The Issue The issues in this case are whether Respondent, Michael R. Harrison, committed the violations alleged in an administrative complaint dated June 28, 1996, and if so, what discipline or penalty is appropriate.
Findings Of Fact Michael R. Harrison is certified by the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission as a law enforcement and correctional officer, having been issued corrections certificate number 26101 on December 18, 1985, and law enforcement certificate number 26100 on July 2, 1987. At the time of the incident at issue, Officer Harrison was employed as a deputy with the Orange County Sheriff’s Office. On February 14, 1995, around 4:25 p.m., Harrison was parked in the woods on Willow Street in Zellwood, Florida, doing some paperwork. He observed two young black males engaged in what he thought was drug dealing. A yellow car pulled up to them, with a white male driving. The tag on the yellow vehicle was in Harrison’s plain view. Familiar with the area, and knowing that the white male did not live there, Harrison decided to run a check on the tag. The tag itself was slightly lopsided and not well-attached, and Harrison’s instincts made him suspicious of the situation. As soon as Harrison gave the tag number to the teletype operator, the yellow car began to pull away from the scene. It was apparent that the driver had noticed Harrison’s vehicle. Harrison began pursuit of the yellow car as he waited for the teletype response on the tag. By the time the tag response came over the radio, Harrison was totally absorbed with his pursuit. There was rush- hour traffic and the yellow car was on U.S. Highway 441, a busy thoroughfare. When Harrison made the stop and the driver produced his license, the computer check revealed that the license was restricted “for business purposes only.” After a brief inquiry that satisfied him that the suspect was not on his way home from work, Harrison arrested the driver on what he considered was a driver’s license violation. As he waited for a back-up deputy and a tow truck for the yellow car, Harrison searched the car and found a small quantity of marijuana. Harrison then charged the driver with the drug offense. In the meantime, and while Harrison was still pursuing the yellow car, the report on the suspected tag came back “negative” (a valid tag). The dispatcher reported that the tag “...should appear on a ’70 Ford, two-door, yellow in color.” This was the vehicle Harrison was pursuing. Moreover, the person to whom the vehicle was registered was the driver arrested by Harrison. Later, the same day as the arrest, Harrison filled out the arrest report, a form titled “Charging Affidavit.” Under the narrative statement of facts to establish probable cause, Harrison included this statement: “I ran the tag and it came back no record found.” (Petitioner’s Exhibit 1) Corporal McCarthy McCullough was reviewing reports at the end of her shift at Orange County Sheriff’s Office around 1 a.m., February 15, 1995. She read Deputy Harrison’s charging affidavit and questioned the sufficiency of his probable cause for the stop. She called him in to discuss the report. He tried to explain to her what “no record found” meant. Harrison admits that when Corporal McCullough talked to him, he was aware he had made an error on the form. He wanted to talk to his supervisor because Corporal McCullough was new on the job, but the sergeant was at school. Harrison felt he needed to amend the charging affidavit, but never did as “things just started happening too fast, and I didn’t have the opportunity.” (transcript, p.31, ll. 5-7) After Harrison left the shift, Corporal McCullough, still suspicious about the probable cause, ran the tag through the teletype herself and got the response described in paragraph 7, above. The next day she talked to her sergeant, and they got a tape of the message to Harrison from the communications center. The tape reflects the exchange between Harrison and the dispatcher when he gave the tag number to the dispatcher and asked for a “28-29,” which is code for a vehicle registration and check to see if the car was stolen or wanted for any reason. The answer, as acknowledged by Harrison at hearing, was the “negative” with information describing the car and driver stopped by Harrison. The statement by Harrison on his charging affidavit is patently false. Although no one formally administered an oath to him before he signed the form, his signature appears under this printed statement: “I swear and affirm the above statements are correct and true.” His signature is next to that of another law enforcement officer or correctional officer with this statement: “Sworn to and subscribed before me, the undersigned authority”. (Petitioner’s Exhibit 1) These statements and the title of the form itself were ample notice to Harrison that he was swearing to the truth of his handwritten report of the arrest and its probable cause.i Aside from his specious argument that he was not really “swearing” to the document, Harrison’s defense is that he never intended to make a false statement. Instead, he never listened to the dispatcher’s response, as he was intent on pursuing his suspect and was concerned for his safety in the pursuit. His instincts were that the driver had intended to deal drugs back on Willow Street, an area where he did not belong, and that because the tag was awry, there was some problem with the vehicle. When he was questioned by Corporal McCullough a simple admission that he had not listened properly to the dispatcher would have credited his excuse of a “mistake.” Instead, he stuck to his story and tried to explain what “no report” meant. His account of the incident is disingenuous and supports a finding that the report was intentionally false, perhaps from an overabundance of zeal to justify a stop that yielded two offenses. After the incident was referred to Internal Affairs, Harrison was dismissed from his position. He had been a deputy for six years without any suspensions or discipline for duty work. He and his partner once shared a commendation of “deputy of the month.”
