The Issue Whether the finger pier portion of Respondent Raab's dock creates a navigational hazard. The resolution of that issue will determine whether the dock qualifies for an exemption from an environmental resource permit under Rule 40E-4.051(3)(b), Florida Administrative Code, and Section 403.813, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact DEP has the authority to regulate the construction of docks in jurisdictional wetlands and other waters of the State of Florida and on state submerged lands under Chapters 253, 373, and 403, Florida Statutes, and Chapters 62-330 (which adopts Chapter 40E-4) and 18-21, Florida Administrative Code. The Association is a residential community located in Sewall's Point, Martin County, Florida. All lots within the community abut navigable channels which provide ingress and egress to the ICW. These channels converge so that there is only one channel that connects to the ICW. Most of the residents of the community have large vessels that routinely navigate the channels within the community. At the time of the formal hearing, many of the vessels owned by residents of the community had drafts of four feet and at least two had drafts of five feet. In 1997, Mr. Raab purchased a residence in the Association that is located very close to where the channel meets the ICW. Because of that location, practically all residents of the Association have to pass in front of Mr. Raab's property when going into or returning from the ICW. The property at issue is located at 22 Simara Street, Sewalls Point, Martin County, Florida. The dock at issue in this proceeding is subject to DEP's regulatory authority. When Mr. Raab purchased this property in 1997, there was an existing marginal dock parallel to the bulk-head. Mr. Raab subsequently sought and received approval from DEP to demolish the existing marginal dock and replace it with a virtually identical structure. The existence and configuration of the marginal dock is not at issue in this proceeding. Mr. Raab thereafter sought to modify his approved marginal dock by adding a finger pier which extended into the channel 36 feet so he could dock his vessel perpendicular to the bulkhead. Mr. Raab's plan also called for the construction of two pilings 12 feet from the end of the finger pier. Mr. Raab had, as of the time of the formal hearing, re-constructed the marginal dock and had constructed the finger pier. 3/ The two additional pilings had not been constructed at the time of the formal hearing. After reviewing the modified project, DEP determined that the project was exempt from the need for an environmental resource permit under Rule 40E-4.051(3)(b), Florida Administrative Code, and Section 403.813, Florida Statutes. DEP also authorized Mr. Raab to use state-owned submerged lands if necessary. The Association thereafter timely challenged DEP's determination that the finger pier portion of the project (and the two additional pilings) did not require an environmental resource permit. There was a conflict in the evidence as to the functional width of the channel in front of Mr. Raab's property. 4/ Mr. Holly testified on behalf of the Association that the functional width of the channel was 83 feet. Mr. Lidberg, testifying on behalf of Mr. Raab, testified that the functional width was 101 feet. This conflict is resolved by finding that the functional width of the channel in front of the Raab property is 101 feet. 5/ The prevailing winds in the area in front of Mr. Raabb's dock blow into the dock. The depth of the water in the channels is influenced by tides. The principal reason Mr. Raab wants the finger pier is so that he can moor his boat with the bow to the prevailing winds in times of high winds. At the time of the formal hearing, Mr. Raab owned a vessel with an overall length of 44 feet. There was a conflict in the evidence as to whether Mr. Raab's finger pier and the two pilings that have been authorized, but not constructed, constitute a hazard to navigation. 6/ Based on the totality of the evidence, it is found that these structures do not create a navigational hazard. 7/
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that DEP enter a final order dismissing the Association's challenge to the determination that Mr. Raab's project qualifies for an exemption from an environmental resource permit. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of March, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of March, 2000.
