Findings Of Fact Reimbursement Program The Florida Legislature created the reimbursement program to provide for rehabilitation of as many petroleum contamination sites as possible, as soon as possible. Section 376.3071(12)(a), Florida Statutes. The Legislature intended that those responsible persons who possessed adequate financial ability should conduct site rehabilitation and seek reimbursement in lieu of the state conducting the cleanup. Section 376.3071(12)(c), Florida Statutes (1993). When owners and operators of the site or their designees perform site remediation program tasks under any of the programs created by Chapter 376, Florida Statutes, those entities become entitled to reimbursement from the Inland Protection Trust Fund (IPTF) of their allowable costs at reasonable rates. Section 376.3071(12)(b), Florida Statutes. "Allowable" costs are those which are associated with work that is appropriate for cleanup tasks. Section 376.3071(12)(d), Florida Statutes, requires DEP to: Reimburse actual and reasonable costs for site rehabilitation; and Reimburse interest on the amount of reimbursable costs for applications filed after August 14, 1992, at a rate of 1 percent per month or the prime rate, which- ever is less. Interest shall be paid from the 61st day after an application is filed with the department until the application is paid, provided the department determines the application is sufficient; otherwise, interest shall be paid commencing on the date the application is made sufficient until the application is paid. . . . A site owner or operator may engage the services of firms to perform remediation activities on a site and may designate an entity to receive reimbursement for such work. Section 376.301(14), Florida Statutes. Chapter 17-773, Florida Administrative Code (as revised in April of 1993), contains DEP's rules which were in effect at the time Petitioners submitted the instant applications. This chapter is currently located in Chapter 62-773, Florida Administrative Code. Chapter 17-773, Florida Administrative Code establishes procedures and documentation required to receive reimbursement from the IPTF. Rule 17-773.100(4), Florida Administrative Code. Rule 17-773.100(5), Florida Administrative Code, provides in pertinent part: "review and approval of reimbursement applications shall be based upon the statutes, rules and written guidelines governing petroleum contamination site cleanup and reimbursement which were in effect at the time the work was performed or the records of activities and expenses were generated, as applicable. . . . In order to be reimbursable, an applicant must break charges in an application into applicable units and rates. Rule 17-773.100(5), Florida Administrative Code. DEP has a predominate rate schedule to determine whether an allowable cost is reasonable. DEP bases its predominate rates on a study of average rates that contractors charge for a particular task. Requests for reimbursement must apply to costs which are "integral" to site rehabilitation. Rule 17-773.100(2), Florida Administrative Code. "Integral" costs are those which are essential to completion of site rehabilitation. Rule 17-773.200(2)(11), Florida Administrative Code. After integral costs have been identified and incorporated on a units and rates basis in an invoice, the invoice may be marked up at two levels. These markups are subject to certain limitations established by DEP rule: There can be no more than two levels of markups or handling fees applied to contractor, subcontractor or vendor invoices (Rule 17-773.350(9), F.A.C.); There can be no markups or handling fees in excess of 15 percent for each level of allowable markup applied to contractor, subcontractor or vendor invoices (Rule 17-773.350(10), F.A.C.); and There can be no markups or handling fees applied to invoices between any two entities which have a financial, familial, or beneficial relationship with each other (Rule 17-773.350(11), F.A.C.). In order to be reimbursable, costs must have been actually "incurred." Rule 17-773.700, Florida Administrative Code. "Incurred" means that allowable costs have been paid. Rule 17-773.200(9), Florida Administrative Code. When the "person responsible for conducting site rehabilitation" (PRFCSR) has no financial interest in the site, DEP considers the following costs as incurred when the program task is complete: Reasonable rates, including profits associated with the work performed, claimed for the use of their own personnel or equip- ment with documentation pursuant to Rule 17-773.700(7), F.A.C.; and Allowable markups or handling fees applied to their paid contractor, subcontractor, or vendor invoices pursuant to Rule 17-773.350(9), (10), and (11), F.A.C. Rule 17-773.200(9), Florida Administrative Code. Other rules reference limitations on the ability of an entity to take a markup. Rule 17-773.600(2)(d), Florida Administrative Code, provides in pertinent part: . . . If the person responsible for conducting site rehabilitation manufactured the [capital expense item], or a markup is otherwise prohibited under Rule 17-773.350(9), (10) or (11), Florida Administrative Code, no markup of the equipment shall be allowed. Rule 17- 773.700(5), Florida Administrative Code, provides in pertinent part: Costs claimed in a reimbursement application for the employees, equipment or materials of the site owner, site operator or any entity which has a financial interest in the site or a familial or other beneficial relation- ship with the site owner or operator shall be considered to be in house and reimburse- ment shall be limited to actual costs only. No fee, markup, commission, percentage or other consideration shall be allowed. . . . Rule 17-773.700(7), Florida Administrative Code, provides in pertinent part as follows: Pursuant to Rule 17-773.200(9), Florida Administrative Code, reasonable rates, including profits, may be claimed for the personnel and equipment or other allowable expenses of the person responsible for conducting site rehabilitation as well as allowable markups on paid contractor subcon- tractor and vendor invoices and shall be considered incurred for the purpose of reimbursement provided: The person responsible for conducting site rehabilitation does not have a financial interest in the site pursuant to Rule 17-773.200(7), Florida Administrative Code, or a familial or other beneficial relationship with the site owner or operator; The activities performed were integral to the program task claimed pursuant to Rule 17-773.500, Florida Administrative Code; and Detailed invoices are provided by the person responsible for conducting site rehabilitation that include all subcon- tractor and vendor invoices . . . [which] must identify the person responsible for conducting site rehabilitation and clearly distinguish their costs from those for paid subcontractors or vendors. There are no other provisions in the applicable rules which pertain to markups. A contractor must pay all invoices generated by a subcontractor at 100 percent of their face value prior to submission of an application in order to qualify those invoices for reimbursement. When a contractor pays a subcontractor's invoices, the contractor paying those invoices normally may take one of the allowable levels of markup. Prior to submitting a reimbursement application, a funder or PRFCSR involved in the reimbursement chain must pay the contractor for its invoices and markup. Then, the funder may apply the second allowable markup and submit the reimbursement application for review by DEP and payment from the IPTF. DEP does not contest the second level of markup in these applications. DEP rules restrict reimbursement when parties within the usual "chain" of reimbursement (PRFCSR or funder, contractor and subcontractor) have financial, beneficial or familial relationships with each other or the site owner. The application form requires disclosure of such relationships through the Program Task and Site Identification Form. Rule 17-773.200(1), Florida Administrative Code, provides as follows: "Beneficial relationship (interest)" means a connection or association, excluding an arm's length contractual relationship, which benefits a person or company by yielding a profit, advantage or benefit, or entitlement thereto, exceeding five percent of the person's or company's annual gross income. Rule 17-773.200(6), Florida Administrative Code, provides in pertinent part: "Familial relationship (interest)" means a connection or association by family or relatives, in which a family member or a relative has a material interest. . . . Rule 17-773.200(7), Florida Administrative Code, provides as follows: "Financial relationship (interest)" means a connection or association through a material interest or sources of income which exceed five percent of annual gross income from a business entity. Banks, lending institutions, and other lenders that provide loans for site rehabilitation activities are not considered to have a financial interest in the site on that basis alone. However, as of the effective date of this rule, guarantors of loans to or co-makers of loans with persons signing as responsible party are considered to have a financial interest if the amount of the loan exceeds five percent of the net worth of either company. As used in this definition, sources of income shall not include any income derived through arm's- length contractual transactions. Rule 17-773.200(13), Florida Administrative Code, states as follows: "Material interest" means a direct or indirect interest or ownership of more than five percent of the total assets or capital stock of any business entity. The rules and written guidelines of DEP do not address activities, including financing arrangements, occurring outside of the usual chain of reimbursement, so long as an applicant does not include charges for such activities in an application. Heretofore, DEP has not deducted finance costs that an applicant does not include as a line item in a reimbursement application. Pursuant to Section 376.3071(l2)(m), Florida Statutes, DEP must perform financial audits "as necessary to ensure compliance with this rule and to certify site rehabilitation costs." Rule 17-773.300(1), Florida Administrative Code. DEP performs this audit function: (a) to establish that the PRFCSR incurred the cost; (b) to determine that adequate documentation supports the claimed costs as incurred; and (c) and to review the reasonableness and allowance of the costs. The audit staff interprets the term "incurred" to mean that the applicant paid the costs included in the reimbursement application. Pursuant to Rule 17-773.350(4)(e), Florida Administrative Code, "[i]nterest or carrying charges of any kind with the exception of those outlined in Rule 17-773.650(1), F.A.C." are not reimbursable. The exceptions to the payment of interest set forth in Rule 17-773.650(1), Florida Administrative Code, are not at issue here. An interest rate charge on short-term borrowed capital from an unrelated third-party source is a "cost of doing business." DEP's predominate rates are fully loaded. They include a variable for all direct and indirect business overhead costs such as rent, utilities and personnel costs. DEP includes the cost of short-term borrowed capital in the direct and indirect overhead components of DEP's fully-loaded personnel rates. Rule 17- 773.700(5)(a), Florida Administrative Code. However, DEP never intended for its predominate rate schedule to create an entitlement to reimbursement of claims which are not otherwise actual and reasonable costs of site rehabilitation. Petitioners PRFCSRs are entitled to make application for reimbursement of allowable markups and costs of site rehabilitation that they incur. In these consolidated cases, the site owners or operators designated either Petitioner ET or Petitioner SEI as PRFCSR. The PRFCSR is typically referred to as the "funder" in the reimbursement chain. Petitioner ET is a trust formed in 1993 and domiciled in Bermuda. It acts as a conduit for funds that finance activities associated with Florida's petroleum contamination site cleanup program. The named beneficiaries of the trust are those contractors and subcontractors entitled to payment of costs for activities integral to site rehabilitation and for allowable markups of such costs. The sole trustee of ET is Western Investors Fiduciary, Ltd. (WIFL). WIFL is also the owner and a beneficiary of ET. Any profit that ET derives from funding cleanup projects flows through WIFL to investors who provide funds to finance site rehabilitation. American Environmental Enterprises, Inc. (AEE discussed below) provided the investment funds for the reimbursement applications at issue here. WIFL is a limited liability corporation created and domiciled in Bermuda. The officers of WIFL are: William R. Robins, President; John G. Engler, Vice-President; and Peter Bougner, Secretary. The directors of WIFL are: William R. Robins, John G. Engler, Paul H. DeCoster, Alec R. Anderson and Nicholas Johnson. WIFL's directors are also its shareholders. Petitioner SEI is a corporation incorporated and operating under Florida law. Organized in 1994, SEI acts as a conduit for funds to finance activities associated with Florida's petroleum contamination site cleanup program. The officers and directors of SEI are: William R. Robins, President; John G. Engler, Executive Vice President; and Paul H. DeCoster, Secretary. William R. Robins is the sole shareholder of SEI. SEI was specifically created to meet the needs of American Factors Group, Inc.'s (AFG discussed below) Florida investors. Respondent DEP is the agency charged with the duty to administer the IPTF and Chapter 376, Florida Statutes. Financing Entities American Factors Group, Inc. (AFG) is a privately held corporation incorporated and operating under New Jersey law. AFG is not a party to this proceeding. AFG, acts as the servicing agent for contracts associated with factoring activities and other types of financing operations. AFG, through one of its divisions, Environmental Factors (EF), entered into financing contracts with entities in the reimbursement process: (a) Petitioners ET and SEI, funders; (b) Gator Environmental, Inc. (Gator), general contractor; and (c) Tower Environmental, Inc. (Tower), prime subcontractor. Through these agreements, EF or its assignee bought the rights of ET, SEI, Gator, and Tower to future reimbursement payments at a percentage of the face value of the relevant invoices. The officers of AFG are: William R. Robins, President; John G. Engler, Vice President; and Paul H. DeCoster, Secretary. Bleak House, Inc. (Texas) owns the stock of AFG. American Environmental Enterprises, Inc. (AEE) is incorporated and operating under Nevada law. AEE is not a party to this proceeding. AEE, as the assignee under the EF contracts, is a third-party provider of capital to various entities in the reimbursement process, including Petitioners. The officers of AEE are: William R. Robins, President; John G. Engler, Vice-President; and Paul H. DeCoster, Secretary. Bleak House, Inc., (Nevada) owns the stock of AEE. Bleak House, Inc., (Nevada) is incorporated and operating under Nevada law. Bleak House, Inc. (Texas) is incorporated and operating under Texas law. Officers of both corporations are William R. Robins, President; John G. Engler, Vice President; and Paul H. DeCoster, Secretary. Magazine Funding, Inc. owns the stock of both Bleak House corporations. Magazine Funding, Inc. is incorporated and operating under Nevada law. Officers of Magazine Funding, Inc. are William R. Robins, President; John G. Engler, Vice-President; and Paul H. DeCoster, Secretary. Family Food Garden, Inc. owns the stock of Magazine Funding, Inc. Family Food Garden, Inc. is incorporated and operating under Massachusetts law. Officers of Family Food Garden, Inc., are William R. Robins, President; and Paul H. DeCoster, Secretary. Six shareholders own the stock of Family Food Garden, Inc. None of these shareholders are related by familial ties to the officers or directors of the aforementioned companies or any relative thereof. Each of these companies -- ET, SEI, WIFL, AEE and AFG (including EF) share common officers and directors. Each of the companies maintain their own books and business records, file their own tax returns, and maintain records in accordance with the laws of the jurisdiction in which they were established. They operate pursuant to their respective bylaws or trust agreement. ET, WIFL, and SEI do not have common assets with AEE or AFG (including EF). ET, WIFL and SEI do not have a beneficial, financial, or familial relationship with AEE or AFG (including EF) as Rule 17-773.200, Florida Administrative Code, defines those terms. Despite the facial organizational and structural integrity of ET, WIFL, SEI, AEE and AFG, the officers and directors of AFG and/or AEE created Petitioners, in large part, for the benefit of AFG and/or AEE as a means to invest funds in Florida's petroleum contamination site cleanup program. The primary purpose of each funder is to maximize the profits of AFG and its investors. AFG has other investment vehicles (funders) which it uses at times depending on the needs of its investors. AFG waits until the last instance before deciding which entity it will designate as funder in any particular factoring scenario. AFG usually does not make that decision until the day AFG's designated funder issues a funder's authorization to the general contractor. At the hearing, Mr. Stephen Parrish, a vice president of AFG, testified as the party representative for ET and SEI. WIFL and SEI have no employees. EF or AFG responded to DEP's request for Petitioners to provide additional information about the financing scheme utilized here using stationary bearing EF's or AFG's letterhead. Nineteen of the letters written on ET's behalf refer to ET as an affiliate of AEE. At least five of the letters written on SEI's behalf refer to ET as the funder and AEE as ET's affiliate. The greater weight of the evidence indicates that AFG and/or AEE negotiated less than arms-length contractual agreements with ET, WIFL, and SEI. Petitioners admit that they are "affiliates" of AEE and AFG through contractual agreements. However, there are no written factoring contracts between Petitioners and AFG such as the ones that exist between AFG, Gator and Tower. The only documented evidence of agreements between Petitioners and AFG are transactional based bills of sale representing the sale to AEE of Petitioners' right to receive reimbursement from the IPTF. AFG created these bills of sale for bookkeeping purposes. AFG did not even go to the trouble of tailoring the form for the bills of sale for their stated purpose. For all practical purposes, Petitioners are under the management and control of AEE and AFG. Petitioners and AFG disclosed their affiliation in meetings with DEP staff and through correspondence and other documentation, including but not limited to: (a) letter to DEP dated July 13, 1994 from AFG's counsel; (b) Addendum to Certification Affidavit signed by a Certified Public Accountant in each application; (c) Funder's Authorization; (d) letters sent to DEP between August 14, 1995 and November 19, 1996. Factoring and the Factoring Transactions Factoring is the purchase and sale of an asset, such as an account receivable, at a discount. An account receivable reflects the costs that a business charges after rendering a service but before the entity responsible for payment pays for that service. When a contractor completes a rehabilitation task, the contractor's invoice is an account receivable until it receives payment. In these consolidated cases, AEE provided short-term operating capital to Gator and Tower at an interest rate equal to the discount percentage of the relevant invoice (account receivable). Gator and Tower did not sell their account receivables to AEE. Instead, AEE, as the assignee of EF, purchased a contractual right to receive Gator's and Tower's reimbursement payments. In exchange, AEE advanced Gator and Tower a discounted amount of their invoices. The discounted amount of an invoice represents a loan from AEE to Gator and Tower. The difference between the face amount of the invoice and the discounted amount of the invoice represents interest. A discount percentage and an interest rate are equivalent. The amount of the discount represents interest on the loan or advance provided by AEE. It is an interest expense to the contractor or subcontractor. The Factoring Agreements On or about April 25, 1994, EF and Tower entered into a Prime Subcontractor Factoring Agreement. On or about July 8, 1994, EF and Tower executed an addendum to the Prime Subcontractor Factoring Agreement. The addendum required Tower to sell to EF Tower's right to receive payments from Gator. In return, EF agreed to advance Tower a discounted amount equal to 97 percent of the face amount of Tower's invoices. Tower agreed to repay EF 100 percent of the face amount of the invoices upon receipt of payments from Gator. The discounted amount of each invoice represents a loan from AEE to Tower. A bill of sale evidenced the sale of Tower's right to receive payment on each application. On or about July 8, 1994, EF and Gator entered into a General Contractor Factoring Contract. On or about July 13, 1994, EF and Gator entered into an Addendum to General Contractor Factoring Agreement. This addendum required Gator to sell EF Gator's right to receive payments from ET or SEI. In return, EF agreed to advance Gator a discounted amount equal to 88 percent of the face amount of Gator's invoices. Gator agreed to repay EF 100 percent of the face amount of the invoices upon receipt of payments from the funder. The discounted amount of each invoice represents a loan from AEE to Gator. A bill of sale evidenced the sale of Gator's right to receive payment on each application. The financing of the pending reimbursement applications involved the following interrelated transactions though not necessarily in this order: AEE as the assignee of EF purchased the right of ET, SEI, Gator and Tower to receive reimbursement for their services at a discount. ET, SEI, Gator and Tower agreed to repay AEE in full. Tower prepared and submitted to Gator an invoice for services provided by Tower and its subcontractors. Tower also prepared and submitted to Gator a reimbursement application for the program task. AEE advanced Tower the agreed upon discount amount. Tower used these funds to pay its subcontractors and vendors. AEE advanced Gator the agreed upon discount amount. Gator used these funds to pay Tower. Tower repaid AEE in full. Gator prepared an invoice for services provided by Gator, Tower and Tower's subcon- tractors including a 15 percent markup and submitted it with the reimbursement application either to ET or SEI. AEE advanced ET or SEI the discounted amounts as agreed. ET or SEI paid Gator in the full amount of Gator's invoice plus markup. Gator repaid AEE in full. ET or SEI prepared an invoice for its services plus the services of Gator, Tower, and Tower's subcontractors and a 15 percent markup. ET or SEI submitted the reimbursement application to DEP. When ET or SEI receives reimbursement from the IPTF, they will remit the total payment to AEE. The on-site work on each project was complete or substantially complete prior to Gator's involvement. In regards to some applications, the relevant dates on the subcontract/purchase order, Gator invoice, and Tower invoice are the same. The amount of time between AEE's payment of the advances and Gator's and Tower's subsequent remittance of 100 percent of the face amount of their invoices to AEE varied from a few days to a few weeks. The Agency Statement--Factoring Petitioners submitted the subject applications to DEP between July 18, 1994 and February 17, 1995. The financing scheme utilized in these applications was unique. Prior to the receipt of these applications, DEP never had reviewed reimbursement applications using the type of factoring scheme at issue here. In fact, the instant cases present a scenario never contemplated by DEP when it promulgated its rules and written policies. In the instant applications, the "chain of reimbursement" included: ET and SEI as funders or PRFCSRs, Gator as the named general contractor, Tower as prime subcontractor, and numerous subcontractors and vendors. As stated above, DEP was also aware that AFG and AEE (including EF) were "affiliated" with ET and SEI and would ultimately receive all reimbursement payments from the IPTF. 56 When Petitioners submitted the subject applications, no rule or written policy disallowed reimbursement for the face amount of contractors' and subcontractors' invoices when they sold their right to payments, i.e. the receivables, at a discount. When Petitioners submitted the subject applications, DEP had rules that restricted the ability of an entity to apply markups on invoices when a familial, financial or beneficial affiliation existed between a contractor, subcontractor, PRFCSR and the site or site owner, or when such relationships existed amongst those entities in the chain of reimbursement. However, there were no rules or written guidelines restricting reimbursement, based upon financial transactions occurring outside of the chain of reimbursement, if the applicant did not pass the costs of such transactions to DEP in an reimbursement application. In that regard, DEP usually dealt only with what was apparent in an application. If an application had a line-item claim for interest, DEP would not pay that claim under the rule limiting the payment of interest. Otherwise, DEP generally did not deal with costs, including interest, for which the applicant did not seek reimbursement. The applications in the subject cases did not contain line-item claims for interest. However, the difference between the face value of the invoices and the amount for which Gator and Tower sold their right to receive reimbursement for those invoices clearly represents interest. Tower's invoices appear to represent work that was integral to site remediation which was broken down into appropriate Eunits and rates. There is no evidence that the prime subcontractor, subcontractors and vendors intentionally inflated their invoices to cover the cost of financing. However, they did