The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner's site located at 13292 N.W. 118th Avenue in Miami, Florida is eligible for reimbursement of the costs of petroleum contamination cleanup pursuant to Section 376.3071(12), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner Rinker Material Corporation ("Rinker") owns and operates a site known as the Rinker FEC Quarry located at 13292 N.W. 118th Avenue, Miami, Florida 33127 (the "site"). At the Site, Rinker operated three (3) one thousand (1,000) gallon tanks which stored waste oil, virgin oil and hydraulic fluid. The DER Facility ID Number for the Site is 138628827. On December 2, 1988, Petitioner, as part of a tank replacement program that it was attempting to conduct in compliance with the applicable state and county regulations, began excavating the three underground storage tanks at the Site. During the excavation, a visible sheen was discovered. At the time of the excavation on December 2, 1988, Alan Gillespie of the Dade County Environmental Resource Management (DERM) was present to conduct a closure inspection of the Site. The December 2, 1988 closure inspection was conducted for Dade County DERM in its own capacity and not as an agent for DER. The purpose of the December 2, 1988 visit by Alan Gillespie was to inspect the removal and closure of the three 1,000 gallon tanks containing, respectively, waste oil, new oil and hydraulic fluid. Mr. Gillespie's inspection indicated that, while there appeared to be no holes in the tanks, free product was visible. Mr. Gillespie noted in his inspection report, dated December 2, 1988, that the contamination was not caused by a tank leak, but, instead, by overspills caused by the pouring of waste oil into the tank, spilling locally around the riser and then contaminating the soil around the tank. Rinker took samples at the Site and submitted them to a laboratory for analysis. It is not clear when the laboratory report was returned, but it generally takes two (2) weeks to obtain the laboratory analysis. Upon receipt of the laboratory report, Rinker initiated its efforts to apply for participation in the Inland Protection Trust Fund for reimbursement or site rehabilitation. In order to participate in the Inland Protection Trust Fund, an applicant was required to submit an Early Detection Incentive Program Notice (the "EDI Form") to DER prior to midnight on December 31,. 1988. The back of the EDI Form states that the form must be filed with and received by DER during the 15 month grace period beginning July 1, 1986 and ending October 1, 1987. The EDI program was; originally scheduled to end on September 30, 1987. However, the deadline for filing was extended by the legislature to December 31, 1988. The EDI Notification Form was not amended to change the dates to reflect subsequent amendments to the reporting date made by the legislature. While the back of the EDI Application Form indicates that the notification form must be filed with and received by DER on or prior to the initial deadline, DER considered as timely all applications with a postmark on or before the extended deadline of December 31, 1988. Petitioner's EDI Form for the Site was prepared by William Voshell, environmental manager for Rinker. Mr. Voshell was out of the state during the last few days of December, 1988. Petitioner's EDI Form was reviewed and signed by William Payne as Vice President of Real Estate for Rinker, on Friday, December 30, 1988. William Payne was informed by Mr. Voshell that the EDI Forms needed to be sent out before the end of the year. A cover letter accompanying the EDI Form for the Site was signed for Mr. Voshell by his secretary, Linda Vasquez on December 30, 1988. After signing the EDI Form, William Payne returned the application to Linda Vasquez to "process to mail". He reminded her that it had to be mailed that day. Ms. Vasquez placed the EDI Form and the cover letter in the Petitioner's mail system on December 30, 1988. The Certified Mail Number P 533059801 appears on the envelope containing Petitioner's EDI Form. January 3, 1989 was the first business day of 1989. The envelope containing the EDI Form was postmarked January 3, 1989. A certified mail return receipt attached to the envelope containing the EDI Form and cover letter shows that the return was stamped by the post office on January 3, 1989. The postal receipt for the EDI Form and cover letter was returned to Rinker from the post office on January 3, 1989. DER received Petitioner's EDI Form for the Site on January 9, 1989. Petitioner's normal procedure is to internally meter regular mail and affix a postmark date. However, certified or registered mail is metered and taken to the post office for processing. Registered mail received in the Petitioner's mailroom on December 30, 1988 should have been metered and taken to the post office for processing the same day or at the latest the next business day (December 31st, a Saturday). After the EDI Form was filed but prior to the eligibility determination, Petitioner was required to submit Site characterization information and documentation of the Site conditions before the initiation of cleanup. The evidence did not establish the expense or costs incurred by Rinker in gathering this information. Prior to ruling on Petitioner's EDI application, DER, through DERM, conducted an eligibility inspection at the Site. Alan Gillespie of DERM conducted the EDI eligibility inspection on April 20, 1989. During an EDI inspection, the inspector examines and reports on the existing conditions of a facility including: recordkeeping, the age of the tanks and the conditions of the monitoring wells and whether there is any negligence involved with the contamination that has occurred. During the April 20, 1989 inspection, Alan Gillespie reported that the three 1,000 gallon underground tanks had been removed and replaced with a new aboveground petroleum storage system. On the EDI inspection report, Mr. Gillespie reported evidence of soil contamination and/or recent product loss and noted that such contamination was discovered at the time of tank removal. After completion of the April 20, 1989 inspection report, Mr. Gillespie's supervisor at DERM sent the report to DER in Tallahassee. In 1989, final Early Detection Incentive Program or Reimbursement Program eligibility determinations were made in Tallahassee by DER. At the time of the EDI eligibility inspection of the Site on April 20, 1989, the role of Dade County DERM was only to conduct an EDI inspection at the site and to forward the information to Tallahassee. Prior to making an eligibility determination on the Site, Patricia Dugan, Environmental Administrator of the DER Petroleum Cleanup Reimbursement Section, reviewed the EDI application, the inspections from DERM, documentation of the site conditions prior to initiation of cleanup and the envelope that the application came in. On November 23, 1989, DER issued an order finding the Site to be ineligible for participation in the Reimbursement Program. Initially, Petitioner's reimbursement application was deemed ineligible because of mixed contamination (i.e., the Site contained used oil) and because the application was deemed untimely. Subsequent to the date of the denial, certain legal decisions made it clear that, contrary to DER's position, sites containing used oil were eligible for participation in the Reimbursement Program. Thus, the only remaining predicate for DER's denial of Rinker's application is that the application was not timely filed. Because Petitioner's EDI application was postmarked on January 3, 1989, after the December 31, 1988 statutory deadline, the Petitioner's application was deemed untimely by DER. DER's policy of relying on the postmark date for purposes of determining timeliness was informally arrived at in 1987. DER has never promulgated a rule on this matter nor conveyed its interpretation to affected parties. Petitioner could have and would have internally placed a postmark date of December 30, 1988 on the envelope containing the EDI Form had it been aware of DER's policy.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Environmental Regulation enter a Final Order approving Petitioner's application for eligibility under the state's reimbursement program. DONE AND ORDERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 23rd day of July, 1990. J. STEPHEN MENTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of July, 1990. APPENDIX Both parties have submitted Proposed Recommended Orders. The following constitutes my rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties. The Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact: Proposed Finding Paragraph Number in the Findings of Fact of Fact Number in the Recommended Order Where Accepted or Reason for Rejection. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 1. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 3, 9 and 10. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 17 and 20. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 20. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 26. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 22, 36, 37 and 38. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 37 and 38. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 40. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 41. Rejected as constituting argument rather than a finding of fact. Rejected as argument rather than a finding of fact. The Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact: Proposed Finding Paragraph Number in the Findings of Fact of Fact Number in the Recommended Order Where Accepted or Reason for Rejection. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 2. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 25. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 22. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 21. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 17. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 16. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 18. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 19. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 20. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 23. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 24. Rejected as constituting argument rather than a finding of fact. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 22. Rejected as unnecessary and irrelevant. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 15. 17. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 15. 18. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 37, 38 and 39. 19. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 4. 20. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 5. 21. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 6. 22. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 7. 23. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 8. 24. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 28. 25. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 29. 26. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 30. 27. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 31. 28. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 32. 29. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 33. 30. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 34. 31. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 36. 32. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 35. 33. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 37. 34. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 39. 35. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 15. 36. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 12. 37. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 14. 38. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 15. 39. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 36, 37 and 38. COPIES FURNISHED: Richard A. Pettigrew, Esquire Morgan, Lewis & Bockius 200 South Biscayne Boulevard Miami, Florida 33181 Janet E. Bowman Department of Environmental Regulation Twin Towers Office Building 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2400 Dale W. Twachtmann, Secretary Department of Environmental Regulation Twin Towers Office Building 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2400 Daniel H. Thompson General Counsel Department of Environmental Regulation Twin Towers Office Building 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2400 =================================================================
Findings Of Fact The Department of Transportation, pursuant to its decision to procure certain sewer line cleaning equipment, issued an Invitation to Bid to potential vendors of such equipment. The specifications in that Invitation to Bid which are at issue in this proceeding concern the specified ability of the machine being proposed to vacuum gutters while being driven or, that is, in motion. The other specification at issue was that the machine had to be a standard production model with five of such machines in service for one year prior to May 1988. The sewer line cleaner specified had to have a nine cubic yard capacity. The bids were received, including that of Vac-Con, Inc. and Jet Vac Sanitary Service. The bid results were posted on June 3, 1988, noticing the Department's intent to award the contract for the nine cubic yard sewer line cleaner to Vac- Con, Inc. Jet Vac Sanitary Service timely filed a formal protest of that intended bid award on June 17, 1988. The Petitioner's formal protest was transmitted to the Division of Administrative Hearings and duly came on for hearing. The Petitioner is contending that the Vac-Con model V290 storm sewer line cleaner does not meet the specifications in the Invitation to Bid because it will not vacuum gutters while in motion in the configuration set forth in Vac-Con's published specifications for its standard models. It asserts, in conjunction with this argument, that the alternative configuration proposed by Vac-Con would in effect render this a nonstandard production model of which Vac- Con has not had five in service prior to May 1988, which would represent a departure from the bid specifications and thus result in a non-responsive bid. The Respondent, however, contends that the alternative configuration proposed by Vac-Con is merely an options package to an existing standard production model machine and thus is in conformance with the specification. The Respondent has been advised by Vac-Con that the V290 machine will perform as specified and that at least five machines have been so configured and have been in service for the required one year or greater period. It is stipulated that Jet Vac Sanitary Service was the next lowest bidder after Vac-Con and has standing to protest the Intent to Award. Jet Vac was a responsive bidder. It is also stipulated that the configuration of the model V290 depicted in Vac-Con's promotional material itself will not meet the specifications set forth in Respondent's Invitation to Bid. The dispute is whether the Vac-Con machine, as optionally modified, as proposed by Vac-Con, meets the specification concerning the machine being a standard production model. In response to the Invitation to Bid, Vac-Con, Inc. submitted a bid for its Vac-Con model V290. It accompanied that bid with a written statement of the model specifications which coincided with the specifications required by the Invitation to Bid. It specified, that is, that it would comply with the requirement that the vehicle be able to vacuum gutters while being driven in motion. Jet Vac in turn submitted a bid which was responsive, but it was not the lowest bid. Vac-Con, Inc., in other bids submitted in the past year as well as in its advertising literature, describes the V290 model of sewer line cleaner as one in which the vacuum compressor is driven by the truck engine, that is the engine which provides the motive power to the vehicle. In order to operate the vacuum compressor as described in that literature, the rear axle of the truck has to be disengaged, with the result that the unit cannot vacuum and drive at the same time. This configuration of the V290 model which has the vacuum being operated by the truck engine or chassis engine, is the normal type of unit offered by Vac-Con in its vehicle demonstrations and literature, as recently as one week prior to trial. In order for the V290 to comply with the bid specifications at issue, it must be reconfigured so that the vacuum compressor is run by an auxiliary engine and not the motive power engine. The power available to operate the vacuum compressors which vacuum trash from gutters and so forth, would be reduced from the chassis engine which, in the normal configuration of that model, operates the vacuum compressors. The reconfiguration whereby the vacuum compressors would be run off the auxiliary engine, and not the motive engine, would require a reversal of the V-belt drives used by the normal unit. This alternate configuration would be obvious to the casual observer. The intent of the term "standard production model" in the specifications at issue is to ensure that a machine purchased will have ready availability of manufacturer's replacement parts out of stock. This serves to prevent the purchaser from having to do development work on new models which are not in standard production runs and do not have inventories of spare parts in the manufacturer's stock as yet. Because the alternate configuration of the unit, whereby it would vacuum while moving, running its vacuum equipment off of its auxiliary engine, requires new engineering and reevaluation of the power of the V290's auxiliary motor, the specification language requiring a "standard production model" and requiring that five such units be operational in the field, requires in this instance that five units in the alternate configuration at issue be found to have been in satisfactory field service for one year. The written description submitted by Vac-Con, Inc. in response to the bidding documents, describes a machine which complies with the specification requiring the ability of the machine to vacuum while it is in motion. That description was specially prepared for purposes of this bid. Indeed it is not a machine represented, at the time of the bid, in the company's advertising literature, catalog data or other published brochures and like sources of information in order to verify that indeed Vac-Con did have five units in the alternative configuration in satisfactory service. The Department's representative, Mr. Burt, telephoned individuals whose names had been supplied him by Vac-Con as being persons who could verify that the alternative, which could vacuum in motion with the vacuum blower run off the auxiliary engine, was indeed in service. Using these names supplied him by Vac-Con and names of persons some of those people in turn gave him, who had such altered machines operating in satisfactory service, Mr. Burt telephoned each of the individuals whose names had thus been furnished by Vac-Con and its customers. He thus confirmed that there were indeed at least five units in service in the field, for at least one year, which had the ability to vacuum gutters while in motion, with the vacuum equipment being operated by the auxiliary engine on the machine. The Department has a policy of relying upon the representations of its suppliers. It does not inspect each piece of equipment before it writes a purchase order after awarding a bid. It instead reserves the right to reject any piece of equipment that does not meet specifications, after purchase. The Department does not wish to get into an adversary relationship with its suppliers and, in turn, vendors typically do not want an adversary or unfavorable relationship with the Department and do not want future disqualifications from bidding based upon any lack of integrity or misrepresentations in responding to bid specifications. Accordingly, the representations made on the bidding document have historically been quite accurate and have a high degree of probability of reliability. Hence, the Department has not, in the exercise of its discretion, followed a policy of physically inspecting each piece of equipment and independently verifying its existence or capabilities. It rather has effectively, in the past, relied upon the vendor's representations regarding the capacities or capabilities of equipment. In fact, the Department has neither the staff nor the time to make any further pre-award investigations, especially due to the nationwide market and indeed, to some extent, international market, in which it seeks to procure equipment of all sorts. In any event, being satisfied that the equipment would perform as represented and verifying that at least five such configured machines were in active field service for a year or more, the Department concluded that, in the exercise of its discretion, that the specifications had been adequately responded to and that the award should be made to Vac-Con as lowest, most responsive bidder. Insufficient proof to the contrary was offered at the hearing.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered awarding the contract for Florida DOT Bid Number MY3188B5 to Vac-Con, Inc. DONE and ENTERED this 8th day of December, 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of December, 1988. COPIES FURNISHED: Ray Heath William B. Singleton Jet Vac Sanitary Services Post Office Box 186 New Smyrna Beach, Florida 32070 Bruce A. Campbell, squire Senior Litigation Attorney Office of General Counsel Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Kaye N. Henderson, P.E., Secretary ATTN: Eleanor F. Turner, M.S. 58 Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450
