E. and submitted to the Department on June 5, June 17, and June 20, 1985. The Permit also contains the following "General Condition" number 2 and "Specific Condition" number 15: . . . . 2. This permit is valid only for the specific processes and operations applied for and indicated in the approved drawings and exhibits. Any unauthorized deviation from the approved drawings, exhibits, specifications, or conditions of this permit may constitute grounds for revocation and enforcement action by the department. . . . . 15. The Department shall be notified and prior approval shall be obtained of any changes or revisions made during construction. . . . . The Permit provides the following with regard to the effect of the conditions of the Permit: The terms, conditions, requirements, limitations, and restrictions set forth herein are "Permit Conditions", and as such are binding upon the permittee and enforceable pursuant to the authority of sections 403.161, 403.727, or 403.859 through 403.861, Florida Statutes. The permittee is hereby placed on notice that the Department will review this permit periodically and may initiate enforcement action for any violation of the "Permit Conditions" by the permittee . . . . During the week after the Permit was issued, Mr. Vail obtained a building permit from Franklin County for the construction of the "inn." In February, 1986, after construction of the Inn had begun, Department inspectors went to the construction site of the Inn. The Permit authorized this inspection and other inspections carried out by the Department. The Department determined that the Inn being constructed by Mr. Vail included a restaurant, an apartment on the third floor of the Inn with two bathrooms, and eight guest rooms on the second floor, each containing a bathroom. This was the first time that the Department knew that Mr. Vail's facility was to include guest rooms and living quarters in addition to containing a 108 seat restaurant. In March of 1986, the Department sent a warning letter to Mr. Vail notifying him of the violation of the General Conditions of his Permit: the use of the approved system for the treatment and disposal of wastewater from the ten bathrooms in the guest rooms and the two bathrooms in the apartment in addition to the 108 seat restaurant. On April 1, 1986, Department personnel met with Mr. Vail and Mr. Brown. The Department reminded Mr. Vail and Mr. Brown that the Permit requested and approved by the Department was for a 108 seat restaurant only. The Department had not authorized a system which was to be used for a 108 seat restaurant and ten additional bathrooms. Pursuant to General Condition 14, the Department informed Mr. Vail that it needed an engineer's evaluation of the ability of the system which had been approved to handle the additional flow which could be expected from the additional ten bathrooms. By letter dated April 1, 1986, the Department memorialized the meeting and indicated that Mr. Vail could operate a 100 seat restaurant and the apartment during the interim. By letter dated May 8, 1986, Mr. Brown asked for additional time to submit the evaluation requested by the Department. The Department approved this request by letter dated May 14, 1986. By letter dated May 16, 1986, Mr. Brown submitted an engineering evaluation which proposed modifications to the approved system to handle the additional ten bathrooms. By letter dated June 13, 1986, the Department indicated that the evaluation was generally acceptable" but requested additional information. In January, 1987, before the additional information was submitted, Mr. Brown died in an airplane accident. No evidence was presented to explain why the information requested by the Department in June of 1986 had not been submitted before January, 1987. In March, 1987, the Department inspected Mr. Vail's facility again. In April, 1987, the Department informed Mr. Vail that the Department would take action to revoke the Permit. Before the Administrative Complaint was issued, the Department requested that certain information be provided on behalf of Mr. Vail by an engineer in an effort to resolve the dispute. Mr. Vail did not, however, obtain the services of an engineer. Instead, Mr. Vail sent the Department information purporting to show the amount of water which had been used at the Inn. That information failed to prove the ability of the system that the Department had approved to handle the maximum wastewater which could be expected from maximum use of the 108 seat restaurant and ten additional bathrooms. At best, the information submitted by Mr. Vail is partial proof that the system is capable of handling the wastewater that has been generated at the Inn for the period of time for which the information relates. No competent substantial proof has been submitted to indicate that the system is capable of handling the maximum wastewater flows which may be experienced or even that the system is adequately handling the current flow. All that has been proved is that there is no apparent problem with the system in handling the current flow. In September, 1987, the Department issued the Administrative Complaint. Pursuant to this Complaint, the Department has sought the revocation of the Permit and prescribed certain orders for corrective action. No application has been submitted by or on behalf of Mr. Vail to the Department to construct and operate a wastewater treatment facility designed to accommodate the sewage flows which may be generated by the Inn as it has been constructed. Although the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services and other agencies were aware that the Inn includes a restaurant and guest rooms, the Department was never so informed.