The Issue At issue in this proceeding is whether Respondent committed the offenses set forth in the Administrative Complaint and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering (Department) is a state agency charged with the duty and responsibility for regulating the pari-mutuel wagering industry in Florida and those licensed under Chapter 550, Florida Statutes. At all times material hereto, Respondent, Jack J. Garey, held pari-mutuel wagering license number 1470144-1081, was a licensed thoroughbred owner, and was a permitholder authorized to conduct horseracing at permitted facilities in the State of Florida. Calder Race Course (Calder) was, at all times material hereto, a permitholder authorized to conduct horseracing in the State of Florida. Incident to the operation of that business, Calder extended check cashing privileges to trainers, owners and other pari-mutuel wagering licensees. On or about November 3, 1997, Respondent endorsed and presented to Calder for payment two checks, each in the amount of $500.00, which were payable to Respondent and drawn on the account of Karin Montejo and Ramiro Montejo at Barnett Bank. Both checks, which Calder paid, were returned unpaid because the account was closed. On or about November 12, 1997, Respondent endorsed and presented to Calder for payment a check in the amount of $1,600.00 which as payable to Respondent and drawn on the account of Karin Montejo and Ramiro Montejo at Barnett Bank. The check, which Calder paid, was, as the previous check drawn on such account, returned unpaid because the account was closed. In late November 1997, Michael Abes, the vice president of finance at Calder, spoke with Respondent regarding the returned checks and demanded repayment. In turn, Respondent acknowledged the debt and promised to repay it; however, no payments were forthcoming. On or about December 27, 1997, Respondent endorsed and presented to Calder two more checks for payment. One check was in the amount of $2,000.00 and the other in the amount of $500.00, and each was payable to Respondent and drawn on the account of Karin Montejo and Ramiro Montejo at Barnett Bank. The checks, paid by Calder, were, as with the previous checks drawn on the same account, returned unpaid because the account was closed. Given the return of the previous checks and his discussion with Mr. Abes, it cannot be subject to serious dispute that Respondent knew when he presented the checks to Calder for payment, that the account on which the checks were drawn had been closed and that they would not be honored by the bank. Despite numerous demands, Respondent did not pay any portion of the outstanding obligation owed Calder until February 1998, when a payment of $300.00 was remitted. Subsequently, on June 5, 1998, the balance of the outstanding obligation due Calder was paid.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered finding Respondent guilty of violating the provisions of Subsection 550.105(6), Florida Statutes, as alleged in Count I of the Administrative Complaint and imposing, as a penalty for such violation, an administrative fine of $300.00, a 30-day suspension, and exclusion from all pari-mutuel facilities in the state for the period of suspension. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of March, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM J. KENDRICK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of March, 1999.
The Issue Whether Respondent committed the violation alleged in the Administrative Complaint, and, if so, what disciplinary action should be taken against him.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at the final hearing and the record as a whole, the following findings of fact are made: At all times material to the instant case, Respondent has held a pari-mutuel wagering occupational license (license number 0609951-1081) issued by Petitioner. At all times material to the instant case, Respondent and Steven Zenker were part-owners of a race horse (named Sixty- Five Roses) that Respondent and his wife, Deedre Johnson, trained at Pompano Park. Pompano Park is a harness racing facility operated by Pompano Park, Inc., the holder of a pari- mutuel permit authorizing it to conduct harness racing in the State of Florida. In April of 1997, Sixty-Five Roses sustained an injury while racing at Pompano Park. The horse was treated over a three-day period (April 12 through April 14, 1997) by Dr. Jonathon Cohen, a veterinarian employed by Dr. Paul R. Plante and Associates (PRPA). The total charge for the veterinary services rendered by Dr. Cohen was $257.00. On April 25, 1997, PRPA sent Ms. Johnson and Mr. Zenker separate bills, each for $128.50 (one-half the total charge). Ms. Johnson's bill was sent to her and her husband's Vernon, New York address (where they reside from the end of April until November each year). The bills indicated that "[a]ny account with an outstanding balance on the 25th of the month [would] be charged a 1.5% late fee or a minimum $5.00 rebilling charge." On or about May 5, 1997, Mr. Zenker paid PRPA the $128.50 he had been billed. The $128.50 that PRPA had billed Ms. Johnson, however, was not paid. PRPA sent Ms. Johnson a statement each month requesting payment. 