The Issue Whether the Respondent should be suspended and dismissed from her employment with the school district.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is charged by Florida law with the operation, control, and supervision of all School District employees. Respondent has been employed by the Petitioner since 1993 as a full-time school bus driver. Accordingly Respondent is classified as non-instructional school personnel. On February 1, 1991, Respondent completed an employment application with the Petitioner. Such application included a security check form. This form required Respondent to answer three specific questions regarding her criminal history. Such questions were: Have you ever received a penalty from a judge or a law enforcement agency or do you currently have charges pending as the result of an arrest? Has a penalty or conviction ever been withheld, delayed or turned over to another agency or has probation been required as the result of your being arrested? Have you ever applied for and received an expungment of an arrest? If your answer to question 1, 2, or 3 is yes, complete the following. If more space is needed, attach an additional sheet. As to each question posed, Respondent answered by checking the box "No." For the area to be completed if any answer were "Yes," Respondent wrote "N/A." Subsequent to the submittal of the application noted above, Respondent was employed part-time by the School Board. On January 4, 1993, Respondent completed a second application for employment with the School Board and again submitted a Security Check form. This second form contained the following questions: Have you ever been convicted or received a penalty (imprisonment, probation, fines, court costs, etc.) from a judge or a law enforcement agency for a crime other than minor traffic infractions? Has a penalty or conviction ever been withheld (adjudication withheld) or delayed or has probation been required as the result of your being arrested? Do you currently have charges pending as the result of an arrest? Have you ever received an expungement (charges erased) of an arrest or a pardon of a conviction? (Any sealed record should be included.) If you responded YES to any of the above questions, give details below. If more space is needed, attach an additional sheet. On the Security Check form executed in 1993, Respondent checked "Yes" and "No" for the first question; "No" to questions 2, 3, and 4; and inserted "N/A" to the portion to be completed if any answer were "YES." Shortly after completing the application, Respondent began her full-time work with the School District. On or about September 30, 1997, Chief Kelly's office received a request for investigation regarding the alleged current arrest of a school employee, Respondent. While conducting this investigation, it was verified that Respondent had a current arrest but that she also had had a previous arrest for aggravated battery. According to court records, the accuracy of which Respondent does not dispute, Respondent was arrested in 1988 for aggravated battery, pled guilty to the lesser offense of battery, and was adjudicated guilty. As a result of the plea, Respondent was placed on probation for six (6) months, was directed to pay probation costs, and was ordered to make restitution for the victim's medical bills. The investigation was completed and the foregoing findings were presented to the Respondent who was offered, by way of a disciplinary conference, an opportunity to respond to the allegations. Respondent was asked to share any mitigating or exculpatory evidence with regard to the alleged falsification of the Security Check forms. Such disciplinary conference occurred on November 10, 1997. Respondent did not deny the prior history nor offer any information to enlighten school officials as to why she had failed to disclose the criminal matter from 1988. At hearing Respondent maintained that a Public Defender had advised her at the time of the plea that the incident would not affect her employment. Respondent admitted that she recalled being on probation for the incident from 1988. Respondent did not request assistance nor seek advice regarding the forms for employment. Respondent completed high school and did not, prior to completing the Security Check form and submitting it to the Petitioner for employment purposes, indicate that she did not understand the questions posed or the information sought from Respondent.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the School Board of Palm Beach County, Florida enter a Final Order sustaining the suspension and dismissal of the Respondent from her employment with the School District. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of August, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. J. D. Parrish Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of August, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Dr. Joan Kowal Superintendent School District of Palm Beach County 3340 Forest Hill Boulevard West Palm Beach, Florida 33406 Frank T. Brogan Commissioner of Education The Capitol, Plaza Level 08 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 Virginia Tanner-Otts, Esquire School District of Palm Beach County 3318 Forest Hill Boulevard, Suite C-302 West Palm Beach, Florida 33406 Lee Rosenberg, Esquire School District of Palm Beach County 3318 Forest Hill Boulevard, Suite C-302 West Palm Beach, Florida 33406 Mamie Washington Kendall, Esquire 141 South Main Street, Suite 211 Belle Glade, Florida 33430
The Issue Can the Board of Real Estate consider matters surrounding the offense to which a person pleads guilty in determining whether that person possesses the necessary character to be licensee? What is the evidentiary effect of a plea of guilty by an applicant for licensure? Is the Petitioner qualified for licensure?