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department issue a Final Order requiring that Mr. Vail comply with all of the corrective orders, except Paragraph 18, contained in the Administrative Complaint. DONE and ORDERED this 11th day of March, 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida. LARRY J. SARTIN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of March, 1988. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NUMBER 87-4242 The parties have submitted proposed findings of fact. It has been noted below which Proposed findings of fact have been generally accepted and the paragraph number(s) in the Recommended Order where they have been accepted, if any. Those proposed findings of fact which have been rejected and the reason for their rejection have also been noted. The Department's Proposed Findings of Fact Proposed Finding Paragraph Number in Recommended Order of Fact of Acceptance or Reason for Rejection 1 Conclusion of law. 2 1. 3 6. 4 10. 5 12 and 13. 6 14. 7 15. 8 18. 9 19. 10 20. 11-12 16. 13 21. 14 23. 15 24. 16 25. 17 26. 18-19 27. 20 28. 21 29 22 Hereby accepted. Mr. Vail's Proposed Findings of Fact 1A 15. Not supported by the weight of the evidence and irrelevant. Hearsay and irrelevant. Although technically true, this is not the issue in this case. The evidence did not prove that the system "can in actuality handle three times the amount permitted." Not supported by the weight of the evidence and irrelevant. 2A Not supported be the weight of the evidence. Exhibit 6 indicates that the Department was aware that the Inn included "hotel rooms" but not the number. Irrelevant. The evidence did not prove that the Department was aware of the scope of the project. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. 3A Irrelevant. Not supported by the weight of the evidence and irrelevant. Even if this were true, the fact remains that the Department was unaware that the Inn included guest rooms or an apartment. Irrelevant. 4A-B Irrelevant. 5A-B Irrelevant. 6A 2-4. B 5. 6 and 11. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. See 12. 13 and 15. Not supported by the weight of the evidence and irrelevant. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. 7A-C Not supported by the weight of the evidence and irrelevant. 8A-D Not supported by the weight of the evidence and irrelevant. 9A-B Not supported by the weight of the evidence and irrelevant. 10-12 Not supported by the weight of the evidence and irrelevant. COPIES FURNISHED: Richard L. Windsor, Esquire State of Florida Department of Environmental Regulation Twin Towers Office Building 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2400 Mr. John Vail St. George Inn Post Office Box 222 St. George Island, Florida 32328 Dale Twachtmann, Secretary State of Florida Department of Environmental Regulation Twin Towers Office Building 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2400 Daniel H. Thompson, Esquire General Counsel State of Florida Department of Environmental Regulation Twin Towers Office Building 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2400
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is Arthur L. Jones, Trustee of the Arthur L. Jones Revocable Trust, also known as Eastlake Woodlands Shopping Center ("Eastlake"). Petitioner is not and never has been responsible for the discharge of pollutants at Eastlake within the meaning of Section 376.302. On November 9, 1993, Petitioner requested a determination of eligibility under the "Good Samaritan" program authorized in Section 376.305(6). Petitioner seeks reimbursement of $644,712 in costs associated with the assessment and remediation of perchloroethylene ("PCE") contamination at Eastlake. From May, 1982, through May, 1986, Eastlake included a dry cleaning establishment among its tenants. The dry cleaning establishment utilized PCE. PCE contamination was discovered in June, 1992, when a Publix Supermarket adjacent to the former dry cleaning business ("Publix") requested an environmental assessment as part of its expansion at Eastlake. The environmental assessment was performed by Chastain-Skillman, Inc. ("Skillman"). Skillman first discovered PCE contamination at the site as a result of tests of groundwater obtained from behind the former dry cleaning establishment. From July, 1992, through August, 1992, Skillman confirmed the PCE contamination through tests of additional groundwater samples from 10 other locations. In October, 1992, Petitioner orally notified Respondent of PCE contamination at the site. The PCE contamination was not reported to Respondent's Emergency Response Coordinator. The PCE contamination was not an emergency. Emergencies typically include incidents such as a petroleum spill related to a vehicular accident, a chemical spill, or a fire related release. The PCE contamination did not constitute an imminent threat to the public health, safety, and welfare. It did not constitute a threat to