The Issue Whether Josephine K. Saunders, the designated beneficiary, is entitled to the benefits payable on the teacher's retirement account of William E. Saunders, deceased, or whether she contractually waived her right to such benefits.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Division enter a final order denying the relief requested by petitioner and distributing the Teachers' Retirement System benefits of William E. Saunders to Josephine K. Saunders, the designated beneficiary. DONE AND RECOMMENDED this 15th day of December, 1981, in Tallahassee, Florida. R. L. CALEEN, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of December, 1981.
The Issue The issue addressed in this proceeding is whether Petitioner is entitled to retain retirement benefits received by him during the time periods May 19, 1983, through December 31, 1983; May 18, 1984, through December 31, 1984; and May 17, 1985 through June 30, 1985.
Findings Of Fact On June 26 and 27, 1990, respectively, the Respondent and the Petitioner submitted to the Hearing Officer their proposed Findings of Fact. In the Appendix to the Recommended Order the Hearing Officer submitted recommended rulings thereon. The following constitutes the rulings in this Final Order on those proposed Findings of Fact. The Petitioner's proposed Findings of Fact Nos. 1, 2, and 3 are hereby accepted and adopted in that they are supported by competent, substantial evidence. The Petitioner's proposed Finding of Fact No. 4 is hereby rejected as an ultimate finding of fact in that it a recitation of isolated bits and pieces of testimony of witnesses, and it is not proper as an ultimate finding of fact. The Petitioner's proposed Finding of Fact No. 5 is hereby rejected upon the authority of Cantor v. Cochran, 184 So.2d 173 (Fla.), in that it is based upon statements of the parties as to the working relationship, which under the Cantor case is not competent evidence. The Petitioner's proposed Finding of Fact No. 6 is hereby rejected upon the grounds and for the reason stated in Paragraph No. 3. The Petitioner's proposed Finding of Fact No. 7 is accepted to the extent that on November 1, 1984, the Petitioner was an employee of the Union County School Board, and continued as such through June 30, 1987, but the remainder of that proposed Finding of Fact No. 7 is hereby rejected in that it is based on the statements and arrangements of the parties, which, based upon the Cantor case do not constitute competent evidence. The Petitioner's proposed Findings of Fact Nos. 8, 9, and 11, are hereby rejected in that each of them is ambiguous, irrelevant, not based upon any competent substantial evidence in the record, and do not serve to either prove or disapprove any of the issues in this cause. The Petitioner's proposed Finding of Fact No. 10, is hereby rejected in that is erroneous as to the dates in question and as to the number of hours in the School Board workweek. The dates in 1983, 1984, and 1985, during which the Petitioner's retirement benefits had been suspended because of exceeding the 780-hour work limitation were as follows: May 19, 1983, through December 31, 1983; May 18, 1984, through December 31, 1984; and May 17, 1985, through June 30, 1985. The Respondent's proposed Finding of Fact Nos. 1 through 8 are each hereby accepted and adopted in that they are each based upon competent, substantial evidence.
Recommendation It is accordingly, RECOMMENDED: That the Division enter a Final Order finding that Petitioner was overpaid retirement benefits for the time periods of May 25, 1985 through June 30, 1985, in the amount of $3024.66. DONE and ORDERED this 31st day of August, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE CLEAVINGER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of August, 1990.
The Issue The issue is whether payment of Petitioner's retirement benefits should have commenced after the filing of an application to retire with the Division of Retirement, with an effective date of April 1, 2004, or be retroactively changed to the date of his termination of employment, July 1, 2003.
