The Issue Whether the Petitioner qualifies for a consumer's certificate of exemption as a "Religious Institution" or "Church" or as a "Charitable Institution" as defined in Chapter 212, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner was incorporated in the State of Florida as a nonprofit corporation on May 11, 1995. On February 21, 1995, Petitioner filed an application for a consumer's certificate of exemption as a charitable institution. The Department under its statutory powers denied the application and advised the Petitioner of his right to a hearing on his application. George B. Cooper is the incorporator president and treasurer of Petitioner. Mr. Cooper serves as the pastor of the Petitioner. Mr. Cooper is a Seventh Day Adventist and attended religious training with that denomination. He is not an ordained minister. The business office and business address of Petitioner is in Jacksonville, at the home of a friend of Mr. Cooper. Mr. Cooper resided in Jacksonville initially, and started his missionary activities there. He subsequently moved the mission to Daytona Beach, and resides in Jacksonville and overnights in Daytona Beach when engaged in mission work. Mr. Cooper leases one-third of a private residence located at 610 Winchester Street, Daytona Beach, Florida. Mr. Cooper provided receipts for $1075 for leasing this space from February, 1995, until July, 1995, and a letter from the landlord which indicates that she is aware that Mr. Cooper conducts religious services there. The leasehold includes a large meeting room with chairs for persons attending services and a podium from which Mr. Cooper leads religious services which include prayer, song and preaching. A small room is available with a cot and sleeping bag to provide a place for homeless to overnight. Mr. Cooper sleeps at the mission when in Daytona Beach. In addition the leasehold includes access to bath and kitchen facilities. Clothes and food are also stored at the mission which Petitioner provides to persons in need. These clothes and food items are gifts in kind obtained from individuals and organizations. Mr. Cooper does not maintain complete records of the items given to him or of the items which he gives away. Mr. Cooper testified that he received $4667 between May and December, 1994 which included $4000 which he received from distribution of religious tracts and pamphlets. Mr. Cooper testified that his expenditures between May and December, 1994 were $5150. This included expenses of $2100 for travel, rent and utilities, $383 for office materials, $100 for literature and gifts of food, clothes and money in the amount of $2567. None of the gifts of money were to other religious or charitable organizations. The Petitioner's mission in Daytona Beach provides clothes, food and minimal temporary shelter to homeless persons and others in need, together with preaching the gospel. To this end, Mr. Cooper conducts church services at regular times during the week and is available to provide care to those who come by his mission 24 hours a day when he is in Daytona Beach.
Recommendation Based upon the consideration of the facts found and the conclusions of law reached, it is, RECOMMENDED: That the application of the Petitioner as a religious institution be approved. DONE and ENTERED this 7th day of September, 1995, in Tallahassee Florida STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of September, 1995. APPENDIX The Department filed proposed findings which were read and considered. The following states which of those findings were adopted and which were rejected and why: Respondent's Recommended Order: Findings: Paragraphs 1, 2 Paragraphs 1, 2 Paragraphs 3, 4 Subsumed by Paragraphs 3, 4 Paragraph 5 Subsumed in part in 3, 4; and rejected in part as irrelevant Paragraphs 6, 7 Subsumed in Paragraph 1 Paragraph 8 Irrelevant There is no allegation that the application was incomplete Paragraph 9 Irrelevant except that the Department automatically considers alternative basis for exemptions Paragraph 10 Subsumed in Paragraph 1 Paragraph 11 Subsumed in Paragraph 6 It is irrelevant that there are no signs or ads or telephone These are not required of a church. Paragraph 12 Deleted from Respondent's findings Paragraph 13 Statement of Case Paragraph 14 The listing of items is not necessary as a finding. Paragraph 15 Subsumed in Paragraph 6 Paragraphs 16, 17 Subsumed in Paragraph 4 Paragraph 18 Subsumed in Paragraph 5 Paragraph 19 Irrelevant and invades the province of the fact finder Paragraph 20 Conclusion of Law COPIES FURNISHED: George B. Cooper, Pastor 2172 McQuade Street Jacksonville, FL 32209 and 610 Winchester Street Daytona Beach, FL 32114 Nancy Francillon, Esquire Lisa M. Raleigh, Esquire Assistant Attorneys General Office of the Attorney General The Capital-Tax Section Tallahassee, FL 32399-1050 Linda Lettera, General Counsel Department of Revenue 204 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0100 Larry Fuchs, Executive Director Department of Revenue 204 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0100
The Issue The issues are whether the alleged actions of the respondents demonstrate a lack of fitness or trustworthiness to engage in the business of insurance within the meaning of Subsection 626.611(7), Florida Statutes (2004), and, if so, what penalty should be imposed. (All statutory references are to Florida Statutes (2004) unless otherwise stated.)
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency responsible for regulating insurance agents in Florida. The respondents, Crain and Carll, are licensed as Life and Health insurance agents pursuant to respective license numbers A056967 and A040734. The respondents have known each other for approximately 13 years. During that time, the two engaged in the business of selling health insurance. Mr. Carll was an independent contractor, but Mr. Crain was Mr. Carll's only boss. Mr. Crain wholly owns two Florida corporations that he operates as insurance agencies. The two corporations are identified in the record as International Life and Health Services of Manatee County, Inc. (Manatee), and International Life and Health Services of Sarasota County, Inc. (Sarasota). Mr. Crain owns two other Florida corporations. They are identified in the record as Independent Living Home Care Agency, Inc. (Home Care Agency), and Independent Living Home Care Membership Association, Inc. (Home Care). Home Care promises in a plan written by Mr. Crain to provide plan purchasers with access to discounted in-home care (the plan). Approximately 44 Florida residents purchased the plan in 2005 and 2006 from insurance agents, including Mr. Carll, who, as agents for Mr. Crain, Manatee, or Sarasota, previously sold health insurance to some of the plan purchasers. Mr. Crain is personally and fully liable for the acts of the selling insurance agents within the meaning of Section 626.839. Mr. Crain is a health insurance agent who is the president and sole shareholder of a health insurance agency. Mr. Crain directly supervised and controlled the insurance agents who sold the plan in Florida. Mr. Crain wrote the plan and trained the insurance agents in the content of the plan, sales techniques, how to exclude impaired customers, and how to determine whether a customer was an appropriate candidate to purchase a plan. Mr. Crain did not obtain a legal opinion concerning his final version of the plan. The plan satisfies the statutory definition of insurance. However, the plan is not health insurance that the legislature has expressed its intent to regulate.1 The plan promises Home Care will provide a purchaser of a membership with access to in-home care from a third-party provider, denominated as a "caregiver," at a cost substantially less than the market rate caregivers normally charge for such services (discounted home care services). The plan promises to refund 120 percent of the membership fee if Home Care were unable to provide access to discounted home care services. The plan excludes medical care from the definition of home care services. Home care services include companion and homemaker services; housekeeping and laundry services; transportation services for doctor visits, groceries, and visits with friends; meal preparation; assistance with dressing and undressing; organizing files and bills; not burdening loved ones; protecting assets and heir's inheritance; gaining respect; and preserving one's legacy while gaining respect and dignity. The plan offers memberships for four, six, and eight years. Only four and six-year memberships are pertinent to this proceeding. The respective cost for each four and six-year membership is $2,475 and $3,475. Home Care promises each member will have access to discounted home care services for respective benefit periods of 1.5 and 2.5 years. The cost of membership does not apply toward the cost of discounted home care services. Services are not available at the discounted rate for the first 90 days after the date a purchaser requests services (the elimination period).2 The elimination period is 180 days "for pre-existing conditions".3 An additional payment of $1,395 reduces the normal elimination period from 90 to 60 days, extends the membership period an additional two years, and extends the respective benefit periods by one year. The plan charges an additional 25 percent if a purchaser elects installment payments. The plan promises home care services at substantial discounts below the market rate. The discounted plan rates are $94 for 24 hours of service; $72 for eight hours of service; and $36 for four hours of service. Market rates in the community range from $204 to $480 for 24 hours of service and from $16 to $18 an hour for shorter periods.4 The 44 plans sold in Florida generated approximately $192,000 in membership fees for Home Care. Mr. Crain deposited the fees into a bank account he created for Home Care and for which Mr. Crain is the sole authorized signatory. Home Care paid commissions to insurance agents ranging from 50 and 60 percent of the sale proceeds. The allegations in this proceeding pertain to four of the 44 plan purchasers. Ms. Janet McClurkin purchased the plan in April 2005 in two installments totaling $2,112. Ms. Ruth Frakes purchased the plan in February 2005 in two installments totaling $4,870. Ms. Carin Clareus purchased the plan in February 2005 for one payment of $1,953. Ms. Eva Muller purchased the plan in March 2005 for one payment of $3,475.5 A finding of guilt requires proof of one or more of five essential allegations, the first of which alleges the four plan purchasers are elderly women who, at the time of purchase, were "disabled" and suffered from "diminished mental capacity." The four sales allegedly violated the plan prohibition against sales to anyone "not of sound mind or body." The four plan purchasers are clearly elderly women. At the time of the hearing, Ms. McClurkin was 94 years old.6 Ms. McClurkin is Canadian, has been widowed for approximately 35 years, has no children or nearby family, and lives alone. Her nephew had power of attorney at the time of the hearing. Ms. McClurkin suffered from hearing and memory loss. She had worn two hearing aids for about a year, was recovering from surgery for breast cancer two years earlier, and had functioned for over 15 years with two artificial hips. Ms. Frakes was 90 years old at the time of the hearing.7 Ms. Frakes had been widowed for approximately 26 years and had no children and no surviving relatives. Ms. Frakes wore a Life Alert alarm, had been wearing two hearing aids for approximately seven years, had been reading through a magnifying glass for approximately five years, was taking medication for high blood pressure, and suffered from arthritis. Ms. Clareus was 97 years old at the time of the hearing and resided in a community of about 200 senior citizens.8 She immigrated to the United States in 1928, had been widowed for approximately four years at the time of the hearing, and had no children and no nearby relatives. Ms. Clareus had been legally blind for approximately eight years but was able to read through an assistive device in her residence. Ms. Muller was approximately 85 years old at the time of the hearing. She immigrated from Germany and then became a U.S. citizen, all in a time frame not disclosed in the record. Ms. Muller had been divorced early in her life and lived alone in a mobile home community. She had no nearby relatives and experienced memory problems. Ms. Muller owns an automobile but does not drive. Friends drive for her. After purchasing