The Issue The issue for consideration was whether the Respondent, Frank R. Kuiken, Jr., should be disciplined because of the misconduct alleged in the Administrative Complaint filed herein.
Findings Of Fact At approximately 3:00 PM on August 30, 1989, Manatee County Sheriff's Deputy Michael Kenyon saw Respondent's wife, Michelle, driving their automobile in the city of Bradenton with a blue flasher posted on the dash board inside the windshield. Because the unauthorized use of such a light is prohibited by law, Deputy Kenyon stopped Ms. Kuiken and when he approached the car, noticed she had moved the light from the dashboard to the floor. When he asked her why she had such a light in the car, she replied that her husband, a private investigator, used it in the course of his business in emergency situations. Deputy Kenyon requested Respondent be contacted and come to the scene. When he arrived, Kuiken advised Kenyon that he was a private investigator and used the light only in cases of extreme emergency in the performance of those duties. He further related he had not yet had the opportunity to use it. Mr. Kuiken also indicated that in addition to being a private investigator, he was a process server appointed by two local judges, and a court officer. Deputy Kenyon attempted to verify Respondent's claim to being a court officer but was unable to do so. Upon request, Respondent refused to show a private investigator's license, but indicated he had a permit to carry a concealed weapon. Several days later, Mr. Eugene Blitch, an investigator with the Department of State's Division of Licensing, was contacted by the Bradenton Police Department regarding Mr. Kuiken's claim to being a private investigator, and requested to confirm the licensing status. Blitch's inquiry and search of official state records revealed that Kuiken was the holder of a concealed weapon permit but did not hold, does not now hold, and never has held a license as either a private investigator or a private investigative agency. There was no evidence presented with reference to the occupational license. Respondent's business card, which he gave to the Deputy Sheriff indicates he holds himself out, without qualification, as an "investigator" offering surety recovery, missing persons searches, and service of process services. He claims this card was not given out to the general public but only to attorneys and finance companies for whom he worked on a contract basis. On September 7, 1989, Mr. Blitch, in the company of a Manatee County detective, went to the Respondent's home in Bradenton where upon inquiry from Blitch, Respondent admitted he did not hold a license to do private investigative work. He also indicated he carried no liability insurance but claimed, however, that he did not work for the public and did not advertise or hold himself out to the general public as a private investigator. He indicated he worked for attorneys, as a process server, and as an employee of ITT Financial Services. Inquiry of the manager of this concern revealed Respondent was not an employee of the company but did security and investigative work for it on a contract basis from time to time. During his interview with Blitch, Respondent denied having admitted to the deputy that he was a private investigator, but the other evidence contradicts this and is found to be more credible. The evidence of record clearly indicates that Respondent held himself out as an investigator, and the hearsay statement of the ITT manager confirms this. Respondent asserted to Mr. Blitch that since he did no work for the general public and limited his activity solely to process serving, work for attorneys, and for ITT, he was not required to be licensed. When advised that his understanding was incorrect, he quickly agreed to do whatever was necessary to "get legal".
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and conclusions of Law, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that the Respondent, Frank Robert Kuiken, Jr., be assessed an administrative fine of $250.00. RECOMMENDED this 11th day of April, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of April, 1990. COPIES FURNISHED: Henri C. Cawthon, Esquire Department of State Division of Licensing The Capitol, Mail Station #4 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Frank Robert Kuiken, Jr. 5655 Tousley Drive Eau Claire, Michigan 49111 Hon. Jim Smith Secretary of State The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Ken Rouse General Counsel Department of State The Capitol, LL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the issues herein, the Department of State, Division of Licensing, (Division), was the state agency responsible for the licensing of private investigators in Florida. On or about February 26, 1992, Petitioner herein, Lyman S. Bradford submitted to the Division an application for a Class "A" Private Investigative Agency license. On the same day, he also submitted an application for a Class "C" Private Investigator's license. In Section 12(a) of the former application and Section 7(a) of the latter, Petitioner indicated he had been convicted of attempted possession of cocaine, a misdemeanor, in 1988. He further indicated probation had been completed. On the basis of her analysis of Petitioner's applications, on March 12, 1992, Joni Rozur, the Division's reporting representative, recommended both applications be approved based on Petitioner's previous licensure as a Class "C" licensee, and noted that his experience met or exceeded the statutory requirements. She also noted, however, that approval was pending receipt of a criminal history report. When that record was received by the Division, it reflected that Petitioner had been arrested in September, 1988 for failure to appear for trial on the attempted possession charge and when brought before the court on October 20, 1988, pleaded not guilty. In November, 1988, however, Petitioner changed his plea of not guilty to nolo contendere and as a result, adjudication of guilt was withheld and he was placed on probation for 6 months with 15 hours community service, and ordered to pay costs. On January 5, 1989, Mr. Bradford failed to meet with his probation officer as ordered and he was brought before the court on February 15, 1989 for a preliminary hearing on a charge of violation of probation. Bond was set at $2,000.00. When he appeared in court on April 12, 1989 on the violation of probation charge, Petitioner pleaded not guilty and hearing was set for May 10, 1989. On that date, Petitioner did not appear and after several other hearings, on June 2, 1989, the judge released Petitioner from his bond on his own recognizance. At a hearing on the violation of probation charge held on August 2, 1989, Petitioner was found guilty and his prior probation was revoked. By way of sentence, he was placed on an additional 6 months probation with conditions. Court action, mostly involving Petitioner's motions for continuance, was periodic for a while, but after a motion to set aside his prior plea to the charge was denied, on December 27, 1990 Petitioner entered a plea of guilty to and was found guilty of violation of probation. He was placed on a new period of probation for 1 year with 300 hours of community service; ordered to undergo drug evaluation and treatment as necessary; ordered to be subjected to random urine testing; and ordered to serve 1 year in jail (suspended). His prior probation was revoked. The criminal information relative to Petitioner which Ms. Rozur relied on to change her recommendation to denial also included Petitioner's arrest on September 14, 1989 on a charge of trafficking in cocaine. Petitioner was tried before a jury in circuit court on that charge on August 21, 1991, and after a trial on the merits, pursuant to his plea of not guilty, was found not guilty. The evidence put before the jury during that trial consisted of the testimony of the two arresting officers who indicated they had observed the transaction and seized a substance at the scene later identified as cocaine; that of the Petitioner's co-actor in the supposed sale; and that of the confidential informant who set up the controlled buy. The evidence, as proffered through the testimony of Deputy Martinez who was present at the scene, indicated that a confidential informant had reported that a sale of cocaine, involving the Petitioner, would take place on an evening in September, 1989. After the confidential informant was given authority to set it up, the Petitioner did not appear and the officers left. Supposedly, Petitioner did appear later and when the informant called the officers again, he was told to set the buy up again another time. The second buy, at which Petitioner was allegedly the broker between the dealer and the confidential informant, took place in the parking lot of a motel in West Palm Beach on September 14, 1989. The informant was fitted with a radio transmitter for recording the conversations among the parties but it failed to work. Nonetheless, Martinez claims he saw Petitioner and his partner meet with the informant outside the motel room and the other officer purportedly overheard their conversation through the closed window. When the parties moved around to the side of the building out of sight and hearing, the two officers, accompanied by a drug detection dog, came out and arrested Petitioner and his associate. During the course of the arrest, cocaine was found both on the associate and wrapped in a pillow case in the back seat of the associate's car. Petitioner had no cocaine in his possession. On the basis of the above information relating to the Petitioner's original conviction, the subsequent violation of probation charge, and the arrest for but acquittal of a charge of trafficking in cocaine, the Division, on May 13, 1992, denied both applications by the Petitioner alleging that his criminal record, as cited, was clear and convincing evidence of a lack of good moral character. The Hearing Officer, however, over strenuous objection of counsel for Respondent, declined to consider as evidence any matters relating to the Petitioner's arrest for trafficking in cocaine on the basis that the acquittal of that offense came after a trial on the merits before a jury subsequent to a plea of not guilty. Under those circumstances, the Hearing Officer would not permit the Division to present evidence regarding the alleged commission of an offense of which the Petitioner had been found not guilty. In retrospect, however, there is some question as to whether or not that evidence should have been considered. At the hearing, Petitioner presented 4 letters from prominent attorneys in practice in southeast Florida going back to 1982 and 1987 through 1991, commenting on his excellent investigative work. In addition, Petitioner also presented 9 letters of recent date from various individuals including a detective with the Palm Beach County Sheriff's Office, the Directress of his church's outreach ministry, the Chief of Police for Palm Beach Gardens, attorneys, a retired highway patrolman, a recovery agent, the assistant manager of the local American Cancer Society unit, and a fire battalion chief, all of whom have known the Petitioner for several years. In these letters, he is described as professional and thoroughgoing, capable, progressive, charitable, efficient, competent, trustworthy, conscientious, and possessed of good moral values and integrity.