The Issue Whether Josephine K. Saunders, the designated beneficiary, is entitled to the benefits payable on the teacher's retirement account of William E. Saunders, deceased, or whether she contractually waived her right to such benefits.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Division enter a final order denying the relief requested by petitioner and distributing the Teachers' Retirement System benefits of William E. Saunders to Josephine K. Saunders, the designated beneficiary. DONE AND RECOMMENDED this 15th day of December, 1981, in Tallahassee, Florida. R. L. CALEEN, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of December, 1981.
The Issue The issues to be resolved in this proceeding concern whether the Petitioner's deceased wife, Dorothy Bazzel, made a valid selection of retirement "option 1" instead of "option 2"; whether that apparent selection was a mistake and, consequently, whether the Petitioner should be allowed to receive retirement survivors benefits in accordance with "option 2", as provided for under section 121.091(6), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Joe Bazzel, is a resident of Blountstown, Florida, and is retired. His wife, now deceased, was Dorothy Bazzel. She was a longtime teacher in the Bay County school system, with more than 46 years continuous creditable service in the Florida Retirement System and as a teacher. She retired on July 1, 1988. The Respondent is an agency of the State of Florida charged with administering and enforcing the statutes, embodied in Chapter 121, and related rules, by which operation of the Florida Retirement System, including determinations of entitlement to and payment of benefits, is accomplished. Mrs. Bazzel underwent surgery for breast cancer on January 11, 1987. She had been diagnosed by Dr. Dixon McCloy, of Panama City, with breast cancer sometime in January of that year. Her progress after surgery was satisfactory, and she kept all appointments, had required x-rays, examinations and mammograms thereafter, by which her physicians monitored her progress. She had expressed to several persons of her acquaintance a desire to retire by the end of the 1987-1988 school year. In order to prepare for that event, she contacted her brother-in-law, Ray Bazzel, who testified in this case, and asked him to contact the Division of Retirement in Tallahassee, Florida, to obtain an estimate of her expected retirement benefits. He made that request to Ms. Loreen Vause, an employee of the Division, on July 16, 1987, by telephone. The Division of Retirement has an ongoing program which automatically generates an estimate of benefits for members who have certain amounts of creditable service and are of a certain age. When Mr. Bazzel made his request for an estimate of benefits for Mrs. Bazzel, the Division was already in the process of preparing a benefit estimate for her through its routine program. That estimate was forwarded to Mrs. Bazzel on July 22, 1987, and it stated as follows: This is a routine audit of your account. Noting the many years of service you have, we are furnishing you an estimate of your benefits as if you terminate your employment on June 30, 1988, and retire effective July 1, 1988. This is furnished for informational purposes only. By means of that estimate, Mrs. Bazzel was informed as to the benefit amounts which she would receive under all four retirement options. See Respondent's exhibit 8 in evidence. Ray Bazzel would visit Mrs. Bazzel on occasion during his visits to Panama City. She was described by him in his testimony to be a very private person not given to talking much about her illness or the operation. She did discuss the possibility of her retirement on one occasion with him, sometime during the summer of 1987. They discussed all four retirement options, and he explained the options in detail to her. He advised her that she would have to make a decision as to which option she would take, but he was never advised by Mrs. Bazzel nor anyone else as to which option she had actually selected until after her death. He did not know that she had made application for retirement on January 14, 1988. Harold Bazzel is a nephew of the Petitioner. He testified that he did not know that Mrs. Bazzel had made an application for retirement and did not know what option she selected until after her death. Richard Locker was the personnel officer with the school board where she was employed and knew Mrs. Bazzel personally and professionally. He was the principal for six years at Cove Elementary School where both his wife, Nan Locker, and Mrs. Bazzel taught. Mr. Locker had a policy of discussing retirement issues with Florida Retirement Service members on his staff and advising them of correct procedures to follow, as to the paperwork involved, and as to the full retirement options which they could select. He advised all members who were employed at his school to call the Division of Retirement in Tallahassee for more information. He never advised anyone of which option they should take because each case is an individual case, and he did not feel comfortable advising an employee or friend which option to take and then later have that person accuse him of advising the wrong option. Mr. Locker saw Mrs. Bazzel after her surgery and stated that after the surgery, she appeared to be in good health. He saw her in May of 1988 and stated that she was very optimistic and appeared capable of teaching the next year. She did not seem moody or depressed in any way to him. He believed that she exhibited an attitude that her treatment had been a success and that her health had been restored. He discussed with her the possibility of her retiring at the end of the 1987-88 school year, and he believed that she would retire at that time. In two telephone calls, he and Mrs. Bazzel discussed the four different retirement options. She appeared to know what he was talking about and to understand those options. He felt that she understood that option 1 would pay the highest benefit amount to her of the four options. He, however, did not really know what option she had chosen until after the Petitioner, her husband, informed him after Mrs. Bazzel's death. Based upon the testimony of Ray and Harold Bazzel and that of Richard Locker, concerning their contact and discussions with and advice to Mrs. Bazzel, it is found that Mrs. Bazzel was aware of the four options and the differences between them. She was aware that option 1 provided the highest benefit to the retiring member for the lifetime of that member and that it would cease at the death of the member with no further benefits being payable to any person. On January 14, 1988, the Petitioner, Joe Bazzel, drove his wife to the offices of the school board, where she completed the forms necessary for her retirement. She talked with Vicky Poole, the records clerk, who helped teachers and administrators complete necessary retirement forms as part of her job duties. Ms. Poole had worked at the school board offices for approximately seven years and had an established procedure for informing prospective retirees of all information needed to process retirement applications. As part of her instructions to them, she would ask each potential retiree to inform her of the option they wanted to select, who their beneficiary would be and where the checks were to be sent. She would inform them when they would start receiving checks, would discuss with them their sick leave balance "payoff", and what steps they needed to take to obtain social security benefits. This discussion with prospective retirees would take up to one-half hour if the retirement form had not been partially completed before the retiree came into the office, or about 15 minutes if the form had already been partially completed. If Mrs. Bazzel already understood the retirement options and had formed an opinion of what she wanted to do concerning retirement and the selection of an option, and if the form had already been partially completed, then the entire process on January 14, 1988 could have occurred in a few minutes. It was Ms. Poole's practice to sit next to the prospective retiree, obtain the necessary information, and type it on the retirement form at that time. She would then advise the member of the various options by referring to the back of the retirement form (Respondent's exhibit 12 in evidence) or to a pamphlet explaining the options issued by the Division of Retirement. Both of those documents contain a narrative description of the retirement options. Ms. Poole did not choose a retirement option or advise a prospective retiree of which option to choose. The retiree must choose his or her own option. Ms. Poole would never advise a person concerning which option to take and had been advised by the Division of Retirement never to give such advice on option selection. If Ms. Poole perceived that a prospective retiree was indecisive about option selection or did not appear to understand the options or the consequences of such election, she would advise that person to speak with someone else who was knowledgeable about the retirement system and about the retiree's financial situation, such as a friend or relative. If a prospective retiree was still indecisive or unsure of the meaning of options or which option to select, Ms. Poole would hold the form and not complete it without being sure in her own mind that the retiree understood the option and knew what it meant. In her standard procedure, she would go over each item on the form at least two and up to four times with a retiree. If they were very certain of the option they wanted to select, she would then finish the form and have the person sign it and give it to Ms. Bolinger to notarize. Ms. Poole realized that the choice of an option was an important decision and conducted her interview with the retiree accordingly. She testified in this regard as follows: If they said well I'm looking at 2 and 3, that's waivering. If they said I want option 1, I typed 1 in and I would say it several times as I typed it in. I mean I was very well aware that this selection was for the rest of their life and could affect someone else. I was very well aware of that. So, I would repeat it several times and when I was complete, when the form was