Findings Of Fact Reimbursement Program The Florida Legislature created the Petroleum Contamination Site Cleanup Program to encourage responsible persons with adequate financial ability to conduct site rehabilitation and seek reimbursement in lieu of the state conducting cleanup. Section 376.3071(12), Florida Statutes (1993). Site owners and operators or their designees become entitled to reimbursement from the Inland Protection Trust Fund (IPTF) of their allowable costs at reasonable rates after completing a program task. Section 376.3071(12)(b), Florida Statutes. The costs of site rehabilitation must be actual and reasonable. Section 376.3071(12)(d), Florida Statutes. "Allowable" costs are those which are associated with work that is appropriate for cleanup tasks, i.e. whether the cost represents work that is technically necessary for the program task and otherwise not in violation of reimbursement limitations prescribed by statute or rule. In order for costs to be reimbursable, an applicant must convert charges in an application into applicable units and rates. Rule 17-773.100(5), Florida Administrative Code. DEP has a predominate rate schedule to determine whether a specific allowable cost is reasonable. DEP bases its predominate rates on a study of average rates that contractors charge for a particular task. In addition, DEP reviews each application to determine whether the overall cost and the methods used to perform the work are reasonable. DEP must also evaluate each application to determine whether a charge is an actual cost of a project. Contractors or subcontractors do not actually incur a fully reimbursable cost when they promise the site owner or its designee that they will perform work for an amount less than other professionals would charge, then allow the site owner or its designee to file a claim for reimbursement at or near the predominate rate. Such an agreement creates a back flow of funds to the site owner or its designee. This is true even though the charges are within the range of DEP's predominate rates. DEP never intended the rate schedule to create an entitlement to reimbursement regardless of the cost that contractors and subcontractors actually incur. Requests for reimbursement must apply to costs which are "integral" to site rehabilitation. Rule 17-773.100(2), Florida Administrative Code. "Integral" costs are those which are essential to completion of site rehabilitation. Rule 17-773.200(2)(11), Florida Administrative Code. After integral costs have been identified and incorporated on a units and rates basis in an invoice, the invoice may be marked up at two levels. These markups are subject to certain limitations: There can be no more than two levels of markups or handling fees applied to contractor, subcontractor or vendor invoices (Rule 17-773.350(9), F.A.C.); There can be no markups or handling fees in excess of 15 percent for each level of allowable markup applied to contractor, subcontractor or vendor invoices (Rule 17-773.350(10), F.A.C.); and There can be no markups or handling fees applied to invoices between any two entities which have a financial, familial, or beneficial relationship with each other (Rule 17-773.350(11), F.A.C.). In order to be reimbursable, costs must have been actually "incurred." Rule 17-773.700, Florida Administrative Code. "Incurred" means that allowable costs have been paid. Rule 17-773.200(9), Florida Administrative Code. A contractor must pay all invoices generated by a subcontractor at 100 percent of their face value prior to submission of an application in order to qualify those invoices for reimbursement. When a contractor pays a subcontractor's invoices, the contractor paying those invoices may apply the first-tier markup. Prior to submitting a reimbursement application, a funder or "the person responsible for contamination site rehabilitation" (PRFCSR) must pay the contractor for its invoices and markup. Then, the funder may apply the second- tier markup and submit the reimbursement application to DEP. DEP does not contest the second level of markup in these applications. DEP rules restrict reimbursement when parties within the usual "chain" of reimbursement (PRFCSR or funder, contractor and subcontractor) have financial, beneficial or familial relationships with each other or the site owner. These terms are defined in Rules 17-773.200(1), 17-773.200(6), 17- 773.200(7), Florida Administrative Code. The application form requires disclosure of such relationships through the Program Task and Site Identification Form. DEP's rules and written guidelines do not address or apply to activities, including financing arrangements, occurring outside of the chain of reimbursement if an applicant does not include charges for such activities in an application. Heretofore, DEP has not deducted finance costs that an applicant does not include as a line item in a reimbursement application. DEP must perform financial audits to ensure compliance with Chapter 376, Florida Statutes, and to certify site rehabilitation costs. Rule 17- 773.300(1), Florida Administrative Code. DEP performs this audit function: (a) to establish that the PRFCSR incurred the cost; (b) to determine that adequate documentation supports the claimed costs as incurred; and (c) and to review the reasonableness and allowance of the costs. The audit staff interprets the term "incurred" to mean that the applicant paid the costs included in the reimbursement application. DEP's audit staff usually does not inquire as to the level of a PRFCSR's financing where the application contains no line-item financing charges. However, the audit staff makes appropriate inquiries depending on the facts and events surrounding an individual application. Pursuant to Rule 17-773.350(4)(e), Florida Administrative Code, "[i]nterest or carrying charges of any kind with the exception of those outlined in Rule 17-773.650(1), F.A.C." are not reimbursable. The exceptions to the payment of interest set forth in Rule 17-773.650(1), Florida Administrative Code, are not at issue here. An interest rate charge on short-term borrowed capital from an unrelated third-party source is a "cost of doing business." DEP's predominate rates are fully loaded. They include a variable for all direct and indirect business overhead costs such as rent, utilities and personnel costs. DEP includes the cost of short-term borrowed capital in the direct and indirect overhead components of the fully-loaded personnel rates. Rule 17-773.700(5)(a), Florida Administrative Code. Petitioners PRFCSRs are entitled to make application for reimbursement of allowable markups and costs of site rehabilitation that they incur. In these consolidated cases, the site owners or operators designated either Petitioner ET or Petitioner SEI as PRFCSR. The PRFCSR is typically referred to as the "funder" in the reimbursement chain. Petitioner ET is a trust formed in 1993 and domiciled in Bermuda. It acts as American Factors Group, Inc.'s (AFG discussed below) conduit for funds that finance activities associated with Florida's petroleum contamination site cleanup program. The named beneficiaries of the trust are those contractors and subcontractors entitled to payment of costs for activities integral to site rehabilitation and for allowable markups of such costs. The sole trustee of ET is Western Investors Fiduciary, Ltd. (WIFL). WIFL is also the owner and a beneficiary of ET. Any profit that ET derives from funding petroleum contamination site cleanup flows through WIFL to investors who provide funds to finance site rehabilitation. American Environmental Enterprises, Inc. (AEE, discussed below) provided the investment funds for the reimbursement applications at issue here. WIFL is a limited liability corporation created and domiciled in Bermuda. The officers of WIFL are: William R. Robins, President; John G. Engler, Vice-President; and Peter Bougner, Secretary. The directors and shareholders of WIFL are: William R. Robins, John G. Engler, Paul H. DeCoster, Alec R. Anderson and Nicholas Johnson. Petitioner SEI is a corporation incorporated and operating under Florida law. Organized in 1994, SEI acts as AFG's conduit for funds to finance activities associated with Florida's petroleum contamination cleanup program. The officers and directors of SEI are: William R. Robins, President; John G. Engler, Executive Vice President; and Paul H. DeCoster, Secretary. William R. Robins is the sole shareholder of SEI. ET filed the petition for administrative hearing on behalf of SEI in at least four cases: Case Numbers 96-405, 96-425, 96-433, 96-437. Respondent DEP is the agency charged with the duty to administer the IPTF and Chapter 376, Florida Statutes. Financing Entities American Factors Group, Inc. (AFG) is a privately held corporation incorporated and operating under New Jersey law. AFG is not a party to this proceeding. AFG, acts as the servicing agent for contracts associated with factoring activities and other types of financing operations. AFG, through one of its divisions, Environmental Factors (EF), entered into factoring contracts with: (a) Gator Environmental, Inc. (Gator), general contractor; and (b) Tower Environmental, Inc. (Tower), prime subcontractor. Through these agreements, EF or its assignee bought the rights of Gator and Tower to future reimbursement payments at a percentage of the face value of the relevant invoices. The officers of AFG are: William R. Robins, President; John G. Engler, Vice President; and Paul H. DeCoster, Secretary. Bleak House, Inc. (Texas) owns the stock of AFG. American Environmental Enterprises, Inc. (AEE) is incorporated and operating under Nevada law. AEE is not a party to this proceeding. AEE, as the assignee under the EF contracts, is a third-party provider of capital to various entities in the reimbursement process. The officers of AEE are: William R. Robins, President; John G. Engler, Vice-President; and Paul H. DeCoster, Secretary. Bleak House, Inc., (Nevada) owns the stock of AEE. Bleak House, Inc., (Nevada) is incorporated and operating under Nevada law. Bleak House, Inc. (Texas) is incorporated and operating under Texas law. Officers of both corporations are William R. Robins, President; John G. Engler, Vice President; and Paul H. DeCoster, Secretary. Magazine Funding, Inc. owns the stock of both Bleak House corporations. Magazine Funding, Inc. is incorporated and operating under Nevada law. Officers of Magazine Funding, Inc. are William R. Robins, President; John G. Engler, Vice-President; and Paul H. DeCoster, Secretary. Family Food Garden, Inc. owns the stock of Magazine Funding, Inc. Family Food Garden, Inc. is incorporated and operating under Massachusetts law. Officers of Family Food Garden, Inc., are William R. Robins, President; and Paul H. DeCoster, Secretary. Six shareholders own the stock of Family Food Garden, Inc. None of these shareholders are related by familial ties to the officers or directors of the aforementioned companies or any relative thereof. Each of these companies -- ET, SEI, WIFL, AEE and AFG (including EF) share common officers and directors. Each of the companies maintain their own books and business records, file their own tax returns, and maintain records in accordance with the laws of the jurisdiction in which they were established. They operate pursuant to their respective bylaws or trust documents. ET, WIFL, and SEI do not have common assets with AEE or AFG (including EF). ET, WIFL and SEI do not have a beneficial, financial, or familial relationship with AEE or AFG (including EF) as Rule 17-773.200, Florida Administrative Code, defines those terms. Despite the facial organizational and structural integrity of ET, WIFL, SEI, AEE and AFG, the officers and directors of AFG and/or AEE created ET, WIFL, and SEI, in large part, for the benefit of AFG and/or AEE as a means to invest funds in petroleum contamination site cleanup programs. The officers and directors of AFG specifically created SEI to meet the needs of AFG's Florida investors. The purpose of each funder is to maximize the profits of AFG and its investors. AFG has other investment vehicles (funders) which it uses at times depending on the needs of its investors. AFG waits until the last instance before deciding which entity it will designate as funder in any particular factoring scenario. AFG usually does not make that decision until the day AFG's designated funder issues a funder's authorization to the general contractor. At the hearing, Mr. Stephen Parrish, a vice president of AFG, testified as the party representative for ET and SEI. ET, WIFL and SEI have no employees. EF or AFG responded to DEP's request for Petitioners to provide additional information about the financing scheme utilized here using stationary bearing EF's or AFG's letterhead. At least five of these letters written on SEI's behalf, refer to ET, an affiliate of AEE, as the funder. Nineteen of the letters written on ET's behalf refer to ET, an affiliate of AEE, as the funder. The greater weight of the evidence indicates that AFG and/or AEE negotiated less than arms-length contractual agreements with ET, WIFL, and SEI. Petitioners admit that they are "affiliates" of AEE and AFG through contractual agreements. However, there are no written factoring contracts between Petitioners and AFG such as the ones that exist between AFG, Gator and Tower. The only documented evidence of agreements between Petitioners and AFG are transactional based bills of sale representing the sale to AEE of Petitioners' right to receive reimbursement from IPTF. AFG created these bills of sale for bookkeeping purposes. AFG did not even go to the trouble of tailoring the form for the bills of sale for their stated purpose. For all practical purposes, Petitioners are under the management and control of AEE and AFG. Petitioners and AFG disclosed their affiliation in meetings with DEP staff and through correspondence and other documentation, including but not limited to: (a) letter to DEP dated July 13, 1994 from AFG's counsel; (b) Addendum to Certification Affidavit signed by a certified public accountant in each application; (c) funder's authorization form; (d) letters sent to DEP between August 14, 1995 and November 19, 1996. Factoring and the Factoring Transactions Factoring is the purchase and sale of an asset, such as an account receivable, at a discount. An account receivable reflects the costs that a business charges after rendering a service but before the entity responsible for payment pays for that service. When a contractor completes a rehabilitation task, the contractor's invoice is an account receivable until it receives payment. In these consolidated cases, AEE provided short-term capital to Gator and Tower at an interest rate equal to the discount percentage of the relevant invoice (account receivable). Gator and Tower did not sell their account receivables to AEE. Instead, AEE, as the assignee of EF, purchased a contractual right to receive Gator's and Tower's reimbursement payments. In exchange, AEE advanced them a discounted amount of their invoices. The discounted amount of each invoice represents a loan from AEE to Gator and Tower. The difference between the face amount of the invoices and the discounted amount of the invoices represents interest. A discount percentage and an interest rate are equivalent. The amount of the discount represents interest on the loans or advances provided by AEE. It is an interest expense to the contractor or subcontractor. The amount that Gator and Tower actually incurred is the discounted amount of their invoices. The Factoring Agreements On or about April 25, 1994, EF and Tower entered into a Prime Subcontractor Factoring Agreement which set forth the terms under which EF or its assignee would finance Tower's site remediation work. At that time, the parties to the contract anticipated that EF would retain a general contractor to perform on-site remediation services with Tower acting as prime subcontractor. In the contract, Tower agreed to sell to EF its right to receive payments from the general contractor at a percentage of the underlying invoices. Subsequent to the execution of April 1994 Prime Subcontractor Factoring Agreement, Tower experienced financial difficulties resulting in its inability to pay subcontractors for work that they performed under non-EF contracts. These financial difficulties made it impossible for Tower to meet its payroll that was due in two weeks. Tower and its subcontractors under the non-EF contracts approached AFG and EF requesting financial assistance to resolve Tower's financial difficulties and to ensure that the subcontractors would be paid for their work. At that time, the program tasks under these non-EF contracts were complete or substantially complete. Given the preexisting contractual relationship between EF and Tower on other projects, AFG determined that it could use a similar financing arrangement to resolve Tower's financial problems. Such an arrangement also would protect AFG's investment in projects being conducted under the EF-Tower contracts. On or about July 8, 1994, EF and Tower executed an addendum to the April 1994 Prime Subcontractor Factoring Agreement. This addendum applied to projects that were not covered by the original Prime Subcontractor Factoring Agreement. The addendum required Tower to sell to EF Tower's right to receive payments from the general contractor. In return, EF agreed to advance Tower a discounted amount equal to 97 percent of the face amount of Tower's invoices. Tower agreed to pay EF 100 percent of the face amount of the invoices upon receipt of payments from the general contractor. The discounted amount of each invoice represents a loan from AEE to Tower. Late in 1993 or early in 1994, Gator began negotiating a contract with EF to provide general contracting services for on-site remediation work on unspecified Florida projects being financed by EF. Gator began serving as general contractor on some of these unspecified projects prior to the execution of a contract. On or about July 8, 1994, EF and Gator entered into a General Contractor Factoring Agreement. In this contract, EF agreed to provide financing for projects on which Gator served as general contractor. Gator agreed to sell to EF its right to receive payments from the funder (ET or SEI) at a percentage of Gator's underlying invoices. On or about July 13, 1994, EF and Gator entered into an Addendum to the July 8, 1994 General Contractor Factoring Agreement. This addendum applied to projects which were not covered under the original General Contractor Factoring Agreement. The addendum required Gator to sell to EF Gator's right to receive payments from the funder (ET or SEI). In return, EF agreed to advance Gator a discounted amount equal to 88 percent of the face amount of Gator's invoices. Gator agreed to pay EF 100 percent of the face amount of the invoices upon receipt of payments from the funder. The discounted amount on each invoice represents a loan from AEE to Gator. Gator and Tower negotiated the respective factoring contracts and addenda thereto at arms-length. Pursuant to the terms of these contracts, EF assigned to AEE the rights to payments due to Tower from Gator and to Gator from ET or SEI. ET and SEI were not named parties to these contracts. The factoring contracts and the corresponding addenda apply to the reimbursement applications at issue here. Pursuant to those agreements, the following interrelated transactions took place though not necessarily in this order. First, Tower provided EF with a Site Certification Affidavit for a certain project. Tower also sent Gator a complete reimbursement application for the project and an invoice for Tower's services and the services of its subcontractors and vendors. Next, EF designated either ET or SEI as the funder. The funder then sent Gator a funder's authorization form. This form acknowledged that EF was an affiliate of the funder. It is the only documented evidence of a contract between the funder and Gator. Gator's receipt of the form constituted authorization for Gator to perform work on the project subject to reimbursement for all reimbursable costs and paid subcontractor invoices. Within two days of receiving the funder's authorization for a project, Gator issued Tower a subcontract/purchase order. Gator notified EF and the funder of such issuance. Upon receipt of the subcontract/purchase order, Tower sold to AEE (at a discount) Tower's right to receive full payment from Gator. A bill of sale evidenced this transaction. Tower agreed to repay AEE the face amount of Tower's invoice upon receipt of payment from Gator. Tower executed an agreement indemnifying the funder and guaranteeing the performance of all services and the delivery of all goods. Tower agreed to a reserve trust fund deposit as security for the ultimate reimbursement payment from the IPTF. Within four days of receiving the complete reimbursement application from Tower and within two days of receiving the funder's authorization, Gator and a certified public accountant (retained by EF) were supposed to review all supporting documentation on the project. The stated purpose of this review was to determine whether the invoices of Tower and its subcontractors were reimbursable under DEP guidelines. As to 30 of the instant applications, Tower completed the on-site work before Gator became involved. In those cases, Gator performed a minimal due diligence review, if any, of Tower's on-site work. This included comparing Tower's technical and administrative files with the applications prepared by Tower. Without Gator's minimal review and risk assessment on these 30 applications, EF would not have included them as projects covered by the addenda to the factoring contracts. As to 15 of the instant applications, Petitioners claim that Gator not only reviewed Tower's work product but also, issued subcontractor/purchase orders selected and scheduled subcontractors, and made on-site visits. However, there is no persuasive record evidence as to the specific activities or the level of Gator's involvement in on-site work on any one of these 15 applications. When Gator and EF's certified public accountant completed their assessment, Gator prepared a deficiency letter and sent it to all parties. The report advised EF, the funder and Tower whether any of Tower's charges were in excess of the reimbursable amount. Tower could accept or reject any disallowance set forth in the deficiency letter. If there was no problem with a disallowance or within five days of Tower's acceptance of a disallowance, AEE advanced Tower an amount equal to 97 percent of Tower's invoice. Tower used these funds to pay subcontractors and vendors. The discounted amount of Tower's invoice represents the actual cost that Tower incurred. Tower signed a repayment agreement in which it promised to repay AEE the face amount of Tower's invoice upon receipt of payment from Gator. When Tower received the discounted cash advance from AEE, it had to contribute the reserve deposit (to cover any reimbursement shortfalls) to a reserve trust, domiciled in Bermuda, which was affiliated with EF. Tower was a beneficiary of the reserve trust to the extent of its contribution less any monies it owed AEE after the IPTF reimbursed the funder. Meanwhile, Gator sold to AEE (at a discount) Gator's right to receive full payment from the funder. A bill of sale evidenced this transaction. Gator agreed to repay AEE the face amount of Gator's invoice upon receipt of payment from the funder. AEE advanced Gator an amount equal to 88 percent of the face amount of Gator's invoice. The discounted amount of Gator's invoice represent the amount that Gator actually incurred. Gator used these funds to pay Tower the face amount of its invoice. Tower in turn repaid AEE in full. Gator signed a repayment agreement in which it promised to repay AEE the face amount of its invoice upon receipt of payment from the funder. For the 45 applications at issue here, the addendum to the General Contractor Factoring Agreement did not require Gator to deposit any amount in the reserve trust which was domiciled in Bermuda and affiliated with EF. Next, Gator prepared an invoice for its services and the services of Tower and its subcontractors including a 15 percent markup and an application preparation fee. Gator's invoice could not include a charge for "management time." Then, Gator forwarded its invoice and Tower's invoice to the funder together with the complete reimbursement application. In the meantime, ET and SEI sold AEE their right to receive reimbursement from the IPTF at a discount equal to 87 percent of their total invoice amount. A bill of sale for each transaction is the only documented evidence of an agreement between the funders and AEE. ET and SEI agreed to repay AEE for the face amount of their invoices upon receipt of payment from IPTF. The funder prepared an invoice for the face amount of Gator's and Tower's invoices plus a 15 percent markup. Upon receipt of ET's or SEI's invoice, AEE advanced them the discounted amount as agreed. ET or SEI used the funds advanced by AEE to pay Gator the face amount of its invoice. Gator in turn repaid AEE in full. When ET or SEI receive a reimbursement payment from the IPTF, they will remit the total payment to AEE. The total cost for each project increased as the discount percentage and the face amount of each invoice passing up through the chain grew larger. In regards to some applications, the relevant dates on the subcontract/purchase order, Gator invoice, and Tower invoice are the same. It is clear that the turn around time on all of the above referenced transactions, including the time between the payment of the advances by AEE to Gator and Tower and their subsequent repayment of 100 percent of the face amount of an invoice to AEE, was very short--a matter of days or weeks. In Summary, the financing of the pending reimbursement applications involved the following interrelated transactions but not necessarily in this order: AEE as the assignee of EF purchased the right of ET, SEI, Gator and Tower to receive reimbursement for their services at a discount. ET, SEI, Gator and Tower agreed to repay AEE in full. Tower prepared and submitted to Gator an invoice for services provided by Tower and its subcontractors. Tower also prepared and submitted to Gator a reimbursement application for the program task. AEE advanced Tower the agreed upon discount amount. Tower used these funds to pay its subcontractors and vendors. AEE advanced Gator the agreed upon discount amount. Gator used these funds to pay Tower. Tower repaid AEE in full. Gator prepared an invoice for services provided by Gator, Tower and Tower's subcontractors including a 15 percent markup and submitted it with the reimbursement application either to ET or SEI. AEE advanced ET or SEI the discounted amounts as agreed. ET or SEI paid Gator in the full amount of Gator's invoice plus markup. Gator repaid AEE in full. ET or SEI prepared an invoice for its services plus the services of Gator, Tower, and Tower's subcontractors and a 15 percent markup. ET or SEI submitted the reimbursement application to DEP. When ET or SEI receives reimbursement from the IPTF, they will remit the total payment to AEE. The Applications Petitioners filed the 45 applications that are the subject of this proceeding between July 18, 1994 and February 17, 1995. The financing scheme that Petitioners utilized in these applications was unique. Prior to receiving these applications, DEP never had reviewed reimbursement applications using the type of financing scheme at issue here. In fact, the instant cases present a scenario never contemplated by DEP when promulgating rules and developing written policies. DEP has established a list by which it determines whether an applicant is charging a "reasonable rate." DEP developed that list in accordance with Petroleum Cleanup Reimbursement (PCR) Guideline Number 1. PCR 1 establishes a "predominant rate" for costs involved in the site rehabilitation process. The predominant rate may be exceeded by up to 30 percent for personnel charges, and by up to 50 percent for non-personnel charges. Within these ranges, DEP evaluates each application and determines whether the PRFCSR is entitled to reimbursement for "allowable cost" at "reasonable rates." The work performed by Tower was at or near DEP's "predominant" rate. In no instance were Tower's rates near the upper limits of the reasonable rate ceiling. Tower's invoices appear to represent work that was integral to site rehabilitation which was broken down into appropriate units and rates. There is no evidence of "price fixing" between any entities engaged in site rehabilitation. There is no evidence that Tower intentionally inflated the costs of cleanup or of the scope of cleanup services to cover the cost of financing. There are no familial, beneficial or financial relationships, or any other form of affiliation between Tower and its subcontractors. A certified public accountant (CPA) attestation accompanied the applications indicating that Petitioners incurred (paid) all