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED: That the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission enter a final order finding that Michael R. Harrison knowingly made a false report, imposing one year’s suspension of his certificate and two years’ probation, with the further requirement that he complete appropriate retraining specified by the Commission. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of June, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. _ Hearings Hearings MARY CLARK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative this 27th day of June, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Amy J. Bardill, Esquire Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1489 H.R. Bishop, Jr., Esquire Post Office Box 11239 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1239 A. Leon Lowry, II, Director Division of Criminal Justice Standards and Training Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1489 Michael Ramage, General Counsel Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1489
The Issue Whether Respondent failed to maintain good moral character as required by section 943.13(7), Florida Statutes (2015),1/ and Florida Administrative Code Rule 11B-20.0012(2)(f), by committing battery and/or false imprisonment; and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the final hearing and the entire record in this proceeding, the following Findings of Fact are made: The Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission (“the Commission”) is the entity within the Department responsible for the execution, administration, implementation, and evaluation of the powers, duties, and functions established under sections 943.085 through 943.255, and is charged with certifying and revoking the certification of law enforcement officers in Florida. § 943.12, Fla. Stat. Pursuant to section 943.1395, the Commission is authorized to investigate incidents in which certified law enforcement officers are alleged to have failed to maintain compliance with the minimum qualifications for certification, and to take disciplinary action against law enforcement officers found to have failed to maintain those standards. Mr. Johnson served in the U.S. Military as a combat medic during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm in 1990 and 1991. He was awarded the Bronze Star for rendering aid while under enemy fire to four soldiers. He denies suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”).2/ Mr. Johnson has been a certified law enforcement officer, Certificate Number 159793, since October 30, 1995, and spent approximately 20 years working in a variety of positions as a deputy sheriff in Alachua County. During that time frame, he spent 10 years instructing other officers on hand-to-hand combat, self-defense, and restraint techniques. He was also on the SWAT team for four to five years. Kelly Thompson has lived in Gainesville for about nine years and works in marketing and public relations. She has children and is of average height and build. Mr. Johnson and Ms. Thompson met through a mutual friend and started dating in February or March of 2015. By November of 2015, there had been considerable turmoil in their relationship. They agreed to meet at Mr. Johnson’s residence during the evening of November 7, 2015. Mr. Johnson lives in a double- wide trailer outside the Gainesville city limits, and his property is off a dirt road. Ms. Thompson arrived at Mr. Johnson’s residence with her Labrador Retriever between 6:00 p.m. and 6:30 p.m. Mr. Johnson had been working a University of Florida football game that day and was already home when she arrived. Their evening began with dinner, and Ms. Thompson used her iPad to set up a webpage for Mr. Johnson’s side business.3/ Ms. Thompson had at least two drinks that evening, and Mr. Johnson had at least one Jack Daniels. After the iPad session and dinner, Mr. Johnson fell asleep watching a football game, and Ms. Thompson began sending text messages of a sexual nature to female contacts in Mr. Johnson’s cell phone.4/ She was attempting to ascertain whether Mr. Johnson was cheating on her.5/ Ms. Thompson confronted Mr. Johnson around midnight that evening about suspicious text messages on his cell phone, an argument ensued, and she either threw his cell phone or smashed it against a wall.6/ Ms. Thompson announced that she was leaving, gathered her dog, retrieved the bags she had brought with her, and got into her car. Ms. Thompson started her car and was in the process of contacting a friend when Mr. Johnson followed her out of his trailer, grabbed her car keys, and threw them and her cell phone into the woods.7/ Both parties remained outside Mr. Johnson’s trailer for at least several minutes. Ms. Thompson then reentered the trailer and found a pocket knife in the kitchen.8/ According to Mr. Johnson, Ms. Thompson threatened him with the knife once he reentered the trailer. While he did not fear for his life, he was concerned about being cut. When Ms. Thompson came at him with the knife, Mr. Johnson responded by using a “straight arm-bar takedown” in which he grabbed Ms. Thompson’s wrist and forced her face down onto the floor. Mr. Johnson described this action as his effort to “deescalate this thing.” After forcing Ms. Thompson to the floor, Mr. Johnson took handcuffs from his weapons belt and cuffed Ms. Thompson’s arms behind her back. He also described this action as an effort to “deescalate this thing.” According to Mr. Johnson, Ms. Thompson was struggling, and he was worried that she would hurt herself. He had been in the process of returning unneeded equipment to the sheriff’s department, and several sets of leg shackles were among the equipment that he was returning.9/ Mr. Johnson then used a nearby set of leg shackles to further confine Ms. Thompson. As for why he decided to use leg shackles, Mr. Johnson gave the following testimony demonstrating he did not consider himself to be in danger: ALJ: Unless she’s - - so at that point in time, why put leg shackles on her? She’s face down. It probably would be difficult for her to get up. Maybe I’ll go test it myself when I get home tonight to see if I can get off the floor. A: I was doing everything I could to keep Ms. Thompson from hurting herself or me. The way the layout was, and it’s not to scale, of course, but if this was the loveseat or, I’m sorry, if this was the loveseat, the altercation occurred right here (indicating). My window out the front door, or I’m sorry, what we call the front of the trailer is right there (indicating). And it’s no higher than that step. * * * ALJ: Sounds like a very low window. A: Correct. Yes, sir. ALJ: How wide is this window? A: It’s a double-paned – it’s actually two windows side by side with the – they just slide up and down, just your standard home window, but they’re side-by-side. ALJ: Why was that of concern with regard to Ms. Thompson while she was face down on the floor? A: When she was face down, she was kicking, she was flailing. I was scared she was going to hurt herself. I didn’t know what to do at this point. I’m not going to sit on her, you know, and do all that silliness. That’s ridiculous. After he had Ms. Thompson handcuffed and shackled, Mr. Johnson sat her on his couch and warned that he would be forced to call the authorities if she did not calm down. Mr. Johnson removed the restraints once Ms. Thompson gained a measure of composure. He is adamant that she was in handcuffs and shackles for no more than 15 to 20 minutes. He also testified that the time period from when she allegedly hit him with his cell phone to when he removed the leg shackles was 30 to 35 minutes. Mr. Johnson notified Ms. Thompson that their relationship was over and that he was going to bed. According to Mr. Johnson, Ms. Thompson followed him to the bedroom, disrobed, and attempted to have sex with him. However, he refused her advances, and they fell asleep together.10/ Mr. Johnson and Ms. Thompson went outside during the morning of November 8, 2015, and located her car keys within 10 minutes. According to Mr. Johnson, he returned to the trailer to look for the iPad, at which time Ms. Thompson started her car, and she drove off saying “I’m going to destroy you, mother f- - -.” Other than preventing Ms. Thompson from leaving when she was