potable water wells at the site. PCE is a solvent commonly used in the dry cleaning business. Release of PCE is a relatively common occurrence in the dry cleaning business. On September 27, 1993, Petitioner and Respondent entered into a consent order with regard to PCE contamination at the site. In relevant part, the consent order requires Petitioner to submit a Contamination Assessment Report and Remedial Action Plan. Petitioner submitted a Contamination Assessment Report in November, 1992. Petitioner did not submit a Remedial Action Plan because Respondent placed a moratorium on enforcement actions undertaken with regard to PCE contamination at dry cleaning establishments. Respondent is in the process of implementing a program for state funded cleanup of contaminated dry cleaning sites throughout the state. Respondent is developing a priority system for cleanup of contaminated dry cleaning sites based upon relative threat to the public health and environment. There are approximately 2,800 contaminated dry cleaning sites around the state that will be affected by Respondent's dry cleaning program. Petitioner is entitled to apply for reimbursement of future costs once Respondent implements its dry cleaning program. Respondent has issued a policy memorandum concerning the review of Good Samaritan applications. Respondent's policy differentiates between petroleum contamination and non-petroleum contamination, such as PCE contaminated sites. Reimbursement of petroleum contamination is funded through the Inland Protection Trust Fund ("IPTF"). Reimbursement of non-petroleum contamination is funded through the Water Quality Assurance Trust Fund ("WQATF"). IPTF funds are statutorily limited to reimbursement of costs associated with petroleum contamination. Respondent's policy is to exhaust the enforcement process before WQATF trust funds are utilized for the assessment and remediation of non- petroleum contamination. Respondent's policy requires a Good Samaritan to obtain prior approval from Respondent's Emergency Response Section or On-Scene Coordinator before initiating cleanup of a non-petroleum site such as the PCE contaminated site at Eastlake. The requirement for prior approval is designed to allow Respondent to preserve the amount of personnel, equipment, and resources available for statutorily prescribed priorities, including emergency responses. 2/ The requirement also allows Respondent to determine the endpoint of the emergency phase of a cleanup and the beginning of the remedial phase of the cleanup. The requirement for prior approval may be waived in the event of an imminent hazard. Respondent adequately explicated its non-rule policy for a moratorium on dry cleaning sites and for prior approval of remediation of non-petroleum sites including dry cleaning sites contaminated with PCE. Respondent's explication was adequate even if its policy constitutes an unwritten rule within the meaning of Section 120.57(1)(b)15, Florida Statutes. Petitioner failed to show good cause for waiver of the requirement for prior approval. The PCE contamination at the site was neither an emergency nor an imminent hazard. The public was restricted from the contaminated area by a fence surrounding the site. The public was not exposed to or threatened with contamination by inhalation. No potable water wells are near the site. Therefore, there was no threat of public access to contaminated drinking water. Petitioner did not obtain prior approval for its remediation of the site. Remediation was undertaken to complete the Publix expansion in a timely manner. Petitioner's efforts in assessing and remediating the site have been exemplary. Petitioner has fully cooperated with Respondent in assessing and remediating the site. In July, 1993, Petitioner retained American Compliance Technologies ("ACT") as a consultant to assist Petitioner in the remediation of the contaminated site. ACT prepared a health and safety plan for workers on the site. The plan addressed the risk to workers of exposure to PCE during construction and demolition activities necessary for the Publix expansion. Construction and demolition activities included removal of the concrete slab at the location of the former dry cleaning business. Disturbance of the soils contaminated with PCE created a potential for exposure of workers to PCE. The health and safety plan developed by ACT required workers to wear standard protective gear utilized by the industry. The plan satisfied the requirements of OSHA. ACT did not prepare a risk assessment addressing the potential for exposure of the general public to PCE. Nor did ACT prepare a risk assessment for the potential impact of PCE on groundwater or potable wells. The PCE contamination did not constitute an imminent threat to the public health, safety, and welfare.
The Issue At issue in this proceeding is the reasonable cost to be reimbursed Petitioner, under the provisions of Section 376.3071(12), Florida Statutes, for the development of a Monitoring Only Plan (MOP) program for the Dagam Oil Company (DEP Facility No. 138504146), at 331 23rd Street, Miami Beach, Florida.