Findings Of Fact On July 19, 1995, Petitioner applied for membership in the Special Risk Division of the Elected Officers' Class of the Florida Retirement System ("FRS"). On August 14, 1995, Respondent sent Petitioner a letter admitting him into FRS. On September 6, 1995, Sarabeth Snuggs, Chief of the Bureau of Enrollment and Contributions for Respondent, sent Petitioner a letter revoking his membership in FRS. On December 17, 1996, Petitioner wrote to Sarabeth Snuggs responding to Respondent's decision to revoke his membership in FRS. Petitioner cited Section 121.052(2)(d), Florida Statutes, which provides that membership in FRS includes "any constitutional county elected officer assuming office after July 1, 1981, including any sheriff." The Consolidated City of Jacksonville was created by the Florida Legislature with the enactment of Chapter 67-1320, Laws of Florida. Section 1.01 of the Jacksonville Charter provides that the county government of Duval County and the municipal government of the City of Jacksonville are consolidated into a single body politic. The Charter further provides that the consolidated government succeeds to and possesses all of the properties of the former government. After being denied membership in FRS, Petitioner and other members of the consolidated government and its instrumentalities worked diligently to convince Respondent to admit Petitioner into FRS. During Petitioner's attempts to be included in FRS, Respondent repeatedly took the position that Duval County did not exist as a county agency. In a letter to Petitioner dated January 15, 1997, Ms. Snuggs wrote that the consolidated Duval County government "chose to consolidate as a 'city' government." Mr. Keane worked with the Duval County Legislative Delegation to amend Chapter 121 to specifically clarify the fact that the Duval County Sheriff and Clerk of Court are constitutional officers entitled to participate in FRS. In 2002, the Florida Legislature adopted language to clarify the Duval County Sheriff and Clerk of Court's status with respect to FRS. In a letter dated June 24, 2002, Petitioner thanked Ms. Snuggs for recognizing his right to elect membership in FRS. Petitioner observed that, since he was in the last year of his second term as Sheriff (Duval County allows only two consecutive terms), he wanted confirmation of his "right to connect the previous seven (7) years of service as Sheriff." The June 24, 2002, letter also asked for "guidance" from Respondent. The purpose of the June 24, 2002, letter was for Petitioner to learn how Respondent intended to treat his first six years of service. Petitioner sought to avoid any problems since his retirement date was rapidly approaching. On October 10, 2002, Petitioner and Mr. George Dandelake, the Chief of the Budget and Management Division of the Sheriff's Office, wrote to Ms. Snuggs requesting a calculation of the amount of employer contributions required on Petitioner's behalf. The October 10 letter also requested that Respondent "identify what documents are required, in addition to the contribution amount which will be paid by the City, that must be supplied to the Florida Retirement System." Petitioner re-applied for membership in FRS, which was granted on June 1, 2002, after the effective date of the legislation designed to specifically admit the Duval County Sheriff and Clerk of Court into FRS. On June 18, 2003, twelve days before the expiration of his term of office, still not having received confirmation of the status of his prior service, Petitioner sent a letter to Ms. Snuggs advising that FRS had not recognized his service from 1995 through 2002. Petitioner again stated in the letter that he was terminating his position as Sheriff on June 30, 2003. Less than a week prior to the termination of his term, Petitioner received two "Statement[s] of Account" dated June 24, 2003, indicating that "you have until retirement to pay the amount due on your account." The statements further indicated that "when you become vested for monthly benefits, we will provide you an estimate of benefits with and without this service." According to the first Statement of Account, Petitioner was entitled to purchase prior service at the 1.6 percent multiplier rate for the FRS regular class. According to the second Statement of Account, Petitioner was entitled to purchase prior service at the 2.0 percent multiplier rate for the FRS special risk class. Neither Statement of Account was correct, as both failed to permit Petitioner to purchase service at the 3.0 percent rate for special risk, despite the fact that Petitioner had served a continuous and uninterrupted term as Sheriff. The Statement of Account did not advise Petitioner that he must submit a separate retirement application, Form FR-11, in order to preserve his retirement date. The statement did advise Petitioner that interest would be assessed at a rate of 6.5 percent. This warning appeared in bold face on the Statement of Account. The June 24, 2003, statements were the first time that Petitioner was supplied with the amount due to purchase service credit. Since neither statement applied the correct multiplier rate (3.0 percent) for all eight years of Petitioner's service as Sheriff, neither statement was correct. Recognizing that only six days remained prior to the expiration of Petitioner's term as Sheriff, Mr. Keane advised Petitioner to submit payment to Respondent on an expedited basis. After receiving the June 24, 2003, Statements of Account, Petitioner prepared a letter dated June 26, 2003, to Cal Ray, the Director of the Department of Administration and Finance for the Consolidated City of Jacksonville. In this letter, Petitioner requested an employer contribution in the amount of $163,554.32 to purchase his prior service. Petitioner further requested an expedited preparation of the check to ensure delivery to Respondent by July 1, 2003. The letter to Mr. Ray requested payment of the amounts that would have been periodically contributed by the City of Jacksonville if Respondent had been acknowledged as a participant in FRS in 1995. On June 27, 2003, three days prior to the expiration of his term of office, Petitioner drove from