Findings Of Fact Petitioner Edward J. Gibney made application to The Board of Real Estate for licensure as a real estate salesman. The Board denied Petitioner's application pursuant to Section 475.25(1)(f), Florida Statutes, because he was convicted of crimes against the laws of the United States and against the laws of the State of New Jersey involving moral turpitude. Petitioner pleaded guilty to the crimes of conspiring to commit fraud on medicaid and medicare claims, a felony under the laws of the United States. He also pleaded guilty to a similar offense which was a felony under the laws of New Jersey. Both offenses arose out of the same factual situation. The sole grounds for denial of Petitioner's application were his criminal convictions and the matters surrounding them. The Petitioner is otherwise qualified for licensure. After initial notification of the Boards intention to deny his application, the Petitioner requested and received an informal hearing before the Board. The Board notified Petitioner that it still intended to deny his application, and the Petitioner requested and was granted a formal hearing. The transcript of the Board's informal hearing was received as Petitioner's Composite Exhibit #1. Petitioner was the only witness at the hearing. He explained very candidly the facts surrounding his entry of guilty pleas to the criminal charges brought against him. His testimony was uncontroverted and is accepted as true. Petitioner, a graduate chemist, was qualified and licensed as a medical laboratory director in New Jersey. For 15 years prior to 1975, he owned and operated a small medical laboratory directly providing clinical laboratory services to private physicians. In 1975, Petitioner was approached several times over a period of three months by Seymour Slaughtnick to provide laboratory services to several doctors for medicaid/medicare patients. Slaughtnick was functioning as an intermediary. Slaughtnick picked up test samples at the doctors' offices and transported them to another laboratory. Slaughtnick wanted to change laboratories because of the poor quality laboratory work. Although Slaughtnick's function was described, Slaughtnick's relationship with the other laboratory or the doctors was never defined. Petitioner described Slaughtnick as a salesman. Petitioner initially refused the Slaughtnick offer because he had not done medicare/medicaid work and did not know how to process the paperwork. Slaughtnick continued to press Petitioner for a commitment to do this work and offered to prepare and submit all the paperwork for Petitioner. Slaughtnick and petitioner eventually agreed to an arrangement under which Slaughtnick picked up the samples, brought them to Petitioner's laboratory, transmitted the test results back to the physicians, and prepared Petitioner's billings to medicare/medicaid for the professional services rendered. Petitioner performed all the laboratory work as ordered by the physicians and prepared all test results, paying Slaughtnick a percentage of the fee for each test for his services. Petitioner was aware that his arrangement with Slaughtnick and permitting Slaughtnick to bill in his name was illegal under New Jersey law. To assure himself that Slaughtnick's billings were in order, Petitioner checked on Slaughtnick's billings after they began to work together. The State of new Jersey's medicaid/medicare plan was administered by Prudential Insurance Company using a blind fee schedule. Petitioner was advised by Prudential that his schedule initially provided various fees for various laboratory tests, but laboratories would not be advised of the amounts of payment or criteria used for assessing the appropriateness of ordering the tests. He was advised Prudential would reject any billings that were inappropriate. In 1976, the State of New Jersey began an investigation of its entire medicare/medicaid system. Initially, the inquiry with Petitioner's laboratory centered on whether he was performing the work ordered. It was determined that Petitioner performed all the work for which he billed the state. This investigation gave rise to an administrative complaint against Petitioner that charged him with overbilling. An administrative hearing was conducted which lasted eight months, during which 55 days of testimony were taken. The New Jersey hearing officer eventually that 50 percent of the orders and billings were correct; however, before the administrative order was entered, the Petitioner was indicated by the state of New Jersey and the United States for conspiracy to defraud under medicaid/medicare. The indictment alleged that Petitioner, Slaughtnick and other unnamed co-conspirators had conspired to defraud medicaid and medicare. The indictment was not introduced at this hearing; however, the Petitioner explained it alleged that the conspirators arranged to order more complex tests than were necessary, performed these tests, and then billed the state for the inflated service. Petitioner denied any knowledge of such a scheme to inflate test orders, however Petitioner did admit that his permitting Slaughtnick to prepare bills to medicaid and medicare in the laboratory's name was not authorized under the New Jersey law. Petitioner also denied knowledge of any kickbacks paid by Slaughtnick to any of the physicians or those in their employment. However, Petitioner stated he had no doubt after the fact that Slaughtnick was engaged in such a practice. Since his release from probation slightly more than 18 months ago, Petitioner has studied real estate and attempted to recover from the strain of the loss of his business, the long hearing, and his conviction and sentencing. The facts upon which this case are based occurred in 1975-76. Petitioner was sentenced in 1977, and has been released from confinement and probation since January, 1980. There is no evidence that petitioner has engaged in any conduct that would reflect adversely on his character since he terminated his laboratory work for medicaid/medicare in 1976.