impaired, Mr. Johnson denied doing anything to prevent Ms. Thompson from departing his residence. Upon driving away from Mr. Johnson’s residence, Ms. Thompson immediately began looking for the police. She saw a Gainesville police car driving down an off-ramp from I-75, and she drove up the ramp in order to make contact with the officer. Ms. Thompson reported that she had been assaulted and held against her will, and the police eventually persuaded her to accompany them to the police station where they took photographs showing she had bruises and scratches on the inside of her upper arms. The photographs also depict markings on her wrists and bruising on her calves. Mr. Johnson ultimately pled no contest to misdemeanor battery and received one year of probation. His probation was terminated early, and the case was sealed. Ultimate Findings Regarding Witness Credibility and the Allegations While there were some issues with Ms. Thompson’s testimony, none of those issues substantially detracted from her credibility. For instance, she testified that the closest neighbor to Mr. Johnson’s residence was 500 yards away, and other witnesses testified that it was only 50 to 100 yards away. Ms. Thompson testified that she attempted to climb that neighbor’s fence. However, the owner of that property testified that the gate is not locked and was slightly ajar. The same person testified that he saw a female walking by his gate during the morning of November 8, 2015. But, that is not inconsistent with Ms. Thompson’s testimony that she and Mr. Johnson were looking for her cell phone that morning. Her estimate of how long she was sending text messages to female contacts in Mr. Johnson’s cell phone was also questioned. Finally, Ms. Thompson testified that Mr. Johnson ripped the cord attached to his landline telephone from a wall, and other witnesses testified that the cord was undamaged. Overall, Ms. Thompson’s testimony was compelling, and there were no clear indications that she was being untruthful. Certain aspects of Mr. Johnson’s testimony cast doubt on his version of events. For example, after removing the handcuffs and leg shackles from Ms. Thompson, Mr. Johnson testified about how he decided to go to bed: ALJ: And so grand total, how long was it between when you put the cuffs on her and then when you took the shackles off? A: Fifteen minutes. ALJ: Fifteen minutes. A: Would be my best guess. ALJ: And if I recall your testimony correctly, you said at that point that the relationship was over. A: Absolutely, yes, sir. ALJ: And then you went to bed. A: I sure did. ALJ: All right. But she was still in your trailer. A: Correct. ALJ: So given everything that transpired and the fact that you put cuffs on her and shackles, and if I recall, you said you went to your bedroom alone initially, why was that, why did you feel safe with her still there in light of what happened? A: I wasn’t threatened necessarily. You know, the woman was inebriated, or I’m sorry, under the influence. It’s hard to explain. Ms. Thompson, the best way I can explain it was she would -- prior to this incident, she would do things to get me agitated and then calm right back down. Looking back on it now, I see it crystal clear. And it was almost – I don’t know how to explain it, but it was just – it was a continuous pattern. And this was just an extreme version of an interaction as far as – minus all this other silliness. But as far as the cussing and all this kind, that’s normal. That was normal. ALJ: I guess where I’m going with that, so at one point you felt – I think you said you were worried about being cut. A: Yes, sir. ALJ: At least you felt threatened enough to take her down with an armbar, get her face down, put cuffs on her. A: Yes, sir. ALJ: And then after only 15 minutes you take the cuffs and shackles off. And then you feel safe enough to go to sleep. But then there’s a pocket knife around, there’s this box of stuff, shackles. I think there’s testimony that you have multiple guns in the house. In light of what happened earlier that evening, that doesn’t seem to be a very wise thing to do. A: You’re exactly right. I agree. Mr. Johnson’s testimony was self-serving at times. For instance, Ms. Thompson was supposedly well aware of his habit of keeping keys inside the two personal vehicles Mr. Johnson kept at his residence, and the Commission’s prosecutor elicited the following testimony: Q: She wanted to leave your house? A: She could have left. Q: Okay. Well, she couldn’t have left because you threw her keys. A: Yes, ma’am, she could. I’ve got two pick-up trucks, but she refuses to ride in them because she is above that. Q: But you wouldn’t have allowed her to – it was your testimony earlier you didn’t want her to drive drunk. A: Not to argue with you, I went to sleep. I wasn’t threatened by this woman anymore. Once again, she manipulated me thinking everything was fine. Everything was fine. She stripped down, ma’am, and tried to have relations with me. Q: Mr. Johnson, all that to say it just aligns itself to be very – I don’t want to testify. Let me ask a different question. With all of her manic craziness, she is getting naked with you and she’s trying to stab you and she’s trying to drive drunk and craziness – A: Yes, ma’am. Q: -- why on earth, with all of your guns and your duty belt in the living room, would you feel safe enough to go into the room after you didn’t feel safe enough [because] she was crazy and you had to restrain her with leg shackles? A: Because she’s a manipulator, ma’am. Q: Okay. Let’s leave it at that. As discussed below in the Conclusions of Law, Mr. Johnson had no duty to retreat when Ms. Thompson confronted him with a knife. However, he testified multiple times that he wanted to “deescalate” the situation, and he agreed that the best way to accomplish that objective under the circumstances he described would have been to walk out the door from which he reentered his trailer: ALJ: And so why did you – I think you testified that you didn’t feel in danger for your life, but so why did you take her down with the armbar? A: I believe it was a reaction, you know, from doing this for so many years. ALJ: Did she lunge at you with the knife? A: She did, yes, sir. And she was waving it and screaming obscenities. * * * A: But anyhow, long story short, I disarmed her. Actually, I should have used some type of distraction technique prior to. Like maybe kicking her or doing something to distract her to get that knife away, but she was under the influence. She was intoxicated, your Honor. She was. We had – we were in a relationship, and I just had to deescalate this thing the safest way I knew how. If I had known all of this would have transpired after that, there would have been no question that I would have done the same exact thing. I would have picked up my radio and called someone and had this monster arrested. ALJ: How many – how many entrances or exits are there to your trailer? A: Two. ALJ: Two. One way to deescalate would be for you to go out the other exit. A: Yes, sir, you’re right. You’re correct.[11/] The findings in paragraphs 12 through 19 above are based on Mr. Johnson’s testimony, and his testimony clearly and convincingly demonstrates that he committed battery. It also clearly and convincingly establishes that he was not acting in self-defense when he placed leg shackles on Ms. Thompson. As for the false imprisonment charge, Mr. Johnson raised an affirmative defense by arguing that Ms. Thompson was intoxicated and unable to drive safely. If the Commission only had to disprove Mr. Johnson’s affirmative defense by a preponderance of the evidence, then the undersigned would conclude that Mr. Johnson also committed false imprisonment. However, the undersigned is not left with a firm belief or conviction, without hesitancy, that Mr. Johnson’s assertion that Ms. Thompson was too intoxicated to drive safely is false.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission issue a Final Order suspending Russell L. Johnson’s Law Enforcement Certification, number 159793, for six months based on his violation of section 943.13(7), Florida Statutes.12/ DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of January, 2020, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S G. W. CHISENHALL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of January, 2020.