Findings Of Fact Petitioners, High Point of Orlando/Calton Homes (High Point) and Breedlove, Dennis and Associates, Inc. (BDA) were among named Respondents in a petition for formal hearing filed by Central Florida Wetlands Society, Inc. (CFWS) in DOAH Case number 91-8339. High Point was a Respondent in DOAH Case number 92-0364, also initiated by a CFWS petition. BDA was retained as consultant for High Point for a project in Orange County involving wetlands and requiring the evaluation of impact and the mitigation of that impact on the wetlands. A permit for the project was granted by the St. Johns River Water Management District (SJRWMD). In late 1991 High Point requested a permit modification when it was determined that mitigation could not be accomplished within the deadlines in the permit conditions. There had been delays in planting caused in part by delays in construction of the project's stormwater management system and it was apparent that the required plantings could not grow fast enough to comply with the mitigation conditions. The technical staff report recommending approval describes the modification as extensions of the deadlines for successful establishment of forested and herbaceous mitigation. CFWS is a Florida nonprofit corporation according to its articles of incorporation filed with the Secretary of State on August 3, 1990. Article III provides these purposes for the corporation: To educate on the roll [sic] of wetlands with emphasis on the values of preservation of wetlands and the prevention of destruction of same. To implement the national policy of no loss of wetlands. To coordinate with other environmental groups to focus attention on wetland preservation. All other things that are lawful under the charter of this corporation and under the laws of the State of Florida. (Exhibit filed at DOAH 8/21/92) On October 7, 1991, CFWS filed a petition for administrative hearing with the SJRWMD in opposition to the district's proposed grant of permit modification to High Point. The petition was verified and signed by Michael W. Mingea as President of CFWS. The petition did not identify CFWS as a corporation, but rather "a not-for-profit private organization under the laws of the State of Florida". The petition named as Respondents, High Point, SJRWMD, DBA and another alleged consultant for High Point, Dyer, Riddle, Mills and Precourt, Inc., (DRMP). The petition was forwarded by SJRWMD to the DOAH for hearing on December 30, 1991, and was assigned DOAH Case number 91-8339. On January 8, 1992, CFWS filed a petition for formal administrative hearing with the SJRWMD disputing a proposed consent order between High Point and SJRWMD assessing $2,463.60 penalty and costs for violation of the mitigation conditions and requiring a mitigation survey. Like the petition described in paragraph 4, above, this petition was signed and sworn by Michael Mingea and did not identify CFWS as a corporation. The Respondent named in the petition was SJRWMD. This petition was forwarded to the DOAH by the district and was received at DOAH on January 21, 1992. It was assigned DOAH Case number 92-0364. A motion in opposition to the petition was filed on January 28, 1992 by counsel for SJRWMD requesting dismissal based on Petitioner's lack of standing, as the consent order does not authorize any activity subject to the district's permitting authority. Further, the motion argued, any issues regarding the proposed permit modification would be addressed in pending case number 91-8339. In an order dated January 28, 1992, the two cases, 91-8339 and 92-0364 were consolidated and set for hearing in Orlando, Florida on June 16 and 17, 1992. On March 5, 1992 a telephone conference hearing was conducted on various pending motions and an order was entered on March 6, 1992 granting motions to dismiss the two consultant parties, BDA and DRMP. The order denied BDA's and DRMP's motions for fees and costs pursuant to Section 120.57(1)(b)5., F.S., based on a finding that the error in including the consultants as Respondents did not rise to the level of bad faith required for an award under 120.57(1)(b)5, F.S. The order granted SJRWMD's motion in opposition to the petition in number 92-0364 and closed the file in that case with remand of the petition to the agency. And finally, the order granted High Point's motion for a more definite statement in Case number 91-8339. The order required CFWS to file its amended petition within