Findings Of Fact Background Petitioner, Panhandle Industries, Inc., is a Florida corporation engaged in the business of consulting, engineering and construction. George M. Hidle, a professional geologist licensed in the State of Florida, is the president and sole owner of the Petitioner corporation. In September 1992, Dagam Oil Company, doing business as Sierra Fina, employed Petitioner to do environmental assessment work and prepare a Contamination Assessment Report (CAR) under the then existing Rule 17-770.630, Florida Administrative Code, for a site located at 331 23rd Street, Miami Beach, Florida (DEP Facility No. 138504146).4 That CAR was submitted to DERM (Metropolitan Dade County, Department of Environmental Resources Management) July 13, 1993. (Petitioner's Exhibit 1.) Pertinent to this case, the CAR provides the following background or historical information: . . . PHYSICAL SETTING . . . Sierra Fina is located at 331 23rd Street in Miami Beach, Florida . . . The facility is bordered to the north by Collins Canal, to the east by the light commercial properties, and to the south/southeast by property that once contained Chevron and Fina service stations. . . . * * * . . . FACILITY HISTORY AND OPERATION Sierra Fina was built in 1963. The station originally operated as a Sunoco service station with a 3 bay garage. Dagam Oil Company purchased the facility in March 1981 from Charles Rosenblatt. At the time the station had five underground fuel tanks. . . . * * * . . . PREVIOUS INVESTIGATIONS Dagam Oil Company contracted with another environmental company in November 1988 to collect groundwater samples from . . . five monitoring wells at the facility. Groundwater samples were collected on November 9, 1988 and analyzed by EPA Method 602. Monitoring well MW-3 was also analyzed by EPA Method 610. All five of the wells had hydrocarbon contaminant concentrations in excess of state guidelines. . . . A discharge notification form was mailed to the DER and DERM on December 9, 1988, the date of receipt of the analytical results from the November 9, 1988 groundwater sampling event. . . . * * * . . . INITIAL REMEDIAL ACTIONS [IRA] [The F]ive underground storage tanks [and associated piping] were removed from the facility during March and April 1989 [, and replaced with four new cathodically protected underground petroleum storage tanks]. Approximately 400 cubic yards of contaminated soil was also removed at that time. On March 31, 1989 a composite sample of the soil was collected for analysis . . . Because of limited space at the station, the contaminated soil was hauled to a Metro Trucking Inc. storage yard located at 112th Avenue and 143 Street in Miami. The contaminated soil was landfarmed at this Metro Trucking facility for a period of seven months, during which time the soil was spread onto visqueen and tilled on a regular basis. On November 21, 1989 the soil was resampled and analyzed . . . Results of this second round of analyses met clean fill criteria. Also at the time of tank replacement, a sheen of free floating hydrocarbons was observed on water in the tank pit. A vac truck was used to skim this product from the pit prior to tank replacement. Approximately 2100 gallons of oily water were removed, transported, and disposed of by Cliff Berry, Inc. . . . Other than these IRA activities, no other assessment or remediation work had been performed at the facility until Petitioner was employed in September 1992. Petitioner's CAR concluded that: Soil and groundwater at Sierra Fina are contaminated with gasoline and diesel hydrocarbons. Excessively contaminated soil is confined to an area at the western end of the station building that is approximately 20 feet in width by 30 feet in length, extending down to a water table of between 6 and 8 feet below land surface. No free phase floating product is present on the groundwater underlying this facility. However, dissolved hydrocarbon contamination is present in the groundwater. A dissolved hydrocarbon plume is present in the western half of the site. This plume measures 80 feet in length by 60 feet in width and extends to a depth of less than 22 feet below land surface, yielding approximately 134,640 gallons of hydrocarbon contaminated water. Volume calculations are based on an average depth to groundwater of 7 feet below land surface and an effective soil porosity of 25%. The highest benzene (53.3 ppb) and total napthalenes (752 ppb) concentrations were detected in MW-12. * * * Groundwater within the Biscayne Aquifer beneath Sierra Fina is nonpotable because of salt water intrusion from the Atlantic Ocean. For this reason there are no private or public potable wells in the area. Contamination at Sierra Fina is limited onsite to the western half of the station, and poses no threats to sensitive receptors in the area, with the possible exception of Collins Canal. The cause of hydrocarbon contamination was never determined; however, the most probable source, i.e. previous petroleum tanks and lines, were removed in March and April of 1989. Based on these findings and the data presented about or elsewhere in this report, it is known that soil and groundwater contamination does exist at this facility in concentrations that exceed guidelines specified in Section 17- 770.730(5)FAC; however, the levels of contamination may not warrant the need for any extensive remediation activities at this site. Petitioner's CAR was approved by DERM on October 8, 1993, and Petitioner was directed to submit a Remedial Action Plan (RAP) within 60 days.5 At the time, Mr. Hidle (Petitioner) was aware that the levels of contamination were low or near target levels, and that it was likely that the contamination levels would decrease naturally over time. Consequently, Petitioner elected to seek approval of a Monitor Only Plan (MOP), as opposed to a RAP. Such choice was favored based on the nature and location of the contaminants. In this regard, it was observed that the soil contamination consisted of both gasoline and diesel fuel, with much of the contaminated soil abutting or underneath the building. Excavation and removal of the soil was not an alternative because it would undermine the structural integrity of the building. Moreover, given the fuel mix, vapor extraction was not a viable option. Given Petitioner's choice to pursue approval of a MOP, it gave notice to the Department and DERM on October 18, 1993, as well as November 12, 1993, and December 2, 1993, of its intention to undertake groundwater sampling and soil sampling on the site. Groundwater sampling was undertaken by Mr. Hidle between 1:30 p.m., November 30, 1993, and 2:30 a.m., December 1, 1993,6 at which time he drew water samples for laboratory analysis from 10 monitor wells (MW) and one deep well (DW). A duplicate sample was also retrieved at MWs 12R and 14, and equipment blanks were also obtained for laboratory analysis. Between 8:25 p.m., December 4, 1993, and 3:40 a.m. December 5, 1993,7 Mr. Hidle and a senior technician (Martin Hidle) augured 6 soil borings for use in preparing the MOP and collected one soil sample for laboratory analysis. Petitioner delivered the water samples to the laboratory (Envirodyne, Inc.) on December 2, 1993, and the soil sample on December 6, 1993, for analysis. The laboratory completed its analysis of the water samples on December 13, 1993, and of the soil sample on December 14, 1993, and rendered its written reports (analysis) to Petitioner.8 Upon receipt of the laboratory data, Mr. Hidle completed his preparation of the MOP. (Petitioner's Exhibit 4.) That MOP contained the following conclusions and recommendations: The initial dissolved hydrocarbon plume dimensions were based on data from groundwater sampling events of January and February 1993. Laboratory results from a more recent sampling event (11/30/93) indicate that plume size and hydrocarbon compound concentrations therein have decreased substantially (Table 4-2). Maximum groundwater contaminant concentrations decreased as follows: benzene from 53.3 ppb to 11.1 ppb; BTEX from 111.7 ppb to 20.6 ppb; total naphthalenes from 752 ppb to 246.1 ppb. During the contamination assessment program task a small area of contaminated soil was found to be abutting the western end of the station building (CAR, Fig. 3-1, p. 35). Because of the presence of diesel compounds in the groundwater, it was assumed during preparation of the CAR that the soil too was contaminated with diesel. In early December 1993 PI Environmental personnel installed six additional soil borings (Figure 3-1, SB-16 through SB-21) and collected one soil sample for laboratory analyses. The soil borings were augered in the immediate area of the previously defined contaminated soil plume, and soil samples were analyzed in the field by using a Foxboro OVA 128. Soil samples were collected vertically every two feet, beginning at one foot below ground surface and continuing until the water table was encountered. A soil sample was collected from boring SB-17 at a depth of six feet below land surface. A net OVA reading of 160 ppm was observed from a duplicate sample taken from the same depth. The soil sample was tested by EPA Methods 3540/8100 (diesel compounds) and 9073 (TRPH). Laboratory results indicated that all diesel compounds were below laboratory detection limits, and the TRPH concentration was below normal background readings. Soil contamination was reclassified as being gasoline in origin, because no diesel compounds were detected in the soil sample from SB-17. Section 17-770.200(2) Florida Administrative Code defines excessively contaminated soil, associated with gasoline contamination, as those that have a net OVA/FID reading equal to or greater than 500 ppm. From December 1993 sampling event, a maximum net OVA/FID reading of 316 ppm was obtained from a sample that was collected at five fee below land surface in SB-17. Based on these results, no excessively contaminated soil was found during the most recent sampling event. It is the recommendation of PI Environmental Inc. that a Monitoring Only Plan be implemented at Sierra Fina. This recommendation is based on the following findings: 1) Absence in the study area of any potable water wells within the Biscayne Aquifer because of salt water intrusion from the Atlantic Ocean 2) Absence of free phase hydrocarbons 3) Absence of excessively contaminated soil 4) Substantial decrease in concentrations of dissolved hydrocarbon compounds within the groundwater during the last year, and 5) relatively low levels of hydrocarbon contamination in the groundwater, i.e., based on the November 30, 1993 sampling event, maximum benzene of 11.1 ppb, maximum BTEX of 20.6 ppb, and maximum total naphthalenes of 246.1 ppb. It is our recommendation that groundwater from monitoring wells MW-8, MW-12R, MW-6, and MW-17 be sampled on a quarterly basis. Groundwater from the source area wells, MW-8 