The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent is guilty of violating Rule 59S-8.005(1)(e)2, Florida Administrative Code, for administering medications or treatments in a negligent manner and subject to discipline for unprofessional conduct under Section 464.018(1)(h), Florida Statutes. If so, another issue is what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact In June 1994 Respondent was licensed as a registered nurse, holding license number RN 2740932. Respondent had been licensed as a registered nurse since 1993 and as a licensed practical nurse since 1987. Respondent's license as a registered nurse became inactive June 21, 1995 after she failed to renew it. In the fall of 1993 East Pointe Hospital hired Respondent as a charge nurse in the transitional care unit, which had recently been started. Although Respondent had only recently become licensed as a registered nurse, the hospital hired her based partly on her current licensing and partly on her previous experience as a licensed practical nurse and respiratory therapist. During the weekend of June 24-26, 1994 Respondent worked the 7:00 pm to 7:00 am shift. As a charge nurse Respondent supervised several other nurses, typically licensed practical nurses. The charge nurse and nurses whom the charge nurse supervised sometimes divided up the patients in the unit, but the charge nurse retained supervisory authority over the other nurses and always remained directly responsible for patients with more complex problems. Patient C. P. had recently been transferred to the transitional care unit from the acute care unit. On the evenings in question, C.P. was among the patients for whom Respondent was directly responsible. Several IVs were being administered the evening of June 24 and early morning of June 25. One patient was having problems with an IV pump and his veins. Respondent asked another nurse, who was under Respondent's supervision, to do the accuchecks on the other patients, including C. P. Accuchecks are finger stick glucose monitors. As was the case with C. P., physicians typically order accuchecks every six hours for patients receiving their total nutrition intravenously. The purpose of the accucheck is to ensure that the patient receiving all his nutrition intravenously does not develop low or high blood sugar, which could have very serious implications. The other nurse failed to perform the accuchecks for midnight at the start of June 25 and 6:00 am on June 25. Respondent failed to follow up to ensure that they were done. Respondent's failure to perform the required accuchecks or to check to make sure that the other nurse performed them constitutes the negligent treatment of a patient. A physician had also ordered that C. P. receive antibiotics intravenously every eight hours, at about 6:00 am, 2:00 pm, and 10:00 pm. Petitioner alleges that Respondent failed to administer two consecutive doses. However, nothing in the nurses' notes documents what would have been a material omission, and no one on the nursing staff bothered to contact the physician who had ordered the antibiotics. There is also a reasonable possibility that IV bags bearing dates and times were mixed up so as to preclude a determination of which registered nurse failed to administer IV medication, if in fact two doses of antibiotics were missed. Respondent later admitted not performing the accuchecks, but never admitted failing to administer the IV antibiotics. Petitioner has failed to prove that Respondent failed to administer the IV medications as ordered. The hospital terminated Respondent's employment shortly after the incidents involving C. P. Respondent has since held two temporary nursing jobs and has applied unsuccessfully for 12 other nursing jobs. She now lives with her mother in Virginia where she earns $100-$200 weekly in employment unrelated to nursing. C. P. suffered no injury as a result of the failure to conduct ordered accuchecks and the failure, if any, to administer the prescribed IV. Respondent has not previously been disciplined as a licensed practical nurse or registered nurse.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Board of Nursing enter a final order finding Respondent guilty of violating Rule 59S-8.005(1)(e), Florida Administrative Code, and Section 464.018(1)(h), Florida Statutes, for her failure to perform two accuchecks or make sure that another nurse had performed them and issuing a reprimand to Respondent. ENTERED on December 21, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of December, 1995. APPENDIX Rulings on Petitioner's Proposed Findings 1-4: adopted or adopted in substance. 5: rejected as irrelevant. 6-12 (first sentence): adopted or adopted in substance. 12 (second sentence): rejected as subordinate and irrelevant. 13-15: rejected as subordinate. 16: rejected as subordinate and irrelevant. 17-18: adopted or adopted in substance. 19-21: rejected as subordinate and recitation of testimony. 22-23: rejected as irrelevant and subordinate. 24: rejected as subordinate. 25: rejected as subordinate and irrelevant. 26-28: adopted or adopted in substance. 29: rejected as irrelevant. Rulings on Respondent's Proposed Findings 1-3 (first sentence): adopted or adopted in substance. 3 (first sentence)-4: rejected as subordinate and irrelevant. 5-6: adopted or adopted in substance, although not as to the identify of the other nurse. 7: adopted or adopted in substance, except that the failure either to perform the accuchecks or ensure that the other nurse did is negligence. 8-14: rejected as subordinate. 15-18: adopted or adopted in substance. COPIES FURNISHED: Laura P. Gaffney, Senior Attorney Agency for Health Care Administration General Counsel's Office Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street, Suite 60 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792 Robert E. Tardif, Jr. Duncan & Tardif, P.A. P.O. Drawer 249 Ft. Myers, FL 33902 Linda Goodgame, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792 Judie Ritter, Executive Director Board of Nursing Daniel Building, Room 50 111 East Coastline Drive Jacksonville, FL 32202