thirty days stating how the proposed permit modifications would adversely affect the waters of the state or otherwise violate statutes and rules governing management and storage of surface waters (MSSW) permits. On April 14, 1992 Karen West, Esquire, filed her notice of appearance on behalf of CFWS and a motion for extension of time of fourteen days to file a more definite statement. On April 21, 1992 Ms. West filed the Petitioner's notice of voluntary dismissal of the petition in number 91-8339, and an order closing file was entered. On April 28, 1992, High Point and BDA filed with the SJRWMD their motion for remand which resulted in the district's order of remand discussed in the preliminary statement, above. The sole issue for remand was these Respondents' entitlement to attorneys fees and costs. High Point and BDA also filed separate motions for sanctions dated May 21, 1992 requesting fees and costs of $6,766.88 for High Point and $1,096.49 for BDA. A telephone conference was conducted on June 11, 1992 on Karen West, Esquire's, motion to withdraw as counsel for CFWS. Michael Mingea, President of CFWS participated and stated that the society had no opposition to the motion. The Hearing Officer and parties then discussed procedural matters related to resolution of the fees case, DOAH Case number 92-3010F. Mr. Mingea asked for, and was given, two weeks to obtain substitute counsel prior to Petitioners commencing discovery. The parties agreed to conduct the final hearing by telephone on August 10, 1992. An order and notice of hearing was entered confirming these matters on June 17, 1992. Notwithstanding the parties' agreement, the August 10th hearing was continued because Petitioners were unable to effectuate discovery or serve subpoenas on Michael Mingea or Todd Swearingen, another CFWS board member. Despite frequent filings of well-drafted requests for extensions, responses to Petitioners' pleadings and similar documents, Michael Mingea never appeared at any of the several hearings scheduled in this case after his initial appearance on June 11th. Despite several explicit orders Mr. Mingea never appeared for deposition by Petitioners, either in person or by telephone. Yet, according to the testimony of other board members, Todd Swearingen and Marty Sharpe, only Michael Mingea initiated the petitions involving High Point and he, alone, was cognizant of the specific basis for those petitions. Marty Sharpe who appeared consistently on behalf of CFWS in this proceeding became a board member in February 1992, several months after the petitions were filed. Petitioners were wholly frustrated in their effort to obtain the discovery to which they were entitled with regard to the bases for the CFWS petition in Case number 92-8339 and its abrupt dismissal. In various written documents and attempts to provide evidence through affidavit CFWS argues that its motives were not bad faith; however, throughout this proceeding CFWS has effectively prevented Petitioners from testing those bare assertions through discovery or cross examination. Mr. Mingea apparently travels extensively with his regular employment and the organization's mail goes to a post office box where it is picked up by volunteers. Contact with the organization was most effectively made through Marty Sharpe who attempted, in turn, to reach Mr. Mingea and convey messages. In the absence of competent evidence to the contrary, the record in this and in the underlying cases, number 91-8339 and 92-0364 support a reasonable inference that the petition in number 91-8339 was filed for a frivolous purpose. The order granting CFWS leave to amend its petition acknowledged that the original petition was legally insufficient. The petition was not amended within the allotted period; but rather was voluntarily dismissed shortly after legal counsel appeared on behalf of the organization. This dismissal reduces, but does not eliminate exposure to liability for filing the initial petition. The fees and costs requested by the Petitioners here are reasonable. Those fees are supported by billing logs attached to the motions for sanctions and reflect an hourly rate of $100.00 for BDA and $160.00 for High Point. Douglas Rillstone testified to the reasonableness of a total of $9,592.00 for High Point, and $2,495.00 for BDA. Those totals are not supported by billing logs and it is not possible to determine the basis for those amounts beyond the original amounts requested.