Jacksonville to Tallahassee to meet with Respondent's representatives, including Ms. Snuggs, regarding Petitioner's retirement. Mr. Dandelake accompanied Petitioner on this trip. At the June 27, 2003, meeting, Petitioner personally delivered a check to Respondent in the amount of $163,554.32. Respondent accepted the check and issued a written receipt signed by Sarabeth Snuggs. Petitioner was never told during the June 27, 2003, meeting with Respondent that he would forfeit benefits if he failed to complete an application. Respondent knew that Petitioner was leaving office on June 30, 2003. Respondent never discussed the filing of an application for retirement benefits at any time during the course of its conversations and correspondence with Petitioner. Petitioner was never told by Respondent to complete any forms to protect his rights to the 2.0 percent multiplier during the pendency of his dispute with Respondent. Petitioner was never provided any handbook, notice, statutes, or rules indicating he would forfeit benefits under any circumstances. When Petitioner left the June 27, 2003, meeting, both he and Mr. Dandelake understood that he was still engaged in a dispute with Respondent over his entitlement to the 3.0 percent multiplier. Petitioner knew that he was required to file an application in order to receive retirement benefits. Petitioner testified that if he had left the June 27 meeting with any indication that he would forfeit benefits by not filing an application, he would have filed something, with advice of counsel, to preserve his rights. Petitioner received an Estimate of Benefits via fax from Respondent on June 27, 2003, reflecting an annual benefit of $23,105.90. This statement valued 6.92 years of Petitioner's uninterrupted special risk service as Sheriff using the 2.0 percent multiplier, and 1.08 years of service as Sheriff using the 3.0 percent multiplier. The June 27, 2003, statement lists Petitioner's retirement date as July 1, 2003. The estimate does not warn Petitioner that he must do anything in order to preserve his July 2003 retirement date. The estimate states only that it is subject to "final verification of all factors." Petitioner's term of office as elected Sheriff ended on June 30, 2003. Petitioner's employment terminated when his term expired on that date. Respondent was aware of the dates of the expiration of Petitioner's term of office as well as his employment termination date. When Petitioner's employment terminated on June 30, 2003, it was unclear whether he would be credited with the 3.0 percent multiplier for his eight years of special risk service. Petitioner was not notified by Respondent prior to the expiration of his term as Sheriff on June 30, 2003, that he needed to submit a retirement application. The first time Petitioner was advised by Respondent of the need to file an application for retirement benefits was in the comment section of the Estimate of Retirement Benefits provided to him by letter dated March 4, 2004. The warning was printed in bold face type. The Estimate of Retirement Benefits dated June 27, 2003, did not include the bold face warning to file an application. Respondent was not provided with a Division of Retirement publication entitled "Preparing to Retire" prior to his leaving service on June 30, 2003. In fact, the copy of the publication offered into evidence by Respondent is dated "July 2003," subsequent to Petitioner's retirement. As the only member of FRS in his office in Jacksonville, Petitioner had no staff or employees trained in FRS or Florida retirement benefits. Petitioner was provided with a "Preparing to Retire" booklet in March 2004. On November 3, 2003, Florida Attorney General Opinion 2003-46 confirmed that Petitioner, as the elected Sheriff, was eligible for membership in the Elected Officer's Class of the Florida Retirement System. On December 31, 2003, and on January 16, 2004, Petitioner's counsel attempted to obtain clarification from Respondent regarding Petitioner's retirement benefits. The December 31, 2003, letter noted that the "extraordinary delay" in resolving the issue of Petitioner's benefits was at no time due to fault on the part of Petitioner. Respondent never refuted or disputed this statement. By letter dated March 4, 2004, Petitioner was finally advised by Respondent that he was entitled to be credited with the higher 3.0 percent multiplier for all eight years of his service as Sheriff. Petitioner noted that the March 4, 2004, Statement of Account, while properly applying the 3.0 percent multiplier, now had changed Petitioner's retirement date to April 2004 from the previous estimates showing a retirement date of July 2003. The March 4, 2004, statement included the bold face notice to Petitioner that he must file an application for retirement benefits. No prior notices or correspondence from Respondent had informed Petitioner that he must file Form FR-11 in order to retain his retirement date of July 1, 2003. After formally being notified that he would receive the 3.0 percent multiplier for all eight of his years of service as Sheriff, and after having received the notice that he must file Form FR-11, Petitioner submitted the form in April 2004. Respondent is a fiduciary charged with acting in the best interest of participants in FRS. Andy Snuggs, who travels around the state educating employers and employees in FRS, acknowledged that Petitioner was not responsible for the delay by Respondent in recognizing Petitioner's entitlement to the 3.0 percent multiplier. Mr. Snuggs acknowledged that he does not tell employees that they will forfeit benefits if they delay the filing of their applications. Petitioner received his first retirement check in May 2004 which was based upon the benefit established in March 2004 of $32,624.58 annually, not the $23,105.90 previously established by Respondent in June 2003. Petitioner has received no retroactive benefits for the period of July 1, 2003, through April 30, 2004. In a letter dated May 6, 2004, Petitioner stated that his acceptance of the first retirement check was not to be construed by Respondent of a waiver of his rights to retroactive benefits from July 1, 2003, forward.