agree to accept a lesser amount then the face amount of their invoices for their services prior to the filing of the applications. In September and October of 1993, Paul DeCoster wrote letters to DEP describing a proposed financing scheme in which AFG would purchase the account receivables of contractors engaged in site rehabilitation. Mr. DeCoster wrote a follow-up letter dated October 4, 1993. In this letter, Mr. DeCoster proposed that AFG would charge the contractor a finder's fee which would be in addition to the 15 percent financing "markup" taken by the investor providing the financing. This proposal referenced a funder, FEC, whose parent was AFG. The transactions between the entities in the instant applications did not involve a finder's fee or a funder identified as FEC. In October of 1993, Will Robins met with DEP staff to discuss the manner in which the reimbursement program would apply to a proposed financing scheme. In this proposal, AFG would charge contractors an application/initiation fee and/or a commitment fee. The transactions between the entities in the instant applications did not involve an application/initiation fee and/or a commitment fee. After that meeting, counsel for AFG sent DEP a letter dated November 4, 1993. The letter acknowledges that the existing rules did not "specifically address the types of situations that arise when providing capital for cleanup activities through funding groups such as AFG." The letter identifies ET as the proposed funder through which AFG would finance cleanups. AFG would receive the ultimate reimbursement payment from the IPTF. At that time DEP was concerned that the proposed application/initiation fee was a "kickback" which DEP should deducted from the funder's markup. In January of 1994, counsel for AFG wrote a letter to DEP describing a financing scheme which differs in some respects from the financing scheme at issue here. This letter states that AFG intended to purchase receivables of the funder and the general contractor at a discount. Under this plan, the general contractor and the funder would claim the two markups. The subcontractors would pay AFG a finder's fee. The letter reveals that AFG, its affiliates, and investors would recover the cash equivalent of both levels of markups plus a fee from subcontractors for funding the high costs or risky projects. The transactions between the entities in the instant applications did not involve a finder's fee. On July 13, 1994, counsel for AFG wrote DEP to explain some modifications in the details to the proposed plan for the purchase and sale of receivables at a discount. This letter informed DEP that AFG would have a financial affiliation with the funder (ET) which would exist outside the chain of reimbursement and which would have no effect on either the markups or the overall reimbursement amount reflected in any application. All contracts within the chain of reimbursement (between ET, SEI, Gator, Tower, and its subcontractors) would be negotiated in arms-length transactions. The letter states: In this plan the subcontractors will perform their work on the site and will prepare their invoices in a manner consistent with any publicly or privately financed cleanup. Those invoices will be complied and forwarded to the general contractor for its review and the general contractor will add on the markup allowed by rule to the subcontractor's bills. The reimbursement application will then be forwarded to the funder who will ensure that all bills have been paid and who will be identified as the "person responsible for conducting site rehabilitation" on the reimbursement application. The funder will take the second markup allowed by rule, and will submit the reimbursement application to the Department of Environmental Protection for processing. Reimbursement will ultimately be paid by the Department to the funder in accordance with the reimbursement application. At no step in this process will the Department relinquish any authority to review and approve either the scope and nature of the clean-up or the rates charged by the contractors and subcontractors. Commencing on August 31, 1994, DEP began to develop a policy regarding the use of factoring as a financing mechanism in the reimbursement program. DEP personnel exchanged numerous documents regarding the subject of factoring. In one of those memoranda dated September 2, 1994, Charles Williams, DEP's Reimbursement Administrator, indicated that "we absolutely need to have a Big Meeting to decide what to do once and for all." In November 1994, DEP provided AFG's counsel with an informal opinion of how DEP would handle a factored application as described by Will Robins of AFG in an earlier meeting with DEP staff. The statement was that the difference between the amount that a contractor accepted in payment for his services, which was a discounted amount after factoring, . . . and the face value of the invoice which was claimed and marked up in the application was determined to be a carrying charge or interest, which is specifically disallowed for reimbursement in the reimbursement rule. American Factors Group. Inc. and the Environmental Trust v. Department of Environmental Protection, DOAH Case No. 95-0343RU, Final Order issued July 24, 1995. DEP advised AFG's counsel that it would deal with factored applications involving other entities on a case by case basis. On December 20, 1994, John Ruddell, DEP's Director of the Division of Waste Management, sought permission from DEP's Policy Coordinating Committee to promulgate a rule amendment to Chapter 62-773, Florida Administrative Code (formally Chapter 17-773). A draft rule accompanied the request. Mr. Ruddell developed the draft rule in compliance with Chapter 94-311, Section 6, Laws of Florida, which required DEP to revise its reimbursement rule. The draft rule provided that nothing in this Chapter shall be construed to authorize reimbursement for the face amount of any bill or invoice representing incurred costs when the receivable has been sold at a discount. In all such cases, reimbursement shall be limited to the actual discounted amount accepted by the provider of the goods or services. . . . The draft rule had the effect of prohibiting factoring as a mechanism for financing site rehabilitation work. The draft rule did not single out any other financing mechanism. DEP did not promulgate that draft rule. DEP requested that Petitioners furnish additional information regarding the instant applications. Between March 1, 1995 and November 17, 1995, Petitioners responded to DEP's requests with letters bearing AFG's or EF's letterhead. The letters state that prior to filling the applications, ET (and in some cases SEI) paid Gator for the face amount of the invoices plus Gator's markup. Gator then paid the subcontractors for the face amount of their invoices. Prior to these payments, AEE, an affiliate of ET, purchased the right to receive the amount due to Gator from ET or SEI and the right to receive the amount due to subcontractors from Gator. In each case, AEE bought the right to receive at a discount. According to the financing scheme, ET or SEI received sufficient funds from AEE to make the payments to Gator. ET, in turn, was obligated to pay AEE following its receipt of the funds claimed in the reimbursement application. On or about April 21, 1995, Bruce French, Environmental Manager in DEP's Bureau of Waste Cleanup, developed a memorandum discussing the proper handling of factored and/or discounted reimbursement applications. Mr. French initially sent the memorandum to Charles Williams, DEP's Reimbursement Administrator in DEP's Bureau of Waste Cleanup. The memorandum states that: invoices from subcontractors, vendors, suppliers and/or the general contractor which were paid a factored (e.g., discounted) amount by a third party capital participant (e.g., funder) represents the actual amount incurred by that entity and subsequently by the general contractor. DEP subsequently disseminated the memorandum to all application reviewers to acquaint them with DEP's policy on invoices or applications involving factoring as the financing mechanism. DEP did not direct the policy on factoring towards any individual company. DEP intended it to apply to "any combination of a general contractor, management company, funder and responsible party" in any situation in which a third party capital provider paid those program participants or suppliers a factored (discounted) amount of their invoices. The policy memorandum directed DEP reviewers to deduct costs from an application in an amount equal to the difference in the face value of an invoice and the amount paid for the right to receive payment under that invoice. The language of the policy set forth in the April 21, 1995 memorandum was broad and did not condition DEP's position on factoring on any affiliation between any parties. Between August 14, 1995 and February 2, 1996, DEP took action on the 45 applications at issue here. As reflected in those notices, DEP denied reimbursement of costs claimed in those applications because of the factoring of the supporting invoices and because "the difference between the face amount of the supporting invoices and the amount factored represents interests or carrying charges which are specifically excluded from reimbursement pursuant to Rule 62- 773.350(4), F.A.C." DEP deducted from the cost of each application an amount equal to the amount of the discount on each relevant invoice. When DEP issued the denial letters, it had not adopted the policy against factoring by the rulemaking procedure required in Section 120.54, Florida Statutes. The notices reflected a basis of denial of costs that was consistent with DEP's policy as reflected in the December 20, 1994 Draft Rule and the April 21, 1995 memorandum. This non-rule policy, which generally applied to all factoring schemes was not apparent from the rules in effect at that time. The Agency Statement--Markup/Value Added Policy Funders and contractors are entitled to take a markup of paid contractor and subcontractor invoices for allowable costs at reasonable rates. The invoices must represent actual and reasonable costs which are integral to site remediation. Contractors usually are entitled to a first-tier 15 percent markup for supervising and/or coordinating on-site remediation, for investing capital while awaiting reimbursement by paying subcontractors' invoices, and for assuming liability for the performance of the subcontractors. Funders normally are entitled to a second-tier 15 percent markup as an incentive to provide funds to finance the work. Markups are expressly subject to limitations set forth in Section 17- 773.350(9), (10) and (11), Florida Administrative Code. There are no other specific or implied limitations on markups in the rules or written guidelines. Requiring each entity that receives a markup in the reimbursement chain to pay contractor, subcontractor, and vendor invoices helps ensure that each level in the reimbursement chain pays the entity at the next lowest level in full. In these cases, each level in the reimbursement application chain "technically" paid the entity at the next lowest level. DEP policy in effect at the time Petitioners submitted the instant applications for reimbursement was to allow markups of paid invoices at two levels. However, DEP was not aware of situations where general contractors claimed markups for work that was complete before they ever became involved in the projects. With regard to all of the pending reimbursement applications, Gator applied a 15 percent markup to all of Tower's invoices including the invoices of Tower's subcontractors and vendors. With regard to a minimum of 30 of the 45 sites, Gator clearly did not supervise, manage or direct any of the on-site remediation activities. In fact, Gator did not become involved until after Tower had undertaken and completed these tasks. In at least 30 of the instant cases, Tower was acting as the general contractor when all of the on-site remediation took place. However, Tower could not apply a 15 percent markup to the invoices for its own services. Gator made it possible for Petitioners to claim the markup on Tower's invoices. As to the 15 sites at which Gator allegedly had some type of involvement with on-site remediation activities, the record contains no evidence regarding the specific activities or the level of Gator's involvement on any particular project. Gator performed some type of minimal due diligence review of Tower's site work. Gator allegedly reviewed Tower's technical and administrative files, cross-referenced technical and administrative files with the applications which Tower prepared, made visits to some job sites, and prepared a deficiency letter to determine the appropriateness of the scope of Tower's work. However, all of these functions were repetitious of the work performed by Tower and the certified public accountant attesting to the Certification Affidavit. Tower was a qualified engineering consulting firm that employed its own engineers and geologists. Gator's employee that reviewed the technical information in Tower's files was not a Florida professional engineer. He was not qualified as a certified public accountant to determine whether a charge was within DEP's reasonable rates. The Gator employee was a Florida professional geologist but he did not sign and seal the deficiency letter as such. There is no reference in DEP's rules or written policies to a deficiency letter. AFG required Gator to prepare the deficiency letter within two days of the date on which EF provided Gator with the opportunity to review a completed task. This two-day turn around time allegedly afforded efficiency of payment. The deficiency letters were limited to the question of whether the scope of Tower's services were reimbursable. Gator did not begin its review of an reimbursement application until after Gator received an invoice from Tower. The relevant subcontract/purchase order issued by Gator to Tower, the Tower invoice and the Gator invoice often were prepared on the same day. Gator "technically" paid the invoices at the next lowest level with money that AEE advanced. When Gator received payments from ET or SEI, it immediately repaid AEE before ET or SEI submitted the applications to DEP or soon thereafter. Pursuant to the addenda to the factoring contracts, Tower, not Gator, contributed to a reserve trust account which AEE will use to cover any reimbursement shortfalls. Gator allegedly indemnified the funder and guaranteed its own work but did not assume a risk of loss on Tower's work. On most if not all of the applications, Gator performed no meaningful management or supervisory functions. Gator's primary purpose in these consolidated cases was not to afford AFG a level of comfort as to the appropriate scope of the individual program tasks but to ensure that third-party investors maximized their profits. On September 1, 1994, Restoration Assistance, Inc., an entity under contract with DEP to review reimbursement applications, issued a memorandum to its reviewers directing them to complete their review and do a "total denial" on "Gator Environmental packages." The memorandum advised the reviewers that "Bruce" was drafting canned language to use in DEP's denial statement. On or about April 21, 1995, DEP presented its reviewers with a memorandum setting forth an initial overview of a "value added" policy for markups taken by a "management company" involved in site remediation activities. The memorandum indicated that DEP would allow reimbursement of claims for actual project management work and value-added services. The memorandum further provided that DEP would allow markups to a management company which only provided cash-flow services for a majority of the program task period even if the management company performed no other service. However, DEP would deny a markup if the management company provided such services during a "one month time period." DEP intended for the April 21, 1995 memorandum to acquaint DEP reviewers with the emerging DEP policy on markups. DEP's rules and written guidelines do not address the distinction made in the April 21, 1995 memorandum regarding the timing during which a management company could provide cash flow services and still be entitled to a markup. On October 20, 1995, Charles Williams issued a DEP policy memorandum for reviewers to use in reviewing reimbursement applications. Through that memorandum, DEP finalized and implemented the "value added" policy. The memorandum states that if the "GC" [general contractor] was involved with the management of the project during the course of the actual work by subcontractors, [DEP] rules do not preclude them from applying a markup. However, if the "GC" came along after the work was completed by other contractors and their involvement was more of a due diligence exercise to faciltiate (sic) a funding arrangement by a third party, then the "GC" markup would not be justified, though a markup by the actual funder listed as the PRFCSR could be allowed." Prior to the establishment of the "value added" policy on October 20, 1995, DEP made no inquiry as to whether a contractor provided value added services which were not reflected in an application in order to be entitled to a markup. DEP applied the "value added" policy to all pending applications (including the ones at issue here) resulting in a deduction of Gator's markup in all of the subject cases. The Department of Banking and Finance reviewed and issued a report (Comptroller's Report) on the Petroleum Contamination Site Cleanup Reimbursement Program on November 29, 1994. This report addressed the issue of markups in the reimbursement program. The Comptroller's Report recognized that DEP found the multiple markup structure to be beneficial in that it "attracts the involvement of companies whose role in cleanup projects is limited to providing funds to finance the work [and] attracts investors who provide funds which might not otherwise be available--thus facilitating cleanup of contaminated sites." The report acknowledges that a prime contractor "might have only limited direct involvement in the cleanup, having engaged subcontractors for most or all of the actual work." The Comptroller's Report did not address whether a contractor would be entitled to a markup if it became involved after all site work was complete. The Petroleum Efficiency Task Force's (PETF) final report concerning financing for reimbursement contractors issued on August 17, 1994. This report discussed DEP's policy of allowing two markups on paid invoices. The report recognized that "funders must be able to rely on the skills and knowledge of contractors to minimize reimbursement shortfalls." The PETF recommended for future consideration that "the Department should provide in rulemaking that contractors who take the first-tier 15 percent markup on subcontracted work must adequately supervise the work." When the PETF issued this final report, there was no existing rule that established any level of on site supervision or any other specific criteria for applying one of the two allowable levels of markup, other than paying invoices for integral site rehabilitation work. DEP's rules and written guidelines did not substantively change with regard to the "value added" policy from the April 22, 1993 revision of Chapter 17-773, Florida Administrative Code, to the October 20, 1995 memorandum which established a non-rule limitation on the ability of an entity to apply a markup to paid invoices. The "value added" policy is not reflected in any rule or written guideline, and would not be made available to a participant in the reimbursement program who requested program information. The "value added" agency statement is a non-rule policy which has the effect of a rule. DEP intends to apply the policy in all cases where a contractor's service adds no value to a project. DEP did not anticipate the need for such a rule when it promulgated the current rules. The Agency Statement Standard During the 1994 Legislative Session, the Florida Legislature directed that "no later than January 1, 1995, DEP shall review and revise rules related to the pollutant storage tanks programs . . . ." Chapter 94-311, Section 6, Laws of Florida. DEP understood that legislative instruction to include rule revisions related to the reimbursement program. On April 7, 1994, the Office of Statewide Prosecution issued a Statewide Grand Jury Report. The final report concerning financing of reimbursement contractors was prepared for the Florida Petroleum Efficiency Task Force on August 17, 1994. The Office of Controller issued its report on the Petroleum Contamination Site Cleanup Reimbursement Program on November 29, 1994. All of these reports offered suggestions for changes to the reimbursement rule. DEP first learned about factoring from presentations by Paul DeCoster and Will Robins in 1993. After these meetings, Petitioner proposed several factoring plans as proposed schemes to finance petroleum contamination site cleanup projects. Petitioners did not finalize the exact financing scheme they intended to use until July of 1994. Petitioners filed the first applications on July 18, 1994. By that time, DEP was aware that the factoring company was affiliated with the funders. DEP was also aware that the factoring company would receive the difference between the face amount of an invoice and the discount amount of that invoice. However, DEP was not aware of the exact nature of the relationships between AFG, AEE, EF, ET, WIFL, SEI, Gator and Tower. DEP was unable to evaluate all aspects of Petitioners' factoring plan without supplemental information about the details of the purchase and sale of receivables as they related to each application. DEP requested additional information from the applicants to determine if the costs were actually incurred. As a result of the information that DEP received, it reviewed all transactions to determine whether the costs claimed in the applications were actual and reasonable. On December 20, 1994, John Ruddell, Director of DEP's Division of Waste Management, sought permission from DEP's Policy Coordinating Committee to promulgate a rule amendment to Chapter 62-773, Florida Administrative Code (formerly Chapter 17-773, Florida Administrative Code). A draft rule accompanied the request. DEP intended the draft rule to comply with the legislative mandate contained in Chapter 94-311, Section 6, Laws of Florida. By that time, Petitioners had filed 41 of the subject applications. The 1994 draft rule provided that if a program participant sold a receivable at a discount, reimbursement would be limited to the actual discounted amount accepted by the provider of the goods or services rendered. The draft rule eliminated markups of contractor and subcontractor invoices. The December 20, 1994 memorandum to DEP's Policy Coordinating Committee did not indicate any deficiency in the existing delegated legislative authority that would prevent DEP from implementing the changes to the draft rule. DEP policy coordinating committee declined to approve the initiation of rulemaking procedures. Instead, it directed DEP staff to draft a bill for the 1995 legislative session. DEP based this decision on a determination that it would take too long to correct the numerous problems through the rulemaking process. The 1995 Legislative Session made several changes to the reimbursement program, particularly as it related to the direction of future site remediation activities. Chapter 95-2, Laws of Florida, passed the 1995 Legislative Session and changed the program from reimbursement of completed work to requiring pre-approval of work before it commenced. The 1995 Legislative Session did not make any relevant amendment to the reimbursement payment procedures in Section 376.3071(12), Florida Statutes. During the period between adjournment of the 1995 Legislative Session and February 2, 1996, DEP took action on each of the 45 applications that are the subject of this proceeding. Meanwhile, DEP focused its attention on making the necessary changes to switch from a reimbursement program to the new pre- approval program. It is not unreasonable to believe that such a significant change in a large program would take an agency some time to educate itself and the program's participants, prepare documentation and forms, and take steps to begin implementation. On March 22, 1996, approximately six and one-half months (198 days) after the petition for administrative hearing in Case No. 95-4606, and almost 21 months after the effective date of Chapter 94-311, Laws of Florida, DEP published its notice of rule development in the Florida Administrative Weekly. DEP filed the notice of rule development specifically "in response to litigation pending before the Division of Administrative Hearings" in the 45 cases that are the subject of this proceeding. In these consolidated cases, DEP did not have sufficient time prior to March 22, 1996 to acquire the knowledge and experience reasonably necessary to address, through the rulemaking process, the policy statements relative to factoring and markups based on value added services. Certainly, related matters were not sufficiently resolved to enable DEP to initiate rulemaking to address the policies set forth in the March 21, 1995 and October 20, 1995 memoranda until the spring of 1996. DEP is currently using the rulemaking procedure expeditiously and in good faith to adopt rules which address these non-rule policies. Additionally, the record indicates that it was not possible for the agency to initiate rulemaking in time to give Petitioners advance notice of the new policies. Petitioners filed the last applications in February of 1995 before DEP had time to fully evaluate the factoring plan. The time it took DEP to develop the detail or precision in the establishment of the policies set forth in the March 21, 1995 and October 20, 1995 memoranda was reasonable under the circumstances.
The Issue The issue posed herein is whether or not the Respondent, Arthur M. Jones, Jr.'s Wastewater Treatment Plant Operator's license should be suspended or revoked based on conduct set forth hereinafter in detail based on allegations as set forth in the Petitioner's Administrative Complaint filed January 31, 1979.