the plan, Ms. Muller executed a power of attorney naming Ms. Ingrid Eglsaer as her general power of attorney. At the time of the hearing, the four witnesses demonstrated confusion and difficulty in recalling specific facts. However, their confusion and impaired memory at the hearing was not clear and convincing evidence that the witnesses were incompetent when they purchased the plan. The allegation of incompetence at the time of purchase may be supported by inference or surmise, but inference and surmise do not satisfy the requirement for clear and convincing evidence.9 Petitioner submitted no expert testimony concerning the mental capacity of a purchaser at the time of the purchase. Petitioner next alleges the respondents misrepresented that Home Care would provide home care services and home medical care without further charge. Each Administrative Complaint admits the alleged misrepresentation conflicts with the terms of the plan.10 The plan promises access to discounted home care services and states that the membership fee does not apply toward charges for discounted home care services.11 The evidence is less than clear and convincing that the respondents misrepresented the contents of the plan in a manner that led purchasers to believe they would receive home care services or home medical care without additional charge. Testimony of the four purchasers concerning verbal representations by insurance agents during sales transactions is confused, is not precise and explicit, and is less than clear and convincing. Each purchaser may have inferred that she was purchasing insurance for either home care services or home medical care without an additional charge. Some purchasers had previously purchased such insurance from the same insurance agent. Each sale included a consultation in which the insurance agent reviewed other insurance held by the purchaser. The plan included terms that sounded to elderly women like familiar insurance terms. For example, the plan requires the purchaser to apply for coverage and employs terms such as "Eligible Persons," "Effective Date," "Elimination Period," "Limitations and Exclusions," and "Benefit Discount Period." The plan extends the elimination period when "pre- existing conditions" exist, describes home care providers as "caregivers," and discusses "co-payments." The plan includes a disclosure form and a medical release form. The evidence is less than clear and convincing that the respondents made promises or representations, other than those in the plan, to induce a purchaser to infer that the plan entitled her to discounted home care or medical care at no additional charge. Rather, the terms of the plan were purposefully confusing and induced the four elderly women to draw the desired inference. Petitioner also alleges the respondents made false and worthless promises that defrauded the purchasers. However, it is unnecessary to resolve the allegations of fraud in this case.12 This case can be resolved if the evidence supports one of two remaining allegations. First, the respondents allegedly misrepresented the access to discounted caregiver services that a purchaser acquired upon payment of a membership fee. Second, the promises of access to discounted caregiver services that the respondents made to each of the four plan purchasers were false and worthless.13 The plan misrepresented the access to caregivers that a purchaser acquired upon payment of a membership fee. The plan provides, in relevant part: If a member joins the association they are guaranteed the homecare discounts provided for in the contractual agreement. Respondent Crain, Exhibit 1, at 4. The plan does not name or otherwise identify a caregiver responsible for supplying the discounted caregiver services "guaranteed" in the plan. In that regard, the plan is factually distinguishable from a home care plan that passed judicial scrutiny in an unrelated proceeding.14 Neither Mr. Crain nor Home Care possessed a legal right to require a caregiver to provide discounted services in accordance with the terms of the plan. Neither Mr. Crain nor Home Care possessed the practical ability to ensure that a caregiver would provide home care services at any price, much less the discounted prices promised in the plan.15 The absence of either a legally enforceable right or practical ability to ensure that a caregiver would provide the discounted home care services promised in the plan were material facts that Mr. Crain did not disclose to purchasers. The failure to disclose material facts was willful and misrepresented the access to discounted caregiver services that a purchaser acquired upon payment of a membership fee. Testimony from Mr. Crain concerning his practical ability to ensure delivery of discounted caregiver services was neither credible nor persuasive to the fact-finder. Mr. Crain discussed home care services with a number of caregivers. Based on those conversations, Mr. Crain developed a list of caregivers he said he could call in the future to request discounted caregiver services promised in the plan if and when one of the 44 purchasers requested services (the list).16 The list evolved between January 2005 and September 2006. Mr. Crain advertised for caregivers in local newspapers. The collective responses numbered between 100 and 200. Mr. Crain or a staff-member collected the contact information for each responder and questioned each responder concerning, among other things, their qualifications and experience. The final list identified 15 caregivers. Mr. Crain described the list of 15 in answers to questions from the fact-finder: [Q] Well, I want to make sure I understand clearly. So, you ran an ad. People called in, you took down their contact information, and did you run [abuse registry] screens on these people? [A] Yes, I did. [Q] Okay. You mentioned earlier 200 responded. Did all 200 make the list? [A] The list? . . . [Q] . . . The list I'm referring to is the list referred to in testimony of . . . [insurance] agents of yours that said you maintained a list of contract individuals . . . Did you maintain a list? [A] I had a list of potential caregivers from the original ad, yes. * * * [Q] So you ran two ads. You had some responses to the first ad, and overwhelming responses to the second ad, and when you talked to the person, what did [you] do . . . ? [A] They call in -- I briefly qualify them. * * * [Q] And what kind of information do you collect? [A] Name, address, phone number, work history, educational history ethical behavior . . . . [and abuse] screening . . . . [I]f the agency they work for currently or in the past could not fax me a copy of . . . screening . . . by AHCA [Agency for Health Care Administration], then I could then screen them myself. [Q] [H]ow many of these people did you actually either screen or get faxes of their screen? [A] About seven. [Q] Out of how many? [A] Altogether, I had spoken to no less than a hundred people. [Q] From both ads? [A] Correct. . . . [Q] How many of the seven did you screen yourself? [A] Three. . . . [Q] Okay. Now, you talked to a hundred. Did you compile a resource list? [A] Yes, I did. [Q] And how many . . . , of the hundred, made the resource list? [A] I had at least 15 potentially eligible people that could work for me, but I had seven that could go at any moment. Or not at any moment but that were available, already screened with experience and ready to go. Or around seven. Transcript (TR) at 581-585. Mr. Crain did not bond or insure any of the 15 potentially eligible caregivers. Mr. Crain explained the bonding procedure in the following testimony: [Q] [The plan] . . . talks about having people bonded, insured, and fully screened, correct? [A] Yes. [Q] Now, we've already talked about screening. How would you make arrangements to bond and insure someone? [A] If they were employed, to bond a person is a one-page form . . . [y]ou deliver to this insurance agency . . . down the road from my office . . . and putting a hundred dollars for every ten thousand dollars of bonding you want. . . . [Q] So, when in the process would you bond and insure someone? [A] The day or the day before they went out to the actual care. [Q] So actually, prior to having a request for services and actually arranging for somebody to go out, you wouldn't have gone through the trouble or expense of bonding or insuring, correct? [A] Correct. [Q] Who actually bears the expense of bonding and insuring? [A] The provider. [Q] You mean the worker? [A] Yeah. . . . TR at 585-586. The plan promised that access to discounted services included a guaranteed refund equal to 120 percent of membership if Home Care were unable to provide access to the discounted caregiver services promised in the plan. Mr. Crain wrote the refund language to state: 17. 120% money back guarantee. If [Home Care] cannot provide homemaker and companion services at the discounted rate as governed by this contract, the company shall pay the member all the fees paid plus an additional 20%. Due to severe, unprecedented, skyrocketing costs for caregivers, or an unforeseen increase in the demand for personnel, the company will make this refund. [Home Care] has a big responsibility to provide quality home care services to all of it's [sic] members. Even though management owners and outside professionals have thoroughly though [sic] out almost every variable in making this contract both beneficial to the customers and profitable for [Home Care], no one can predict the future. Therefore it is agreed by both parties that by entering into this contract that the legal remedy for [Home Care's] possible inability to provide the service at the discounted rate, is for [Home Care] to refund 120% of the member's fee after reviewing the case with legal counsel as provided for by [Home Care] regarding the unusual circumstances of the said member. Respondent Crain, Exhibit 1, at 7. The promise that access to discounted caregiver services includes a guaranteed refund of 120 percent of the membership fee is a false promise. The promise is not conditioned on any discernable legal standard or any other standard capable of objective measurement. Rather, the applicable standard is a subjective standard to be interpreted at the sole discretion of Mr. Crain. Mr. Crain willfully included the false refund promise in the plan. As Mr. Crain explained: The right to get a refund? After five days, they don't have a right to get a refund. [Q] Do you or have you, on behalf of the company, given refunds to persons beyond the five-day period? [A] Yes. [Q] Is that at your discretion? [A] Yes. [Q] Is there any particular policy or plan regarding when and how to give a refund and how much? [A] No. TR at 614. Mr. Crain is the sole arbiter of the entitlement to a refund and the amount of the refund to be paid. For example, Mr. Crain paid Ms. Muller 120 percent of her membership fee but paid only a prorated amount to Ms. Clareus.17 The promise to refund 120 percent of the membership fee is worthless. Mr. Crain willfully included the worthless promise in the plan. The refund obligation is owed solely by Home Care, and Home Care has not retained sufficient reserves to fund its contractual obligation.18 Mr. Crain withdrew virtually all of the $192,000 in membership fees to pay commissions, operating costs, and similar expenses. On June 19, 2006, Home Care had $946 in its bank account. The last refund obligation Home Care owes to the two unpaid purchasers in this proceeding will not expire until sometime in 2011. The corporate promise to refund 120 percent of the membership fee is worthless because it is an unfunded obligation to pay refunds from non-existent reserves. Mr. Carll did not exercise ordinary diligence, much less the reasonable skill and diligence required of an insurance agent, to examine the plan for misrepresentations and false promises. Mr. Carll willfully failed to independently examine the plan. As Mr. Carll explained during his testimony: Jim was constantly on the phone interviewing people, prospective caregivers, talking to -- even to home health care agencies that provide homemaker services, and it's my understanding that he had compiled a list of people who could be called in the event if someone requested for [sic] service. * * * [Q] When you had meetings with Mr. Crain, did you ask him questions? [A] Yes. [Q] What questions did you ask about the plan? [A] Oh, how does the elimination period work. You know, when do services begin? What do people have to do to get services? Questions of that nature. [Q] Anything else? [A] Just questions about, you know, well how to talk to these people and, you know, what to look for when you walk into a house. [Q] Did you ask Mr. Crain what ability he had to ensure that these third party contractors would provide their services for the fees he guaranteed in the plan? [A] Yes. [Q] Okay. What did you ask him? [A] I said, Well, how can we be sure that these people will get the services that they need when they ask for them? [Q] And? [A] He said that he had interviewed numerous people. He had a list of people that he could call . . . to provide [discounted services]. . . . [Q] Did you ask Mr. Crain what ability he had to . . . enforce that representation from them if, at some future time, he asked them to provide that service, and they said they no longer would? [A] I didn't ask him that question. [Q] So you didn't ask him if he had these people under legal contract for the term of the plan? [A] No. . . . I have a lot of faith in Jim Crain. TR at 358 and 422-424. Mr. Carll knew, or should have known, that the plan he sold included misrepresentations. Mr. Carll knew, or should have known, from the language of the plan that the refund promise is false. Each of the respondents is an insurance agent who enjoyed a fiduciary relationship which arose from previous sales of health insurance. Mr. Carll also enjoyed a fiduciary relationship that arose during the previously discussed consultative role he performed when he reviewed with plan purchasers their existing insurance. As Mr. Carll explained during his testimony: Well, a lot them, some of them were referrals, some of them were people we already knew. [Q] How did you know them? [A] That they had purchased insurance with us before. You know, a lot of them called the office. [Q] For what purpose did they call? [A] Well, they called the office looking for the agent that sold them insurance. TR at 360-361.