and MW-12R, should be analyzed quarterly by EPA Methods 602 and 610. Groundwater from the perimeter wells, MW-6 and MW-17, should be analyzed quarterly by EPB Method 602 and semiannually by EPA Methods 602 and 610. Petitioner submitted the MOP to DERM on January 24, 1994. Pertinent to this case, it is observed that the MOP was a brief document, consisting of only 13 pages of textual material, much of which was a restatement of material contained in the CAR. The balance of the report consisted of 5 "Figures" (three of which were contained in the CAR and one of which is an updated version of a CAR Figure); 2 "Tables" (an update of the Water Table Elevation table contained in the CAR to include the November 30, 1993, data, and an update of the Summary of Groundwater Analyses contained in the CAR to include the November 30, 1993, and December 1, 1993, data); 6 "Geologic Log[s]" (a restating of the soil boring results noted in the field notes for December 4 and 5, 1993); copies of the laboratory (Envirodyne, Inc.'s) reports of groundwater analysis; and the laboratory's report on the soil analysis. In all, while apparently adequate and nicely presented, the MOP does not address a complex or unique issue, and does not evidence the expenditure, or need to expend, an inordinate amount of effort to produce. Petitioner's MOP was disapproved by DERM on May 11, 1994, for the following reasons: A complete round of groundwater analyses, no greater than six months old, is required. Therefore, all wells at this site must be sampled for EPA Method 418.1, and monitoring wells numbered MW-6, MW-9, MW-10, MW-11, MW-13, MW-16, and MW-17 must be sampled for EPA Method 610. Because diesel contamination is present at this site, soil OVA readings above 50 ppm are considered to indicate excessively contaminated soil. Based on this OVA readings obtained for your Contamination Assessment Report (CAR) and this MOP, excessively contaminated soil does exist at this site. Since this coil could be a continuing source of contamination, it must be removed prior to the approval of a MOP. Consequently, Petitioner was directed to submit an addendum to the MOP to address those issues. On June 1, 1994, Petitioner gave notice to the Department and DERM of its intent to collect groundwater samples to address issues raised by DERM's MOP review letter. These samples were collected by Mr. Hidle and a technician (Leo Iannone) between 1:15 p.m. and 10:00 p.m., June 15, 1994.9 Petitioner delivered the water samples to the laboratory (Envirodyne, Inc.) on June 16, 1994. The laboratory completed its analysis and delivered its written reports to Petitioner on or about June 23, 1994. Upon receipt of the laboratory data, Mr. Hidle completed the Monitoring Only Plan Addendum (Petitioner's Exhibit 8), and submitted it to DERM on July 5, 1994. The addendum addressed the additional groundwater analysis that was performed, and with regard to the diesel contamination it observed, as follows: Soil analytical results (MOP, Page 62) are below laboratory detection limits for EPA 610 compounds; however, because groundwater at this facility is contaminated with both gasoline and diesel, we are concurring with DERM by reclassifying excessively contaminated soil as any soil that exhibits net OVA/FID readings of 50 ppm or greater, per Chapter 17-770 FAC. OVA/FID soil analyses were performed in accordance to Panhandle Industries, Inc. approved Comp QAP. Net OVA/FID soil results obtained during the CAR program task are shown in Figure 1-5. A maximum net OVA/FID reading of 887 ppm was obtained during CAR soil assessment activities which ended on November 29, 1992. Figure 1-6 shows net OVA/FID results obtained during the MOP program task. These MOP analyses are current through December 5, 1993. A maximum net OVA/FID of 316 ppm was obtained during this latter event. As is shown in comparison of Figures 1-5 and 1-6, it can be seen that the size of the soil contaminant plume and OVA/FID net soil readings therein have decreased significantly since initiation of the CAR. Also, by observing Figure 1-6, which has a scale of 1" = 20', it is evident that very little soil, if any can be excavated without jeopardizing the structural integrity of the station building. Furthermore, there exist the possibility that some soil contamination may underlie the building itself; therefore, soil excavation would most likely result in only partial removal of the contaminated soil plume. The addendum concluded by recommending that the MOP be implemented as originally proposed, but with additional monitoring to assure a continuing decline in contamination. The addendum, like the MOP, was a brief document and contains only 6 pages of textual material. The balance of the addendum contains 6 "Figures" (all of which appeared in the CAR or MOP); 2 "Tables" (an update of the Water Table Elevations table contained in the MOP to include June 15, 1994, data, and an update of the Summary of Groundwater Analyses contained in the MOP to include the June 15, 1994, data); and the laboratory reports of groundwater analyses. As with the MOP, the addendum did not appear to address any complex or unique issues, and did not evidence the expenditure, or need to expend, an inordinate amount of time to produce. On August 16, 1994, and August 26, 1994, DERM and the Department, respectively, approved