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner be awarded retirement benefits at the rate of 3.0 percent per year for his eight years of Elected Officer's Class of service, retroactive to July 1, 2003. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of July, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT S. COHEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of July, 2005. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert D. Klausner, Esquire Klausner & Kaufman, P.A. 10059 Northwest 1st Court Plantation, Florida 33324 Robert B. Button, Esquire Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 160 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 Sarabeth Snuggs, Director Division of Retirement Department of Management Services Post Office Box 9000 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-9000 Alberto Dominguez, General Counsel Division of Retirement Department of Management Services Post Office Box 9000 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-9000
The Issue The issue posed for decision herein is whether or not the Respondent's (Division of Retirement) denial of Petitioner's claim to buy for retirement credit purposes, service while she was a student nurse during the period August, 1941 through December, 1944 was proper.
Findings Of Fact Based upon my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, the arguments of counsel, and the entire record compiled herein, the following relevant facts are found. The facts herein are virtually undisputed. From August, 1941, through December, 1944, Petitioner was a student nurse at Florida State Hospital (Hospital) at Chattahoochee, Florida. As a student nurse, Petitioner worked twelve (12) hours a day, six and one-half (6-1/2) days per week with one full day off each month. During the weekdays, Petitioner spent time in class, with the remainder of time spent in the wards at the Hospital. Petitioner averaged between thirty-nine (39) and forty-seven (47) hours of work per week at the Hospital. As a student nurse, Petitioner received a salary of $15.00 per month in addition to her room, board, uniform and various fringe benefits such as medical care and leave, much like other Hospital employees. Personnel problems were resolved through the personnel office as with other employees. Petitioner returned to work at the Hospital as a Registered Nurse in October, 1954, and has worked almost continually to the present time. During the period 1970 through early 1972, employees of Florida State Hospital were given the opportunity to participate in the State and County Officers and Employees Retirement System (SCOERS). Petitioner participated in that retirement system. During the period 1970 through 1972, various state retirement systems, including SCOERS, merged and formed the present Florida Retirement System (FRS). Petitioner was given the option to transfer to FRS and in fact exercised that option by designating that election on a ballot provided by the personnel office at Florida State Hospital (Petitioner's Exhibit 1). The effective date of that transfer to FRS is December 1, 1970. During the period 1970 through early 1972, Respondent permitted transferees of the SCOERS retirement system to transfer student nurse credits as part of the retirement credits in the same manner as "full-time work" for retirement credit purposes. In early 1972, Respondent changed its policy of allowing work as a student nurse to be credited toward retirement benefits. C. J. Brock has been the personnel manager at Florida State Hospital in Chattahoochee since approximately 1968. He was initially hired at the Hospital in 1955. As personnel manager, Mr. Brock is in charge of submitting employee claims for retirement credits for various types of employment service to FRS for retirement benefits.' Mr. Brock recalled Petitioner visiting his office pan various occasions between the periods 1963 through 1972 inquiring as to the manner for purchasing student time for retirement credit purposes. Mr. Brock advised Petitioner that he would research the wage statements to determine the exact amount of student time she had earned and would refer the matter to FRS for a decision, Mr. Brock is not authorized to act for or on behalf of Respondent. The interaction between the Hospital's personnel officer and Respondent is limited to the referral of claims and certification of wage and employment statements. As such, there is no agency relationship between the Hospital and Respondent. This referral was made by Mr. Brock on Petitioner's behalf on December 20, 1972, and the request was denied. Former student nurses who were members of SCOERS and transferred to FRS during the periods 1970 through early 1972 had been allowed to purchase retirement credit for their student nurse service. This practice ended in early 1972. In this regard, Mr. Brock has certified the payroll records for student nurses who purchased retirement credit for their student nurse time, Ruth Sampson, Assistant Bureau Chief for the Division of Retireent, has primarily been involved in reviewing retirement benefit calculations since approximately 1969. Mrs. Sampson is familiar with the merger of SCOERS and FRS. Mrs. Sampson affirmed that Respondent had a policy which allowed members of SCOERS who transferred to FRS to purchase retirement credit for student employment time and that such policy was followed from December 1, 1970 (the inception of FRS) to early 1972. This policy was also followed by the SCOERS administrator prior to December 1, 1970. This unwritten policy was changed, according to Mrs. Sampson for two primary reasons. First, Chapter 122, Florida Statutes, did not permit the purchase of student time. Secondly, with the combination of SCOERS and the Teacher Retirement System (TRS) into the combined FRS system, an inequity existed since TRS members, unlike student nurses, were not allowed to purchase student time. As