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a final order finding the respondents guilty of violating Subsection 626.611(7), for the reasons stated herein, and suspending their licenses for 24 months from the date the proposed agency action becomes final. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of January, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of January, 2007.
The Issue Whether the Petitions filed by Ambar Trail, Ltd.; Sierra Meadows Apartments, Ltd.; and Quail Roost Transit Village IV, Ltd., should be dismissed for lack of standing.
Findings Of Fact Florida Housing is a public corporation created under Florida law to administer the governmental function of financing or refinancing affordable housing and related facilities in Florida. Florida Housing administers a competitive solicitation process to implement the provisions of the housing credit program, under which developers apply and compete for funding for projects in response to RFAs developed by Florida Housing. The RFA in this case was specifically targeted to provide affordable housing in Miami-Dade County, Florida. The RFA introduction provides: 2 As this Recommended Order of Dismissal is based upon a motion to dismiss, the factual allegations of the three Petitions filed by the Petitioners in this consolidate case are accepted as true, and the Findings of Fact are derived from the four corners of those Petitions, see Madison Highlands. LLC v. Florida Housing Finance Corp., 220 So. 3d 467, 473 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017), and facts that are not otherwise in dispute. This Request for Applications (RFA) is open to Applicants proposing the development of affordable, multifamily housing located in Miami- Dade County. Under this RFA, Florida Housing Finance Corporation (the Corporation) expects to have up to an estimated $7,195,917 of Housing Credits available for award to proposed Developments located in Miami-Dade County. After Florida Housing announced its preliminary funding award decisions for RFA 2019-112 for Housing Credit Financing for Affordable Housing Developments Located in Miami-Dade County, each of the Petitioners filed Petitions challenging the decisions. Petitioners do not allege that Florida Housing improperly scored or evaluated the applications selected for funding, nor do they contend that Petitioners' applications should be funded. Instead, Petitioners allege that the evaluation was fundamentally unfair and seeks to have the entire RFA rescinded based on alleged improprieties of one responding entity and its affiliates. Petitioners claim that the evaluation process was fundamentally unfair is based entirely on allegations that several entities associated with Housing Trust Group, LLC (HTG), combined to submit 15 Priority I applications in contravention of the limitation in the RFA on the number of Priority I applications that could be submitted. Even assuming Petitioners' assertions are correct, there is no scenario in which Petitioners can reach the funding range for this RFA. In order to break ties for those applicants that achieve the maximum number of points and meet the mandatory eligibility requirements, the RFA sets forth a series of tie-breakers to determine which applications will be awarded funding. The instant RFA included specific goals to fund certain types of developments and sets forth sorting order tie-breakers to distinguish between applicants. The relevant RFA provisions are as follows: Goals The Corporation has a goal to fund one (1) proposed Development that (a) selected the Demographic Commitment of Family at questions 2.a. of Exhibit A and (b) qualifies for the Geographic Areas of Opportunity/SADDA Goal as outlined in Section Four A. 11. a. The Corporation has a goal to fund one (1) proposed Development that selected the Demographic Commitment of Elderly (Non-ALF) at question 2.a. of Exhibit A. *Note: During the Funding Selection Process outlined below, Developments selected for these goals will only count toward one goal. Applicant Sorting Order All eligible Priority I Applications will be ranked by sorting the Applications as follows, followed by Priority II Applications. First, from highest score to lowest score; Next, by the Application's eligibility for the Proximity Funding Preference (which is outlined in Section Four A.5.e. of the RFA) with Applications that qualify for the preference listed above Applications that do not qualify for the preference; Next, by the Application's eligibility for the Per Unit Construction Funding Preference which is outlined in Section Four A.lO.e. of the RFA (with Applications that qualify for the preference listed above Applications that do not qualify for the preference); Next, by the Application's eligibility for the Development Category Funding Preference which is outlined in Section Four A.4.(b)(4) of the RFA (with Applications that qualify for the preference listed above Applications that do not qualify for the preference); Next, by the Applicant's Leveraging Classification, applying the multipliers outlined in Item 3 of Exhibit C of the RFA (with Applications having the Classification of A listed above Applications having the Classification of B); Next, by the Applicant's eligibility for the Florida Job Creation Funding Preference which is outlined in Item 4 of Exhibit C of the RFA (with Applications that qualify for the preference listed above Applications that do not qualify for the preference); and And finally, by lotterv number, resulting in the lowest lottery number receiving preference. This RFA was similar to previous RFAs issued by Florida Housing, but included some new provisions limiting the number of Priority I applications that could be submitted. Specifically, the RFA provided: Priority Designation of Applications Applicants may submit no more than three (3) Priority I Applications. There is no limit to the number of Priority II Applications that can be submitted; however, no Principal can be a Principal, as defined in Rule Chapter 67- 48.002(94), F.A.C., of more than three ( 3) Priority 1 Applications. For purposes of scoring, Florida Housing will rely on the Principals of the Applicant and Developer(s) Disclosure Form (Rev. 05-2019) outlined below in order to determine if a Principal is a Principal on more than three (3) Priority 1 Applications. If during scoring it is determined that a Principal is disclosed as a Principal on more than three (3) Priority I Applications, all such Priority I Applications will be deemed Priority II. If it is later determined that a Principal, as defined in Rule Chapter 67-48.002(94), F.A.C., was not disclosed as a Principal and the undisclosed Principal causes the maximum set forth above to be exceeded, the award(s) for the affected Application(s) will be rescinded and all Principals of the affected Applications may be subject to material misrepresentation, even if Applications were not selected for funding, were deemed ineligible, or were withdrawn. The Petitioners all timely submitted applications in response to the RFA. Lottery numbers were assigned by Florida Housing, at random, to all applications shortly after the applications were received and before any scoring began. Lottery numbers were assigned to the applications without regard to whether the application was a Priority I or Priority II. The RFA did not limit the number of Priority II Applications that could be submitted. Review of the applications to determine if a principal was a principal on more than three Priority 1 Applications occurred during the scoring process, well after lottery numbers were assigned. The leveraging line, which would have divided the Priority I Applications into Group A and Group B, was established after the eligibility determinations were made. All applications were included in Group A. There were no Group B applications. Thus, all applications were treated equally with respect to this preference. The applications were ultimately ranked according to lottery number and funding goal. . If Florida Housing had determined that an entity or entities submitted more than three Priority I Applications with related principals, the relief set forth in the RFA was to move those applications to Priority II. Florida Housing did not affirmatively conclude that any of the 15 challenged applications included undisclosed principals so as to cause a violation of the maximum number of Priority I Applications that could be submitted. All of the applications that were deemed eligible for funding, including the Priority II Applications, scored equally, and met all of the funding preferences. After the applications were evaluated by the Review Committee appointed by Florida Housing, the scores were finalized and preliminary award recommendations were presented and approved by Florida Housing's Board. Consistent with the procedures set forth in the RFA, Florida Housing staff reviewed the Principal Disclosure Forms to determine the number of Priority I Applications that had been filed by each applicant. This review did not result in a determination that any applicant had exceeded the allowable number of Priority I Applications that included the same principal. One of the HTG Applications (Orchid Pointe, App. No. 2020-148C) was initially selected to satisfy the Elderly Development goal. Subsequently, three applications, including Slate Miami, that had initially been deemed ineligible due to financial arrearages were later determined to be in full compliance and, thus, eligible as of the close of business on January 8, 2020. The Review Committee reconvened on January 21, 2020, to reinstate those three applications. Slate Miami was then recommended for funding. The Review Committee ultimately recommended to the Board the following applications for funding: Harbour Springs (App. No. 2020-101C), which met the Geographic Areas of Opportunity/SADDA Goal; Slate Miami (App. No. 2020-122C), which met the Elderly (non-ALF) Goal; and Naranja Lakes (App. No. 2020-117C), which was the next highest-ranked eligible Priority I Application. The Board approved the Committee's recommendations at its meeting on January 23, 2020, and approved the preliminary selection of Harbour Springs, Slate Miami, and Naranja Lakes for funding. The applications selected for funding held Lottery numbers 1 (Harbour Springs), 2 (Naranja Lakes), and 4 (Slate Miami). Petitioners' lottery numbers were 16 (Quail Roost), 59 (Sierra Meadows) and 24 (Ambar Trail). The three applications selected for funding have no affiliation or association with HTG, or any of the entities that may have filed applications in contravention of the limitation in the RFA for Priority I applications. The applications alleged in the Petitions as being affiliated with HTG received a wide range of lottery numbers in the random selection, including numbers: 3, 6, 14, 19, 30, 38, 40, 42, 44, 45, 49, 52 through 54, and 58. If Petitioners prevailed in demonstrating an improper principal relationship between the HTG applications, the relief specified in the RFA (the specifications of which were not challenged) would have been the conversion of the offending HTG applications to Priority II applications. The relief would not have been the removal of those applications from the pool of applications, nor would it have affected the assignment of lottery numbers to any of the applicants, including HTG. The Petitions do not allege any error in scoring or ineligibility with respect to the three applications preliminarily approved for funding.