complete, I'd give it back and go over it again, again reemphasizing the option. If they did waiver, I would briefly go over the options and there was time, I always mention, you know, there's time to do this, to choose your option, perhaps you want to talk to someone. I could not advise them. That's what I did. Ms. Poole remembered that Mrs. Bazzel came into the office but did not remember if the retirement forms had already been completed or partially completed prior to the visit. She testified that there was no doubt in her mind that Mrs. Bazzel chose option 1 and no doubt that she knew what option 1 meant. Ms. Bolinger began to work with the school board dealing with retirement applications in 1984. She is now the records clerk who handles retirement matters for teachers and school administrators. This is the same job that Ms. Poole performed in January of 1988. Ms. Bolinger notarized the retirement form of Mrs. Bazzel. Ms. Bolinger learned her job from Ms. Poole and testified that the retirement form was always completed in the office before a retirement clerk and was never sent to anyone. She stated that the clerk would ask the member if they understood each of the options, and the clerk would be sure that the member did understand them. It was the practice to ask such a retiring person if he or she was familiar with the options. If the retiree seemed the least bit confused, Ms. Bolinger testified that the clerk would discuss each option all over again with the prospective retiree, give him the form with the options listed on the back, and they would then discuss each one and make sure that the prospective retiree understood each option before continuing the process of executing the requisite forms. Thus, Ms. Poole and Ms. Bolinger or any school board clerk follows a routine practice of examining and discussing in detail each retirement option with a prospective retiree and makes sure that person understands the wording of the four options and what the four options mean before making a selection, answering any questions the prospective retiree might have and advising them to seek counsel from a qualified person if the prospective retiree remains unsure of which option to elect. After the forms are completed, the clerks, including Ms. Bolinger and Ms. Poole, when she was performing that function, examine the forms with the retiring member to make sure that all information is correct. "We wait until they check the whole thing and this is exactly what they want, and I watch them sign it." The signature is the last item which is placed on the retirement form. If the retiring member appears unsure about the options, Ms. Poole and Ms. Bolinger will ask them to go home and think about it and think it all through before they decide. Like Ms. Poole, Ms. Bolinger leaves the option selection up to the retiring member and does not attempt to advise persons about which option to select, merely giving them the information concerning the effect of selecting a particular option. In her capacity as a notary, Ms. Bolinger stated that if a person did not look like they knew what they were doing in executing the form, she would not notarize the form. If they did not appear to understand that they were applying for retirement, or which facet of it they were applying for, she would, likewise, not notarize the form. She would not notarize a signature after the fact of the signature being placed on the form. Ms. Bolinger was shown a copy of Petitioner's exhibit 7, in evidence, which is a copy of the retirement form that did not have her notary signature. She observed that her notary stamp was on that copy but that her name had merely been signed in the wrong place, possibly because she was new to those duties concerning retirement clerk matters. She testified, however, that her signature was correctly placed on the form, she believes, that same day. See pages 17 and 37 of Petitioner's exhibit 7, in evidence. On January 14, 1988, Mrs. Bazzel completed two forms: FR-11, "Application for Service Retirement", and FR-9, "Request for Audit", (see Respondent's exhibits 9 and 10, in evidence). Both of those forms contain Mrs. Bazzel's signature and are dated with the same date, January 14, 1988. The FR- 11 form had that date written on it in three places. The two forms were then filed with the Division of Retirement. They were acknowledged by the Division as being received on the next day, January 15, 1988, according to the form FST- 40C, "Acknowledgment of Retirement Application", which has January 15, 1988 as the received date. See Respondent's exhibit 11 and the testimony of Stanley Colvin, in evidence. The Petitioner testified that he believes the retirement application forms referenced above were suspect as to accuracy because, according to his testimony, he took his wife to the school board offices on a Friday to sign the forms after the end of the teaching day on either January 8th or January 15th, and states that generally he remembers that it was a Friday because that was the day they had the habit of leaving the Panama City area to visit relatives for the weekend. However, the forms are dated January 14, 1988 in several places. The forms in evidence and the testimony of Ms. Colvin establish that the application documents were received on January 15th in the offices of the Respondent agency. Thus, they could not have been signed on Friday, January 15th. If they had been signed on Friday, January 8th, the record leaves no explanation as to why all of the forms were dated January 14th. The Hearing Officer can only logically find that, indeed, the forms were signed by Mrs. Bazzel on January 14, 1988 and received in the offices of the Division in Tallahassee, Florida, on January 15, 1988. The date of January 20, 1988, appearing on the documents, was established to be the date they were received in the bureau within the department which actually performs benefit calculations, not the date it was first received by the department. The evidence establishes that Mrs. Bazzel selected option 1, the retirement option which provides no survivor's benefits. None of the exhibits in evidence can support a finding that she chose or intended to choose option 2, which provides survivor's benefits. The application for service retirement shows an election for option 1 and the acknowledgment of receipt of that retirement application, FST-40C, shows that option 1 was selected, as well as the letter that informed Mrs. Bazzel that she was being added to the retirement payroll in the category of option 1 benefits. On August 1, 1988, the day after the first retirement warrant would have been received by Mrs. Bazzel, Ray Bazzel called the offices of the Division of Retirement to state that Mrs. Bazzel had checked the wrong number of income tax exemptions and wanted to change them. In order to know how many exemptions she had, he would have had to see the stub from that first retirement warrant. The stub would have depicted the gross amount of the benefit, which was the same amount as that provided for option 1, and not the gross amount attributable to option 2. See FST-40C form, in evidence as Respondent's exhibit 8. Additionally, in a conversation with one of her closest friends, Nan Locker, Mrs. Bazzel led Ms. Locker and friends at school to believe that her surgery had alleviated her medical problem with cancer and that she was in good health. During a conversation they had approximately nine months before Mrs. Bazzel's death, Mrs. Bazzel, in talking about retirement with Ms. Locker, who was also contemplating retirement, made a comment as follows: "Well, I've got my retirement and Joe's got his." This comment was made sometime in the fall of 1989 before Mrs. Bazzel's death in July of 1990. Although the Petitioner introduced exhibits 1, 2 and 4 in an attempt to show that his wife meant to select option 2 and that some mistake was made by the school board or the Division in preparing and submitting the documentation setting up Mrs. Bazzel's retirement benefit situation; in reality, those exhibits merely show that Mrs. Bazzel possibly did some calculations as to the difference in monthly amounts between option 1 and option 2. The exhibits can only show that she may have been aware of the difference in monthly benefit amounts between the two options, but they do not show that she intended to select option 2. Indeed, the evidence and testimony, considered in its totality, shows that her selection of option 1 was a voluntary, knowing selection. The evidence also shows that Mrs. Bazzel was mentally and medically competent to make that selection, freely and voluntarily. Her visits with Dr. McCloy, her treating physician, in the first half of 1988, to monitor her health situation after the cancer surgery, were normal and showed nothing unusual as far as any recurrence of cancer was concerned. Her chest x-rays were negative for recurrent cancer. On June 3, 1988, she was diagnosed as having a small duodenal ulcer, but no indication of recurrent cancer was present. Dr. McCloy treated her for the ulcer with medication; and by August 10, 1988, her symptoms attributable thereto had largely been alleviated. Her visits to Dr. McCloy were routine for the remainder of 1988 and 1989, with normal results. It was not until March of 1990 that she was diagnosed with a spot on the left rib, which proved to be recurrent cancer, probably attributable to the original breast cancer. She deceased as a result of this condition on July 9, 1990. Dr. McCloy testified that he never advised Mrs. Bazzel that her cancer was terminal because he believed that it had been successfully treated after the surgery and for a long period of time thereafter he had no evidence of its recurrence. Therefore, he had not advised her that she was terminally ill during the period of time she was making the retirement decisions, applying for and receiving her first retirement check during essentially the first half of 1988. Dr. McCloy's testimony further establishes, without doubt, that Mrs. Bazzel was alert, possessed her full intelligence and faculties, and understood the significance of his medical instructions, and understood his advice as to her health status. Accordingly, it has been established that Mrs. Bazzel did not have a recurrence of cancer