Findings Of Fact Based upon my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, the arguments of counsel and the documentary evidence received, the following relevant facts are found. Respondent, Arthur M. Jones, Jr., is a duly certified Class C Wastewater Treatment Plant Operator, certified pursuant to Chapter 17-16, Florida Administrative Code. Respondent holds license No. 793 originally issued by the Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services on May 13, 1971. The responsibility for certification of wastewater treatment plant operators was transferred to the Florida Department of Pollution Control by Executive Order 72-75. The Florida Department of Environmental Regulation is the successor agency to the Florida Department of Pollution Control by virtue of Chapter 75- 22, Laws of Florida, and is authorized by Section 403.101, Florida Statutes, to issue and revoke operators' certificates pursuant to its rules and Chapter 120, Florida Statutes. At all times material to this complaint, Respondent was employed by the Duval County School Board in Jacksonville, Florida. At all times material, Respondent was employed by the School Board as a School Sewer/Water Plant Mechanic, a position requiring certification by the Department as a Wastewater Treatment Plant Operator. In his capacity as a School Sewer/Water Plant Mechanic and Class C Operator, Respondent was responsible for the operation, supervision, maintenance and collection of influent and effluent samples from various Duval County schools. Persons responsible for the operation, supervision, maintenance and collection of influent and effluent samples must be licensed and certified by the Department as a Wastewater Treatment Plant Operator. Additionally, Respondent, in his capacity as a School Sewer/Water Plant Mechanic and Certified Class C Wastewater Treatment Plant Operator, was responsible for the proper collection of composite samples of raw sewage and the treated effluent from each such plant. According to instructions given the Respondent, a composite sample was to be taken by filling one-third of a sample bottle at two-hour intervals until the bottle was full. The composite sample of raw sewage was to be taken from the influent line and the composite sample of treated final sewage was to be taken from the effluent line. After the collection process, Respondent was responsible for properly and accurately labeling the composite samples and for depositing them in a refrigeration unit at School No. 98. The composite samples are then picked up at School No. 98 by authorized personnel for laboratory analysis to determine whether sewage is being adequately treated. The complaint, in summary fashion, alleged that the Respondent on or about February 15 and March 15, 1978, completely filled a raw sample bottle from the filter bed rather than from the influent line of the plant at School No. 94. That sample was submitted as a composite sample and placed in the refrigeration unit for pickup and analysis by laboratory personnel. Additionally, the complaint alleges that on February 15, 1978, at School No. 82, Respondent filled raw and final sample bottles for Schools Nos. 82, 64, 83 and 153, none of which were a proper composite sample. The samples, it is alleged, were all taken from School No. 82. The complaint alleges that similar acts occurred on March 15, 1978; on April 4, 1978 and April 11, 1978, all of which acts "constitute gross neglect and fraud in the performance of duties as an operator of a wastewater plant." Based thereon, the Petitioner seeks revocation of the Respondent's Class C Wastewater Treatment Plant Operator's license. L. L. Masters is Respondent's foreman and is in charge of the wastewater treatment plant facilities. Masters is Respondent's immediate supervisor. On March 15, 1978, Foreman Masters assigned Respondent the duties of taking composite samples of Schools 94, 64, 83, 82 and 159. Evidence reveals that Foreman Masters arrived at School 82 at 9:00 o'clock a.m. and departed at 2:00 p.m. Evidence also reveals that Foreman Masters had a clear view of the entire wastewater treatment plant and that it was impossible for the Respondent to enter and leave the treatment plant in a manner whereby composite samples could be collected without Foreman Masters seeing him. In this regard, Respondent's work orders reflect that he reported having arrived at School 82 at 10:40 a.m. and departed at 12:10 p.m. (Petitioner's Exhibits 5, 6, 7 and 8.) On April 4, 1978, Respondent was assigned to collect composite samples from Schools 72, 233, 76 and 208. (Petitioner's Exhibit 9.) Foreman Masters observed Respondent on April 4, 1978, with employee Carl Casey. Masters went to School 77 at 8:30 and Respondent was not there, although he had given a dispatcher a routing which would have taken him to School 76. When Foreman Masters noted that Respondent had not arrived at School 76 by 8:30 a.m., he took employee Carl Casey to School 233 and left Casey at School 233 while he returned to School 76. The Respondent was not there and Masters drove to School 208 where the Respondent arrived at approximately 9:30 a.m. It suffices to say that the Respondent then left for School 233 and arrived there at 10:30. From approximately 10:45 to 11:45, the Respondent was in the wastewater treatment area of School 233 and took three samples from the effluent line and three samples from the influent line at School 233 from the period 10:30 a.m. through 11:45 a.m. (Petitioner's Exhibits 9, 10 and 11.) Employee Pat Wilson testified that he accompanied Respondent on February 15, 1978, and that all samples were taken from the filter beds of Schools 98 and 82. Detective Jack C. Adams of the Jacksonville Police Department was assigned to the surveillance of Respondent on April 11, 1978. Detective Adams credibly testified that the Respondent did not take composite samples from the assigned schools as reflected by the work orders submitted by Respondent Respondent appeared and testified that one of the events for which he had been charged occurred as alleged; however, he testified that inasmuch as he questioned the procedures, he was of the opinion that since no harm was done, and since no school experienced problems, he is not guilty of gross neglect and fraud in the performance of his duties as an operator of a wastewater treatment plant as alleged. The evidence herein reveals that the Respondent was instructed as to the proper procedures for testing, collecting and preserving composite raw and final samples from wastewater treatment plants by his employer. He testified that he had attended a seminar wherein the instructions for such procedures were outlined to him and that he was given a manual on the methods for collecting raw and final samples. Barry McAlister, a certification officer for the Department, testified that Class C operators are instructed as to the proper procedures for collecting samples. Additionally, he testified that the submitting agencies rely heavily on the operators to properly collect samples which are submitted for analysis. Chapters 17-19.04, Florida Administrative Code, additionally set forth the sampling and testing methods for collection and preservation of composite samples. Although there was some conflicting testimony respecting the adherence to the procedures uniformly by the various wastewater treatment plant operators employed by the School Board, the undersigned is of the opinion that the Respondent was not at liberty to select and choose the manner within which he would collect composite samples for analysis by his employer in view of outstanding instructions which were in effect during his employment.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby, RECOMMENDED: That the Respondent, Arthur M. Jones, Jr.'s license as a Class C Wastewater Treatment Plant Operator be suspended for a period of two (2) years. RECOMMENDED this 28th day of September, 1979, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Silvia Morell Alderman, Esquire Department of Environmental Regulation Twin Towers Office Building 2600 Blair Stone Reed Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Joseph S. Farley, Jr., Esquire Mahon, Mahon & Farley 350 East Adams Street Jacksonville, Florida 32202
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Philip G. Nicholson, does business as Allstate Termite Control. The Respondent holds a pest control identification card issued by the Office of Entomology of the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services. On or about September 23, 1977, the Respondent entered into a subterranean termite control contract and service agreement with Roland E. Cooley and Alma P. Cooley with respect to the Cooleys' residence in Lake Worth, Florida. The chemical specified for use on the contract was chlordane. On or about that same date, the Respondent entered into a contract with Roland E. Cooley and Alma P. Cooley to perform a dry wood termite attic prevention treatment on the Cooley's residence. The chemical specified in the dry wood contract was "dri die". Only hearsay testimony was offered to establish what, if any, representations the Respondent made to the Cooleys to induce them to enter into the contracts. The work performed by the Respondent on the Cooleys' residence was not sufficient to provide the protection specified in the contracts, and in the case of the dry wood treatment, was unnecessary. The Cooleys' residence is constructed on a concrete slab. With such structures, the chlordane label, which governs use of the chemical, requires that all voids in hollow masonry units of the foundation be treated at the rate of at least one gallon per five linear feet of wall. It is thus necessary to drill each masonry block so that the chemical can be injected into it. Hollow masonry blocks were used in constructing the foundation of the Cooley house. Only one drill hole was made on the north side of the house into the masonry blocks, and none were made on the south side. If each of the masonry units had been treated as required, drill holes would have been placed at every eighteen inches along the foundation. This was not done, and the treatment for subterranean termite control was thus not in accordance with the label on the chemical, and was substandard. The treatment was inadequate to provide the Cooleys with the protection provided in the subterranean termite control contract. As to the dri die treatment at the Cooley house, the sort of treatment specified would not give the Cooleys any significant termite protection, since it would only protect them from dry wood termites in their attic. It is not a sort of treatment that is ordinarily performed. In order to be performed effectively, however, the dri die must be applied in accordance with the label which gives directions for its use. It is required that all wood surfaces be covered with the chemical at a recommended rate of one pound per one thousand square feet of area. At the Cooley residence, dri die was placed in the area, however, it was placed in a small pile in one part of the attic. It was not evenly spread, all wood surfaces were not covered, and insufficient chemical was utilized. The treatment specified would have provided the Cooleys only with dry wood termite prevention in the one part of the attic where the chemical was piled. The treatment was not in accordance with the label instructions, and was substandard. On or about September 27, 1977, the Respondent entered into a subterranean termite control contract and service agreement with Mr. and Mrs. Walter J. Delaney, for their residence in Lake Worth, Florida. The type of chemical specified for use in the contract was chlordane. The contract sets out the street address and zip code of the Delaneys' residence, but does not state the city. The address set out on the contract is sufficient to establish the location of the Delaneys' residence. Only hearsay evidence was offered at the final hearing to indicate what, if any, representations the Respondent made to the Delaneys in order to induce them to enter into the contract. The work performed by the Respondent on the Delaney home was insufficient to comport with the label instructions for application of chlordane, was substandard, and did not provide the Delaneys with the protection specified in the contract. The Delaneys' home is of concrete slab on-ground construction. The foundation is constructed of hollow masonry units. The voids in the hollow masonry units were not each treated as required on the chlordane label. Only one drill hole was made on the south side of the house and none were made on the north side. Several drill holes were made on the other sides of the house, however, four of them were fake, in other words they did not go all the way through the slab. On or about September 28, 1977, the Respondent entered into a subterranean termite control contract and service agreement with Mrs. Ann Sahlem, for her residence in West Palm Beach, Florida. The chemical specified for use in the contract was chlordane. Only hearsay evidence was offered to establish what representations, if any, were made by the Respondent to induce Mrs. Sahlem to enter into the contract. The work performed by the Respondent on the Sahlem residence did not comport with the label instructions for us of chlordane, was substandard, and was not sufficient to provide Mrs. Sahlem with the protection specified in the contract. The Sahlem residence is constructed on an on-ground concrete slab. The foundation is constructed of hollow masonry units. The voids in each of the hollow masonry units were not filled as required by the chlordane label. No drill holes were made on the west side of the home, and only one was made on the east side. On the north side of the home the holes were too far apart to treat all of the voids. The address set out on the Sahlem contract does not give the city of Mrs. Sahlem's residence although it does give the street address and zip code. The address as given is sufficient to identify the residence. On or about September 30, 1977, the Respondent entered into a subterranean termite control contract and service agreement, and a dry wood termite attic prevention treatment agreement with Mrs. Elizabeth A. Hughes. The chemical specified for use in the subterranean termite control contract was chlordane. The chemical specified in the dry wood termite prevention treatment was "dri die". The contracts were for Mrs. Hughes' residence in Lake Worth, Florida. The contracts do not specify the city of Mrs. Hughes' residence, although the street address and zip code are set out. The address as set out is sufficient to adequately identify the location of Mrs. Hughes' residence. No evidence was offered from which it could be concluded that the Respondent made any misrepresentations to Mrs. Hughes to induce her to enter into the contracts. The work performed under the contracts was, however, not in accordance with the label instructions for chlordane and dri die treatments, was substandard, and was not sufficient to provide the treatment specified in the contracts. Mrs. Hughes' home is constructed on a concrete slab. The foundation is constructed of hollow masonry units. The voids in the masonry units were not each treated as required on the chlordane directions. Furthermore, the drill holes were made three feet above the ground along one wall, and five feet above the ground along another wall, which would be insufficient to allow introduction of the chemicals below the concrete slab. The dri die was not distributed evenly over the attic wood surfaces as required on the dri die label. An insufficient amount of the chemical was utilized, and it was placed at one spot in the attic. The dri die treatment was unnecessary, and even if it had been advisable, it was not accomplished in a manner which would provide any useful protection to Mrs. Hughes. On or about October 27, 1977, the Respondent entered into a subterranean termite control contract and service agreement with Mrs.. Fred J. Schultz. The contract was for Mrs. Schultz's residence in Lake Worth, Florida. No direct evidence was offered to establish what, if any, representations were made by the Respondent to induce Mrs. Schultz to enter into the contract. It appears that the contract was solicited and performed by employees of the Respondent, and not by him directly, although he signed the contract and was responsible for the work. The chemical specified for use in the contract is Gold Crest, 72%, which is a trade name for chlordane. The work performed by the Respondent did not comport with the label instructions for use of chlordane, was substandard, and was not sufficient to provide the protection specified in the contract. The Sdchultz's home is constructed on piers with a crawl space. The instructions for application of chlordane contained in the label provide that in treating such structures it is necessary to either rod or dig a narrow trench to the top of the footing along the inside of the foundation walls, around all piers, sewers, pipes, and conduits; and to rod or dig a narrow trench to the top of the footing along the outside of the foundation wall. The Respondent, or his employees who performed the work at the Schultz residence did not make any trenches whatever, and did not even enter the crawl space below the Schultz's home in order to treat the piers. No evidence was presented from which it could be determined that the Respondent performed any dry wood termite treatment on the Schultz's residence. No evidence was presented from which it could be determined that any such work that may have been performed was done improperly, or that it was accomplished with or without a contract. On or about October 21, 1977, the Respondent entered into a subterranean termite control contract and service agreement with Mrs. Hulda Radke. The contract related to Mrs. Radke's residence in West Palm Beach, Florida. The chemical specified for use in the contract was chlordane. The Respondent also entered into contracts to perform home repairs for Mrs. Radke. No evidence was offered from which it could be concluded that the Respondent made any misrepresentations in order to induce Mrs. Radke to enter into the contract for termite control. The termite control work performed by the Respondent on Mrs. Radke's residence did not comport with the label instructions for use of chlordane, was substandard, and was not sufficient to provide the protection specified in the contract. Mrs. Radke's home was of pier constructions with a crawl space. No trenches were made, and the chemical was not trenched or rodded around each pier, and around each foundation wall. The chemical was broadcast along the top of the soil, but was not placed below the surface. The label instructions specify that a chemical should not be broadcast sprayed. On or about October 26, 1977 the Respondent entered into a subterranean termite control contract and service agreement with Mrs. Charles Thompson, for her residence in West Palm Beach, Florida. The chemical specified for use in the contract was chlordane. No direct evidence was offered to establish what, if any, representations were made by the Respondent to induce Mrs. Thompson to enter into the contract. The work performed by the Respondent on the Thompson residence did not comport with the label instructions for use of chlordane, was substandard, and was insufficient to provide the protection specified in the contract. The Thompson residence is of pier and crawl space construction. No trenches or rodding was done as specified on the chlordane label, and each pier was not treated. The address set out on the Thompson contract is insufficient. It gives only a street address, and no city or zip code. The Respondent testified that he used a process known as "long rodding" to treat under concrete slabs. Long rodding is a method whereby the end of a spray assembly is extended, and chemicals introduced under a slab. It is used typically where hollow masonry is not used in constructing the foundation. The process does not work well because the end of the rod cannot be adequately controlled. Even if this process were utilized, the chlordane label would required that all voids in hollow masonry units be treated. Failure to treat each of the voids would render the treatment substandard. It appears that since these incidents occurred, the Respondent has performed numerous termite control contracts in Hillsborough and Pinellas counties without complaint.
The Issue The issues are whether Respondent violated Florida Administrative Code Rules 64E-6.022(1)(b)2., 64E-6.022(1)(d), and 64E-6.022(1)(p) by repairing an onsite sewage disposal system without a permit, resulting in missed inspections, and if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency charged with enforcing the statutory and regulatory provisions pertaining to the practice of septic tank installations and repairs in Florida. See § 381.0065(3), Fla. Stat. (2003). Repair of onsite sewage treatment and disposal systems must be performed under the supervision and control of a registered septic tank contractor. Respondent is the qualifying registered septic tank contractor for All Florida Septic Tank Service, Inc., having been issued the registration number SR00011389. Respondent has 15 years of experience in the field of septic system construction and repair. The qualifying registered septic tank contractor for Simmons Septic and Tractor Service, Inc., is Joey Wayne Simmons. The qualifying registered septic tank contractor for AA Septic Tank Service, Inc., is Billy Wayne Joyner. However, Mr. Simmons, Mr. Joyner, and Respondent work closely together, sometimes working together on a job and/or acting as the qualifying registered septic tank contractor on each other's behalf. On September 2, 2003, the septic disposal system at the residence of Jack Young was not functioning properly. Mr. Young contracted with one of the above-referenced septic tank services to repair the system. On September 2, 2003, Respondent and another employee of All Florida Septic Tank Service, Inc., along with two employees from AA Septic Tank Service, Inc., went to Mr. Young's residence to repair Mr. Young's onsite sewage disposal system. No one applied for a permit to make any repairs to Mr. Young's system. With Respondent acting as the registered septic tank contractor, the men used a backhoe to dig up the septic tank, which was buried three feet in the ground. Respondent then repaired the pump and ran a new one and one-quarter force main line to the existing header because the old line had been compromised by roots. Respondent also cleaned roots from inside the distribution box. Respondent then sealed the tank and directed the men to cover it up. No one called Petitioner's local office, the Duval County Health Department, to request an inspection of the repair before covering the tank. The work on Mr. Young's septic system involved the replacement of an effluent transmission line. It required a permit because it constituted more than a minor repair to the pump and distribution box. Respondent should not have performed the work without a permit from the Duval County Health Department. Because there was no permit, there was no request for inspection by the Duval County Health Department. When the work was completed, Mr. Young gave Respondent a check in the amount of $1,000, payable to Mr. Simmons. The check reflected payment for repair to the filter bed, otherwise known as the drainfield. Respondent indicated his receipt of the check by signing the AA Septic Tank Service, Inc.'s Daily Truck Log and Maintenance Report. In February 2004, Mr. Young's septic system began to fail once again due to root blockage in the lines. Respondent advised Mr. Young that a permit would be required in order to make any further repairs. Mr. Young refused to pull a permit or to pay for any additional costs. On February 17, 2004, Mr. Young contacted Petitioner to report the failure of his system's drainfield. On February 18, 2004, Petitioner's inspector confirmed that Mr. Young's drainfield had failed and was causing a sanitary nuisance. During the hearing, Respondent admitted that there are no disputed issues of material facts in this case. He stated that he agreed with everything. However, he did not agree that the work he performed for Mr. Young required a permit from and inspections by Petitioner's Duval County Health Department.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That Petitioner enter a final order, finding that Respondent violated the standards of practice and imposing an administrative fine in the amount of $1,000. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of December, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of December, 2005. COPIES FURNISHED: Catherine R. Berry, Esquire Department of Health 515 West Sixth Street Jacksonville, Florida 32206-4311 James L. Smith All Florida Septic Tank Service, Inc. 8300 West Beaver Street Jacksonville, Florida 32220 R. S. Power, Agency Clerk Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 Timothy M. Cerio, General Counsel Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 Dr. John A. Agwunobi, Secretary Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A00 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701
Findings Of Fact Reimbursement Program The Florida Legislature created the Petroleum Contamination Site Cleanup Program to encourage responsible persons with adequate financial ability to conduct site rehabilitation and seek reimbursement in lieu of the state conducting cleanup. Section 376.3071(12), Florida Statutes (1993). Site owners and operators or their designees become entitled to reimbursement from the Inland Protection Trust Fund (IPTF) of their allowable costs at reasonable rates after completing a program task. Section 376.3071(12)(b), Florida Statutes. The costs of site rehabilitation must be actual and reasonable. Section 376.3071(12)(d), Florida Statutes. "Allowable" costs are those which are associated with work that is appropriate for cleanup tasks, i.e. whether the cost represents work that is technically necessary for the program task and otherwise not in violation of reimbursement limitations prescribed by statute or rule. In order for costs to be reimbursable, an applicant must convert charges in an application into applicable units and rates. Rule 17-773.100(5), Florida Administrative Code. DEP has a predominate rate schedule to determine whether a specific allowable cost is reasonable. DEP bases its predominate rates on a study of average rates that contractors charge for a particular task. In addition, DEP reviews each application to determine whether the overall cost and the methods used to perform the work are reasonable. DEP must also evaluate each application to determine whether a charge is an actual cost of a project. Contractors or subcontractors do not actually incur a fully reimbursable cost when they promise the site owner or its designee that they will perform work for an amount less than other professionals would charge, then allow the site owner or its designee to file a claim for reimbursement at or near the predominate rate. Such an agreement creates a back flow of funds to the site owner or its designee. This is true even though the charges are within the range of DEP's predominate rates. DEP never intended the rate schedule to create an entitlement to reimbursement regardless of the cost that contractors and subcontractors actually incur. Requests for reimbursement must apply to costs which are "integral" to site rehabilitation. Rule 17-773.100(2), Florida Administrative Code. "Integral" costs are those which are essential to completion of site rehabilitation. Rule 17-773.200(2)(11), Florida Administrative Code. After integral costs have been identified and incorporated on a units and rates basis in an invoice, the invoice may be marked up at two levels. These markups are subject to certain limitations: There can be no more than two levels of markups or handling fees applied to contractor, subcontractor or vendor invoices (Rule 17-773.350(9), F.A.C.); There can be no markups or handling fees in excess of 15 percent for each level of allowable markup applied to contractor, subcontractor or vendor invoices (Rule 17-773.350(10), F.A.C.); and There can be no markups or handling fees applied to invoices between any two entities which have a financial, familial, or beneficial relationship with each other (Rule 17-773.350(11), F.A.C.). In order to be reimbursable, costs must have been actually "incurred." Rule 17-773.700, Florida Administrative Code. "Incurred" means that allowable costs have been paid. Rule 17-773.200(9), Florida Administrative Code. A contractor must pay all invoices generated by a subcontractor at 100 percent of their face value prior to submission of an application in order to qualify those invoices for reimbursement. When a contractor pays a subcontractor's invoices, the contractor paying those invoices may apply the first-tier markup. Prior to submitting a reimbursement application, a funder or "the person responsible for contamination site rehabilitation" (PRFCSR) must pay the contractor for its invoices and markup. Then, the funder may apply the second- tier markup and submit the reimbursement application to DEP. DEP does not contest the second level of markup in these applications. DEP rules restrict reimbursement when parties within the usual "chain" of reimbursement (PRFCSR or funder, contractor and subcontractor) have financial, beneficial or familial relationships with each other or the site owner. These terms are defined in Rules 17-773.200(1), 17-773.200(6), 17- 773.200(7), Florida Administrative Code. The application form requires disclosure of such relationships through the Program Task and Site Identification Form. DEP's rules and written guidelines do not address or apply to activities, including financing arrangements, occurring outside of the chain of reimbursement if an applicant does not include charges for such activities in an application. Heretofore, DEP has not deducted finance costs that an applicant does not include as a line item in a reimbursement application. DEP must perform financial audits to ensure compliance with Chapter 376, Florida Statutes, and to certify site rehabilitation costs. Rule 17- 773.300(1), Florida Administrative Code. DEP performs this audit function: (a) to establish that the PRFCSR incurred the cost; (b) to determine that adequate documentation supports the claimed costs as incurred; and (c) and to review the reasonableness and allowance of the costs. The audit staff interprets the term "incurred" to mean that the applicant paid the costs included in the reimbursement application. DEP's audit staff usually does not inquire as to the level of a PRFCSR's financing where the application contains no line-item financing charges. However, the audit staff makes appropriate inquiries depending on the facts and events surrounding an individual application. Pursuant to Rule 17-773.350(4)(e), Florida Administrative Code, "[i]nterest or carrying charges of any kind with the exception of those outlined in Rule 17-773.650(1), F.A.C." are not reimbursable. The exceptions to the payment of interest set forth in Rule 17-773.650(1), Florida Administrative Code, are not at issue here. An interest rate charge on short-term borrowed capital from an unrelated third-party source is a "cost of doing business." DEP's predominate rates are fully loaded. They include a variable for all direct and indirect business overhead costs such as rent, utilities and personnel costs. DEP includes the cost of short-term borrowed capital in the direct and indirect overhead components of the fully-loaded personnel rates. Rule 17-773.700(5)(a), Florida Administrative Code. Petitioners PRFCSRs are entitled to make application for reimbursement of allowable markups and costs of site rehabilitation that they incur. In these consolidated cases, the site owners or operators designated either Petitioner ET or Petitioner SEI as PRFCSR. The PRFCSR is typically referred to as the "funder" in the reimbursement chain. Petitioner ET is a trust formed in 1993 and domiciled in Bermuda. It acts as American Factors Group, Inc.'s (AFG discussed below) conduit for funds that finance activities associated with Florida's petroleum contamination site cleanup program. The named beneficiaries of the trust are those contractors and subcontractors entitled to payment of costs for activities integral to site rehabilitation and for allowable markups of such costs. The sole trustee of ET is Western Investors Fiduciary, Ltd. (WIFL). WIFL