the "monitoring only" proposal. The request for reimbursement Petitioner submitted its reimbursement application on or about August 23, 1994, and it was apparently complete on or about April 18, 1996. (Petitioner's Exhibit 11). That application sought recovery of the following sums for the items noted: 6. REMEDIAL ACTION PLAN [MOP and MOP Addendum] PREPARATION . . . Personnel 31442.55 Capital Expense Items Rentals 1127.45 Mileage 68.05 Shipping 35.00 Well Drilling Permits Analysis 3680.00 Miscellaneous 1601.25 REMEDIAL ACTION PLAN PREPARATION TOTAL 37954.30 * * * 13. REIMBURSEMENT APPLICATION PREPARATION Supplementary Forms Personnel 795.00 Capital Expense Items Rentals 15.00 Mileage .80 Shipping 86.81 Well Drilling Permits Analysis Miscellaneous 60.75 APPLICATION PREPARATION TOTAL 958.36 CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANT REVIEW FEE 500.00 APPLICATION GRAND TOTAL 39412.66 By letter (Order of Determination of Reimbursement) of June 27, 1996, the Department responded to Petitioner's reimbursement request as follows: We have completed review of your Reimbursement Application for expenses incurred during the Remedial Action Plan/Monitoring Only Plan program task at this site and have determined that $13,198.70 of the total $39,412.66 requested is allowable for reimbursement. This amount will be paid to the person responsible for conducting site rehabilitation when processing is completed by the Comptroller's Office. Some adjustments to the amount of reimbursement requested have been made. The following list details these adjustments. Citations refer to the specific sections of the enclosed Reimbursement Application Summary Sheets: 1. $24,766.25 in Section 6A, $259.95 in Section 6C, $28.20 in Section 6D and $63.25 in Section 6I were deducted because the total personnel hours (413.15 hours) and the total cost of $39,412.66 claimed for performing a limited scope of work consisting of 78.34 hours of field activities, two rounds of analyses (59 samples) and two letter reports have been determined to be excessive. However, actual field activities (including a reasonable amount of preparation), two rounds of analyses and a reasonable amount of personnel time to prepare two letter reports have been allowed. 2. $162.50 in Section 6A, $9.00 in Section 6E and $331.15 in Section 6I were deducted for costs associated with providing backup for the Contamination Assessment reimbursement application. These costs are not reimbursable in this application which is for the Remedial Action Plan/Monitoring Only Plan program task. $184.80 in Section 6A and $394.56 in Section 6I were deducted for field supplies, ice, conducting database modifications and purchasing office supplies, which are considered to be overhead. These costs are not justified in addition to the loaded personnel rates which already include overhead and profit. $11.76 in Section 6I was deducted because the rate for reproduction ($0.99 per page) has been determined to be excessive. However, $0.15 (per page) has been allowed based on the predominant rate claimed in other reimbursement applications for similar rates. $19.56 in Section 13E was deducted for costs added to the application preparation claimed as a markup. Reimbursement for application preparation is limited to actual costs only. $17.02 was added to the application grand total to cover the cost of reproducing the reimbursement application and invoices and shipping the replacements to the Department. (Petitioner's Exhibit 12.) Petitioner filed a timely challenge to contest the Department's decision. That challenge disputed the Department's action, as set forth in paragraphs numbered 1 through 4 of the letter, but Petitioner did not then, or at hearing, dispute the Department's action with regard to the matters contained in paragraphs numbered 5 and 6 of the Department's letter. (Petitioner's Exhibit 13). Subsequently, at hearing, Petitioner withdrew its request for reimbursement regarding the items contained in paragraph 3 of the Department's letter. (Transcript, page 101). The claim for the cost of preparing the reimbursement application Petitioner's claim for the cost of preparation of the reimbursement application totalled $1,458.36 (including the certified public accountant review fee). The Department proposed to deduct $19.56 (in Section 13E), and to add $17.02 to cover certain costs, as noted in the Department's letter. (Petitioner's Exhibits 12 and 13). Petitioner offered no objection to the Department's decision and, therefore, Petitioner should be awarded $1,455.82, without the need for further discussion, as the cost of preparing the reimbursement application. The claim for the cost of preparation of the MOP and MOP Addendum Petitioner's application for reimbursement claimed 413.15 personnel hours ($31,442.55) were dedicated to the development of the MOP (329.42 hours/$25,500.95) and the MOP Addendum (83.73 hours/$5,941.60). (Respondent's Exhibit 7, and Transcript, pages 188-190). In its initial review, the Department approved 55.67 hours ($3,790.45) for the MOP and 41.92 hours ($2,538.55) for the MOP Addendum, for a total award of $6,329.00. Subsequently, the Department resolved to accept as reasonable, 89 hours ($6,308.00) for the MOP and 83.73 hours ($5,941.60) for the MOP Addendum, for a total award of $12,249.60 for