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered finding that Petitioners lack standing and dismissing the Petitions with prejudice. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of April, 2020, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JAMES H. PETERSON, III Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of April, 2020. COPIES FURNISHED: Maureen McCarthy Daughton, Esquire Maureen McCarthy Daughton, LLC Suite 3-231 1400 Village Square Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32312 (eServed) Michael P. Donaldson, Esquire Carlton Fields Jorden Burt, P.A. 215 South Monroe Street, Suite 500 Post Office Drawer 190 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-0190 (eServed) Donna Elizabeth Blanton, Esquire Brittany Adams Long, Esquire Radey Law Firm, P.A. Suite 200 301 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (eServed) Hugh R. Brown, General Counsel Betty Zachem, Esquire Florida Housing Finance Corporation Suite 5000 227 North Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301-1329 (eServed) M. Christopher Bryant, Esquire Oertel, Fernandez, Bryant & Atkinson, P.A. Post Office Box 1110 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1110 (eServed) J. Stephen Menton, Esquire Tana D. Storey, Esquire Rutledge Ecenia, P.A. 119 South Monroe Street, Suite 202 Post Office Box 551 (32302) Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (eServed) Corporation Clerk Florida Housing Finance Corporation Suite 5000 227 North Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301-1329 (eServed)
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant facts are found: Petitioner timely submitted her application for home energy assistance and the respondent timely notified her that her application had been denied for the reason that her household income exceeded the limit for her household size. Petitioner Randolph resides with her fourteen year old daughter and receives Social Security income in the monthly amount of $522.00. For a household with two persons, the maximum monthly income consistent with eligibility for benefits under the Low-Income Home Energy Assistance Program is $474.00. Rule 10C-29.13(5)(a), Florida Administrative Code. Petitioner Randolph uses oxygen on a twenty-four hour daily basis, and needs to use air conditioning in her home due to a chronic pulmonary condition. This condition, as well as other physical ailments, results in substantial medical bills on a monthly basis.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law recited above, it is RECOMMENDED that petitioner's application for benefits under the Low-Income Home Energy Assistance Program be DENIED. Respectfully submitted and entered this 21st day of June, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE D. TREMOR Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of June, 1982. COPIES FURNISHED: Mary F. Randolph 9310 Grandfield Road #A Thonotosassa, Florida 33592 Amelia Park, Esquire District VI Legal Counsel W. T. Edwards Facility 4000 West Buffalo Avenue Tampa, Florida 33614 David H. Pingree, Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Blvd. Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issue in this case is whether a portion of Florida Administrative Code Rule 67-48.0072 is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is a limited partnership and developer of affordable housing in Florida. The Petitioner is seeking to construct a 116-unit affordable housing family apartment complex ("Elmwood Terrace") in Fort Myers, Lee County, Florida. The Petitioner has standing to initiate and participate in this proceeding. The Respondent is a public corporation organized under Chapter 420, Florida Statutes (2010), to administer state programs that provide financial support to developers seeking to construct affordable housing. Such support is provided through a variety of mechanisms, including the use of federal tax credits. The federal tax credit program was created in 1986 to promote the construction and operation of privately-developed affordable housing. The tax credits relevant to this proceeding provide a dollar-for-dollar credit against federal tax liabilities for a period of ten years. The Respondent is the designated Florida agency responsible for distribution of the federal tax credits. The tax credits are awarded pursuant to a "Qualified Allocation Plan" (QAP) that must be annually approved by the Governor and adopted as an administrative rule by the Respondent. As a matter of course, developers receiving the federal tax credits sell them through syndicators for discounted cash. The sale of the tax credits generates debt-free cash equity for developers. Developers seeking financial support to build affordable housing units submit applications to the Respondent during an annual competitive process known as the "Universal Cycle." Every three years, the Respondent commissions a study (the "Shimberg Report"), which measures, within each Florida county, the number of "cost-burden" renters earning 60 percent or less of an area's median income (AMI) who pay more than 40 percent of their income in rent. The AMI is determined by the federal government. The cost-burden households are further classified into four groups: families, the elderly, farm workers, and commercial fishermen. The Shimberg Report also assesses needs related to homeless people in the state. Developers seeking to obtain affordable housing financing are required to set aside a portion of the proposed units for income-limited residents. Access to affordable housing units is generally targeted towards persons receiving no more than 60 percent of the AMI. The Universal Cycle process allows the Respondent to target specific housing deficiencies in terms of geographic availability and population demographics and to preserve the stock of existing affordable housing. During the Universal Cycle process, the Respondent identifies areas where additional affordable housing is unnecessary, to discourage additional development in weak markets and to encourage development in those locations where there is a lack of access to affordable housing. The Respondent classifies areas where there is little need for additional affordable housing as "Location A" areas. Each application filed during the Universal Cycle is evaluated, scored, and competitively ranked against other applications filed during the same Universal Cycle. After the Respondent completes the competitive ranking of the applications submitted in the Universal Cycle, the applicants are provided with an opportunity to review and comment on the evaluation and scoring of the proposals. Applicants may also cure defects in their own proposals. After the close of the review and comment period, the Respondent publishes a revised competitive ranking of the proposals. Developers may challenge the second ranking through an administrative hearing. After the second ranking process is final, developers achieving an acceptable score receive preliminary funding commitments and proceed into a "credit underwriting" evaluation process. The credit underwriting process is governed by Florida Administrative Code Rule 67-48.0072. The Respondent selects an independent credit underwriter who reviews each proposal according to requirements set forth by administrative rule (the "Credit Underwriting Rule"). The cost of the credit underwriting review is paid by the developer. The credit underwriter considers all aspects of the proposed development, including financing sources, plans and specifications, cost analysis, zoning verification, site control, environmental reports, construction contracts, and engineering and architectural contracts. The responsibility for the market study is assigned by the credit underwriter to an independent market analyst. The credit underwriter prepares a report for each applicant invited into the process. The reports are submitted to the Respondent's nine-member, statutorily-created Board of Directors (Board). The Board approves or denies each application for financial support. The Petitioner applied for funds for the Elmwood Terrace project during the 2007 Universal Cycle. The Petitioner's application received a perfect score, maximum points, and was allocated tax credits in the amount of $1,498,680. The Petitioner thereafter entered the credit underwriting process. The credit underwriting analysis was performed by Seltzer Management Group (SMG). SMG contracted with a market analyst, Vogt, Williams & Bowen Research, Inc. (VWB), to prepare the required market study. The affordable units at Elmwood Terrace were initially intended for persons receiving incomes no more than 60 percent of the AMI. The VWB research indicated that the Elmwood Terrace project would adversely affect the existing affordable housing developments, if the Elmwood Terrace units were available to the 60 percent AMI population. The existing affordable housing developments, also serving the 60 percent AMI population, included two developments that had participated in the Respondent's "Guarantee Fund" program, addressed elsewhere herein. VWB determined that the impact of the Elmwood Terrace project on the existing developments could be ameliorated were some of the Elmwood Terrace units targeted during "lease-up" to persons at income levels of not more than 50 percent of the AMI. The lease-up period is the time required for a new development to reach anticipated occupancy levels. The issue was the subject of discussions between the Petitioner, VWB, and SMG. To resolve the anticipated negative impact on the existing affordable housing developments, the Petitioner agreed to target the 50 percent AMI population. In September 2008, the credit underwriter issued his report and recommended that the Petitioner receive the previously-allocated tax credits. On September 22, 2008, the Respondent's Board accepted the credit underwriting report and followed the recommendation. In the fall of 2008, after the Petitioner received the tax credits, the nation's economic environment deteriorated considerably. As a result, the syndicator with whom the Petitioner had been working to sell the tax credits advised that the sale would not occur. The Petitioner was unable to locate an alternate purchaser for the tax credits. The Petitioner considered altering the target population of the project in an attempt to attract a buyer for the tax credits, and there were discussions with the Respondent about the option, but there was no credible evidence presented that such an alteration would have resulted in the sale of the Petitioner's tax credits. Lacking a buyer for the tax credits, the Petitioner was unable to convert the credits to cash, and they were of little value in providing funds for the project. The Petitioner was not alone in its predicament, and many other developers who received tax credits in the 2007 and 2008 Universal Cycles found themselves unable to generate cash through the sale of their tax credits. In early 2009, Congress adopted the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (PL 111-5), referred to herein as ARRA, which incorporated a broad range of economic stimulus activities. Included within the ARRA was the "Tax Credit Exchange Program" that provided for the return by the appropriate state agency of a portion of the unused tax credits in exchange for a cash distribution of 85 percent of the tax credit value. The State of Florida received $578,701,964 through the Tax Credit Exchange Program. The ARRA also provided additional funds to state housing finance agencies through a "Tax Credit Assistance Program" intended to "resume funding of affordable housing projects across the nation while stimulating job creation in the hard-hat construction