is also the owner and a beneficiary of ET. Any profit that ET derives from funding petroleum contamination site cleanup flows through WIFL to investors who provide funds to finance site rehabilitation. American Environmental Enterprises, Inc. (AEE, discussed below) provided the investment funds for the reimbursement applications at issue here. WIFL is a limited liability corporation created and domiciled in Bermuda. The officers of WIFL are: William R. Robins, President; John G. Engler, Vice-President; and Peter Bougner, Secretary. The directors and shareholders of WIFL are: William R. Robins, John G. Engler, Paul H. DeCoster, Alec R. Anderson and Nicholas Johnson. Petitioner SEI is a corporation incorporated and operating under Florida law. Organized in 1994, SEI acts as AFG's conduit for funds to finance activities associated with Florida's petroleum contamination cleanup program. The officers and directors of SEI are: William R. Robins, President; John G. Engler, Executive Vice President; and Paul H. DeCoster, Secretary. William R. Robins is the sole shareholder of SEI. ET filed the petition for administrative hearing on behalf of SEI in at least four cases: Case Numbers 96-405, 96-425, 96-433, 96-437. Respondent DEP is the agency charged with the duty to administer the IPTF and Chapter 376, Florida Statutes. Financing Entities American Factors Group, Inc. (AFG) is a privately held corporation incorporated and operating under New Jersey law. AFG is not a party to this proceeding. AFG, acts as the servicing agent for contracts associated with factoring activities and other types of financing operations. AFG, through one of its divisions, Environmental Factors (EF), entered into factoring contracts with: (a) Gator Environmental, Inc. (Gator), general contractor; and (b) Tower Environmental, Inc. (Tower), prime subcontractor. Through these agreements, EF or its assignee bought the rights of Gator and Tower to future reimbursement payments at a percentage of the face value of the relevant invoices. The officers of AFG are: William R. Robins, President; John G. Engler, Vice President; and Paul H. DeCoster, Secretary. Bleak House, Inc. (Texas) owns the stock of AFG. American Environmental Enterprises, Inc. (AEE) is incorporated and operating under Nevada law. AEE is not a party to this proceeding. AEE, as the assignee under the EF contracts, is a third-party provider of capital to various entities in the reimbursement process. The officers of AEE are: William R. Robins, President; John G. Engler, Vice-President; and Paul H. DeCoster, Secretary. Bleak House, Inc., (Nevada) owns the stock of AEE. Bleak House, Inc., (Nevada) is incorporated and operating under Nevada law. Bleak House, Inc. (Texas) is incorporated and operating under Texas law. Officers of both corporations are William R. Robins, President; John G. Engler, Vice President; and Paul H. DeCoster, Secretary. Magazine Funding, Inc. owns the stock of both Bleak House corporations. Magazine Funding, Inc. is incorporated and operating under Nevada law. Officers of Magazine Funding, Inc. are William R. Robins, President; John G. Engler, Vice-President; and Paul H. DeCoster, Secretary. Family Food Garden, Inc. owns the stock of Magazine Funding, Inc. Family Food Garden, Inc. is incorporated and operating under Massachusetts law. Officers of Family Food Garden, Inc., are William R. Robins, President; and Paul H. DeCoster, Secretary. Six shareholders own the stock of Family Food Garden, Inc. None of these shareholders are related by familial ties to the officers or directors of the aforementioned companies or any relative thereof. Each of these companies -- ET, SEI, WIFL, AEE and AFG (including EF) share common officers and directors. Each of the companies maintain their own books and business records, file their own tax returns, and maintain records in accordance with the laws of the jurisdiction in which they were established. They operate pursuant to their respective bylaws or trust documents. ET, WIFL, and SEI do not have common assets with AEE or AFG (including EF). ET, WIFL and SEI do not have a beneficial, financial, or familial relationship with AEE or AFG (including EF) as Rule 17-773.200, Florida Administrative Code, defines those terms. Despite the facial organizational and structural integrity of ET, WIFL, SEI, AEE and AFG, the officers and directors of AFG and/or AEE created ET, WIFL, and SEI, in large part, for the benefit of AFG and/or AEE as a means to invest funds in petroleum contamination site cleanup programs. The officers and directors of AFG specifically created SEI to meet the needs of AFG's Florida investors. The purpose of each funder is to maximize the profits of AFG and its investors. AFG has other investment vehicles (funders) which it uses at times depending on the needs of its investors. AFG waits until the last instance before deciding which entity it will designate as funder in any particular factoring scenario. AFG usually does not make that decision until the day AFG's designated funder issues a funder's authorization to the general contractor. At the hearing, Mr. Stephen Parrish, a vice president of AFG, testified as the party representative for ET and SEI. ET, WIFL and SEI have no employees. EF or AFG responded to DEP's request for Petitioners to provide additional information about the financing scheme utilized here using stationary bearing EF's or AFG's letterhead. At least five of these letters written on SEI's behalf, refer to ET, an affiliate of AEE, as the funder. Nineteen of the letters written on ET's behalf refer to ET, an affiliate of AEE, as the funder. The greater weight of the evidence indicates that AFG and/or AEE negotiated less than arms-length contractual agreements with ET, WIFL, and SEI. Petitioners admit that they are "affiliates" of AEE and AFG through contractual agreements. However, there are no written factoring contracts between Petitioners and AFG such as the ones that exist between AFG, Gator and Tower. The only documented evidence of agreements between Petitioners and AFG are transactional based bills of sale representing the sale to AEE of Petitioners' right to receive reimbursement from IPTF. AFG created these bills of sale for bookkeeping purposes. AFG did not even go to the trouble of tailoring the form for the bills of sale for their stated purpose. For all practical purposes, Petitioners are under the management and control of AEE and AFG. Petitioners and AFG disclosed their affiliation in meetings with DEP staff and through correspondence and other documentation, including but not limited to: (a) letter to DEP dated July 13, 1994 from AFG's counsel; (b) Addendum to Certification Affidavit signed by a certified public accountant in each application; (c) funder's authorization form; (d) letters sent to DEP between August 14, 1995 and November 19, 1996. Factoring and the Factoring Transactions Factoring is the purchase and sale of an asset, such as an account receivable, at a discount. An account receivable reflects the costs that a business charges after rendering a service but before the entity responsible for payment pays for that service. When a contractor completes a rehabilitation task, the contractor's invoice is an account receivable until it receives payment. In these consolidated cases, AEE provided short-term capital to Gator and Tower at an interest rate equal to the discount percentage of the relevant invoice (account receivable). Gator and Tower did not sell their account receivables to AEE. Instead, AEE, as the assignee of EF, purchased a contractual right to receive Gator's and Tower's reimbursement payments. In exchange, AEE advanced them a discounted amount of their invoices. The discounted amount of each invoice represents a loan from AEE to Gator and Tower. The difference between the face amount of the invoices and the discounted amount of the invoices represents interest. A discount percentage and an interest rate are equivalent. The amount of the discount represents interest on the loans or advances provided by AEE. It is an interest expense to the contractor or subcontractor. The amount that Gator and Tower actually incurred is the discounted amount of their invoices. The Factoring Agreements On or about April 25, 1994, EF and Tower entered into a Prime Subcontractor Factoring Agreement which set forth the terms under which EF or its assignee would finance Tower's site remediation work. At that time, the parties to the contract anticipated that EF would retain a general contractor to perform on-site remediation services with Tower acting as prime subcontractor. In the contract, Tower agreed to sell to EF its right to receive payments from the general contractor at a percentage of the underlying invoices. Subsequent to the execution of April 1994 Prime Subcontractor Factoring Agreement, Tower experienced financial difficulties resulting in its inability to pay subcontractors for work that they performed under non-EF contracts. These financial difficulties made it impossible for Tower to meet its payroll that was due in two weeks. Tower and its subcontractors under the non-EF contracts approached AFG and EF requesting financial assistance to resolve Tower's financial difficulties and to ensure that the subcontractors would be paid for their work. At that time, the program tasks under these non-EF contracts were complete or substantially complete. Given the preexisting contractual relationship between EF and Tower on other projects, AFG determined that it could use a similar financing arrangement to resolve Tower's financial problems. Such an arrangement also would protect AFG's investment in projects being conducted under the EF-Tower contracts. On or about July 8, 1994, EF and Tower executed an addendum to the April 1994 Prime Subcontractor Factoring Agreement. This addendum applied to projects that were not covered by the original Prime Subcontractor Factoring Agreement. The addendum required Tower to sell to EF Tower's right to receive payments from the general contractor. In return, EF agreed to advance Tower a discounted amount equal to 97 percent of the face amount of Tower's invoices. Tower agreed to pay EF 100 percent of the face amount of the invoices upon receipt of payments from the general contractor. The discounted amount of each invoice represents a loan from AEE to Tower. Late in 1993 or early in 1994, Gator began negotiating a contract with EF to provide general contracting services for on-site remediation work on unspecified Florida projects being financed by EF. Gator began serving as general contractor on some of these unspecified projects prior to the execution of a contract. On or about July 8, 1994, EF and Gator entered into a General Contractor Factoring Agreement. In this contract, EF agreed to provide financing for projects on which Gator served as general contractor. Gator agreed to sell to EF its right to receive payments from the funder (ET or SEI) at a percentage of Gator's underlying invoices. On or about July 13, 1994, EF and Gator entered into an Addendum to the July 8, 1994 General Contractor Factoring Agreement. This addendum applied to projects which were not covered under the original General Contractor Factoring Agreement. The addendum required Gator to sell to EF Gator's right to receive payments from the funder (ET or SEI). In return, EF agreed to advance Gator a discounted amount equal to 88 percent of the face amount of Gator's invoices. Gator agreed to pay EF 100 percent of the face amount of the invoices upon receipt of payments from the funder. The discounted amount on each invoice represents a loan from AEE to Gator. Gator and Tower negotiated the respective factoring contracts and addenda thereto at arms-length. Pursuant to the terms of these contracts, EF assigned to AEE the rights to payments due to Tower from Gator and to Gator from ET or SEI. ET and SEI were not named parties to these contracts. The factoring contracts and the corresponding addenda apply to the reimbursement applications at issue here. Pursuant to those agreements, the following interrelated transactions took place though not necessarily in this order. First, Tower provided EF with a Site Certification Affidavit for a certain project. Tower also sent Gator a complete reimbursement application for the project and an invoice for Tower's services and the services of its subcontractors and vendors. Next, EF designated either ET or SEI as the funder. The funder then sent Gator a funder's authorization form. This form acknowledged that EF was an affiliate of the funder. It is the only documented evidence of a contract between the funder and Gator. Gator's receipt of the form constituted authorization for Gator to perform work on the project subject to reimbursement for all reimbursable costs and paid subcontractor invoices. Within two days of receiving the funder's authorization for a project, Gator issued Tower a subcontract/purchase order. Gator notified EF and the funder of such issuance. Upon receipt of the subcontract/purchase order, Tower sold to AEE (at a discount) Tower's right to receive full payment from Gator. A bill of sale evidenced this transaction. Tower agreed to repay AEE the face amount of Tower's invoice upon receipt of payment from Gator. Tower executed an agreement indemnifying the funder and guaranteeing the performance of all services and the delivery of all goods. Tower agreed to a reserve trust fund deposit as security for the ultimate reimbursement payment from the IPTF. Within four days of receiving the complete reimbursement application from Tower and within two days of receiving the funder's authorization, Gator and a certified public accountant (retained by EF) were supposed to review all supporting documentation on the project. The stated purpose of this review was to determine whether the invoices of Tower and its subcontractors were reimbursable under DEP guidelines. As to 30 of the instant applications, Tower completed the on-site work before Gator became involved. In those cases, Gator performed a minimal due diligence review, if any, of Tower's on-site work. This included comparing Tower's technical and administrative files with the applications prepared by Tower. Without Gator's minimal review and risk assessment on these 30 applications, EF would not have included them as projects covered by the addenda to the factoring contracts. As to 15 of the instant applications, Petitioners claim that Gator not only reviewed Tower's work product but also, issued subcontractor/purchase orders selected and scheduled subcontractors, and made on-site visits. However, there is no persuasive record evidence as to the specific activities or the level of Gator's involvement in on-site work on any one of these 15 applications. When Gator and EF's certified public accountant completed their assessment, Gator prepared a deficiency letter and sent it to all parties. The report advised EF, the funder and Tower whether any of Tower's charges were in excess of the reimbursable amount. Tower could accept or reject any disallowance set forth in the deficiency letter. If there was no problem with a disallowance or within five days of Tower's acceptance of a disallowance, AEE advanced Tower an amount equal to 97 percent of Tower's invoice. Tower used these funds to pay subcontractors and vendors. The discounted amount of Tower's invoice represents the actual cost that Tower incurred. Tower signed a repayment agreement in which it promised to repay AEE the face amount of Tower's invoice upon receipt of payment from Gator. When Tower received the discounted cash advance from AEE, it had to contribute the reserve deposit (to cover any reimbursement shortfalls) to a reserve trust, domiciled in Bermuda, which was affiliated with EF. Tower was a beneficiary of the reserve trust to the extent of its contribution less any monies it owed AEE after the IPTF reimbursed the funder. Meanwhile, Gator sold to AEE (at a discount) Gator's right to receive full payment from the funder. A bill of sale evidenced this transaction. Gator agreed to repay AEE the face amount of Gator's invoice upon receipt of payment from the funder. AEE advanced Gator an amount equal to 88 percent of the face amount of Gator's invoice. The discounted amount of Gator's invoice represent the amount that Gator actually incurred. Gator used these funds to pay Tower the face amount of its invoice. Tower in turn repaid AEE in full. Gator signed a repayment agreement in which it promised to repay AEE the face amount of its invoice upon receipt of payment from the funder. For the 45 applications at issue here, the addendum to the General Contractor Factoring Agreement did not require Gator to deposit any amount in the reserve trust which was domiciled in Bermuda and affiliated with EF. Next, Gator prepared an invoice for its services and the services of Tower and its subcontractors including a 15 percent markup and an application preparation fee. Gator's invoice could not include a charge for "management time." Then, Gator forwarded its invoice and Tower's invoice to the funder together with the complete reimbursement application. In the meantime, ET and SEI sold AEE their right to receive reimbursement from the IPTF at a discount equal to 87 percent of their total invoice amount. A bill of sale for each transaction is the only documented evidence of an agreement between the funders and AEE. ET and SEI agreed to repay AEE for the face amount of their invoices upon receipt of payment from IPTF. The funder prepared an invoice for the face amount of Gator's and Tower's invoices plus a 15 percent markup. Upon receipt of ET's or SEI's invoice, AEE advanced them the discounted amount as agreed. ET or SEI used the funds advanced by AEE to pay Gator the face amount of its invoice. Gator in turn repaid AEE in full. When ET or SEI receive a reimbursement payment from the IPTF, they will remit the total payment to AEE. The total cost for each project increased as the discount percentage and the face amount of each invoice passing up through the chain grew larger. In regards to some applications, the relevant dates on the subcontract/purchase order, Gator invoice, and Tower invoice are the same. It is clear that the turn around time on all of the above referenced transactions, including the time between the payment of the advances by AEE to Gator and Tower and their subsequent repayment of 100 percent of the face amount of an invoice to AEE, was very short--a matter of days or weeks. In Summary, the financing of the pending reimbursement applications involved the following interrelated transactions but not necessarily in this order: AEE as the assignee of EF purchased the right of ET, SEI, Gator and Tower to receive reimbursement for their services at a discount. ET, SEI, Gator and Tower agreed to repay AEE in full. Tower prepared and submitted to Gator an invoice for services provided by Tower and its subcontractors. Tower also prepared and submitted to Gator a reimbursement application for the program task. AEE advanced Tower the agreed upon discount amount. Tower used these funds to pay its subcontractors and vendors. AEE advanced Gator the agreed upon discount amount. Gator used these funds to pay Tower. Tower repaid AEE in full. Gator prepared an invoice for services provided by Gator, Tower and Tower's subcontractors including a 15 percent markup and submitted it with the reimbursement application either to ET or SEI. AEE advanced ET or SEI the discounted amounts as agreed. ET or SEI paid Gator in the full amount of Gator's invoice plus markup. Gator repaid AEE in full. ET or SEI prepared an invoice for its services plus the services of Gator, Tower, and Tower's subcontractors and a 15 percent markup. ET or SEI submitted the reimbursement application to DEP. When ET or SEI receives reimbursement from the IPTF, they will remit the total payment to AEE. The Applications Petitioners filed the 45 applications that are the subject of this proceeding between July 18, 1994 and February 17, 1995. The financing scheme that Petitioners utilized in these applications was unique. Prior to receiving these applications, DEP never had reviewed reimbursement applications using the type of financing scheme at issue here. In fact, the instant cases present a scenario never contemplated by DEP when promulgating rules and developing written policies. DEP has established a list by which it determines whether an applicant is charging a "reasonable rate." DEP developed that list in accordance with Petroleum Cleanup Reimbursement (PCR) Guideline Number 1. PCR 1 establishes a "predominant rate" for costs involved in the site rehabilitation process. The predominant rate may be exceeded by up to 30 percent for personnel charges, and by up to 50 percent for non-personnel charges. Within these ranges, DEP evaluates each application and determines whether the PRFCSR is entitled to reimbursement for "allowable cost" at "reasonable rates." The work performed by Tower was at or near DEP's "predominant" rate. In no instance were Tower's rates near the upper limits of the reasonable rate ceiling. Tower's invoices appear to represent work that was integral to site rehabilitation which was broken down into appropriate units and rates. There is no evidence of "price fixing" between any entities engaged in site rehabilitation. There is no evidence that Tower intentionally inflated the costs of cleanup or of the scope of cleanup services to cover the cost of financing. There are no familial, beneficial or financial relationships, or any other form of affiliation between Tower and its subcontractors. A certified public accountant (CPA) attestation accompanied the applications indicating that Petitioners incurred (paid) all relevant costs. The applications did not include charges associated with the financing arrangements as line items. The CPA attestations referenced an addendum to the Certification Affidavit. The addendum indicated that "American Environmental Enterprises, Inc., an affiliate of the Environmental Trust, has provided financing to certain contractors and subcontractors by factoring invoices which are included within this application." The CPA provided the reference to the addendum in the CPA attestation as an "emphasis of the matter" statement rather then an "exception," or a modification of the CPA's attestation that Petitioners had incurred all costs in the application. The CPA firm performing the attestation services previously informed DEP of its intent with regard to "emphasis of the matter" reports. Nevertheless, the difference between the face amount of an invoice and the discounted amount of that invoice clearly represents interest. This interest was not allowable as an actual and reasonable cost of site remediation because Gator and Tower agreed to accept a lesser amount for their services prior to submittal of the applications. Therefore, they did not actually incur the amount reflected in the face amount of their invoices. DEP's predominate rates and units are fully loaded. Interest rate charges on borrowed capital from unrelated third-party sources are a "cost of doing business." DEP's fully-loaded rates include a variable for all direct and indirect business overhead costs such as rent, utilities and personnel costs. The direct and indirect overhead components of DEP's fully-loaded rates include the cost of short-term "working" capital. However, DEP never intended the predominate rate schedule to entitle an applicant to reimbursement for costs that it did not actually incur. In the instant cases, funds that passed down through the chain from ET or SEI to Gator or from Gator to Tower flowed directly and immediately back to AEE who was affiliated with the funder. Any profit derived by the funder, ET or SEI, will flow directly to AEE and its investors. The amount that Petitioner's actually incurred before they submitted the applications was the amount that AEE advanced to Tower and/or its subcontractors for integral site work plus the actual cost of Gator's allowable services, if any, which were separate and distinct from Tower's work, plus any allowable markup(s). Factoring Policy At the time that Petitioners submitted the subject applications for reimbursement, there was no rule or written guideline governing financing transactions, including factoring, occurring outside of the usual chain of reimbursement. DEP normally did not inquire about such financing so long as an applicant did not pass the costs of such financial transactions to DEP in the application as a line-item cost. There was no policy disallowing reimbursement for the face amount of the invoices when an applicant sold the right to payment, i.e. the receivable, at a discount to a disinterested third-party in an arms- length transaction. Commencing on August 31, 1994, DEP began to develop a policy regarding the use of factoring as a financing mechanism in the reimbursement program. DEP staff exchanged numerous documents regarding the subject of factoring. In one of those documents, Charles Williams, DEP's Reimbursement Administrator indicated that "we absolutely need to have a Big Meeting to decide what to do once and for all." In a November 1994 telephone conversation, DEP provided AFG's counsel with an informal opinion of how DEP would handle a factored application as described by Will Robins of AFG in an earlier meeting with DEP staff. The statement was: that the difference between the amount that a contractor accepted in payment for his services, which was a discounted amount after factoring, . . . and the face value of the invoice which was claimed and marked up in the application was determined to be a carrying charge or interest, which is specifically disallowed for reimbursement in the reimbursement rule. American Factors Group. Inc. and the Environmental Trust v. Department of Environmental Protection, DOAH Case No. 95-0343RU, Final Order issued July 24, 1995. DEP advised AFG's counsel that it would deal with factored applications involving other entities on a case by case basis. On December 20, 1994, John Ruddell, Director of DEP's Division of Waste Management, sought permission from DEP's Policy Coordinating Committee to promulgate a rule amendment to Chapter 62-773, Florida Administrative Code (formerly Chapter 17-773, Florida Administrative Code.) A draft rule accompanied the request. The draft rule was developed in compliance with Chapter 94-311, Section 6, Laws of Florida, which required DEP to revise its reimbursement rule. The draft rule provided that: nothing in this Chapter shall be construed to authorize reimbursement for the face amount of any bill or invoice representing incurred costs when the receivable has been sold at a discount. In all such cases, reimbursement shall be limited to the actual discounted amount accepted by the provider of the goods or services . . . . The draft rule had the effect of prohibiting factoring as a mechanism for financing site rehabilitation work. It did not single out any other type of financing mechanism. DEP did not promulgate the draft rule because the problems with the program were too numerous to correct in a timely fashion by rulemaking. Instead, DEP focused on drafting proposed legislation. In the meantime, DEP requested that Petitioners furnish additional information regarding the instant applications. Between March 1, 1995 and November 17, 1995, ET and SEI responded to DEP's requests with letters bearing AFG's or EF's letterhead. The letters state that prior to filing the applications, ET or SEI paid Gator for the face amount of Gator's invoices plus Gator's markup. Gator then paid the subcontractors for the face amount of their invoices. Prior to these payments, AEE an affiliate of ET, or SEI purchased the right to receive the amount due to Gator from ET and the right to receive the amount due to subcontractors from Gator. In each case, AEE bought the right to receive at a discount. According to the financing scheme, ET or SEI received sufficient funds from AEE to make the payments to Gator. ET or SEI, in turn, were obligated to pay AEE following their receipt of the funds claimed in the reimbursement application. On April 21, 1995, DEP issued a memorandum to DEP application reviewers to guide them in the processing of reimbursement applications. The memorandum indicated that: invoices from subcontractors, vendors, suppliers and/or the general contractor which were paid a factored (e.g., discounted) amount by a third party capital participant (e.g., funder) represents the actual amount incurred by that entity and subsequently by the general contractor. The memorandum directed reviewers to deduct costs in an amount equal to the difference in the face value of an invoice or application and the amount paid for the right to receive payment under that invoice or application. DEP did not direct the policy set forth in the April 21, 1995 memorandum towards any individual company. DEP intended the policy to apply to "any combination of a general contractor, management company, funder and responsible party" in any situation in which a third-party capital provider paid any program participants a factored (discounted) amount of their invoices." The April 21, 1995, policy did not condition DEP's position on factoring on any affiliation between any parties. Between August 14, 1995 and January 19, 1996, DEP took action on the 45 applications that are the subject of this proceeding. As reflected in those notices, DEP denied reimbursement of costs claimed in those applications "as a result of factoring of the supporting invoices" and because "the difference between the face amount of the supporting invoices and the amount factored represents interests or carrying charges which are specifically excluded from reimbursement pursuant to Rule 62-773.350, F.A.C." The notices properly reflect a basis of denial of costs that is consistent with DEP's policy as reflected in the December 20, 1994 draft rule and the April 21, 1995 memorandum. DEP has proven that its policy on factoring is consistent with its legislative mandate to deny reimbursement of costs which are not actual and reasonable. Affiliation Policy Not all out-of-chain affiliations between entities constitute a problem with regard to reimbursement. However, the instant cases presented DEP with unique facts as to the relationship between AEE, AFG, ET, WIFL and SEI which DEP's rules and written policies do cover. The mere existence of common corporate officers does not, in and of itself, cause AFG/AEE, ET, WIFL, and SEI to lose their integrity as separate legal entities, or make them "one and the same." Common officers of corporations are not an element of the term "financial relationship," nor does the concept of common corporate officers appear in the definitions of beneficial relationship, familial relationship, indirect interests, material interests, or sources of income. DEP's position at hearing that "affiliation" is a major key to it's position with regard to factoring does not appear in any of the documents in which DEP has either discussed or disseminated information regarding factoring. There are no requirements in DEP's application forms to disclose the nature of the relationships between an applicant and an applicant's source of financing. DEP makes no standard inquiry of funders to disclose the nature of any affiliation between the funder and the provider of capital. Nevertheless, the record supports DEP's position that it can deny reimbursement for costs when a PRFCSR has an "affiliation" with a factoring company outside of the chain of reimbursement under the facts of these cases. It is not contested that ET, WIFL, SEI and AFG and its sister company AEE are affiliated. The greater weight of the evidence indicates that this affiliation goes beyond a mere contractual agreement. AFG, AEE, WIFL (which owns ET and is a trust beneficiary), and SEI have common officers and directors. These officers and directors created ET and SEI primarily for the benefit of AFG and AEE as conduits for investment of funds in Florida's petroleum contamination site rehabilitation program. AFG has other investment vehicles, in addition to ET and SEI, which it can designate as a funder depending on the needs of its investors. AFG usually waits until the last instance to select the funder that it will use in any particular case. AFG often selects the funder on the same day that the funder issues its authorization to the general contractor. The greater weight of the evidence indicates that AFG and/or AEE and the Petitioners did not negotiate the contractual agreements between them at arms-length. A bill of sale evidencing the sale of