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recommended that Petitioner Edward J. Gibney be denied licensure upon the specific ground that under Section 475.17(1), Florida Statutes, he failed to present sufficient evidence of his reputation in the community to assure the Board of Real Estate that the interest of the public and investors would not be endangered unduly. DONE and ORDERED this 14th day of October, 1981, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of October, 1981. COPIES FURNISHED: Larry H. Spalding, Esquire 6360 South Tamiami Trail Sarasota, Florida 33581 Jeffrey A. Miller, Esquire Department of Legal Affairs Administrative Law Section The Capitol, 16th Floor Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Carlos B. Stafford, Executive Director Board of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street PO Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802
Findings Of Fact Petitioner's application for licensure as a real estate salesman reveals that he was born in Miami, Florida, in 1960. In 1979 Petitioner asked a friend to take him to a department store so he could do some shopping. While Petitioner was inside the store shopping, his friend was stealing hub caps in the parking lot until he was caught by the police who arrested both Petitioner and his friend. Petitioner was charged with grand larceny from a building and possession of a barbiturate (methaqualone), but the charges were dropped. In 1981 Petitioner borrowed a car from an acquaintance in order to go out on a date. While Petitioner was driving the car, he was stopped for a traffic violation at which time it was discovered that the borrowed car was a rental car which had been stolen. Although Petitioner was arrested for vehicular theft of an automobile, that charge was dismissed. In 1984 while Petitioner was attempting to locate the home of a friend, he stopped at a house which turned out to. be on the wrong street. As he was returning from the front door of the house to his car, he was stopped by the police. Since the home was located in a neighborhood subject to burglaries and Petitioner did not live in that neighborhood, he was arrested and charged with trespassing and with loitering and prowling. Pursuant to the advice of his public defender, Petitioner plead to one of those charges adjudication was withheld on that charge and the other charge was dropped. Petitioner was not placed on probation and no fine was imposed on him although he believes that he paid court costs. Petitioner disclosed all of the above-described arrests to Respondent in his application for licensure although the application seeks information regarding convictions and not arrests where no conviction or adjudication ever occurs. For the past five years Petitioner has been employed by United Cerebral Palsy. His duties include vehicle maintenance, building maintenance, and lawn maintenance for two group homes. He receives weekly advances from his employer for purchasing supplies. Petitioner has been married for approximately one year.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered approving Petitioner's application for licensure as a real estate salesman, subject to the successful completion of any required examination. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 19th day of November, 1985, at Tallahassee, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT, Hearing OFficer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of November, 1985. COPIES FURNISHED: Bernard Stefon Gonzalez Post Office Box 610104 North Miami, FL 33261 Ralph Armstead, Esquire Department of Legal Affairs 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, FL 32801 Harold Huff, Executive Director Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, FL 32801| Fred Roche, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32301 Salvatore A. Carpino, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32301