industry." On July 31, 2009, the Respondent issued a Request for Proposals (RFP 2009-04) to facilitate the distribution of the ARRA funds. The Respondent issued the RFP because the 2009 QAP specifically required the Respondent to allocate the relevant federal funds by means of a "competitive request for proposal or competitive application process as approved by the board." The 2009 QAP was adopted as part of the 2009 Universal Cycle rules. Projects selected for funding through the RFP would be evaluated through the routine credit underwriting process. Participation in the RFP process was limited to developers who held an "active award" of tax credits as of February 17, 2009, and who were unable to close on the sale of the credits. The RFP included restrictions against proposals for development within areas designated as "Location A." Although the location of the Elmwood Terrace project had not been within an area designated as "Location A" during the 2007 Universal Cycle process, the Respondent had subsequently designated the area as "Location A" by the time of the 2009 Universal Cycle. The RFP also established occupancy standards for projects funded under the RFP that exceeded the standards established in the Universal Cycle instructions and an evaluation process separate from the Universal Cycle requirements. Although the restrictions in the RFP would have automatically precluded the Petitioner from being awarded funds, the Petitioner submitted a response to the RFP and then filed a successful challenge to the RFP specifications (DOAH Case No. 09-4682BID). In a Recommended Order issued on November 12, 2009, the Administrative law Judge presiding over the RFP challenge determined that certain provisions of the RFP, including the automatic rejection of Location A projects, the increased occupancy standards, and the RFP evaluation criteria, were invalid. The Respondent adopted the Recommended Order by a Final Order issued on December 4, 2009, and invited the Petitioner into the credit underwriting process by a letter dated December 9, 2009. The credit underwriter assigned to analyze the Petitioner's project was SMG, the same credit underwriter that performed the original analysis of the Petitioner's project during the 2007 Universal Cycle. SMG retained Meridian Appraisal Group, Inc. (Meridian), to prepare the required market study. The Respondent was not consulted regarding the SMG decision to retain Meridian for the market analysis. The decision to retain Meridian for the market analysis was entirely that of SMG. The Respondent did not direct SMG or Meridian in any manner regarding the assessment or evaluation of any negative impact of the proposed project on existing affordable housing developments. Meridian completed the market study and forwarded it to SMG on January 26, 2010. The Meridian market analysis included a review of the relevant data as well as consideration of the actual economic conditions experienced in Lee County, Florida, including the extremely poor performance of the existing housing stock, as well as significant job losses and considerable unemployment. The Meridian market analysis determined that the Elmwood Terrace development would have a negative impact on two existing affordable housing apartment developments that were underwritten by the Respondent through a Guarantee Fund created at Section 420.5092, Florida Statutes, by the Florida Legislature in 1992. The existing Guarantee Fund properties referenced in the SMG recommendation are "Bernwood Trace" and "Westwood," both family-oriented apartment developments within five miles of the Elmwood Terrace location. The Guarantee Fund essentially obligates the Respondent to satisfy mortgage debt with the proceeds of Florida's documentary stamp taxes, if an affordable housing development is unable to generate sufficient revenue to service the debt. Because the Guarantee Fund program essentially serves to underwrite the repayment of mortgage debt for a "guaranteed" affordable housing development, the program increases the availability, and lowers the cost, of credit for developers. The Guarantee Fund program has participated in the financing of more than 100 projects, most of which closed between 1999 and 2002. Since 2005, the Respondent has not approved any additional Guarantee Fund participation in any affordable housing developments. The Respondent's total risk exposure through the Guarantee Fund is approximately 750 million dollars. Prior to October 2008, no claims were made against the Guarantee Fund. Since November 2008, there have been eight claims filed against the Guarantee Fund. Affordable housing financing includes restrictions that mandate the inclusion of a specific number of affordable housing units. Such restrictions are eliminated through foreclosure proceedings, and, accordingly, access to affordable housing units can be reduced if a development fails. Presuming that the eight claims pending against the Guarantee Fund eventually proceeded through foreclosure, as many as 2,300 residential units could be deducted from the stock of affordable housing. When there is a claim on the Guarantee Fund, the Respondent has to assume payment of the mortgage debt. The claims are paid from the Guarantee Fund capital, which is detrimental to the Respondent's risk-to-capital ratio. The risk-to-capital ratio is presently four to one. The maximum risk-to-capital ratio acceptable to rating agencies is five to one. The eight claims against the Guarantee Fund have ranged between ten and 18 million dollars each. The Respondent's bond rating has declined because of the eight claims. A continued decline in the Respondent's bond rating could result in documentary stamp tax receipts being used for payment of Guarantee Fund claims and directed away from the Respondent's programs that are intended to support the creation of affordable housing. In an effort to prevent additional claims against the Guarantee Fund, the Respondent has created the "Subordinate Mortgage Initiative" to provide assistance in the form of two- year loans to troubled Guarantee Fund properties. When preparing the 2010 market study, Meridian did not review the VWB market analysis performed as part of the 2007 application. Although the Petitioner has asserted that Meridian should have reviewed the 2007 VWB analysis, there is no evidence that Meridian's decision to conduct an independent market study without reference to the prior market review was inappropriate. On February 8, 2010, SMG issued a recommendation that the Petitioner's funding request be denied "because of the proposed development's potential financial impacts on developments in the area previously funded by Florida Housing and an anticipated negative impact to the two Guarantee Fund properties located within five miles of the proposed development." There is no evidence that the Meridian analysis was inadequate or improperly completed. There is no evidence that the SMG's reliance on the Meridian analysis was inappropriate. For purposes of this Order, the Meridian analysis and the SMG credit underwriting report have been accepted. Elmwood Terrace, a newer development with newer amenities, would compete for residents with the Bernwood Trace and Westwood developments. The financing for Bernwood Trace and Westwood was premised on projections that the affordable housing units would be leased to the 60 percent AMI population; however, the developments have been unable to maintain full occupancy levels, even though a number of units in the two properties are leased at reduced rates based on 50 percent AMI income levels. A rent reduction implemented by an existing development, whether based on economic conditions or resulting from competition, constitutes a negative impact on the development. There is no credible evidence that the occupancy rates are attributable to any difficulty in management of the two developments. It is reasonable to conclude that the leasing issues are related to economic conditions present in Lee County, Florida. In January 2010, VWB conducted an alternative market analysis. The VWB analysis was not provided to SMG or to the Respondent at any time during the credit underwriting process. Based on the 2010 VWB analysis, the Petitioner asserted that economic conditions in Lee County, Florida, have improved since the first credit underwriting report was completed in 2008 and that the improvement is expected to continue. There is no noteworthy evidence that economic conditions have improved or will significantly improve in the Lee County, Florida, market in the predictable future, and the VWB analysis is rejected. The Petitioner offered to mitigate any negative impact on the Guarantee Fund properties by committing affordable units to 50 percent AMI income levels. Given the existing economic and rental market conditions in Lee County, Florida, the evidence fails to establish that the offer would actually alleviate the negative impact on the affected Guarantee Fund developments. The 2010 VWB analysis states that there is substantial unmet demand for housing at 50 percent AMI and that there will be no impact on the Guarantee Fund units if the Elmwood Terrace units were set aside for such individuals. There is no credible evidence that there is a substantial and relevant unmet affordable housing demand in Lee County, Florida. The VWB analysis is rejected. Following the completion of each annual Universal Cycle process, the Respondent actively solicits feedback from developers and the public and then amends the Universal Cycle requirements to address the issues raised, as well as to reflect existing affordable housing needs and general concerns of the Board. The amendments are applicable for the following Universal Cycle. In 2009, the Respondent amended subsection (10) of the Credit Underwriting Rule as part of the annual revisions to the Universal Cycle process. The relevant amendment (referred to by the parties as the "Impact Rule") added this directive to the credit underwriter: The Credit Underwriter must review and determine whether there will be a negative impact to Guarantee Fund Developments within the primary market area or five miles of the proposed development, whichever is greater. The amendment was prompted by the Respondent's experience in the fall of 2008 when considering two separate applications for affordable housing financing. The potential negative impact of a proposed development on an existing Guarantee Fund property was central to the Board's consideration of one application, and the Board ultimately denied the application. In the second case, the Board granted the application, despite the potential negative impact on a competing development that was not underwritten by the Guarantee Fund. The intent of the language was to advise developers that the existence of Guarantee Fund properties within the competitive market area would be part of the credit underwriting evaluation and the Board's consideration. Notwithstanding the language added to the rule, the credit underwriter is charged with reviewing the need for additional affordable housing. Even in absence of the added language, consideration of any negative impact to competing developments based on inadequate need for additional affordable housing would be appropriate. In rendering the 2010 credit underwriting report on Elmwood Terrace, the credit underwriter complied with the directive. Prior to determining that the Petitioner's funding application should be denied, the Respondent's Board was clearly aware of the Petitioner's application, the credit underwriting report and market analysis, and the economic conditions in Lee County, Florida. There is no credible evidence of any need for additional affordable housing in Lee County, Florida. There is no credible evidence that the Lee County, Florida, market can sustain the addition of the units proposed by the Petitioner without adversely affecting the financial feasibility of the existing Guarantee Fund developments. The Board was aware that the Elmwood Terrace development could attract residents from the nearby Guarantee Fund properties and that local economic conditions threatened the financial viability of the properties. Given current economic conditions, approval of the application at issue in this proceeding would reasonably be expected to result in a negative impact to existing affordable housing developments. The protection of Guarantee Fund developments is necessary to safeguard the resources used to support the creation and availability of affordable housing in the state.