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the issues contained herein, Respondent. ROYCE S. McCALL, was licensed by the State of Florida as a licensed practical nurse, the license initially issued on December 4, 1978 and renewed thereafter until the present. His license number is 0500981. On July 11, 1984, Respondent was employed as a licensed practical nurse with the Walton County Convalescent Center (WCCC) in DeFuniak Springs, Florida. Late that evening, at approximately 4 or 5 a.m., Respondent, as charge nurse on one of the Center's units, along with Rachiel Infinger and Corene Fondren, was about to change a bladder catheter on one of the Center's residents, a Mrs. Rourke. Before doing so, however, he discovered that Mrs. Rourke had fouled herself and he refused to do the procedure then instructing Mrs. Rourke's aides to clean her up. He then went to the room occupied by Mrs. Harper, an elderly, completely bedridden patient between 80 and 90 years old, who rarely talks and can hardly move her arms and legs. Mrs. Harper also required a bladder catheter change and Respondent, along with another nurse, was attempting to do it. Since apparently Mrs. Harper was resisting somewhat, Respondent asked Ms. Infinger to help. During the course of the procedure, Mrs. Harper brought her hand down into the area where Respondent was working in an attempt to stop him. It was obvious that the procedure was somewhat painful to her and in the opinion of Ms. Infinger, Respondent was being less than gentle. When Mrs. Harper brought her hand down, Respondent grabbed it and moved it out of the way telling her at the time to, "Move your damned hand." This comment was heard by both Ms. Infinger and Ms. Fondren. When Respondent moved Mrs. Harper's hand, it collided with the bed rail which broke the skin causing it to bleed. Ms. Infinger noticed this and mentioned it to Respondent. He said he would take care of it and Ms. Infinger went some place else to do something. When she came back some 30 to 45 minutes later, she found that Respondent had still not dressed the skin break on Mrs. Harper's hand. Ms. Infinger thinks Respondent was too rough with Mrs. Harper. She believes it was not necessary for him to throw the elderly woman's hand off as he did. There were two aides present who could have, had they been asked, moved the hand and held it out of the way. There is some divergence in the testimony of Ms. Infinger and Ms. Fondren as to whether Respondent threw Mrs. Harper's hand or pushed it with the former contending it was a throw and the latter contending it was merely a push. Even Ms. Fondren, however, who believes this rough action was a reflex action by Respondent who had been in a bad mood all evening, agrees that since someone was there to help him, he should have asked for help rather than reacting on his own. If either witness is to be believed, however, Respondent acted unprofessionally. On the other hand, however, Ms. Stubbs, Ms. Blocker, and Ms. Fields, all of whom had worked with Respondent for several months, knew him from their repeated observations of him at work never to be abusive or rough with his patients. He is generally very kind to his patients, taking the time to explain what he is doing and exhibiting patience and understanding. His patience is somewhat less with the aides who in his opinion, do not do what they should on duty. Mrs. Harper has had several other skin tears both before and after the one in issue here. She is an old woman who bruises easily and whose skin can be broken easily. While not a difficult patient, she is somewhat confused and tends to try to interfere at times with the ministrations of those trying to help her and her hands often get in the way. Here, it is obvious that Respondent was in a bad mood late at night when he went to treat Mrs. Harper. He had just come from another patient who had not been properly cared for by the aides responsible for her and he was clearly annoyed. No doubt Mrs. Harper, not through spite or even consciously, attempted to stop him from doing what was no doubt a painful procedure and he reacted unprofessionally. This is not to say he consciously intended to harm her, but his reaction was less than it should have been in this situation. When Ms. Infinger came back and found that Respondent had not tended to Mrs. Harpers wound, she immediately reported this fact to Barbara Jean Miller, a licensed practical nurse working on another unit that evening who quickly treated and dressed the skin tear. When she left duty the next morning, she reported what she had seen and done and what Ms. Infinger had told her to the Assistant Director of Nursing who she saw outside in the parking lot. This lady reported it to the Director of Nursing, Mrs. Harwell, who conducted her own investigation. Mrs. Harwell interviewed Respondent who after first denying that the incident had taken place, admitted that he did yank Mrs. Harper's arm but stated he did not know it had hit the bed rail. He also initially denied knowing there was an injury but then admitted he had been told there was and that he had said he would fix it. He admitted that he was upset that evening. In the catheter procedure that Respondent was accomplishing, it is never appropriate to handle a patient so forcefully that it results in an injury even though it may be necessary to restrain or move the patient in some fashion. In Mrs. Harwell's opinion, Respondent's handling of Mrs. Harper in this instance was below minimum standards for the nursing profession. After talking with all the witnesses and securing pictures of the injury, based on her investigation and her discussions with Respondent, she terminated his employment with WCCC that day not only because in this instance his performance was below standards and unprofessional but also because this was the second incident of substandard performance on his record. She had previously chastised him for speaking improperly to or about another patient several weeks previously. Consequently, it is clear that Respondent moved Mrs. Harper's hand in such a manner that resulted in injury to her which is unprofessional conduct on his part compounded by his failure to return to treat the wound once he was made aware of it.
The Issue Is Petitioner guilty of violating Section 455.227(1)(c) Florida Statutes, justifying imposition of conditional licensure as two years probation with terms listed in the Order filed September 20, 1996? The charge of violating Section 464.018(1)(b) Florida Statutes has been dropped by the Board.