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant to this matter, Ricky L. Sapp held Florida Teaching Certificate number 528297, in elementary education and was employed as a math teacher at Belleview Middle School, Escambia County, Florida. During the 1985-1986 school term, Shawn Dickinson, a 13-14 year old male, was a student in the Respondent's math class. During the fall of 1985, Sapp began to employ the student to perform tasks including yard work, car washing and other small jobs. Dickinson went to Sapp's home both to perform odd jobs and on a social basis. The student gave gifts to Sapp and other teachers at Christmas 1985. Sapp and two other teachers gave the student a pair of jeans. During the 1985- 86 school term, Sapp assisted the student with a science project. On at least one occasion, they attended a movie together. On other occasions Sapp took the student along with a group of other students on a deep-sea fishing trip. During the summer of 1986, Dickinson began to reduce his social contact with Sapp. While Dickinson's mother had expressed to her son her desire that he associate more often with people his own age, she did not forbid him from visiting Sapp. She did not express her concern to Sapp. On one occasion Sapp spoke with Dickinson's mother and asked her to permit the student to have dinner at Sapp's home. She agreed to allow the student to attend with a friend of his and instructed the boys to remain together; however, the student's friend left Sapp's home. Dickinson and Sapp may have engaged in an argument. Following that incident, Dickinson's mother refused to permit him to further associate with Sapp. In the fall of 1986, the mother spoke with the school principal about Sapp and her son. She also talked with the vice- principal and guidance counselor, apparently related to the same concerns expressed to the principal. She did not communicate with Sapp. The student testified that during this time Sapp sent messages to him through other students but there was no information as to the nature of the messages. During the fall, both the student and his mother, according to testimony, received telephone calls from Sapp during which he relayed his feelings regarding the situation. Sapp denied making the phone calls. The mother also received calls from someone who would hang up when she answered. She believed the calls were from Sapp. During this time period Dickinson's family had their telephone number changed. At about the same time, the mother's car tires were slashed. In early October 1986, Sapp's home was burglarized and various items were stolen. Sapp had reason to believe that Dickinson was involved in the incident. He contacted the boy's parents and accused the student of the theft of approximately $1,300.00 of personal items. The boy's mother did not believe her son had committed the act. Sapp also contacted the police who investigated the incident. At about the same time, the police conducted an investigation into the slashed tire incident and the phone "hang-ups", during which Dickinson was apparently questioned. Dickinson was not charged in the matter. At the administrative hearing Dickinson denied stealing any of Sapp's belongings, but stated that he possibly "stole my stuff back from him." In early November 1986, Sapp was arrested and charged with lewd and lascivious acts on a child, Shawn Dickinson. Sapp attempted to have the student and his family withdraw their accusations and apparently offered to reimburse the student's family for the cost of having their phone number changed and for replacement of the car tires, but was unsuccessful. The Respondent was subsequently tried on the charge and found not guilty. (R-1) COUNT I Count I of the administrative complaint alleges several instances of sexual contact between Sapp and Dickinson. Sapp denied the allegations. The evidence did not clearly and convincingly establish that such sexual contact took place. The testimony of the student related to the allegation of sexual content was limited to the student's assertion solely that such contact, one instance wherein Sapp performed oral sex on Dickinson, and 20- 25 instances wherein Dickinson performed anal intercourse on Sapp, occurred. Dickinson stated that he told no one other than the police about the contact. The claimed contact supposedly occurred over a period of approximately six months. Dickinson stated that he continued to participate in the activity because of alleged threats made by Sapp. The threats included having Dickinson's class schedule changed, killing his dog, having one of Dickinson's "best friends" attack him, and putting a bomb in his mother's car and killing her. Dickinson admitted that he had never revealed the threat to kill the dog prior to the administrative hearing, although he has testified several times previously about the threats. At one point on direct examination the student testified that he first revealed the sexual contact to the police when Sapp "got arrested and I had to go talk to the police." (Tr.19) Yet Sapp was arrested for the alleged sexual contact with the student. Dickinson stated that he terminated the alleged contact with Sapp because his parents were suspicious of the amount of money Dickinson was receiving. However, there was no evidence that funds changed hands other than as a result of the odd-jobs Dickinson performed for Sapp. The administrative complaint alleges that the student received approximately one hundred dollars over the 1985-1986 period, an amount which appears reasonable in relation to the work apparently performed. Because the student's explanation of events and reasons for permitting the alleged contact to continue are vague and confusing, his testimony is not credible. The allegation of sexual contact between Dickinson and Sapp is rejected as not being supported by clear and convincing evidence. COUNT II Count II alleges several instances wherein Sapp has been convicted or had adjudication withheld in criminal offenses and has failed to disclose such facts on his application for teacher certification. One allegation concerns a charge of telephone harassment against Sapp. The arrest supposedly was related to numerous phone calls to the home of Dickinson. While there was testimony by Dickinson and his mother which indicated that they had received phone calls which could be termed harassing, and that such calls were or were believed to be from the Respondent, there was no evidence that he was ever arrested for such activities. The evidence introduced at hearing indicates that the arrest which occurred in November 1986 was related to the alleged sexual contact. The Petitioner did not meet the burden of proof on this allegation. Further, the administrative complaint alleges that Sapp was charged with one count of passing worthless checks in October, 1977 and three counts of passing worthless in June, 1987. No evidence was presented on these allegations. In October 1979, Sapp was involved in a lounge fight and was subsequently charged with simple battery. Sapp pled guilty. Adjudication was withheld, and a fine and six months probation were imposed. (P-9) In December 1979, Sapp was involved in a parking lot altercation and was subsequently charged with criminal mischief. Sapp pled not guilty. Adjudication was withheld and six months probation was ordered. (P-8) In December 1976,2/ Sapp was charged with leaving the scene of an accident, a criminal traffic offense. Sapp pled not guilty, but was found by a judge to be guilty. A $52.00 fine was imposed. (P-7) On Sapp's applications for teacher certification filed in September 1982, October 1982, October 1984, June 1985 and December 1985, he replied in the negative to the question, "Have you ever been convicted or had adjudication withheld in a criminal offense other than a minor traffic violation or are there any criminal charges now pending against you other than minor traffic violations?" (P-2, P-3, P-4, P-5, P-6) On the applications Sapp acknowledged by signature that his responses on the application were true, correct, and on three applications, complete. 