until it was diagnosed in March of 1990, long after she had made the relevant retirement decisions pertinent hereto, and that she knew and was fully aware of her medical condition during the process of applying for her retirement benefits. She, therefore, understood the steps she took for retirement application and benefit receipt purposes, and was not medically or mentally impaired to make those decisions. It was established that she began her teaching career as a member of the Teacher Retirement System, pursuant to Chapter 238, Florida Statutes. She subsequently transferred into the Florida Retirement System under Chapter 121, Florida Statutes, during an open enrollment period. While a member of the Teacher Retirement System, she paid $12,870.33 in total contributions, plus interest, which accumulated on those contributions in the amount of $8,561.97, for a total on deposit in her account of $21,432.30. During the period of her retirement before her death, Mrs. Bazzel received total benefits in the amount of $49,551.95. She, therefore, received $28,119.65 more in benefits than she had paid into the Teacher Retirement System in contributions, plus accumulated interest. It was proven that the distance to the residence or places of business of the deponents, whose depositions were admitted into evidence, comports with the standard of Rule 1.330, Florida Rules of Civil Procedure. Since the locations of the deponents as potential witnesses accorded with the 100 mile standard, their depositions were admitted in lieu of live testimony.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is therefore, RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be issued by the Division of Retirement determining that the Petitioner, Joe Bazzel, is not entitled to have the retirement option selected by Dorothy Bazzel changed from option 1 to option 2. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of September, 1992, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of September, 1992. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 91-5774 Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact 1-5. Rejected as not being in accord with the preponderant weight of the evidence. 6. Accepted but not itself materially dispositive. 7-11. Rejected as not being in accord with the preponderant weight of the evidence. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact 1-25. Accepted. 26-30. Accepted. COPIES FURNISHED: A.J. McMullian, III, Director Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center, Bldg. C 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-1560 Mr. Larry Strong Acting Secretary Department of Management Services Knight Building, Suite 307 Koger Executive Center 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, FL 32399-0950 Joe Bazzel P.O. Box 46 Blountstown, FL 32424 Stanley M. Danek, Esq. Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center 2639 North Monroe Street, Bldg. C Tallahassee, FL 32399-1560
Findings Of Fact Petitioner retired from employment with the State of Florida effective January 1, 1976, and began drawing retirement benefits on that date. During 1979, she worked for the South Florida State Hospital, her former employer, on a temporary basis while continuing to receive retirement compensation of $235.46 monthly. At the request of the South Florida State Hospital, Petitioner worked from June 7 through August 10, and September 7 through December 6, 1979. On September 28, she reached five hundred hours of employment for the calendar year. Therefore, Petitioner exceeded five hundred hours of state employment during the months of September, October, November, and December, 1979. Respondent seeks return of retirement compensation for the last three days of September and for all of the months of October, November and December, plus ten percent annual interest. This amounts to $729.93 in retirement compensation plus $36.04 interest through April 30, 1980.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That Petitioner be ordered to repay the State of Florida retirement compensation in the amount of $729.93 plus ten percent interest compounded annually. RECOMMENDED this 12th day of August, 1980, in Tallahassee, Florida. R. T. CARPENTER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Department of Administration Room 101 Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-1777 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of August, 1980. COPIES FURNISHED: Mrs. Sarah H. Hoyle 1201 S.W. 17th Street Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33315 Augustus D. Aikens, Esquire Division Attorney Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center 2639 North Monroe Street Suite 207C - Box 81 Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Christopher M. Rundle, Esquire South Florida State Hospital 1000 S.W. 84th Avenue Hollywood, Florida Mr. A. J. McMullian, III State Retirement Director Cedars Executive Center 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32303
The Issue Whether the Petitioner should be permitted to return his retirement contributions and be reinstated in the Florida Retirement System so that he can apply for disability benefits from the Florida Retirement System.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a thirty-four year old man, having left high school in the eleventh grade in order to get married, but later took the GED test to qualify as a high school graduate. Some years later he was informed by an Ophthalmologist that he had fallen into the bracket of being legally blind, a status which categorizes a person who has ten percent (10%) or less vision. Petitioner can and does read. He worked for a bakery which entailed work with machinery and required extensive reading, but was advised by the ophthalmologist to find a job where he would not be required to work with machinery and which did not require extensive reading. Petitioner began participating in the State and County Officers and Employees Retirement System on July 1, 1969, when he became a partner in a blind vending stand. He elected to become a member of the Florida Retirement System on December 1, 1970. Petitioner attended two (2) agency meetings at which retirement was discussed. He stated that he had changed from the State and County Officers and Employees Retirement System (Chapter 122, Florida Statutes) to the Florida Retirement System (Chapter 121, Florida Statutes), and was prompted to make the change because a senior partner in the business who had been there for many years said that it was a good idea for him and for the younger partner to sign into the new system. He stated that there probably was a discussion relative to the merits of the new retirement system but that he did not remember anything about it. He did, however, sign the card to change retirement systems. On June 1, 1971, Petitioner suffered some type of injury to his back which was subsequently diagnosed as a sprain. Petitioner received medical treatment and returned to work where he continued to work for the Bureau of Blind Services for approximately three years, resigning November 11, 1974. On March 5, 1975, Petitioner obtained a lump sum as a settlement for this disputed claim under the Florida Workmen's Compensation Act. Petitioner went on leave February 5, 1974, after supplying his supervisor, Mr. Eurgil G. Crawford, Administrative Vending Stand Section, Bureau of Blind Services, with a letter from the physician stating that Petitioner had a "nervous condition." In a letter of October 10, 1974, Mr. Crawford advised Petitioner to either return to work or to contact them if it was not possible. He also stated that the Petitioner would have sixty (60) days in which he might come back to work if he so desired, but that after that time his position would have to be filled permanently by another employee. Petitioner had had some employment problems with the other two (2) members of the three (3) man working team. The problems involved the work at the stand, cleanliness and the lifting necessary to operate the stand. He stated that he and the other two (2) members just could not get together as far as working as a team was concerned. After termination of employment, which was voluntary on the part of Petitioner, Petitioner contacted the supervisor, Mr. Crawford, and asked whether he was entitled to benefits he had contributed and was told that he was. Thereupon, Mr. Crawford sent him the necessary forms to apply for a refund. A refund was made after Petitioner had signed the proper forms and returned them to Mr. Crawford. Two (2) state warrants were issued to Petitioner, one on December 19, 1974, and a subsequent one to close out his account. Petitioner did not work after leaving the Blind Services and has not attempted to find work but receives disability benefits from Social Security based on a 15 percent permanent partial disability rating. He stated that "I have come up with a couple of not so advantageous jobs, you know, its a possibility of getting hurt and one thing and another, I haven't done anything." Subsequently, Petitioner requested information from the Respondent and, after receiving literature from them in 1976, tendered a sum of money equal to the refund he had received so he could apply for disability retirement benefits. The tender of the repayment of his contributions was denied. Petitioner applied for this administrative hearing. Petitioner contends: That he was unaware of a choice to apply for a disability rating when he signed the waiver to obtain a refund. That the supervisor owed Petitioner a special duty to inform him of the possibility of applying for disability benefits before requesting a return of his contributions. Respondent contends: That Petitioner was present at meetings at which the retirement system was discussed; he had information that caused him to transfer to the Florida Retirement System; that he knew of eligibility requirements under the Florida Retirement System and that requirements for eligibility were written in a booklet he had obtained from an employee of the retirement system and that he testified he knew of the five year eligibility requirement. That Petitioner voluntarily signed the waiver, that he had due notice and that the tender of the refund was properly denied.