Findings Of Fact On March 11, 1994, FDOT issued Notice of Violation Number CM03114D to Timothy Paletti, d/b/a Suwanee Belle Marina and Restaurant. Mr. Paletti received the notice on March 18, 1994 and timely requested formal hearing. The sign cited in the notice is a mobile sign located on U.S. Highway 19, two hundred feet north of the Gilchrist County Line, in Dixie County. FDOT has not issued a state outdoor advertising sign permit corresponding to the cited mobile sign to Timothy Paletti d/b/a Suwannee Belle Marina and Restaurant. This particular sign has never been permitted to anyone. The cited mobile sign is two-sided so that it can be read by traffic approaching from both directions. It sits on a narrow pie-shaped parcel of land on the west side of U.S. Highway 19, on the north side of River Street as River Street enters U.S. Highway 19 from the west. U.S. Highway 19 and River Street form a "T" at that point. Respondent, in association with Marilou Clark, d/b/a Suwannee River Investment Enterprises, Inc., holds FDOT permits which correspond to outdoor advertising signs located on U.S. Highway 19 (northbound) approximately 100 feet north of Marina Drive. U.S. Highway 19 in Dixie County is part of the federal-aid primary system. The cited mobile sign informs the public travelling U.S. Highway 19 about the services offered at, and the location of, Suwannee Belle Marina and Restaurant. The cited mobile sign is located on property which the county has zoned "environmentally sensitive." Several properties owned by other parties are located between the cited mobile sign and Suwannee Belle Marina and Restaurant. The intervening properties all about River Street, which runs perpendicular to U.S. Highway 19 and which parallels a canal. The parcel of land upon which Suwannee Belle Marina and Restaurant are located is at the point at which the small canal and River Street reach either a larger canal or the Suwannee River, one block west of U.S. Highway 19. The intervening properties are used by their owners for their own private business or personal uses which have no relation to Suwannee Belle Marina and Restaurant. The cited mobile sign is not an official FDOT traffic directional sign. It has displayed such information as, "Boat Rentals," "Live Bait," and "Suwannee Belle Marina and Restaurant (with an arrow symbol)." Since at least 1975, FDOT has required state outdoor advertising sign permits for permanently erected signs which were maintained at or near the site upon which Respondent's cited mobile sign is currently located. Those signs were used to advertise the same marina. Richard Corbin d/b/a Yellow Jacket Marina, Inc., held FDOT permits which corresponded to the permanent signs previously maintained at or near the site of Respondent's cited mobile sign until those permits lapsed for non-payment of the annual sign permit renewal fees. In 1989, Respondent Paletti transacted to purchase the marina from Mr. Corbin. Respondent would not have acquired the marina and restaurant if he had not believed he could simultaneously use the roadside parcel containing the signs. He used all the signs to advertise Suwannee Belle Marina and Restaurant from 1989 onward. Respondent Paletti and Mr. Corbin have been involved in a series of lawsuits ever since 1989. Respondent successfully operated the marina and restaurant from 1989 through sometime in 1991 or 1992. The restaurant was first leased and then closed due to the amount of Respondent's time, energy, and money involved in these lawsuits. In 1993, the restaurant was only used for limited parties. The use of the primary parcel in 1994 is not clear on the record. Without becoming embroiled in minutiae, it is sufficient to find here that Mr. Corbin did not pay his annual FDOT sign permit renewal fees and would not agree to transfer his permits to Respondent, so Respondent paid the fees for awhile. FDOT refused to transfer the old sign permits to him. Respondent stopped paying the sign permit fees. After lapse of the original permits, the previously permitted permanent signs were removed by FDOT. The never-permitted mobile sign was not removed by FDOT. The previously permitted permanent signs were not in place and currently permitted as of FDOT's March 11, 1994 notice of violation for Respondent's mobile sign. Respondent had not timely requested formal hearing with regard to any of the agency actions culminating in the removal of the permanent signs, and as of March 11, 1994, his request time had long passed. James R. Clendenon owns the pie-shaped parcel upon which Respondent's cited mobile sign is located. It is normally a vacant lot except for the mobile sign. He leases it to Respondent. Respondent maintained that although the cited mobile sign is located on a parcel which is physically separate from the primary location of the restaurant and marina business, the two parcels function as one business site and neither parcel can function without the other. This position is grounded upon the need to