stated, the letter from Mr. Brock certifying Petitioner's employment and wage statements for the period in question was dated December 20, 1972. Mrs. Sampson, by letter dated March 30, 1973, requested additional information respecting the salary paid Petitioner and the amount of time she actually spent working at the Hospital during the period in question. Mr. Brock replied by letter dated April 4, 1973, advising that during the period in question, Petitioner was a student nurse at the Hospital which paid a full-time salary of $15.00 per month. By letter dated May 14, 1973, Mrs. Sampson denied Petitioner's claim since Petitioner was primarily a student during the period that the prior service claim was submitted (Joint Exhibit No. 1). Mr. Robert L. Kennedy, Jr. , the former Director of FRS, appeared and related that the policy decision was made to discontinue the practice of allowing student time to be credited for retirement purposes since that practice was not contemplated by pertinent statutes. Former Director Kennedy disagreed with the Comptroller's policy decision which had previously allowed this practice.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED: That the Petitioner's appeal of the State Retirement Director's decision denying her request to purchase prior service credit for her service as a student nurse be DENIED. Accordingly, it is RECOMMENDED that the decision of the State Retirement Director be SUSTAINED. RECOMMENDED this 13th day of May, 1980, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Edward S. Stafman, Esquire Diane K. Kiesling, Esquire PATTERSON and TRAYNHAN Division of Retirement 1215 Thomasville Road Cedars Executive Center Tallahassee, Florida 32302 2639 North Monroe Street Suite 207C - Box .81 Tallahassee, Florida 32303 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER =================================================================
The Issue Whether or not the Respondent, State of Florida, Department of Administration, Division of Retirement, was in error in refusing to allow the Petitioner, John S. Forster, Jr., a/k/a John S. Forster to repay his contributions to the Florida Retirement Systems after he had requested and been granted a refund of his contributions made to the Florida Retirement Systems.
Findings Of Fact John S. Forster, Jr. applied for a job with the University of North Florida, Jacksonville, Florida. That application was under the name John S. Forster. He was given employment by the University and commenced the job. His position was as Store Keeper II. That job involved the receiving and distribution of incoming materials which the University was purchasing. Sometime in the middle to late part of February, 1976 the Petitioner suffered an injury in his employment and was required to be away from his work. During the course of the treatment of the Petitioner and subsequent contact by the employer, it was discovered that the Petitioner had on several occasions given false answers on his employment applications and medical questionnaires. Specifically, in answering questions propounded to him about former serious illness or operations, he had answered in the negative when in fact he had had a back condition which required surgery. This finding is borne out by the Respondent's Exhibits 2, 3 and 4, admitted into evidence, which are employment questionnaires and medical questionnaires completed by the petitioner. After the discovery of the false answers and subsequent to the Petitioner having been away from his employment for an extended period of time, a decision was made to terminate the Petitioner from his employment with the University of North Florida. Upon receiving the notice of termination the Petitioner had no further contact with the University of North Florida and did not attend any form of exit interview, as is the policy of the University. However, prior to his employment, the University had given an orientation session in which he was made familiar with the right that he had under the Florida Retirement Systems, to include the distribution of certain brochures of information. It is not clear how the Petitioner obtained the form, but he did obtain a form which is a form utilized for requesting refund of contributions to the Florida Retirement Systems. This form may be found as Respondent's Exhibit 1, admitted into evidence. The form was completed in its entirety by the Petitioner, with the exception of the portions which are to be completed by the last Florida employer. The portions to be completed by the Florida employer were not completed. effectively what the form did was to instruct the, Petitioner that his application for refund would waive, for him, his heirs and assignees all rights, title and interest in the Florida Retirement Systems. This waiver constitutes a waiver in law on the question of any rights the Petitioner, his heirs and assignees would have under the Florida Retirement Systems. The waiver becomes significant because the Petitioner went to a social security office and discovered that he would possibly be entitled to certain benefits due to the injury he suffered on the job with the University of North Florida, and those benefits would accrue to the Petitioner as a member of the Florida Retirement Systems. Notwithstanding that possible right to recovery, the Petitioner may not recover any compensation from the Florida Retirement Systems, due to his voluntary withdrawal from the Florida Retirement Systems by his refund request dated May 7, 1976. This withdrawal was made without coercion and without the knowledge of the University of North Florida and without the responsibility on the Dart of the University of North Florida or the Florida Division of Retirement to give any instructions on the implications of such a refund being granted. The Petitioner now has received his contributions from the Florida Retirement Systems and is not entitled to further relief as petitioned for.