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered by the Division of Licensing denying Petitioner's applications for a Class "A" Private Investigative Agency License and a Class "C" Private Investigator License at this time. RECOMMENDED this 30th day of September, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of September, 1992. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 92-3631S The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties to this case. FOR THE PETITIONER: Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated except for the last sentence which is rejected. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted but as a comment on the evidence. Accepted. FOR THE RESPONDENT: 1. & 2. Accepted and incorporated herein. 3. & 4. Accepted and incorporated herein. 5. - 8. Rejected. Accepted. Accepted. COPIES FURNISHED: Henri C. Cawthon, Esquire Department of State Division of Licensing The Capitol, M.S. #4 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Thomas C. Gano, Esquire Lubin & Gano, P.A. Second Floor, Flagler Plaza 1217 South Flagler Drive West Palm Beach, Florida 33401 Hon. Jim Smith Secretary of State The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Phyllis Slater General Counsel The Capitol, PL-02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant hereto, Respondent held a Class "C" Private Investigator's License Number C90-00727 and a Class "G" Statewide Firearms License, Number G90-02226. In April 1991 Respondent taught a Saturday morning class, the third or fourth week of that month, in which Beatrice Price and Ryan Martin were trainees. At the conclusion of the lecture Respondent took the two trainees on a "real" investigation. The subject of the investigation was a dentist, Dr. Kathleen Gerreaux, under surveillance on either a worker's compensation claim or a liability claim (conflict in the testimony and the type of surveillance is not relevant). Respondent placed a microphone under the blouse of Beatrice Price a/k/a Beatrix Herrera and had her go to the office of Dr. Gerreaux to try and learn in what activities she was engaging. The conversation was recorded in Respondent's van parked some distance away. When Herrera returned to the van the tape was replayed in her presence and the words of the investigator and Dr. Gerreaux could be clearly understood. Shortly thereafter Dr. Gerreaux left her office and returned to her home. Respondent took the van to the vicinity of the residence, parked several houses away and rigged Ryan Martin with a microphone under his shirt and had him go to Dr. Gerreaux's home to attempt to get her to go jogging or perform some other exercise which could be videotaped. Herrera overheard the conversation between Martin and Dr. Gerreaux while waiting in the van. This incident was not reported to Petitioner until several months later after Herrera had contacted plaintiff's investigator to complain about an incident which she was told she had been taped without her knowledge or consent. When told that her evidence was insufficient to support her claim Herrera told the investigator about the taping of the conversation with Dr. Gerreaux. This initiated the investigation which led to the Administrative Complaint filed herein. After talking to Herrera and Martin the investigator also interviewed Respondent regarding the taping incident. Respondent admitted to the investigator that he had used Herrera and Martin to intercept the conversations with Dr. Gerreaux, but said the tapes were unintelligible. Respondent's version of this incident was similar to the testimony given at the hearing by Herrera except for the clarity of the taped conversation.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is, hereby, RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered finding David J. Berry guilty of violating section 493.6118(1)(f), F.S. and that an Administrative fine of $1000 be imposed. DONE AND RECOMMENDED this 2nd day of November, 1993, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. K. N. AYERS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of November, 1993. COPIES FURNISHED: Honorable Jim Smith Secretary of State The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Phyllis Slater, General Counsel Department of State The Capitol, PL-02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Henri C. Cawthon Assistant General Counsel Department of State Division of Licensing The Capitol, Mail Station #4 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Ronald L. Jones, Esquire 1020 East Lafayette Street, Suite 108 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact The applicant, Eugene Harold Givens, worked 30 hours per week from January of 1974 until June, 1976, for I. H. Givens, a Class "A" private investigator. The applicant surveilled and investigated prostitution and drug trafficking for a total of 3900 hours during this two-and-a-half-year period at the San Carlos Hotel in Pensacola, Florida. The applicant worked 200 hours for I. H. Givens in interviewing witnesses, locating witnesses and taking statements from witnesses for attorney James A Johnston. The applicant worked 10 hours per week for two years, 1977 and 1978, for Ronald McNesbitt attempting to gain information concerning illegal drug trafficking and stolen property in Escambia County, Florida. This constituted a total of 1040 hours. The applicant worked on various cases for I. H. Givens between 1976 and 1978 for a total of 780 hours as indicated: 20 hours investigation of stolen tax checks; 40 hours investigation and surveillance in a child custody case; 80 hours investigation into the cause of death of the son of Charles Walker; and 640 hours of surveillance and general private detective work with various attorneys and individual clients of I. H. Givens. The applicant worked 20 hours per week for four months for I. H. Givens in investigation of stolen property for a total of 320 hours. This investigation was conducted in conjunction with the offices of the sheriffs of Escambia and Santa Rosa Counties. The total number of hours worked by the applicant was 6240 hours. Applying the Department of State's procedure of dividing the number of hours worked by an applicant by 40 hours, the work hours in a full-time week, the applicant worked a total of 156 weeks, or three years.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law the Hearing Officer recommends that the Department of State approve the application for licensure of Eugene Harold Givens as a Class "A" private investigative agency. DONE and ORDERED this 9th day of July, 1980, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: W. J. Gladwin, Jr., Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of State The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301 James A. Johnston, Esquire Number 1 North Palafox Street Pensacola, Florida 32501
The Issue Whether Respondent violated Section 493.6118(1)(n), Florida Statutes, as alleged in Counts I, II, IV and V of the Administrative Complaint by subcontracting with individuals named therein to provide private investigative services at a time when they were not licensed as a Class "A" investigative agency. Whether Respondent violated Section 493.6118(1)(n), Florida Statutes, as alleged in Count III of the Administrative Complaint, by allowing an improperly licensed person, John Polk, to direct the activities of licensees, or exercise operational control over the regulated activities of Morse Security Group, Incorporated. Whether Respondent violated Section 493.6118(1)(s), Florida Statutes, as alleged in Count VI in the Administrative Complaint, by failing to report to the Department the termination of persons listed in that count. Whether Respondent violated Section 493.6118(1)(s), Florida Statutes, as alleged in the Administrative Complaint, by directing the activities of licensees, thereby acting as a manager, subsequent to the voluntary deactivation of his Class "C" private investigator's license and Class "M" private investigative/security agency manager's license. Whether Respondent violated Section 493.6118(1)(f), Florida Statutes, as alleged in the Administrative Complaint, by misrepresenting his agency by advertising in the Martindale-Hubbell Law Directory 1993, that his agency is "Florida's largest and oldest private investigative agency", when it is not. Whether Respondent violated Section 493.6118(1)(r), Florida Statutes, as alleged in the Administrative Complaint, by failing to certify the completion or termination of the internship of William J. Smithberger when he had the duty as a sponsor to do so.