Recommendation Deny the Petition. DONE and ORDERED this 18th day of April, 1978, in Tallahassee, Florida. DELPHENE C. STRICKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: David A. Townsend, Esquire Albritton, Sessums & Di Dio 100 Madison Avenue, Suite 301 Tampa, Florida 33602 Stephen S. Mathues, Esquire Assistant Division Attorney Division of Retirement Department of Administration Cedars Executive Center Tallahassee, Florida
The Issue Whether Petitioner is entitled to purchase leave of absence retirement credit on behalf of James Gapinski, Petitioner's ex- husband and a deceased member of the Florida Retirement System.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Geraldine Gapinski, is the former spouse of James Gapinski, deceased. At the time of his death, Mr. Gapinski was an employee of Florida State University and a "vested" Florida Retirement Service (FRS) member. Petitioner is an employee of the Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE) and an active member of FRS. Mr. Gapinski was continuously employed by Florida's Univeristy System from approximately 1970, until his death on November 20, 2000, with the exception of a period from September 10, 1976 to June 9, 1977, during which period he took an approved leave of absence. During the period September 10, 1976 to June 9, 1977, no contributions were made by Mr. Gapinski or on Mr. Gapinski's behalf to FRS toward his accruing retirement benefits and he earned no creditable service in FRS for this eight month period he was on his leave of absence. On May 4, 2000, Mr. Gapinski requested an audit and estimate of retirement benefits from Respondent. At the time of his request for an audit and estimate, Mr. Gapinski and Petitioner had begun a dissolution of marriage proceeding (divorce). At all times material, each litigant had independent legal counsel, and each lawyer was aware that Mr. Gapinski's FRS benefits were "on the table" for division of the marital estate in the course of the divorce proceedings. At all times material, Mr. Gapinski was terminally ill with cancer. On September 14, 2000, Mr. Gapinski applied for participation in the Deferred Retirement Option Program (DROP). His application (DROP Form DP11) requested a DROP "begin date" of September 1, 2000, and designated each of Mr. Gapinski's two adult daughters as 50 percent primary beneficiaries. Petitioner, who at that time was still married to Mr. Gapinski, was not even designated a secondary beneficiary. The application, which Mr. Gapinski signed, stated in pertinent part, I understand that the earliest date my participation in the DROP can begin is the first date I reach my normal retirement date as determined by law . . . I cannot add additional service, change options, or change my type of retirement after my DROP begin date (emphasis in original). The application also specified eight required acts before Mr. Gapinski could retire and become a DROP participant, including, but not limited to, 4. A check payable to FRS for any amount you owe, or a written statement that you do not wish to claim the service . . . . On September 15, 2000, Respondent provided James Gapinski with two estimates of benefits. Estimate No. 1 showed the benefit Mr. Gapinski would be entitled to if he chose to purchase the one year leave of absence for $6,820.52, providing for a DROP beginning date of September 1, 2000. This estimate further advised that 6.5 percent per annum would be posted on June 30, 2001. It also stated, Comments: The amount due is to purchase service for your leave of absence from September 10, 1976 to June 9, 1977. This amount must be paid for a DROP begin date of September 1, 2000. Mr. Gapinski was also notified of the need to purchase his leave of absence credit in a letter from Respondent dated September 15, 2001, stating, in pertinent part, as follows: The following items are pending. The amount due is to purchase service for your leave of absence from September 10, 1976 to June 9, 1977. If you do not elect to pay the above amount due and purchase the service it represents, we must have written notification of your intent. * * * Completion of the Option Selection for FRS members, . . . AFTER YOUR FIRST MONTH OF DROP PARTICIPATION YOU CANNOT ADD ADDITIONAL SERVICE, CHANGE OPTIONS, CHANGE YOUR DROP BEGIN DATE OR CHANGE YOUR TYPE OF RETIREMENT. * * * Estimate No. 2 sent to Mr. Gapinski on September 15, 2000, showed the benefit Mr. Gapinski would be entitled to if he chose not to purchase his leave of absence and waited until March 1, 2001, to participate in DROP, when he would accrue 30 years of service without counting the gap left by his 1976-1977 leave of absence. This estimate also stated: Comments: This estimate does not include the purchase of your leave of absence and is provided for comparison purposes. It is provided for DROP purposes with a March 1, 2001, DROP begin date (see the enclosed DROP brochure). If you do not elect to pay the amount due and purchase the service it represents, we must have written notice of your intent. Apparently, neither attorney ever saw any of the foregoing papers. The thrust of Petitioner's attorney's actions and advice was to obtain survivorship retirement benefits, not necessarily DROP benefits, for Petitioner. On October 23, 2000, Petitioner's attorney was told by telephone by Ms. Ferguson, a representative of Respondent, that Petitioner must make a non-party request to release Mr. Gapinski's retirement information to her. So far as this record shows, no third party request was ever made, but that day, Petitioner's attorney and Ferguson also generally discussed retirement pay-out options that Mr. Gapinski could elect, and Petitioner's attorney was generally aware that the DROP process was not complete. On October 24, 2000, Petitioner's attorney discussed by telephone, retirement, divorce, and survivorship benefit issues and life insurance payment options with Ms. Hudson, a representative of Respondent. On October 26, 2000, Petitioner's attorney discussed, by telephone, retirement options and steps to be taken, with both Ms. Ferguson and Mr. Helms, another of Respondent's representatives. Mr. Helms told her the DROP application was not complete but if the couple were still married, Option No. 3 would give the most benefit for survivorship benefits. During the October 2000, conversations, Petitioner's attorney made each of Respondent's representatives aware of the impending divorce and of Mr. Gapinski's impending death, but the attorney did not specifically inquire how soon the lapsed time payment must be made and none of Respondent's representatives volunteered information on that issue. At Mr. Gapinski's request, the divorce proceeding was bifurcated. Prior to the divorce, Petitioner's attorney had done independent research and was aware that Mr. Gapinski had to pay the $6,820.52, in order to perfect the DROP program and in order to complete 30 years of creditable service in order to be eligible for survivorship benefits on his retirement. This information was communicated to Petitioner by her attorney and whether or not Petitioner would be willing to pay half the amount was discussed. Petitioner stated she would be willing to pay half the amount owed. As a condition to her agreement to bifurcate the divorce proceeding, that is, as a condition to letting Mr. Gapinski out of the marriage but reserving jurisdiction in the Circuit Court to resolve certain disputes concerning assets and entitlements, Petitioner required that the couple enter into an "Agreement" on October 27, 2000, which provided, in pertinent part, as follows: BIFURCATION: The Husband shall be entitled to bifurcation of the dissolution action. The marriage of the parties shall be dissolved with the Court reserving on all remaining unresolved issues not addressed in this agreement. In light of the Husband's health, the Wife shall schedule and appear at an ex parte hearing to dissolve the marriage, to obtain Court-ordered approval of this agreement, and to ensure the Court's reservation of jurisdiction to hear any and all issues pertinent to support and the division of property not yet settled by the parties. * * * B. The Wife further agrees that all marital assets awarded to her in this cause (including proceeds from the Husband's retirement and life insurance in the event the Husband predeceases her), shall be placed in an inter vivos trust, from which she may draw living, personal, and medical expenses, during her life, with the parties' adult daughters named as the irrevocable beneficiaries of the remainder of such trust. C. The Husband agrees to bequeath sufficient marital assets, awarded to him in this cause, to the parties' adult daughters to aid in their comfort and support. HUSBAND'S RETIREMENT: The Husband shall elect an option on his retirement with the State of Florida that provides for survivorship benefits for the benefit of the Wife. The wife shall be entitled to all such retirement survivorship benefits which, like the other assets she receives in this bifurcated action, shall be placed in an inter vivos trust for her living, personal and medical expenses, during her life, with the adult daughters as irrevocable beneficiaries of the remainder of the trust. The Husband shall, simultaneously with the signing of the agreement, execute such documents as are necessary to create retirement survivorship benefits in accordance with this term. Should the Husband fail to execute the survivorship option on his retirement or should he ever change such option in