Recommendation It is recommended that the Petitioner, John S. Forster, Jr. also known as John S. Forster, be denied any right to repay his contributions into the Florida Retirement Systems as a means to receiving compensation on the injury received while employed by the University of North Florida. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of April, 1978, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: John S. Forster, Jr. 11615 Jonathan Road Jacksonville, Florida 32225 Stephen S. Mathues, Esquire Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center 2639 North Monroe Street Suite 207-C - Box 81 Tallahassee, Florida 32303
The Issue Whether Petitioner qualifies for retirement benefits as a joint annuitant of the late Roy Hartley, Jr.
Findings Of Fact Roy Hartley, Jr., died on June 11, 1994, with more than ten years of service as a member of the Florida Retirement System (FRS). Mr. Hartley was employed as a police officer with the Metro Dade Police Department. His Social Security Number was 267-70-3906. At the time of his death, Mr. Hartley had personally contributed the sum of $655.38 to the FRS. On October 29, 1993, Mr. Hartley designated Petitioner as the beneficiary of his retirement benefits on FRS Form M-10. After Mr. Hartley's death, Petitioner applied to the State of Florida, Division of Retirement, for benefits as Mr. Hartley's designated beneficiary. To be entitled to monthly retirement benefits, Petitioner must establish that she was a dependent of Mr. Hartley so as to qualify as a joint annuitant of his monthly retirement benefits. Section 121.091(7)(g), Florida Statutes (1994), contains the option that Petitioner seeks to exercise: (7)(g) The designated beneficiary who is the surviving spouse or other dependent of a member whose employment is terminated by death subsequent to the completion of 10 years of credible service but prior to actual retirement may elect to receive a deferred monthly benefit as if the member had lived and had elected a deferred monthly benefit, as provided in paragraph (5)(b), calculated on the basis of the average final compensation and creditable service of the member at his death and the age the member would have attained on the commencement date of the deferred benefit elected by his beneficiary, paid in accordance with option 3 of paragraph (6)(a). Section 121.021(28)(c), Florida Statutes, contains the definition of the term "dependent beneficiary" that is pertinent to this proceeding: (28) Dependent beneficiary means any person designated by the member to receive a retirement benefit upon the member's death who is either: * * * (c) A person who is financially dependent for no less than one-half of his support from the deceased at retirement or at time of the death of such member, whichever occurs first. Rule 60S-6.001(34), Florida Administrative Code, defines the term "joint annuitant" as follows: JOINT ANNUITANT -- Means . . . any other person who is financially dependent where the other person is someone who is receiving one-half or more of his support from the member or is eligible to be claimed as a dependent or exemption on the Federal income tax return of the member. Petitioner and Mr. Hartley were not married, but they were living together at the time of his death. Except for a relatively short breakup, they had lived together for thirteen years. Petitioner was not claimed as a dependent on Mr. Hartley's federal income tax return. At the times pertinent to this proceeding, Petitioner worked part-time as a bartender. Respondent requires a person who is claiming to be a dependent of a deceased member pursuant to Section 121.021(28)(c), Florida Statutes, to document that the member contributed more than half of the alleged dependent's support. Stanley Colvin, the administrator of Respondent's retirement section, established that the Respondent typically reviews financial data for the year preceding the member's death in determining whether the deceased member contributed half of the alleged dependent's support. In making this determination, the Respondent determines the amount that the alleged dependent has to contribute to his or her own support and thereafter requires the alleged dependent to establish that the member contributed an amount equal to or more than that amount. Since the member died in June of 1994, Respondent in this case examined the W-2 statements for Petitioner and for Mr. Hartley for several years proceeding his death and for the year 1994. The 1993 W-2 statements reflect that Mr. Hartley had income from his employment of $67,360.23 while Petitioner had income from her employment of $9,450.00. Based on the differences between their earnings, it did not appear that there would be a problem with Petitioner's claim when Respondent's staff first reviewed the claim. The house in which Petitioner and Mr. Hartley lived at the time of his death was titled solely in the name of the Petitioner. This house was purchased in 1992. The fact that Petitioner owned the house only in her name caused Respondent's staff to question this claim. After learning about the house, Respondent's staff asked Petitioner to document that Mr. Hartley contributed more than half of her support and requested that she provide copies of cancelled checks and tax returns. In response to that request, Petitioner provided copies of certain cancelled checks and copies of her tax returns for 1992 and 1993. 