Findings Of Fact On April 25, 1995, Petitioner pled nolo contendere to a first degree misdemeanor count of passing a worthless bank check in violation of Section 832.05(2)(a) Florida Statutes. Section 832.05(2)(a) Florida Statutes provides, in pertinent part, as follows: It is unlawful for any person, . . . to draw, make, utter, issue, or deliver to another any check, . . . knowing at the time of the drawing, making, uttering, issuing, or delivery such check or draft, . . . that the maker . . . has not sufficient funds on deposit . . . with such bank . . . with which to pay the same on presentation . . . nor does this section apply to any postdated check. As part of a court diversion program, adjudication was withheld and Petitioner was assigned to take the Florida Association for Corrective Training, Inc. (FACT) course on the criminal consequences of dishonored checks and how to avoid them. Petitioner completed the FACT course, and also paid restitution, diversion fees and court costs. This course was completed on September 12, 1995. A plea of nolo contendere is neither an admission of guilt nor a denial of charges. A plea of nolo contendere with adjudication of guilt withheld does not constitute a conviction. Petitioner made her plea as a matter of convenience. Petitioner has never been found guilty or convicted of passing a worthless bank check. The check which gave rise to Petitioner's April 25, 1995 plea of nolo contendere to a misdemeanor under Section 832.05(2)(a) Florida Statutes was written to Florida State University (FSU) on September 2, 1994 for tuition fees for courses in which Petitioner had enrolled as a nursing student. Petitioner made an error in the calculations of her check register. The check was returned to FSU as "without sufficient funds". FSU redeposited the check, which was then returned a second time to FSU as "without sufficient funds". Upon learning that the check had been returned, Petitioner contacted the FSU registrar's office. She was told that she had contacted FSU soon enough, so that she could withdraw from classes without penalty, and therefore she need not be concerned about the check. Petitioner did withdraw from classes and thought the problem was solved. However, FSU subsequently pressed criminal charges for the check with the Leon County State Attorney's Office. On March 28, 1996, Petitioner applied for a practical nursing license (L.P.N.). On her application, Petitioner answered in the affirmative the question as to whether she had ever been convicted or entered a nolo contendere or guilty plea regardless of adjudication, for any offense other than a minor traffic violation. She also provided a written explanation for the April 25, 1995 nolo contendere misdemeanor plea. Additionally, in an effort to be candid and forthcoming, Petitioner provided a written explanation for each of five other charges for passing worthless bank checks brought against her. As a result, Petitioner was invited to appear, and chose to appear, before the Board of Nursing's Credentials Committee to explain the circumstances surrounding her April 25, 1995 nolo contendere plea and the other worthless check charges she had disclosed. According to Petitioner, this meeting lasted less than five minutes and she was asked no questions. Pursuant to Section 464.002 Florida Statutes, the Board of Nursing voted to grant Petitioner an L.P.N. license subject to two years' probation with terms described in its September 20, 1996 Order based upon the Board's "finding of fact" that Petitioner "was found guilty or pled nolo contendere on various charges of passing worthless bank checks" and that there were aggravating circumstances surrounding the plea. The Board's Order concluded that Petitioner is guilty of violating Section 455.227(1)(c) Florida Statutes. Section 455.227(1)(c) Florida Statutes provides that a license may be disciplined for: Being convicted or found guilty of, or entering a plea of nolo contendere to, regardless of adjudication, a crime in any jurisdiction which relates to the practice of, or the ability to practice, a licensee's profession. The Board of Nursing does not have a disciplinary guideline, a range of penalties, or a rule addressing mitigating circumstances for a misdemeanor violation of Section 832.05(2)(a) as a violation of Section 455.227(1)(c) Florida Statutes.1 The Board of Nursing issued license number 1250541 to Petitioner effective October 9, 1996 and subject to two years' probation, as described in its September 20, 1996 Order. Petitioner had an opportunity at formal hearing to present evidence concerning her nolo contendere plea and the five other charges she voluntarily reported to the Board. A "no information" is the method of dismissing a misdemeanor criminal charge. A "nolle prosequi" is the method of dismissing a felony criminal charge. The first charge occurred in 1991 or 1992. It involved a dishonored check for a mere $5.64 to Winn-Dixie. The court diversion program at that time was not very elaborate, but Petitioner attended a single February 25, 1992 lecture on the passing of bad checks, and paid restitution plus $20.00 in costs. A nolle prosequi was entered. Petitioner's check to FSU on September 2, 1994 for $199.79 resulted in two service charges being imposed on her checking account by her bank. (See Finding of Fact 5) These unilateral debits by the bank resulted in a check written September 15, 1994 by Petitioner for $56.59 to Winn-Dixie being dishonored for insufficient funds. Petitioner wrote a letter of explanation, paid restitution, and a "no information" was filed. A $49.19 check written to Wal-Mart on March 31, 1995 and a $150.48 check written to Winn-Dixie on April 5, 1995 were dishonored because Petitioner relied upon her ex-fiancé to deposit money he owed her directly into her checking account instead of Petitioner receiving payment from him in person. Petitioner did not see her ex-fiancé in person or return to their joint residence to pick up her bank statements because he had been abusive and she was fearful of him. He did not, in fact, make the deposit to her account. Petitioner paid restitution and costs for both cases. The Wal-Mart check situation resulted in a "no information." The Winn-Dixie check situation resulted in a nolle prosequi. A $99.20 check Petitioner had written to Publix on September 4, 1995 was dishonored because a car repair shop which had repaired her car did not honor an oral agreement Petitioner understood would prevent her check to the repair shop from being presented to the bank until after she had made a sufficient deposit from an insurance claim for the car repairs. This resulted in a "no information." Due to the uncertainty of the State Attorney's computer records (TR 96-98) and Petitioner's clear testimony, it is found that Petitioner was not required to undergo the diversion program for the September 15, 1994, March 31, 1995, April 5, 1995, and September 4, 1995 checks. However, it is abundantly clear she has now had two courses concerning this subject: one in 1992 and