Findings Of Fact Morse Security Group holds a Class "A" Private Investigative Agency License, Number AOO-00919, effective June 30, 1993, which was originally issued in 1976, and is currently active. Harvey Morse, the principal of Respondent, holds a Class "C" private investigator license, number COO-008861, effective November 24, 1992, which was originally issued in 1975, and was placed on inactive status by the Department on January 21, 1993. Harvey Morse also was issued a Class "DI" Security Officer Instructor License, No. DI89-00348, effective January 8, 1993, a Class "G" Statewide Firearms License, No. GOO-11067, effective December 6, 1991, which was placed on inactive status with the Department on January 21, 1993, and a Class "M" Private Investigative/Security Agency Manager license No. M85-00112, effective August 7, 1992, which was placed on inactive status with the Department on January 21, 1993. Craig Hull became employed with Respondent in February of 1993, as a part-time investigator. Hull worked under the direct supervision and control of Respondent, and held himself out to the public as an employee. When Hull entered into his contractual employment agreement with Respondent, he was given a vacation/sick day policy document noting his status as a full-time employee of Respondent. Hull executed an Employment Agreement which referred to him as the "employee" and also referred to him as an "independent subcontractor" for the purpose of withholdings. At the time of Hull's employment with Respondent, he held a Class "C" private investigator license. In all aspects of Hull's employment with Respondent, he conducted himself, and was treated as an employee. Hull did business for Respondent under the Respondent's corporate name; held himself out to the public as being Respondent's employee; signed contracts on behalf of Respondent; received letters and correspondence as an employee; was directed when and were to show up for work; how to answer to the telephone; when to answer the telephone; and in all other respects was under the direct control and supervision of Respondent. During the course of employment with Morse Security Group, Hull possessed no occupational license, business cards, stationery, telephone listing, brochures or printed material that identified him as having any relationship with Respondent other than employee and filed no fictitious name with the Department of State. In dealing with clients and the general public, Hull held himself out as an employee of Respondent and his business cards indicated that he was an employee of Respondent. Of the five cases that Hull handled on behalf of Respondent, he at no time attempted to limit the Respondent's liability to any of those clients by asserting that he was an independent contractor, or had any other relationship with Respondent other than employee. Respondent never identified Hull to others an anything other than an employee. At no time did Respondent attempt to limit its general liability to the public as to Hull's employment by the use of the term subcontractor. Respondent never attempted to perpetrate a fraud on the public by the use of the term subcontractor as to Hull's employment. Respondent's liability insurance in effect from 1991 through 1994, specifically covered Hull as an employee of Respondent. John K. Polk was employed by Respondent from February 5, 1992 through March 27, 1993. At the inception of Polk's employment, he entered into an employment contract with Respondent. The agreement for employment was entitled "Employment Agreement", and consisted of twelve paragraphs. Throughout the employment agreement Polk is referred to as employee and Respondent is referred to as employer except in paragraph 10. Paragraph 10 informed Polk that as employee he would be regarded as a subcontractor or independent contractor for the purposes of taxes, workers' compensation, licenses, permits, and insurance. During the course of Polk's employment his relationship with Respondent was governed by the employment agreement. In addition to the employment agreement signed by Polk, he received a separate document entitled, "Employee Vacation/Sick Leave Policy". The vacation/sick leave document further identified and regulated Polk as an employee. During the course of Polk's employment with Respondent Polk did not maintain a separate general liability policy. At no time during the course of Polk's employment with Respondent did Respondent attempt to limit its liability to its clients by treating Polk as anything other than as an employee. Polk never attempted to use the fact that the term "subcontractor" had been used in paragraph 10 of the employment agreement in order to limit Respondent's liabilities to clients. Polk's employee fidelity bond questionnaire for State Farm Fire and Casualty Company Insurance was submitted by Respondent listing Polk as an employee, and Polk was covered under the policy for any acts of negligence of omissions. During the period of Polk's employment with Respondent he held no separate occupational license. Polk's business cards and stationery was provided by Respondent, and identified Polk as an employee of Respondent. The business telephone employed by Polk during his employment with Respondent was identified as Respondent. Polk worked under the direct supervision and control of Respondent. At all times Polk held himself out as an employee to Respondent's clients. During the course of his employment with Respondent, Polk was covered under Respondent's general liability policy for any acts of negligence or omission committed by Polk. Randy Morgan was employed with Respondent as an investigator from January 1, 1991, to approximately December, 1992. Morgan did not have a written contract for employment with the Respondent. Morgan was compensated by the case on an hourly basis by Respondent. Morgan was responsible for withholding his own Social Security and federal income taxes. Morgan considered himself as an employee of Respondent, and was under the supervision and control of Respondent. At all times during the course of his employment Morgan held himself out as an employee of Respondent, not as a subcontractor. Robert O. Sutley was employed by Respondent from November of 1992, until approximately March, 1993. During his employment with Respondent, Sutley held "DD", "B", and "G" licenses from the Department. Sutley entered into an employment agreement with Respondent which consisted of twelve paragraphs entitled "Employment Agreement". Within the employment agreement, the term "independent contractor" was a term used in relation to the workers' compensation and the withholding of taxes. Respondent did not attempt to limit its liability to the general public in regard to Sutley. Throughout the course of his employment with Respondent, Sutley held himself out as an investigator employee of Respondent. During his employment with Respondent, Sutley was under the supervision and control of Respondent. Respondent was contacted on a cold call by Martindale-Hubbell Law Directory for the purposes of advertising. After negotiations, Respondent caused to be issued an advertisement in the Martindale-Hubbell directory. Respondent initially instructed Martindale-Hubbell to advertise that Respondent was "one of the oldest and largest investigative agencies in Florida". The basis for the requested advertisement that Respondent was one of the oldest and largest was Respondent's purchase of a statewide detective agency, which had been in business in Florida since the 1950's, and that Respondent has an affiliate office in Europe and other parts of the United States. Pinkerton's of Florida has been licensed in Florida as an investigative agency since 1968. Pinkerton's has employed over 25 investigator employees on an annual basis over the last five years. Prior to its publication in Martindale-Hubbell, Respondent was not aware of the contents of the advertisement. The ad, as published, stated that the Respondent was the oldest and largest investigative agency in Florida. Respondent became aware of the contents of the