relevant costs. The applications did not include charges associated with the financing arrangements as line items. The CPA attestations referenced an addendum to the Certification Affidavit. The addendum indicated that "American Environmental Enterprises, Inc., an affiliate of the Environmental Trust, has provided financing to certain contractors and subcontractors by factoring invoices which are included within this application." The CPA provided the reference to the addendum in the CPA attestation as an "emphasis of the matter" statement rather then an "exception," or a modification of the CPA's attestation that Petitioners had incurred all costs in the application. The CPA firm performing the attestation services previously informed DEP of its intent with regard to "emphasis of the matter" reports. Nevertheless, the difference between the face amount of an invoice and the discounted amount of that invoice clearly represents interest. This interest was not allowable as an actual and reasonable cost of site remediation because Gator and Tower agreed to accept a lesser amount for their services prior to submittal of the applications. Therefore, they did not actually incur the amount reflected in the face amount of their invoices. DEP's predominate rates and units are fully loaded. Interest rate charges on borrowed capital from unrelated third-party sources are a "cost of doing business." DEP's fully-loaded rates include a variable for all direct and indirect business overhead costs such as rent, utilities and personnel costs. The direct and indirect overhead components of DEP's fully-loaded rates include the cost of short-term "working" capital. However, DEP never intended the predominate rate schedule to entitle an applicant to reimbursement for costs that it did not actually incur. In the instant cases, funds that passed down through the chain from ET or SEI to Gator or from Gator to Tower flowed directly and immediately back to AEE who was affiliated with the funder. Any profit derived by the funder, ET or SEI, will flow directly to AEE and its investors. The amount that Petitioner's actually incurred before they submitted the applications was the amount that AEE advanced to Tower and/or its subcontractors for integral site work plus the actual cost of Gator's allowable services, if any, which were separate and distinct from Tower's work, plus any allowable markup(s). Factoring Policy At the time that Petitioners submitted the subject applications for reimbursement, there was no rule or written guideline governing financing transactions, including factoring, occurring outside of the usual chain of reimbursement. DEP normally did not inquire about such financing so long as an applicant did not pass the costs of such financial transactions to DEP in the application as a line-item cost. There was no policy disallowing reimbursement for the face amount of the invoices when an applicant sold the right to payment, i.e. the receivable, at a discount to a disinterested third-party in an arms- length transaction. Commencing on August 31, 1994, DEP began to develop a policy regarding the use of factoring as a financing mechanism in the reimbursement program. DEP staff exchanged numerous documents regarding the subject of factoring. In one of those documents, Charles Williams, DEP's Reimbursement Administrator indicated that "we absolutely need to have a Big Meeting to decide what to do once and for all." In a November 1994 telephone conversation, DEP provided AFG's counsel with an informal opinion of how DEP would handle a factored application as described by Will Robins of AFG in an earlier meeting with DEP staff. The statement was: that the difference between the amount that a contractor accepted in payment for his services, which was a discounted amount after factoring, . . . and the face value of the invoice which was claimed and marked up in the application was determined to be a carrying charge or interest, which is specifically disallowed for reimbursement in the reimbursement rule. American Factors Group. Inc. and the Environmental Trust v. Department of Environmental Protection, DOAH Case No. 95-0343RU, Final Order issued July 24, 1995. DEP advised AFG's counsel that it would deal with factored applications involving other entities on a case by case basis. On December 20, 1994, John Ruddell, Director of DEP's Division of Waste Management, sought permission from DEP's Policy Coordinating Committee to promulgate a rule amendment to Chapter 62-773, Florida Administrative Code (formerly Chapter 17-773, Florida Administrative Code.) A draft rule accompanied the request. The draft rule was developed in compliance with Chapter 94-311, Section 6, Laws of Florida, which required DEP to revise its reimbursement rule. The draft rule provided that: nothing in this Chapter shall be construed to authorize reimbursement for the face amount of any bill or invoice representing incurred costs when the receivable has been sold at a discount. In all such cases, reimbursement shall be limited to the actual discounted amount accepted by the provider of the goods or services . . . . The draft rule had the effect of prohibiting factoring as a mechanism for financing site rehabilitation work. It did not single out any other type of financing mechanism. DEP did not promulgate the draft rule because the problems with the program were too numerous to correct in a timely fashion by rulemaking. Instead, DEP focused on drafting proposed legislation. In the meantime, DEP requested that Petitioners furnish additional information regarding the instant applications. Between March 1, 1995 and November 17, 1995, ET and SEI responded to DEP's requests with letters bearing AFG's or EF's letterhead. The letters state that prior to filing the applications, ET or SEI paid Gator for the face amount of Gator's invoices plus Gator's markup. Gator then paid the subcontractors for the face amount of their invoices. Prior to these payments, AEE an affiliate of ET, or SEI purchased the right to receive the amount due to Gator from ET and the right to receive the amount due to subcontractors from Gator. In each case, AEE bought the right to receive at a discount. According to the financing scheme, ET or SEI received sufficient funds from AEE to make the payments to Gator. ET or SEI, in turn, were obligated to pay AEE following their receipt of the funds claimed in the reimbursement application. On April 21, 1995, DEP issued a memorandum to DEP application reviewers to guide them in the processing of reimbursement applications. The memorandum indicated that: invoices from subcontractors, vendors, suppliers and/or the general contractor which were paid a factored (e.g., discounted) amount by a third party capital participant (e.g., funder) represents the actual amount incurred by that entity and subsequently by the general contractor. The memorandum directed reviewers to deduct costs in an amount equal to the difference in the face value of an invoice or application and the amount paid for the right to receive payment under that invoice or application. DEP did not direct the policy set forth in the April 21, 1995 memorandum towards any individual company. DEP intended the policy to apply to "any combination of a general contractor, management company, funder and responsible party" in any situation in which a third-party capital provider paid any program participants a factored (discounted) amount of their invoices." The April 21, 1995, policy did not condition DEP's position on factoring on any affiliation between any parties. Between August 14, 1995 and January 19, 1996, DEP took action on the 45 applications that are the subject of this proceeding. As reflected in those notices, DEP denied reimbursement of costs claimed in those applications "as a result of factoring of the supporting invoices" and because "the difference between the face amount of the supporting invoices and the amount factored represents interests or carrying charges which are specifically excluded from reimbursement pursuant to Rule 62-773.350, F.A.C." The notices properly reflect a basis of denial of costs that is consistent with DEP's policy as reflected in the December 20, 1994 draft rule and the April 21, 1995 memorandum. DEP has proven that its policy on factoring is consistent with its legislative mandate to deny reimbursement of costs which are not actual and reasonable. Affiliation Policy Not all out-of-chain affiliations between entities constitute a problem with regard to reimbursement. However, the instant cases presented DEP with unique facts as to the relationship between AEE, AFG, ET, WIFL and SEI which DEP's rules and written policies do cover. The mere existence of common corporate officers does not, in and of itself, cause AFG/AEE, ET, WIFL, and SEI to lose their integrity as separate legal entities, or make them "one and the same." Common officers of corporations are not an element of the term "financial relationship," nor does the concept of common corporate officers appear in the definitions of beneficial relationship, familial relationship, indirect interests, material interests, or sources of income. DEP's position at hearing that "affiliation" is a major key to it's position with regard to factoring does not appear in any of the documents in which DEP has either discussed or disseminated information regarding factoring. There are no requirements in DEP's application forms to disclose the nature of the relationships between an applicant and an applicant's source of financing. DEP makes no standard inquiry of funders to disclose the nature of any affiliation between the funder and the provider of capital. Nevertheless, the record supports DEP's position that it can deny reimbursement for costs when a PRFCSR has an "affiliation" with a factoring company outside of the chain of reimbursement under the facts of these cases. It is not contested that ET, WIFL, SEI and AFG and its sister company AEE are affiliated. The greater weight of the evidence indicates that this affiliation goes beyond a mere contractual agreement. AFG, AEE, WIFL (which owns ET and is a trust beneficiary), and SEI have common officers and directors. These officers and directors created ET and SEI primarily for the benefit of AFG and AEE as conduits for investment of funds in Florida's petroleum contamination site rehabilitation program. AFG has other investment vehicles, in addition to ET and SEI, which it can designate as a funder depending on the needs of its investors. AFG usually waits until the last instance to select the funder that it will use in any particular case. AFG often selects the funder on the same day that the funder issues its authorization to the general contractor. The greater weight of the evidence indicates that AFG and/or AEE and the Petitioners did not negotiate the contractual agreements between them at arms-length. A bill of sale evidencing the sale of Petitioners' right to receive reimbursement on each application is the only documented evidence of agreements between Petitioners and AFG or AEE. Any profit derived by ET flows back to AEE through WIFL. ET and SEI are under the management and control of AEE and AFG's officers and directors. For all practical purposes ET and SEI are "one and the same" as AEE and AFG. The affiliation between AEE, AFG, WIFL, ET and SEI is especially troublesome here where AEE advanced the discounted amount of invoices to: (a) Tower so that it could pay its subcontractors in full; (b) Gator so that it could pay Tower in full; and (c) its affiliates, ET and SEI, so that they could pay Gator in full. Gator's and Tower's immediate repayment in the face amount of the invoices to AEE is a back flow of funds (interest) to an entity affiliated with Petitioners. All of these transactions took place before Petitioners filed the instant applications or within a few days thereafter. They create a paper trail indicating that the parties within the "chain" at each level incurred the face amount of the next lowest level. However, the only amount actually incurred at the time Petitioners submitted the applications was the discounted amount of the invoices. Interest or Carrying Charges "Incurred" means that "allowable costs have been paid." (Rule 17- 773.200(9), Florida Administrative Code) Under DEP's rules, the facial meaning of the term is that persons must receive due return for their invoiced goods and services, billed on a units and reasonable rates basis, for allowable costs of site rehabilitation. A finance charge usually does not effect DEP's determination of charges that were "incurred" unless that charge appears as a line-item cost which is not the case here. However, these consolidated cases presented DEP with a new scenario in which Gator and Tower immediately repaid the face amount of their invoices to AEE retaining only the discount amount of their invoices to pay the actual costs of the level below them before submitting the applications. Moreover, they included the carrying charges in the applications as having been "incurred." Case Number 95-403RU, Pick Kwick No. 143, DEP Facility No. 528515448 is a typical example showing how the entities in the chain paid interest charges and included them in the application. In that case, Gator provided Tower with a subcontract/purchase order on July 8, 1994. Tower provided Gator with an invoice in the amount of $17,556.43 on July 8, 1994. Tower's invoice represented services performed in connection with the initial remedial action task at the Pick Kwick No. 143 facility including $269.90 for application preparation. On or about July 8, 1994, Gator provided ET with an invoice in the amount of $20,149.41. This invoice included Gator's 15 percent markup in the amount of $2,592.98 and $269.90 for application preparation. On August 4, 1994, AEE purchased Gator's right to receive payment from ET. AEE advanced Gator $17,696.44 or 88 percent of Gator's invoice. The interest charge on the advance was $2,452.97. On August 4, 1994, AEE purchased Tower's right to receive payment from Gator. AEE advanced Tower $17,029.74 or 97 percent of Tower's invoice. The interest charge on the advance was $526.69. On August 10, 1994, AEE purchased ET's right to receive payment from IPTF. AEE advanced ET $20,831.41 or 87 percent of ET's invoice. The interest charge on the advance was $2,981.93. On August 15, 1994, ET filed the reimbursement application in the amount of $23,813.34. This amount included ET's 15 percent markup on the face amount of Gator's invoice. Prior to filing the application, ET paid Gator, $20,149.41. Gator then paid Tower $17,556.43. Following receipt of payment from ET, Gator repaid AEE $20,149.41. Following receipt of payment from Gator, Tower repaid AEE $17,556.43. Gator and Tower made these repayments within a matter of weeks of the time that AEE advanced funds to them. Calculating simple interest, the annualized interest rate on the loan from AEE to Gator was approximately 144 percent. The annualized interest rate on the loan from AEE to Tower was approximately 36 percent. These were the interest rates, as predetermined by the discount percentage in the addenda to the factoring contracts (Gator at 88 percent and Tower at 97 percent), in approximately 30 of the 45 applications. In the other 15 applications, the Gator sold its right to receive payment at a discount percentage between 87 to 89 percent of the face amount of the invoice. In those cases, Tower sold its right to receive payment at a discount percentage between 95 and 72 percent of the face amount of the invoice. There is no evidence that Petitioners made adjustments to the costs in the applications where Gator and Tower sold their right to payments for a discount percentage at an amount other than as stated in the addenda to the factoring contracts. Analysis of the transactions involved in each of the subject applications clearly shows that the financing scheme utilized here was not equivalent to a "plain vanilla" loan from a disinterested third-party capital provider such as a bank. DEP properly deducted costs from Petitioners' applications that represented interest which Gator and Tower agreed to repay to Petitioners' affiliate, AEE, before Petitioners submitted the applications. The only costs that Gator and Tower actually incurred was the net amount that they received after factoring their invoices. That amount includes the difference between the face amount Gator's and Tower's invoices and the amount that AEE advanced to them. Gator and Tower did not actually incur allowable costs in the amount of the interest paid to AEE when they : (a) agreed to accept reimbursement for their services at a discount; (b) accepted the full amount of their invoices from the next highest level; and (c) passed the full amount of their respective invoices back to AEE. DEP did not envision this type of elaborate factoring plan when it created its simple definition of "incurred" as meaning allowable costs have been paid. It is important for participants in the program to know the "rules of the game." Applicants have to make technical and financial decisions regarding site cleanup. They have to pay all contractors and subcontractors prior to submitting an application. In this case Petitioners' attempts to win DEP's pre-approval of their various factoring proposals were unsuccessful because DEP did not have enough information about the transactions and the relationships of the entities involved. After DEP received additional information from Petitioners, it became abundantly clear that the rules were insufficient to cover the financing scheme presented here. As early as November 4, 1993, Petitioners acknowledged that "the provisions of Rule 170773, F.A.C. do not specifically address the types of situations that arise when providing capital for cleanup activities through funding groups such as AFG." Petitioners revealed their final plan in July of 1994 just before they began filing the applications. At that time, Petitioners knew DEP's concerns. They also knew DEP could not make a decision on an application until they filed the application with DEP. Inconsistent Application of Statutes, Rules and Written Guidelines DEP has authorized financial transactions by which other applicants, after incurring (paying) all costs and filing their applications, sold or pledged their right to future payment to an entity outside the usual reimbursement chain. In those cases, DEP did not deduct interest associated with such transactions. DEP's approval of such transactions came before Petitioners filed their applications in this matter. There is no evidence that those transactions involved the factoring of invoices and an agreement to repay interest before the PRFCSR submitted the applications. Likewise, there is no evidence of an affiliation and less than arms-length negotiation between the funder and the financing company in those cases. The record contains no evidence of an inconsistent application of DEP's statutes, rules or written policies before or after Petitioners filed the instant applications. Reservoir Capital On March 14, 1994, DEP met with Reservoir Capital Corporation (Reservoir) to discuss a change of address notice directing reimbursement orders and checks for Clean America Financial, Inc. (Clean America) applications to a Baltimore, Maryland address. During that meeting Reservoir's counsel informed DEP that Reservoir "paid a percentage, not the full cost, for each application." DEP representative, Paul DiGuisseppe, informed Charles Williams of that conversation by memorandum dated March 15, 1994. Mr. DiGuisseppe later spoke with a representative of Clean America (the funder) and advised him to provide a list of facilities pledged to Reservoir for which notices and payments were to be sent to the Baltimore, Maryland address. On March 30, 1994, Clean America wrote to Charles Williams and Doug Jones, providing a list of sites pledged to Reservoir and directing DEP to send payments to the Baltimore, Maryland address. Among the sites pledged to Reservoir were Curry Station, DEP Facility No. 309103537 and Scardo Automotive, DEP Facility No. 428511319. On June 17, 1994, DEP issued a reimbursement order to Scardo Automotive at the Baltimore, Maryland address. On July 1, 1994, DEP issued a reimbursement order to Curry Station at the Baltimore, Maryland address. These orders did not contain a denial of costs or deductions of interest based upon the disclosed fact that Reservoir had purchased the applications for an amount less than their face value. However, there is no evidence that either of the applicants sold the right to receive reimbursement before submitting the application. Additionally, there is no evidence that Reservoir was affiliated with Clean America. On April 11, 1996, DEP revisited the Reservoir Capital factoring mechanism. In that instance, DEP reviewed a situation in which Reservoir Capital directly paid a subcontractor's invoice in an application that All American Funding (All American) filed. Reservoir had purchased the receivable of All American, and applied part of the purchase price to directly pay a subcontractor. There is no evidence of any "affiliation" between Reservoir and any other entity in the reimbursement chain. Prior to the meeting with Reservoir, DEP intended to deny those costs since it appeared that Reservoir actually paid them rather than the applicant, All American. As a result of that meeting, DEP requested additional information from Reservoir. At the time of hearing in these cases, DEP had not made a decision in that case pending receipt of the requested information. Governor's Bank On March 9, 1994, Governors Bank wrote to Charles Williams requesting that DEP directly remit to Governors Bank any reimbursement due on an application filed by Clean America due to the fact that Clean America "secured its borrowings from the bank with any rights to payment which CAFC has in connection with certain reimbursement applications." On March 30, 1994, Clean America sent a letter to Charles Williams and Doug Jones requesting that the DEP honor the March 9, 1994 letter directing payment to Governor's Bank. On November 4, 1994, Clean America advised DEP that DEP was to remit additional final reimbursements to Governors Bank. The letter advised DEP that "based upon a loan relationship Governor's Bank established with Clean America . . ." reimbursement payments had been assigned to Governors Bank and therefore "all payments and proceeds must be remitted to Governor's Bank." There is no record evidence that Clean America entered into a loan agreement with Governors Bank prior to submittal of the application or that the applications included claims for interest paid to the bank. There is no evidence of any affiliation between Clean America and the bank. The financing mechanism that Petitioners used for these 45 applications is not similar to a "plain vanilla" bank loan where a lender advances funds after an applicant files an application and directs DEP to forward reimbursement payments to a bank lock box. Barriston Environmental Investors L.P. On March 11, 1993, Barriston Environmental Investors, L.P. (Barriston) wrote to John Ruddell, Director of the DEP's Division of Waste Management and described a mechanism of financing by which Barriston (the funder) would obtain funds, at least partially through bank debt, for the payment of subcontractors' site rehabilitation invoices. In the Barriston proposal, the subcontractor would remit an "investment banking fee" of 5 percent of the value of the invoices back to the funder upon payment of 100 percent of the invoices. Barriston's letter acknowledged that this fee would not be reimbursable under the program. In addition, the Barriston funder would receive a commitment fee from the site owner which the Barriston funder would not include in the reimbursement claim. A reference in the letter to the payment of interest on funds advanced on the site owner's behalf does not specify the time frame in which interest would be paid, i.e. before or after the filing of an application. The letter sought DEP's approval and assurance that the payment of 100 percent of the invoices would entitle Barriston to full reimbursement including both markups. Barriston's letter requested an informal response because it realized that DEP had no authority to take official agency action without the submission of an application. On April 9, 1993, DEP responded to the Barriston letter. In its response, DEP stated that the arrangements appeared to be consistent with current statutes and rules and would be eligible for the full reimbursement allowed by DEP's rules. However, there is no record evidence of any official agency action on an application submitted in accordance with Barriston's proposal. Interest Indemnification Interest indemnification encompasses a situation in which a contractor pays interest directly back to a funder during the period of time after submittal of an application but before reimbursement by the IPTF. In June 1995, a DEP employee contacted Petitioners' certified public accountant (CPA) inquiring about the practice and seeking copies of his other clients' interest indemnification contracts. After that conversation, the CPA discussed the matter with another DEP employee to confirm his understanding that financing issues were outside of the scope of DEP's review so long as an applicant did not include such charges in the