one in 1995. (See Findings of Fact 3 and 16) It is also clear she wrote her last bad check before completing the second FACT course on September 12, 1995. Two of Petitioner's bank check problems arose while she was a nursing student. Petitioner was employed as a patient care technician at Vivra Renal Care from July 1995 through October 1996. One of Petitioner's bank check problems arose while she was employed in the care of critically ill people. Dr. Evelyn Singer, Dean of the School of Nursing at FSU testified as an expert in nursing education and the practice of nursing. She opined that practical nurses are responsible for observing and documenting vital patient information and routine patient care. Other health care professionals rely upon the accuracy of practical nurses' observations and documentation. Nursing instructors stress the importance of accuracy and honesty when a practical nurse handles vital patient information. A documentation mistake by a practical nurse has the potential for resulting in a patient's death. Dr. Singer further opined that passing worthless bank checks is a crime related to the practice of nursing because the skills called into question for passing worthless bank checks are the same skills required to be an effective nurse, ie., making accurate observations, accurately recording observations and events, making accurate calculations, accurately measuring medication doses, accurately measuring and noting blood pressure and temperature of patients, appropriately changing dressings, accurately measuring and reporting patient observations, being cognizant of details, and addressing errors or omissions honestly and promptly. However, Dr. Singer further testified that if those things are accurately performed, then a nurse's ability is not affected by even a felony bad check arrest and plea. Dr. Singer believes that an inaccurate nurse is an untrustworthy nurse. In Dr. Singer's expert opinion, practical nurses should notify their nursing units if they have been arrested and convicted of writing worthless checks so as to constitute a felony (TR 124-126), so that the registered nurse under whose license they practice can be on the alert for documentation mistakes. What significance a felony arrest or conviction has as opposed to a misdemeanor arrest or conviction was not explained by Dr. Singer, but she viewed the probation imposed on Petitioner not as a judgment of personal guilt or dishonesty but as an opportunity for Petitioner's employer to be on the lookout for inaccuracies. At Petitioner's request, Judith G. Hankin, Director, School of Practical Nursing, Lively Technical Center, wrote a letter dated March 15, 1996 to the Board of Nursing. She wrote, [Petitioner] entered the Practical Nursing Program on August 23, 1993. On March 14, 1996 [Petitioner] informed me that she had an arrest record for series of worthless bank checks. . . . Her overall behavior during the time she was enrolled in school was acceptable. I feel that [Petitioner] is capable of assuming the responsibilities of a graduate practical nurse. Petitioner has worked as a licensed practical nurse at Vivra Renal Care, Tallahassee, Florida since her licensure on October 9, 1996. Her duties include assisting patients receiving kidney dialysis by setting up dialysis machines, preparation of dializers, assisting patients, and initiating treatment and discharge of patients. Charles E. Brown, R.N., is the head nurse at Vivra Renal Care. He has supervised and been involved in the evaluation of Petitioner since she began work at Vivra Renal Care in July 1995. (See Findings of Fact 22 and 29) Nurse Brown also was accepted as an expert in clinical nursing. He opined that inadvertently writing a worthless check or pleading nolo contendere does not relate to the practice of nursing or the ability to practice nursing. Mr. Brown has consistently observed, over a period of approximately 18 months, that Petitioner accurately measures medication doses, accurately measures and notes blood pressure and temperature of patients, appropriately changes dressings, accurately measures and reports patient observations and is cognizant of details. Nurse Brown described Petitioner's nursing abilities as "good" and the opposite of careless to the point that she is more than meticulous.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Board of Nursing rescind its September 20, 1996 Order and enter a Final Order granting Petitioner an unrestricted L.P.N. license, without any probationary period. RECOMMENDED this 1st day of MAY, 1997, at Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax FILING (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of May, 1997.
Findings Of Fact On 22 June 1982 DHRS, Office of Licensure and Certification, conducted an inspection of Respondent's facility known as Regency Oaks at Gainesville, Florida. During this inspection the nurses' schedule was not produced and the inspector, with the assistance of Respondent's staff, attempted to reconstruct the nurses' schedule for the month of June, 1982, up to the date of the inspection. From the data received it was determined that on the 7:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m. shift on June 5, 1982, Respondent was staffed with one registered nurse (RN) and three licensed practical nurses (LPN) on June 6 there were two RN's and two LPNs; on June 12 there were three RNs and one LPN; and on June 19 there were three RNs and one LPN. Staffing requirements for nursing homes are determined by the shift and census of the nursing home. All of the shortages here involved the day shift. On each of the days of 5, 6, 12, and 19 June the regulations required two RNs and three LPNs on the day shift. The regulations also permit the substitution of an RN for an LPN. Accordingly, from the evidence gathered bv Petitioner's evaluation at the June 22 inspection, Respondent was short one RN on June 5 and one LPN on June 6, 12, and 19. Respondent presented time cards for the periods here involved. These time cards, which were accepted in evidence as business records of Respondent, show that on June 12 Respondent had two RNs and three LPNs on duty on the day shift. Respondent's one witness admitted the nursing home was understaffed one RN on June 5 and one LPN on June 6 and 19.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Daniel E. Gallagher, is a licensed practical nurse, holding license number 41727-1 issued by the Department of Professional Regulation on June 1, 1985. From May 28, 1985, to August 29, 1985, the Respondent was employed at Care Unit of Jacksonville Beach, Florida, as a licensed practical nurse. During this employment, the Respondent appeared for work frequently with the odor of alcohol on his breath, with bloodshot eyes, and in a disheveled condition. He frequently used mouth wash and mints. The odor of alcohol was smelled by other employees and by patients. This behavior started shortly after the Respondent began working at Care Unit, and it became progressively more evident until August, 1985, when the Respondent was terminated from his employment. Coming to work as a licensed practical nurse in the condition described above is unprofessional conduct which departs from the minimal standards of acceptable and prevailing nursing practice. A licensed practical nurse who assumes the duties of his employment under the effects of the use of alcohol, with the odor of alcohol on his breath, with bloodshot eyes, and in a disheveled condition, is unable to practice nursing with reasonable skill and safety to patients.