advertisement upon receipt of the complaint filed against him by the State. Respondent then sent a letter to Martindale-Hubbell, inquiring why the advertisement read "Florida's oldest and largest private investigative agency", as opposed to "one of Florida's largest and oldest private investigative agencies" as previously instructed by Respondent. Martindale-Hubbell acknowledged that the final draft of the advertisement had been done without Respondent's approval and that an error had been made by Martindale-Hubbell in the advertisement, as it appeared in their publication. Respondent instructed Martindale-Hubbell to cease further advertisement. Respondent reported on his letterhead stationery to the Department the termination of the following persons: Colard, Crews, Fitzgerald, Martin, Morgan, Polk, and Stebbins within the statutory time limit. When Respondent was advised by Mr. Matlack that the computer printout from the Department showed that the above named people were still on a list indicating that they were associated with Respondent, Respondent sent another letter dated April 27, 1993 to the Department advising them of the termination of those listed individuals. As of October 15, 1993, the above named persons were still listed as in Respondent's employ. During the period from January 1, 1993 to April 1993, Harvey E. Morse voluntarily deactivated Class "C" Private Investigator's License and Private Investigative Security Agency Manager's License. Morse voluntarily deactivated licenses upon his graduation from the police academy and his association with the Florida Highway Patrol as a full time auxiliary trooper. Upon voluntary deactivation of Morse's licenses, Morse notified each of the company's employees that Morse would not be involved in any more investigations, and that the employees were to receive their direction from either Dwayne Rutledge or Maria Morse. Morse continued to engage in non-regulated functions such as marketing, sales, computer functions, bookkeeping, and payroll and teaching, training and instruction. During the periods of voluntary deactivation of his license, Morse would run a driver's license record on the computer, receive a printout, and hand it to an employee. Morse refrained, however, from being involved in an investigation based upon that printout. Morse has refrained from involvement in any regulated activities from the time that he voluntarily deactivated his license. Once Morse voluntarily deactivated his license, the primary person responsible for investigations and management of employees was Dwayne Rutledge. During the period from September 1992 to January 1993, Harvey E. Morse supervised and trained John Polk. Morse was always available by way of pager or cellular phone, and in constant contact with John Polk during that time period. Further, Respondent installed a two-way radio system so that Morse could talk with and supervise John Polk on a constant basis. Morse was never more than 60 miles from John Polk during his internship from September 1992 till January 1993, and Morse was in daily contact with John Polk in regard to pending investigations, new matters, old matters, and the general business of the Respondent's office. On several occasions during the above stated time period, Polk would communicate with Morse while he was on patrol in a Florida Highway Patrol vehicle, and ask questions of Morse concerning how investigative matters should be handled. Polk was afforded certain latitude by Morse to make administrative decisions on a day-to-day basis as his training progressed, and Morse placed more confidence in Polk's abilities in certain areas. However, Morse still oversaw those decisions. At all times, Polk's supervision of Respondent's employees was under the direct supervision and control of Morse or other licensed managers in Respondent's employ. The purpose of the Respondent's purchase of a two way radio system was twofold: One, to communicate with other investigators during the course of an investigation; and the other was to afford constant communication among Morse, the office managers, Dwayne Rutledge and Maria Morse, and the investigators, in case of a question would arise in the performance of their duties. Rutledge, as well as Maria Morse, became employed as office manager(s) shortly after 1990, and both he and Mrs. Morse were continuously available to the employees and oversaw, in conjunction with the Morse, the performance of their regulated duties.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is WHEREFORE, it is RECOMMENDED: Petitioner having failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent violated those sections as alleged in Counts I through IX of the Administrative Complaint, it is hereby recommended that said Counts be DISMISSED. DONE and ENTERED this 31st day of January, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of January, 1994. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 93-3890 The following constitutes my specific rulings, in accordance with section 120.59, Florida Statutes, on proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties. Proposed findings of fact submitted by Petitioner. Petitioner waived the filing of proposed findings of fact. Proposed findings of fact submitted by Respondent. Accepted in substance: Count I, unnumbered paragraphs 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18; Count II, paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 15, 16, 17, 20, 22; Count IV, unnumbered paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8; Count V, unnumbered paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18; Count VIII, unnumbered paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9; Count VI, unnumbered paragraphs 1, 2 (in part), 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9; Count VII, unnumbered paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12; Count III, unnumbered paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12. Rejected as argument or conclusory: Count I, unnumbered paragraphs 2, 21; Count IV, paragraphs 9; Count V, paragraph 2(in part); Count VII, paragraphs 4; Count III paragraphs 4, 9. Rejected as redundant or surplusage, or irrelevant and immaterial: Count II, unnumbered paragraphs 13, 18, 19; Count IV, paragraph 5; Count VI, paragraph 4. COPIES FURNISHED: Henri C. Cawthon, Esquire Department of State Division of Licensing The Capitol Mail Station-4 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 William J. Sheaffer, Esquire William J. Sheaffer, PA. 609 East Central Boulevard Orlando, Florida 32801 Honorable Jim Smith Secretary of State The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Phyllis Slater, Esquire General Counsel The Capitol, PL-02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250
The Issue The issues are whether Petitioner's rule challenge petition should be dismissed for failure to present issues that meet the requirements of Sections 120.56(1), 120.56(3), and 120.56(4), Florida Statutes, and if so, whether Respondent is entitled to an award of costs and attorneys' fees pursuant to Sections 120.569(2)(e), 120.595(3), and 120.595(4), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner filed an application for a Class "C" private investigator license on or about May 15, 2000. By letter dated September 5, 2000, Respondent advised Petitioner that his application for a Class "C" license as a private investigator was denied. The letter stated as follows in relevant part: Failure to qualify under Section 493.6203, Florida Statutes. You have not demonstrated the necessary lawfully gained, verifiable, full-time experience or appropriate training. Your application is therefore being denied. Petitioner filed a request for an administrative hearing with Respondent on or about September 13, 2000. He filed an amended request for hearing with Respondent on or about September 15, 2000. On September 27, 2000, Respondent issued an Order Dismissing Petition with Leave to Amend. This order referenced Rule 28-106.201(2), Florida Administrative Code, and found that Petitioner's