direct potential customers down the one block of River Street to the primary site of the restaurant and marina because the signs affixed to the restaurant and marina are not readily visible from U.S. Highway 19. River Street sometimes floods. In 1990, it flooded four times and was under water three weeks at a time. Due to flooding in the whole area, Respondent had to pick up guests on the sign site parcel and ferry them down the canal that runs parallel to River Street to the restaurant. During this period, Respondent moved his manager's trailer to the sign site parcel and also sold pontoon boats from that location. FDOT inspectors have visited the site ten times over the last two years and seen nothing on the sign site except the signs. FDOT contended that the "environmentally sensitive" nature of the sign site precludes its use for any commercial purpose, but FDOT's exhibit admitted to support this premise actually provides for special exceptions under the land use plan and zoning statutes for water-dependent commercial uses such as marinas and limited campgrounds. By itself, the sign site could not be used for either purpose. Respondent conceded that the marina and restaurant site can still be used if the sign on the non-contiguous parcel is removed, but he maintained that then his primary site would not be "functional." Based upon his vivid testimony that to remove the sign constitutes "a dagger in the heart of my business," it is found that by "nonfunctional" he means, "financially disastrous." His testimony did not explore any uses other than a restaurant and marina for which the primary location could be used.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Department of Transportation enter a final order requiring Respondent to remove the mobile sign which is the subject of its Notice of Violation Number CM031194D within 10 days of the entry of the final order, and instructing agency staff to remove the sign on the eleventh day if Respondent has not previously done so. RECOMMENDED this 1st day of May, 1995, at Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of May, 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER 94-3420T The following constitute specific rulings, pursuant to S120.59(2), F.S., upon the parties' respective proposed findings of fact (PFOF). Petitioner's PFOF: 1-7, 9-11 Accepted except that cumulative material was not utilized. 8 Covered only as proven in FOF 7, 14, and 18. Respondent's PFOF: Respondent's proposed order is divided into some sections not normally recognized in such orders or pursuant to Sections 120.57(1) and 120.59(2) F.S. or Chapter 60Q-2 F.A.C. Respondent has also created two segments, labelled "Proposed Findings of Fact A. Review of Evidence" on pg. 4, and "B. Proposed Findings of Fact" on pg. 8. Review of the Evidence The introductory paragraph is rejected as mere argumentation. Accepted except that unnecessary, subordinate, and/or cumulative material has not been utilized, and legal argumentation has been excluded. Contrary to Section 120.59(2) F.S., the posthearing order, and Rules 60Q-2.024 and 60Q-2.031 F.A.C., this proposal does not number sentences or paragraphs and runs over three pages long. It is rejected for that reason and because it intermixes legal argumentation and factual proposals. The substance not covered in some manner in the recommended order is immaterial or irrelevant, or subordinate, unnecessary and/or cumulative to the facts as found. Proposed Findings of Fact None of these proposals contains any citation to the record, and all are rejected for that reason. PFOF 1, 5, 7, and 9 are rejected because, as stated, they are conclusions of law or legal argumentation. All of PFOF 2-4, 6, and 8 have been covered in substance. COPIES FURNISHED: Helene A. Mayton Assistant General Counsel Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street, M.S. 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Norm La Coe, Esquire Postal Box 140 226 Gainesville, Florida 32614-0226 Ben G. Watts, Secretary Attn Diedre Grubbs, M.S. 58 Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450
The Issue Appellants raise five issues on appeal: (1) that the Commission erred in approving the Application despite there being no competent substantial evidence of LKCCC’s financial capacity to develop the property; (2) that the Commission erred in approving the Application despite there being no competent substantial evidence that the project will meet the “local needs” requirement of the MCC; (3) that the Commission’s Public Meeting denied Appellants due process, and was fundamentally unfair; (4) that the Commission erred in approving the Application despite the failure of the project to comply with the “phasing and aggregation” requirements of the MCC for reserved outparcels; and (5) that the Commission erred in approving the Application despite the failure of the project to comply with, and the project’s inconsistency with, the Lower Keys Livable CommuniKeys Plan (“CommuniKeys Plan”).