1/ Mr. Hartley and Petitioner routinely gambled at Seminole Bingo. The down payment for the house came from their bingo winnings. Although they both gambled at bingo, Petitioner usually sat in the chair so that she would be the one to claim any bingo winnings. These winnings were reported on Petitioner's income taxes for the years 1992 and 1993. For 1992, Petitioner claimed bingo winnings in the amount of $60,531 and wagering losses in the amount $45,850. For 1993, Petitioner claimed bingo winnings in the amount of $21,860 and wagering losses in an equal amount. Petitioner's federal income tax return for 1993 reflected an adjusted gross income of $31,508. This sum included bingo winnings of $21,860. Petitioner testified, credibly, that they did not go to bingo as frequently in 1994 because Mr. Hartley had become interested in racing automobiles, but there was no evidence as to whether Petitioner or Mr. Hartley won at bingo during 1994 prior to Mr. Hartley's death. After reviewing the documentation provided by Petitioner, the Respondent denied monthly benefits to her. Respondent's denial was based on its interpretation of its rule that all income, including gambling winnings, should be considered as being available for the support of a person claiming to be a dependent of a member of the FRS. 2/ Respondent is not concerned with whether the alleged dependent loses his or her winnings at bingo or uses the winnings to pay bills. Respondent allocated the house payments, household expenses, and grocery costs paid by Mr. Hartley to have been one-half for Petitioner's support and the other half for his own support. 3. Respondent determined, correctly, that the documentation did not support a findings that Mr. Hartley contributed more than half of Petitioner's support when the bingo winnings were considered. Respondent advised Petitioner that she was entitled to a refund of Mr. Hartley's contribution to the FRS in the amount of $655.38. Petitioner established that Mr. Hartley paid the house payment ($683.00 per month in 1994), that he paid most of the household expenses, and that he routinely gave Petitioner cash for food, clothes, and miscellaneous expenses. The only bill routinely paid by Petitioner was the utility bill. She also paid her car bill and her auto insurance bill. Mr. Hartley occasionally assisted her with those bills. Based on the totality of the evidence, 4/ including the discrepancy between Mr. Hartley's earned income and Petitioner's earned income, 5/ the fact that Mr. Hartley paid the housing expenses, except for utilities, and the fact that he routinely gave Petitioner cash to use for her support, it is found that Mr. Hartley contributed more than $10,000 a year toward Petitioner's support. The evidence does not, however, support a finding that Mr. Hartley contributed more than $31,000 a year toward Petitioner's support. 6/
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a final order that adopts the findings of fact and conclusions of law contained herein and approves Petitioner's application for monthly benefits as a joint annuitant of Roy Hartley, Jr. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of August, 1996, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of August, 1996.
The Issue Whether the purported selection of Option 2 for payment of Florida Retirement System disability retirement benefits to Lon Emory Sweely, now deceased, and his beneficiary, the Petitioner, Richard A. Castillo, Jr., was valid and effective.
Findings Of Fact On or about June 20, 1990, Lon Emory Sweely executed a Division of Retirement Form FR-13 Florida Retirement System Application for Disability Retirement. The application indicated that Sweely's disability resulted from AIDS-related conditions. It selected Option 1, which the application designates as the "Maximum Benefit" and describes as follows: Full benefits payable to the member for his lifetime. If death occurs before the total benefits paid to member equals the contributions made, the difference, if any, is refunded to beneficiary in a lump sum payment. In so doing, Sweely rejected Option 2, which the application designates as "Ten Years Certain," and describes: Lifetime benefit to member, but not less than 120 monthly payments to someone. A decreased retirement benefit payable to a member during his lifetime, and in the event of his death with a period of ten (10) years after his retirement, the same monthly amount shall be payable for the balance of such ten (10) year period to his beneficiary, or in case the beneficiary is deceased, in accordance with Section 121.091(3), Florida Statutes, as though no beneficiary has been named. The application, also designated the Petitioner, Richard A. Castillo, Jr., as Sweely's sole beneficiary. (Sweely previously had designated the Petitioner as his beneficiary, with the Petitioner's mother as the first contingent beneficiary, on a Division of Retirement Personal History Record Form FRS-M10 (Revised 3/89) executed by Sweely on January 25, 1990.) At the time of Sweely's application for disability retirement, Sweely knew that he had full-blown AIDS and that his life expectancy would have to be estimated at approximately two years or less. There also is evidence that Eulah Lee McWilliams, the principal at the elementary school where Sweely taught, counseled Sweely on his options and advised Sweely to select the "Ten Years Certain" option. It is clear that Sweely wanted the Petitioner, and no one else, to be his sole beneficiary and to be provided for after his death in the manner and to the extent to which he decided. McWilliams believed that Sweely wanted the Petitioner to have the benefits of the "Ten Year