hearing request was substantially deficient because it did not contain the following: An explanation of how the petitioner's substantial interest will be affected by the agency determination; A statement of disputed issues of material fact. The Petitioner has not disputed the material facts at issue in this case; which is whether the Petitioner provided the Division with information which the Division could then verify. Verification is achieved by actually speaking with the persons provided by an applicant to obtain information as to what duties were performed and to obtain a percentage of the time worked which involved investigative work. Petitioner provided information concerning former employers in the Affidavit of Experience section of the application. After submitting the application, Petitioner submitted an affidavit from an investigator, however that investigator was not Petitioner's employer and therefore not in the position to verify Petitioner's experience. For the first time, in Petitioner's requests for a hearing, Petitioner submits information concerning a former career in executive recruiting consisting of an affidavit, notarized in Maryland, of a former co- worker. This information was never provided to the Division and is not listed anywhere on the application submitted by Petitioner nor is there any way to verify any of the information in that affidavit as the affiant's address and telephone number are not provided. In his petitions for hearing Petitioner has raised only legal issues which are not legally the forum of a formal administrative hearing. Section 120.569(1), Florida Statutes . . . . A concise statement of the ultimate facts alleged, including the specific facts the petitioner contends warrant reversal or modification of the agency's proposed action; A statement of the specific rules or statutes the petitioner contends require reversal or modification of the agency's proposed action . . . . (Emphasis added) Respondent's Order Dismissing Petition with Leave to Amend also determined that: (a) Petitioner's hearing requests improperly mixed rule validity challenge arguments for Section 120.56, Florida Statutes, proceedings with disputed material fact arguments for proceedings under Sections 120.569 and 120.57, Florida Statutes; (b) Petitioner's argument that his Juris Doctorate training and related legal work experience met the statutory requirements of Section 493.6203(4), Florida Statutes, was a statutory construction/legal argument presented in the guise of factual issues; (c) The Division of Administrative Hearings does not have jurisdiction to decide constitutional validity arguments in a Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes, proceeding; and (d) Petitioner's argument that he is entitled to licensure by default due to the failure of the agency to meet the 90-day time requirement of Section 120.60, Florida Statutes, is a legal issue in light of the tolling provision of Section 493.6108, Florida Statutes. In a footnote to the Order Dismissing Petition with Leave to Amend, Respondent referred to two documents that Respondent attached as a courtesy to Petitioner. The first document was Respondent's Opinion Letter No. 92-50. This letter responded to a specific inquiry, determining that an attorney, who was not a member of the Florida Bar and who wanted to perform sub-contract investigative work for a licensed private investigation agency, was not exempt under Section 493.6102(6), Florida Statutes, from having to separately qualify for "C" licensure requirements. The second document was Respondent's internal memorandum, identified herein as Opinion No. 92-4. This memorandum determined that legal training and work experience of attorneys do not automatically qualify them for a Class "C" license. Instead, each application should be considered on a case-by-case basis. On October 10, 2000, Petitioner filed his Request for Formal Administrative Hearing, citing Section 120.54, Florida Statutes, as authority to challenge certain of Respondent's rules and statements defined as rules. Petitioner claims that Respondent routinely applies heightened scrutiny to applications submitted by attorneys, persons who are qualified to be attorneys, or others who have research and investigative skills but no actual police or criminal justice experience. Petitioner's hearing request first argues that Respondent's Order Dismissing Petition with Leave to Amend, together with its attachments, all of which are referenced above, set forth policies having the effect of rules. In Petitioner's "First Rule Challenge," he argues that Respondent's interpretation of the time limitations for processing license applications in Section 120.60, Florida Statutes, together with Respondent's interpretation of the tolling provisions of Section 493.6108(1), Florida Statutes, constitute a rule. Petitioner concludes that Respondent is without delegated legislative authority to extend the 90-day application processing time of Section 120.60, Florida Statutes, unless Respondent does not receive the fingerprint investigation report required by Section 493.6108(1), Florida Statutes, prior to the expiration of the 90-day processing period. Petitioner's "Second Rule Challenge" argues that Respondent's Opinion No. 92-4, a memorandum dated January 23, 1992, constitutes a rule because: (a) Respondent uses the opinion to define the "practice of law"; and (b) Respondent relies on the opinion in refusing to recognize experience gained by lawyers in the practice of their profession unless the lawyer was engaged in "full-time investigative work." However, Respondent concludes by acknowledging that the opinion recommends a case-by-case analysis of each attorney's application to determine whether the attorney has the experience and training required by Section 493.6203(4), Florida Statutes. Petitioner's "Third Rule Challenge" also argues that Respondent's Opinion No. 92-4 constitutes a rule. According to Petitioner, Respondent relies on the opinion to find that an attorney, even if a member of the Florida Bar, lacks creditable "college coursework related to criminal justice, criminology, or law enforcement administration." See Section 493.6203(4)(b), Florida Statutes. Petitioner concludes that Respondent does not have authority to interpret the meaning of the statutory term, "related to," so narrowly. Petitioner's hearing request did not include a "Fourth Rule Challenge." Petitioner's "Fifth Rule Challenge" states that Respondent's Opinion Letter No. 92-50, dated October 20, 1992, is an unpromulgated rule. Petitioner claims that Respondent relies on this opinion to set broad policy concerning the agency's treatment of the experience and educational qualification of unlicensed attorneys. Petitioner states that the opinion infringes on the regulatory jurisdiction of the Florida Bar. Petitioner asserts that he is substantially affected because he is an unlicensed attorney. Petitioner's "Sixth Rule Challenge" states that Respondent's Order Dismissing Petition with Leave to Amend is an unpromulgated rule. Specifically, Petitioner claims Respondent created a rule by refusing to credit applicants with work experience that is not "verifiable by actually speaking with the persons provided by an applicant to obtain information as to what duties were performed and to obtain a percentage of the time worked which involved investigative work." According to Petitioner, Respondent has no authority to establish such an agency specific meaning of the common term, "verifiable experience." Petitioner's "Seventh Rule Challenge" argues that Respondent has adopted a special meaning for the term "private investigation" which contravenes the statute. Petitioner takes issue with Respondent's interpretation of "private investigation" as defined in Section 493.6101(17), Florida Statutes. Petitioner also challenges Respondent's interpretation of the experience requirement of Section 493.6203(4), Florida Statutes. Petitioner has withdrawn his "Eighth Rule challenge" regarding the validity of Rule 1C-3.100(3)(a), Florida Administrative.