3/ On his applications, Sapp indicated that he had not been convicted or had adjudication withheld in a criminal offense other than a minor traffic violation even though adjudication has been withheld in the simple battery and criminal mischief cases in 1979. The Petitioner testified at hearing that he did not understand the relevant portion of the teaching certificate application. He testified that he did not intend to deceive the Petitioner, that he did not understand the meaning of the term "adjudication withheld," that he did not list any arrests because, prior to the lewd and lascivious charge of November 1986, he had never been handcuffed or otherwise restrained which to him signified arrest, and that he had not intended to conceal the information. However, he did indicate that on several occasions he had heard a judge say "adjudication withheld" and that he made no attempt to learn the meaning of the term. Sapp's assertion that he did not intend to mislead the Petitioner is rejected in light of his attestation that the information he provided was complete, correct and true. Sapp failed to disclose the material facts of prior legal entanglements on his applications for the teacher certificates, in violation of Section 231.28(1)(h), Florida Statutes and Rule 6B-1.006 (5)(h), Florida Administrative Code. Accordingly, insofar as the preceding findings of fact state, the Petitioner has met the burden of proof as to the related allegations of Count II. COUNT III The administrative complaint charges that Sapp has violated Section 231.28(1)(e), Florida Statutes, in that he has been convicted of a misdemeanor, felony, or any other criminal charge, other than a minor traffic violation. The evidence establishes that in 1976, Sapp was convicted of a criminal traffic offense, failure to remain at the scene of accident, and was fined fifty-two dollars. Section 231.28(1)(e) , Florida Statutes, provides for appropriate disciplinary action where the certificate holder has been convicted of a misdemeanor, felony, or any other criminal charge, other than a minor traffic violation. Section 316.655, Florida Statutes, establishes that failure to remain at the scene of an accident involving damage to property, a violation of Section 316.061, Florida Statutes, is included among those violations identified as criminal offenses. Other violations classified as criminal offenses include failure to remain at the scene of an accident involving death or personal injury, providing false information in circumstances where the uniform traffic control law requires that information be provided, failure to obey the orders of police and fire department officials, reckless driving, driving under the influence, fleeing or attempting to elude a police officer, obstruction of traffic for purposes of non-permitted solicitation, and failure or refusal to submit a vehicle to weight and load testing upon request. The potential penalty for violation of Section 316.061, Florida Statutes, is a fine of not more than $500.00 or imprisonment for not more than sixty days or both. An examination of the range of potential penalties for criminal traffic violations indicates that the penalty for violation of Section 316.061, Florida Statutes, is less severe than the penalties provided for other violations. Accordingly, it is found that the violation of Section 316.061, Florida Statutes, is a minor traffic violation. The allegation of Count III is rejected. COUNT IV The administrative complaint charges that Sapp, based on the prior allegations, has been found guilty of personal conduct which seriously reduces his effectiveness as an employee of the School Board, pursuant to Section 231.28(1)(f), Florida Statutes. Although the Petitioner presented testimony related to the allegations and the resulting effectiveness of Sapp, such testimony was based on all of the allegations being established by the requisite burden of proof. In that such allegations were not established, this Count is rejected. COUNT V The administrative complaint alleges that, pursuant to Section 231.28(2), Florida Statutes, Sapp has pled guilty or been found guilty of an offense contained within Section 231.28(1) , Florida Statutes, which is prima facie proof of grounds for revocation of the certificate. Section 231.28(1)(d), Florida Statutes, includes misdemeanors, felonies, and certain other criminal charges. The evidence established that in October 1979, Sapp pled guilty to simple battery, a first degree misdemeanor. Section 784.03(2), Florida Statutes (1975). Accordingly, the burden of proof has been met and Count V is sustained. COUNT VI COUNT VII COUNT VIII COUNT IX COUNT X COUNT XI The above six Counts were related to allegations of sexual contact between Sapp and Dickinson and are rejected as not established by the requisite burden of proof. COUNT XII The administrative complaint alleges that the Respondent has failed to maintain honesty in all professional dealings pursuant to Section 231.28(1)(h), Florida Statutes, and Rule 6B-1.006(5)(a), Florida Administrative Code. As to the allegations supported by the burden of proof, Sapp failed to disclose material facts on applications filed for purposes of obtaining or retaining teacher certification even though he attested to the truthfulness of the information. The failure to provide the information is found to be a failure to maintain honesty in his professional dealings, accordingly, Count XII is sustained. COUNT XIII The administrative complaint alleges that in violation of Section 231.28(1)(h), Florida Statutes and Rule 6B- 1.006(5)(g), Florida Administrative Code, Sapp submitted fraudulent information on a document in connection with his professional activities. Sapp testified that he did not understand the question on the application for teacher certification related to prior criminal offenses, and did not intend to mislead or deceive the Petitioner. However, more than once he admitted to having heard a judge state that adjudication was withheld in connection with the various separate offenses, and that he did not know the meaning of the term. Yet he attested that the information submitted on two applications was true and correct and on three later applications that the information was true, correct and complete. The attestation of truth, correctness and completeness implies that the attestor understands the questions and that his responses are based on such understanding. To provide false information or to make material omissions of fact on such an application constitutes the submission of fraudulent information. Accordingly, the Petitioner has met the burden and Count XIII is sustained.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Education Practices Commission enter a final order imposing a fine of $1,000.00. DONE and ENTERED this 6th day of October, 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of October, 1988.