contravention of this term, the Husband agrees that the obligation of this term is binding upon his estate, which estate shall be responsible for paying such retirement survivorship benefits to the Wife. The Agreement could have, but did not, specifically require that the leave of absence be purchased by either Mr. Gapinski or Petitioner. Petitioner's and Mr. Gapinski's Agreement does not bind the Respondent, which was in no way privy to that Agreement. Petitioner and Mr. Gapinski's marriage was dissolved on November 1, 2000. Petitioner's attorney provided Mr. Gapinski, through his counsel, with DROP forms (FST-12 and FRS-11o). On November 1, 2000, Mr. Gapinski executed Option 2 for his DROP retirement on these forms, naming Petitioner as his sole primary beneficiary and negating his prior designation of his adult daughters as beneficiaries. Option No. 2 provides for a reduced monthly benefit payable for the FRS member's (Mr. Gapinski's) lifetime. If the member dies before receiving 120 monthly payments, his designated beneficiary (Petitioner) would receive a monthly benefit in the same amount until the monthly benefit payments to both of them equaled 120 monthly payments, when payments would terminate. Option No. 2 is available for regular service retirements as well as DROP retirements. Option No. 3 is also available for regular service retirements and DROP retirements. Option No. 3 would have provided a reduced monthly benefit payable for Mr. Gapinski's lifetime, and upon his death, his joint annuitant, if living, would receive a lifetime monthly benefit payment in the same amount as Mr. Gapinski was receiving. Then, no further benefits would be payable after both he and his joint annuitant were deceased. There are exceptions to the foregoing general description, none of which matter to the case at bar. Option No. 3 would clearly provide more money to Petitioner if she were eligible. On November 2, 2000, Petitioner's attorney had three short telephone conversations with Mr. Helms, who opined that since Mr. Gapinski had signed up for DROP while the couple were still married, Petitioner could still get Option No. 3, with DROP retroactive to September 1, 2000, but that the leave of absence must be paid for. Apparently, Petitioner's attorney did not ask what would happen if the gap was not paid for before Mr. Gapinski died and no representative of Respondent volunteered that information. The thrust of Petitioner's case continued to be to persuade Mr. Gapinski to pay the whole amount due and to change his Option election to No. 3. On or about November 3, 2000, Mr. Helms sent an estimate letter based on selecting a September 1, 2000, retirement date with Option No. 1, to Mr. Gapinski. This estimate letter stated Mr. Gapinski had 30.11 years of creditable service. It did not mention DROP or any pay back. It did state that no lump sum retirement or cash value payments were available. (Second page of attachment to Exhibit P-11). On November 3, 2000, Petitioner's attorney wrote Mr. Gapinski's attorney that Mr. Gapinski was considered by Respondent to be in the DROP program as of September 1, 2000, not March 1, 2001, as supposed before the divorce, but he had not bought back his leave by paying $6,820.52, and requested that Mr. Gapinski change his Option Election Form to Option No. 3 and authorize the payment of the $6,820.52 to Respondent. On or about November 9, 2000, Petitioner's attorney sent the already-executed FST-12 (Beneficiary Designation Form) and FRS-11o (Option Selection for FRS Members) showing Option No. 2 to Respondent. Mr. Helms acknowledged receipt. On or about November 9, 2000, Mr. Helms told Petitioner's attorney that the forms were correct and anyone could pay the $6,820.52. The attorney felt Mr. Gapinski was enrolled in DROP but that the $6,820.52 was still needed. On November 15, 2000, Petitioner's attorney sent Mr. Helms a letter memorializing their conversation, in which Mr. Helms had indicated it was not necessary for Petitioner to sign below the Option No. 2 selection paragraph on FRS 11o as long as she was aware of the option Mr. Gapinski had selected. On November 20, 2000, Mr. Gapinski passed away without anyone having purchased his leave of absence credit. Mr. Gapinski was only 57 years of age when he died. DROP retirement or regular service retirement with full benefits is possible at 62 years of age or upon attaining 30 years of creditable service. Mr. Gapinski remained in regular employment until his death. Because he had not purchased the leave of absence credit, Mr. Gapinski died with only 29 years and 9 months of creditable service for purposes of retirement. In other words, he was 3 months and ten days short of the 30-year retirement mark necessary to activate DROP or regular service retirement. Petitioner never communicated directly with Respondent until after Mr. Gapinski's death. Mr. Gapinski's will provided for the effective disinheritance of Petitioner to the extent provided by law. On December 14, 2000, Petitioner's attorney spoke by telephone with Mr. Helms, who told her he thought Petitioner could still pay the leave of absence money but he would call her back. On December 15, 2000, Stanley Colvin, another of Respondent's representatives, telephoned Petitioner's attorney to say Petitioner could not pay the amount after Mr. Gapinski's death. At no time prior to Mr. Gapinski's death did any representative of Respondent affirmatively represent to anyone that Petitioner could pay the money after Mr. Gapinski's death or the conditions under which no benefits would be paid or specifically what would happen if Mr. Gapinski died before the money was paid by someone. By a December 15, 2000, letter, Respondent notified Petitioner that since Mr. Gapinski had elected not to purchase the leave of absence, he could not have reached the required 30 years of service necessary to participate in the DROP program until March 1, 2001. It further stated that since Mr. Gapinski's death occurred before completion of the required months necessary to participate in DROP, his DROP application was cancelled and his choice of Option No. 2 was nullified. Moreover, Mr. Gapinski was viewed as an active FRS member on the date of his death, and because Petitioner, though designated as his beneficiary was not also a joint annuitant, she could only receive a refund of Mr. Gapinski's retirement contributions in the amount of $4,719.19,and was not eligible to receive Option No. 3. Respondent did not send a similar letter to prior beneficiaries, the decedent, or his estate/personal representatives. Petitioner requested a review, and on February 2, 2001, Respondent issued its proposed final agency action letter, to the same effect as the December 15, 2000, letter. Respondent did not send a similar proposed final agency action letter to prior beneficiaries, the decedent, or his estate/personal representatives. However, the undersigned notes that Mr. Gapinski's adult daughters, who also were his joint personal representatives, were present in the courtroom on September 24, 2001, the first day of hearing. As of the second day of hearing on October 21, 2001, the estate had been closed and the personal representatives had been discharged. Mr. Larry Hunnicutt, Benefits Administrator for the Bureau of Retirement Calculations, Division of Retirement, testified by deposition. He indicated that Respondent Division of Retirement has no rules in place specifically addressing DROP. Therefore, in DROP cases, Respondent interprets and applies Chapter 121, Florida Statutes, and the existing rules addressing regular service retirement. In practice, Respondent gives DROP applicants a 90-day grace period from the date of application in which to finalize all the outstanding documents or other requirements for DROP eligibility, including payments of amounts due, even though there are no provisions in place authorizing a grace period for DROP applicants. If there are money amounts due, the member must pay up during this period. If the member fails to pay up during this period, the DROP application and the option selected for DROP is cancelled by a certified letter, but the designated beneficiary remains intact. Herein, because the amounts were not paid before Mr. Gapinski died, and because it would serve no purpose to notify the decedent, who could no longer complete his DROP requirements, Respondent did not send the deceased member a cancellation of his DROP application and Option No. 2 selection. Rather, it treated the DROP application and option selection as null and void and notified his ex-wife, the designated beneficiary, of what Respondent understood to be her rights. In this notification, Respondent applied the statutes as its personnel understood them to apply to a member who dies in active service prior to reaching either 62 years of age or 30 years of creditable service. Respondent would have permitted Petitioner to pay the money on Mr. Gapinski's behalf only during his lifetime. If the amount due had been paid, and Petitioner were qualified for Option No. 2, she would receive approximately $500,000 plus cost of living increases as opposed to $4,719.19. She would receive considerably more if she qualified for Option No. 3.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement enter a final order denying Petitioner's request to purchase leave of absence credit on the account of James Gapinski. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of December, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of December, 2001.