The Issue Case No. 97-3049 Did Respondent conduct business as a private investigative agency during the period of January 1, 1997, through April 7, 1997, without a Class “A” Private Investigative Agency License in violation of Section 493.6118(1)(g), Florida Statutes? Did Respondent perform the services of a private investigator during the period of January 1, 1997 through April 7, 1997, without a Class “C” Private Investigator License in violation of Section 493.6118(1)(g), Florida Statutes? Case No. 97-3096 Did Respondent conduct business as a private investigative agency during the period of January 1, 1997, through April 7, 1997, without a Class “A” Private Investigative Agency License in violation of Section 493.6118(1)(g), Florida Statutes? Did Respondent perform the services of a private investigator during the period of January 1, 1997, through April 7, 1997, without a Class “C” Private Investigator License in violation of Section 493.6118(1)(g), Florida Statutes?
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant findings of fact are made: The Department is the agency of the State of Florida charged with the responsibility of investigating and enforcing the provisions of Chapter 493, Florida Statutes. Case Number 97-3049 Respondent Dormal Cavilee was not licensed as a private investigator in the State of Florida and did not possess a State of Florida Class “C” Private Investigator license at any time material to this proceeding. Respondent Dormal Cavilee was not licensed as a private investigative agency in the State of Florida and did not possess a State of Florida Class “A” Private Investigative Agency license at any time material to this proceeding. During the period of January 1, 1997, to April 7, 1997, Respondent Dormal Cavilee performed private investigations, as defined in Section 493.6101(17), Florida Statutes, for Geoffrey A. Foster, attorney-at-law and for Dwight M. Wells or Deborah Wells (Wells), attorneys at law. While performing private investigations for Foster and Wells during the period of January 1, 1997 to April 7, 1997, Respondent Dormal Cavilee was under contract and was not solely and exclusively employed by Foster or by Wells. Additionally, an employer-employee relationship did not exist between Foster or Wells and Respondent Dormal Cavilee in that neither Foster nor Wells deducted federal income tax or social security tax, or furnished any health or retirement benefits to Respondent Dormal Cavilee. Case Number 97-3096 Respondent Mary Cavilee was not licensed as a private investigator in the State of Florida and did not possess a State of Florida Class “C” Private Investigator license at any time material to this proceeding. Respondent Mary Cavilee was not licensed as a private investigative agency in the State of Florida and did not possess a State of Florida Class “A” Private Investigative Agency license at any time material to this proceeding. During the period of January 1, 1997, to April 7, 1997, Respondent Mary Cavilee performed private investigations, as defined in Section 493.6101(17), Florida Statutes, for Dwight M. Wells or Deborah Wells (Wells), attorneys at law. While performing private investigations for Wells during the period January 1, 1997, to April 7, 1997, Respondent Mary Cavilee was under contract and was not solely and exclusively employed by Wells. Additionally, an employer-employee relationship did not exist between Wells and Respondent Mary Cavilee in that Wells did not deduct federal income tax or social security tax, or furnish any health or retirement benefits to Respondent Mary Cavilee. Case Numbers 97-3049 and 97-3096 A billing statement from Respondent Dormal Cavilee and Respondent Mary Cavilee dated March 1, 1997, to Dwight M. Wells, shows the date of investigation, the person performing the investigation (either Dormal Cavilee or Mary Cavilee), the amount of time involved in performing the investigation, the hourly rate and the total amount charged. The billing statement shows that the investigations are related to the defense of Grady Wilson in Case Number CF93-5094-A1XX, a criminal case in Polk County, Florida. Nothing on the billing statement indicates that it is a statement for private investigations furnished by a private investigative agency referred to as Criminal Defense Investigations. The Motion for Payment of Costs filed by Dwight M. Bell in Case Number CF93-5094-A1XX provides in pertinent part: That the following expense was incurred during the investigation, discovery process, pre-trial preparation and trial of this cause: Criminal Defense Investigations $2,500.00 Both the Order Approving Additional Funds for Investigation Costs dated March 3, 1997, and the Order Approving Motion for Payment of Costs refer to the payments as payment for investigations performed by criminal defense investigations. Neither Respondent Dormal Cavilee nor Respondent Mary Cavilee advertised as providing, or engaged in the business of furnishing private investigations, notwithstanding language in the motion and orders referred to above which was apparently referring to the type of services being performed rather than private investigations being furnished by a private investigative agency. On April 7, 1997, a Cease and Desist Order was issued to both Respondent Dormal Cavilee and Respondent Mary Cavilee. The record indicates that both Respondent Dormal Cavilee and Respondent Mary Cavilee honored the Cease and Desist Order and cease performing any private investigations other than in an employer-employee relationship with Wells. Chapter 493, Florida Statutes, did not apply to such activity. See Section 493.6102, Florida Statutes. Neither Respondent Dormal Cavilee nor Respondent Mary Cavilee attempted to “cover-up” any of their activities when questioned by the investigator for the Department. Respondents knew or should have known that their activity in regards to investigations for Foster and Wells required that they be licensed under Chapter 493, Florida Statutes. However, there appeared to be some confusion on the part of the Respondents as to whether their relationship with the defense attorneys required that they be licensed under Chapter 493, Florida Statutes.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and review of Rule 1C-3.113, Florida Administrative Code, concerning disciplinary guidelines, range of penalties, and aggravating and mitigating circumstances, it is recommended that the Department in Case Number 97-3049 enter a final order: (a) dismissing Counts I, II, and IV of the Administrative Complaint; (b) finding Respondent Dormal Cavilee guilty of the violations charged in Count III and V of the Administrative Complaint, assess an administrative fine in the amount of $300.00 for each count for a total of $600.00. It is further recommended that the Department in Case Number 97-3096 enter a final order dismissing Counts I and III of the Administrative Complaint; and finding Respondent Mary Cavilee guilty of the violations charged in Count II of the Administrative Complaint, assess an administrative fine in the amount of $300.00. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of January, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6947 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of January, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Hon. Sandra B. Mortham Secretary of State The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Don Bell General Counsel The Capitol, Plaza Level-02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Kristi Reid Bronson, Esquire Department of State, Division of Licensing The Capital, Mail Station Four Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Dormal Dean Cavilee 1900 Queens Terrace Southwest Winter Haven, Florida 33880 Mary Louise Cavilee 2768 Janie Trail Auburndale, Florida 33823
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner Gilbert Hevia's application for a Class "C" private investigator's license should be granted.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the final hearing and the entire record in this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: On November 18, 1993, Petitioner submitted an application dated October 18, 1993, to the Department for a Class "C" private investigator's license. Paragraph 8 of the application directed the applicant to list the sponsor and time period for any internship he had completed. Petitioner listed an internship under the sponsorship of Carlos A. Fernandez for the period from March 15, 1991 through September 17, 1993. In a letter dated February 24, 1994, Cindi Merritt, a Service Representative for the Department's Bureau of License Issuance, advised Petitioner that the Department was investigating his experience for the Class "C" license. The letter confirmed that the Petitioner was entitled to two months credit for investigative experience under the sponsorship of Mr. Rolando Baldomero of Tri-Star Security Systems, Inc. ("Tri-Star") from June 10, 1991 through August 1991. The record in this proceeding does not reveal how the Department became aware of Petitioner's experience with Mr. Baldomero since that internship is not listed on Petitioner's application. Apparently, Petitioner presented some supplemental information to the Department to be considered. However, it is not clear when or how such information was presented. At the hearing, the Department agreed that Petitioner was entitled to two months credit for his internship with Tri-Star. The February 24, 1994 letter states that the Department's service