Findings Of Fact On September 4, 1979, the Department of State levied a $200 civil fine against Weaver and Automobile Recovery by its letter of that date. As of that date, the Petitioner was not licensed by the Department of State under Chapter 493, Florida Statutes. The $200 fine was paid, and a formal hearing was requested.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Hearing Officer would recommend that the fine be set aside and the $200 be repaid to the Petitioners. This recommended in no way constitutes a ruling or finding on the underlying grounds upon which the fine was assessed. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of February 1980 in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Mr. John M. Weaver Automobile Recovery Bureau of Florida, Inc. Post Office Box 18452 Tampa, Florida 33679 W. J. Gladwin, Jr., Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of State The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether the Appellee's suspension of Appellant was in compliance with Chapter 110, Florida Statutes, and Chapter 22A-7.10F and G(2), Florida Administrative Code. Whether the Appellee's suspension of Appellant should be sustained.
Findings Of Fact C. W. Mathis was on January 22, 1977, a state trooper, employed by Appellee, Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles, Florida Highway Patrol, in Orlando, Florida. By letter dated February 22, 1977, Trooper Mathis, the Appellant, was notified that he was being suspended for eight (8) hours without pay by the Appellee, Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles, Florida Highway Patrol for: "Leaving the workstation without authori- zation and negligence, in violation of Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Personnel Rules and Regulations 2.lC, willful violation of statutory authority, rules, regulations or policies, and General Order 43, l.A.(4), pages 43-2 and 43-4, Florida Highway Patrol Manual." Trooper Mathis appealed this suspension which is the subject of the bearing. The Division of Administrative Hearings, Department of Administration, has jurisdiction of the cause. On January 22, 1977, Trooper Mathis was on State Road 400, out of his assigned authority, and running radar at approximately 8:50 A.M. He pursued and stopped a car which was clocked at speeding 75 miles per hour. Trooper Mathis asked the driver for a drivers license and when the driver stated he had none, Trooper Mathis told him to get out of the vehicle and asked the driver's name and proof of ownership of the vehicle. The driver indicated that his information was in the glove compartment and both Trooper Mathis and the driver obtained an instrument from the glove compartment of the driver's automobile. In the stopped vehicle was a white male passenger. Trooper Mathis returned to the patrol car and had the driver sit in the right front seat of the patrol car. Mathis then left the left front seat of the patrol car to obtain the vehicle identification number from the automobile and returned to the patrol car where the driver or violator was sitting. Mathis then called the radio dispatcher for a "check for wanted" personal (10-29). Trooper Mathis was looking down and when he looked up the automobile he had stopped was gone, driven obviously by the passenger who was left seated in the stopped vehicle. The driver of the automobile seated in the patrol car with Trooper Mathis told Trooper Mathis that he didn't see his car leave and that he had picked up the white male passenger hitchhiking on State Road 400 at the Turnpike. Trooper Mathis then proceeded west on State Road 400 in hopes of finding the car. He also called the station and asked radio operator Roundtree to copy a vehicle identification number without asking for a "check for wanted" 10-29. Radio operator Roundtree ran the first vehicle identification number (1Y27D 57106363) given by Trooper Mathis and it came back nothing on file. (The second vehicle identification number (1Y27D5T1O6367) later came back registered to the following: Eva Kuhn, 25 North Westview Avenue, Feasterville, Pennsylvania, on a 1975 Chevrolet, license number A02326.) Radio operator Roundtree then ran the tag number for 10-29 thinking that both vehicle identification numbers he had run were negative for wanted. The tag came back negative. After a search of the area and not locating the vehicle Trooper Mathis asked to meet with a deputy sheriff. The meeting with the deputy was for his passenger to make a "stolen car" report. When the violator finished his report with the deputy he advised Trooper Mathis that he had relatives visiting at Disney World and would like to be dropped off there. Trooper Mathis then brought him to Disney World and left him there. It was later found that the driver-violator had stolen the vehicle. Appellee, Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles, contends: Trooper Mathis was negligent and should be Punished for (1) failing to ask for a proper 10-29 ("check for wanted") on the vehicle identification number; (2) failing to keep the stopped vehicle under surveilance so that the passenger was able to drive it away unnoticed; (3) failing to require identification from the violator-driver before believing the violator's story. Appellant, C. W. Mathis, contends: (l) that under the circumstances it was excuseable that he failed to immediately ask for a proper 10-29 "check for wanted"; (2) that the traffic was very heavy and he was obliged to go very fast if he were to properly find the violator and do the job for which he was paid; (3) that the radio operator was inexperienced and should have made the proper calls which would have notified Trooper. Mathis that the driver-violator was not the owner of the stopped vehicle.