Petitioners' right to receive reimbursement on each application is the only documented evidence of agreements between Petitioners and AFG or AEE. Any profit derived by ET flows back to AEE through WIFL. ET and SEI are under the management and control of AEE and AFG's officers and directors. For all practical purposes ET and SEI are "one and the same" as AEE and AFG. The affiliation between AEE, AFG, WIFL, ET and SEI is especially troublesome here where AEE advanced the discounted amount of invoices to: (a) Tower so that it could pay its subcontractors in full; (b) Gator so that it could pay Tower in full; and (c) its affiliates, ET and SEI, so that they could pay Gator in full. Gator's and Tower's immediate repayment in the face amount of the invoices to AEE is a back flow of funds (interest) to an entity affiliated with Petitioners. All of these transactions took place before Petitioners filed the instant applications or within a few days thereafter. They create a paper trail indicating that the parties within the "chain" at each level incurred the face amount of the next lowest level. However, the only amount actually incurred at the time Petitioners submitted the applications was the discounted amount of the invoices. Interest or Carrying Charges "Incurred" means that "allowable costs have been paid." (Rule 17- 773.200(9), Florida Administrative Code) Under DEP's rules, the facial meaning of the term is that persons must receive due return for their invoiced goods and services, billed on a units and reasonable rates basis, for allowable costs of site rehabilitation. A finance charge usually does not effect DEP's determination of charges that were "incurred" unless that charge appears as a line-item cost which is not the case here. However, these consolidated cases presented DEP with a new scenario in which Gator and Tower immediately repaid the face amount of their invoices to AEE retaining only the discount amount of their invoices to pay the actual costs of the level below them before submitting the applications. Moreover, they included the carrying charges in the applications as having been "incurred." Case Number 95-403RU, Pick Kwick No. 143, DEP Facility No. 528515448 is a typical example showing how the entities in the chain paid interest charges and included them in the application. In that case, Gator provided Tower with a subcontract/purchase order on July 8, 1994. Tower provided Gator with an invoice in the amount of $17,556.43 on July 8, 1994. Tower's invoice represented services performed in connection with the initial remedial action task at the Pick Kwick No. 143 facility including $269.90 for application preparation. On or about July 8, 1994, Gator provided ET with an invoice in the amount of $20,149.41. This invoice included Gator's 15 percent markup in the amount of $2,592.98 and $269.90 for application preparation. On August 4, 1994, AEE purchased Gator's right to receive payment from ET. AEE advanced Gator $17,696.44 or 88 percent of Gator's invoice. The interest charge on the advance was $2,452.97. On August 4, 1994, AEE purchased Tower's right to receive payment from Gator. AEE advanced Tower $17,029.74 or 97 percent of Tower's invoice. The interest charge on the advance was $526.69. On August 10, 1994, AEE purchased ET's right to receive payment from IPTF. AEE advanced ET $20,831.41 or 87 percent of ET's invoice. The interest charge on the advance was $2,981.93. On August 15, 1994, ET filed the reimbursement application in the amount of $23,813.34. This amount included ET's 15 percent markup on the face amount of Gator's invoice. Prior to filing the application, ET paid Gator, $20,149.41. Gator then paid Tower $17,556.43. Following receipt of payment from ET, Gator repaid AEE $20,149.41. Following receipt of payment from Gator, Tower repaid AEE $17,556.43. Gator and Tower made these repayments within a matter of weeks of the time that AEE advanced funds to them. Calculating simple interest, the annualized interest rate on the loan from AEE to Gator was approximately 144 percent. The annualized interest rate on the loan from AEE to Tower was approximately 36 percent. These were the interest rates, as predetermined by the discount percentage in the addenda to the factoring contracts (Gator at 88 percent and Tower at 97 percent), in approximately 30 of the 45 applications. In the other 15 applications, the Gator sold its right to receive payment at a discount percentage between 87 to 89 percent of the face amount of the invoice. In those cases, Tower sold its right to receive payment at a discount percentage between 95 and 72 percent of the face amount of the invoice. There is no evidence that Petitioners made adjustments to the costs in the applications where Gator and Tower sold their right to payments for a discount percentage at an amount other than as stated in the addenda to the factoring contracts. Analysis of the transactions involved in each of the subject applications clearly shows that the financing scheme utilized here was not equivalent to a "plain vanilla" loan from a disinterested third-party capital provider such as a bank. DEP properly deducted costs from Petitioners' applications that represented interest which Gator and Tower agreed to repay to Petitioners' affiliate, AEE, before Petitioners submitted the applications. The only costs that Gator and Tower actually incurred was the net amount that they received after factoring their invoices. That amount includes the difference between the face amount Gator's and Tower's invoices and the amount that AEE advanced to them. Gator and Tower did not actually incur allowable costs in the amount of the interest paid to AEE when they : (a) agreed to accept reimbursement for their services at a discount; (b) accepted the full amount of their invoices from the next highest level; and (c) passed the full amount of their respective invoices back to AEE. DEP did not envision this type of elaborate factoring plan when it created its simple definition of "incurred" as meaning allowable costs have been paid. It is important for participants in the program to know the "rules of the game." Applicants have to make technical and financial decisions regarding site cleanup. They have to pay all contractors and subcontractors prior to submitting an application. In this case Petitioners' attempts to win DEP's pre-approval of their various factoring proposals were unsuccessful because DEP did not have enough information about the transactions and the relationships of the entities involved. After DEP received additional information from Petitioners, it became abundantly clear that the rules were insufficient to cover the financing scheme presented here. As early as November 4, 1993, Petitioners acknowledged that "the provisions of Rule 170773, F.A.C. do not specifically address the types of situations that arise when providing capital for cleanup activities through funding groups such as AFG." Petitioners revealed their final plan in July of 1994 just before they began filing the applications. At that time, Petitioners knew DEP's concerns. They also knew DEP could not make a decision on an application until they filed the application with DEP. Inconsistent Application of Statutes, Rules and Written Guidelines DEP has authorized financial transactions by which other applicants, after incurring (paying) all costs and filing their applications, sold or pledged their right to future payment to an entity outside the usual reimbursement chain. In those cases, DEP did not deduct interest associated with such transactions. DEP's approval of such transactions came before Petitioners filed their applications in this matter. There is no evidence that those transactions involved the factoring of invoices and an agreement to repay interest before the PRFCSR submitted the applications. Likewise, there is no evidence of an affiliation and less than arms-length negotiation between the funder and the financing company in those cases. The record contains no evidence of an inconsistent application of DEP's statutes, rules or written policies before or after Petitioners filed the instant applications. Reservoir Capital On March 14, 1994, DEP met with Reservoir Capital Corporation (Reservoir) to discuss a change of address notice directing reimbursement orders and checks for Clean America Financial, Inc. (Clean America) applications to a Baltimore, Maryland address. During that meeting Reservoir's counsel informed DEP that Reservoir "paid a percentage, not the full cost, for each application." DEP representative, Paul DiGuisseppe, informed Charles Williams of that conversation by memorandum dated March 15, 1994. Mr. DiGuisseppe later spoke with a representative of Clean America (the funder) and advised him to provide a list of facilities pledged to Reservoir for which notices and payments were to be sent to the Baltimore, Maryland address. On March 30, 1994, Clean America wrote to Charles Williams and Doug Jones, providing a list of sites pledged to Reservoir and directing DEP to send payments to the Baltimore, Maryland address. Among the sites pledged to Reservoir were Curry Station, DEP Facility No. 309103537 and Scardo Automotive, DEP Facility No. 428511319. On June 17, 1994, DEP issued a reimbursement order to Scardo Automotive at the Baltimore, Maryland address. On July 1, 1994, DEP issued a reimbursement order to Curry Station at the Baltimore, Maryland address. These orders did not contain a denial of costs or deductions of interest based upon the disclosed fact that Reservoir had purchased the applications for an amount less than their face value. However, there is no evidence that either of the applicants sold the right to receive reimbursement before submitting the application. Additionally, there is no evidence that Reservoir was affiliated with Clean America. On April 11, 1996, DEP revisited the Reservoir Capital factoring mechanism. In that instance, DEP reviewed a situation in which Reservoir Capital directly paid a subcontractor's invoice in an application that All American Funding (All American) filed. Reservoir had purchased the receivable of All American, and applied part of the purchase price to directly pay a subcontractor. There is no evidence of any "affiliation" between Reservoir and any other entity in the reimbursement chain. Prior to the meeting with Reservoir, DEP intended to deny those costs since it appeared that Reservoir actually paid them rather than the applicant, All American. As a result of that meeting, DEP requested additional information from Reservoir. At the time of hearing in these cases, DEP had not made a decision in that case pending receipt of the requested information. Governor's Bank On March 9, 1994, Governors Bank wrote to Charles Williams requesting that DEP directly remit to Governors Bank any reimbursement due on an application filed by Clean America due to the fact that Clean America "secured its borrowings from the bank with any rights to payment which CAFC has in connection with certain reimbursement applications." On March 30, 1994, Clean America sent a letter to Charles Williams and Doug Jones requesting that the DEP honor the March 9, 1994 letter directing payment to Governor's Bank. On November 4, 1994, Clean America advised DEP that DEP was to remit additional final reimbursements to Governors Bank. The letter advised DEP that "based upon a loan relationship Governor's Bank established with Clean America . . ." reimbursement payments had been assigned to Governors Bank and therefore "all payments and proceeds must be remitted to Governor's Bank." There is no record evidence that Clean America entered into a loan agreement with Governors Bank prior to submittal of the application or that the applications included claims for interest paid to the bank. There is no evidence of any affiliation between Clean America and the bank. The financing mechanism that Petitioners used for these 45 applications is not similar to a "plain vanilla" bank loan where a lender advances funds after an applicant files an application and directs DEP to forward reimbursement payments to a bank lock box. Barriston Environmental Investors L.P. On March 11, 1993, Barriston Environmental Investors, L.P. (Barriston) wrote to John Ruddell, Director of the DEP's Division of Waste Management and described a mechanism of financing by which Barriston (the funder) would obtain funds, at least partially through bank debt, for the payment of subcontractors' site rehabilitation invoices. In the Barriston proposal, the subcontractor would remit an "investment banking fee" of 5 percent of the value of the invoices back to the funder upon payment of 100 percent of the invoices. Barriston's letter acknowledged that this fee would not be reimbursable under the program. In addition, the Barriston funder would receive a commitment fee from the site owner which the Barriston funder would not include in the reimbursement claim. A reference in the letter to the payment of interest on funds advanced on the site owner's behalf does not specify the time frame in which interest would be paid, i.e. before or after the filing of an application. The letter sought DEP's approval and assurance that the payment of 100 percent of the invoices would entitle Barriston to full reimbursement including both markups. Barriston's letter requested an informal response because it realized that DEP had no authority to take official agency action without the submission of an application. On April 9, 1993, DEP responded to the Barriston letter. In its response, DEP stated that the arrangements appeared to be consistent with current statutes and rules and would be eligible for the full reimbursement allowed by DEP's rules. However, there is no record evidence of any official agency action on an application submitted in accordance with Barriston's proposal. Interest Indemnification Interest indemnification encompasses a situation in which a contractor pays interest directly back to a funder during the period of time after submittal of an application but before reimbursement by the IPTF. In June 1995, a DEP employee contacted Petitioners' certified public accountant (CPA) inquiring about the practice and seeking copies of his other clients' interest indemnification contracts. After that conversation, the CPA discussed the matter with another DEP employee to confirm his understanding that financing issues were outside of the scope of DEP's review so long as an applicant did not include such charges in the application. Since the June 1995 discussions, DEP has reimbursed applications which were financed through interest indemnification without adjustments for the payment of interest. However, the interest indemnification payments applied to applications after the applicants filed them with DEP to replace long-term interest that IPTF is no longer paying. The applicants were not seeking reimbursement of those payments as incurred costs. Petitioners have not established their entitlement to reimbursement for the factored amounts of their invoices. DEP presented competent evidence to support its "factoring" and "affiliation" policies as applied here. In addition, the evidence indicates that DEP has not inconsistently applied such policies to other similarly situated reimbursement applicants. Petitioners have failed to prove that DEP's denial of costs based upon factoring is not reasonably related to the purpose of reimbursement review and otherwise unsupported by competent evidence. The April 21, 1995 policy statement is a rule as defined in Section 120.52(16), Florida Statutes. DEP was not aware of the need for such a rule when it made the last substantive amendments to Rule 17-773, Florida Administrative Code, in 1993. Nevertheless, DEP demonstrated that the non-rule policy is a reasonable interpretation of Sections 376.3071(12)(b) and 376.3071(12)(d), Florida Statutes. DEP provided an evidentiary basis to support its factoring policy in these consolidated cases. The difference between the face amount of the invoices and their factored amount did not represent allowable costs which were actual and reasonable. DEP deducted the amount of the relevant discount percentage (on a prorated basis) from each invoice submitted by Tower and its subcontractors. There is a discrepancy between the amount that DEP deducted from each invoice (itemized) and the total deduction based on a lump sum in 33 of the 45 cases which DEP did not explain during the hearing. Therefore, before DEP enters a Final Order, it should review the supporting documents to determine the correct deduction in each application. "Value Added" Policy Funders and contractors are entitled to take a markup of paid contractor and subcontractor invoices for allowable costs at reasonable rates. The invoices must represent actual and reasonable costs which are integral to site remediation. Contractors are entitled to a first-tier 15 percent markup for supervising and/or coordinating on-site remediation, for investing capital while awaiting reimbursement by paying subcontractors invoices, and for assuming liability for the performance of the subcontractors. Funders generally are entitled to a second-tier 15 percent markup as an incentive to provide funds to finance the work. Markups are expressly subject to limitations set forth in Section 17- 773.350(9), (10) and (11), Florida Administrative Code. There are no other specific or implied limitations on markups in the rules or written guidelines. Requiring each entity that receives a markup in the reimbursement chain to pay contractor, subcontractor, and vendor invoices helps ensure that each level in the reimbursement chain pays the participant at the next lowest level. In these cases, each level in the reimbursement application chain "technically" paid the next lowest level. DEP policy in effect at the time Petitioners submitted the instant applications for reimbursement was to allow markups of paid invoices at two levels. However, prior to the submission of the instant applications, DEP was not aware of a case where a general contractor claimed a markup for work that was complete before the general contractor became involved in the project. With regard to all of the pending reimbursement applications, Gator applied a 15 percent markup to all of Tower's invoices including the invoices of Tower's subcontractors. With regard to a minimum of 30 of the 45 sites, Gator clearly did not supervise, manage or direct site remediation activities performed by Tower or its subcontractors. In fact, Gator did not become involved until after Tower completed these tasks. In at least 30 of the instant cases, Tower was acting as the general contractor when all of the on-site remediation took place. However, Tower could not apply a 15 percent markup to the invoices for its own services. Gator made it possible for Petitioners to claim the markup on Tower's invoices. As to the 15 sites at which Gator allegedly had some type of involvement with on-site remediation activities, there is no persuasive evidence regarding the specific activities or the level of Gator's involvement on any particular project. On September 1, 1994, Restoration Assistance, an entity under contract with DEP to review reimbursement applications, issued a memorandum to its reviewers directing them to complete their review and do a "total denial" on "Gator Environmental packages." The memorandum advised the reviewers that "Bruce" was drafting canned language to use in DEP's denial statement. On or about April 21, 1995, DEP presented its reviewers with a memorandum setting forth an initial overview of a "value added" policy for markups taken by a "management company" involved in site remediation activities. According to the memorandum, DEP would allow reimbursement of claims for actual project management work and value-added services. The memorandum further provided that DEP would allow markups to a management company which only provided cash-flow services for a majority of the program task period even if the management company performed no other service. However, DEP would deny a markup if the management company provided such services during a "one month time period." DEP intended for the April 21, 1995 memorandum to acquaint DEP reviewers with the emerging DEP policy on markups. DEP's rules and written guidelines do not address the distinction made in the April 21, 1995 memorandum regarding the timing during which a management company could provide cash flow services and still be entitled to a markup. On October 20, 1995, Charles Williams issued a DEP policy memorandum for reviewers to use in reviewing reimbursement applications. Through that memorandum, DEP finalized and implemented the "value added" policy. The memorandum states that: if the 'GC' [general contractor] was involved with the management of the project during the course of the actual work by subcontractors, [DEP] rules do not preclude them from applying a markup. However, if the 'GC' came along after the work was completed by other contractors and their involvement was more of a due diligence exercise to faciltiate (sic) a funding arrangement by a third party, then the 'GC' markup would not be justified, though a markup by the actual funder listed as the PRFCSR could be allowed. Prior to the establishment of the "value added" policy on October 20, 1995, DEP made no inquiry as to whether a contractor provided value added services in order for the contractor to be entitled to a markup. DEP applied the "value added" policy to all pending applications (including the ones at issue here) resulting in a deduction of Gator's markup in all of the subject cases. The Department of Banking and Finance reviewed and issued a report (Comptroller's Report) on the Petroleum Contamination Site Cleanup Reimbursement Program on November 29, 1994. This report addressed the issue of markups in the reimbursement program. The Comptroller's Report recognized that DEP found the multiple markup structure to be beneficial in that it "attracts the involvement of companies whose role in cleanup projects is limited to providing funds to finance the work [and] attracts investors who provide funds which might not otherwise be available--thus facilitating cleanup of contaminated sites." The Comptroller's Report describes a two-tier arrangement involving a "prime contractor engaged to manage the cleanup project" and a "funding entity." The report acknowledges that the prime contractor "might have only limited direct involvement in the cleanup, having engaged subcontractors for most or all of the actual work." The example in the Comptroller's report did not state what DEP's policy would be if a subcontractor had completed all of the actual work before the contractor became involved. Even without this consideration, the report was critical of DEP's allowance of markups on either level. The Petroleum Efficiency Task Force (PETF) issued its final report on financing contractors on August 17, 1994. This report discussed DEP's policy of allowing two markups. In this discussion, the PETF recognized that "funders must be able to rely on the skills and knowledge of contractors to minimize reimbursement shortfalls." The PETF recommended for future consideration that "the Department should provide in rulemaking that contractors who take the first-tier 15 percent markup on subcontracted work must adequately supervise the work." When the PETF issued its report, there was no existing rule that established any level of on site supervision or any other specific criteria for applying one of the two allowable levels of markup, other than paying invoices for integral site rehabilitation work. DEP's rules and written guidelines did not substantively change with regard to the "value added" policy from the April 22, 1993 revision of Chapter 17-773, Florida Administrative Code, to the October 20, 1995 memorandum which established a non-rule limitation on the ability of an entity to apply a markup to paid invoices. Because the rules and written guidelines do not reflect the "value added" policy, a participant in the program would not be aware of it even if the participant requested program information. Gator technically paid 100 percent of the face value of Tower's invoices. Without Gator's involvement, AFG and AEE would not have financed these applications. However, DEP presented persuasive evidence at the hearing to support its position that Gator was not entitled to a markup because Gator's services added no value to site remediation projects. In the instant cases, Gator performed some type of a minimal due diligence review of Tower's site work. Gator allegedly reviewed Tower's technical and administrative files, cross-referenced technical and administrative files with the applications which Tower prepared, made visits to some job sites, and prepared a deficiency letter to determine the appropriateness of the scope of Tower's work. However, all of these functions were repetitious of the work that was performed by Tower and the certified public accountant attesting to the Certification Affidavit. Gator limited the deficiency letters to the question of whether the scope of Tower's services were reimbursable. However, there is no evidence that Tower's deficiency letters resulted in adjustments to costs in the applications as filed by Petitioners. The deficiency letters served only to adjust the discount percentage set forth in the addenda to the factoring contracts. Tower was a qualified engineering consulting firm that employed its own engineers and geologists. Gator's employee that reviewed the technical information in Tower's files was not a Florida professional engineer. He was not qualified as a certified public accountant to determine whether a charge was within DEP's reasonable rates. The Gator employee was a Florida professional geologist but he did not sign and seal the deficiency letter as such. There is no reference in DEP's rules or written policies to a deficiency letter. AFG required Gator to prepare the deficiency letter within two days of the date on which EF provided Gator with the opportunity to review a completed task. This two-day turn around time allegedly afforded efficiency of payment. Gator did not begin its review of an reimbursement application until after Gator received an invoice from Tower. The relevant subcontract/purchase order issued by Gator to Tower, the Tower invoice and the Gator invoice were often prepared on the same day. Gator technically paid Tower's invoices with funds that AEE advanced. Tower used these funds to repay AEE. When Gator received payment from ET or SEI, it passed the funds back to AEE before ET or SEI submitted the applications to DEP or immediately thereafter. Pursuant to the addenda to the factoring contracts, Tower, not Gator, contributed to a reserve trust account which AEE will use to cover any reimbursement shortfalls. Gator indemnified AEE and guaranteed its own work but did not assume a risk of loss on Tower's work. On most if not all of the applications, Gator performed no meaningful management or supervisory functions. The greater weight of the evidence indicates that Gator's primary purpose in these consolidated cases was not to afford AFG a level of comfort as to the appropriate scope of the individual program tasks but to ensure that third-party investors maximized their profits. The "value added" agency statement has the effect of a rule which DEP did not contemplate when it promulgated its rules and written policies. Nevertheless, DEP's decision concerning the value added policy is within the scope of its delegated legislative authority. DEP has proven that reimbursement for Gator's services was not allowable as actual and reasonable costs of site remediation. Therefore, it is not entitled to a first-tier markup. Computer Costs Prior to January 1, 1995, DEP determined the reimbursability of computer costs based upon a "units and rates basis" as provided by Rules 17- 773.100(5), and 17-733.700(2)(d), Florida Administrative Code. DEP evaluated computer costs "as a certain number of hours [at] a reasonable rate." Pursuant to the units and rates rule provisions, there was no rational basis for DEP to deny the computer costs contained in applications filed prior to January 1, 1995. On January 1, 1995, DEP established a policy by which it would disallow in full any computer costs greater than $750. Under that policy, DEP would reimburse in full an applicant's computer costs with supporting invoices of $749 dollars, but disallow in full computer costs with supporting invoices of $751. DEP's reimbursement orders involving more than $750 in computer costs after January 1, 1995 routinely stated that "there was insufficient justification to demonstrate that this computer time was integral to the task or necessary." DEP applied the computer policy to all applications filed and pending review at the time it developed the policy, regardless of when an applicant performed the work or generated the records. DEP applied the January 1, 1995 computer policy to the application in Case No. 95-4606 which ET filed on July 18, 1994. In that case DEP denied $1,456.25 in computer costs allowing no reimbursement for computer time. On April 27, 1995, DEP implemented a new policy by which it evaluated computer costs based upon a calculation of allowable personnel hours per task as opposed to a units and rates basis. Under that policy DEP would evaluate the total allowable personnel hours in a task and limit computer costs to 10 percent of those hours up to a maximum of $750. Under the April 27, 1995 policy, DEP reduced the reimbursement for computer costs to $500 if the reimbursable amount exceeded $750 after DEP made the 10 percent calculation. DEP implemented the April 27, 1995 policy through the use of a calculation work sheet which it provided to its application reviewers. DEP applied the April 27, 1995 computer policy and work sheet to all applications pending review at the time DEP developed the policy, regardless of when the applicant performed the work or generated the records. DEP applied the April 27, 1995, policy in all of the subject cases subsequent to Case No. 95-4606, with the following exceptions: Case Nos. 96- 0432RU, 96-1006 and 96-1009, which had no denial of computer costs; and Case No. 96-1352, in which DEP applied the 10 percent limitation, but reimbursed 896.75 dollars of the computer costs. After implementation of the April 27, 1995 policy, DEP made no effort to adjust the denial of all computer costs in Case No. 95-4606 under the January 1, 1995 policy. The only other category in which DEP evaluates reimbursement on a percentage of hours basis, rather than a units and rates basis, is total management costs. DEP's written guidelines and Rule 17-773.350(16), Florida Administrative Code, limit management costs to a percentage of total allowable personnel hours. There are no rules or written guidelines that would limit computer costs based upon criteria other than a units and rates evaluation, or that would support DEP's policies as reflected in the January 1, 1995 and April 27, 1995 policy memoranda. DEP's rules and written guidelines did not substantively change with regard to this issue from the time Petitioners filed the subject applications, to the time DEP established the January 1, 1995 and the April 27, 1995 computer policies. DEP did not issue any PCRs or other written guidelines to place applicants on fair notice of DEP's new policies with regard to computer costs. DEP presented no persuasive evidence at the hearing to support its January 1, 1995 and April 27, 1995 policies. The only basis for the policy was DEP's representation that it developed the policies as a "reasonableness issue" in order to reduce the amount of computer costs that were appearing in reimbursement applications. DEP did not demonstrate that it based the new policies on any calculation of the amount of computer time necessary to perform a remediation task. Once the total computer costs reached $750 dollars, DEP gave no consideration to the scope or complexity of the task. Given the difference in the amounts involved in performing site remediation services (e.g. an application totaling 7,249.75 dollars in Case No. 96-0411RU versus an application totaling 149,080.02 dollars in Case No. 96-0425RU) and the differences in program tasks (see Rule 17-773.500, Florida Administrative Code), a policy establishing a flat numerical limit on computer costs that an applicant may claim in an application is not reasonable. DEP presented no evidence at the hearing to prove the basis for its retroactive application of the policies to work performed and applications submitted prior to the