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing relating to the issue of jurisdiction, the following relevant facts are found: On or about March 28, 1979, respondents T.V. Rodriquez and Trafalgar Developers of Florida, Inc. filed with the Department of Environmental Regulation an application for a permit to conduct dredge and fill activities on a 2.3 acre area located within a 495 acre planned unit development in Orlando. The 2.3 acre tract is located in a cypress swamp area in the northeast portion of the development site. The application sought authority to excavate 2,000 cubic yards of material for the installation of a five foot diameter drainage culvert, and to backfill the installed pipe with 3,000 cubic yards of fill material. All of the construction activity was to be confined to the 2.3 acre tract which, as noted above, was a cypress swamp area interior to the project boundaries. While there were no other property owners immediately adjacent to the cypress swamp upon which the dredging and filling was to occur, the applicants did provide for notification purposes the names of two property owners which were the closest, although not adjacent, to the proposed project site. Neither the petitioners nor the intervenors in this proceeding were among the two names provided. The Department of Environmental Regulation reviewed the application and, on April 5, 1980, requested further infor- mation. Upon receipt of this information, an employee of DER, Jim Morgan, conducted a field inspection of the dredge and fill site on May 10, 1979. It was Mr. Morgan's conclusion that the proposed project would result in the elimination of approxi- mately three percent of the wetlands associated with the eastern boundary of the 495 acre development, and would not significantly impact the remaining portion of the wetland community. Mr. Morgan recommended that the application be approved, with two specific conditions. One condition pertained to the containment of turbidity at the project site if the site is inundated during construction. The other condition pertained to a proposed swale for outfall of a planned ditch system for the drainage of the 495 acre planned unit development. On May 18, 1979, the Department of Environmental Regulation issued Permit No. 48-18682-4E to respondents to excavate 2,000 cubic yards of material for the installation of a five foot diameter drainage culvert and to backfill the installed pipe with 3,000 cubic yards of fill material suitable for use as-a golf course foundation. The permit contained the specific conditions recommended by Mr. Morgan. Specific Condition Number 1 reads as follows: "(1) The drainage plan for this proposed 495 acre planned unit development will require the lowering of the water table via way of a planned ditch system, thus making development feasible. This ditch system will ultimately [sici discharge to an existing county canal via way of a proposed swale, which is exempt from this department's per- mitting pursuant to Chapter 17-4.04(10)(k). A swale conveys water only during and immediately after the advent of a storm. This installation must conform to this explicit definition, otherwise, additional dredge and fill permits will be required, including the entire development's drainage facility. Upon completion of the development, this department shall be notified and periodic inspections will be performed by the department's staff to determine if the outfall conforms with the definition of a swale." By letters to DER dated August 20, 1979, the petitioners herein stated that they had just been informed on August 17, 1979, of the issuance of the subject permit to the respondents. Their original letters to the DER, as well as their amended and restated petition, claim that, as owners of property located adjacent to the property upon which the drainage project would be conducted pursuant to the subject permit, they were entitled to notice prior to the issuance of the permit and that their substantial interest will be affected by the drainage project authorized by said permit. The petitioners Frances Bandy and Charles R. Bandy own Lot 14 in Golden Acres which is a considerable distance from the 2.3 acre tract upon which respondents are permitted to conduct dredging and filling activities. The petitioners Anna and Lee Rowe and Fay M. Handy own Lots 20 and 21 in Golden Acres, as well as a five acre lake. These lots and lake are even further from the permitted dredge and fill site. None of the petitioners own property which is adjacent to the permitted 2.3 acre site. Betty J. Hardy, Wayne Hardy and Vista Landscaping Inc. moved to intervene in this proceeding by motion dated March 5, 1980. An amended motion to intervene was filed on March 17, 1980, adding Julian T. Hardy as a named party intervenor. The intervenors own and have a business interest in property located a considerable distance south of the permitted 2.3 acres. The intervenors conduct a wholesale nursery business on their property. Their complaint lies with the effect that the proposed drainage of the entire 495 acre development and the alleged drainage ditch located on property contiguous to their property will have on their property and business interests. As of the time of the hearing on March 18, 1980, construction pursuant to the permit issued on May 18, 1979, was approximately ninety-five percent (95 percent) complete.