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that license number 41727-1, held by the Respondent, Daniel E. Gallagher, be suspended for 30 days; and that following this period of suspension the Respondent be placed on probation for one year, subject to such conditions as the Board may specify. THIS RECOMMENDED ORDER entered this 11th day of September, 1986 in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM B. THOMAS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of September, 1986. COPIES FURNISHED: William M. Furlow, Esquire 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mr. Daniel E. Gallagher 379 East 5th Street Mount Vernon, N.Y. 10550 Fred Roche Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Wings S. Benton, Esquire General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Judie Ritter Executive Director Department of Professional Regulation 111 East Coastline Drive Room 504 Jacksonville, Florida 32201 =================================================================
The Issue The issue is whether respondent's license as a practical nurse should be disciplined for the reasons cited in the amended administrative complaint.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: At all times relevant hereto, respondent, Susan Helen Tavares Benson, was a licensed practical nurse having been issued license number PN 0537171 by petitioner, Department of Professional Regulation, Board of Nursing (Board). Respondent has been licensed as a practical nurse since December 3, 1979. She currently resides in Naples, Florida. On February 12 and 13, 1989, respondent was employed as an independent contractor by Morning Star Nursing Home Service, a Naples firm that provided private in-home nursing care in the Naples area. On those particular dates, respondent was assigned to work the 4 p.m. - midnight shift at the home of C. S., an elderly female patient who was bedridden. Respondent relieved another nurse, Miriam Sheriff, who had worked the 8 a.m. - 4 p.m. shift. When respondent reported for duty on February 13, Sheriff observed respondent wearing street clothes, to be "hyper" and having what she perceived to be a very prominent smell of alcohol on her breath. Sheriff also recalled that when she left the premises there were no drinking glasses on the table in the area where the nurse normally sat. Although Sheriff was concerned with respondent's appearance and demeanor, she did not say anything when leaving the premises. Living in the patient's home at that time were the patient's husband and daughter. A few minutes after respondent reported for duty, the husband and daughter advised respondent they were leaving the home to run an errand and would return shortly. Although the husband spoke briefly with respondent before leaving and after returning, he did not detect any alcohol on respondent's breath. When the husband and daughter returned home about two hours later, the husband found the patient (wife) to be "quiet" and resting. However, the daughter spoke with her mother, and based on that conversation, approached respondent, smelled her breath, detected what she perceived to be alcohol, and asked respondent whether she had been drinking. Respondent denied drinking alcoholic beverages and contended it was Listerine mouth wash that the daughter smelled. At that point, the daughter told respondent to leave the premises. The daughter declined to accept respondent's suggestion that she call respondent's supervisor, have the supervisor come to the house, and confirm or dispel the claim that respondent was drinking. After respondent departed, the father and daughter found a glass partially filled with gin on an end table next to the couch where the nurse normally sat. It may be reasonably inferred that the drink had been prepared by respondent. After leaving the premises, respondent immediately telephoned her employer and reported the incident. A few hours later, respondent's supervisor telephoned respondent and advised her to take a breathalyzer test at a local law enforcement agency or obtain a blood alcohol test at a local hospital in order to prove she was not drinking on duty. Although respondent attempted to take a breathalyzer at the local sheriff's office, she was unable to do so since the law enforcement agency would not administer the test unless respondent had first been arrested. Respondent was also unable to obtain a blood alcohol test at a local hospital without a doctor's order and payment of a $250 fee. She reported this to her supervisor around 11:30 p.m. that evening. Respondent denied drinking any alcohol and contended the glass was on the end table when she reported for duty. However, these contentions are rejected as not being credible. There is no evidence that respondent's judgment or coordination were impaired by such consumption or that her conduct in any way threatened the health and welfare of the patient. According to the Board's expert, a nurse reporting to duty while under the influence of alcohol would be guilty of unprofessional conduct and such conduct would constitute a departure from the minimum standards of acceptable and prevailing nursing practice. However, there was no evidence that respondent was under the influence of alcohol, i. e., her judgment was impaired, when she reported to duty on February 13. The expert further opined that if a nurse reported to duty after consuming any amount of alcohol, no matter how small a quantity and without regard to when the alcohol was consumed, and even if it did not impair her judgment or skills, the nurse's conduct would nonetheless be "unprofessional" because it would give the impression that the nurse's judgment was clouded. However, this opinion is not accepted as being logical, rationale or persuasive. Although not specifically addressed by the expert, it may be inferred that by having an alcoholic beverage in her possession while on duty, a nurse would not conform with the minimum standard of conduct. There is no evidence that respondent has ever been subject to disciplinary action at any other time during her eleven year tenure as a licensed practical nurse.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recommended that respondent be found guilty of violating Subsection 464.018(1)(h), Florida Statutes (1989), and that she be given a reprimand. RECOMMENDED this 5th day of March, 1991, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of March, 1991. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 90-2516 Petitioner: 1. Partially adopted in finding of fact 1. 2-4. Partially adopted in finding of fact 2. 5. Partially adopted in finding of fact 3. 6. Rejected as being unnecessary. 7-8. Partially adopted in finding of fact 3. 9. Partially adopted in finding of fact 4. 10. Rejected as being hearsay. 11-16. Partially adopted in finding of fact 5. 17. Rejected as being hearsay. 18-20. Partially adopted in finding of fact 6. 21-25. COPIES Partially adopted FURNISHED: in finding of fact 8. Tracey S. Hartman, Esquire 1940 North Monroe Street, Suite 60 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792 Ms. Susan H. T. Benson P. O. Box 143 Naples, FL 33939 Jack L. McRay, Esquire 1940 North Monroe Street, Suite 60 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792 Judie Ritter Executive Director 504 Daniel Building 111 East Coastline Drive Jacksonville, FL 32202