development of the policies. DEP did not attempt to explain the basis for its failure to apply the rules and written guidelines in effect at the time the work was performed or the records generated. Based upon the foregoing, DEP's denial of computer costs in each of these applications is not supported by the statutes, rules and written guidelines in effect at the time the work was performed or the applications were filed. Each application contains information supporting the computer costs. The application Certification Affidavits and CPA attestations demonstrate that Petitioners incurred the computer costs which DEP should reimburse. The reimbursement for computer costs should be in full except to the extent that DEP allocates to a supporting document a prorated share of the amount of a discount on a factored invoice. As a final note, of the computer costs denied in 16 of the 45 reimbursement notices, the sum of the allowances and deductions does not equal the overall claim. The differences ranged from a few dollars to over four hundred dollars. DEP provided no evidence to explain the discrepancy in the amount calculated by DEP in its notices. Miscellaneous Costs Prior to September 27, 1995, DEP reimbursed miscellaneous line-item costs when the applicant furnished support for them in the application. The miscellaneous costs policy as of May 17, 1995 even dispensed with the requirement of supporting invoices when these costs totaled less than 300 dollars. DEP's reviewers are employees of a firm that provides DEP with application review services as an independent contractor. On September 27, 1995, after a meeting with DEP staff, the application reviewers implemented a policy to deny costs for "overhead." Under the new policy, certain items were overhead, including but not limited to: gloves, mason jars, sampling disposables, phone calls, excessive faxes, excessive copying, small hand tools, shipping documents, etc. The application reviewers had to exercise their own discretion as to which items were "overhead" until they received a guideline from DEP. The reviewers decided to approve overhead expenses of less than $50 and deny items for more than $50. The policy continued in existence at least through November 9, 1995. DEP applied the miscellaneous/overhead policy to all of the subject applications, regardless of the date of cleanup work or application submittal. The application reviewers applied the miscellaneous/overhead "policy" without the knowledge of DEP's Reimbursement Administrator, Charles Williams. When Mr. Williams found out about the policy, he "counselled them that they need to reverse that position." The correct policy would allow reimbursement of "miscellaneous/overhead" costs that the reviewers denied in 33 of the 45 applications. DEP made no effort to correct the denial of these costs based upon its erroneously applied policy. DEP presented no persuasive evidence at the hearing to support its application of the miscellaneous/overhead policy in applications submitted prior to the development of the policy. DEP did not explain the basis for its failure to apply the rules and written guidelines in effect at the time the subcontractors performed the work or generated the records. Based upon the foregoing, DEP's denial of miscellaneous/overhead costs in 33 applications in which DEP denied such costs is not supported by the applicable states, rules and written guidelines. Each application contains information supporting the miscellaneous costs. The applications' Certification Affidavits and CPA Attestations demonstrate that Petitioner's incurred the miscellaneous costs. Therefore, DEP should reimburse those miscellaneous costs. The reimbursement should be in full except to the extent that DEP allocates to a supporting document a prorated share of the amount of a discount on a factored invoice. Airfare From June 17, 1993, to sometime prior to January 31, 1996, DEP's policy with regard to the reimbursement of airfare was to pay airfare integral to site rehabilitation when such costs were relatively inexpensive. By no later than January 31, 1996, DEP developed and applied a policy to deny all airfare costs regardless of whether the applicant provided justification. On March 13, 1996, DEP decided that once again it would reimburse airfare with sufficient justification such as a comparison with car travel. DEP considers the changes in reimbursability of airfare as "just procedures to follow," and applicable without regard to the timing of work performed. DEP denied airfare charges in Case No. 96-1353 as overhead charges. DEP's rules and written guidelines did not substantively change with regard to airfare from June 17, 1993, when airfare was reimbursable, to the policy implemented on January 31, 1996, in which airfare was not reimbursable, to March 13, 1996, when airfare was reimbursable once again. DEP issued no PCRs or other written guidelines to place applicants on fair notice of the changes in policy with regard to airfare. DEP has not provided any evidence to support the basis for the fluctuations in its airfare policy. DEP presented no evidence at the hearing to provide the basis for its application of the airfare policy to work performed and applications submitted prior to the development of the changes in policy. DEP did not explain the basis for its failure to apply the rules and written guidelines in effect at the time the subcontractors performed the work or generated the records. Based upon the foregoing, DEP's denial of airfare costs in the application for Case No. 96-1353 is not supported by the applicable rules and written guidelines. The application contains information supporting the miscellaneous costs. The application's Certification Affidavit and CPA Attestation demonstrate that Petitioner ET incurred the airfare costs. Therefore, DEP should reimburse airfare costs in full except to the extent that DEP allocates to a supporting invoice the prorated amount of a discount on a factored invoice. Inconsistent Agency Practice The application of DEP's factoring policy did not treat Petitioners in a manner different from other funders. Heretofore, DEP was not aware of a case where program participants factored their invoices before filing an application and claimed the face amount of those invoices for reimbursement. The affiliation between Petitioners and AFG and/or AEE was also unique. DEP issued a memorandum requiring funders to provide "clarification regarding essential cost documentation" on July 26, 1995. The purpose of this memorandum was to remind application reviewers of the need for a funder to submit an invoice documenting and supporting its line-item claim for the second- tier 15 percent markup. DEP did not intend for this memorandum to limit DEP's ability to inquire about relationships and transactions taking place outside the usual chain of reimbursement when an application on its face refers to a factoring scheme involving an "affiliation" between the factoring company and the funder. DEP does not deduct finance charges when an applicant incurs (pays) all invoices, submits the application, then sells the receivable or agrees to pay long-term interest pending receipt of payment from the IPTF. In the instant cases, Petitioners agreed to accept reimbursement for their services at a discount before they submitted the applications then included the cost of borrowing capital in the application. DEP does not routinely ask questions of other applicants regarding their financing. Nevertheless, under the facts of these cases, DEP would have been remiss in its duty if it had not made such inquiries. DEP's actions in the instant cases are not inconsistent with its actions taken in other cases with other similarly situated entities because there is no evidence that other such cases exist. Bias On August 31, 1994, Bruce French provided Charles Williams with a memorandum in which Mr. French discussed factoring. In his memorandum, Mr. French concluded that DEP could only reimburse the "discount" amount that the factoring company actually incurred/paid the funders. On September 1, 1994, Mr. French had a discussion with someone named "Toni" at McGuinnes Laboratories regarding the laboratories' use of AFG services for financing invoices to Tower. On September 2, 1994, Mr. French related in a memorandum to Charles Williams, his understanding that the laboratory had different price lists for different customers, generally depending on volume of analysis performed and individual payment agreements. Mr. French surmised that the laboratory's price for services "is inflated to deal with AFG's discount price to be paid by AFG." Mr. French concluded that, under those circumstances, AFG's financing arrangements may "represent collusion on behalf of all parties to the application to defraud DEP for the benefit of AFG. That is, prices are 'fixed' prior to performing of services." On September 2, 1994, Mr. Williams responded to Mr. French's memo by indicating that the scenario presented by Mr. French "sounds interesting" and that DEP would "absolutely need to have a Big Meeting to decide what to do once and for all." On September 12, 1994, Mr. French provided information on factoring to Bill Sittig of DEP's Office of the Inspector General and to Mr. Williams. Mr. French included a drawing entitled "The Tangled Web They Weave or the Hidden Discount Line Items and other Fluff, August 31, 1994 Interpretation of Bruce French's Discussion." At the hearing, neither Mr. Sittig nor Mr. Williams remembered seeing the drawing. There is no competent evidence as to the identity of the person creating the drawing. There is no persuasive competent evidence that Mr. French was biased against Petitioners or any other entity utilizing factoring as a mechanism of financing. Moreover, DEP had no direct and demonstrable bias against Petitioners. Timeliness of Agency Action Prior to filing the instant applications, representatives of the funders and AFG presented various financing schemes to DEP for pre-approval. In each proposal, the person speaking for AFG also spoke on behalf of the funders. At all times relevant here, Paul DeCoster was secretary and counsel for AFG. He was also secretary of SEI and a corporate director and shareholder of WIFL. In September of 1993, Mr. DeCoster wrote a letter to DEP describing a proposed financing scheme in which AFG would purchase the account receivables of contractors engaged in site rehabilitation. AFG's plans were in a formative stage at this time. Mr. DeCoster wrote DEP a follow-up letter dated October 4, 1993. This letter states that: the amount of financing required to meet [certain contractor clients'] working capital needs is so large that FEC [a funder] must find large institutional investors to accommodate them. For service of finding such investors, FEC proposes to charge a fee to the contractor client, which would be in addition to the 15 [percent] 'markup' taken by the investor providing the financing. The October 4, 1993 letter disclosed that contractor clients would deposit funds in a trust account as security for the performance of their work. The trust would invest its funds "in accounts receivable purchased from AFG, the parent of FEC, and any income earned by the trust on those investments would inure to the benefit of AFG." The plan that Mr. DeCoster proposed was markedly different from the scheme utilized here. The most noticeable differences are that the subject applications did not involve a finder's fee, FEC as a funder, or the purchase of AFG's accounts receivable by a reserve trust. In October of 1993, Will Robins met with DEP staff to discuss the manner in which the reimbursement program would apply to a proposed financing scheme. In this proposal, AFG would charge contractors an application/initiation fee and/or a commitment fee. The transactions between the entities in the instant applications did not involve an application/initiation fee and/or a commitment fee. When Mr. Robins made his presentation, DEP did not know the specific relationships between the entities involved or Mr. Robins' position as an officer, director, and or shareholder of these entities. After that meeting, counsel for AFG sent DEP a letter dated November 4, 1993. The letter acknowledges that the existing rules did not "specifically address the types of situations that arise when providing capital for cleanup activities through funding groups such as AFG." The letter identifies ET as the proposed funder through which AFG would finance cleanups. According to the letter, ET would incur the costs but AFG would hold the right to receive the ultimate reimbursement payment from the IPTF. The letter clearly reveals DEP's concern that the proposed application/initiation fee was a "kickback" which should be deducted from the funder's markup. In January of 1994, counsel for AFG wrote a letter to DEP describing a financing scheme which differs in some respects from the financing scheme at issue here. This letter states that AFG intended to purchase receivables of the funder and the general contractor at a discount. Under this plan, the general contractor and the funder would claim the two allowable markups. The subcontractors would pay AFG a finder's fee. The letter reveals that AFG, its affiliates, and investors would recover the cash equivalent of both levels of markups plus a fee from subcontractors for funding the high costs of risky projects. The letter states that: since the Department's reimbursement rules do not specifically address the issue of site cleanups that are funded through private sources of capital . . . it is important that we know if there are any obvious or glaring problems with this plan that would cause reimbursement to be withheld otherwise restricted. On July 13, 1994, counsel for AFG wrote DEP to explain some modifications in the details to the proposed plan for the purchase and sale of receivables at a discount. This letter informed DEP that AFG would have a financial affiliation with the funder (ET) which would exist outside the chain of reimbursement and which would have no effect on either the markups or the overall reimbursement amount reflected in any application. All contracts within the chain of reimbursement (between ET, SEI, Gator, Tower, and its subcontractors) would be negotiated in arms-length transactions. The letter states: In this plan the subcontractors will perform their work on the site and will prepare their invoices in a manner consistent with any publicly or privately financed cleanup. Those invoices will be complied and forwarded to the general contractor for its review and the general contractor will add on the markup allowed by rule to the subcontractor's bills. The reimbursement application will then be forwarded to the funder who will ensure that all bills have been paid and who will be identified as the "person responsible for conducting site rehabilitation" on the reimbursement application. The funder will take the second markup allowed by rule, and will submit the reimbursement application to the Department of Environmental Protection for processing. Reimbursement will ultimately be paid by the Department to the funder in accordance with the reimbursement application. At no step in this process will the Department relinquish any authority to review and approve either the scope and nature of the cleanup or the rates charged by the contractors and subcontractors. Petitioners filed the first of their applications with DEP on July 18, 1994, five days after the date of the July 13, 1994 letter. In late November, 1994, after all but 4 of the 45 applications were filed, DEP placed a telephone call to Petitioners' counsel advising him of the position DEP intended to take with regard to his client's financing arrangements. DEP did not provide any written confirmation of that call, or issue any document describing its policy, until April 21, 1995. In each of the above described letters and/or meetings, AFG's attempt to ascertain DEP's position regarding the various proposed financing mechanisms was unsuccessful. However, AFG was aware that DEP could not take a position that represented official agency action until an applicant actually filed an application. At no time did DEP make any affirmative statement which misled Petitioners regarding the acceptability of AFG's proposals. There is no persuasive evidence to support a finding that the agency did not timely respond to the claims for reimbursement.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing, it is recommended that DEP enter a Final Order in each of these consolidated cases: (a) disallowing reimbursement of the first- tier markup; (b) disallowing reimbursement of any factored invoice in an amount equal to the amount of the discount on that invoice; and (c) allowing reimbursement of costs associated with airfare, computers, and miscellaneous/overhead expenses. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of October, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of October, 1996. COPIES FURNISHED: E. Gary Early, Esquire Christopher R. Haughee, Esquire Akerman, Senterfitt and Eidson, P.A. 216 South Monroe Street, Suite 200 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-2555 W. Douglas Beason, Esquire Betsy F. Hewitt, Esquire Department of Environmental Protection 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2400 Virginia B. Wetherell, Secretary Department of Environmental Protection Douglas Building 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 Perry Odom, Esquire Department of Environmental Protection 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000
The Issue Whether Beker Phosphate Corporation should be granted a hermit to construct an industrial waste water facility pursuant to chapter 403, Florida Statutes. By application, dated April 8, 1975, Beker Phosphate Corporation (hereinafter Beker) , sought a permit to construct an industrial waste water facility in Manatee County, Florida, from the Department of Pollution Control (now and hereinafter DER) . The application was received on April 11 and, after advising Beker that the application was incomplete a meeting was held on May 9th between DER and Beker representatives with the result that Beker filed a new application dated June 11, that was received by the DER in July. Further meetings were held in the fall of 1975 and additional in formation was received as to the application. On December 16, 1975, DER secretary. Jay W. Landers, Jr., issued a Notice Of Intent To Grant A Permit With Conditions. The conditions were unspecified in the letter of intent (Exhibit 1.) Subsequently, on December 23 and December 24, 1975, Sarasota County (hereinafter Sarasota) and the Town of Longboat Key (hereinafter Longboat Key), respectively, filed petitions with the DER alleging that their substantial interests would be adversely affected by approval of the permit application and setting forth in their petitions certain disputed questions of fact for determination. After a prehearing conference, Amended Petitions were filed by those parties to clarify and expand on such questions of fact and to resolve procedural matters. Additionally, during this period, George Browning, III, of Sarasota, Florida was granted status as an intervenor.
Findings Of Fact Beker proposes to construct a phosphate rock mine and beneficiation plant on a tract of approximately 11,000 acres in a predominately agricultural and ranching area of Manatee County about 10 miles from Myakka City, Florida. The mining will be performed by two dredges. One will mine overburden and return it to the mined-out area and the other will mine phosphate rock matrix which will be pumped to the beneficiation plant. The plant will consist essentially of two circuits. The first is a washer where the matrix pumped from the dredging operation is partially cleaned of clay and fine sand, and the coarser phosphate particles "pebbles" are separated as a product. The "fines" from the washing operation consist of small phosphate rock particles, sand, and clay. This mixture will be treated in the second section of the plant by "flotation" methods to recover the small phosphate rock particles as a product. During initial operation, the sand and clay will be stored in a temporary waste material storage area, but as the mining proceeds and the dredge pits open up, the sand and clay material will be pumped back to the dredge pits so that sand, and overburden will be mixed and redeposited to reclaim the land. Approximately 8 million gallons of fresh water per day will be drawn from the Floridian aquifer to be used in the flotation circuits. From the plant the water flows in two types of streams--one containing sand suspended in water and one containing clay suspended in water. Both streams flow into a settling pond surrounded by an earthen dam where sand and clay solids settle to the bottom. The clarified water is then decanted through six spillway structures into a hydraulic recirculation ditch outside the dam and flows back to the plant for re-use. The ponds and canals that make up the hydraulic circuit are planned to have sufficient capacity to contain rainwater falling on the site and pond system during the wet season when there are heavy rainfalls (approximately from May to September). Excess water will be decanted from the hydraulic recirculation ditch through a structure into a pipe and then discharged into Wingate Creek. The settling pond will occupy approximately 225 acres and its capacity will be about 8,458 acre- feet. The pond itself can be used to act as a reservoir and water can be built up in the pond during periods of high rainfall. It will not be necessary to release the water at any particular time. It can be released at will when the effluent contains a minimum of pollutant materials (Exhibit 1). Matrix is an unconsolidated mixture of phosphate pebbles and boulders of partly phosphatized limestone, quartz and clay. The washing operation removes unwanted oversized material and fine clays. The purpose of the flotation plant is to recover fine phosphate rock that might otherwise be lost. In the flotation process, flotation reagents, including sulfuric acid, number 2 fuel oil, tall oil, sodium hydroxide, and amines are used for treatment. The wastes are then moved to the settling pond where over a period of time the "slimes", (sands and clays) will settle to the bottom forming an impervious layer which will seal the pond. The settling process removes more than 90 percent of the contaminants from the influent. The coarser clay particles settle first and many of the fine particles settle in a process called "flocculation" by which electrical forces bring the particles together. However, some of the particles will not flocculate and remain suspended in the water. These extremely small particles constitute the total suspended solids that remain in the effluent when it is discharged from the settling area. They probably will not settle out entirely during their course from Wingate Creek into the Myaaka River and eventually to the Gulf of Mexico. However, even if it were assumed that such materials would settle somewhere between the point of discharge and Charlotte Harbor, over the entire 20 year proposed life of the mine they would form a deposit much less than 1/10th of an inch. Although it is technically possible to treat water to the degree that it would result in distilled water, realistic concepts of treatment establish that an additional settling or "polishing" pond for the proposed facility might not improve the quality of the wastewater finally discharged in state waters to any appreciable degree. Alternative proposals for the reduction of pollutants by additional processing, such as the intentional growth of water hyacinths in settling areas or use of chemical coagulants would result in creating other waste materials and thus be counterproductive (Testimony of Bromwell; Exhibit 1). The applicant's discharge of wastewater to Wingate Creek will average approximately 3.19 million gallons per day. However, since discharge will be effected primarily during periods of excessive rainfall, actual discharges can reach a maximum of about ten million gallons per day during this period. The effluent contained in such discharge will meet the test of at least 90 percent removal of organic and inorganic wastes specified by Rule 17-3.04(1), Florida Administrative Code, when measured by the influent into the settling pond and the effluent leaving that area. This treatment, however, will not produce an effluent equivalent to that produced by the "highest quality municipal waste treatment." The highest degree of treatment that has been reached by municipalities is "advanced waste treatment" as defined in Rule 17-3.04(2)(b), Florida Administrative Code. The water quality characteristics of the effluent will meet the standards of Rule 17-3.05 as to concentrations of those pollutants reasonably anticipated to be fond in the wastewater based on samples taken where the waters are discharged into Wingate Creek (Testimony of Gilgallon, Davis, Edwards, Heinzman, Bromwell, Bartow, Wellford, Exhibit 1). In preparing the application, no consideration was given to the need of meeting treatment standards for highest quality municipal waste treatment or advanced waste treatment. Neither did the recommending official of the DER, Mr. Edwards, then Regional Administrator for the Southwest Region, consider this standard because he had been advised by the DER legal staff that Rule 17-3.04(2) did not apply to Wingate Creek since it was not a tributary to one of the bodies of water listed in subparagraph (c) of the rule 17-3.04(2). This determination was based upon Resolution No. 74-83, September 17, 1974, of the Florida Pollution Control Board that was issued after legal challenges had been made to an interpretation by the Department of Pollution Control legal staff that Rule 17-3.04(2) required advanced wastewater treatment for industrial waste discharges. The Board, in its resolution, determined that since evidence had not been taken concerning treatment standards for industrial waste discharges at the time of adoption of the effluent standards for sanitary waste contained in Rule 17-3.04(2), the advanced wastewater treatment standards in the aforesaid rule would not be enforced against industrial dischargers pending full hearings on a new Rule to clearly express the Board's intent in this regard (Testimony of Gilgallon, Edwards; Exhibit 1). Special conditions that the Southwest Region, Department of Environmental Regulation, recommends should be attached to any issuance of a construction permit, other than standard conditions and those relating to other types of permits, are as follow: Approval by DER prior to the construction of any above grade phosphatic clay storage facility other than the initial settling pond. Removal efficiencies for oil and grease shall be a minimum of 90 percent and shall not exceed 14 milligrams per liter measured in the discharge effluent. Discharge effluent to Wingate Creek shall meet the water quality standards of Chapter 17-3.05(2) at the point of discharge prior to mixing with the receiving stream. Further treatment of the discharge will be required in the event compliance with proviso (c) above cannot be achieved or significant degradation of the receiving stream occurs as determined by the DER. In addition to required routine monitoring, a detailed analysis of the untreated and treated wastewater to be conducted once on representative samples during (1) month of July and (2) month of February. Such analyses shall, as a minimum, include all the parameters listed in 17-3:05(2). Applicants shall conduct an investigation into total retention possibilities of the effluent including, but not limited to, the following areas: recharge wells retention and storage of excess water during the "wet" season with subsequent reuse during the "dry" season for process and/or irrigation purposes. A report of these investigations shall be submitted prior to submission of operation permit application The location of monitoring wells shall be down gradient from the settling pond. Detailed proposal, subject to the DER approval, regarding exact location and number of wells to adequately ascertain the impact of seepage to be submitted no later than 90 days prior to commencement of operation. Bond to be posted for damages that may result from a clay settling area dam failure. Oral and written communications from the public were received at the hearing and included the following: Announcement by the County Attorney, Manatee County, that the county did not plan to appeal the DER Notice of Intent to Grant the permit (Statement of E.N. Fay, Jr.). The Division of Recreation and Parks, Department of Natural Resources, fears that the construction of the phosphate mine up-stream from the Myaaka diver State Park poses a serious potential threat to its aquatic habitat due to the possibility of a dam failure. It also fears that pollutants from the project will tend to settle as the river waters flow through the two lakes in the park. It therefore, opposes the construction until assurance can be given that proper safeguards have been taken to prevent such problems (Testimony of Alverez). The Longboat Key Garden Club believes that the project would involve too much water consumption and also that phosphate mining should be halted until further government studies are made to assure that the safety and health of the populace and the environment will not be endangered through polluted runoff and phosphate spills (Testimony of Monroe). The Save Our Bays Association in Manatee County has collected petitions from citizens in Manatee County requesting a referendum on a ballot this November for or against phosphate mining. The Association believes that such a vote should be taken before final decision is made on the subject. Its spokesman fears that if the quality and quantity of the drinking water is disrupted, it will interfere with continued tourist trade (Testimony of Howard Greer). The Palma Sola Parks Association opposes the Beker Application until there is greater assurance of environmentally safe mining (Testimony of Blankenship) A former physical and health education director is concerned about the fact that there has not been sufficient data collected on the effect of radioactive materials in runoff and waste. She believes there should be more research in these areas and asked that the public be protected from such hazards (Testimony of Mary Kay Greer). The Manasota-88 project for environmental qualities of 1968 and 1988 believes that issuance of the permit should be withheld until health implications can be determined concerning potential hazards to the Myakka and Manatee Rivers' watersheds (Exhibit 7). A former member of the Manatee County Planning Commission that approved the Beker application prior to action by the County Commission of Manatee County is in favor of the proposed project because Beker's plan to impound water will augment the water facilities of the county (Testimony of Reasoner). The City of Bradenton believes that since it is being required to meet advanced water treatment standards of discharge for sanitary sewage, Beker Phosphate Corporation should be required to meet similar standards (Testimony of Mayor A.K. Leach). A member of the Myakka City Civic Association who is an adjacent land owner to Beker Phosphate Corporation feels that the project is necessary in order to produce jobs for individuals in that area of the county (Testimony of Mizell). The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service is concerned that proposed construction of two dams by the applicant will destroy approximately (4) acres of mangrove areas, three acres of pasture land and about 185 acres of bottom land or hardwood habitat. It recommends an alternative method of backup levies constructed around the primary settling bases on the applicant's land to contain any spills and prevent destruction of the streams and associated wetlands (Testimony of Johnston) The Conservation Council of Manatee County believes that Beker's unique mining and reclamation plan will help the farming industry and also create necessary water reserviors and recreation areas, and therefore endorses its proposal to mine in Manatee County (Testimony of Kent, Exhibit 14). Petitions were submitted at the hearing from approximately 3,000 individuals living in Manatee and Sarasota Counties opposing the issuance of the permit because they believe that phosphate mining is dangerous to the quality and supply of the water and endangers the health of the people (Composite Exhibit 9, Testimony of Humphrey).