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant hereto the Respondent was licensed as a Class "D" Security Officer and held license No. D92-09970. On April 7, 1993 Detective Janice Shine, a deputy sheriff with the Pinellas County Sheriff's office, left her office around 11:00 p.m. driving a 1984 Oldsmobile which was unmarked but not fully equipped to serve as a police vehicle. This was a spare vehicle owned by the Pinellas County Sheriff's office. While Detective Shine was stopped at a stoplight on Ulmerton Road in the left hand lane, Respondent pulled alongside of her vehicle in the center lane. When the light changed, both cars proceeded straight ahead. Respondent pulled in front of Shine's vehicle and slowed down. Shine passed him on the right, and when she did, Respondent indicated for her to pull over to the side of the road. Shine testified that Respondent told her that he was a police officer and that she was speeding. Shine replied that she was a deputy sheriff and for him to grow up. Respondent continued to follow Shine and motioned for her to pull off the road. Detective Shine used her radio to call for back up, and further down Ulmerton Road she did pull off the road. Respondent pulled up behind her. Detective Shine emerged from her car with her sheriff's badge in her hand and proceeded toward Respondent's car. Respondent got out of his car with flashlight in hand and accused Detective Shine of driving while intoxicated. Shortly after these two vehicles stopped, approximately four cars carrying deputy sheriffs and/or police pulled up at the scene. Respondent repeated his accusations against Detective Shine and requested she be given a sobriety test. The officers talked to Shine out of the presence of Respondent, then arrested Respondent on charges of impersonating a police officer. At this time Respondent was dressed in a khaki shirt which was part of his security officer's uniform, with the name of the company for whom he was working on the front of the shirt and an American flag on the shoulder. Respondent was subsequently tried in the criminal court in Pinellas County on charges of falsely impersonating an officer and was found not guilty.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Administrative Complaint filed against George Stephanou be dismissed. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of November, 1993, in Tallahassee, Florida. K. N. AYERS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of November, 1993. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, DOAH NO. 93-3926 Proposed findings submitted by Petitioner are accepted except: (2) Latter part of sentence starting with "told her". (6) Rejected that Respondent told Shine he was a police officer. (10) Rejected that Respondent had emergency lights. Detective Shine testified he turned on and off his high beams. (12) Rejected that Respondent used his flashlight in an intimidating manner. COPIES FURNISHED: Henri Cawthon, Esquire Department of State The Capitol, Mail Station #4 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 George E. Stephanou 24195 U.S. 19 North, Lot 444 Clearwater, Florida 34623 Honorable Jim Smith Secretary of State Department of State The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Phyllis Slater, General Counsel Department of State The Capitol, PL-02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the allegations contained in the Administrative Complaint, the Petitioner, Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission, (Commission), was and is the state agency responsible for the certification of law enforcement officers in this state. The Respondent, Douglas E. Szczepanik, was and is certified in Florida as a law enforcement officer. Late on the evening of August 22, 1988, Respondent was employed as a police officer with the Delray Beach, Florida, Police Department, (Department). While at the hospital with Officer Eberhart collecting a blood specimen from a third person for use in another police matter, he heard a police radio call relating to the hot pursuit of a felony suspect. He and Eberhart went to the scene of the expected apprehension and found that the suspect had been apprehended after a high speed chase by several police cars including one driven by Officer Thomas A. Whatley. It was subsequently determined that the suspect had lost control of his vehicle, a stolen car, and had ended up abandoning it on the city's municipal golf course adjacent to West Atlantic Avenue. He then ran off on foot across the course with Officer Whatley in pursuit in his police cruiser. The suspect ran up a hill and down the other side. Whatley, surmising that the hill was no more than that, and that the other side of the hill was a down slope, drove up the hill after the suspect at a speed of approximately 45 to 50 mph. As he reached the crest, he found that he was on the lip of a sand trap and since he could not stop, his car became airborne, coming to rest some 25 - 30 feet further along, in the sand trap. Though it did not bear significant outward signs of damage, the vehicle was, in fact rendered inoperable as a result of the impact. Fortunately, the suspect was apprehended by other officers on the scene. As a result of the serious nature of the suspect's alleged crimes, suspected murder of an officer and car theft, many Delray Beach officers were involved in the chase and were, therefore, on the scene at the time of the apprehension and Whatley's vehicular mishap, including his Lieutenant, Woods, and his patrol sergeant, then Sergeant Musco. Lt. Woods directed Sgt. Musco to block traffic on Atlantic Avenue and another officer to get the damaged vehicles towed away. He directed Respondent, then at the scene, to write the traffic accident report relating to Whatley's car. There is some indication that initially Woods did not think a report was necessary, but he ultimately became