personnel costs.10 The 83.73 hours ($5,941.60) agreed to by the Department for the MOP Addendum was the precise amount Petitioner requested in its reimbursement application; however, the 89 hours ($6,308.00) accepted by the Department for the MOP is clearly less than the 329.42 hours ($25,500.95) Petitioner had requested. With regard to the difference, the Department views the request as excessive. In contrast, Petitioner contends the time requested was reasonable. Here, the Department's view has merit. To support the reasonableness of the hours (labor) claimed, Petitioner pointed to the "Daily Time Log[s]" which were contained within the reimbursement application, and which it contended contain an accurate recording of the hours worked and the task performed. (Petitioner's Exhibits 11, and Transcript, pages 29 through 31). According to Mr. Hidle, all employees of the company were required to keep a notepad on which they were to record the job (customer), hours worked, and task performed. At some future date, perhaps up to a week or more, those entries were ostensibly transferred to the "Daily Time Log." (Transcript, pages 29 through 31, and page 84). Consequently, Mr. Hidle contends Petitioner's "Daily Time Log[s]" may be relied upon to accurately reflect the hours actually worked, and that those hours were reasonably expended. Here, considering the record, Mr. Hidle's testimony is rejected as not credible or, stated otherwise, inherently improbable and unworthy of belief. In so concluding, it is observed that there is nothing of record, either in the exhibits or testimony offered at hearing, that could possibly explain the dichotomy between the number of hours claimed for development of the MOP (329.42) and the number of hours claimed for development of the MOP Addendum (83.73). Notably, neither project was particularly complex, and the tasks performed were reasonably alike. Similarly, it is inherently improbable, given the limited field work and the product produced (the MOP), that production of the MOP could require 329.42 hours or, stated differently, eight and one-quarter weeks, at 40 hours per week. Finally, most of the entries for which substantial blocks of time are assigned contain only vague or general terms to describe the task, such as "literature review," "MOP/RAP preparation," "file review," and "schedule/plan/coordinate RAP/MOP." Such practice renders it impossible to determine what work was actually done, whether the work was duplicative, and whether the time was actually expended or reasonable. Given the record, it must be concluded that the proof offered by Petitioner to support the number of hours claimed for development of the MOP is not credible or persuasive, and that it would be pure speculation to attempt to derive any calculation or meaningful estimate based on such proof. In the end, Petitioner must bear the responsibility for such failure. While Petitioner's proof offers no credible basis upon which to derive the number of hours dedicated to the MOP and their reasonableness, Petitioner obviously dedicated time to the MOP, and to the extent the record provides a reasonable basis on which to predicate an award, it is appropriate to do so. Here, given the lack of credibility of Petitioner's "Daily time Log[s]," as well as the testimony of Mr. Hidle, to provide a basis on which to derive the number of hours actually worked, and then test those hours against the standard of reasonableness, the only option is to award the 89 hours or $6,308.00, which the Department agrees were reasonably expended. Finally, with regard to the miscellaneous cost items, as opposed to personnel hours, rejected by the Department's letter of June 27, 1996, it must be resolved that Petitioner failed to offer, at hearing, any compelling proof that the items rejected by the Department were reasonable expenditures incurred in development of the monitor only program. Consequently, the following sections of Petitioner's reimbursement application have been reduced by the sums stated: $295.95 deducted from Section 6C; $28.20 deducted from Section 6D; $9.00 deducted from Section 6E; and $800.72 deducted from Section 6I. The award for reimbursement Given the proof, Petitioner should be awarded the following sums, for the items indicated, as reimbursement for preparation of the MOP and MOP Addendum: Personnel $12,249.60 Capital Expense Items Rentals 867.50 Mileage 39.85 Shipping 26.00 Well Drilling Permits Analysis 3680.00 Miscellaneous 800.53 TOTAL 17,663.48 For expenses involved in preparation of the reimbursement application, Petitioner should be awarded the following sums for the items indicated: Personnel $ 795.00 Capital Expense Items Rentals 15.00 Mileage .80 Shipping 67.25 Well Drilling Permits Analysis Miscellaneous 77.77 APPLICATION PREPARATION TOTAL 955.82 CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANT REVIEW FEE 500.00 TOTAL FOR APPLICATION PREPARATION 1,455.82 In all, Petitioner should be accorded a total reimbursement of $19,119.30.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered which awards Petitioner the sum of $19,119.30, as reimbursable costs. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of February, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM J. KENDRICK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of February, 1999.