The Issue The issues in this case are whether Respondent, L.B. King, Jr., violated certain rules relating to petroleum contamination site cleanup criteria promulgated by Petitioner, Department of Environmental Protection (Department), whether he should be required to pay an administrative fine and investigative costs and expenses incurred by the Department, and whether he should take corrective action, as described in the Department's Notice of Violation, Orders for Corrective Action, and Administrative Penalty Assessment (Notice of Violation) issued on June 15, 2007.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the record presented by the parties, and those allegations in the Notice of Violation which are undisputed, the following findings of fact are determined: Respondent is the owner and operator of non-residential property (doing business as King Oil and Tire) located at 16776 Southeast U.S. Highway 19 (at Main Street and Ward Street) in Cross City, Florida. He has owned the property since June 30, 1982. Since July 1978, eight regulated petroleum storage tanks were situated on the property. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 62- 761.200(20), (45), (53), and (65). The Department has assigned facility identification number 15/8839661 to the site. During the intervening time period since Respondent assumed ownership, six of the tanks and their associated piping have been closed or removed, including tank 4 in August 1997 and tanks 5 and 6 in March 2004. Tank 4 was a 1,000 gallon diesel underground storage tank system (UST) originally installed in July 1982, tank 5 was a kerosene UST installed in July 1978, while tank 6 was a waste oil UST installed in July 1978. Only tanks 7 and 8 still remain in service. After tank 4 and the associated piping were closed in August 1997, Respondent conducted a closure assessment in the area of tank 4 and performed soil and groundwater analytical sampling in the area of its former piping run. He then filed a Tank Closure Assessment Report (TCAR) with the Department on August 19, 2003. The TCAR revealed groundwater contaminants above the Department's Cleanup Target Levels (CTLs) for Methylnapthalene in two respects and for Naphthalene. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 62-777.170(1)(a), Table I. Because of the presence of contamination on the site, on September 3, 2003, the Department sent Respondent a letter requesting that he submit a Discharge Report Form (DRF) and initiate a site assessment, as required by Florida Administrative Code Rule 62-770.600, and that he file a completed site assessment report by July 10, 2004.3 Subsection (1) of that rule requires that "[w]ithin 30 days of discovery of contamination, the responsible party shall initiate a site assessment." On September 29, 2003, the Department received the requested DRF. During a tank closure inspection of tanks 5 and 6 performed on March 4, 2004, the Levy County Health Department, acting on behalf of the Department, discovered stained soils in the fill area of tank 6. On May 18, 2004, the Department received a TCAR dated May 7, 2004, for the closure of tanks 5 and 6. The TCAR documented the results of laboratory analytical tests on groundwater samples, which revealed groundwater contaminants above the Department's CTLs for Methylnapthalene in two respects. On May 24, 2004, the Department received from Respondent a copy of a DRF (dated March 9, 2004, as amended on April 9, 2004) for the contamination related to tanks 5 and 6. The DRF was the last report filed by Respondent concerning tanks 5 and 6. On the same date, the Department sent Respondent a letter requesting that he initiate site assessment activities for the discharge related to tanks 5 and 6, as required by Florida Administrative Code Rule 62-770.600(1). On July 14, 2004, the Department sent Respondent another letter requesting (a) completion of a site assessment and (b) the submission of a Site Assessment Report (SAR) for the discharge from tank 4 (SAR-97), which complied with the requirements of Florida Administrative Code Rule 62-770.600(8). (The SAR-97 was originally due on July 10, 2004, but had not yet been filed.) In order to be deemed complete, a SAR must contain all of the information detailed in subsection (8). Also, the letter requested that a SAR for the 2004 discharge (SAR-04) be completed no later than August 1, 2004, as required by Florida Administrative Code Rule 62-770.600(7). That subsection requires in relevant part that "[w]ithin 270 days of discovery of contamination, the responsible party shall submit to the Department or to the FDEP local program for review two copies of a [SAR] " On July 15, 2004, or the day after the above letter was mailed, the Department received a copy of the SAR-97 from Respondent. The report was then referred to the Department's Petroleum Cleanup Section for its review. By letter dated August 27, 2004, the Department advised Respondent that SAR-97 was under review. The letter also changed the due date for the SAR-04 from August 1, 2004, to November 9, 2004. On September 15, 2004, the Department received correspondence from Respondent requesting an extension of time in which to submit his SAR-04. On December 10, 2004, the Department approved the request and authorized Respondent to file a SAR-04 no later than March 1, 2005. On April 12, 2005, Respondent filed with the Department a Site Assessment Report Addendum (SARA) for the 1997 discharge (SARA-97). The report was dated March 1, 2005. On May 25, 2005, the Department sent Respondent a letter requesting that he file two copies of a supplement to the SARA-97 no later than July 5, 2005, to address certain deficiencies noted in that report, as required by Florida Administrative Code Rule 62-770-600(11). That subsection provides that "[i]f the [SAR] is incomplete in any respect, or is insufficient to satisfy the objectives of subsection 62- 770.600(3), F.A.C., the Department or the FDEP local program shall inform the responsible party pursuant to paragraph 62- 770.600(9)(b), F.A.C., and the responsible party shall submit to the Department or to the FDEP local program for review two copies of a [SARA] that addresses the deficiencies within 60 days after receipt of the notice." The same letter also requested that a disposal manifest be provided for the tank and piping closures. On July 11, 2005, the Department received a second SARA-97 from Respondent's consultant. On July 14, 2005, it also received the disposal manifest documentation for the closure of tank 4 and its piping. These were the last reports filed by Respondent. On October 4, 2005, the Department sent Respondent a letter requesting that he provide two copies of a third SARA for the 1997 discharge to address deficiencies noted by the Department in the second SARA. The letter indicated that the third SARA was to be filed no later than November 23, 2005. The Department also requested that he provide a completed financial affidavit to justify Respondent's claim that he was financially unable to complete the remaining required cleanup corrective actions at his property. On November 29, 2005, Respondent requested an extension of time to complete the third SARA-97. (The reason for the requested extension was that Respondent's insurance carrier would not give authorization for the work.) On January 12, 2006, the Department advised Respondent by letter that his request had been denied and that he must submit either the third SARA or a financial affidavit, as previously requested, no later than February 15, 2006. In its response, the Department indicated that it did not "consider generic delays by contractors or insurance carriers as good cause for an extension." To date, neither filing has been made. By failing to file the requested third SARA for the 1997 discharge, Respondent has contravened the requirements of Florida Administrative Code Rules 62-770.600(11) and 62- 770.800(3), which require that within 60 days after notice, a responsible party submit a SARA to address deficiencies noted in a SAR. Respondent's conduct also implicates Florida Administrative Code Rule 62-770.800(5), which makes it a violation of two Florida Statutes for a responsible party to not submit requested information within the time frame specified. Since March 1, 2005, which was the due date on which a report was to be filed, Respondent has failed to submit an approved SAR for the 2004 discharge, as required by Florida Administrative Code Rule 62-770.600(7), which in turn contravenes Florida Administrative Code Rule 62-770.800(3) and (5). To date, Respondent has failed to complete site assessment activities for both the 1997 and 2004 discharges, as required by Florida Administrative Code Rule 62-770.600(10). That provision states that "[s]ite assessment activities shall not be deemed complete until such time as a [SAR] is approved." To date, Respondent has failed to timely and completely assess and remediate the contamination at his property, as required by Florida Administrative Code Rule Chapter 62-770. That chapter contains the criteria which apply to the cleanup of a site contaminated with petroleum products. During the course of its investigation of this matter, the Department has incurred expenses "in the amount of not less than $500.00." As mitigating evidence, Respondent offered into evidence Respondent's Exhibits 2-15, the majority of which pertain to his insurance policy and the pending litigation with his carrier, Mid-Continent Casualty Company (MCC), or the priority score funding process, which is the process by which contaminated properties are scored or rated for purposes of determining eligibility to receive state cleanup funds when the responsible party is financially unable to do so. Although evidence regarding the insurance policy and pending litigation was deemed to be immaterial to the issues of establishing Respondent's liability for the violations and responsibility for undertaking the corrective actions necessary to satisfy the violations, the undersigned ruled that it could be used by Respondent as mitigating evidence, if relevant, for the purpose of seeking to reduce the administrative penalty. Respondent's Exhibits 8, 9, and 11 indicate that after he reported the 2003 discharge to MCC, in 2003 the carrier denied coverage for that discharge (on the ground "any 'confirmed release' must commence after the retroactive date of the policy (4/3/98)"). However, MCC initially accepted coverage for the 2004 discharge and authorized Respondent's environmental consultants to conduct a site assessment. The documents further show that in December 2005, or before the 2004 site assessment had been completed and a SAR prepared, MCC reversed its position and denied coverage for the 2004 discharge on the ground there was no "Confirmed Release," as defined by the policy. Respondent then filed his lawsuit seeking a determination that the carrier was responsible for cleanup costs. Respondent asserts that he has expended more than $50,000.00 in pursuing the lawsuit, which is much more than the administrative penalty being assessed by the Department. Respondent points out that prior to the time MCC reversed its position as to coverage for the 2004 discharge in December 2005, he had filed a DFR, TCAR, disposal manifest, SAR- 97, and two SARAs for the 1997 discharge, and a TCAR and DFR for the 2004 discharge, all of which indicate a good faith effort on his part to comply with the assessment requirements. As noted above, the final reports prepared by Respondent's consultant were a second SARA-97 and a disposal manifest for the 1997 discharge, which were filed with the Department in July 2005, and a TCAR and DRF for the 2004 discharge filed in May 2004. Respondent's Exhibit 10A recites language in Coverage B of the insurance policy, which provides in part that MCC "will pay Clean-up Costs by an Insured for environmental damage that an Insured is legally obligated to pay . . . ." Respondent argues that if he acknowledges by affidavit or other proof that he does not have the ability to pay for cleanup costs, he fears that under the above language, MCC would not be "legally obligated to pay." This is because Section 376.3071(7)(c), Florida Statutes, provides that when a responsible party does not have the ability to pay for all of the cleanup costs, the Department "may" enter into an agreement with the responsible party to undertake all or part of the site rehabilitation after "taking into consideration the party's net worth and the economic impact on the party." Respondent contends that if he files an affidavit under this statute, MCC would then be relieved of any responsibility under the policy, and his rights in the lawsuit would be jeopardized. Respondent further points out that several other provisions in the insurance policy prohibit him from completing the assessment until the litigation is concluded. For example, one provision (Section II.B) provides that "No Clean-up Costs, charges, and expenses shall be incurred without the Company's consent," while another (Section II.C) provides that "An Insured shall not admit or assume any liabilities or settle any Claim(s) without the Company's consent." Respondent asserts that these provisions prevent his consultant from conducting any further work on the site without MCC's consent, and if he does so, he will lose the right to reimbursement under the policy. Finally, Exhibits 3 through 6 show that Respondent's property has been assigned a site ranking score of ten points, and that the Department is currently funding sites that are eligible for state restoration funding only if they have scores of 37 points and higher. Thus, Respondent argues that a delay in remediation of the site is not unreasonable. Except for the two discharges at issue in this case, there is no evidence that Respondent has a history of non- compliance or that he gained any direct economic benefit by virtue of the discharges. Although no reports have been filed since July 2005, through counsel, Respondent has kept the Department abreast of his efforts to establish liability on the part of MCC so that the site assessments can resume.
The Issue The issues to be resolved in the proceeding concern whether the Respondent, a licensed septic tank contractor, installed twelve septic tank systems at eleven locations in Bay and Walton Counties in which the required filters were removed, allegedly violating the various provisions of Chapter 381, Florida Statutes, and Chapter 64E-6, Florida Administrative Code, cited and discussed herein below and, if that is the case whether an administrative fine should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is an Agency of the State of Florida charged, in pertinent part, with regulating the licensure and compliance of septic tank contractors with the statutory and regulatory authorities cited herein. That authority includes the inspection and approval of the installation of septic tank and drainfield waste disposal systems in Bay and Walton Counties, Florida. It includes the authority to prosecute alleged violations of the statutes and rules regarding appropriate and legal installation of septic tanks and drainfield systems as are involved in this case. The Respondent, John E. McDaniel, is a licensed septic tank contractor subject to the Department's jurisdiction and regulation. His firm installed twelve septic tank systems at eleven locations in Bay County, Walton County and one in Fountain, Florida. Final inspections were conducted on those systems from May 7, 1998 through January 11, 1999. Thereafter, acting on information and belief, the Department inspected those systems again and found that after final inspections that eleven legally required filters from eleven septic tank systems had been removed after the previous "final inspection." The removal of those filters was without authorization and contrary to the portions of the Florida Administrative Code cited below. The petitioner agency took the position that the Respondent and his company were responsible for the illegal removal of the septic tank filters and took initial Agency action assessing a fine in the proposed amount of $3,300.00, $300.00 per violation. The Respondent contested that initial agency action bringing about the subject formal proceeding and evidentiary hearing. Mike Guyne is the Environmental Health Director of the Bay County Health Department. He is familiar with three incidents of prior discipline where the Respondent was subjected to fines for two citations issued by the Department in 1996. Septic tank filters are required on all septic tanks. Although homeowners or persons other than the septic tank contractor could remove the filters, it would be difficult because the lids covering the filter weigh fifty to seventy-five pounds and are sealed with cement mortar and then covered with a layer of dirt. Thus if any person were to remove the subject septic tank filters it would be most easily accomplished before the system is sealed with mortar and before it is covered with dirt (i.e., after the final inspection of the system was made but before it was covered up). On February 16, 1999, Joseph W. Miner, an Environmental Health Specialist for Washington County, went to a site in Washington County to inspect a septic tank system installed by Superior Septic Tank Company (Respondent). The filter in that system had been painted orange on the top but the installers had already moved to another job and so Mr. Miner was unable to question them regarding the origin of that filter. Mr. Miner went to the next site to inspect a septic tank system also installed by Superior Septic Tank Company, and the filter in that septic tank system had also been painted orange on its top. Some counties mark filters by spray painting them when they are put into service to keep them from being removed and used in another system. Mr. Miner engaged in a conversation with an employee of the Superior Septic Tank Company whose name is unknown (gray- haired gentleman with a ponytail) at the second location. This employee was in the company of co-employee Mike Parker who testified in this case. He was questioned by Mr. Miner. This employee told Mr. Miner that Walton County had marked those filters and once the inspections were complete and the inspector left those Walton County job sites that, if the homeowner did not want a filter on the system, employees of Superior Septic Tank Company removed the filters before sealing the tank and system. This same employee also told Mr. Miner that they could not re-use the orange painted filter in Walton County because they would be detected as having already been painted (for identification reasons by Department personnel) and therefore, if they were installed in a different system later the inspector would know that they had been removed from a previous system. Consequently, this employee told Mr. Miner that the painted filters from Walton County were thereafter used in Washington County system installations. When Mr. Miner questioned this employee about the authority for removing the filters he was told that Mr. McDaniel, the Respondent and the owner of Superior Septic Tank Company, had indicated that he had authorization "from Tallahassee" authorizing the filter removal. Mr. McDaniel himself stated in a phone conversation with Mr. Miner that he had a verbal agreement to remove filters from septic tanks with the Director of Environmental Health for Bay County. In any event, in Washington County no septic tank systems are approved for final inspection unless filters are installed according to Mr. Miner. Amanda Brown had septic tank systems installed by the Respondent at two sites. These systems later began failing and at that point an employee of the Respondent, who happened to be Brown's brother, Charles Eldridge, told Ms. Brown that the filters in her systems had been removed after final inspection. Environmental Health staff personnel later opened those three systems installed by the Respondent company in Ms. Brown's presence. Two of the three systems had no filters installed. Ms. Brown had not authorized removal of those filters. Ken Manley is a contractor who builds residential homes including those at the addresses depicted in Exhibits three and four. Mr. Manley did not authorize the removal of the filters from the septic tank systems referenced in Exhibits three and four, although someone removed them. George Stanley Pitts is a land developer who contracted with Superior Septic Tank Company and Mr. McDaniel to install septic tank systems. The systems were installed at the locations referenced in Exhibits five, six, seven and eight in evidence. Mr. Pitts had a conversation with personnel of the Superior Septic Tank Company who told him that the Health Department had authorized leaving filters out of the systems if the owner did not object. Mr. Pitts maintains that he did not remove nor authorize removal of the filters referenced in those exhibits and yet they were removed. James Buchanan owns property that is referenced in Exhibit nine in evidence. He had a septic tank system installed by the Respondent on Angie Road as referenced in Exhibit nine. He did not authorize removal of the filter from the septic tank system at that location although they were removed after the final inspection. Thomas Owen as well had a septic tank system installed at 12034 Oak Avenue, in Fountain, Florida, as depicted in Exhibit ten. It was installed by Superior Septic Tank Company. After the final inspection was done on the system, the filter was removed although Owen states that he did not authorize removal of the filter from his septic tank system. Charles Eldridge was employed by Superior Septic Tank Company and John McDaniel. He was employed at four different times during a five-year period including 1998. When he was employed in 1998, the installation of filters in septic tank systems was a relatively new requirement. Mr. Eldridge performed work on his sister's septic tank systems which are described in Exhibits one and two in evidence. He removed the filters from those systems. Mr. Eldridge maintains that Mr. McDaniel told employees and frequently reminded them to remove filters from septic tank systems after final inspections were performed by Health Department officials. Mr. McDaniel, according to Eldridge, told his employees that the filters cost from $28.00 to $38.00 and could be used again in a later system (implicitly for reasons of saving money). Kevin Cobb is a Environmental Health Specialist for the Walton County Health Department. He is an inspector of septic tank systems. He did a final construction inspection and a final inspection of the septic tank system installed by Mr. McDaniel's Superior Septic Tank Company which is described in Exhibit eleven. When he performed the final inspection he spray-painted the top of the filter with orange paint, which is the practice and policy in Walton County as a means to show that that filter had been used; therefore if it appears in a later-constructed and installed system it will show the inspector at that later time that the filter had previously been used and illegally removed from another system. Mr. Cobb was accompanied by another Health Department employee and re-inspected the septic tank system described in Exhibit eleven. After removing the lid over the filter location he found that there was no filter in the outlet "T" fitting, although orange paint remained on top of the "T" fitting as shown in the photographs, in evidence as Exhibits sixteen and seventeen. Mr. Cobb discovered the filters were missing in two of the three systems installed by Superior Septic Tank Company which he inspected. Ralph McDonald is an Environmental Health Inspector for the Bay County Health Department. He inspected the septic tank systems depicted in Exhibits one, two, six, nine and ten, which were installed by the Superior Septic Tank Company. When he made the construction inspection of those systems he found filters to be in place in those systems. He did not authorize removal of the filters. Brian Hughes is also an Environmental Health Inspector for the Bay County Health Department. He made the construction inspection on septic tank systems referenced in Exhibits three, four, and eight in evidence, which were also installed by the Superior Septic Tank Company. When he made that inspection he found the filters to be properly in place. He also would not authorize removal of filters from septic tank systems nor approve permitting systems which did not have filters. After final approval of the septic tank systems referenced in Exhibits two, five, six, seven, eight, nine and ten, the Bay County Health Department re-inspected those systems and found according to Mr. Hughes and Mr. Darsey's testimony, as well as Mr. Ellis', that the filters were then missing from those same systems. Thus they had been removed after the final construction and inspection had been performed. Carl Darsey is a Supervisor in Environmental Health for the Bay County Health Department. The septic tank systems installed by the Superior Septic Tank Company described in Exhibits five and seven also had filters at the time the construction approval inspection was performed. Mr. Darsey never authorized removal of those filters nor would he approve systems without the filters in place. Leroy Ellis is employed in the Disease Intervention section of the Bay County Health Department and accompanied the other named employees of the Bay County Health Department on the re-inspections of the above-referenced septic tank systems. His testimony corroborates that of Hughes and Darsey. After final approval of the septic tank systems referenced in Exhibits three and four, Mr. Guyne, with other environmental health staff of the Bay County Health Department, re-inspected those systems installed by the Superior Septic Tank Company and found that the filters were missing from those systems as well. Septic tank system filters are designed to clean the effluent and add longevity to the septic tank systems, to help prevent clogging of the drainfields. Filters have been installed in all septic tanks according to Department rules and policies for approximately the last two years and, according to Mr. Guyne, no complaints on system failures have been brought to the Bay County Health Department's attention related to filters. Mike Parker is an installation supervisor employed by the Superior Septic Tank Company. He had a conversation with Mr. Miner in Washington County and informed him of customer problems with maintenance of the filters. Mr. Guyne established, however, that homeowners are responsible for problems with their septic tank filters after the final inspection. It was not established, however, that any of the homeowners or customers of the Superior Septic Tank Company and Mr. McDaniel removed the filters themselves. Initially, in approximately early 1998, Mr. McDaniel took the position that he had some informal authority from Health Department Personnel to remove filters and so informed Mr. Eldridge and Mr. Miner. Later, however, when the dispute arose concerning the removal of the filters and who might have removed them, he took the position that he did not remove any filters. In a one-year period Mr. McDaniel's installation personnel typically installed about two hundred and fifty septic tank systems. In Walton County two filters were missing out of three tanks checked, and in Bay County ten filters were missing out of fourteen tanks checked. Mr. Eldridge testified that if an inspector remained on a site during the time that the system was being back-filled or covered up then the filter would be left in the system. Thus two employees of the Respondent stated that they were instructed to remove the filters after the final inspection. Moreover, a random sampling of septic tank systems installed by the Respondent established that a great majority of them had had the filters removed. The explanation that vandals may have taken the twelve filters does not make sense. It strains belief to think that twelve of seventeen septic tanks would be vandalized and then only vandalized as to the removal of filters with no other damage done to the systems. Further, the two employees testifying on behalf of the Respondent have testimony deficient in materiality or weight. Mike Parker was not employed by the Respondent when the installations of the majority of these systems occurred. He had no knowledge of doing the installation on the eleven systems involved and was not working for McDaniel during the relevant period in 1998. He was not aware that filters in Walton County are painted with orange paint to try to prevent their removal and re-use, and does not remember any orange paint on filters installed in Washington County, which was clearly established to be the case on the filters that Mr. McDaniel was installing. Additionally, Mr. Halstead's memory is deficient because upon being questioned about annual installations performed, his testimony varied about how many weekly or annual installations are performed. Mr. Halstead stated that he had never seen any filters in Walton County painted with orange paint when the testimony of Mr. Cobb, corroborated by the photographs in evidence, show that they clearly were painted with orange paint in Walton County. Thus both Mr. Halstead and Mr. Parker's testimony is entitled to little weight. Mr. McDaniel submitted a report in evidence showing that Charles Eldridge had apparently used marijuana at one point and had gotten into an altercation resulting in a trespass warning from the Sheriff's Department. This was supposedly related to a dispute over payment of wages, in conjunction with Mr. Eldridge apparently quitting his job with Mr. McDaniel in anger. This evidence was intended to show that Mr. Eldridge was a disgruntled former employee who might therefore have a motive to lie in his testimony to retaliate against Mr. McDaniel for perceived past grievances. The evidence shows clearly, however, that after this report was entered concerning Mr. Eldridge and after their verbal altercation, that, according to Mr. McDaniel's own testimony, he had hired Mr. Eldridge several more times. Thus there is an insufficient demonstration in the evidence of a motive on the part of Mr. Eldridge to actually lie in retaliation against Mr. McDaniel. Mr. Eldridge had apparently become upset when he worked for Mr. McDaniel because of a shortage of pay due him and Mr. McDaniel testified that he admittedly had caused that problem with Mr. Eldridge, but this does not warrant a finding that Mr. Eldridge's testimony was fabricated. This is because the statement made to Mr. Miner by the "gray-haired employee with the ponytail," who made the incriminating statement about instructions from Mr. McDaniel to remove filters, was not refuted, which fact corroborates Mr. Eldridge's testimony. That employee clearly stated that the fluorescent painted filters came from Walton County and were removed from Walton County septic tank systems and then re-used in Washington County. The reason given for the removal was that Mr. McDaniel had instructed his personnel to remove them. That is consistent with the testimony given by Mr. Eldridge. Mr. Miner phoned Mr. McDaniel back at the time the question first arose concerning the Walton and Washington County systems, and Mr. McDaniel told him that he had authorization from the Environmental Health Director in Bay County to remove filters. That authorization was shown never to have existed even if relevant. Later, at hearing, Mr. McDaniel denied making that statement and said that he never removed any filters at all. That assertion renders his testimony inconsistent and thus it cannot be credited.