The Issue The sole issue in this cause is whether or not the payments received from Gadsden County by Petitioner, as set forth on pages 4 through 8 of her Amended Petition, for services rendered as Official Court Reporter pursuant to Chapter 29, Florida Statutes, constitute "compensation" within the meaning of that term in Chapter 121, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact On April 27 and May 1, 1992, respectively, the Respondent and the Petitioner submitted to the Hearing Officer their Proposed Recommended Orders including proposed Findings of Fact. In the Appendix to Recommended Order, the Hearing Officer submitted recommended rulings thereon. The following constitutes the rulings in this Final Order on those proposed Findings of Fact. The Petitioner's and Respondent's proposed Findings of Fact Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7, are hereby accepted and adopted in that they track the stipulated facts contained in the PREHEARING STIPULATION dated and filed March 30, 1992. The Petitioner's proposed Findings of Fact Nos. 8, 9, 10, and 11, are hereby rejected in that they are conclusions of law and were not contained within the stipulated facts contained within the PREHEARING STIPULATION, and are, therefore, not based upon competent substantial evidence. The actual employment position held by the Petitioner as an employee of the judicial branch of the State of Florida is clearly identified on Florida Retirement System Form FR-11, which was executed by the Petitioner on January 24, 1990, and certified by the Chief Judge of the Second Judicial Circuit (Exhibit 6 attached to the PREHEARING STIPULATION), whereon the "Title of Position held" is stated to have been "Official Court Reporter, Second Judicial Circuit of Florida assigned to Gadsden County." The supplemental salary that was paid to the Petitioner by the County required paper work identifying her as a county employee for payroll purposes only; but, as a matter of law, she held her State position as an official court reporter solely at the pleasure of the Judges of the Second Judicial Circuit pursuant to Section 29.01, Florida Statutes. In the Conclusions of Law in this Final Order, this issue shall be fully analyzed. RULINGS ON HEARING OFFICER'S RECOMMENDED CONCLUSIONS OF LAW Recommended Conclusion of Law No. 1 is hereby accepted as a proper statement of applicable law. Recommended Conclusion of Law No. 2 is hereby accepted as a correct statement of applicable law. Recommended Conclusion of Law No. 3 is hereby rejected in that it erroneously concludes that the Petitioner's salary and fees were authorized and set by statute, when, they had to have been authorized and set pursuant to Rule 2.070, Florida Rules of Judicial Administration. The conclusion of the Hearing Officer is incorrect because under Rule 2.070, Florida Rules of Judicial Administration, the compensation of, and the fees in question to be charged by, court reporters are authorized and set by such judicial rule. Rule 2.070, Florida Rules of Judicial Administration, adopted generally by reference the annual salary for court reporters set forth in Section 29.04, Florida Statutes, for a 60-hour work month. That judicial rule then goes on to provide for overtime at the rate of $10.00 per hour. That Rule 2.070, Florida Rules of Judicial Administration, also provides that the fees in question (for transcripts and depositions) to be charged by court reporters should be set in each circuit by administrative order, and, in the absence of such order, as provided by law. Such court reporters' fees, therefore, are set pursuant to said judicial Rule 2.070, which authorizes the charging of such fees in accordance with a circuit administrative order, and, in its absence, as provided by law. The setting of such fees and the authorization to charge same arise from said judicial Rule 2.070, and not from Chapter 29, Florida Statutes. The fee schedule set forth in Chapter 29, Florida Statutes, derives its legal efficacy not from its legislative enactment alone, but from its judicial approval in said Rule 2.070 in the event that a local circuit administrative order setting such fees has not been entered. In such instance, the fees are not set by statute, but by judicial approval of a statutory fee schedule. The judicial branch has set such fees, not the legislative. Thus, any such fees were not set by statute. The citations by the Hearing Officer in recommended Conclusion of Law No. 4 of Rules 22B-1.004(4)(b)1., and 22B-6.001(49), Florida Administrative Code, are rejected as being inapplicable to the proceeding at bar inasmuch as the Petitioner as an Official Court Reporter appointed pursuant to Section 29.01, Florida Statutes, was an employee of the State of Florida and was not an employee of Gadsden County. Under said Section 29.01 all official court reporters are appointed by and serve at the pleasure of the Chief Judge and a majority of the Judges of the Court in which the reporter is serving. Provision is made in Section 29.04, Florida Statutes, for the respective counties to provide funds necessary to pay the cost of reporting in criminal cases as necessary to provide competent reporters in such proceedings, but any such monies paid to such official court reporters would be paid to state employees. The judicial branch of government in Florida is a State court system. Official Court Reporters are hired and retained by the State Judges in a Circuit, and their employment is not determined or continued to any extent whatsoever by any Board of County Commissioners. Under Section 29.04(3), Florida Statutes, provision is made for the counties to supplement the funds necessary to pay the cost of reporting in criminal cases as necessary to provide competent reporters in such proceedings. The counties are a source of funding, and are not employers of the Official Court Reporters. In the case of Matter of Compensation of Hunter, 635 P.2d 1371 (Or. App. 1981), the Court of Appeals of Oregon held that where court reporters are appointed and hold their offices at the pleasure of the Judges, and are officers of the Court subject to the direction and control of the Judges, those court reporters are employees of the State of Oregon and not of the counties. At page 1373 of 635 P.2d the Court held: "The right to control is also important from a policy standpoint. The judges of the State of Oregon benefit directly from the services of the court reporters. They not only perform reporting duties in court, but are also the judges' official secretaries. See ORS 8.330. The State benefits most directly from court reporters' services, and it should be responsible for providing their workers' compensation insurance." Recommended Conclusion of Law of No. 5 is hereby rejected as a conclusion of law in that is a recitation of the relative positions of the parties and is not of any recommended holding or ruling by the Hearing Officer. Upon the reasoning and authorities set forth in Paragraph No. (3), above, recommended Conclusion of Law No. 6 is hereby rejected in that the fees in question were not authorized or set by legislative statute but were, in fact, authorized and set pursuant to judicial Rule 2.070, Florida Rules of Judicial Administration. The first three sentences of recommended Conclusion of Law No. 7 are hereby rejected in that they misconstrue the first sentence of Section 121.021(22), Florida Statutes, that states: "`Compensation', means the monthly salary paid a member, including overtime payments paid from a salary fund, as reported by the employer on the wage and tax statement (Internal Revenue Service form W-2) or any similar form." [Emphasis supplied] A form 1099 is not a form on which an employer reports salary paid from a salary fund to an employee, but, rather is a form utilized to report payments of income to an independent contractor. The "similar form" in that statute refers to an employer's wage and tax statement, which may be a form W-2, which is not the equivalent to a form 1099. As hereinafter discussed in Conclusions of Law Nos. (11), (12), and (13) of this Final Order, Official Court Reporters are "professional persons" within the meaning of that term in Section 121.021(22), Florida Statutes. The recommended Conclusion of Law of the Hearing Officer that the transcribing of criminal proceedings do not constitute "special or particular services" does not comport with either judicial Rule 2.070, Florida Rules of Judicial Administration, or a 1957 Opinion of the Attorney General of Florida. Under said judicial Rule 2.070 the basic salary for a court reporter is set in subsection (g) together with provision for the payment of overtime for hours in excess of 60 worked per month. In subsection (e) of Rule 2.070, provision is made for fees for what would constitute special or particular services by a court reporter, and the fees that may be charged for same. In a 1957 Opinion of the Attorney General of Florida (1957 0p. Att'y. Gen. Fla. 057- 109 (April 