Recommendation Dismiss appeal; the suspension was for just cause. DONE and ORDERED this 4th day of August, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. DELPHENE C. STRICKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Carlton Building, Room 530 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of August, 1977. COPIES FURNISHED: Mrs. Dorothy Roberts Appeals Coordinator Department of Administration Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 C. W. Mathis 1409 Lukay Street Ocoee, Florida 32761 Enoch J. Whitney, Esquire Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkmam Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304
The Issue Whether Respondent committed an unlawful employment practice in violation of Sections 760.10(1), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Beard Equipment Company, Inc., sells and maintains heavy equipment in Panama City, Florida. The Petitioner, Robert G. Harrison began employment with the Respondent in Panama City, Florida, in September, 1988. The Petitioner was employed as a janitor. Petitioner's duties included running numerous and varied errands which required driving of a motor vehicle. In April of 1989, Petitioner was hospitalized in order to adjust his medication for what he indicated was a bipolar disorder. However, at the hearing, Petitioner produced no expert testimony to establish that he was mentally handicapped or had bipolar disorder. At that time, Respondent became aware that Petitioner had a medical problem. Later, Petitioner was hospitalized in order to adjust his medication on two more occasions in 1989, and twice in 1992. On each occasion the Respondent accommodated Petitioner by making arrangements to hire temporary employees or readjust other employees' duties so that they could perform Petitioner's duties while he was hospitalized. In early 1992, the Respondent's liability insurance company conducted a random audit of employee driving records. The Respondent was notified by its insurance company that no coverage would be provided for any accident where the employee/driver had a DUI conviction. This random audit prompted Respondent to conduct a complete company- wide internal audit of driving records of all employees. The driving record audit resulted in some transfers for those employees for whom driving was an essential part of their job duties, but whose driving records would prohibit them from being covered under Respondent's liability policy. Employees who could not fulfill the duties of a non-driving position were terminated. Respondent could not afford to allow employees to drive who could not be insured by Respondent's liability carrier. The in-house driving record audit revealed that Petitioner had a DUI conviction on his record. Respondent had no other non-driving positions for which the Petitioner was qualified. Respondent was therefore forced to discharge the Petitioner since he could no longer fulfill the duties of his employment. Petitioner was discharged in November of 1992. When Petitioner was terminated, Petitioner was advised by Mark Veal, his supervisor, that the driving record audit had revealed that Petitioner had a DUI conviction, and because he would not be covered under the company insurance policy, they had no alternative but to discharge him. Within a day or so, Petitioner's wife called and requested his discharge letter in writing. Veal prepared the letter, indicating that due to Petitioner's medical history, his operating a motor vehicle would be too much of a liability. Although the real reason for Petitioner's discharge and the reason given him at the time was the DUI conviction, Veal tried to write the discharge letter in such a way as to minimize any embarrassment for the Petitioner due to his DUI conviction. Therefore, the termination letter does not support the conclusion that Respondent discriminated against Petitioner based on a mental handicap. In fact, there was no substantial evidence that Respondent terminated Petitioner based on a mental handicap. The evidence clearly showed Respondent was terminated for his driving record and his lack of qualifications to fill any other non-driving position. Moreover, Petitioner failed to establish that his position was filled by a person not in a protected class or that Respondent is an employer employing more than 15 employees. Given these facts, Petitioner has not established a prima facie case that Respondent committed an unlawful employment practice.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is accordingly, RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order finding that Petitioner did not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he was discriminated against because of his alleged handicap in violation of the Florida Human Rights Act and that the petition be dismissed. DONE AND ORDERED this 22nd day of December, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE CLEAVINGER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of December, 1994.
The Issue Whether the Petitioner's application for licensure as a yacht and ship salesman should be approved or denied.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: The Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums, and Mobile Homes, is the state agency responsible for licensing and regulating yacht and ship brokers and salespersons in Florida. Section 326.003, Florida Statutes (1997). On July 28, 1998, the Division received an application for a yacht and ship salesperson's license from Richard Badolato. Question 13 on the application solicits information of the applicant's criminal history as follows: Have you ever been convicted of a crime, either pled or been found guilty, or entered a plea of nolo contendere (no contest), even if adjudication was withheld? NOTE: This question applies to any violation of the laws of any municipality, county, state, or nation, including traffic offenses (but not parking, speeding, inspection or traffic signal violations), without regard to whether you were placed on probation, had adjudication withheld, paroled, or pardoned. Your answer to this question will be checked against local and state records. Failure to answer this question accurately could cause denial of licensure. After Question 15 of the application, the following statement appears in bold type: "If your answer to question 13, 14, or 15 is Yes, attach your complete signed statement of the charges and facts, together with the dates, name and location of the court in which the proceedings were held or are pending." Mr. Badolato answered Question 13 in the affirmative, and he signed the application, thereby certifying that "the foregoing information is true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief." Mr. Badolato did not provide the statement of particulars which must be submitted by those answering Question 13 in the affirmative. In a letter dated July 28, 1998, the Division notified Mr. Badolato that his application was incomplete and that he should, among other things, provide a complete written explanation of his criminal history. In response to this letter, Mr. Badolato provided a signed statement in which he stated: "I was arrested and charged with possession of marj. in 1981." Mr. Badolato also provided a telephone number on the statement, indicating that he could be contacted at that number if the Division had any questions. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 326.004(15), the Division issued a 90-day temporary license to Mr. Badolato, pending completion of the criminal history analysis that is done on all applicants by the Florida Department of Law Enforcement. The Division subsequently received a report from the Federal Bureau of Investigation which revealed that Mr. Badolato had three drug-related felony convictions, as well as an arrest on June 22, 1977, which resulted in a charge of possession of marijuana with intent to distribute. On August 24, 1981, Mr. Badolato was convicted in federal district court in Brunswick, Georgia, of conspiracy to smuggle marijuana; he was sentenced to ten years in prison and ordered to pay a $30,000 fine. On October 23, 1981, Mr. Badolato was convicted in federal district court in Miami, Florida, of conspiracy to distribute cocaine; he was sentenced to thirty months in prison, to run consecutively with the ten-year sentence in the Georgia case. On January 31, 1989, Mr. Badolato was convicted in federal district court in Maryland of conspiracy to distribute marijuana; he was sentenced to thirty-six months in prison, to run concurrently with any sentence imposed for a violation of parole. Mr. Badolato was released from prison in 1991 and successfully completed parole in December 1996 with respect to the 1989 conviction. In late 1997, Mr. Badolato received a letter advising him that he might be eligible for clemency. An attorney acting on behalf of Mr. Badolato filed an application for clemency with the Florida Parole Commission. Although Mr. Badolato has never seen this application, he assumes that the file developed during review of the application contains complete information regarding his criminal history.2 When the Division received the Federal Bureau of Investigation report, Peter Butler, head of the Division's general enforcement section, contacted Mr. Badolato by telephone, read to him the statement in the application quoted in paragraph 4 above, and asked him if he wanted to amend his application. Because he could not remember the exact dates of his three felony convictions, Mr. Badolato responded by referring Mr. Butler to the Clemency Board if Mr. Butler wanted to obtain further information about Mr. Badolato's criminal history. Mr. Badolato acknowledged in his testimony that he should have been more thorough in completing his application for licensure, that he was lazy and stupid for not being more forthcoming in the application, and that he did not intend to mislead the Division. He believed that, by answering "Yes" to Question 13 and admitting that he was arrested and charged with possession of marijuana in 1981, he had provided enough information to alert the Division that he had a criminal history. He also assumed that it would be very easy for the Division to obtain complete information about his background merely by running a computer check and by reviewing the information in his clemency application file. From 1991, when he was released from prison, until December 1998, Mr. Badolato was involved in the restaurant business in a managerial capacity, and, as part of his duties, he handled large sums of money. No money in his care was ever found missing, and no adverse employment actions were taken against him during this time. In addition, during the time he was on parole, Mr. Badolato periodically submitted to random drug-testing and never failed a test. The evidence presented by Mr. Badolato is not sufficient to establish that he is of good moral character. He admitted in his answer to Question 13 on the application that he had been convicted of a felony, yet he included in the statement which he filed as part of the application a vague, incomplete, misleading, and inaccurate reference to an arrest and charge of possession of marijuana in 1981.3 Furthermore, Mr. Badolato certified by his signature on the application form that the information he provided was "true and correct to the best of [his] knowledge and belief," when he was certainly fully aware that he had three separate felony convictions. Mr. Badolato presented evidence of his good employment history subsequent to his release from prison in 1991, his successful termination of probation, and his faithful payments on the $30,000 fine imposed in 1981, all of which tend to show rehabilitation and good moral character. However, Mr. Badolato's failure to include in his application complete and accurate information regarding his criminal history tends to show lack of rehabilitation and lack of good moral character. On balance, Mr. Badolato's failure to disclose in his application his complete criminal history outweighs the evidence he presented to show rehabilitation and good moral character.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Land Sales, Condominiums, and Mobile Homes, enter a final order denying Richard Badolato's application for licensure as a yacht and ship salesperson. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of August, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. PATRICIA HART MALONO Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of August, 1999.
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant hereto the Respondent was licensed as a Class "D" Security Officer and held license No. D92-09970. On April 7, 1993 Detective Janice Shine, a deputy sheriff with the Pinellas County Sheriff's office, left her office around 11:00 p.m. driving a 1984 Oldsmobile which was unmarked but not fully equipped to serve as a police vehicle. This was a spare vehicle owned by the Pinellas County Sheriff's office. While Detective Shine was stopped at a stoplight on Ulmerton Road in the left hand lane, Respondent pulled alongside of her vehicle in the center lane. When the light changed, both cars proceeded straight ahead. Respondent pulled in front of Shine's vehicle and slowed down. Shine passed him on the right, and when she did, Respondent indicated for her to pull over to the side of the road. Shine testified that Respondent told her that he was a police officer and that she was speeding. Shine replied that she was a deputy sheriff and for him to grow up. Respondent continued to follow Shine and motioned for her to pull off the road. Detective Shine used her radio to call for back up, and further down Ulmerton Road she did pull off the road. Respondent pulled up behind her. Detective Shine emerged from her car with her sheriff's badge in her hand and proceeded toward Respondent's car. Respondent got out of his car with flashlight in hand and accused Detective Shine of driving while intoxicated. Shortly after these two vehicles stopped, approximately four cars carrying deputy sheriffs and/or police pulled up at the scene. Respondent repeated his accusations against Detective Shine and requested she be given a sobriety test. The officers talked to Shine out of the presence of Respondent, then arrested Respondent on charges of impersonating a police officer. At this time Respondent was dressed in a khaki shirt which was part of his security officer's uniform, with the name of the company for whom he was working on the front of the shirt and an American flag on the shoulder. Respondent was subsequently tried in the criminal court in Pinellas County on charges of falsely impersonating an officer and was found not guilty.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Administrative Complaint filed against George Stephanou be dismissed. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of November, 1993, in Tallahassee, Florida. K. N. AYERS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of November, 1993. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, DOAH NO. 93-3926 Proposed findings submitted by Petitioner are accepted except: (2) Latter part of sentence starting with "told her". (6) Rejected that Respondent told Shine he was a police officer. (10) Rejected that Respondent had emergency lights. Detective Shine testified he turned on and off his high beams. (12) Rejected that Respondent used his flashlight in an intimidating manner. COPIES FURNISHED: Henri Cawthon, Esquire Department of State The Capitol, Mail Station #4 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 George E. Stephanou 24195 U.S. 19 North, Lot 444 Clearwater, Florida 34623 Honorable Jim Smith Secretary of State Department of State The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Phyllis Slater, General Counsel Department of State The Capitol, PL-02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250