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore, recommended that a final order be issued by the Department of Health finding that the Respondent committed the violations charged and assessing a $3,300.00 fine against the Respondent. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of March, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of March, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Rodney M. Johnson, Esquire Chief Legal Counsel Department of Health Northwest Law Office 1295 West Fairfield Drive Pensacola, Florida 32501 Gary W. Tennyson, Esquire 3235 Lisenby Avenue Panama City, Florida 32405 Angela T. Hall, Clerk Department of Health 2020 Capital Circle, Southeast Bin A02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1703 Amy M. Jones, Acting General Counsel Department of Health 2020 Capital Circle, Southeast Bin A02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1703
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner is eligible to continue participating in the Drycleaning Solvent Cleanup Program.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Sunset Square General Partnership, is the owner of Sunset Square Shopping Center located in Clearwater, Florida, and in which Tux Cleaners, Department of Environmental Protection Identification No. 529501419, was a tenant conducting a drycleaning business. At all times relevant hereto, the Sunset Square Shopping Center was managed by the Stuart S. Golding Company on behalf of Sunset Square General Partnership. At all times relevant to this proceeding, Tux Cleaners was owned and operated by Angelo Guarnieri. In June 1996, Petitioner submitted an application to participate in the Drycleaning Solvent Cleanup Program (Program/ Drycleaning Solvent Cleanup Program). The application was signed by a representative of Petitioner and by Guarnieri. David Scher, an employee of the Stuart S. Golding Company, was listed on the application as the contact person for Petitioner. All applications to the Drycleaning Solvent Cleanup Program are joint applications that include the real property owner, the operator of the drycleaning facility, and the owner of the drycleaning facility. Thus, in this instance, the applicant was Petitioner, the owner of the real property on which the drycleaning facility was located, and Guarnieri, the owner and operator of the facility. Petitioner was listed as the "designated applicant" on the aforementioned application filed with the Department. The "designated applicant" served to advise and provide the Department with a single point of contact. Upon review of Petitioner's application, the Department determined that Petitioner met the prescribed eligibility requirements for participation in the Drycleaning Solvent Cleanup Program. Thereafter, by letter dated September 27, 1996, the Department notified Petitioner that its site, Tux Cleaners, was eligible for participation in the Drycleaning Solvent Cleanup Program. The letter advised Petitioner that its "participation in the Program is contingent upon continual compliance with the conditions of eligibility set forth in Section 376.3078(3), F.S." At the time Petitioner's letter of eligibility was issued, Section 376.3078(7), Florida Statutes (1995), required that owners and operators of drycleaning facilities install secondary containment by January 1, 1997. This statute was enacted in 1995, the year before Petitioner was determined eligible for participation in the Drycleaning Solvent Cleanup Program. To maintain its eligibility in the Drycleaning Solvent Cleanup Program, Petitioner was required to install secondary containment at Tux Cleaners by January 1, 1997. As of January 1, 1997, secondary containment had not been installed at Tux Cleaners. Consequently, on January 2, 1997, Petitioner and Tux Cleaners were no longer in compliance with the eligibility requirements for participation in the Drycleaning Solvent Cleanup Program. On January 21, 1998, Margaret Hennis, a Pinellas County environmental inspector, conducted an inspection of Tux Cleaners as part of a Title V compliance inspection. During the inspection, Hennis discovered that Tux Cleaners did not have the required secondary containment and advised Guarnieri that secondary containment needed to be installed. Guarnieri then informed Hennis that the equipment had been ordered in late 1997. Guarnieri initially ordered secondary containment for Tux Cleaners in June 1997 but cancelled the order because he thought the business had been sold. When the business was not sold, Guarnieri reordered the secondary containment in late 1997, almost one year after it should have been installed. There is no evidence that the secondary containment was ever delivered to Tux Cleaners; and it clearly was never installed at Tux Cleaners. Prior to becoming eligible for the Drycleaning Solvent Cleanup Program, Petitioner hired an environmental consultant, who subsequently advised Petitioner to apply for participation in the Program. After the application of Petitioner and Tux Cleaners was approved, Petitioner believed that the environmental consultant would monitor the drycleaning facility to ensure that the site was in continual compliance with Program eligibility requirements. Although Petitioner and Guarnieri submitted a joint application to the Department, they never discussed the need to install secondary containment at Tux Cleaners. It was only after receiving the February 26, 1998, letter described below that Petitioner had actual knowledge of the secondary containment requirement. Accordingly, Petitioner never asked Guarnieri whether the secondary containment had been installed or directed Guarnieri to install the required secondary containment. Furthermore, Guarnieri never discussed with Petitioner the January 1997 inspection of Tux Cleaners, Hennis' notification that secondary containment needed to be installed, or any matters relative to Guarnieri's ordering and reordering of the secondary containment. By letter dated February 26, 1998 (notice of cancellation), the Department notified Petitioner of its intent to cancel Petitioner's eligibility for participation in the Drycleaning Solvent Cleanup Program and of the reason for the cancellation. According to the notice of cancellation, the reason for the cancellation was that Tux Cleaners had "fail[ed] to continuously comply with the conditions of eligibility set forth in s. 376.3078(3), F.S." The February 26, 1998, letter stated, in pertinent part, the following: The Department has determined that the referenced site is no longer eligible to participate in the Drycleaning Solvent Cleanup Program for the following reason: Pursuant to s. 376.3078(7)(a), Florida Statutes (F.S.), owners or operators of drycleaning facilities shall by January 1, 1997, install dikes or other containment structures around each machine or item of equipment in which drycleaning solvents are used and around any area in which solvents or waste- containing solvents are stored. As of January 21, 1998, secondary containment had not been installed at the referenced facility. Failure to meet this requirement constitutes gross negligence (s. 376.3078(7)(d), F.S.). Also, failure to meet this requirement constitutes a failure to continuously comply with the conditions of eligibility set forth in s. 376.3078(3). Pursuant to s. 376.3078(3)(n)1., F.S., the Department shall have the authority to cancel the eligibility of any drycleaning facility or wholesale supply facility that fails to continuously comply with the conditions of eligibility set forth in s. 376.3078(3), F.S. Persons whose substantial interests are affected by this Order of Eligibility Cancellation have a right, pursuant to Sections 120.569 and 120.57, F.S., to petition for an administrative determination (hearing). The Petition must conform to the requirements of Chapters 62-103 and 28-5, F.A.C., and must be filed (received) with the Department's Office of General Counsel, 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000, within forty-five (45) calendar days of receipt of this Notice. Failure to file a petition within the forty-five (45) calendar days constitutes a waiver or any right such persons have to an administrative determination (hearing) pursuant to Sections 120.569 and 120.57, F.S. * * * If a petition is filed, the administrative hearing process is designed to formulate agency action. Accordingly, the Department's final action may be different from the position taken by it in this Notice. * * * This Order of Eligibility Cancellation is final and effective forty-five (45) calendar days after the date of receipt of this Order unless the attached site access form is signed and returned to the Department or unless a petition is filed in accordance with the preceding paragraph. Upon the timely filing of such petition, this Order will not be effective until further order of the Department. Please be advised that mediation of administrative disputes arising from or relating to this Order of Eligibility Cancellation is not available [s.] 120.573, F.S.; when requested the Department will continue to meet and discuss disputed issues with parties adversely affected by this order. The February 26, 1998, notice of cancellation contained a typographical error in that it referenced an "attached site access form." That reference was as follows: "This Order of eligibility cancellation is final and effective forty-five (45) calendar days after the date of receipt of this Order unless the site access form is signed and returned to the Department or unless a petition is filed in accordance with the preceding paragraph." The reference in the notice of cancellation to the site access form was irrelevant to the notice and improperly and inadvertently included in the notice. That reference should have been omitted from the notice of cancellation and the sentence which mistakenly referred to the site access form should have stated: This Order of Eligibility Cancellation is final and effective forty-five (45) calendar days after receipt of this Order unless a petition is filed in accordance with the preceding paragraph. The February 26, 1998, notice of cancellation complies with the requirements of Section 376.3078(3)(n)2., Florida Statutes, notwithstanding the aforementioned typographical error contained therein. Consistent with the statutory requirements, the letter gives written notice to the applicant of the Department's intent to cancel Petitioner's program eligibility and also states the reason for the cancellation. Section 376.3078(3)(n)2., Florida Statutes, provides that the "applicant shall have 45 days to resolve the reason for the cancellation to the satisfaction of the Department." Typically, the Department's cancellation notices do not state that applicants or participants have 45 days to resolve the reason or reasons for cancellation of their eligibility. Nevertheless, the Department affords this opportunity to adversely affected parties. To facilitate this process, the Department's cancellation notices advise these parties that, when requested, the Department will "continue to meet and discuss disputed issues with parties adversely affected by this Order." Petitioner availed itself of the opportunity to discuss the disputed issues with the Department. In fact, shortly after receiving the notice of cancellation, Petitioner contacted the Department officials to determine what steps it could take to remain eligible for participation in the Drycleaning Solvent Cleaning Program. Thereafter, Petitioner took immediate steps in an attempt to resolve the reasons for cancellation of its eligibility. After extensive discussions between Petitioner and Department officials, the Department concluded that the notice of cancellation had been properly issued. The Department reached this conclusion after Petitioner acknowledged that Tux Cleaners did not have secondary containment installed by the January 1, 1997, the statutorily prescribed deadline for such installation. Having determined that the secondary containment had not been installed by the January 1997 deadline, the Department concluded that the reason for the cancellation of Petitioner's eligibility could not be resolved or corrected. The Department has interpreted the 45-day language in Section 376.3078(3)(n)2., Florida Statutes, to allow Program applicants or participants the opportunity to resolve items that do not constitute gross negligence within the meaning of the statute. In an attempt to bring the facility into compliance, Petitioner insisted that Guarnieri shut down all drycleaning operations at Tux Cleaners and remove all machines and solvents from the property. By mid-March 1998, Tux Cleaners had shut down all drycleaning operations and by the end of March 1998, all drycleaning machines were removed from the facility. Moreover, in mid-March 1998, after the drycleaning operations ceased, Tux Cleaners continued only as a dry drop-off facility. Any store operating solely as a dry drop-off facility is not required to have secondary containment. Secondary containment was not installed at Tux Cleaners by January 1, 1997, the statutorily prescribed deadline, even though it operated as a drycleaning facility from January 1, 1997, until mid-March 1998. Consequently, beginning in January 1, 1997, and through March 1998, Petitioner and Tux Cleaners were not in compliance with the eligibility requirements of the Drycleaning Solvent Cleanup Program.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby: RECOMMENDED that the Department issue a final order finding that Petitioner's facility is not eligible to participate in the Drycleaning Solvent Cleanup Program. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of January, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CAROLYN S. HOLIFIELD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of January, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Martha L. Nebelsiek, Esquire Department of Environmental Protection 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Mail Station 35 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 Richard M. Hanchett, Esquire Trenam, Kemker, Scharf, Barkin, Frye, O'Neill & Mullis, P.A. 2700 Barnett Plaza 101 East Kennedy Boulevard Post Office Box 1102 Tampa, Florida 33601-1102 Kathy Carter, Agency Clerk Department of Environmental Protection 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Mail Station 35 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 Teri Donaldson, General Counsel Department of Environmental Protection 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Mail Station 35 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000
The Issue The ultimate issue to be resolved in this proceeding is whether the Department of Environmental Regulation should issue a permit to Broward County authorizing construction of the proposed Cell 14 extension of the Broward County landfill located in the Town of Davie, Florida. Broward County and the Department of Environmental Regulation contend that Broward County has provided reasonable assurance that the proposed facility will meet the requirements of the Department's rules and regulations and not cause pollution in contravention of the Department's standards. The Town of Davie contends that the proposed facility will not meet the Department's requirements and will result in pollution in contravention of the Department's standards.
Findings Of Fact Broward County presently operates a landfill known as the Davie Landfill on a tract of land comprising 200 acres within the Town of Davie, Broward County, Florida. The existing sanitary landfill includes 13 cells which cover approximately 20 acres on the northeastern portion of the site. The landfill had an original design elevation of50 feet. The Department of Environmental Regulation, in a separate permitting proceeding, has authorized an increase to the height of the existing landfill to 90 feet. The permit authorizing increasing the height of the existing landfill has been challenged by the Town of Davie and is the subject of a separate proceeding before the Division of Administrative Hearings. The site which includes the landfill also has a sludge lagoon and trash landfill located in close proximity to the sanitary landfill. The sludge lagoon was used until sometime in 1981 for disposal of septic tank clean-out, sludges, grease trap waste, and wastewater treatments. The trash landfill was designed primarily for disposal of yard trash. The existing landfill has vertical side slopes of 3.5 to l. In other words, the height of the landfill increases along sides by i foot for every 3.5 feet traveled horizontally. Through this application, Broward County is seeking approval to expand its sanitary landfill by adding a proposed Cell 14. Cell 14 would constitute a Class I landfill since it will receive in excess of 20 tons of solid waste per day. The proposed Cell 14 would be constructed along the existing western face of Cells 1 through 13. It would ultimately be constructed to a height of 90 feet and would be capped with an impervious substance. The western side slope of the proposed cell would also be 3.5 to 1. Cell 14 would cover approximately 11 acres, bringing the total size of the sanitary landfill to just over 30 acres. With Cell 14, the sanitary landfill would continue to operate until approximately 1986. Containing leachate and preventing it from entering surface or ground waters is a most important consideration in determining whether to permit sanitary landfills. Leachate is water that has passed through refuse and been contaminated by the refuse. If significant amounts of leachate from Cell 14 enters into surface and ground waters, violations of the Department's water quality standards would be likely. Several features have been designed into Cell 14 to prevent introduction of leachate into surface and ground waters. The base of the cell would have a high density polyethylene liner to prevent percolation of Leachate that collects at the bottom of the cell into groundwater. A leachate collection system consisting of pipes and manholes has been devised. As leachate collects at the base of the cell, it will be dumped into tank trucks and carried to nearby wastewater disposal plants where it will be treated. A stormwater collection system has been designed so that initial stormwater runoff will be pumped to the leachate collection system and tested. If significant pollutants are contained in the stormwater runoff, it can continue to be pumped into the leachate collection system and ultimately removed to off-site treatment plants. If there are not significant pollutants in the runoff, runoff will be collected in a swale system and ultimately percolate into groundwater. Water that leaves the site in this manner is not likely to cause violations of Department of Environmental Regulation standards either in surface or ground waters. Numerous technological advances have occurred since Cells 1 through 13 of the Davie Landfill were designed and constructed. These cells have a designed-in leachate collection system. The system presently functions adequately, except that the liners under the earlier cells appear to be breaking down. It is apparent that the liner under Cells 1 through 4 has deteriorated to the extent that all leachate from these cells is not collected in the leachate collection system, but enters the groundwater below the landfill. Leachate from a landfill of this sort and magnitude that enters groundwater is likely to cause pollution in violation of the Department's standards. Leachate is presently entering the groundwater from Cells 1 through 4. The nature of the liner under the remaining original cells is not known. It is thought to be made of asphalt. Many forms of asphalt, obviously including the kind that was used to line Cells 1 through 4, are not capable of containing Leachate for an extended period of time. If the liner breaks down, the leachate collection system under all of the original cells will no longer function, and leachate will enter the groundwater, causing violations of Department of Environmental Regulation standards. There will not be an impervious liner between the existing cells of the Davie Landfill and the proposed Cell 14. It has been estimated that the cost of such a liner would be prohibitive. There will be limerock placed between the existing cells and the proposed cell; however, limerock is permeable. Some Leachate from Cell 14 will seep into the existing cells. Some of the leachate from the proposed Cell 14 that enters the existing Cells 1 through 4 will find its way into groundwater under the landfill. Leachate that enters the remaining cells will also find its way into groundwater if the liner under these cells breaks down as the liner under Cells 1 through 4 has broken down. If Leachate from the proposed Cell 14 enters groundwater under the site of the landfill, it is likely to cause pollution in violation of Department of Environmental Regulation standards. Groundwater in the area of the Davie Landfill flows generally from the northwest to the southeast. Some of the groundwater from the site of the sanitary landfill is likely to find its way into a canal which is located just to the south of the site. this is the C-11 Canal. If leachate from the proposed Cell 14 enters groundwater under the site of the landfill, it is likely to ultimately cause violations of Department of Environmental Regulation standards in the C-11 Canal. Except for the fact that the liners under the existing cells of the sanitary landfill are subject to deterioration, the leachate collection system can function appropriately. The leachate collection system for the proposed Cell 14 can also function without allowing introduction of leachate into surface and ground waters. The leachate collection systems utilize pipes that are presently buried under the existing landfill and will be further buried by the construction of Cell 14. The pipes that are presently being used, and are proposed to be used, are designed to withstand pressure greater than would be imposed on them. Furthermore, they are being placed in such a manner (surrounded by rock and utilizing ball joints) as to reduce the pressure imposed upon them. It is possible that one of the pipes could break and that leachate could thus escape from the Leachate collection system. This possibility is not a likely one, however, given the design parameters of the pipes and the nature of their installation. The fact that the leachate collection system for existing cells of the Davie Landfill would be buried under the proposed Cell 14 does not raise a significant danger that the system will break down. Again, the design parameters of the pipes and the nature of their installation render breakage unlikely. The sludge pit that is located just to the southwest of the sanitary landfill and the trash landfill that is located just to the south of the sanitary landfill offer potentially severe threats to the integrity of ground and surface waters on and off of the site. The sludge pit is a hazardous waste site. The trash landfill is not designed to prevent substances placed on the landfill from percolating into groundwater. It does not appear that construction of the proposed Cell 14 addition to the sanitary landfill would increase the risk of pollution that the sludge pit and trash landfill present. It does not appear that construction of the proposed Cell 14 would cause significant additional surface or ground water flows that would increase the risk of material from the sludge pit or the trash landfill from entering surface or ground waters. The applicant has failed to provide reasonable assurance that its proposed addition to the Davie Landfill will not result in violations of Department of Environmental Regulation standards contained in Chapters 17-3, 17- 4, and 17-7, Florida Administrative Code. While the proposed cell has been designed with appropriate liners and with an appropriate leachate collection system, its location abutting an existing landfill which does not have an adequate liner preventing percolation of leachate into groundwater increases the risk of that occurring. It appears that the only means of preventing or reducing that risk is either to close off the existing cells, or to place a liner between the existing cells and any addition in order to prevent flows of Leachate from new landfill activities into the existing cells.