The Issue The issue is whether Florida Housing Finance Corporation’s (“Florida Housing”) review and scoring of the applications responding to RFA 2020-104 SAIL Funding for Farm Worker and Commercial Fishing Worker Housing (“the RFA”) were clearly erroneous, contrary to competition, arbitrary, or capricious.
Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence adduced at the final hearing, the record as a whole, the stipulated facts, and matters subject to official recognition, the following Findings of Fact are made: Florida Housing is a public corporation created pursuant to section 420.504, Florida Statutes (2020).2 Its purpose is to promote public welfare by administering the financing of affordable housing in Florida. Florida Housing is authorized by section 420.507(48), to allocate federal low income housing tax credits, State Apartment Incentive Loans (“SAIL”), and other funding by means of competitive solicitations. Florida Administrative Code Chapter 67-60 provides that Florida Housing will allocate its competitive funding through the bid protest provisions of section 120.57(3), Florida Statutes. Funding is available through a competitive application process commenced by the issuance of a Request for Applications, which is equivalent to a “request for proposal” as described in rule 67-60.009(4). 1 Pueblo Bonito’s Exhibit 1 is the deposition of Nancy Muller of Florida Housing. 2 Unless stated otherwise, all statutory references shall be to the 2020 version of the Florida Statutes. Through the RFA, Florida Housing seeks to award up to an estimated total of $5,131,050 in SAIL Financing for the construction or rehabilitation of affordable housing developments for farm workers and commercial fishing workers. The RFA was issued on April 15, 2020, and a modified version was issued on April 24, 2020. The application deadline was May 19, 2020. La Estancia and Pueblo Bonito submitted applications proposing the rehabilitation of existing farm worker housing in Hillsborough and Lee Counties, respectively. Both applications were deemed eligible for funding. A review committee was appointed to review the applications and make recommendations to Florida Housing’s Board of Directors (“the Board”). The scoring of the applications was based on a 100-point scale. Applicants submitting a Principal Disclosure Form that had been stamped “pre-approved” received five points. The remaining points were awarded based on the subjective scoring of narrative sections within the applications, and the maximum points were available as follows: Current and Future Need for Farm Worker or Commercial Fishing Worker Housing in the Area (“Need”): 15 points Experience Operating and managing Farm Worker or Commercial Fishing Worker Housing (“Experience”): 20 points Outreach, Marketing, and Referral (“Outreach”): 30 points Resident Access to Onsite and Offsite Programs, Services, and Resources (“Access”): 30 points. With regard to Need, the 2019 Rental Market Study prepared for Florida Housing by the Shimberg Center for Housing Studies at the University of Florida determined that 14.2 percent of Florida’s farm workers are employed in Hillsborough County and 2.55 percent are employed in Lee County. Pueblo Bonito noted in its application that its development is only three miles from the Collier County line, and 5.63 percent of the state’s farm workers are employed in Collier County. La Estancia did not reference Manatee County in its application but noted in its request for a formal administrative hearing that its development is a similar distance from Manatee County, and 6.88 percent of the state’s farm workers are employed there. The Shimberg study also calculated need for farm worker housing type by county with 3,813 multifamily units needed in Hillsborough County, 741 multifamily units needed in Lee County, 1,546 multifamily units needed in Collier County, and 2,337 multifamily units needed in Manatee County. For some RFAs, Florida Housing imposes additional conditions on applications for developments located in Limited Development Areas (“LDAs”). The main purpose of an LDA is to protect Florida Housing’s funded developments in a particular area. An LDA is generally an area that Florida Housing has placed a boundary around that limits different types of new development. Florida Housing annually publishes an LDA Chart on its website listing areas or counties that may apply in the RFA cycle for the coming year. The mere existence of an LDA does not prohibit development within the LDA. This is especially true for rehabilitation projects like those proposed in the instant case. An RFA must specifically reference the LDA in order for the LDA to apply. The first draft of the 2020 LDA Chart was not published by Florida Housing until May 29, 2020, and thus the modified RFA issued on April 24, 2020, included no reference to the LDA Chart. Nor did the RFA include any specific provisions regarding LDAs. The first draft of the 2020 LDA Chart and each subsequent draft or amendment included Lee County for farm worker housing. Florida Housing indicated that the basis for Lee County’s LDA designation was a downward trend in occupancy rates. The occupancy rate for the housing stock in Lee County for the period of August 2019 through January 2020 was 91.67 percent as compared to 95.83 percent for the period of September 2019 through February 2020. Based on this trend, Lee County was proposed as an LDA for the 2020/2021 Florida Housing RFA funding cycle, which became effective July 10, 2020. The following table reflects how the review committee awarded points to the two applicants: Pueblo Bonito La Estancia Principal Disclosure Form (5) 5 5 “Need” (15) 12 12 “Experience” (20) 16 17 “Outreach” (30) 27 27 “Access” (30) 25 24 Total (100) 85 85 In the event of a tie, Florida Housing designed the RFA and the associated rules to incorporate a series of “tie-breakers.” The tiebreakers, in the order of applicability, were: By points received for the Need criterion, with more points preferred. Both applicants received 12 points for need. By SAIL Request Amount Per Unit, with lower SAIL funds per unit preferred. Both applicants requested $50,000 in SAIL funds per unit. By Total SAIL Request Amount as a percentage of Total Development Cost (“TDC”), with applicants whose SAIL request amount is 90 percent or less of TDC preferred. Both applicants’ Total SAIL Request Amount was 90 percent or less of their respective TDCs. By a Florida Job Creation Preference. Both applicants satisfied this preference. By lottery numbers randomly assigned to the applications when they were submitted to Florida Housing. Pueblo Bonito had lottery number 1, and La Estancia had lottery number 2. Nancy Muller was the Review Committee member assigned to review and score the “Need” narrative section of the Applications responding to the RFA. Ms. Muller is currently a Policy Specialist with Florida Housing. Prior to her current position, Ms. Muller was, for many years, the Director of Policy and Special Programs. In reviewing and scoring the applications submitted to Florida Housing in the instant case, Ms. Muller indicated that she first read the narrative question of the RFA and broke the question down into four separate component parts. The components included: (a) current and future need for farm workers over the next 10 to 15 years; (b) location and proximity of farms and other types of farm work that typically use farm worker labor; (c) information concerning the types of crops, seasons, etc. and the demand for specific farm worker housing; and (d) whether waivers have been requested or granted for either the proposed Development or Developments in the area. Next, Ms. Muller reviewed each application against those component parts and ultimately awarded La Estancia and Pueblo Bonito 12 points each for their respective response to the need section. Marisa Button, Florida Housing’s corporate representative, testified that just because the documented need for farm worker housing is higher in Hillsborough County than it is in Lee County does not mean that La Estancia should have received a higher score in the narrative section than Pueblo Bonito because the RFA “sets forth a much more nuanced request for the description of the current and future needs in the area for the proposed development. So it’s not limited to just a flat-out look at the county under the Shimberg study. If [that] were the case, we wouldn’t need to have a narrative scoring component of the RFA.” Ms. Muller and Ms. Button persuasively testified that numeric need was just one of the components an applicant needed to address in responding to the needs question. In fact, Ms. Muller indicated she recognized the greater numeric need for farm worker housing in Hillsborough County, and the greater need factored into her consideration of that particular component. However, Ms. Muller pointed out that because both proposed projects were rehabilitation of existing units, neither was actually addressing nor reducing the numeric need for new units. Ms. Muller acknowledged that La Estancia’s response at this component of the need analysis was “stronger” because of the greater need. Nevertheless, Ms. Muller indicated that while La Estancia demonstrated a greater numeric need, Pueblo Bonito’s response was “stronger” in other areas of the overall need response. Specifically, Pueblo Bonito provided a stronger response as to the location and proximity of farms and other types of farm work that use farm worker labor. Ms. Muller considered and evaluated the strengths and weaknesses of each response and no one component was weighted greater than any other component. Based on the scoring and tie-breakers, the review committee recommended Pueblo Bonito for funding. However, the Board’s deliberations were not to be limited to the review committee’s recommendation or information provided by the review committee. With regard to the Board’s funding selection, the RFA stated that: [t]he Board may use the Applications, the Committee’s scoring, any other information or recommendation provided by the Committee or staff, and any other information the Board deems relevant in its selection of Applicants to whom to award funding. The Board met on July 17, 2020, to consider the review committee’s recommendation and preliminarily selected Pueblo Bonito for funding, subject to satisfactory completion of the credit underwriting process.3 Florida 3 The RFA also employed a “Funding Test” to be used in the selection of applications for funding. The “Funding Test” required that the amount of unawarded SAIL funding must be enough to fully fund that applicant’s SAIL request amount. After the selection of Pueblo Bonito for funding, there was only $1,131,050 in SAIL funding remaining, and that was not enough to fund La Estancia’s $4,200,000 SAIL request. Housing staff did not inform the Board that Lee County had been designated as an LDA for farm worker housing on the 2020 LDA Chart. Also, there is no evidence that any Board member knew of Lee County’s LDA status or of declining farm worker housing occupancy when they voted to select Pueblo Bonito for funding. La Estancia could not have presented the information regarding Lee County’s LDA status to the Board. The RFA contains a “noninterference” clause prohibiting an applicant or its representative from contacting Board members or Florida Housing’s staff “concerning their own or any other Applicant’s Application” during the period beginning with the application deadline and continuing until the Board “renders a final decision on the RFA.” If an applicant makes such contact in an attempt to influence the selection process, then that applicant’s application is disqualified. As a result, La Estancia was unable to correct the review committee’s omission of information regarding declining farm worker housing occupancy levels in Lee County. Ms. Button testified that it was Florida Housing’s practice not to