26, 1957)), the Attorney General of Florida analyzed Section 122.02, Florida Statutes, the predecessor to Section 121.021(22), Florida Statutes, as to what constituted compensation under the State and County Officers and Employees Retirement System (SCOERS). The opinion of the Attorney General was that hourly wages plus overtime would be included within the monthly compensation. But, at the end of that opinion the Attorney General concluded: "We conclude that in the case mentioned in the question the employing authority has prescribed the formula for fixing the monthly compensation or salary. It may vary depending upon the hours employed in discharging the routine work of the employment but the formula is fixed and applicable mathematically. This is not a situation where fees are paid for special or particular services. It is a regular retainer made depending upon the actual hours engaged in performing the month by month routine duties as School Board Attorney. It has no reference to fees for handing special items such as bond validation or other litigation." Under Rule 2.070, Florida Rules of Judicial Administration, official court reporters are paid their basic salary and overtime for their court appearances in reporting the proceedings. But, if they are to furnish transcripts of proceedings or depositions, which work would be done after their regular working hours, then the fees for such special or particular services are to be set by local circuit administrative order, or in the absence of same, as provided by law. These special or particular services that the court reporters are performing for such additional fees are not performed during their regular working hours, which by said Rule 2.070, is limited to 60 hours per month. And the last sentence of Recommended Conclusion of Law No. 7 that the Petitioner was a county employee is hereby rejected upon the grounds and reasoning set forth in Paragraph No. (4) above. The Hearing Officer's Recommended Conclusion of Law No. 8 (misnumbered as "7") is hereby rejected upon the grounds and for the reasons set forth in Paragraph Nos. (3) through (7) set forth above.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recommended that respondent enter a final order approving petitioner's request for additional retirement benefits by including in the calculation of average final compensation those fees received by petitioner between January 1973 and February 1990 as set forth on pages 4 through 8 of her amended petition. RECOMMENDED this 24th day of June, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this day of June, 1992. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 91-3168 Petitioner: Accepted in finding of fact 1. Accepted in finding of fact 2. 3-4. Accepted in finding of fact 3. 5-6. Accepted in finding of fact 4. 7. Accepted in finding of fact 5. 8-11. Accepted in finding of fact 3. Respondent: Accepted in finding of fact 1. Covered in preliminary statement and in finding of fact 2. 3-4. Accepted in finding of fact 3. 5-6. Accepted in finding of fact 4. 7. Accepted in finding of fact 5. COPIES FURNISHED: A. J. McMullian, III, Director Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center, Building C 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-1560 John A. Pieno, Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-1500 Edgar Lee Elzie, Esquire P. O. Box 82 Tallahassee, FL 32302 Burton M. Michaels, Esquire Cedars Executive Center, Building C 2630 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-1560
The Issue Whether Petitioner's retirement benefits should be suspended pursuant to Section 121.091(9)(c) , Florida Statutes. Petitioner appeared at the hearing unaccompanied by counsel or other representative. His rights in administrative proceedings conducted pursuant to Chanter 120, F.S., were explained to him and he elected to represent himself in the matter.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner Theron J. Owen was employed by the Department of Transportation, State of Florida, for a period of 13 years, and made contributions under the applicable retirement system during that period. On March 1, 1977, at the age of 56, he retired under the Florida Retirement System, Chapter 121, Florida Statutes, with a monthly benefit of $88.79. (Testimony of Petitioner, Respondent's Exhibit 1) Petitioner was reemployed by the Department of General Services as a security guard at the State Office Building in Winter Park, Florida, on Nay 19, 1978. In December, 1978, Respondent received from Petitioner an executed Form FR23 "Application of Retiree for Suspension of Retirement Benefit and Return to Service" wherein he advised the Director of Retirement of his employment with the Department of General Services and that he had reached 500 hours of reemployment on August 15, 1978. Petitioner previously had provided verbal notice of his reemployment to Respondent in November, 1978. (Respondent's Exhibits 1-2) Petitioner's retirement benefits were suspended by Respondent in November, 1978, pursuant to Section 121.091(9) Statutes. However, December, benefit was inadvertently paid to Petitioner. During the period August- December, 1978, Respondent received $314.70 in retirement benefits. (Respondent's Exhibit 1, Stipulation of Parties) Petitioner elected to take "early" retirement, but obtained reemployment with the state for financial reasons. He acknowledges his indebtedness to the state, but has been unable to obtain a loan to repay the overnayments. He has not received retirement benefits during 1979. He is of the opinion that the statutory provision which limits a retired state employee to state benefits only during the first 500 hours of reemployment with the state shows a punitive intent on the part of the legislature to prevent retired personnel from returning to gainful state employment. During his one-year tenure with the Department of General Services, he has been promoted and received an "above-satisfactory" performance rating. (Testimony of Petitioner, Petitioner's Exhibit 1)
Recommendation That Respondent suspend payment of retirement benefits to Petitioner until restitution has been made of excess benefits paid in the amount of $314.70, plus accrued interest at 10 percent compounded annually from date of receipt of such excess benefits until date of repayment. DONE and ENTERED this 29th day of June, 1979, in Tallahassee, Florida. THOMAS C. OLDHAM Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Theron J. Owen 818 San Juan Boulevard Orlando, Florida 32807 L. Keith Pafford, Esquire Division Attorney Division of Retirement Department of Administration Cedars Executive Center2639 North Monroe Street Suite 207C, Box 81 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
Findings Of Fact Petitioner enrolled in "Plan A" of the Teachers Retirement System on August 13, 1954 as a teacher in the Orange County Florida school System. Petitioner transferred to Jacksonville, Florida and began teaching in Duval County on August 18, 1959 and continued hem membership in the Teachers' Retirement System "Plan A". Petitioner requested a change from the Teachers' Retirement System "Plan A" to Teachers' Retirement System "Plan E" by letter dated April 5, 1965. Petitioner was approved on March 26, 1966 for Teachers' Retirement System benefits and received disability retirement benefits for a period of time until she re-entered the teaching profession on November 27, 1970 in Duval County, Florida. She subsequently repaid an overpayment of these disability benefits which been paid for a period of time when she had returned to work in Duval County without notice to the Division of Retirement. Petitioner transferred from the Teachers Retirement System to the Florida Retirement System on October 15, 1970 when she signed a ballot entitled "Social Security Referendum and Application for Florida Retirement System Membership". Petitioner complains that she did not know when she signed the ballot that she was in fact changing her retirement from the Teachers' Retirement System to the Florida Retirement System contending that the statements of the person conducting the meeting at which the ballots were distributed informed the group the ballots were for an election for social security coverage. The ballot, however, clearly reflects that if social security benefits are desired, a change in the retirement system is necessary. Petitioner applied for Florida Retirement System disability benefits on October 20, 1971 and was approved. This benefit is $26.07 per month greater than the benefits she would have received had she remained in the Teachers' Retirement System. On October 3, 1975, Petitioner was supplied with the various documents concerning her actions in regard to her retirement benefits and was informed that her election to transfer into the Florida Retirement System was irrevocable and there was no method by which she could be transferred back into the Teachers' Retirement System. She requested a hearing on the transfer.