representative "asked Mr. Carlos A. Fernandez (who sponsored you after Mr. Baldomero) to complete the completion/termination of Sponsorship Form. Mr. Fernandez sent the completed form back on February 22, 1994. He indicated that he could not supply your dates of employment because he no longer had your records. He also stated 90 percent of your job duties entailed office work and that you did not successfully complete your internship with him." As set forth in the Preliminary Statement above, counsel for the parties apparently discussed and agreed prior to the commencement of the hearing in this matter that the sole issue to be resolved in this case was whether Petitioner's employment with Mr. Fernandez's company, CAF Associates, Inc. ("CAF"), qualified as lawfully gained investigative experience for purposes of Section 493.6203, Florida Statutes. Mr. Fernandez testified at the hearing and claimed that Petitioner's job duties with his company were mainly clerical and only 10 percent of Petitioner's work was investigative in nature. This contention is rejected as not credible. Mr. Fernandez has apparently decided to try to thwart Petitioner's effort to obtain his own license. The more persuasive evidence established that, from at least March of 1992 through September of 1993, Petitioner was intricately involved in all aspects of the operations of CAF, which is a private investigative agency. At some point during this time period, Petitioner was made President of the company. Respondent worked 45-60 hours a week for CAF. He did field work on his own and with subcontractors of the company. He was also actively involved in the administration of the business, but he only spent 5-15 hours per week on administrative duties. In sum, the evidence conclusively established that Petitioner had qualifying experience under Mr. Fernandez for at least eighteen (18) months from March of 1992 through September of 1993. It appears that Petitioner actually began working for Mr. Fernandez prior to March of 1992, but the exact date his employment began has not been established in this proceeding. Furthermore, it is not clear that Petitioner's job duties prior to March of 1992 would qualify as experience for purposes of Section 493.6203, Florida Statutes. As noted above, there is no dispute that Petitioner obtained two (2) months of qualifying experience with Tri-Star Security from June of 1991 through August of 1991. The evidence also conclusively established that Petitioner obtained qualifying experience with CAF from March, 1992 through September 1993. The evidence was not conclusive as to Petitioner's activities from August 1991 through March 1992. Thus, the evidence presented only established that Petitioner had twenty (20) months of qualifying experience. At the hearing, Petitioner claimed that he had several other forms of experience that qualified for credit under Section 493.6023(4), Florida Statutes. Specifically, Petitioner contended that he had successfully completed some college coursework in criminal justice and had also completed some law enforcement training. These items are not listed on his application. Petitioner testified that he completed two semesters of college work in "pre-law." No evidence was presented as to the specific courses taken, how many hours were completed or how such coursework should be translated into credit for purposes of the experience requirement of the statute. Subsequent to the hearing, Petitioner submitted certain additional information which he contends supports his claim to experience arising from matters not previously considered by the Department. As discussed in more detail below, the evidence presented was not sufficient to reach a conclusion as to the amount of credit, if any, which should be afforded to Petitioner for these matters. However, in view of the confusion arising from the stipulation as to the scope of the hearing, these matters should be reviewed and considered by the Department prior to the entry of a Final Order in this case. With his post-hearing submittal, Petitioner filed a Certificate of Completion awarded to him by the Southeast Florida Institute of Criminal Justice/Miami-Dade Community College. This information was apparently not provided to the Department when it initially reviewed Petitioner's application. The certificate indicates that Petitioner completed a course for "State Certified Security Training for "D" License" on September 13, 1990. Petitioner contends that this certificate evidences completion by Petitioner of "college coursework related to criminal justice, criminology, or law enforcement administration" or "law enforcement-related training received from any federal, state, county, or municipal agency" as described in Section 493.6203(4), Florida Statutes. The Department has not commented on whether this program can qualify under the statute. The evidence presented in this case was insufficient to conclude how much, if any, credit should be given to Petitioner for the completion of the training for the class "D" license. During the hearing, Petitioner claimed that his work experience while a member of the United States Marine Corps should also be considered towards the experience necessary for licensing. The evidence established that Petitioner was stationed in the Persian Gulf from approximately November 1990, through April 1991. During that period, he was assigned to an intelligence officer who was responsible for investigations and hearings in a wide variety of matters. Petitioner claims his job duties included investigation and quasi-law enforcement duties. Petitioner did not list his military experience on his application. Section VI of the Class "C" license application states that "if military experience is to be used towards satisfaction of the experience requirement . . ., a copy of [the Respondent's] DD 214 must be provided with the application." The required form has not been provided so Petitioner's military experience has not been verified. The Department contends that Petitioner deliberately submitted a misleading application that claimed he was employed by CAF from March 1991 through September 1993. The evidence presented in this case is insufficient to reach such a conclusion. There is obviously some confusion as to when Petitioner actually began working for CAF. This confusion has been exacerbated by Mr. Fernandez's claim that Petitioner's employment records have been lost. The more persuasive evidence in this case established that Mr. Fernandez has sought to keep Petitioner from obtaining a license. Petitioner apparently thought there was little doubt that he met the experience requirement. His application failed to list several matters that could potentially be credited towards the total experience needed for licensure. The evidence in this case, however, is insufficient to conclude that the twenty- four (24) month total has been met.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered finding that Petitioner has gained eighteen (18) months of verifiable full-time experience or training as a result of his employment with CAF and two (2) months as a result of his employment with Tri-Star. Petitioner should be afforded an opportunity to produce additional evidence within sixty (60) days to establish that he has met the remaining four (4) months experience requirement. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 7th day of December 1994. J. STEPHEN MENTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of December 1994. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER Both parties have submitted Proposed Recommended Orders. The following constitutes my rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties. Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact. Addressed in the preliminary statement and in Findings of fact five (5). Rejected as unnecessary. The evidence did not establish that Mr. Fernandez was a formal sponsor pursuant to Section 493.6116. Rejected as argumentative. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact five (5), six (6) and seven (7). (7). Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact five (5), six (6) and seven Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact seven (7). Addressed in the Preliminary Statement and in Findings of Fact eleven (11). Subordinate to Findings of Fact twelve (12). Subordinate to Findings of Fact thirteen (13). Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact. 1-2. Adopted in substance in the Preliminary Statement. Adopted in substance in the Preliminary Statement. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact one (1) and two (2). Subordinate to Findings of Fact two (2) and fourteen (14). Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact thirteen (13). Subordinate to Findings of Fact five (5), six (6), and seven (7). Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact three (3) and seven (7). COPIES FURNISHED: Richard R. Whidden, Jr., Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of State/Division of Licensing The Capitol, MS #4 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 J. James Donnellan, III, Esquire 1900 Brickell Avenue Miami, Florida 33129 Honorable Jim Smith Secretary of State The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Phyllis Slater General Counsel Department of State The Capitol, PL-02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250
The Issue Whether or not Petitioner satisfies the "experience or training" requirement to obtain a Class "C" private investigator's license.