application. Since the June 1995 discussions, DEP has reimbursed applications which were financed through interest indemnification without adjustments for the payment of interest. However, the interest indemnification payments applied to applications after the applicants filed them with DEP to replace long-term interest that IPTF is no longer paying. The applicants were not seeking reimbursement of those payments as incurred costs. Petitioners have not established their entitlement to reimbursement for the factored amounts of their invoices. DEP presented competent evidence to support its "factoring" and "affiliation" policies as applied here. In addition, the evidence indicates that DEP has not inconsistently applied such policies to other similarly situated reimbursement applicants. Petitioners have failed to prove that DEP's denial of costs based upon factoring is not reasonably related to the purpose of reimbursement review and otherwise unsupported by competent evidence. The April 21, 1995 policy statement is a rule as defined in Section 120.52(16), Florida Statutes. DEP was not aware of the need for such a rule when it made the last substantive amendments to Rule 17-773, Florida Administrative Code, in 1993. Nevertheless, DEP demonstrated that the non-rule policy is a reasonable interpretation of Sections 376.3071(12)(b) and 376.3071(12)(d), Florida Statutes. DEP provided an evidentiary basis to support its factoring policy in these consolidated cases. The difference between the face amount of the invoices and their factored amount did not represent allowable costs which were actual and reasonable. DEP deducted the amount of the relevant discount percentage (on a prorated basis) from each invoice submitted by Tower and its subcontractors. There is a discrepancy between the amount that DEP deducted from each invoice (itemized) and the total deduction based on a lump sum in 33 of the 45 cases which DEP did not explain during the hearing. Therefore, before DEP enters a Final Order, it should review the supporting documents to determine the correct deduction in each application. "Value Added" Policy Funders and contractors are entitled to take a markup of paid contractor and subcontractor invoices for allowable costs at reasonable rates. The invoices must represent actual and reasonable costs which are integral to site remediation. Contractors are entitled to a first-tier 15 percent markup for supervising and/or coordinating on-site remediation, for investing capital while awaiting reimbursement by paying subcontractors invoices, and for assuming liability for the performance of the subcontractors. Funders generally are entitled to a second-tier 15 percent markup as an incentive to provide funds to finance the work. Markups are expressly subject to limitations set forth in Section 17- 773.350(9), (10) and (11), Florida Administrative Code. There are no other specific or implied limitations on markups in the rules or written guidelines. Requiring each entity that receives a markup in the reimbursement chain to pay contractor, subcontractor, and vendor invoices helps ensure that each level in the reimbursement chain pays the participant at the next lowest level. In these cases, each level in the reimbursement application chain "technically" paid the next lowest level. DEP policy in effect at the time Petitioners submitted the instant applications for reimbursement was to allow markups of paid invoices at two levels. However, prior to the submission of the instant applications, DEP was not aware of a case where a general contractor claimed a markup for work that was complete before the general contractor became involved in the project. With regard to all of the pending reimbursement applications, Gator applied a 15 percent markup to all of Tower's invoices including the invoices of Tower's subcontractors. With regard to a minimum of 30 of the 45 sites, Gator clearly did not supervise, manage or direct site remediation activities performed by Tower or its subcontractors. In fact, Gator did not become involved until after Tower completed these tasks. In at least 30 of the instant cases, Tower was acting as the general contractor when all of the on-site remediation took place. However, Tower could not apply a 15 percent markup to the invoices for its own services. Gator made it possible for Petitioners to claim the markup on Tower's invoices. As to the 15 sites at which Gator allegedly had some type of involvement with on-site remediation activities, there is no persuasive evidence regarding the specific activities or the level of Gator's involvement on any particular project. On September 1, 1994, Restoration Assistance, an entity under contract with DEP to review reimbursement applications, issued a memorandum to its reviewers directing them to complete their review and do a "total denial" on "Gator Environmental packages." The memorandum advised the reviewers that "Bruce" was drafting canned language to use in DEP's denial statement. On or about April 21, 1995, DEP presented its reviewers with a memorandum setting forth an initial overview of a "value added" policy for markups taken by a "management company" involved in site remediation activities. According to the memorandum, DEP would allow reimbursement of claims for actual project management work and value-added services. The memorandum further provided that DEP would allow markups to a management company which only provided cash-flow services for a majority of the program task period even if the management company performed no other service. However, DEP would deny a markup if the management company provided such services during a "one month time period." DEP intended for the April 21, 1995 memorandum to acquaint DEP reviewers with the emerging DEP policy on markups. DEP's rules and written guidelines do not address the distinction made in the April 21, 1995 memorandum regarding the timing during which a management company could provide cash flow services and still be entitled to a markup. On October 20, 1995, Charles Williams issued a DEP policy memorandum for reviewers to use in reviewing reimbursement applications. Through that memorandum, DEP finalized and implemented the "value added" policy. The memorandum states that: if the 'GC' [general contractor] was involved with the management of the project during the course of the actual work by subcontractors, [DEP] rules do not preclude them from applying a markup. However, if the 'GC' came along after the work was completed by other contractors and their involvement was more of a due diligence exercise to faciltiate (sic) a funding arrangement by a third party, then the 'GC' markup would not be justified, though a markup by the actual funder listed as the PRFCSR could be allowed. Prior to the establishment of the "value added" policy on October 20, 1995, DEP made no inquiry as to whether a contractor provided value added services in order for the contractor to be entitled to a markup. DEP applied the "value added" policy to all pending applications (including the ones at issue here) resulting in a deduction of Gator's markup in all of the subject cases. The Department of Banking and Finance reviewed and issued a report (Comptroller's Report) on the Petroleum Contamination Site Cleanup Reimbursement Program on November 29, 1994. This report addressed the issue of markups in the reimbursement program. The Comptroller's Report recognized that DEP found the multiple markup structure to be beneficial in that it "attracts the involvement of companies whose role in cleanup projects is limited to providing funds to finance the work [and] attracts investors who provide funds which might not otherwise be available--thus facilitating cleanup of contaminated sites." The Comptroller's Report describes a two-tier arrangement involving a "prime contractor engaged to manage the cleanup project" and a "funding entity." The report acknowledges that the prime contractor "might have only limited direct involvement in the cleanup, having engaged subcontractors for most or all of the actual work." The example in the Comptroller's report did not state what DEP's policy would be if a subcontractor had completed all of the actual work before the contractor became involved. Even without this consideration, the report was critical of DEP's allowance of markups on either level. The Petroleum Efficiency Task Force (PETF) issued its final report on financing contractors on August 17, 1994. This report discussed DEP's policy of allowing two markups. In this discussion, the PETF recognized that "funders must be able to rely on the skills and knowledge of contractors to minimize reimbursement shortfalls." The PETF recommended for future consideration that "the Department should provide in rulemaking that contractors who take the first-tier 15 percent markup on subcontracted work must adequately supervise the work." When the PETF issued its report, there was no existing rule that established any level of on site supervision or any other specific criteria for applying one of the two allowable levels of markup, other than paying invoices for integral site rehabilitation work. DEP's rules and written guidelines did not substantively change with regard to the "value added" policy from the April 22, 1993 revision of Chapter 17-773, Florida Administrative Code, to the October 20, 1995 memorandum which established a non-rule limitation on the ability of an entity to apply a markup to paid invoices. Because the rules and written guidelines do not reflect the "value added" policy, a participant in the program would not be aware of it even if the participant requested program information. Gator technically paid 100 percent of the face value of Tower's invoices. Without Gator's involvement, AFG and AEE would not have financed these applications. However, DEP presented persuasive evidence at the hearing to support its position that Gator was not entitled to a markup because Gator's services added no value to site remediation projects. In the instant cases, Gator performed some type of a minimal due diligence review of Tower's site work. Gator allegedly reviewed Tower's technical and administrative files, cross-referenced technical and administrative files with the applications which Tower prepared, made visits to some job sites, and prepared a deficiency letter to determine the appropriateness of the scope of Tower's work. However, all of these functions were repetitious of the work that was performed by Tower and the certified public accountant attesting to the Certification Affidavit. Gator limited the deficiency letters to the question of whether the scope of Tower's services were reimbursable. However, there is no evidence that Tower's deficiency letters resulted in adjustments to costs in the applications as filed by Petitioners. The deficiency letters served only to adjust the discount percentage set forth in the addenda to the factoring contracts. Tower was a qualified engineering consulting firm that employed its own engineers and geologists. Gator's employee that reviewed the technical information in Tower's files was not a Florida professional engineer. He was not qualified as a certified public accountant to determine whether a charge was within DEP's reasonable rates. The Gator employee was a Florida professional geologist but he did not sign and seal the deficiency letter as such. There is no reference in DEP's rules or written policies to a deficiency letter. AFG required Gator to prepare the deficiency letter within two days of the date on which EF provided Gator with the opportunity to review a completed task. This two-day turn around time allegedly afforded efficiency of payment. Gator did not begin its review of an reimbursement application until after Gator received an invoice from Tower. The relevant subcontract/purchase order issued by Gator to Tower, the Tower invoice and the Gator invoice were often prepared on the same day. Gator technically paid Tower's invoices with funds that AEE advanced. Tower used these funds to repay AEE. When Gator received payment from ET or SEI, it passed the funds back to AEE before ET or SEI submitted the applications to DEP or immediately thereafter. Pursuant to the addenda to the factoring contracts, Tower, not Gator, contributed to a reserve trust account which AEE will use to cover any reimbursement shortfalls. Gator indemnified AEE and guaranteed its own work but did not assume a risk of loss on Tower's work. On most if not all of the applications, Gator performed no meaningful management or supervisory functions. The greater weight of the evidence indicates that Gator's primary purpose in these consolidated cases was not to afford AFG a level of comfort as to the appropriate scope of the individual program tasks but to ensure that third-party investors maximized their profits. The "value added" agency statement has the effect of a rule which DEP did not contemplate when it promulgated its rules and written policies. Nevertheless, DEP's decision concerning the value added policy is within the scope of its delegated legislative authority. DEP has proven that reimbursement for Gator's services was not allowable as actual and reasonable costs of site remediation. Therefore, it is not entitled to a first-tier markup. Computer Costs Prior to January 1, 1995, DEP determined the reimbursability of computer costs based upon a "units and rates basis" as provided by Rules 17- 773.100(5), and 17-733.700(2)(d), Florida Administrative Code. DEP evaluated computer costs "as a certain number of hours [at] a reasonable rate." Pursuant to the units and rates rule provisions, there was no rational basis for DEP to deny the computer costs contained in applications filed prior to January 1, 1995. On January 1, 1995, DEP established a policy by which it would disallow in full any computer costs greater than $750. Under that policy, DEP would reimburse in full an applicant's computer costs with supporting invoices of $749 dollars, but disallow in full computer costs with supporting invoices of $751. DEP's reimbursement orders involving more than $750 in computer costs after January 1, 1995 routinely stated that "there was insufficient justification to demonstrate that this computer time was integral to the task or necessary." DEP applied the computer policy to all applications filed and pending review at the time it developed the policy, regardless of when an applicant performed the work or generated the records. DEP applied the January 1, 1995 computer policy to the application in Case No. 95-4606 which ET filed on July 18, 1994. In that case DEP denied $1,456.25 in computer costs allowing no reimbursement for computer time. On April 27, 1995, DEP implemented a new policy by which it evaluated computer costs based upon a calculation of allowable personnel hours per task as opposed to a units and rates basis. Under that policy DEP would evaluate the total allowable personnel hours in a task and limit computer costs to 10 percent of those hours up to a maximum of $750. Under the April 27, 1995 policy, DEP reduced the reimbursement for computer costs to $500 if the reimbursable amount exceeded $750 after DEP made the 10 percent calculation. DEP implemented the April 27, 1995 policy through the use of a calculation work sheet which it provided to its application reviewers. DEP applied the April 27, 1995 computer policy and work sheet to all applications pending review at the time DEP developed the policy, regardless of when the applicant performed the work or generated the records. DEP applied the April 27, 1995, policy in all of the subject cases subsequent to Case No. 95-4606, with the following exceptions: Case Nos. 96- 0432RU, 96-1006 and 96-1009, which had no denial of computer costs; and Case No. 96-1352, in which DEP applied the 10 percent limitation, but reimbursed 896.75 dollars of the computer costs. After implementation of the April 27, 1995 policy, DEP made no effort to adjust the denial of all computer costs in Case No. 95-4606 under the January 1, 1995 policy. The only other category in which DEP evaluates reimbursement on a percentage of hours basis, rather than a units and rates basis, is total management costs. DEP's written guidelines and Rule 17-773.350(16), Florida Administrative Code, limit management costs to a percentage of total allowable personnel hours. There are no rules or written guidelines that would limit computer costs based upon criteria other than a units and rates evaluation, or that would support DEP's policies as reflected in the January 1, 1995 and April 27, 1995 policy memoranda. DEP's rules and written guidelines did not substantively change with regard to this issue from the time Petitioners filed the subject applications, to the time DEP established the January 1, 1995 and the April 27, 1995 computer policies. DEP did not issue any PCRs or other written guidelines to place applicants on fair notice of DEP's new policies with regard to computer costs. DEP presented no persuasive evidence at the hearing to support its January 1, 1995 and April 27, 1995 policies. The only basis for the policy was DEP's representation that it developed the policies as a "reasonableness issue" in order to reduce the amount of computer costs that were appearing in reimbursement applications. DEP did not demonstrate that it based the new policies on any calculation of the amount of computer time necessary to perform a remediation task. Once the total computer costs reached $750 dollars, DEP gave no consideration to the scope or complexity of the task. Given the difference in the amounts involved in performing site remediation services (e.g. an application totaling 7,249.75 dollars in Case No. 96-0411RU versus an application totaling 149,080.02 dollars in Case No. 96-0425RU) and the differences in program tasks (see Rule 17-773.500, Florida Administrative Code), a policy establishing a flat numerical limit on computer costs that an applicant may claim in an application is not reasonable. DEP presented no evidence at the hearing to prove the basis for its retroactive application of the policies to work performed and applications submitted prior to the development of the policies. DEP did not attempt to explain the basis for its failure to apply the rules and written guidelines in effect at the time the work was performed or the records generated. Based upon the foregoing, DEP's denial of computer costs in each of these applications is not supported by the statutes, rules and written guidelines in effect at the time the work was performed or the applications were filed. Each application contains information supporting the computer costs. The application Certification Affidavits and CPA attestations demonstrate that Petitioners incurred the computer costs which DEP should reimburse. The reimbursement for computer costs should be in full except to the extent that DEP allocates to a supporting document a prorated share of the amount of a discount on a factored invoice. As a final note, of the computer costs denied in 16 of the 45 reimbursement notices, the sum of the allowances and deductions does not equal the overall claim. The differences ranged from a few dollars to over four hundred dollars. DEP provided no evidence to explain the discrepancy in the amount calculated by DEP in its notices. Miscellaneous Costs Prior to September 27, 1995, DEP reimbursed miscellaneous line-item costs when the applicant furnished support for them in the application. The miscellaneous costs policy as of May 17, 1995 even dispensed with the requirement of supporting invoices when these costs totaled less than 300 dollars. DEP's reviewers are employees of a firm that provides DEP with application review services as an independent contractor. On September 27, 1995, after a meeting with DEP staff, the application reviewers implemented a policy to deny costs for "overhead." Under the new policy, certain items were overhead, including but not limited to: gloves, mason jars, sampling disposables, phone calls, excessive faxes, excessive copying, small hand tools, shipping documents, etc. The application reviewers had to exercise their own discretion as to which items were "overhead" until they received a guideline from DEP. The reviewers decided to approve overhead expenses of less than $50 and deny items for more than $50. The policy continued in existence at least through November 9, 1995. DEP applied the miscellaneous/overhead policy to all of the subject applications, regardless of the date of cleanup work or application submittal. The application reviewers applied the miscellaneous/overhead "policy" without the knowledge of DEP's Reimbursement Administrator, Charles Williams. When Mr. Williams found out about the policy, he "counselled them that they need to reverse that position." The correct policy would allow reimbursement of "miscellaneous/overhead" costs that the reviewers denied in 33 of the 45 applications. DEP made no effort to correct the denial of these costs based upon its erroneously applied policy. DEP presented no persuasive evidence at the hearing to support its application of the miscellaneous/overhead policy in applications submitted prior to the development of the policy. DEP did not explain the basis for its failure to apply the rules and written guidelines in effect at the time the subcontractors performed the work or generated the records. Based upon the foregoing, DEP's denial of miscellaneous/overhead costs in 33 applications in which DEP denied such costs is not supported by the applicable states, rules and written guidelines. Each application contains information supporting the miscellaneous costs. The applications' Certification Affidavits and CPA Attestations demonstrate that Petitioner's incurred the miscellaneous costs. Therefore, DEP should reimburse those miscellaneous costs. The reimbursement should be in full except to the extent that DEP allocates to a supporting document a prorated share of the amount of a discount on a factored invoice. Airfare From June 17, 1993, to sometime prior to January 31, 1996, DEP's policy with regard to the reimbursement of airfare was to pay airfare integral to site rehabilitation when such costs were relatively inexpensive. By no later than January 31, 1996, DEP developed and applied a policy to deny all airfare costs regardless of whether the applicant provided justification. On March 13, 1996, DEP decided that once again it would reimburse airfare with sufficient justification such as a comparison with car travel. DEP considers the changes in reimbursability of airfare as "just procedures to follow," and applicable without regard to the timing of work performed. DEP denied airfare charges in Case No. 96-1353 as overhead charges. DEP's rules and written guidelines did not substantively change with regard to airfare from June 17, 1993, when airfare was reimbursable, to the policy implemented on January 31, 1996, in which airfare was not reimbursable, to March 13, 1996, when airfare was reimbursable once again. DEP issued no PCRs or other written guidelines to place applicants on fair notice of the changes in policy with regard to airfare. DEP has not provided any evidence to support the basis for the fluctuations in its airfare policy. DEP presented no evidence at the hearing to provide the basis for its application of the airfare policy to work performed and applications submitted prior to the development of the changes in policy. DEP did not explain the basis for its failure to apply the rules and written guidelines in effect at the time the subcontractors performed the work or generated the records. Based upon the foregoing, DEP's denial of airfare costs in the application for Case No. 96-1353 is not supported by the applicable rules and written guidelines. The application contains information supporting the miscellaneous costs. The application's Certification Affidavit and CPA Attestation demonstrate that Petitioner ET incurred the airfare costs. Therefore, DEP should reimburse airfare costs in full except to the extent that DEP allocates to a supporting invoice the prorated amount of a discount on a factored invoice. Inconsistent Agency Practice The application of DEP's factoring policy did not treat Petitioners in a manner different from other funders. Heretofore, DEP was not aware of a case where program participants factored their invoices before filing an application and claimed the face amount of those invoices for reimbursement. The affiliation between Petitioners and AFG and/or AEE was also unique. DEP issued a memorandum requiring funders to provide "clarification regarding essential cost documentation" on July 26, 1995. The purpose of this memorandum was to remind application reviewers of the need for a funder to submit an invoice documenting and supporting its line-item claim for the second- tier 15 percent markup. DEP did not intend for this memorandum to limit DEP's ability to inquire about relationships and transactions taking place outside the usual chain of reimbursement when an application on its face refers to a factoring scheme involving an "affiliation" between the factoring company and the funder. DEP does not deduct finance charges when an applicant incurs (pays) all invoices, submits the application, then sells the receivable or agrees to pay long-term interest pending receipt of payment from the IPTF. In the instant cases, Petitioners agreed to accept