The Issue Whether Respondent committed an unlawful employment practice against Petitioner by terminating her on the basis of her race.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, an African-American female, was employed by Respondent in the position of Certified Nursing Assistant (CNA) from April 21, 2007, to February 21, 2008, when she was terminated. Respondent Employer is a provider of long-term and rehabilitative care to elderly patients and patients recovering from surgery. The majority of Respondent’s patients range from 60-to-90 years old. Upon hiring, Petitioner received a copy of the Employer’s Handbook. CNAs are responsible for patients’ basic needs, which include feeding, bathing, dressing, and turning. They are responsible for performing vital sign checks and providing reports to nurses on each patient’s health condition. CNAs are supervised by nurses, including Nurse Practitioners, Registered Nurses (RNs), and Licensed Practical Nurses (LPNs). The majority of nurses and CNAs employed by Respondent are African-American. At all times material, Petitioner regularly worked night shifts, beginning at 11:00 p.m. and ending at 7:00 a.m. the following day. Typically, fewer CNAs are scheduled to work the night shifts as compared to shifts scheduled between 7:00 a.m. and 11:00 p.m. The assignment of fewer CNAs to these shifts means that there is a greater need for those employees assigned to the night shifts to be alert and responsive to patients’ status, needs, and requests. Petitioner was scheduled to work a shift beginning at 3:00 p.m. on February 7, 2008, and then another shift from 11:00 p.m. February 7, 2008, to 7:00 a.m. February 8, 2008. She admitted that she worked a double shift spanning February 7, 2008, and February 8, 2008. The Employer’s records show that she had been paid for the period of time from 11:00 p.m. February 7, 2008, to 7:00 a.m. February 8, 2008. According to employee disciplinary reports admitted in evidence, Michelle Hatcher, LPN, an African-American female who was the night shift Charge Nurse, observed Petitioner and a Caucasian female CNA sleeping on the job on February 8, 2008. The two sleeping CNAs were not attending to patient call lights, which was an unsafe situation. Nurse Hatcher’s observation was confirmed by two separate, dated written statements provided by female African-American Nurse Felicia Rockett against each named CNA. “Discharge” was the proposed disciplinary action. Serious injury or death of a patient may result when a CNA fails to perform required job responsibilities. Respondent’s Employee Handbook describes “sleeping or inattention on the job” as a serious infraction which is subject to immediate discharge. Petitioner testified that she knew that sleeping on the job was a cause for immediate discharge and that it warrants termination “on the spot,” without prior warnings or progressive discipline. She denied ever sleeping on the job. Nurse Hatcher did not have authority to immediately terminate Petitioner and the sleeping Caucasian LPN “on the spot.” Nurse Hatcher was required to provide a written disciplinary report of the incident to the Director of Clinical Services, a/k/a the Director of Nursing, which she did. In turn, the Director of Clinical Services was responsible for reporting any termination of employment issue to Employer's Regional Director of Human Resources for review and a final decision on the appropriate course of action. Laura Register, a Caucasian female, had been appointed Acting Director of Clinical Services on or about February 7, 2008. She was new to the position, and there were many pending matters when she assumed the position, including disciplinary matters. Elaine Leslie, a Caucasian female and Respondent’s Regional Director of Clinical Services, visited Respondent’s Tallahassee facility two or three days per week for awhile to help acclimate Ms. Register to her new position and to assist her with pending matters. Mesdames Leslie and Register triaged resident care issues ahead of disciplinary actions. Therefore, there was a delay in addressing the two CNAs' disciplinary action forms. To ensure consistency and protect against bias, discrimination, and personality problems, Robert Walker, Respondent’s Regional Director of Human Resources, reviews and makes the final decisions with respect to all termination actions. This process is designed to ensure that uniform policies are applied to one and all equally. Ms. Leslie and Ms. Register contacted Mr. Walker, a Caucasian male, to review the disciplinary reports related to the charges of sleeping on the job. The three executives then reviewed the disciplinary reports of Nurses Hatcher and Rockett and believed their reports of Petitioner’s and the Caucasian CNA’s sleeping-on-the-job to be credible. Mr. Walker made the final decision to terminate Petitioner and the Caucasian CNA. He held a termination meeting with Petitioner, rather than terminating her by telephone. Petitioner’s termination date reflects when the termination actually occurred, on February 21, 2008, not the date of the offense or when the offense was reported to management. Respondent offered evidence of Petitioner sleeping on the job as the sole motivating factor in terminating her employment.1/ Respondent has a firm anti-discriminatory policy, of which Petitioner was aware because she signed a copy thereof upon her date of hire. However, Petitioner never complained to Mr. Walker about perceived racial discrimination, before or after her termination. At hearing, she denied any discriminatory treatment or any racial slurs or comments by any of Respondent’s employees at any time before, during, or after the incidents previously related. On February 29, 2008, which was after Petitioner’s February 21, 2008, termination, Respondent hired three new CNAs: one Caucasian and two African-American. Ten of the eleven CNAs hired by the Employer from February 5, 2008, to March 26, 2008, were African-American females.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order dismissing Petitioner’s Charge of Discrimination and Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of July, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of July, 2009.