Findings Of Fact On May 22, 1989, Petitioner filed an application for a Class "C" private investigator's license. Included in that application, Petitioner related that he was employed by Austin Private Security Specialists of Austin, Texas as a security officer-undercover investigator during the period from September, 1985 until July, 1987. During his employment with Austin private Security Specialists (Austin), approximately 60% of Petitioner's job duties included investigative work and the remaining 40% was in security related work. Respondent did not credit Petitioner's investigative experience which he claims based on his employment at Austin; however, he was credited with nine months security experience based on his employment at Austin. Respondent' denied Petitioner's claim for investigative experience in Texas based on its determination that Petitioner was not in compliance with Texas regulations while he was employed at Austin. Petitioner also claimed experience for employment with Wackenhut Company of Tampa during the period February 28, 1989 through July 28, 1989. At Wackenhut, Respondent was employed as a private investigator intern. At Wackenhut, Petitioner worked under the sponsorship of Robert Crane, private investigator and successfully completed his work for Wackenhut during Crane's sponsorship. Petitioner was credited with five months investigative experience for his employment at Wackenhut. A review of Petitioner's relevant personnel records from Texas indicates that Petitioner was registered as a commissioned security guard from October 29, 1985 until September 4, 1986. Petitioner was registered as being employed in security sales from September 4, 1986 until September 30, 1987. Petitioner was never registered as an investigator with Austin or any other Texas company. In Texas, to properly perform investigative work, an applicant, as Petitioner, must either hold a private investigator's license or be registered under a qualifying company's license as doing investigative work for the company to be in compliance with state regulations. Section 35 of Texas article 4413(29 dd) and Sections 35 and 36A, Rules and Regulations of the Texas Board of Private Investigators. Petitioner was not otherwise exempt from licensure in Texas as he failed to demonstrate that he was employed exclusively as an undercover agent during the period for which he claims experience based on his Texas employment. Respondent has a written policy of not crediting experience or training without required licensure or registration as it is difficult to verify such experience without licensure and it is practically impossible to determine whether the applicant has complied with applicable law.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that: Respondent enter a final order denying Petitioner's application for a class "C" private investigator's license. DONE and ENTERED this 2nd day of March, 1990, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of March, 1990. COPIES FURNISHED: Carrol D. Roberson 1714 Old Village Way Oldsmar, FL 34677 Henry D. Cawthon, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of State The Capitol, Mailstation #4 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0250 Jim Smith Secretary of State The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Ken Rouse, Esquire General Counsel Department of State The Capitol, LL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399
The Issue Whether Respondent, Carswell Investigations, Dexter B. Carswell, owner, committed the violations alleged in the administrative complaint dated September 20, 1995; and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact At all times material to the allegations of this case, Respondent held a class "A" private investigative agency license, number A94-00095; a class "C" private investigator license, number C93-00488; and a class "G" statewide firearm license, number G94-02105. Petitioner is the state agency charged with the responsibility of regulating such licenses. On August 22, 1994, Respondent, Dexter B. Carswell, was in Bibb County, Georgia. On that date, Respondent was riding in an automobile which went onto the school grounds of the Northeast High School, a Bibb County school property where Richard Harned was employed as a campus police officer. Posted conspicuously on those grounds were signs which notified the public that persons, vehicles, and personal belongings on school property were subject to search and that state law prohibited the possession of a deadly weapon on school property. While on school property on that date, Respondent was in possession of a handgun which is described as a 40 caliber Glock. On August 22, 1994, in Bibb County, Georgia, Respondent did not have a license to carry a concealed weapon in Georgia. Respondent knew a license was needed to carry a concealed weapon in Georgia. On August 22, 1994, in Bibb County, Georgia, Respondent did not have a license to conduct private investigations in Georgia. Respondent knew a license was required to conduct private investigations in Georgia. On August 22, 1994, in Bibb County, Georgia, Respondent carried a badge with the words "Investigator Detective" at the top, and "State of Florida, Broward County, FLA" along with an official-looking outline of the state of Florida. This badge did not denote Respondent was a licensed private investigator but could easily be misread as an official police badge. On or about January 5, 1995, by the grand jury for the December, 1994 term of the Bibb Superior Court, Respondent was indicted for the offenses of possession of a weapon on school property and carrying a concealed weapon in violation of Georgia law. As a result, Respondent pled guilty to the charges and, as a first time offender, adjudication was withheld, and he received time served (seven days), paid fines, and was placed on three years probation. Respondent is currently serving that probation. When Respondent filed his application for the class "A" investigative agency license he represented himself as the sole proprietor of Carswell Investigations. This application (Petitioner's exhibit 8) was submitted on March 18, 1994. Respondent subsequently incorporated Carswell Investigations and filed articles of incorporation with the office of the Secretary of State. Those articles represent that the corporate officers of the company are: Dexter Carswell, President; Jimmy Carswell, Vice President; Ethel Carswell, Secretary; and Alvaro Valdez, Treasurer. Respondent remained the sole owner of the corporation. Despite the incorporation of the business, Respondent did not update the licensing information with the Division of Licensing. Alvaro Valdez, who is also known as Alvara Valdel or Alvara Valdez, is a convicted felon. On August 22, 1994, Alvaro Valdez had in his possession a business card in the name of Carswell Investigations, Inc. No. A-94-00095, which certified Mr. Valdez as an employee of the company.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is, hereby, RECOMMENDED: That the Department of State, Division of Licensing, enter a final order imposing an administrative fine in the amount of $1,350.00; suspending Respondent's class "C" license for a period of time to coincide with his probation from the Georgia criminal proceeding; and revoking Respondent's class "G" license. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of September, 1996, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOYOUS D. PARRISH, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of September, 1996. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 96-0324 Rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the Petitioner: Paragraphs 1, and 3 through 12 are accepted. Paragraph 2 is rejected as contrary to the weight of the credible evidence. Rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the Respondent: 1. None submitted. COPIES FURNISHED: Sandra B. Mortham, Secretary Department of State The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Don Bell, General Counsel Department of State The Capitol, PL-02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Michele Guy, Esquire Department of State Division of Licensing The Capitol, Mail Station Number 4 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Dexter B. Carswell Carswell Investigations 3101 Northwest 47 Terrace, Number 119 Lauderdale Lakes, Florida 33319