1/ In or around November or December of 1999, Dr. Cohen, during an encounter with the Johnsons at Pompano Park, handed them a copy of the last monthly statement that had been sent and told them that they needed to make payment. Not having received any payment from the Johnsons, in early 1999, PRPA filed suit against Respondent in Broward County Court Case No. CONO 99-0010 to recover monies owed for the veterinary services provided by Dr. Cohen on April 12 through April 14, 1997, in connection with the treatment Sixty-Five Roses. On March 2, 1999, the following Default Judgment was entered in Broward County Court Case No. CONO 99-0010 against Respondent: This action having come on for consideration, and it appearing to the court the above-named Defendant [Respondent] was duly served with statement of claim and it appearing further that the said defendant failed to appear in said action and the court finding that the said Defendant is justly indebted to the Plaintiff in the sum of $244.50. It is therefore considered, ordered and adjudged that the said Plaintiff, Dr. Paul Plante and Associates, do have and recover from said Defendant the sum of $128.50 for damages, besides the sum of $116.00 for costs of this suit, and the sum of $0 for interest, all of which shall bear interest at the rate of 10% for the current year and thereafter at the prevailing rate per year as provided for by Florida Statute, for all of which let execution issue. Respondent has not made any payments to PRPA to satisfy this judgment, nor has he sought to have the judgment set aside.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a final order finding Respondent guilty of the violation alleged in the Administrative Complaint and suspending his occupational license "for a period of no less than 10 days and continuing until the Respondent provides proof that he has satisfied his outstanding financial obligation" to PRPA. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of May, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of May, 2001.
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant hereto, Denver Owens was licensed as a barber in this state and has been so licensed for 26 years. Although Owens has worked in barbershops for most of the last 26 years, he never owned a shop until he opened this barbershop in Apopka some two years ago. At the time he opened the shop he obtained an occupational license which, with his current barber's license, he thought was all he needed to operate a one-man shop. On April 26, 1984, an inspector with the Department of Professional Regulation saw the barber's sign on the site not on her records and entered the shop to inspect. The only discrepancy which is material to the issues here is that no registration had been issued for the barbershop. When questioned by the inspector, Owens readily acknowledged that he had not applied for registration for a shop because he was unaware such registration was required. The following day Owens submitted an application to register his shop and obtained registration dated May 4, 1984. When told the Department proposed to assess a fine of $250 against him for operating without a shop license, Owens requested a hearing, the file was forwarded to the Division of Administrative Hearings, and this hearing ensued.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent committed an unlawful employment act against Petitioner pursuant to Chapter 70 of the Pinellas County Code, as amended, and Title VII of the U.S. Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, a black female, is a member of a protected group. Respondent is an employer as defined in the Pinellas County Code, as amended, and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended. Respondent hired Petitioner as a telemarketer on December 8, 1997. Petitioner's job required her to call the telephone numbers on a list furnished by Respondent. After making the call, Petitioner was supposed to solicit the booking of vacations in time-share rental units by reading from a script prepared by Respondent. The script included an offer to sell potential customers three vacations in three locations for $69. When Respondent hired Petitioner, she signed a copy of Respondent's "New Employee Policy and Procedures" manual. Petitioner admits that this manual required her to book 25 vacations each pay period after a two-week training period. She also admits that the manual required her to only use the prepared script, including preplanned rebuttals to customer questions when talking over the telephone. Petitioner understood that during the two-week training period, she would be required to book 14 vacations or be terminated. She knew that Respondent's supervisors would monitor her sales calls. Petitioner sold four vacation packages in her first week at work with no complaints from her supervisors. In fact, one of Respondent's supervisors known as Mike told Petitioner, "You got the juice." On December 15, 1997, Mike monitored one of Petitioner's calls. Petitioner admits that she did not use the scripted rebuttals in answering the customer's questions during the monitored call. Instead, she attempted to answer the customer's questions using her own words. According to Petitioner, she used "baby English" to explain the sales offer in simple terms that the customer could understand. After completing the monitored call on December 15, 1997, Mike told Petitioner to "stick to the shit on the script." Mike admonished Petitioner not to "candy coat it." Petitioner never heard Mike use profanity or curse words with any other employee. Before Petitioner went to work on December 16, 1997, she called a second supervisor known as Kelly. Kelly was the supervisor that originally hired Petitioner. During this call, Petitioner