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law recited herein, it is RECOMMENDED that the petitioners request for an administrative hearing pursuant to Section 120.57(1) be dismissed, with prejudice, for lack of jurisdiction. Respectfully submitted and entered this 22nd day of April, 1980, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE D. TREMOR Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 101 Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Cleatous J. Simmons Lowndes, Drosdick and Doster Post Office Box 2809 Orlando, Florida 32802 Roger D. Schwenke Carlton, Fields, Ward, Emmanual, Smith and Cutler, P.A. Post Office Box 3239 Tampa, Florida 33601 Stanley J. Niego Office of General Counsel Department of Environmental Regulation 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Honorable Jacob Varn Secretary, Department of Environmental Regulation 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact Application for consumptive use permit No. 75-00225 is a request for an existing use to be withdrawn from the Floridan Aquifer from two different wells. These two wells are located in the Hillsborough Basin and in Polk County. The property contiguous to the wells encompasses approximately 80.9 acres. The water is to be used for citrus processing and disposed of off site. The permit seeks, for average daily withdrawal, 2.98 million gallons per day for one well and 1.566 million gallons per day for the other well for a total average daily withdrawal of 3.864 million gallons per day. For maximum daily withdrawal the permit seeks 4.096 million gallons per day for one well and 2.792 million gallons per day for the other well for a total maximum daily withdrawal of 6.888 million gallons per day. The amount of water sought to be consumptively used by this application greatly exceeds the water crop of the subject lands owned by applicant. Mr. John C. Jennings and Mr. William Sunderland, owners of property adjacent to the Kraft property, appeared in their own behalf and stated that they felt that their wells were being hurt because of the large quantities of water pumped by Kraft. They did not attempt to offer expert testimony nor did they claim to be hydrologists. They did note that each had substantial problems with their wells running out of water.
Recommendation It does not appear that the district has had a reasonable opportunity to examine the objections and comments of Messers. Jennings and Sunderland with regard to the effect of the applied for consumptive use on their property. These objections were apparently raised for the first time at the hearing. As noted in paragraph 6, if the wells of Messers. Jennings and Sunderland are substantially affected in an adverse manner by applicant's use of such large quantities of water, such a use would not seem to be a reasonable, beneficial use as is required for permit unless further conditions were placed upon the permit. Therefore, it is recommended that the Southwest Florida Water Management District staff further investigate the effect of the applied for consumptive use on the wells located on the property of John C. Jennings and William Sunderland prior to the Board taking formal action on this application. ENTERED this 26th day of May, 1976, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHRIS H. BENTLEY, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Jay T. Ahern, Esquire Staff Attorney Southwest Florida Water Management District P. 0. Box 457 Brooksville, Florida 33512 Douglas T. Moring, Esquire Kraftco Corporation Kraftco Court Glenview, Illinois 60025
The Issue Whether the Planning Commission deviated from essential requirements of law in denying Appellant's application for a special use permit to operate a car rental agency at 2576 Harn Boulevard, Clearwater, Florida.
Findings Of Fact Manual Kastrenakes, d/b/a Pinellas Rent-A-Car, Appellant, purchased the property which is the subject of this appeal in 1989. Prior to this purchase, the property was the site of a Farm Store, which has been vacated. Appellant also owns a filling station in the vicinity of this property which is legally operated and is in compliance with all zoning requirements. The property is zoned CH (highway commercial). Within Highway Commercial Districts, outdoor retail sales, displays and/or storage are permitted as conditional uses. Section 135.129(11), City of Clearwater Land Development Code. Objections to the granting of this conditional use permit come from residents of multifamily residential buildings adjacent to and west of the property in issue. Many of those residents are retired and/or infirm and contend they will be disturbed by the operation of a rental car business "in their back yard." To counter some of these objections, Appellant agreed to conditions being imposed on this permit limiting hours of operation, lighting, paving, buffer zones, and parking. Protestants also contend that operating the business would depreciate the value of their property, but no credible evidence was presented to support this position. Appellant has further agreed that disabled or wrecked vehicles will not be stored on this property, and only fully operable rental automobiles will be stored and/or displayed on this property.