apply new standards or requirements that changed after the application deadline when scoring applications. She stated that Florida Housing scores “based on the terms of the RFA and we wouldn’t retroactively apply something to those applications after they’ve been submitted.” She specifically testified that if a county is designated as an LDA after the application deadline, Florida Housing would not apply that designation to the application. She also testified that one of the reasons for not considering new requirements after the application deadline is that applicants would not be allowed to amend their applications to address these new requirements. Even if the July 10 LDA designation had applied to this RFA, there is no evidence that it would have changed Florida Housing’s scoring decision. The primary purpose for the LDA designation is to discourage new construction that could harm existing developments. In this case, both applicants are proposing to rehabilitate existing developments, and the evidence shows that Florida Housing would not prohibit the funding of a rehabilitation project even if it were in an LDA. Florida Housing has funded the rehabilitation of farm worker developments located in LDAs since 2013 or 2014. In RFA 2017-104, the only previous farm worker RFA in evidence, the LDA designation did not even apply to rehabilitation projects that were in Florida Housing’s portfolio. Ms. Muller testified that because the two applicants in this case both involved rehabilitation of developments in Florida Housing’s portfolio, the LDA designation would have been “moot,” unless the physical occupancy rates were dire, which they were not. She also testified that “preservation of existing developments is of much less, if any, importance related to LDA.” Ms. Button testified that she did not specifically inform the Board of the LDA designation “because it’s not relevant to the terms for which the applications were scored for this RFA, it was not a part of the RFA terms, and the applicants did not, you know, apply with that designation put in place. It’s for a future prospective funding cycle and it was not effective until after the application due date.” The greater weight of the evidence indicates that Florida Housing’s review and scoring of the applications responding to the RFA were not clearly erroneous, contrary to competition, arbitrary, or capricious.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Florida Housing Finance Corporation enter a Final Order dismissing La Estancia, Ltd.’s formal written protest and awarding funding to Partnership in Housing, Inc. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of October, 2020, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S G. W. CHISENHALL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of October, 2020. COPIES FURNISHED: Hugh R. Brown, General Counsel Florida Housing Finance Corporation Suite 5000 227 North Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301-1329 (eServed) M. Christopher Bryant, Esquire Oertel, Fernandez, Bryant & Atkinson, P.A. Post Office Box 1110 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1110 (eServed) Michael P. Donaldson, Esquire Carlton Fields Suite 500 215 South Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32302 (eServed) Christopher Dale McGuire, Esquire Florida Housing Finance Corporation Suite 5000 227 North Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (eServed) Corporation Clerk Florida Housing Finance Corporation Suite 5000 227 North Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (eServed)
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner is entitled to an exemption from sales and use tax as a religious or charitable organization.
Findings Of Fact By Application for Consumer Certificate of Exemption dated March 17, 1992, Petitioner requested a sales tax exemption as a religious organization. The application indicates that Petitioner was incorporated on February 18, 1992. At all times, the president of Petitioner has been Reverend Robert M. Rinaldi. By letter dated April 16, 1992, Respondent requested that Petitioner supply information concerning its primary purpose, including a list of all activities or services and to whom they are generally offered. The letter also requested, among other things, statements of receipts and expenditures and a copy of the letter determining that Petitioner is exempt from federal income tax. Petitioner submitted to Respondent evidence of 12 expenditures during the quarter ending March 31, 1992. The expenditures and their descriptions are as follows: Morrisons-- dinner business; Holiday Inn in Tampa--lodging for quarterly convention; Maas Brother in Naples--attire; Marshalls-- personal; Martha's Health Food Shop--personal; Things Remembered--card case/business cards; RJ Cafe Tropical--lunch interview; Beach Works Marco Island--attire; annual membership fee for vice president's American Express card; Las Vegas Discount golf and tennis in Naples--personal; Eckerd's Vision Works--medical eyeglasses; Quality Inn Golf Country Club in Naples--lodging during business travel; Avon Fashions/Hampton-- personal; Del Wright in Sarasota--automobile expenses and travel; JC Penney--personal; Amador's Restaurant in Naples-- dinner/lunch; Avon Fashions/Hampton--personal; annual membership fee for treasurer's American Express card; and Mobil Oil--business travel. Petitioner produced other evidence of similar types of expenditures, such as for fitness center fees, car insurance, car service, car payments, utilities, and rent. Nothing in the record links these expenditures to religious or charitable activities. There were expenditures for printing religious tracts and self- improvement educational materials, but they do not appear to be a substantial part of the total expenditures of Petitioner during the time in question. After receiving these materials, a representative of Respondent telephoned Reverend Rinaldi and stated that Petitioner would have to submit additional documentation of its income and expenses and formal affiliation with prison chapels where Petitioner reportedly conducted outreach programs. Respondent's representative also asked for evidence of Reverend Rinaldi's counselling credentials. Petitioner next submitted a copy of a letter from the Department of Treasury determining that Petitioner was exempt from federal income tax. Petitioner also submitted a budget for the year ending 1992 and a proposed budget for the year ending 1993. However, the budgets did not document a charitable purpose. The budget reveals that the largest disbursement was $4200, which was rent for an office and living quarters. The largest single receipt was $1764.27, which was a contribution from the incorporator, who was Rev. Rinaldi. There were no charitable receipts, such as from contributions from members, the public, or anonymous sources. On November 10, 1992, Respondent sent a letter to Petitioner requesting additional information, including statements of the primary purpose of the organization and of receipts and expenditures. The request asked for a description or explanation for each charity-related program expenditure. On November 18, 1992, Petitioner submitted a second Application for Consumer's Certificate of Exemption. The information was essentially unchanged from the first application. Rev. Rinaldi also sent Respondent a religious flyer. On February 10, 1993, Petitioner submitted a third Application for Consumer's Certificate of Exemption. The material was essentially unchanged from the preceding two applications. On March 30, 1993, one of Respondent's representatives sent a letter to Petitioner stating that Petitioner does not meet the criteria for exemption from sales tax. In response, Petitioner sent a letter to Respondent received April 8, 1993, requesting reconsideration of the denial. On May 4, 1993, Respondent sent Petitioner a letter stating that, as indicated during an earlier telephone conversation, Respondent had not yet received sufficient documentation to justify a sales tax exemption. Following up on Rev. Rinaldi's opinion that Petitioner qualified as a charitable organization, the letter suggests that he submit materials describing each charitable service or activity, the types of persons receiving such services, the frequency that the services are offered, the demonstrated benefit provided by Petitioner to disadvantaged persons, the fees charged by Petitioner, and the availability of Petitioner's services at the same or less cost elsewhere. The letter also asks for a statement of income and expenses. In response, Petitioner filed a fourth Application for Consumer's Certificate of Exemption on November 10, 1993. Rev. Rinaldi explained Petitioner's activities as informing people of the truth and the second coming of Jesus Christ and stopping addictions to drugs and alcohol. The enclosed materials included a church telephone number. The materials state that services are available 24 hours a day for no fees and are provided solely for the spiritual preparation of humanity. The materials also indicate several addresses at which religious activities are conducted. Upon investigation, Respondent learned that Petitioner's telephone number had been disconnected, the street address is Rev. Rinaldi's apartment, and the addresses at which religious activities are conducted are locations of Alcoholic Anonymous, from which Rev. Rinaldi and his church had been barred as public disturbances. Checking with the post office, the investigator learned that all mail for Rev. Rinaldi and Petitioner is being forwarded to an address in New York. Respondent asked for more information, and Petitioner supplied information no different than that previously supplied. By letter dated April 26, 1994, Respondent informed Petitioner that its application was denied. Following another exchange of correspondence, Respondent sent Petitioner a Notice of Intent to Deny dated June 17, 1994. The Notice of Intent to Deny states that Respondent determined that: [Petitioner] travels from church to church and does not assemble regularly at a particular established location. [Petitioner] conducts services for short periods of time at numerous temporary locations. [Respondent] has reviewed your application and supporting documents and has determined that the primary purpose of your organization fails to meet the qualifications for sales tax exemption authorized by Section 212.08(7), Florida Statutes. By letter dated June 24, 1994, Petitioner requested a formal hearing on its application for sales tax exemption. Petitioner does not regularly conduct services. Petitioner does not engage in other religious activities nor does Petitioner provide services typically associated with a church. Petitioner has no established physical place for worship. Petitioner has generalized plans to construct one or more places for worship. However, these plans are post-apocalyptic in nature and thus do not assure the commencement of construction in the immediate future.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department of Revenue enter a final order denying Petitioner's application for an exemption certificate from sales and use tax. ENTERED on December 20, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings on December 20, 1994. COPIES FURNISHED: Larry Fuchs, Executive Director Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0100 Linda Lettera, General Counsel Department of Revenue 204 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0100 Rev. Robert Rinaldi P.O. Box 1081 167 N. Collier Blvd. J-3 Marco Island, FL 33937-1081 Attorney Lisa M. Raleigh Office of the Attorney General The Capitol--Tax Section Tallahassee, FL 32399-1050
The Issue Whether any Respondent committed a discriminatory act upon Petitioner in violation of Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, as amended by the Fair Housing Act of 1988 and Chapter 760 of the Florida Statutes?