Recommendation Dismiss the Petition of Petitioner Martha A. Crosson. DONE and ORDERED this 15th day of November, 1976 in Tallahassee, Florida. DELPHENE C. STRICKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: L. Keith Pafford, Esquire Division of Retirement 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Martha A. Crosson 801 West Myrtle Independence, Kansas 67301 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER ================================================================= STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF ADMINISTRATION DIVISION OF RETIREMENT MARTHA A. CARSON, Petitioner, vs. CASE NO. 76-1456 STATE OF FLORIDA, DEPARTMENT OF ADMINISTRATION, DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, Respondent. /
The Issue The issue for determination in this proceeding is whether Petitioner is entitled to receive benefits under the retirement plan of his deceased mother, Violet Portee, pursuant to the Florida Retirement System, Chapter 121, Florida Statutes. 1/
Findings Of Fact Violet Portee was employed by Jackson Memorial Hospital ("Jackson") in Dade County, Florida, as a ward clerk from 1970 through October 3, 1990. Mrs. Portee retired from her employment at Jackson effective December 1, 1990. 4/ Mrs. Portee was a member of the Florida Retirement System. Petitioner is the son of Mrs. Portee and Mrs. Portee's closest surviving relative. Mrs. Portee was diagnosed with terminal, gastric cancer sometime in August, 1990. Petitioner first learned of his mother's condition from the attending physician when Petitioner visited his mother in the hospital. Mrs. Portee was admitted to the hospital for approximately one week on three separate occasions between August, 1990, and December, 1990. She began taking medications for pain in November, 1990. Her pain medication included Percodan, Tylenol 3 with codeine, Demerol, and morphine. Mrs. Portee went on sick and annual leave, and eventually went on leave without pay. Mrs. Portee executed a power of attorney in favor of her son on October 25, 1990. On November 14, 1990, Mrs. Portee met for approximately an hour and a half with Luis Gonzalez, a compensation specialist in the Jackson Human Resources Division. One of Mr. Gonzalez's primary functions is counseling employees on retirement matters. Mrs. Portee completed a request for estimate of her retirement benefits ("FRS Form FR-9") and her application for retirement ("FRS Form FR-11"). A retiree may select one of four options for retirement benefits on the FRS Form FR-11. Mrs. Portee selected Option 1 on her Application For Service Retirement, Form FR-11. Option 1, Member Benefit Only, provides maximum monthly benefits for the retiree during his or her lifetime but provides no benefit for survivors of the retiree. Option 2, Ten Years Certain, provides benefits to the retiree during the retiree's lifetime and, in the event of the retiree's death within 10 years of the date of retirement, the same monthly amount is paid to the retiree's beneficiary for the balance of the 10 year period. The monthly benefit to the retiree under Option 2 is paid at an actuarial rate that is less than that paid under Option 1. Options 3 and 4 provide benefits to joint annuitants. 5/ Sometime before November 28 or 29, 1990, Petitioner and Mr. Gonzalez discussed the retirement status of Mrs. Portee. Petitioner asked Mr. Gonzalez for instructions on how to change the option selected by Mrs. Portee on her Application For Service Retirement, Form FR-11, from Option 1 to Option 2. Mr. Gonzalez explained that Mrs. Portee's selection of options could be changed in one of two ways. First, Mrs. Portee could come into Mr. Gonzalez's office, execute a new Form FR-11, and select Option 2. Second, Mrs. Portee could return the first retirement benefit warrant uncashed to the Division of Retirement and write on the warrant that she wished to change the benefits option from Option 1 to Option 2. Mrs. Portee was too ill to return to Mr. Gonzalez's office to execute a new retirement option. Petitioner decided to wait and return the first benefit warrant uncashed and request a change in the options selected. The first benefit warrant was dated December 31, 1990, Warrant No. 0580615. Mrs. Portee died on December 6, 1990, before receiving the first benefit warrant. The first benefit warrant was neither cashed nor returned to the Division of Retirement with written instructions to change the selection of benefit from Option 1 to Option 2. During his conversations with Mr. Gonzalez, Petitioner disclosed neither the seriousness of Mrs. Portee's medical condition nor that Petitioner had power of attorney for Mrs. Portee. If Mr. Gonzalez had known either fact, he would have proceeded more expeditiously to change Mrs. Portee's selection of Option 1 to Option 2. Petitioner and Mr. Gonzalez next spoke on December 8, 1990. Petitioner had telephoned Mr. Gonzalez on December 6, 1990, but Mr. Gonzalez was not in. When Mr. Gonzalez returned Petitioner's telephone call on December 8, 1990, Petitioner informed Mr. Gonzalez that Mrs. Portee had died two days earlier. A meeting between the two men was set for December 18, 1990. At the meeting on December 18, 1990, Petitioner inquired about changing his mother's retirement benefits from Option 1 to Option 2. Mr. Gonzalez telephoned the Division of Retirement in Tallahassee, Florida, and was advised that Mrs. Portee's retirement benefits option selection could not be changed after her death. A final meeting was conducted on December 24, 1990, between Petitioner, Mr. Gonzalez, and Mr. Brian Derer, a benefits specialist with Jackson. Petitioner had come into the office to complete certain documents concerning Mrs. Portee's life insurance. During this meeting, Petitioner informed Mr. Gonzalez and Mr. Derer for the first time that Petitioner had power of attorney from Mrs. Portee. Mr. Gonzalez informed Petitioner that there was nothing he could do to change Mrs. Portee's option selection after her death. Mr. Gonzalez explained that he was an employee of Jackson and that neither he nor Jackson was an agency of the Division of Retirement or the Florida Retirement System. Petitioner contacted the Division of Retirement on January 14, 1991, for assistance. Petitioner was advised by Stanley Colvin to write to the Division of Retirement. In response to Petitioner's written request, the Division of Retirement advised Petitioner that the only benefit to be paid was a return of contributions to the retirement plan.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent should enter a final order awarding Petitioner those benefits that are most favorable to Petitioner pursuant to Sections 121.091(6), (7)(b), and (8), Florida Statutes. DONE and ENTERED this 22nd day of July, 1991, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL MANRY Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of July, 1991.