convinced it was and gave the job to Respondent. Since both Respondent and Eberhart were traffic investigators, Eberhart indicated he would do it and Respondent acquiesced. Respondent and Eberhart both discussed the accident and both developed their own theory as to how it happened. Neither, however, bothered to question Whatley who remained at the scene for some time before being directed to resume patrol, using Respondent's cruiser. Even when that was being set up, Respondent did not question Whatley as to what had happened, speaking to him only to caution him not to lose his keys when he turned them over to him. Based on their examination of the scene on Atlantic Avenue, and without even looking at Whatley's vehicle and where it ended up, Eberhart concluded that the accident occurred when the suspect lost control of his vehicle and ran into Whatley's forcing him to lose control and run up the side of and into the sand trap. Had Eberhart bothered to look at the vehicle, he would have seen no body damage consistent with collision. Eberhart was subsequently convinced by Respondent, who did look at Whatley's vehicle, that an alternative theory, indicating that the suspect lost control of his vehicle and prompted Whatley to lose control of his in an effort to avoid a collision, was what happened. In any event, Respondent claims that later that evening, back at Police Headquarters, he saw Whatley attempting to write out his report. Whatley allegedly asked Respondent for help in writing it since he was relatively new to the force and this was his first accident. Respondent also claims that he merely told Whatley the format for the report and the type of information to put in it. He admits that, as an example of what to say, he told Whatley his theory of the accident. When Whatley indicated that was not how it happened, Respondent allegedly told him, then, to write in what did happen as he, Whatley, recalled it, and he denies suggesting that Whatley use his scenario if it was not correct. Whatley, on the other hand, claims that while they were still at the scene of the accident he talked with Respondent and told him what had happened. Respondent supposedly walked around the wreck and then told Whatley to put in his supplement to the accident report that he had been taking evasive action. When Whatley told him that was not the way it happened, Respondent is alleged to have said that the people "upstairs" wanted police accident reports to reflect no fault on the part of the officers. Whatley claims that Sgt. Musco was present at the time but Musco does not profess to have heard that and Respondent categorically denies that Whatley told him at the scene how the accident occurred or that he went to the sand trap to look at the vehicle. In a statement made to Captain Schrader in November, 1988 as a part of the Internal Affairs investigation, Respondent again denied he spoke with Whatley at the accident scene. No evidence was presented by the Petitioner as to what benefit Respondent would gain or what detriment he would avoid by telling Whatley to falsify his supplement. Musco claims that when he first saw Whatley, he appeared depressed about the incident and Musco told him to write it up as it had happened and not to worry about it because he, Musco, was not worried about the car. When Respondent, who Musco had assigned to write up the report, said he was going to show it had happened when Whatley attempted to avoid an accident, Musco told him to write the report honestly as he had been trained to do, and as Whatley had reported it. Musco did not follow up to see if the report or Whatley's supplement thereto was prepared properly. Since he had assigned the duty to a trained traffic/homicide investigator, (Respondent), he presumed it was done correctly. He knows of no policy to falsify reports of police accidents and in fact has had an accident himself, in which he was at fault, and which was written up accurately. Respondent claims that after he spoke with Whatley at Police headquarters and told him to write the report honestly, he left and met Lt. Woods outside. He told Woods that Eberhart was going to write the accident report and that Whatley was going to write his supplement honestly. Woods reportedly responded that was no good because he had already told everyone it had happened because of Whatley's attempt to evade the suspect's car. Because of that, even though Woods did not give him any instructions to do so, Respondent claims he went back inside and told Whatley to write his supplement the way he remembered it. Respondent claims that at no time did he ever tell Whatley to write a false report. He also claims that he never made the statement attributed to him regarding the people "upstairs." He would have nothing to gain or to lose by convincing Whatley to falsify his supplement. After getting advice from Respondent and from Sgt. Musco, Officer Whatley, for some reason, wrote his supplement indicating he had the accident in an attempt to evade the suspect's out of control vehicle. Whatley cites two meetings with Respondent that evening, as does Respondent, but their stories of what transpired differs radically. Whatley claims that Respondent told him to make sure his supplement conformed to what was in Eberhart's report. He