reimbursement for their services at a discount before they submitted the applications then included the cost of borrowing capital in the application. DEP does not routinely ask questions of other applicants regarding their financing. Nevertheless, under the facts of these cases, DEP would have been remiss in its duty if it had not made such inquiries. DEP's actions in the instant cases are not inconsistent with its actions taken in other cases with other similarly situated entities because there is no evidence that other such cases exist. Bias On August 31, 1994, Bruce French provided Charles Williams with a memorandum in which Mr. French discussed factoring. In his memorandum, Mr. French concluded that DEP could only reimburse the "discount" amount that the factoring company actually incurred/paid the funders. On September 1, 1994, Mr. French had a discussion with someone named "Toni" at McGuinnes Laboratories regarding the laboratories' use of AFG services for financing invoices to Tower. On September 2, 1994, Mr. French related in a memorandum to Charles Williams, his understanding that the laboratory had different price lists for different customers, generally depending on volume of analysis performed and individual payment agreements. Mr. French surmised that the laboratory's price for services "is inflated to deal with AFG's discount price to be paid by AFG." Mr. French concluded that, under those circumstances, AFG's financing arrangements may "represent collusion on behalf of all parties to the application to defraud DEP for the benefit of AFG. That is, prices are 'fixed' prior to performing of services." On September 2, 1994, Mr. Williams responded to Mr. French's memo by indicating that the scenario presented by Mr. French "sounds interesting" and that DEP would "absolutely need to have a Big Meeting to decide what to do once and for all." On September 12, 1994, Mr. French provided information on factoring to Bill Sittig of DEP's Office of the Inspector General and to Mr. Williams. Mr. French included a drawing entitled "The Tangled Web They Weave or the Hidden Discount Line Items and other Fluff, August 31, 1994 Interpretation of Bruce French's Discussion." At the hearing, neither Mr. Sittig nor Mr. Williams remembered seeing the drawing. There is no competent evidence as to the identity of the person creating the drawing. There is no persuasive competent evidence that Mr. French was biased against Petitioners or any other entity utilizing factoring as a mechanism of financing. Moreover, DEP had no direct and demonstrable bias against Petitioners. Timeliness of Agency Action Prior to filing the instant applications, representatives of the funders and AFG presented various financing schemes to DEP for pre-approval. In each proposal, the person speaking for AFG also spoke on behalf of the funders. At all times relevant here, Paul DeCoster was secretary and counsel for AFG. He was also secretary of SEI and a corporate director and shareholder of WIFL. In September of 1993, Mr. DeCoster wrote a letter to DEP describing a proposed financing scheme in which AFG would purchase the account receivables of contractors engaged in site rehabilitation. AFG's plans were in a formative stage at this time. Mr. DeCoster wrote DEP a follow-up letter dated October 4, 1993. This letter states that: the amount of financing required to meet [certain contractor clients'] working capital needs is so large that FEC [a funder] must find large institutional investors to accommodate them. For service of finding such investors, FEC proposes to charge a fee to the contractor client, which would be in addition to the 15 [percent] 'markup' taken by the investor providing the financing. The October 4, 1993 letter disclosed that contractor clients would deposit funds in a trust account as security for the performance of their work. The trust would invest its funds "in accounts receivable purchased from AFG, the parent of FEC, and any income earned by the trust on those investments would inure to the benefit of AFG." The plan that Mr. DeCoster proposed was markedly different from the scheme utilized here. The most noticeable differences are that the subject applications did not involve a finder's fee, FEC as a funder, or the purchase of AFG's accounts receivable by a reserve trust. In October of 1993, Will Robins met with DEP staff to discuss the manner in which the reimbursement program would apply to a proposed financing scheme. In this proposal, AFG would charge contractors an application/initiation fee and/or a commitment fee. The transactions between the entities in the instant applications did not involve an application/initiation fee and/or a commitment fee. When Mr. Robins made his presentation, DEP did not know the specific relationships between the entities involved or Mr. Robins' position as an officer, director, and or shareholder of these entities. After that meeting, counsel for AFG sent DEP a letter dated November 4, 1993. The letter acknowledges that the existing rules did not "specifically address the types of situations that arise when providing capital for cleanup activities through funding groups such as AFG." The letter identifies ET as the proposed funder through which AFG would finance cleanups. According to the letter, ET would incur the costs but AFG would hold the right to receive the ultimate reimbursement payment from the IPTF. The letter clearly reveals DEP's concern that the proposed application/initiation fee was a "kickback" which should be deducted from the funder's markup. In January of 1994, counsel for AFG wrote a letter to DEP describing a financing scheme which differs in some respects from the financing scheme at issue here. This letter states that AFG intended to purchase receivables of the funder and the general contractor at a discount. Under this plan, the general contractor and the funder would claim the two allowable markups. The subcontractors would pay AFG a finder's fee. The letter reveals that AFG, its affiliates, and investors would recover the cash equivalent of both levels of markups plus a fee from subcontractors for funding the high costs of risky projects. The letter states that: since the Department's reimbursement rules do not specifically address the issue of site cleanups that are funded through private sources of capital . . . it is important that we know if there are any obvious or glaring problems with this plan that would cause reimbursement to be withheld otherwise restricted. On July 13, 1994, counsel for AFG wrote DEP to explain some modifications in the details to the proposed plan for the purchase and sale of receivables at a discount. This letter informed DEP that AFG would have a financial affiliation with the funder (ET) which would exist outside the chain of reimbursement and which would have no effect on either the markups or the overall reimbursement amount reflected in any application. All contracts within the chain of reimbursement (between ET, SEI, Gator, Tower, and its subcontractors) would be negotiated in arms-length transactions. The letter states: In this plan the subcontractors will perform their work on the site and will prepare their invoices in a manner consistent with any publicly or privately financed cleanup. Those invoices will be complied and forwarded to the general contractor for its review and the general contractor will add on the markup allowed by rule to the subcontractor's bills. The reimbursement application will then be forwarded to the funder who will ensure that all bills have been paid and who will be identified as the "person responsible for conducting site rehabilitation" on the reimbursement application. The funder will take the second markup allowed by rule, and will submit the reimbursement application to the Department of Environmental Protection for processing. Reimbursement will ultimately be paid by the Department to the funder in accordance with the reimbursement application. At no step in this process will the Department relinquish any authority to review and approve either the scope and nature of the cleanup or the rates charged by the contractors and subcontractors. Petitioners filed the first of their applications with DEP on July 18, 1994, five days after the date of the July 13, 1994 letter. In late November, 1994, after all but 4 of the 45 applications were filed, DEP placed a telephone call to Petitioners' counsel advising him of the position DEP intended to take with regard to his client's financing arrangements. DEP did not provide any written confirmation of that call, or issue any document describing its policy, until April 21, 1995. In each of the above described letters and/or meetings, AFG's attempt to ascertain DEP's position regarding the various proposed financing mechanisms was unsuccessful. However, AFG was aware that DEP could not take a position that represented official agency action until an applicant actually filed an application. At no time did DEP make any affirmative statement which misled Petitioners regarding the acceptability of AFG's proposals. There is no persuasive evidence to support a finding that the agency did not timely respond to the claims for reimbursement.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing, it is recommended that DEP enter a Final Order in each of these consolidated cases: (a) disallowing reimbursement of the first- tier markup; (b) disallowing reimbursement of any factored invoice in an amount equal to the amount of the discount on that invoice; and (c) allowing reimbursement of costs associated with airfare, computers, and miscellaneous/overhead expenses. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of October, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of October, 1996. COPIES FURNISHED: E. Gary Early, Esquire Christopher R. Haughee, Esquire Akerman, Senterfitt and Eidson, P.A. 216 South Monroe Street, Suite 200 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-2555 W. Douglas Beason, Esquire Betsy F. Hewitt, Esquire Department of Environmental Protection 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2400 Virginia B. Wetherell, Secretary Department of Environmental Protection Douglas Building 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 Perry Odom, Esquire Department of Environmental Protection 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000
The Issue Whether Beker Phosphate Corporation should be granted a hermit to construct an industrial waste water facility pursuant to chapter 403, Florida Statutes. By application, dated April 8, 1975, Beker Phosphate Corporation (hereinafter Beker) , sought a permit to construct an industrial waste water facility in Manatee County, Florida, from the Department of Pollution Control (now and hereinafter DER) . The application was received on April 11 and, after advising Beker that the application was incomplete a meeting was held on May 9th between DER and Beker representatives with the result that Beker filed a new application dated June 11, that was received by the DER in July. Further meetings were held in the fall of 1975 and additional in formation was received as to the application. On December 16, 1975, DER secretary. Jay W. Landers, Jr., issued a Notice Of Intent To Grant A Permit With Conditions. The conditions were unspecified in the letter of intent (Exhibit 1.) Subsequently, on December 23 and December 24, 1975, Sarasota County (hereinafter Sarasota) and the Town of Longboat Key (hereinafter Longboat Key), respectively, filed petitions with the DER alleging that their substantial interests would be adversely affected by approval of the permit application and setting forth in their petitions certain disputed questions of fact for determination. After a prehearing conference, Amended Petitions were filed by those parties to clarify and expand on such questions of fact and to resolve procedural matters. Additionally, during this period, George Browning, III, of Sarasota, Florida was granted status as an intervenor.
Findings Of Fact Beker proposes to construct a phosphate rock mine and beneficiation plant on a tract of approximately 11,000 acres in a predominately agricultural and ranching area of Manatee County about 10 miles from Myakka City, Florida. The mining will be performed by two dredges. One will mine overburden and return it to the mined-out area and the other will mine phosphate rock matrix which will be pumped to the beneficiation plant. The plant will consist essentially of two circuits. The first is a washer where the matrix pumped from the dredging operation is partially cleaned of clay and fine sand, and the coarser phosphate particles "pebbles" are separated as a product. The "fines" from the washing operation consist of small phosphate rock particles, sand, and clay. This mixture will be treated in the second section of the plant by "flotation" methods to recover the small phosphate rock particles as a product. During initial operation, the sand and clay will be stored in a temporary waste material storage area, but as the mining proceeds and the dredge pits open up, the sand and clay material will be pumped back to the dredge pits so that sand, and overburden will be mixed and redeposited to reclaim the land. Approximately 8 million gallons of fresh water per day will be drawn from the Floridian aquifer to be used in the flotation circuits. From the plant the water flows in two types of streams--one containing sand suspended in water and one containing clay suspended in water. Both streams flow into a settling pond surrounded by an earthen dam where sand and clay solids settle to the bottom. The clarified water is then decanted through six spillway structures into a hydraulic recirculation ditch outside the dam and flows back to the plant for re-use. The ponds and canals that make up the hydraulic circuit are planned to have sufficient capacity to contain rainwater falling on the site and pond system during the wet season when there are heavy rainfalls (approximately from May to September). Excess water will be decanted from the hydraulic recirculation ditch through a structure into a pipe and then discharged into Wingate Creek. The settling pond will occupy approximately 225 acres and its capacity will be about 8,458 acre- feet. The pond itself can be used to act as a reservoir and water can be built up in the pond during periods of high rainfall. It will not be necessary to release the water at any particular time. It can be released at will when the effluent contains a minimum of pollutant materials (Exhibit 1). Matrix is an unconsolidated mixture of phosphate pebbles and boulders of partly phosphatized limestone, quartz and clay. The washing operation removes unwanted oversized material and fine clays. The purpose of the flotation plant is to recover fine phosphate rock that might otherwise be lost. In the flotation process, flotation reagents, including sulfuric acid, number 2 fuel oil, tall oil, sodium hydroxide, and amines are used for treatment. The wastes are then moved to the settling pond where over a period of time the "slimes", (sands and clays) will settle to the bottom forming an impervious layer which will seal the pond. The settling process removes more than 90 percent of the contaminants from the influent. The coarser clay particles settle first and many of the fine particles settle in a process called "flocculation" by which electrical forces bring the particles together. However, some of the particles will not flocculate and remain suspended in the water. These extremely small particles constitute the total suspended solids that remain in the effluent when it is discharged from the settling area. They probably will not settle out entirely during their course from Wingate Creek into the Myaaka River and eventually to the Gulf of Mexico. However, even if it were assumed that such materials would settle somewhere between the point of discharge and Charlotte Harbor, over the entire 20 year proposed life of the mine they would form a deposit much less than 1/10th of an inch. Although it is technically possible to treat water to the degree that it would result in distilled water, realistic concepts of treatment establish that an additional settling or "polishing" pond for the proposed facility might not improve the quality of the wastewater finally discharged in state waters to any appreciable degree. Alternative proposals for the reduction of pollutants by additional processing, such as the intentional growth of water hyacinths in settling areas or use of chemical coagulants would result in creating other waste materials and thus be counterproductive (Testimony of Bromwell; Exhibit 1). The applicant's discharge of wastewater to Wingate Creek will average approximately 3.19 million gallons per day. However, since discharge will be effected primarily during periods of excessive rainfall, actual discharges can reach a maximum of about ten million gallons per day during this period. The effluent contained in such discharge will meet the test of at least 90 percent removal of organic and inorganic wastes specified by Rule 17-3.04(1), Florida Administrative Code, when measured by the influent into the settling pond and the effluent leaving that area. This treatment, however, will not produce an effluent equivalent to that produced by the "highest quality municipal waste treatment." The highest degree of treatment that has been reached by municipalities is "advanced waste treatment" as defined in Rule 17-3.04(2)(b), Florida Administrative Code. The water quality characteristics of the effluent will meet the standards of Rule 17-3.05 as to concentrations of those pollutants reasonably anticipated to be fond in the wastewater based on samples taken where the waters are discharged into Wingate Creek (Testimony of Gilgallon, Davis, Edwards, Heinzman, Bromwell, Bartow, Wellford, Exhibit 1). In preparing the application, no consideration was given to the need of meeting treatment standards for highest quality municipal waste treatment or advanced waste treatment. Neither did the recommending official of the DER, Mr. Edwards, then Regional Administrator for the Southwest Region, consider this standard because he had been advised by the DER legal staff that Rule 17-3.04(2) did not apply to Wingate Creek since it was not a tributary to one of the bodies of water listed in subparagraph (c) of the rule 17-3.04(2). This determination was based upon Resolution No. 74-83, September 17, 1974, of the Florida Pollution Control Board that was issued after legal challenges had been made to an interpretation by the Department of Pollution Control legal staff that Rule 17-3.04(2) required advanced wastewater treatment for industrial waste discharges. The Board, in its resolution, determined that since evidence had not been taken concerning treatment standards for industrial waste discharges at the time of adoption of the effluent standards for sanitary waste contained in Rule 17-3.04(2), the advanced wastewater treatment standards in the aforesaid rule would not be enforced against industrial dischargers pending full hearings on a new Rule to clearly express the Board's intent in this regard (Testimony of Gilgallon, Edwards; Exhibit 1). Special conditions that the Southwest Region, Department of Environmental Regulation, recommends should be attached to any issuance of a construction permit, other than standard conditions and those relating to other types of permits, are as follow: Approval by DER prior to the construction of any above grade phosphatic clay storage facility other than the initial settling pond. Removal efficiencies for oil and grease shall be a minimum of 90 percent and shall not exceed 14 milligrams per liter measured in the discharge effluent. Discharge effluent to Wingate Creek shall meet the water quality standards of Chapter 17-3.05(2) at the point of discharge prior to mixing with the receiving stream. Further treatment of the discharge will be required in the event compliance with proviso (c) above cannot be achieved or significant degradation of the receiving stream occurs as determined by the DER. In addition to required routine monitoring, a detailed analysis of the untreated and treated wastewater to be conducted once on representative samples during (1) month of July and (2) month of February. Such analyses shall, as a minimum, include all the parameters listed in 17-3:05(2). Applicants shall conduct an investigation into total retention possibilities of the effluent including, but not limited to, the following areas: recharge wells retention and storage of excess water during the "wet" season with subsequent reuse during the "dry" season for process and/or irrigation purposes. A report of these investigations shall be submitted prior to submission of operation permit application The location of monitoring wells shall be down gradient from the settling pond. Detailed proposal, subject to the DER approval, regarding exact location and number of wells to adequately ascertain the impact of seepage to be submitted no later than 90 days prior to commencement of operation. Bond to be posted for damages that may result from a clay settling area dam failure. Oral and written communications from the public were received at the hearing and included the following: Announcement by the County Attorney, Manatee County, that the county did not plan to appeal the DER Notice of Intent to Grant the permit (Statement of E.N. Fay, Jr.). The Division of Recreation and Parks, Department of Natural Resources, fears that the construction of the phosphate mine up-stream from the Myaaka diver State Park poses a serious potential threat to its aquatic habitat due to the possibility of a dam failure. It also fears that pollutants from the project will tend to settle as the river waters flow through the two lakes in the park. It therefore, opposes the construction until assurance can be given that proper safeguards have been taken to prevent such problems (Testimony of Alverez). The Longboat Key Garden Club believes that the project would involve too much water consumption and also that phosphate mining should be halted until further government studies are made to assure that the safety and health of the populace and the environment will not be endangered through polluted runoff and phosphate spills (Testimony of Monroe). The Save Our Bays Association in Manatee County has collected petitions from citizens in Manatee County requesting a referendum on a ballot this November for or against phosphate mining. The Association believes that such a vote should be taken before final decision is made on the subject. Its spokesman fears that if the quality and quantity of the drinking water is disrupted, it will interfere with continued tourist trade (Testimony of Howard Greer). The Palma Sola Parks Association opposes the Beker Application until there is greater assurance of environmentally safe mining (Testimony of Blankenship) A former physical and health education director is concerned about the fact that there has not been sufficient data collected on the effect of radioactive materials in runoff and waste. She believes there should be more research in these areas and asked that the public be protected from such hazards (Testimony of Mary Kay Greer). The Manasota-88 project for environmental qualities of 1968 and 1988 believes that issuance of the permit should be withheld until health implications can be determined concerning potential hazards to the Myakka and Manatee Rivers' watersheds (Exhibit 7). A former member of the Manatee County Planning Commission that approved the Beker application prior to action by the County Commission of Manatee County is in favor of the proposed project because Beker's plan to impound water will augment the water facilities of the county (Testimony of Reasoner). The City of Bradenton believes that since it is being required to meet advanced water treatment standards of discharge for sanitary sewage, Beker Phosphate Corporation should be required to meet similar standards (Testimony of Mayor A.K. Leach). A member of the Myakka City Civic Association who is an adjacent land owner to Beker Phosphate Corporation feels that the project is necessary in order to produce jobs for individuals in that area of the county (Testimony of Mizell). The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service is concerned that proposed construction of two dams by the applicant will destroy approximately (4) acres of mangrove areas, three acres of pasture land and about 185 acres of bottom land or hardwood habitat. It recommends an alternative method of backup levies constructed around the primary settling bases on the applicant's land to contain any spills and prevent destruction of the streams and associated wetlands (Testimony of Johnston) The Conservation Council of Manatee County believes that Beker's unique mining and reclamation plan will help the farming industry and also create necessary water reserviors and recreation areas, and therefore endorses its proposal to mine in Manatee County (Testimony of Kent, Exhibit 14). Petitions were submitted at the hearing from approximately 3,000 individuals living in Manatee and Sarasota Counties opposing the issuance of the permit because they believe that phosphate mining is dangerous to the quality and supply of the water and endangers the health of the people (Composite Exhibit 9, Testimony of Humphrey).