The Issue The issues in this case are whether, before applying for licensure as a registered nurse in Florida, Petitioner had suffered the denial of an application for licensure as a practical nurse in the state of Virginia, and, if so, whether Petitioner's failure to disclose that fact in her Florida application was a knowing misrepresentation; finally, if either or both of the forgoing questions are answered in the affirmative, whether Respondent has grounds to deny Petitioner's pending application for a nursing license.
Findings Of Fact On October 15, 2012, Petitioner Yolette Tema ("Tema") signed an application for licensure as a registered nurse, which she mailed to the Department of Health for review by Respondent Board of Nursing (the "Board"). Item No. 9 of the application sought information about the applicant's disciplinary history. Four subparts (lettered A through D) asked questions that called for a "yes" or "no" answer, which the applicant was to give by marking the applicable check box. The first question ("9A") was: Have you ever been denied or is there now any proceeding to deny your application for any healthcare license to practice in Florida or any other state, jurisdiction or country? Tema answered, "No." In Item No. 10 of the application, there appeared above the signature line the following declarations: I recognize that providing false information may result in disciplinary action against my license or criminal penalties pursuant to Sections 456.067, 775.083, and 775.084, Florida Statutes. I have carefully read the questions in the foregoing application and have answered them completely, without reservations of any kind. Should I furnish any false information in this application, I hereby agree that such act shall constitute cause for denial, suspension or revocation of my license to practice as a Registered Nurse or Licensed Practical Nurse in the State of Florida. Tema's signature manifested her agreement with the foregoing declarations. Despite having acknowledged the hard consequences of deceit, Tema's negative answer to the question of whether she ever had suffered the denial of an application for licensure was false. In fact, in June 2011, the Virginia Board of Nursing had denied Tema's application for licensure as a practical nurse, on the ground that she had provided false information in an effort to obtain a license by fraud, deceit, or material omission. Tema had received timely, contemporaneous notice of the Virginia Board of Nursing's final decision, and she was fully aware of that disposition at all times relevant to this case. When she completed the Florida application in October 2012, therefore, Tema knew that her response to question 9A was false. Because the information Tema failed to disclose obviously would have hurt her chances of obtaining a license in Florida, the undersigned disbelieves Tema's explanation for the material omission, which was that she simply made a mistake.1/ Instead, the undersigned infers that Tema intentionally omitted the damaging fact of the Virginia denial in hopes that the Board would not discover it.2/ The Board did, however, discover the Virginia decision while reviewing Tema's application. Based on that past denial and Tema's present failure to disclose it, the Board determined that Tema's Florida application should be denied. The Board's preliminary decision was communicated to Tema through a Notice of Intent to Deny dated February 11, 2014. Determinations of Ultimate Fact Tema is guilty of having an application for a license to practice nursing denied by the licensing authority of another state, which is a disciplinable offense under section 464.018(1)(b), Florida Statutes.3/ Tema is guilty of attempting to procure a license to practice nursing by knowing misrepresentation, which is a disciplinable offense under section 464.018(1)(a).
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Board of Nursing enter a final order denying Tema's application for licensure as a registered nurse. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of September, 2014, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of September, 2014.
Findings Of Fact Having reviewed the entire record before it, the Board finds that the Findings of Fact as contained in the Hearing Officer's Recommended Order are adequately supported by competent, substantial evidence and hereby adopts those Findings of Fact as its own.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner's application for licensure by examination be GRANTED and that Ann Mary McKay be authorized to take the licensed practical nurse examination. DONE and ENTERED this 9th day of March, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of March, 1982.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent violated section 760.10(7), Florida Statutes (2011), by discriminating against Petitioner, who is white, because Petitioner opposed Respondent's discrimination against other employees because of race and color, in violation of section 760.10(1)(a), and by discriminating against Petitioner because of a handicap in violation of section 760.10(1)(a).