did, and when he gave it to Lt. Woods to read, Woods rejected it because it was false and Woods knew it to be false. Woods then told him to hold off on the supplement and about a week later, Whatley was told by Captain Cole to write another supplement which was accurate. Respondent, on the other hand, claims he had little contact with Whatley at the scene of the mishap and denies any direct conversation with him about the accident. All he said, he claims, was, "it doesn't look too bad." Respondent asserts that at no time did Whatley tell him how the accident occurred. Later that evening, when, at the station he saw Whatley writing his report, Whatley asked him for advice as to how to construct and what to put into his supplemental report. Respondent claims he told Whatley to go back and tell the story as it happened. He admits to telling Whatley how he felt the accident occurred but when Whatley said that was not how it was, Respondent again told him to write it as it happened. This whole conversation took no more than a minute or a minute and a half. The only direction he gave Whatley was as to the format of the supplement, not the substance, other than that it be the truth. When, a few minutes later, Respondent saw Woods and told him that Whatley was having trouble, Woods told Respondent how he felt the accident had occurred. At that time, Woods gave Respondent no directions, but Respondent went back into the station and again told Whatley to write up his supplement the way he, Whatley, recalled the accident happening. The following day, according to Respondent, Woods pulled him aside and told him he had just spoken to Major Lincoln who said the report was to be written as Respondent had originally said the accident had occurred, incorrectly. At no time did Respondent speak directly with Lincoln about the accident.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered in this case by the Commission dismissing the Administrative Complaint filed against the Respondent. RECOMMENDED in Tallahassee, Florida this 17th day of January, 1992. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of January, 1992. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER The following constitute my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, regarding the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the Petitioner in this proceeding. FOR THE PETITIONER: & 2. Accepted and incorporated herein. 3. - 5. Accepted and incorporated herein. 6. - 9. Accepted and incorporated herein. - 14. Not phrased as Findings of Fact but more as restatements of testimony. However, the substance of the restatements is correctly stated and has been accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. - 18. Accepted and incorporated herein. 19. - 21. Accepted and incorporated herein. 22. & 23. Accepted and incorporated herein as an accurate recitation of Whatley's story. 24. & 25. Again, not phrased as Findings of Fact. Here, however, the substance of Whatley's statement is rejected as not proven. 26. & 27. Rejected as not supported by evidence of record. - 30. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted. Rejected as not supported by the evidence. Whatley and Respondent did meet at the station that evening, but the allegation that Respondent told Whatley to falsify his report is not supported by credible evidence. & 34. These are restatements of testimony but are accepted. 35. - 37. An accurate restatement of the testimony, but the testimony is rejected as unsupported. Even Lincoln denied making the statement. 38. - 40. Accepted and incorporated herein. 41. - 43. Accepted and incorporated herein. 44. & 45. Accepted as accurate recitations of the testimony. COPIES FURNISHED: Rodney Gaddy, Esquire Michael R. Ramage, Esquire Florida Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Charles Salerno, Esquire 242 Plaza Office P.O. Box 1349 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 James T. Moore Commissioner Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Jeffrey Long Director CJSTC Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
Findings Of Fact On September 4, 1979, the Department of State levied a $200 civil fine against Weaver and Automobile Recovery by its letter of that date. As of that date, the Petitioner was not licensed by the Department of State under Chapter 493, Florida Statutes. The $200 fine was paid, and a formal hearing was requested.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Hearing Officer would recommend that the fine be set aside and the $200 be repaid to the Petitioners. This recommended in no way constitutes a ruling or finding on the underlying grounds upon which the fine was assessed. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of February 1980 in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Mr. John M. Weaver Automobile Recovery Bureau of Florida, Inc. Post Office Box 18452 Tampa, Florida 33679 W. J. Gladwin, Jr., Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of State The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether the Appellee's suspension of Appellant was in compliance with Chapter 110, Florida Statutes, and Chapter 22A-7.10F and G(2), Florida Administrative Code. Whether the Appellee's suspension of Appellant should be sustained.