The Issue The issues in this case are whether Respondent, Nemi, Inc., should pay a $500.00 administrative fine for maintaining an unpermitted stationary installation that is reasonably expected to be a source of water pollution (Count I); whether it should pay an administrative fine of $9,500.00 for failing to submit a completed Site Assessment Report (SAR) within 270 days of discovery of the discharge of chemical solvents (Count II); whether it should pay investigative costs and expenses in the amount of $1,500.00 incurred by Respondent, Department of Environmental Protection (Department) (Count III); and whether it should take corrective action, as described in the Department's Notice of Violation, Orders for Corrective Action, and Administrative Penalty Assessment (Notice of Violation) issued on January 23, 2009.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: Respondent is a for-profit corporation registered to do business in the State. Respondent's president and registered agent is Neil Schuberg, who represented the corporation at hearing. Respondent is the owner of a 1.1-acre parcel of real property located at 6801 Northwest 17th Avenue, Fort Lauderdale, Florida. The property is situated in what is known as the Gateway Industrial Center just south of the City of Pompano Beach and midway between the Florida Turnpike and Interstate 95. The parcel is rectangular shaped and is approximately 90 feet wide by 180 feet long. The property is further identified by the Broward County Property Appraiser as Parcel Identification Number 494209050040. A one-story warehouse and parking lot are located on the property, which is currently leased by Respondent to a testing laboratory. The evidence shows that for at least since 1981 David R. Ligh owned the property until his death. After he died, his widow, Elsie M. Ligh, sold the property in 1994 to Clayton John Pierce subject to a mortgage in the amount of $167,640.00. Mr. Pierce began operating a business on the premises known as Combined Roof Services, Inc. In 1995, Mr. Pierce decided to sell the property. A potential buyer, S & S Propeller Company, retained the services of Buck Eco-Logic, Inc., an environmental consulting firm, to prepare an environmental site assessment for the purpose of "determining the suitability of property for ownership by [S & S Propeller Company]." When it first inspected the site in July 1995, Buck Eco-Logic, Inc., discovered three thirty-five gallon drums and a twenty-gallon black plastic tub, all labeled "hazardous waste" and reflecting that they had contained tetrachloroethene (also known as perchloroethylene) waste. This is a chemical solvent that is typically used by dry cleaning establishments. The labels carried the name and "EPA ID number" of Family Dry Cleaners located at 6804 Stirling Road, Davie, Florida, an address which appears to be around ten to twelve miles south of the subject property. The three drums were lying on their sides on the northern end of an asphalt parking area beneath overgrown Brazilian pepper trees and were empty; the empty twenty-gallon tub was located inside the building on the property. Soil borings on the property performed by Buck Eco- Logic, Inc., revealed concentrations of tetrachloroethene at 10,613 parts per billion, which exceed allowable standards. Tetrachloroethene and its breakdown products are a solid waste, as defined by Florida Administrative Code Rule 62-701.200(113). A Phase I Environmental Site Assessment (Phase I ESA) dated August 13, 1995, was prepared by the consulting firm and sets forth in detail the results of its inspection. See Department Exhibit 2. The sale was never consummated. Later that year, Mr. Pierce engaged the same consulting firm to perform a Phase II Environmental Site Assessment of the property. That assessment revealed concentrations in groundwater ranging from 8,840 parts per billion to 173,000 parts per billion of tetrachloroethene, which exceed the State Clean Soil Criteria and State Maximum Contaminant Levels. The report, issued on October 13, 1995, was received in evidence as Department Exhibit 3. On October 30, 1995, a Mr. Pivnick, an attorney with the firm of Dombroff & Gilmore, P.A., which represented Mr. Pierce, notified the Department by letter that the empty drums and tub had been discovered on the property. The letter also attached a copy of the Phase I ESA. Mr. Pivnick was instructed by the Department to contact the local police department to report the incident as well as the state warning system for reporting discharges to the environment. Also, the Department contacted other local agencies and the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). In October 1995, Mr. Pierce vacated the premises and ceased operating Combined Roof Services, Inc. In January 1996, he began leasing the property to Sun Valley Industries, also a roofing repair business, until that firm vacated the premises in December 1997. With the use of grant monies, the Department engaged the services of International Technology Corporation to prepare a Preliminary Investigation Report (PIR) for the property. That report was issued on February 13, 1997. See Department Exhibit The PIR recommended that additional monitoring of the site (through shallow monitoring wells, soil samples, groundwater samples, and groundwater flow direction) be made to quantify the presence of chlorinated solvents. Again with the use of grant monies, in 1997 the Department engaged the services of Post, Buckley, Schuh & Jernigan, Inc., to prepare a Site Inspection Report (Report) for the subject property. The Report was issued in March 1998. See Department Exhibit 5. Excessive tetrachloroethene, Cis-1, 2- dichloroethene, and trichloroethylene were detected in ground water samples, while tetrachloroethene was detected in all seven soil samples. On April 2, 1998, Ms. Ligh assigned the mortgage on the property to Nemi, Inc., for around $100,000.00. Mr. Schuberg explained that he was able to purchase it at a discount because Mr. Pierce had ceased making payments on the mortgage and had warned Ms. Ligh that if she foreclosed on the mortgage, she would be responsible for cleanup costs on the property exceeding a million dollars. While Mr. Schuberg acknowledged that he was aware of a contamination problem on the property, he says the mortgage was purchased as an investment, and he never thought he would actually acquire the property because he believed Mr. Pierce would continue to make the mortgage payments. After failing to make payments on the mortgage, on September 21, 1999, Mr. Pierce executed a Warranty Deed in Lieu of Foreclosure in favor of Nemi, Inc. Based on conversations with Mr. Pierce at that time, Mr. Schuberg says he was under the impression that the spill was much smaller than it actually was, and that it would be cleaned up by the Department. At hearing, Mr. Schuberg characterized Mr. Pierce as "a hustler and a liar." After Mr. Pivnick's report of contamination was received, the Department, along with the Broward County Department of Natural Resource Protection, initiated an investigation (probably in late 1995 or early 1996) in an attempt to verify the source of the contamination. Because Family Dry Cleaners "was on the top of [its] list," the Department first sought to determine whether that firm had actually deposited the drums and tub on the subject property. It learned that in 1994, or a year before the contamination was reported to the Department, Family Dry Cleaners had been evicted by its landlord, Lincoln Park. According to the Department, this "led to a dead- end" as far as Family Dry Cleaners was concerned. However, that business had been replaced by another tenant, Liberty Dry Cleaners. The Department then attempted to ascertain whether Lincoln Park or the new tenant might have been responsible for transporting the drums and tub to the subject property and dumping the waste. However, the Department was unable to confirm that either of the two had done so. Photographs of the drums and tub were made by Buck Eco- Logic, Inc., when it conducted an assessment in July 1995. Because the empty drums and tub were later removed from the site by unknown persons, the Department was only able to review the photographs when it conducted its investigation. Photographs of the drums indicated that they were larger than the twenty-gallon drums normally used by a dry cleaning establishment, and the labels on the drums were not perforated or dot matrix, which are more typical of those used by dry cleaners. For this reason, and because the empty tub was found inside the building on the property, the Department attempted to determine if Mr. Pierce had purchased the contaminants for use in his operations; it was not able to confirm this fact. The Department also contacted local law enforcement officials to see whether a criminal investigation could be launched. As noted above, however, the drums and tub had been removed by unknown persons while Mr. Pierce still had possession of the property and there was no forensic evidence for law enforcement officials to examine. The result of the investigation was that the Department was unable to determine who deposited the drums on the site or the exact location where the contents were first dumped. Although Respondent contended that the Department could have easily determined who removed the empty drums and tub from the subject property by examining the manifests of the carriers who engage in that type of business, the Department investigator did not attempt to do this since the yellow pages in the telephone directory reflected at least six pages of transporters in this type of business. Further, there is no evidence that a commercial transporter was even involved. For all of these reasons, the Department looked to the current owner of the property, Respondent, as the entity responsible for site rehabilitation since there were, and still are, contaminants leaching into the groundwater and aquifer system. Specifically, as of 2007, or twelve years after the discharge occurred, the groundwater on Respondent's property was still contaminated with tetrachloroethene, trichloroethylene, and cis-1, 2-dichloroethene exceeding the Department's groundwater standards. Also, the same contaminants exceeded the Department's soil cleanup target levels based on ground water criteria. Because rainfall and surface water continue to come into contact with the contaminated soil, and there is no liner or impervious cap in place, the installation is reasonably expected to be a source of water pollution. On September 12, 2001, the Department sent a letter by certified mail to Respondent advising that contamination was present on the property, that there were "possible violations of law for which you may be responsible," and that a Preliminary Contamination Assessment (PCA) must be filed within sixty days from the date of the letter. See Department Exhibit 6. Although a meeting of the parties was held on October 4, 2001, a PCA was never filed. 16. On April 27, 2006, March 12, 2007, and July 3, 2007, the Department issued Warning Letters to Respondent advising that an enforcement action would be initiated unless Respondent provided a SAR within a time certain. See Department Exhibits 7, 8, and 9. (The record is silent as to why no formal activity occurred between October 2001 and April 2006.) Exhibit 8 reflects that on November 21, 2006, "analysis results of sampling of one monitoring well were received by the Department." A meeting was later conducted by the parties on January 16, 2007, at which time Respondent agreed to "draft a suitable letter of [its] intentions with regard to conducting the required assessment and send it to the Department on or before January 31, 2007." There is no record of such a letter being sent. In August 2007, Respondent contracted with Florida Environmental Engineering, Inc., to perform a "limited site assessment report." In March 2008, that firm submitted to the Department a Preliminary Site Assessment Report (PSAR) See Department Exhibit 10. For this service, Respondent paid around $16,000.00. On March 21, 2008, the Department advised Respondent by letter that the PSAR was incomplete and that further information should be provided by April 30, 2008. See Department Exhibit 11. An Addendum to the PSAR was provided on May 5, 2008. See Department Exhibit 12. This report cost Respondent an additional $3,000.00. The PSAR indicated that contaminants (dichloroethene and trichloroethylene) in the water and soil on the property exceeded Department groundwater and soil cleanup target standards and levels. The report concluded, however, that "the discharge to the site is from an offsite source" (west of the property) and that "the property owner is no longer a responsible party." On August 27 and then again on October 22, 2008, the Department issued letters to Respondent advising that "there is not enough data to support the assumption that the discharge is offsite and the contamination is from an offsite source located west of the property." The Department reached this conclusion because, among other reasons, "[t]he contamination does not seem to be delineated towards the northern and southern portions of the site," "[t]here are no horizontal delineation wells to [the] north," the "iso contour maps provided appear to show the vertical delineation of the contamination but not horizontal delineation [of the plume]," "additional monitoring points need to be [added]," and "the onsite monitoring well, MW-2, shows a very high concentration of Perchloroethylene (PCE) at 81,000 ug/L [microgram per liter] and other contaminants, while the MW-1 does not exhibit groundwater contamination to that extent." See Department Exhibits 14 and 15. In plainer language, Respondent's report was deficient in that all contamination sources were not identified; it failed to delineate the horizontal and vertical extent of soil and groundwater contamination; and it failed to recommend a remedial action to clean up the contamination. The two letters advised that the site assessment was incomplete and that additional information described in the letters must be submitted by November 14, 2008. To date, Respondent has failed to submit the required information. According to Mr. Schuberg, to perform a study that would supply the additional information requested by the Department would cost him around $100,000.00, an amount he is unwilling to pay. More than 270 days has expired since a discharge was discovered on Respondent's property, and it has failed to submit a complete SAR, as described in Florida Administrative Code Rule 62-780.600(8). See also Table A, Fla. Admin. Code R. Ch. 62-780, which prescribes the specific time frame (within 270 days after the discharge is discovered) for submitting this report. The Department has incurred expenses in the amount of $1,500.00 while investigating this matter. See Department Exhibit 17. This amount is not disputed. As corrective action, the Department requests that within ninety days of the effective date of this Final Order, Respondent submit a complete SAR which addresses the deficiencies specified in the Department's August 27, 2008, letter. See Department Exhibit 14. To complete the SAR, additional soil and groundwater samples need to be collected to determine the vertical and horizontal extent of contamination, all source areas must be identified, and a remedial action must be developed to abate the contamination. Finally, the contaminated soil must be removed from the property so that it will no longer discharge into the groundwater. The Notice of Violation requests that upon approval of the SAR, Respondent "shall commence and complete in a timely fashion all further tasks" required by Florida Administrative Code Rule Chapter 62-780. These corrective actions are reasonable and are hereby approved. In calculating the penalty, Respondent has assessed a $500.00 administrative penalty for Respondent maintaining a stationary installation that is reasonably expected to be a source of water pollution without a permit. This is based upon a violation of Section 403.121(5), Florida Statutes, which makes it unlawful to not comply with a regulatory statute's requirement. Under Section 403.121(6), Florida Statutes, the Department has also assessed a $500.00 per day penalty against Respondent for failing to file a SAR for nineteen days, for a total of $9,500.00. When added to the $500.00 previously assessed, the total administrative penalty is $10,000.00, which is the maximum allowed in this type of proceeding. See § 403.121(2)(a), Fla. Stat. Throughout this process, Mr. Schuberg has contended that the responsibility for cleanup lies with the person or entity actually responsible for placing the drums and tub on the property in 1995. He says that the evidence clearly shows that Family Dry Cleaners is the responsible party. However, the Department and local authorities were never able to confirm who actually dumped the waste on the subject property. Although Mr. Schuberg says it will take "[i]n the hundreds of thousands of dollars" to clean up the site, the evidence shows that when he purchased the mortgage in 1998 and assumed ownership in 1999, he knew the property was contaminated. Mr. Schuberg further stated that because his consultant could never get "answers" from the Department, the consultant was instructed to stop work. However, Mr. Schuberg never contacted the Department to get clarification about what was required. At hearing, Mr. Schuberg also offered a lay opinion that his consultant's report filed in March 2008 proves that in 1995 the contents of the drums and tub were dumped on an offsite asphalt road adjacent to the property, surface water runoff then carried the chemical solvents onto his property, and the empty drums and tub were left in the parking lot. The Department's expert did not agree with this supposition, and there is no expert testimony to confirm the accuracy of this theory. Respondent has also contended that the property should be cleaned up with state funds. As pointed out by a Department witness, however, one problem is that the property does not meet the definition of a dry cleaner and thus cannot qualify for funds under that program. Then, too, a state-funded cleanup is a last resort which is used only after the Department has exhausted all enforcement remedies. Also, in this era of tight budgets, the Department has a finite amount of funds to use for this purpose, and is limited to cleaning up only a few sites per year. Finally, the responsible party must first acknowledge by affidavit that it lacks the necessary resources to clean up the property before the Department "may" seek cleanup funds. Respondent has not yet filed such an affidavit or admitted liability. In terms of mitigating evidence, Mr. Schuberg conceded that he has not done "a whole lot" to address the contamination problem since acquiring the property in 1999. In 2008, he did expend around $20,000.00 in having a PSAR and Addendum prepared for the Department. In all other respects, he steadfastly refuses to spend any more money on assessments or take responsibility for the cleanup since he believes that Family Dry Cleaners is the entity responsible for site rehabilitation.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Phillip G. Panos, recently moved from Michigan to Florida and is now a Florida resident. On December 9, 1989, prior to moving to Florida, he applied to the Respondent, Department of Environmental Regulation for certification as a Class C domestic waste water treatment plant operator. The Respondent is an agency of the State of Florida charged, among other duties, with regulating the certification, the practice standards and the educational standards of Class C domestic waste water treatment plant operators. The Respondent agency reviewed the Petitioner's application and denied it for failure to demonstrate the requisite three years of experience required by the rule cited below. From April, 1974 to June, 1990 the Petitioner was employed at the Chapaton Pumping Station in St. Clair Shores, Macomb, Michigan. The Chapaton Pumping Station duties involved the Petitioner monitoring the distribution of sewage flows, collecting sludge samples, chlorinating the effluent and pumping it into Lake St. Clair. When the Petitioner left the Chapaton Pumping Station, in June of 1990, he held the position of Senior Station Operator II. The Chapaton Pumping Station receives a combination of storm water flow and sanitary sewage flows. It is a pumping and storm water retention facility for combined sewage. The facility provides primary treatment and disinfection for this combined sewage effluent. The effluent is chlorinated and then pumped to nearby Lake St. Clair while the solids that have settled out of the effluent are retained, collected and sent to the Detroit waste water treatment facility for advanced waste treatment. Chapaton is classified by the state of Michigan's Department of Natural Resources as an "industrial/commercial facility". The industrial classification was originated by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and has been adopted as a designation or classification by both Michigan and Florida. The Petitioner holds an industrial/commercial waste water treatment certification from the state of Michigan in the category of "plain clarification and disinfection." The Petitioner's experience in Michigan is in the area of industrial waste water treatment and does not constitute actual experience in on-site operational control of a domestic waste water treatment plant (that is a sewage treatment plant). The Petitioner's experience in Michigan does not qualify as industrial waste water treatment plant experience, that could be used to meet the actual experience requirement, because the Chapaton plant performs only primary treatment and disinfection. Secondary or advanced waste treatment is performed at the Detroit waste water treatment plant, with which the Petitioner has no experience. In a typical domestic waste water treatment plant in Florida, "primary treatment" involves primary clarification or settling. Primary clarification occurs in a circular or rectangular tank where soluble solids settle out to the bottom of the tank and floating solids are removed by a skimming device. The soluble solids are called sludge. Primary clarification can remove 40% of BOD and suspended solids. It is not a form of advanced treatment or even secondary treatment. At the Chapaton plant, during primary treatment, a minimum of 70% BOD and suspended solids are removed. The sludge is not treated at the Chapaton plant but is pumped to the Detroit waste water treatment plant. Thus Chapaton could not be classified as a domestic waste water treatment plant by Florida standards, since it only provides primary clarification and no secondary or advanced waste water treatment. Secondary treatment consists of two types. Activated sludge or trickling filter treatment. Both types deal with oxygen being introduced to the sludge to achieve stabilization and more settling out of the sludge elements. Since June 18, 1990 the Petitioner has been employed as a waste water treatment plant operator I in a training program at the George L. Lohmeyer Waste water Treatment Plant in Ft. Lauderdale, Florida. In that training program the Petitioner is being trained in all phases of operation of the Lohmeyer plant. It is a 34-million-gallon-per-day (MGD) activated sludge treatment plant. In his duties, the Petitioner monitors the plant treatment processes, takes samples and submits them to the city's laboratory. The Petitioner is capable of testing the samples himself for dissolved oxygen, chlorine and ph. Reports are signed by the regional chief or the regional facilities manager. The Petitioner's present position qualifies as actual, appropriate experience in the operational control of a waste water treatment plant. The Petitioner has accumulated approximately 3-1/2 months of the 12 months of actual experience required for certification as a Class C waste water treatment plant operator, through the exercise of his duties at the Lohmeyer plant. The Petitioner must accumulate 12 months or 2,080 hours of actual experience before he can qualify for the Class C certification. The Petitioner is a high school graduate and has successfully completed Volumes I and II of the California State University correspondence course in waste water treatment, which is included on the Respondent agency's list of approved courses. Petitioner's 3-1/2 months of actual appropriate experience in Ft. Lauderdale, plus his educational background, including the courses taken in California, yield a total of 36 months or 3 years of constructive experience. Petitioner does not yet have the 12 months of actual experience required by the rules but rather, is approximately 8-1/2 months short of the actual experience requirement. Thus, the Petitioner fails to meet the experience requirement necessary for certification as a Class C domestic waste water treatment plant operator at this time, although in approximately 8-1/2 months, he should be able to meet that requirement.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law, the evidence of record and the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, it is therefore RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be entered by the Department of Environmental Regulation denying Petitioner's application for certification as a Class C domestic waste water treatment plant operator without prejudice to reapplication at such time as his one year of actual experience at such a treatment facility is completed. DONE and ENTERED this 11 of December, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11 day of December, 1990. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 90-479 (The Petitioner filed no proposed findings of fact.) RESPONDENT'S PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT 1. - 21. are accepted. COPIES FURNISHED TO: Dale H. Twachtmann, Secretary Department of Environmental Regulation 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, FL 32399-2400 Daniel H. Thompson, Esq. General Counsel Department of Environmental Regulation 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, FL 32399-2400 Phillip G. Panos 2315 N.W. 115 Drive Coral Springs, FL 33065 Francine M. Ffolkes, Esq. Assistant General Counsel Department of Environmental Regulation 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, FL 32399-2400