Findings Of Fact The Florida Commission on Human Relations is the state agency charged with the responsibility of promoting and encouraging fair treatment in housing in accordance with the provisions of Chapter 760, Florida Statutes. Such authority includes, but is not limited to, issues involving the Fair Housing Act found at Sections 760.20-760.37, Florida Statutes. In 1995, Petitioner, Ms. Davis, applied to purchase a home using financing through a high-risk, public/private partnership government home loan program operated by the Duval County Housing Finance Authority (DCHFA) entitled the Value Homes Program II. Following conversations with Mr. Mike Martin, the Finance Director of DCHFA, Petitioner was initially informed that she could purchase a home up to the value of $98,000, depending on her income and past credit history. Petitioner was directed to Ms. Holly Cleveland, a loan specialist for First Union National Bank (FUNB) for processing. Upon review, Ms. Cleveland informed Ms. Davis of an outstanding judgement on her credit file in an amount of $1,000. Ms. Davis denied owing the amount, refused to satisfy the judgement, and provided a written explanation of the alleged debt obligation. Ms. Davis was prequalified by FUNB for a loan amount not to exceed $86,900 at an interest rate of 6.11 percent. After selecting the model type, Petitioner signed a contract with Mr. Jack Daniels, a representative for the Respondent Atlantic Builders to construct the new home. FUNB contacted Petitioner regarding loan documents relating to the Value Homes Program II, and requested additional information explaining the default information from USA Loan on her credit report. Petitioner provided the bank with the information, and Ms. Scott relayed it to Mr. Pocapanni, the director of Duval County's loan program. On April 5, 1996, Petitioner's Realtor, Ms. Maestas, informed Ms. Davis that she had been approved for the loan. Minutes later, Ms. Davis received a call from Ms. Scott, confirming the approval. However, on August 23, 1996, Ms. Scott inquired again about the judgement and urged Petitioner to speak with Mr. Rick Homes, FUNB Representative to rectify the situation. On August 28, Ms. Davis was advised by the representatives of FUNB that they were having difficulties securing the money from Duval County's Value Homes Program II due to the outstanding judgement against her. The closing on her new home had been delayed. In an effort to facilitate the closing, FUNB agreed to assist her and pay the outstanding judgement. Ms. Davis was informed that she would close on her new home on August 30, 1996. On August 30, Petitioner and Mr. Maestas attended the final inspection of the home. Mr. Daniels, the contractor, strongly urged her to make an immediate decision on the home because interest rates were escalating. Ms. Davis felt his behavior was unprofessional toward her and Mr. Maestas. Duval County Housing Finance Autholrity (DCHFA) Pursuant to DCHFA's loan program rules, gifts of cash for all or part of the closings costs, pre-paids or optional down payment are permitted only if the donation is a bona fide gift, and repayment is neither expected nor implied. Additionally, the gift donor may not be a party who has a direct interest in the sale of the property, such as the builder, seller, lender, or any one associated with them. In addition, all outstanding charge-offs, judgements and liens are required to be satisfied prior to closing. At least thirty other applicants have been turned down due to outstanding judgements under the Value Homes Program II, many of which were filed as a result of the non-payment of rent. Since 1992, 66 percent of the county's SHIP funds, consisting of seven affordable housing loan programs including Value Homes II, have gone to minority families. Ms. Davis had a judgement entered against her for nonpayment of rent which she refused to pay. The Value Homes Program II policy clearly states that an outstanding judgement must be paid in full before a purchase money mortgage loan can be made. It has been the requirement of the program since its inception in 1992. Although FUNB and her Realtor offered to pay the judgement for Ms. Davis, it was not permitted under the guidelines. Thereafter, FUNB offered to make Ms. Davis a program authorized unsecured loan to pay the judgement yet she refused. There is no evidence of discrimination. First Union National Bank (FUNB) As stated previously, Petitioner applied for a residential mortgage with FUNB under the Value Homes Program II, a public-private partnership between the Duval County Housing Finance Authority and seven local banks, including FUNB. Her application was submitted to FUNB by the Jacksonville Housing Partnership in accordance with the program guidelines. Ms. Davis' initial loan request was $88,200 to finance the purchase of an existing home. On her application, she disclosed the outstanding judgement entered against her. Mistakenly however, the loan officer, who was unfamiliar with all of the program guidelines, informed Ms. Davis that she would submit her application to the underwriter for processing. She was locked in at the interest rate of 6.11 percent for a period of 90 days. On March 26, 1996, Petitioner signed a contract with Atlantic Builders for the construction of a new home. Petitioner completed another loan application for a lower amount of $78,295. Ms. Davis' loan application was held pending receipt of (1) evidence of the source of funds at closing; (2) an explanation letter for late payments on a loan to USA group; and (3) receipt of the new contract to purchase. FUNB received Petitioner's credit report on March 25, 1996, which reflected the judgement referenced in her application, as well as a customer statement concerning the judgement submitted to the credit bureau in May 1994. Petitioner's financing was conditionally approved on April 5, 1996. She was provided a commitment letter requiring her to furnish FUNB with a note and a first mortgage. Due to delays in the completion of the home, Ms. Davis was locked in for an additional 90 days at the existing program mortgage rate of 6.00 percent in June 1996. Construction of the new house was completed in early August of 1996, and Ms. Davis was scheduled to close on August 28, 1996. FUNB noticed that upon receipt and review of the title commitment, that the judgement in the amount of $1,035 held by Ann J. Wall remained. Unless the judgement was satisfied, FUNB was unable to comply with the loan guidelines and possess a first mortgage or a title policy reflecting a first lien on the property. Ms. Davis was informed that the judgement had to be satisfied prior to closing. She refused and maintained that it was unjust. Although Ms. Davis submitted a written explanation for the judgement, the Value Homes Program II loan could not be closed without satisfaction of the judgement. The DCHFA declined the loan for the Value Homes Program II because of Petitioner's refusal to satisfy the loan. There is no evidence of discrimination. In further efforts to get Petitioner in the home, FUNB offered to satisfy the judgement and provide Ms. Davis with 100 percent financing in its Affordable Homes Program at the market rate of 8.25 percent. Ms. Davis refused the offer. Atlantic Builders Atlantic Builders was not involved in the financing of Petitioner's home, and had no direct relationship with the Housing Authority or FUNB. Although they attempted to accommodate Petitioner while she secured satisfactory financing, Atlantic Builders agreed to refund her $500 deposit in the event she was unable to extend the locked rate or lock period to her satisfaction. Ms. Davis agreed to release Atlantic Builders from their obligations under the contract in the event the deposit was returned to her. Atlantic Builders worked with Ms. Davis for six months before the contract was ultimately terminated and both parties were released from further claims and/or liabilities. The evidence revealed that Mr. Jack Daniels of Atlantic Builders exhibited unprofessional and rude behavior. However, there is no evidence of discrimination.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and the lack of evidence of discrimination against Petitioner, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order denying Ms. Davis' petition. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of October, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM R. PFEIFFER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of October, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Brenda Davis 5170 Collins Road, Apartment 1808 Jacksonville, Florida 32244 Kimberly Gilyard, Esquire 50 North Laura Street, Suite 3100 Jacksonville, Florida 32202 Steve Rohan, Esquire 117 West Duvall Street, Suite 480 Jacksonville, Florida 32202 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Dana L. Baird, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149