Findings Of Fact C. W. Mathis was on January 22, 1977, a state trooper, employed by Appellee, Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles, Florida Highway Patrol, in Orlando, Florida. By letter dated February 22, 1977, Trooper Mathis, the Appellant, was notified that he was being suspended for eight (8) hours without pay by the Appellee, Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles, Florida Highway Patrol for: "Leaving the workstation without authori- zation and negligence, in violation of Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Personnel Rules and Regulations 2.lC, willful violation of statutory authority, rules, regulations or policies, and General Order 43, l.A.(4), pages 43-2 and 43-4, Florida Highway Patrol Manual." Trooper Mathis appealed this suspension which is the subject of the bearing. The Division of Administrative Hearings, Department of Administration, has jurisdiction of the cause. On January 22, 1977, Trooper Mathis was on State Road 400, out of his assigned authority, and running radar at approximately 8:50 A.M. He pursued and stopped a car which was clocked at speeding 75 miles per hour. Trooper Mathis asked the driver for a drivers license and when the driver stated he had none, Trooper Mathis told him to get out of the vehicle and asked the driver's name and proof of ownership of the vehicle. The driver indicated that his information was in the glove compartment and both Trooper Mathis and the driver obtained an instrument from the glove compartment of the driver's automobile. In the stopped vehicle was a white male passenger. Trooper Mathis returned to the patrol car and had the driver sit in the right front seat of the patrol car. Mathis then left the left front seat of the patrol car to obtain the vehicle identification number from the automobile and returned to the patrol car where the driver or violator was sitting. Mathis then called the radio dispatcher for a "check for wanted" personal (10-29). Trooper Mathis was looking down and when he looked up the automobile he had stopped was gone, driven obviously by the passenger who was left seated in the stopped vehicle. The driver of the automobile seated in the patrol car with Trooper Mathis told Trooper Mathis that he didn't see his car leave and that he had picked up the white male passenger hitchhiking on State Road 400 at the Turnpike. Trooper Mathis then proceeded west on State Road 400 in hopes of finding the car. He also called the station and asked radio operator Roundtree to copy a vehicle identification number without asking for a "check for wanted" 10-29. Radio operator Roundtree ran the first vehicle identification number (1Y27D 57106363) given by Trooper Mathis and it came back nothing on file. (The second vehicle identification number (1Y27D5T1O6367) later came back registered to the following: Eva Kuhn, 25 North Westview Avenue, Feasterville, Pennsylvania, on a 1975 Chevrolet, license number A02326.) Radio operator Roundtree then ran the tag number for 10-29 thinking that both vehicle identification numbers he had run were negative for wanted. The tag came back negative. After a search of the area and not locating the vehicle Trooper Mathis asked to meet with a deputy sheriff. The meeting with the deputy was for his passenger to make a "stolen car" report. When the violator finished his report with the deputy he advised Trooper Mathis that he had relatives visiting at Disney World and would like to be dropped off there. Trooper Mathis then brought him to Disney World and left him there. It was later found that the driver-violator had stolen the vehicle. Appellee, Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles, contends: Trooper Mathis was negligent and should be Punished for (1) failing to ask for a proper 10-29 ("check for wanted") on the vehicle identification number; (2) failing to keep the stopped vehicle under surveilance so that the passenger was able to drive it away unnoticed; (3) failing to require identification from the violator-driver before believing the violator's story. Appellant, C. W. Mathis, contends: (l) that under the circumstances it was excuseable that he failed to immediately ask for a proper 10-29 "check for wanted"; (2) that the traffic was very heavy and he was obliged to go very fast if he were to properly find the violator and do the job for which he was paid; (3) that the radio operator was inexperienced and should have made the proper calls which would have notified Trooper. Mathis that the driver-violator was not the owner of the stopped vehicle.
Recommendation Dismiss appeal; the suspension was for just cause. DONE and ORDERED this 4th day of August, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. DELPHENE C. STRICKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Carlton Building, Room 530 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of August, 1977. COPIES FURNISHED: Mrs. Dorothy Roberts Appeals Coordinator Department of Administration Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 C. W. Mathis 1409 Lukay Street Ocoee, Florida 32761 Enoch J. Whitney, Esquire Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkmam Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304