The Issue Whether the Petitioner's application to participate in the Drycleaning Solvent Cleanup Program with regard to its Kendale Lakes facility should be granted or denied.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: The Department of Environmental Protection is the state agency responsible for administering the Drycleaning Solvent Cleanup Program set out in Section 376.3078, Florida Statutes (1995). Dryclean USA is a Florida corporation and is the owner of commercial real property located at 14099 Southwest 88th Street in Miami, Florida. Dryclean USA is an operator of a drycleaning facility at that location, as those terms are defined in Sections 376.301(8) and (21), Florida Statutes. The facility, known as the Kendale Lakes facility, has been operated by Dryclean USA as a drycleaning facility for approximately twenty years. Drycleaning establishments use solvent in the cleaning process. Tetrachloroethylene, also known as perchloroethylene, is a commonly used drycleaning solvent and is considered a hazardous substance. Tetrachloroethylene is saturated in water at 150,000 parts per billion. The drycleaning process produces lint that can contain tetrachloroethylene; contact water, which is water that has, at some point during the drycleaning cycle, come into contact with tetrachloroethylene; and sludge from the mechanism that separates pure tetrachloroethylene from water and solid materials produced during the drycleaning process. In addition, tetrachloroethylene accumulates in the filters used in the drycleaning machine. These substances must be disposed of as hazardous waste. Steiner Atlantic Corporation is one of the largest distributors of drycleaning equipment in the country, and Dryclean USA purchases its equipment from this company. The drycleaning machine in the Kendale Lakes facility was purchased from Steiner Atlantic and has been in use at the Kendale Lakes facility since 1991. The machine is a third-generation machine that uses closed-loop technology. Tetrachloroethylene is introduced into the system from a pressurized container that is connected to the drycleaning machine through quick-disconnect valves. The tetrachloroethylene is pumped directed into the machine so that it does not come into contact with the air. Once the cleaning cycle is completed, tetrachloroethylene and water are extracted from the clothes, heated, and turned into a vapor. The vapor is routed across condensing coils that chill the vapor and turn it back into a liquid. The liquid goes into a separator, where the tetrachloroethylene and the water are separated; the tetrachloroethylene is returned to the drycleaning machine and the water, called separator water, is collected in a hazardous waste drum, which is hauled off the site by a company which is licensed to dispose of hazardous waste. Steiner Atlantic develops training programs for its customers and for a number of years has worked with Dryclean USA to develop training programs for Dryclean USA managers and employees. The Dryclean USA training programs are among the most extensive programs that Steiner Atlantic has developed and rank among the best in the country. The training for Dryclean USA managers both now and in 1995 consists of an intensive three-week program. In addition to courses on how to manage the business, Dryclean USA managers are trained in the operation and maintenance of all the equipment in the drycleaning facility, including the drycleaning machine, and in the legal requirements for handing hazardous waste. The program also includes training in environmental and safety issues, as well as hands-on instruction on the proper handling of tetrachloroethylene and equipment that comes into contact with tetrachloroethylene. Managers are provided with on-going training in addition to the initial training program. Dryclean USA also has a training program in hazardous waste management for all of its employees, and this program was in place in 1995. All of Dryclean USA's employees receive this training from in-house training personnel or from district managers, and the employees must read a training manual, watch a video, and pass several tests that deal with handling hazardous waste. The employees are taught that tetrachloroethylene and substances contaminated with tetrachloroethylene must be disposed of in hazardous waste containers, which are then hauled away and disposed of by a hazardous waste disposal company. Managers at the Dryclean USA facilities are responsible for ensuring that tetrachloroethylene and substances contaminated with tetrachloroethylene are disposed of properly. All Dryclean USA employees receive training in handling spills of tetrachloroethylene and substances contaminated with tetrachloroethylene, although the manager is the person responsible for ensuring-that spills are handled correctly and in accordance with the following procedures. First, all employees who will not participate in cleaning up the spill are evacuated from the premises. Certain designated employees, including the manager, use the spill kit provided in each facility to contain and absorb the spill. The spill kit consists of safety equipment for the employees handling the spill and of absorbent cloth, such as comforters or blankets, to absorb the tetrachloroethylene. The cloth used to absorb the spill is put through the drycleaning cycle to extract the tetrachloroethylene. Dryclean USA requires that all spills, no matter how small, be immediately reported to the Dryclean USA maintenance department, which promptly dispatches an engineer to assist with the spill if it is the result of an equipment malfunction. Additionally, the employees are required to keep internal records of any spill that is less than one quart and to report to the state any spill in excess of one quart. These procedures are set out both in the Dryclean USA Written Hazard Communication Program manual provided to all employees and in the Dryclean USA Emergency Contingency Plan posted on the bulletin board at each Dryclean USA facility. No spills were reported at the Kendale Lakes facility in April or May 1995. In addition to the training given to managers and other employees, the maintenance manager of Dryclean USA is also the environmental officer, and he performs semi-annual audits of each facility operated by Dryclean USA with respect to health, safety, and environmental standards. During these audits, the environmental officer ensures that the employees of each facility are aware of the procedures for the routine collection and disposition of substances contaminated with tetrachloroethylene and of the emergency contingency plan for handling spills of tetrachloroethylene and substances contaminated with tetrachloroethylene. No deficiencies were found at the Kendale Lakes facility during the 1995 audits. In 1994, the soil and groundwater at the Kendale Lakes facility was found to be contaminated by tetrachloroethylene. At that time, Dryclean USA was leasing the property, but, upon learning of the contamination, it purchased the property. Dryclean USA notified DERM of the contamination, and, in the spring of 1994, it retained the U.S. Environmental Group, an environmental consulting firm that, among other things, performs contamination assessments and develops and institutes remediation plans for sites contaminated with tetrachloroethylene. U.S. Environmental Group prepared a contamination assessment report delineating the area of contamination in the soil and groundwater around the Kendale Lakes facility. It also developed and implemented an interim remedial measures plan for both soil and groundwater contamination. Neither DERM nor U.S. Environmental Group nor any other agency or entity has identified the source of the contamination at the Kendale Lakes site. When U.S. Environmental Group began its assessment of the contamination in 1994, it did not find any discharge occurring from the drycleaning system in place at that time and so concluded that the contamination was historical. DERM assigned Nicholas Simmons as project manager for the Kendale Lakes site. In the spring of 1995, Mr. Simmons held the position of Hydrogeologist II in DERM's hazardous waste remediation program. His primary responsibilities in this position were to review contamination assessment reports, remedial action plans, and other documents relating to contaminated sites in Dade County and to make recommendations as to whether the reports and plans should be approved or disapproved. He was project manager for a number of sites contaminated with drycleaning solvents. Before he became a Hydrogeologist II with DERM, Mr. Simmons was a Pollution Control Inspector I with that agency, and his responsibilities included making field inspections of industrial facilities in Dade County, including drycleaning establishments. During his time as a pollution control inspector, Mr. Simmons visited approximately 20 to 30 drycleaning sites, although he did not personally inspect all of them. On April 28, 1995, Mr. Simmons made a visit to the Kendale Lakes facility in his capacity as DERM project manager to observe U.S. Environmental Group install a new monitoring well inside the facility. While at the facility, Mr. Simmons decided to make a cursory inspection to see if he could locate a source of the contamination at the site. He was unsuccessful in this respect, but he found several "items of concern" at the facility, none of which constituted a violation of any federal, state, or local laws, rules, or regulations or involved a discharge of tetrachloroethylene into the soil or groundwater. One "item of concern" he identified during his April 28 inspection was what appeared to be a leak from a pipe connected to the drycleaning machine. The liquid dripping from the pipe was clear and was dripping into a three-gallon bucket. Mr. Simmons did not take a sample of the liquid to determine if it was contaminated with tetrachloroethylene, nor did he observe the method of disposal of the liquid. The temporary manager, who was manager at the Kendale Lakes facility only one day per week, told him that he presumed the liquid was disposed of as hazardous waste. Mr. Simmons prepared a memorandum dated April 28, 1995, to Mark Pettit, a DERM code enforcement officer, in which he reported in detail the inspection, the observations he made, and the conversations he had with Dryclean USA employees during his visit to the Kendale Lakes facility on that date. Mr. Simmons visited the Kendale Lakes site again on May 2, 1995, to observe U.S. Environmental Group install equipment for a soil vapor extraction pilot test. Mr. Simmons took the opportunity to re-inspect the facility. Monica Resconi, the manager of the Kendale Lakes facility, was present during this inspection. In addition, Eddie Rodriguez, then-president of Dryclean USA, was present during most of the May 2 inspection. Mr. Simmons observed that clear liquid was still dripping from the pipe connected to the drycleaning machine into a small bucket. Mr. Simmons asked for and received permission from Ms. Resconi and Mr. Rodriguez to take a sample of the liquid in the bucket, and he submitted it for testing to the DERM laboratory. The laboratory analysis established that the sample contained 220.5 parts per billion of tetrachloroethylene. Mr. Simmons did not ask Ms. Resconi or Mr. Rodriguez how this liquid was disposed of, and he did not observe anyone actually disposing of the liquid. During Mr. Simmons' May 2 visit to the Kendale Lakes facility, he also observed a whitish liquid in a drum labeled "Hazardous Waste" that was located close to the drycleaning machine. A hose connected the drycleaning machine and the drum, but Mr. Simmons did not know whether there was liquid traveling through the hose or whether liquid would travel from the machine to the drum or vice versa. He also observed what appeared to be the same liquid in a puddle on the floor. He asked Ms. Resconi what the liquid was, and she put her hand into the puddle and identified the liquid as water. She wiped it up with a rag. Mr. Simmons did not observe her disposing of the rag, and he did not take a sample of either the liquid in the drum or the liquid on the floor. When Mr. Simmons showed Mr. Rodriguez the dripping liquid he had first observed on April 28 and the area where he had observed the puddle of whitish liquid, Mr. Rodriguez immediately called the maintenance manager for Dryclean USA, and a maintenance technician and the maintenance supervisor were promptly sent to the Kendale Lakes facility. They reported to the maintenance manager that the liquid dripping from the pipe was water that had condensed on the outside of a refrigerator pipe because some of the insulation was missing. They also reported that there were no other leaks from the drycleaning machine. When he inspected the machine the following day, the maintenance manager found that the insulation on the pipe had been replaced and that the pipe was no longer dripping. He also found no other leaks in the drycleaning machine. Finally, Mr. Simmons observed a yellow bucket just inside the back door of the facility during his May 2 inspection. The bucket contained dirty water and a mop with a green handle. He asked Ms. Resconi what the bucket contained, and she explained that it was water that had been used to mop the floor of the facility. When he asked how this water was disposed of, Ms. Resconi stated that it was thrown out the back door. Mr. Simmons asked for and received permission from Ms. Resconi and Mr. Rodriguez to collect a sample of the water in the bucket, but the sample he took was not acceptable for analysis and was discarded. For some time prior to Mr. Rodriguez's meeting with Mr. Simmons, Dryclean USA's policy regarding the disposal of mop water required that water used to mop the front, or store area, of the facility be discarded down the toilet and that water used to mop the back area of the facility where the drycleaning equipment was located be discarded in hazardous waste containers. When Mr. Simmons told Mr. Rodriguez on May 2 that he was concerned that the water in the mop bucket might contain tetrachloroethylene, Mr. Rodriguez responded by directing Ms. Resconi to dispose of all mop water in the hazardous waste containers. Mr. Simmons prepared a memorandum dated May 2, 1995, to Mark Pettit, a DERM code enforcement officer, in which he reported in detail the inspection, the observations he made, and the conversations he had with Dryclean USA employees during his visit to the Kendale Lakes facility on that date. In accordance with Mr. Simmons' recommendation, a detailed inspection of the Kendale Lakes facility was ordered. On May 11, 1995, Heather Wright, an inspector with DERM's hazardous facilities section, visited the facility to perform this inspection. Ms. Resconi was not at the facility, but Ms. Wright met with Brad Clayton, the temporary manager at Kendale Lakes, and with Steve Lundy, Dryclean USA's district manager responsible for the Kendale Lakes facility. Ms. Wright made a detailed inspection of the facility on May 11, 1995, and found that the floor around the drycleaning machine was dry and that there was no evidence of leaks from the drycleaning machine. Mr. Lundy discussed with Ms. Wright the procedure for cleaning up spills of tetrachloroethylene or substances known to be contaminated with tetrachloroethylene, and he told her that spills were picked up with absorbent cloth, which was then put into the drycleaning machine to extract the tetrachloroethylene from the cloth. He also told her that any other materials known to be contaminated with tetrachloroethylene were disposed of in hazardous waste druMs. Ms. Wright questioned Mr. Lundy on the method of disposing of water in the mop bucket, which was located just inside the back door of the facility. He told her that it was thrown out the back door of the facility, but he also told her that spills were not cleaned up with the mop, which was used only to mop the floors of the facility. Ms. Wright collected a sample of the water in the mop bucket and submitted it to the DERM laboratory for testing. The laboratory analysis established that the sample contained 121,928 parts per billion of tetrachloroethylene, an amount close to saturation.3 Ms. Wright did not observe the manner in which the employees of the Kendale Lakes facility disposed of the water in the mop bucket. Ms. Wright prepared an Incident Report dated May 11, 1995, in which she reported in detail the inspection, the observations she made, and the conversations she had with Dryclean USA employees during her visit to the Kendale Lakes facility on that date. When Mr. Rodriguez learned that the sample of water taken from the mop bucket at the Kendale Lakes facility contained almost 122,000 parts per billion of tetrachloroethylene, he instituted a new policy regarding the handling of mop water at all Dryclean USA facilities. Pursuant to a memo dated June 8, 1995, the new procedure requires that two mop buckets be maintained in each Dryclean USA facility, one to be used exclusively for mopping in the front "store" portion of the facility and one to be used exclusively for mopping in the back of the facility where the drycleaning equipment is located. The bucket used for mopping the back of the facility must be red, and the mop used must have a red handle. The water in the bucket used to mop the front of the facility must be discarded into the toilet, and the water in the red bucket, as well as the mop heads, must be disposed of as hazardous waste. According to samples taken by U.S. Environmental Group in November 1996, the level of tetrachloroethylene in samples of groundwater taken from Monitoring Well Number 2, located just outside the back door of the Kendale Lakes facility, was 499 parts per billion, a very small amount but one which was significantly higher than the samples taken from other monitoring wells at the Kendale Lakes site. This indicates that there has been a discharge of tetrachloroethylene in the vicinity of the back door of the facility, but the contamination in this area is in the form of pockets of pure tetrachloroethylene in the soil under the asphalt in the back of the facility. This is not consistent with the discharge of tetrachloroethylene that is dissolved in water. From 1994, when it began working at the Kendale Lakes facility, until the present, U.S. Environmental Group has found no indication of additional or increased contamination from tetrachloroethylene at the Kendale Lakes facility. On April 1, 1996, Dryclean USA applied to the Department for a determination that its Kendale Lakes facility was eligible to participate in the Drycleaning Solvent Cleanup Program. As part of its review process, the Department requested that DERM provide answers to certain questions relating to the Kendale Lakes facility. One of the questions was whether DERM was aware of any "willful" discharge of contaminated materials at the Kendale Lakes site; DERM answered "Unknown." Also in response to the Department's inquiries, DERM provided the Department with materials that included the inspection reports submitted by Mr. Simmons and Ms. Wright in late April and early May 1995 and the laboratory analysis of the mop water sample taken by Ms. Wright on May 11, 1995. The Department relied on the information received from DERM in reviewing the application. In a letter dated August 2, 1996, the Department notified Dryclean USA that its application for the Kendale Lakes facility was denied because it had determined that Dryclean USA had willfully discharged drycleaning solvents "onto the soils or into the waters of the State." The sole basis for this conclusion was the information in Mr. Simmons' and Ms. Wright's reports that Ms. Resconi and Mr. Lundy stated during the inspections on May 2 and May 11, respectively, that the water in the mop bucket found beside the back door of the facility was routinely thrown out of the back door and on the laboratory results showing that the sample of water taken from the mop bucket on May 11, 1995, contained approximately 122,000 parts per billion of tetrachloroethylene. The parties have stipulated that, except for the issue of whether there has been a willful discharge of drycleaning solvent at Dryclean USA's Kendale Lakes facility subsequent to November 1, 1980, the application at issue in this proceeding satisfies all of the statutory criteria to establish Dryclean USA's eligibility to participate in the Drycleaning Solvent Cleanup Program for that facility. The evidence presented by the Department is not sufficient to support a finding that there were willful discharges of drycleaning solvent at the Kendale Lakes facility subsequent to November 19, 1980. The evidence does not establish that spills of tetrachloroethylene and substances contaminated with tetrachloroethylene were routinely cleaned up with a mop and the mop water discharged out the back door of the Kendale Lakes facility. Dryclean USA's employees received extensive training in the proper disposal of hazardous waste and the proper method for handing spills of tetrachloroethylene and substances contaminated with tetrachloroethylene, and its managers were given additional training that included information on the legal and environmental aspects of tetrachloroethylene contamination. There was no plausible reason suggested by the evidence for Ms. Resconi to flout the policies and procedures established by her employer. Furthermore, the evidence presented by the Department is simply too tenuous to establish, as the Department proposes, that Ms. Resconi admitted to Mr. Simmons that spills of tetrachloroethylene and substances contaminated with tetrachloroethylene were routinely cleaned up with a mop and the mop water discharged out the back door of the Kendale Lakes facility.4 At most, the evidence establishes that water used to mop the floor of the Kendale Lakes facility was most likely discharged out the back door until May 2, 1995, when Mr. Rodriguez directed Ms. Resconi to dispose of all mop water at the facility in the hazardous waste containers, and that, on May 11, 1995, the water in the mop bucket contained a significant amount of tetrachloroethylene. There is no evidence that Dryclean USA or its employees knew that the water in the mop bucket on May 11, 1995, contained tetrachloroethylene or that the water in the mop bucket on May 11, 1995, was discharged out the back door of the facility or that any mop water containing tetrachloroethylene was discharged out the back door of the facility. In fact, the uncontroverted evidence is that there has been no increase in the level of tetrachloroethylene contamination at the Kendale Lakes facility since at least 1994.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Environmental Protection issue a Final Order granting the Drycleaning Solvent Cleanup Program Application submitted by Dryclean USA of Florida, Inc., for its facility located at 14099 Southwest 88th Street, Miami, Florida. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of January, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. PATRICIA HART MALONO Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of January, 1998.
The Issue The issues to be determined in this case are whether Respondents should pay the administrative penalty, investigative costs, and attorney’s fees and undertake the corrective actions that are demanded by the Florida Department of Environmental Protection (the “Department”) as set forth in the Final Amended Notice of Violation, Orders for Corrective Action, and Administrative Penalty Assessment.