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a registered nurse. She was hired by Respondent in mid-July 2009, participated in an orientation program for approximately a month, and began work as a charge nurse on the night shift of the cardiovascular step-down unit in late August. The cardiovascular step-down unit primarily cares for patients who are recuperating from cardiovascular surgeries and procedures. In early September, Petitioner was counseled for two unscheduled absences and for twice leaving her shift early on account of illness. On November 27, 2009, Petitioner left her shift due to illness without notifying her supervisor. Respondent began taking steps to terminate Petitioner's employment. Respondent told Petitioner not to report for her next shift but to attend a meeting with the director of human resources, the chief nursing officer, and the nurse director. After the meeting, Respondent decided to terminate Petitioner's employment. After the meeting, Petitioner hand-wrote a 12-page letter defending her actions on November 27 and her performance on the job in general. Several days later, she hand-wrote another similar letter, this one 36 pages long. In neither of these letters, or at any time up until then, did Petitioner claim that she was being retaliated against for opposing discrimination against minority employees or that she was being discriminated against because of a handicap or disability. Instead, she excused her actions on November 27 and blamed several other employees of Respondent for making her actions and job performance in general look worse than they actually were. One of Petitioner's main targets of blame in these letters was Karen Franco. Franco is a Filipino registered nurse who sometimes worked as the charge nurse on her shift. Petitioner claims that she received Franco's agreement to cover for Petitioner as charge nurse on November 27, in addition to caring for the patients assigned to Franco on the shift, and did extensive preparation of a charge report for Franco to update and deliver at the end of the shift. Petitioner says she told Franco and almost everyone else on the shift that she was leaving early and placing Franco in charge. Petitioner says she forgot to tell her supervisor and called Franco from her cell phone in the parking lot to ask her to notify the supervisor. Petitioner says Franco agreed to do so. Franco contradicted practically all of Petitioner's version of events. According to Franco, she refused to be placed in charge in addition to caring for her patients, did not know when Petitioner left the building, did not know Petitioner was gone until she received a telephone call after Petitioner already had left the building, and did not agree to advise the supervisor for Petitioner. Another target of Petitioner's blame in these letters was Dena Vegter, the nurse manager for Petitioner's night shift. In the first letter, Petitioner's main complaint was that Vegter reacted with hostility when Petitioner made suggestions to improve the operation of the night shift unit. The letter said nothing about Vegter supposedly discriminating against minority nurses, about Petitioner opposing this practice, or about Vegter or anyone else retaliating against Petitioner for her opposition. In the second letter, Petitioner modified her complaint against Vegter, alleging that Vegter became hostile when Petitioner refused to cooperate with a plan to "crush" and drive off a nurse named Choisette, whom Vegter perceived to be a poor nurse and a liability to the unit. She also alleged in the second letter that Vegter wanted Petitioner to cooperate in getting rid of a nurse with a hearing impairment and that Petitioner herself was fired on account of medical issues. Before writing these letters, Petitioner never complained to anyone at the hospital that Vegter was targeting minority nurses or nurses with disabilities, not even to Sandria George, Vegter's immediate supervisor, who is black and participated in firing Petitioner. Besides George, Respondent had numerous minority nurses and other staff. Petitioner did not prove that Vegter or anyone else employed by Respondent was discriminating against minorities. When Vegter moved from the step-down unit to the cardiovascular unit, several minorities requested to be transferred with her, including several individuals Petitioner claims were Vegter's "targets." During and after Petitioner's employment by Respondent, Respondent fired some minority nurses, some minority nurses resigned, and some non-minority nurses were hired. However, during the same time period, some non-minority nurses were fired or resigned, and some minority nurses were hired. As for the alleged discrimination against Petitioner because of her handicap, during the time she worked at the hospital, Petitioner never claimed to have a handicap or disability. She alleged in her complaint of discrimination filed in November 2010 that she had fibromyalgia and "issues" with the discs in her back that prevented her from working four days in a row. However, Petitioner did not prove that she had a medical condition that limited her in any major life activity. In addition, at Petitioner's request, she never was scheduled to work more than three days in a row and usually was scheduled for no more than two days in a row. Petitioner now claims that she was demoted from charge nurse because of her inability to work four days in a row and in retaliation for opposing discrimination against minority nurses. However, the evidence was that there was no actual charge nurse position at the time Petitioner worked for Respondent. Rather, the nurse manager would assign one of the nurses on duty to be in charge of the shift. The charge nurse would receive a small additional amount of pay, but it was not a permanent job classification. In any event, Petitioner clearly was not demoted since she was assigned to be in charge on her last night on the job before her termination. After filing her complaint of discrimination, Petitioner again modified her story to allege for the first time what she described as an elaborate plot by her and Vegter. Petitioner said Vegter was an old and dear friend of Petitioner who agreed to have Petitioner hired by Vegter's immediate supervisor, Sandria George, while concealing from George her close friendship with Petitioner. According to Petitioner, after George hired her, the plan was for Petitioner to improve the operation of the night shift and share credit with Vegter, to the benefit of both of them. Vegter persuasively contradicted most of Petitioner's allegations. She testified that she had no close friendship with Petitioner, but an rather an old friendship based on prior employment together. She also testified that there was no plot to dupe George and the hospital. To the contrary, Vegter testified that she openly acknowledged to George that she knew Petitioner and requested that George interview Petitioner and make an independent decision whether to hire her. She also denied targeting minority nurses or nurses with handicaps or disabilities. Respondent had legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for all employment actions taken with respect to Petitioner. Petitioner failed to prove that Respondent's reasons were pretexts for actual retaliation against Petitioner for opposing illegal discrimination or for actual discrimination against Petitioner based on handicap. There was no persuasive evidence that Respondent discriminates against nurses or other employees because of race or handicap (disability). Petitioner's testimony regarding such discrimination is rejected as not credible. In December 2009, Petitioner both threatened Respondent and begged Respondent for her children's sake to allow her to resign with severance pay instead of being terminated. Respondent agreed so that Petitioner would be able to collect unemployment and be reemployed more easily. In return, Petitioner agreed not to bring an action such as this one.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that FCHR enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of May, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of May, 2012. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Thomas M. Findley, Esquire Messer, Caparello and Self, P.A. 2618 Centennial Place Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Jerry Girley, Esquire The Girley Law Firm, P.A. 125 East Marks Street Orlando, Florida 32803 Lawrence Kranert, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