complained about Mike's use of profanity. When Kelly agreed to discuss Petitioner's complaint with Mike, Petitioner said she would talk to Mike herself. Petitioner went to work later on December 16, 1997. When she arrived, Mike confronted Petitioner about her complaint to Kelly. Petitioner advised Mike that she only objected to his language and hoped he was not mad at her. Mike responded, "I don't get mad, I get even." When Petitioner stood to stretch for the first time on December 16, 1997, Mike instructed her to sit down. Mike told Petitioner that he would get her some more leads. Mike also told Petitioner that she was "not the only telemarketer that had not sold a vacation package but that the other person had sixty years on her." Petitioner was aware that Respondent had fired an older native-American male known as Ray. Respondent hired Ray as a telemarketer after hiring Petitioner. When Petitioner was ready to leave work on December 17, 1997, a third supervisor known as Tom asked to speak to Petitioner. During this conversation, Tom told Petitioner that she was good on the telephone but that Respondent could not afford to keep her employed and had to let her go. Tom referred Petitioner to another company that trained telemarketers to take in-coming calls. Tom gave Petitioner her paycheck, telling her that he was doing her a favor. During Petitioner's employment with Respondent, she was the only black employee. However, apart from describing the older native American as a trainee telemarketer, Petitioner did not present any evidence as to the following: (a) whether there were other telemarketers who were members of an unprotected class; (b) whether Petitioner was replaced by a person outside the protected class; (c) whether Petitioner was discharged while other telemarketers from an unprotected class were not discharged for failing to follow the script or failing to book more than four vacations during the first ten days of employment; and (d) whether Petitioner was discharged while other telemarketers from an unprotected class with equal or less competence were retained. Petitioner was never late to work and never called in sick.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the City's Human Relations Review Board enter a final order dismissing Petitioner's Complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of November, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of November, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Bruce Boudreau Vacation Break 14020 Roosevelt Boulevard Suite 805 Clearwater, Florida 33762 Donna Conway 3156 Mount Zion Road No. 606 Stockbridge, Georgia 30281 William C. Falkner, Esquire Pinellas County Attorney's Office 315 Court Street Clearwater, Florida 33756 Stephanie Rugg, Hearing Clerk City of St. Petersburg Community Affairs Department Post Office Box 2842 St. Petersburg, Florida 33731
The Issue Whether the Respondent discriminated against Ruby D. Johnson on the basis of a handicap in violation of the Human Rights Act of 1977, as amended?
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner began employment with the Respondent at its Lake City, Florida, plant during 1977 or 1978. The Respondent manufactures metal parts for automobiles. The Petitioner was employed by the Respondent as a parts assembly worker. At the time the Petitioner began employment with the Respondent, she informed the Respondent that she did not have any handicap. On June 28, 1984, the Petitioner was accidently struck on the head with a broom by another employee while at work. She was struck with the straw end of the broom. The Petitioner did not return to her job for approximately two months after being struck on the head. The Petitioner was treated by George G. Feussner, M.D. When Dr. Feussner authorized the Petitioner's return to work, he recommended that she not be required to perform any work requiring standing or leaning, climbing or operation of dangerous equipment for approximately three to four weeks. In September, 1985, the Petitioner experienced dizziness and fell while at work. In a letter dated October 2, 1985, Dr. Feussner informed the Respondent of the following: Despite and [sic] extensive evaluation of this lady, I cannot find objective findings to go along with her symptoms. I believe that she should be able to return to work at her regular job, but I still think that it would be dangerous considering her emotional dedication to her symptoms she is likely to injure herself if she works around dangerous equipment or at heights. She should therefore find a job that does not involve these activities... The Petitioner, when she tried to return to work, was not allowed to work because she had filed a workmen's compensation claim as a result of her alleged condition. This claim was being disputed by the Respondent's workmen compensation insurance carrier. On October 31, 1985, the Respondent laid off several employees with seniority equal to or greater than the Petitioner's seniority. Employees were laid off because of a lack of work. The Petitioner would have been laid off also, but was not because of the disputed claim over workmen's compensation. In November, 1985, the Petitioner's workmen compensation claim was denied. At that time the Petitioner was informed that she was also being laid off. In October, 1986, the Respondent began recalling the employees it had laid off in November, 1985. The Petitioner was not recalled, however, because of the restrictions on the Petitioner's ability to work. The Petitioner filed a Petition for Relief from an Unlawful Employment Practice with the Commission in October, 1986. On November 13, 1987, the Commission issued a Notice of Determination: No Cause.