Findings Of Fact The Parties The Department is the administrative agency of the state of Florida having the power and duty to protect Florida’s air and water resources and to administer and enforce the provisions of chapters 376 and 403, Florida Statutes, and the rules promulgated thereunder in Florida Administrative Code Title 62. Germain is a licensed Florida attorney. From May 2006 to January 2013, Germain was the record owner of the real property at 1120 West Main Street, Leesburg, Lake County, Florida (the “Germain property”). Leesburg’s is an active Florida corporation that was incorporated in January 2013 by Germain. Germain is Leesburg’s sole corporate officer and sole shareholder and has managerial authority over the Germain property. John Doe 1-5 is a placeholder designation used by the Department for the purpose of covering all potential entities to which Germain might transfer the property. No other such entity materialized. Background A gas station was operated on the Germain property continually from the 1920s through the late 1980s. During the 1980s and perhaps for a longer period, C.E. Griner operated the gas station under the name Griner’s Service Station. Griner’s Service Station had at least three underground storage tanks (“USTs”) used to store leaded and unleaded gasoline. In 1989 or 1990, Griner ceased operation of the gas station and the USTs were filled with concrete and abandoned in place. The Germain property has not been used as a gas station since that time. In 1990, the Department inspected the Germain property and prepared a report. The inspection report noted that the USTs at the Germain property “were not cleaned properly prior to filling with concrete.” The report also noted that the tanks were not properly abandoned in place. No evidence was presented to explain in what way the tanks were not properly abandoned, or to indicate whether the Department took any enforcement action based on this report. In 1996, Gustavo Garcia purchased the Germain property from Griner. In May 2006, Germain purchased the property from Garcia. Another gas station, operating for many years under several names (now “Sunoco”), is located at 1200 West Main Street, across a side street and west of the Germain property. Since 1990, one or more discharges of petroleum contaminants occurred on the Sunoco property. There were also gas stations at the other two corners of the Main Street intersection, but no evidence was presented about their operations or conditions. In March 2003, apparently as part of a pre-purchase investigation, testing was conducted at the Sunoco property that revealed petroleum contamination in the groundwater. Soil contamination was not reported. S&ME, Inc. (“S&ME”), an environmental consulting firm, subsequently submitted a discharge report to the Department’s Central District Office in Orlando. Later in 2003, S&ME conducted an initial site assessment for the Sunoco property. In the report it produced, S&ME noted that it found concentrations of petroleum contaminants in the groundwater that were above the Department’s Groundwater Cleanup Target Levels (“GCTLs”). The concentrations exceeding GCTLs were in samples taken from the eastern side of the Sunoco property, closest to the Germain property. In 2004, S&ME completed a Templated Site Assessment Report for the Sunoco property. Groundwater samples from the eastern portion of the Sunoco property again revealed petroleum contamination exceeding GCTLs. Garcia, who owned the Germain property at the time, allowed S&ME to conduct soil testing on the Germain property. The soil samples were taken by direct push methods and were tested with an organic vapor analyzer (“OVA”), which revealed toluene, ethylbenzene, total xylenes, naphthalene, 1-methyl naphthalene, and total recoverable petroleum hydrocarbons exceeding the Department’s Soil Cleanup Target Levels (“SCTLs”). In 2005, another private environmental consulting firm, ATC Associates, Inc. (“ATC”), performed a Supplemental Site Assessment on the Sunoco property and produced a report. As part of its assessment, ATC installed three monitoring wells on the Germain property and collected groundwater samples. These groundwater samples revealed petroleum constituent concentrations that exceeded GCTLs and were higher than concentrations found in groundwater samples taken under the Sunoco property. Both the 2004 and 2005 site assessment reports concluded that the groundwater in the area flowed from the southeast to the northwest; that is, from the Germain property toward the Sunoco property. Germain referred to a figure in S&ME’s 2004 report that he claimed indicated a southeasterly flow of groundwater from Sunoco toward the Germain property. However, a preponderance of the evidence establishes that groundwater flow in the area is generally northwesterly from the Germain property toward the Sunoco property. Based on the results of its testing, ATC concluded in its site assessment report that the groundwater contamination on the eastern portion of the Sunoco property had migrated from the Germain property. ATC also took soil samples from the Germain property. It screened the soil samples with an OVA and reported petroleum contamination exceeding the Department’s SCTLs. Petroleum contamination in soil typically does not travel far horizontally. It remains in the vicinity of the source. Therefore, the soil contamination found on the Germain property indicates an onsite source of the contamination. All of the assessment reports were filed with Seminole County, presumably with the Department of Public Safety, Emergency Management Division, which is the local entity with which the Department contracted to inspect and manage petroleum facilities in the area. These reports were public records before Germain purchased his property. A June 2005 Memorandum from Seminole County informed Bret LeRoux at the Department’s Central District Office that ATC’s 2005 site assessment report indicated the Germain property was the source of petroleum contamination. The Memorandum recommended that the Department contact the owner of the property about the contamination. The Memorandum was filed at the Department. After the Department received the Memorandum, it requested and received the site assessment reports from Seminole County. The Department did not notify Garcia or the public about the contamination in 2005. The Department did not notify Germain about the contamination until August 2007. All Appropriate Inquiry The principal factual dispute in this case is whether Germain undertook “all appropriate inquiry into the previous ownership and use of” the Germain property before purchasing it, as required by section 376.308(1)(c)1/: [A person acquiring title to petroleum- contaminated property after July 1992] must also establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she undertook, at the time of acquisition, all appropriate inquiry into the previous ownership and use of the property consistent with good commercial or customary practice in an effort to minimize liability. Before he purchased the Germain property in 2006, Germain knew that it had been a gas station for a number of years. Garcia told Germain that the USTs had been filled with concrete and were “within the law.” Germain was also aware that the Sunoco USTs had recently been excavated and that there was a problem with the tanks and possible contamination there. Germain said he spoke with neighbors about the property, but he did not say what he learned from them. Before the purchase, Germain conducted a visual inspection of the property and saw “several little metal plates” in the parking lot. Germain claimed it was only later that he learned that some of the plates were covers for groundwater monitoring wells. Germain said he visited and reviewed files at a Lake County office, but he was not specific about which county offices he visited. He also went to the Leesburg Historic Board to review property records. Germain’s testimony was not clear about what records he saw on these visits. Germain did not go to the office of the Seminole County Department of Public Safety, Emergency Management Division, to view records pertaining to the Germain property. He did not claim to have gone to the Department’s Central District Office in Orlando. In other words, Germain did not go to the offices of the agencies responsible for regulating petroleum USTs. Nor did Germain say that he talked to any knowledgeable employee of these agencies by telephone about possible contamination issues on the Germain property. While at a Lake County office, Germain searched the DEP website and saw two documents that indicated the USTs on the Germain property had been closed in place. One of the documents indicated a cleanup status of “no contamination.” Germain claimed that he relied on these documents to conclude that the property was clean. The Department explained that the phrase “no contamination” is used in its database as a default where no contamination has been reported and no discharge form has been filed. It is not a determination based on a site investigation that the site is free of contamination. However, the Department had received information that the Germain property was contaminated, so its explanation of the “no contamination” status for the Germain property was unsatisfactory. Germain does not practice environmental law. He neither claimed nor demonstrated knowledge or experience with the legal or factual issues associated with petroleum contamination. Germain did not present evidence to establish that he followed “good commercial or customary practice” in his investigation of the property as required by section 376.308(1)(c). Good commercial practice in the purchase of property upon which potentially contaminating activities have occurred entails consultation with a person with appropriate knowledge and experience. Germain did not consult with an environmental attorney or environmental consultant regarding the potential liability associated with property used as a gas station. If Germain had hired an environmental consultant to assist him, the consultant would have known where to find public records about the gas station, including any soil and groundwater analyses. An environmental consultant would have seen the site assessment reports and other public records that indicated petroleum contamination on the Germain property. A consultant would likely have recommended a Phase I environmental site assessment (“ESA”). A Phase I ESA entails, generally, determining past uses of a property, inspecting the property for visible indications of potential contamination, and reviewing aerial photographs, historical documents, and public records related to the property and its surroundings. A Phase II ESA would follow if potential contamination is discovered and usually includes taking soil and groundwater samples. In considering whether all appropriate inquiry was undertaken by a purchaser of contaminated property, section 376.308(1)(c) directs the court or administrative law judge to take into account: any specialized knowledge or experience on the part of the defendant, the relationship of the purchase price to the value of the property if uncontaminated, commonly known or reasonably ascertainable information about the property, the obviousness of the presence or likely presence of contamination at the property, and the ability to detect such contamination by appropriate inspection. Germain did not have specialized knowledge regarding the regulation of petroleum USTs. However, as a lawyer, he was familiar with the practice of employing or working with professionals with specialized knowledge in order to achieve the objectives or solve the problems of his clients. If Germain’s legal assistance had been sought by a client to solve an environmental problem, Germain would have declined to proceed because he did not possess the requisite knowledge or he would have sought the assistance of an environmental lawyer or environmental consultant. In purchasing the Germain property, Germain did not undertake the reasonable steps a lawyer must take for a client. No evidence was presented about the relationship of the purchase price to the value of the Germain property. Germain did not show that the site assessment reports and other documents discussed above were not “reasonably ascertainable information.” Although a visual inspection by a lay person would not have disclosed the presence of contamination at the property, an environmental consultant would have recognized the groundwater monitor wells and would have known to seek information about the reason for their installation and the groundwater sampling results. Taking all relevant considerations into account, Germain failed to show that he made all appropriate inquiry before he purchased the Germain property. Germain transferred the property to Leesburg’s in January 2013 in part to limit his potential personal liability for petroleum contamination. The Germain property is Leesburg’s primary asset. Because Leesburg’s took title to the Germain property after the NOV was issued, it had full knowledge of the contamination and cannot claim to be an innocent purchaser. Post-Purchase Investigation In August 2007, the Department sent Germain a letter informing him that the Department had reason to believe his property was contaminated with petroleum and requiring him to conduct a site assessment pursuant to rule 62-770.600(1).2/ In September 2007, the Department sent Germain the 2004 and 2005 site assessment reports. Germain did not conduct a site assessment. At the final hearing, the Department did not state whether it had made any effort to take enforcement action against Griner, whom the record evidence indicates was the owner of the gas station when the discharge occurred. In 2012, the Department issued Germain a notice of violation for failing to conduct a site assessment and remediation. After Germain transferred the property to Leesburg’s, the Department issued the Final NOV to add Leesburg’s as a Respondent. The Final NOV seeks penalties of $10,000 against Germain, and $10,000 against Leesburg’s. While investigating this matter, the Department incurred expenses of $11,380.37 in investigative costs. Confirmation of On-site Contamination Despite the site assessment reports that documented contamination on the Germain property, Germain disputed the Department’s claim that the property was contaminated. The Department conducted testing and completed a Site Investigation Report in 2010. Because Germain would not allow the Department onto his property, the Department installed groundwater monitoring wells adjacent to the Germain property to the west and south, and collected groundwater samples. The Department confirmed the northwesterly flow of groundwater documented in previous reports and found elevated levels of petroleum contaminants above GCTLs, including benzene, ethylbenzene, toluene, xylene, total lead, EDB, and total recoverable petroleum hydrocarbons. Monitoring wells west of, or downgradient of, the Germain property showed high levels of groundwater contamination, while monitoring wells to the south and southeast, or upgradient of the property showed no signs of contamination, indicating that the source of the groundwater contamination was on the Germain property. Based on the site assessments and its own investigation, the Department determined that the Germain property is the source of petroleum contamination detected along the eastern portion of the Sunoco property. Germain and Leesburg’s did not present any expert testimony to support their claim that the Germain property is not contaminated or that the contamination migrated to the Germain property from offsite. A preponderance of the record evidence shows that the Germain property is the source of the petroleum contamination found in the onsite soil and groundwater, as well as in groundwater on the eastern portion of the Sunoco property.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is Arthur L. Jones, Trustee of the Arthur L. Jones Revocable Trust, also known as Eastlake Woodlands Shopping Center ("Eastlake"). Petitioner is not and never has been responsible for the discharge of pollutants at Eastlake within the meaning of Section 376.302. On November 9, 1993, Petitioner requested a determination of eligibility under the "Good Samaritan" program authorized in Section 376.305(6). Petitioner seeks reimbursement of $644,712 in costs associated with the assessment and remediation of perchloroethylene ("PCE") contamination at Eastlake. From May, 1982, through May, 1986, Eastlake included a dry cleaning establishment among its tenants. The dry cleaning establishment utilized PCE. PCE contamination was discovered in June, 1992, when a Publix Supermarket adjacent to the former dry cleaning business ("Publix") requested an environmental assessment as part of its expansion at Eastlake. The environmental assessment was performed by Chastain-Skillman, Inc. ("Skillman"). Skillman first discovered PCE contamination at the site as a result of tests of groundwater obtained from behind the former dry cleaning establishment. From July, 1992, through August, 1992, Skillman confirmed the PCE contamination through tests of additional groundwater samples from 10 other locations. In October, 1992, Petitioner orally notified Respondent of PCE contamination at the site. The PCE contamination was not reported to Respondent's Emergency Response Coordinator. The PCE contamination was not an emergency. Emergencies typically include incidents such as a petroleum spill related to a vehicular accident, a chemical spill, or a fire related release. The PCE contamination did not constitute an imminent threat to the public health, safety, and welfare. It did not constitute a threat to potable water wells at the site. PCE is a solvent commonly used in the dry cleaning business. Release of PCE is a relatively common occurrence in the dry cleaning business. On September 27, 1993, Petitioner and Respondent entered into a consent order with regard to PCE contamination at the site. In relevant part, the consent order requires Petitioner to submit a Contamination Assessment Report and Remedial Action Plan. Petitioner submitted a Contamination Assessment Report in November, 1992. Petitioner did not submit a Remedial Action Plan because Respondent placed a moratorium on enforcement actions undertaken with regard to PCE contamination at dry cleaning establishments. Respondent is in the process of implementing a program for state funded cleanup of contaminated dry cleaning sites throughout the state. Respondent is developing a priority system for cleanup of contaminated dry cleaning sites based upon relative threat to the public health and environment. There are approximately 2,800 contaminated dry cleaning sites around the state that will be affected by Respondent's dry cleaning program. Petitioner is entitled to apply for reimbursement of future costs once Respondent implements its dry cleaning program. Respondent has issued a policy memorandum concerning the review of Good Samaritan applications. Respondent's policy differentiates between petroleum contamination and non-petroleum contamination, such as PCE contaminated sites. Reimbursement of petroleum contamination is funded through the Inland Protection Trust Fund ("IPTF"). Reimbursement of non-petroleum contamination is funded through the Water Quality Assurance Trust Fund ("WQATF"). IPTF funds are statutorily limited to reimbursement of costs associated with petroleum contamination. Respondent's policy is to exhaust the enforcement process before WQATF trust funds are utilized for the assessment and remediation of non- petroleum contamination. Respondent's policy requires a Good Samaritan to obtain prior approval from Respondent's Emergency Response Section or On-Scene Coordinator before initiating cleanup of a non-petroleum site such as the PCE contaminated site at Eastlake. The requirement for prior approval is designed to allow Respondent to preserve the amount of personnel, equipment, and resources available for statutorily prescribed priorities, including emergency responses. 2/ The requirement also allows Respondent to determine the endpoint of the emergency phase of a cleanup and the beginning of the remedial phase of the cleanup. The requirement for prior approval may be waived in the event of an imminent hazard. Respondent adequately explicated its non-rule policy for a moratorium on dry cleaning sites and for prior approval of remediation of non-petroleum sites including dry cleaning sites contaminated with PCE. Respondent's explication was adequate even if its policy constitutes an unwritten rule within the meaning of Section 120.57(1)(b)15, Florida Statutes. Petitioner failed to show good cause for waiver of the requirement for prior approval. The PCE contamination at the site was neither an emergency nor an imminent hazard. The public was restricted from the contaminated area by a fence surrounding the site. The public was not exposed to or threatened with contamination by inhalation. No potable water wells are near the site. Therefore, there was no threat of public access to contaminated drinking water. Petitioner did not obtain prior approval for its remediation of the site. Remediation was undertaken to complete the Publix expansion in a timely manner. Petitioner's efforts in assessing and remediating the site have been exemplary. Petitioner has fully cooperated with Respondent in assessing and remediating the site. In July, 1993, Petitioner retained American Compliance Technologies ("ACT") as a consultant to assist Petitioner in the remediation of the contaminated site. ACT prepared a health and safety plan for workers on the site. The plan addressed the risk to workers of exposure to PCE during construction and demolition activities necessary for the Publix expansion. Construction and demolition activities included removal of the concrete slab at the location of the former dry cleaning business. Disturbance of the soils contaminated with PCE created a potential for exposure of workers to PCE. The health and safety plan developed by ACT required workers to wear standard protective gear utilized by the industry. The plan satisfied the requirements of OSHA. ACT did not prepare a risk assessment addressing the potential for exposure of the general public to PCE. Nor did ACT prepare a risk assessment for the potential impact of PCE on groundwater or potable wells. The PCE contamination did not constitute an imminent threat to the public health, safety, and welfare.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent is guilty of discharging untreated septage at a site that Respondent was not permitted to use, in violation of Rule 10D-6.052(7)(b), Florida Administrative Code; and operating two septic pumping trucks, even though authorized to operate only one such vehicle, in violation of Rules 10D-6.052(2)(a) and 10D-6.052(1), Florida Administrative Code; and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Since 1989, Respondent has been a registered septic tank contractor. Petitioner annually issues Respondent a separate permit to pump, transport, and dispose of septage. Petitioner or its predecessor has disciplined Respondent on two occasions. On November 15, 1994, Respondent paid a $500 fine after the issuance of an administrative complaint for discharging improperly treated septage, and, on August 19, 1996, Petitioner issued a final order imposing a $500 fine and 90-day suspension against Respondent for repairing a septic tank system without a permit. Respondent’s attempts to explain away these violations were unpersuasive. At the time in question, Respondent’s permits allowed him to operate only one truck in transporting septage--a 1988 Ford--and to discharge septage only at one location--Hunter Land Application Site. Respondent’s permits also required him to stabilize septage only at one location--A-1 Septic Tank Service’s Lime Stabilization Facility. On August 15, 1997, Respondent operated or caused to be operated the permitted 1988 Ford truck and another unpermitted truck for the purpose of receiving and transporting septage that Respondent had pumped from septic tanks. Respondent and one of his employees drove the loaded trucks to J. R. Brooks & Sons Ranch, where they landspread the septage that they had been transporting. They dumped at this site about 8000 gallons of raw septage containing condoms, tampons, vegetable matter, and other items of the type normally found in unscreened septage pumped from septic tanks and grease traps. Petitioner had not approved the J. R. Brooks site for discharge of septage pumped from septic tanks. The Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) had designated the J. R. Brooks site for use by Resource Tech, which transported wastewater residuals from the Dade County Municipal Treatment Plant and discharged them at the J. R. Brooks site. The permit allowed Resource Tech to discharge wastewater residuals with only minimal levels of pathogens. DEP calculates the carrying capacity of sites such as the J. R. Brooks site based on the amount of material that they receive from permitted, disclosed discharges. After learning that the J. R. Brooks site had received unpermitted discharges, DEP determined that it must close the site and find a new one due to public-safety concerns. Respondent also failed to stabilize the septage with lime prior to discharging it on the J. R. Brooks site. The purpose of adding lime to septage is to kill pathogens. The J. R. Brooks site drains through ditches into nearby wetlands. From there, runoff drains into the Estero Bay. The untreated septage discharged by Respondent presents a greater threat to wildlife and public safety than do the wastewater residuals remaining after wastewater treatment that Residual Tech was authorized to discharge at the site. At the time of the hearing, Respondent was negotiating the sale of the business, but the buyers needed to operate under Respondent’s certificate until they could qualify to obtain one. However, Respondent admitted that he had someone else available to qualify the buyers’ operation for a certificate.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Health enter a final order revoking Respondent’s certificate as a septic tank contractor. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of September, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of September, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Susan Mastin Scott Chief Legal Counsel Department of Health Post Office Box 9309 Fort Myers, Florida 33902-9309 John Charles Coleman Coleman & Coleman Post Office Box 2089 Fort Myers, Florida 33902 Angela T. Hall, Agency Clerk Department of Health Bin A02 2020 Capital Circle Southeast Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1703 Pete Peterson, General Counsel Department of Health Bin A02 2020 Capital Circle Southeast Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1703