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission on Human Relations enter a final order denying the Petitioner's Petition for Relief. DONE and ENTERED this 7th day of September, 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida. LARRY J. SARTIN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of September, 1988. COPIES FURNISHED: Ruby D. Johnson 1802 North Georgia Street Lake City, Florida 32055 William B. Hatfield Supervisor of Human Relations ITT Thompson Industries - Metal Division Post Office Box 928 Valdosta, Georgia 31603-0928 Donald A. Griffin Executive Director Commission On Human Relations, Florida 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1925 Dana Baird General Counsel Commission On Human Relations, Florida 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1025 =================================================================
The Issue Whether Respondent, Sanford Housing Authority (Respondent), committed an unlawful employment practice as alleged in the Petition for Relief filed with the Florida Commission on Human Relations (FCHR) and, if so, what relief should Petitioner, Jimitre Smith (Petitioner), be granted.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a female who was pregnant during a portion of the time events occurred related to her employment with Respondent. At the time of Petitioner’s initial employment with Respondent, the Sanford Housing Authority operated public housing complexes within its geographical area pursuant to a HUD program to provide housing assistant to low income, qualified residents. At some point, the Orlando Housing Authority stepped in to take over the management of Respondent’s properties. Due to the deteriorating condition of Respondent’s properties, residents were provided Section 8 vouchers so that they could obtain private rental opportunities. In the midst of the transition period, Petitioner’s employment with Respondent ended. Petitioner was initially hired by Respondent to replace a receptionist who was out on maternity leave. The assignment was part-time and temporary. It began on or about March 31, 2010. When the receptionist returned to work, Petitioner was offered a second part-time job as leasing clerk. Although the record is not clear when this second job started, it is undisputed that Petitioner sought and was granted maternity leave due to her own pregnancy on September 27, 2010. It was during this time period that the Orlando Housing Authority stepped in to take over Respondent’s responsibilities. Mr. Fleming, an employee of the Orlando Housing Authority, served as the Interim Executive Director for Respondent. In November 2010 residents were advised of the plan to demolish the substandard housing units. Since the units would not be leased, a leasing clerk was no longer required. Although Petitioner had been told she could return to work after her maternity leave, there was no position available for her at that time. Once the Orlando Housing Authority took over management, all of the day-to-day work was assigned to its employees. Respondent kept a handful of maintenance workers, but there is no evidence Petitioner sought and/or was denied that type of job. Petitioner claimed she should have been offered or allowed to apply for a job with the Orlando Housing Authority. There is no evidence that entity was required to hire her or that it refused to hire her because of her gender or pregnancy or that Respondent refused to recommend Petitioner for employment due to her gender or pregnancy. When Petitioner was cleared for return to work in December 2010, there was not a job to return to as Respondent did not have a position for her. There is no evidence that Respondent hired anyone during or after Petitioner’s pregnancy or that Petitioner was refused a job that she was qualified to perform. Had a suitable job been available, it most likely would have come through the Orlando Housing Authority. In January of 2011, Respondent formally eliminated Respondent’s part-time position through a reduction in workforce decision. At that time, Petitioner received a severance payment from Respondent and an offer for other job training opportunities.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order finding no cause for an unlawful employment practice as alleged by Petitioner, and dismissing her employment discrimination complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of January, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S J. D. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of January, 2013. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations Suite 100 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Jimitre Rochelle Smith 804 South Bay Avenue Sanford, Florida 32771 Ricardo L. Gilmore, Esquire Saxon, Gilmore, Carraway and Gibbons, P.A. Suite 600 201 East Kennedy Boulevard Tampa, Florida 33602 Cheyanne Costilla, Interim General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations Suite 100 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether or not on or about December 8, 2000, Petitioner possessed the appropriate license to operate a body-piercing salon establishment in accordance with Section 381.0075, Florida Statutes, and Chapter 64E-19, Florida Administrative Code.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence presented, the testimony, and upon the personal inspection of the undersigned, the following findings of fact are made: At all times material hereto, Respondent, Department of Health, Division of Environmental Health, is the state agency charged with implementation of Section 381.0075, Florida Statutes, and Chapter 64E-19, Florida Administrative Code. At all times material hereto, Petitioner, Rita Moroz, operated a manicure-pedicure, nail-lengthening establishment, "A New Adventure of Tampa Bay," located at 11608 North Dale Mabry Highway, Hillsborough County, Tampa, Florida 33618. Section 381.0075(2)(a), Florida Statutes, defines "BodyPiercing" as for commercial purposes the act of penetrating the skin to make, generally permanent in nature, a hole, mark, or scar. "Bodypiercing" does not include the use of a mechanized, presterilized ear-piercing system that penetrates the outer perimeter of lobe of the ear or both. At all times material hereto, Petitioner admitted that she operated a body-piercing establishment salon and provided body-piercing services without first having obtained a body-piercing license as required by law. At all times pertinent hereto, Petitioner possessed a manicure-pedicure license issued by another country and her foreign license also authorized body-piercing services. Petitioner, upon receipt of the Certificate of Violation, discontinued performing body-piercing services. The representative for the Agency stated that the Department would accept, in consideration of Petitioner's admissions and prompt discontinuation of body-piercing services, a reduced fine in an amount not to exceed $500.00.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, it is
The Issue Whether Petitioner is entitled to have his general contractor’s license re-instated.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner received a license as a general contractor in 1984. At all times material to this case, the Petitioner was required to renew his license every two years. For the Petitioner, the renewal was due on or before August 31 of even numbered years. For example, the Petitioner’s license due for renewal in 2000 was due August 31, 2000. There are two types of licenses pertinent to this case: active and inactive. The renewal fees associated with these licenses are different. An inactive licensee pays a smaller renewal fee. The Respondent is responsible for maintaining records, collecting the appropriate fees, and processing license renewals for licensees. If a contractor fails to pay the requisite renewal fees when they are due the license automatically goes into a “delinquent status.” This status continues until the licensee makes good on the past due renewal fees and submits a complete renewal application. If the licensee does not remit the appropriate fees and completed application before the next licensing renewal period expires (the next two year cycle), the license becomes “null.” In this case, the Petitioner held an inactive license during the 1998-2000 two year-period. On or before August 31, 2000, the Petitioner should have submitted a complete application and paid the renewal fees to keep his license in good status. The Petitioner did not submit a complete application and did not remit the appropriate fees for renewal on or before August 31, 2000. Consequently, on September 1, 2000, the Petitioner’s license went into the delinquent status noted above. To clear this status the Petitioner was required to renew his license by submitting a complete renewal application with the appropriate fees on or before August 31, 2002. The Petitioner did not do so. Therefore, on September 1, 2002, the Petitioner’s license became “null” as a matter of law. The “null” status cannot be changed by paying unpaid fees. Instead, a licensee may either apply for and seek a new license or seek to re-instate the license. To that end, the Petitioner filed a request for reinstatement on or about June 9, 2006. When the Respondent denied the Petitioner’s request for reinstatement, the instant case ensued. Prior to August 31, 2002, the Petitioner did not contact the Respondent to relate personal tragedies, did not cure the delinquent renewal status, and did not pay the fees necessary to renew his inactive license. The Petitioner’s request for a refund (dated May 18, 2005) of the untimely fees paid in September 2002 was not approved. The Respondent provided no explanation for why the untimely fees were not refunded to the Petitioner.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a Final Order denying Petitioner's request for reinstatement of his license. The Respondent should, however, refund the Petitioner’s untimely paid fees. S DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of March, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. J. D. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of March, 2007. COPIES FURNISHED: Rodney Williams 513 Northwest 22nd Avenue Apartment 4 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33311-7773 Deborah Bartholow Loucks, Esquire Office of the Attorney General The Capitol, Plaza Level-01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 G. W. Harrell, Executive Director Construction Industry Licensing Board Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Michael Martinez, Acting General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
The Issue Whether the Petitioner's application for a Pari-Mutuel Wagering occupational license and request for a waiver should be granted or denied for the reasons set forth in the Respondent's letter dated August 20, 2009.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: The Division is the state agency responsible for issuing occupational licenses to employees of pari-mutuel facilities in Florida. See § 550.105(1), Fla. Stat. On or about April 2, 2009, Ms. Jennings submitted an application for a pari-mutuel wagering license, specifically for a cardroom license that would allow her to be a dealer in the poker room of a pari-mutuel facility. Ms. Jennings indicated on the application form that she had never held a pari-mutuel license in Florida. In the section of the license application entitled "To Be Completed by Cardroom Applicants Only," Ms. Jennings answered "no" to the following question: "Have you ever been convicted of, or had adjudication of guilt withheld for, a felony or misdemeanor involving forgery, larceny, extortion or conspiracy to defraud or filing false reports to government agency, racing or gaming commission or authority, in this state or any other stated under the laws of the United States?" In the section of the application entitled "Background Information", Ms. Jennings answered "no" to the following question: "Have you ever been convicted of or had adjudication withheld for any crime, or pled guilty or nolo contendere to any criminal charges against you? If yes, give details in the space provided below." In the space provided, Ms. Jennings wrote: "Had adjudication; As part of a prosecution of someone else, I cooperated and gave testimony. However, I was personally not convicted of any wrongdoing." Upon investigation, the Division learned that Ms. Jennings had been adjudicated guilty of one count of grand theft in the third degree on January 26, 1995, in Brevard County, Florida. She was sentenced to two years' probation and required to report monthly to her probation officer. Ms. Jennings spent approximately three months in jail prior to her conviction because she could not pay for her bail. On April 22, 2009, Ms. Jennings submitted a request for a waiver from the Division so she could obtain her pari-mutuel wagering license. A waiver must be obtained by, among others, any new applicant for a Florida pari-mutuel license who has been convicted of any felony. Ms. Jennings was 27 years of age when she was convicted of grand theft. She explained that, at the time of the offense, she was involved with a boyfriend who had threatened to kill her and her family when she first became involved with him. She stated that she became "brainwashed and co-dependent on him and basically scared for my life."2 As a result, Ms. Jennings did whatever her boyfriend wanted her to do. According to Ms. Jennings, she was charged with grand theft because, at her boyfriend's direction, she obtained a cell phone under a false name. Ms. Jennings testified that she answered "no" to the question asking if she had been convicted of a crime because she was told by a federal prosecutor named Larry Turner that she would "have a clean record" if she testified against her boyfriend, who had been charged with murder.3 Ms. Jennings testified, and her boyfriend was convicted. Ms. Jennings assumed, therefore, that she would not have "anything in [her] background as a criminal record."4 Ms. Jennings gave the following testimony at the final hearing: She told the Division's investigators about the circumstances of her criminal conviction but did not tell them that she believed her criminal record had been sealed. She was shocked when the Division's investigators told her they had found records of her conviction: "I was like, Huh?"5 She had to go look up the records of the conviction and then her recollection of the arrest and conviction "came back to [her] . . . eventually."6 She was shocked when the Division's investigators told her they had found this conviction because she thought the conviction had been erased. Ms. Jennings has a high school education. After her conviction, Ms. Jennings tried to go to school, but she did not finish. For a time, she worked at a restaurant as a waitress; she had a part-time job doing promotional work for night clubs; and she also worked as a blackjack dealer at a nightclub where blackjack was played for entertainment. When asked what she had done with her life, Ms. Jennings responded: "I had boyfriends and long-term relationships and basically I was taking care of them."7 Ms. Jennings's current boyfriend, her sister, and her best friend testified that Ms. Jennings had always been honest with them. The totality of the evidence presented by Ms. Jennings is insufficient to establish she is rehabilitated and possesses good moral character: She failed to disclose her conviction for grand theft in her application for licensure; her explanations of the reasons for failing to disclose the conviction are inconsistent; her explanation of the act underlying her conviction of grand theft, procuring a cell phone under a false name, is unconvincing; and her vague description of her life since the conviction fails to demonstrate any accomplishments or any positive change in her circumstances since her conviction.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, enter a final order denying the application of Soon Young P. Jennings for a pari-mutuel wagering license. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of June, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. PATRICIA M. HART Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of June, 2010.