Certain" Option 2. Based on their conversations, McWilliams believed that Sweely concurred with her recommendation in order to provide the maximum possible benefit to the Petitioner upon Sweely's death. But, in the face of Sweely's knowledge and McWilliams's advice and understanding, the application indicates that Sweely selected Option 1. There was evidence that the Petitioner was present and assisting Sweely when the Form FR-13 was executed and that the Petitioner filled out part of the form at Sweely's direction, as writing was inconvenient and difficult for Sweely at the time. But there was no evidence that Sweely was unable to make informed decisions when he executed Division of Retirement Form FR-13 on or about June 20, 1990. The evidence also did not prove that Sweely's choice of Option 1 was inadvertent error. At that point in time, Sweely may have wanted to be optimistic and to be able to enjoy and share with the Petitioner the maximum possible monthly benefit for as long as Sweely lived. McWilliams testified that, at the time, Sweely was trying to remain "up-beat" concerning his illness, in part thinking that this might extend his lifetime. A decision to choose Option 1, contrary to McWilliams's recommendation, also would not have been inconsistent with an earlier decision by Sweely in April, 1990, (this time in conformance with McWilliams's recommendation) to postpone applying for retirement benefits until he exhausted all of his accumulated fully-paid sick leave. Had Sweely died while on sick leave, the Petitioner would not have received the additional retirement benefits he is seeking in this case. (It is not clear from the record exactly what the benefits would have been, but it seems that the Petitioner would not have been entitled to any of the additional retirement benefits he is seeking in this case. Cf. Section 121.091(7), Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1990); F.A.C. Rule 60S-4.008.) A little over a month later, Sweely's condition worsened, and on or about August 14, 1990, he had to be hospitalized again (as already had happened from time to time during Sweely's full-blown AIDS.) On or about August 15, 1990, the Division of Retirement approved Sweely's application for disability retirement, effective July 1, 1990. On the same date, the Division of Retirement also sent Sweely a Division of Retirement Form FST-40c (R5/89) Acknowledgement of Retirement Application and a blank FRS- 11o "Option Selection Form for FRS Members." The Form FST-40c (R5/89) requested that Sweely "review carefully how the option one and two are paid to your beneficiary." The descriptions of the options in the Form FRS-11o were somewhat different from those in the Form FR-13 application. Option 1 was not called the "Maximum Benefit," and it was described as follows: A monthly benefit payable for my lifetime. Upon my death, the monthy benefit will stop and my beneficiary will receive only a refund of any contributionss I have paid which are in excess of the amount I have received in benefits. This option does not provide a continuing benefit to my beneficiary. (Emphasis in the original.) Option 2 was not called "Ten Years Certain," and it was described as follows: A reduced monthly benefit payable for my lifetime. If I die before receiving 120 monthly benefit payments, my designated beneficiary will receive a monthly benefit payment in the same amount as I was receiving until the monthly benefit payments to both me and my beneficiary equal 120 monthly payments. No further benefits are then payable. The FRS-11o "Option Selection Form for FRS Members" also stated in bold and underlined upper case type: "MEMBER MUST SIGN AND DATE IN THE PRESENCE OF A NOTARY PUBLIC." Whenever Sweely was hospitalized, the emotional strain on the Petitioner increased, and the time spent with Sweely in the hospital left the Petitioner less time to accomplish normal household tasks. The Petitioner's life and home usually became disorganized during Sweely's hospitalizations, and the Petitioner often allowed mail to pile up at their home at these times. The Petitioner testified that, notwithstanding Sweely's hospitalization and its disruptive effect on his life and habits, he happened to collect and read the mail on August 16, 1990. He testified that among the items of mail he read that day was the envelope postmarked the day before in Tallahassee, Florida, containing the Division of Retirement Form FST-40c (R5/89) Acknowledgement of Retirement Application and the blank FRS-11o "Option Selection Form for FRS Members." The Petitioner testified that he telephoned McWilliams to discuss the forms with her, and she asked him to bring them to the hospital. He testified, and she confirmed, that she met with the Petitioner at the hospital, looked at the forms, and explained them to the Petitioner. Believing, based on the conversations she had with Sweely before June 20, 1990, that Option 2 was Sweely's actual choice, McWilliams advised the Petitioner to choose Option 2. McWilliams testified that she discussed the matter with Sweely and with the Petitioner in Sweely's presence on August 16, 1990. (It certainly is possible that, had they discussed the matter with Sweely on August 16, 1990, Sweely might have chosen Option 2 at that time.) But the Petitioner testified that they did not discuss the matter with Sweely on August 16, 1990. The Petitioner explained that, although Sweely was oriented and physically able to write his name and, from time to time, was mentally lucid on that day, the Petitioner did not think that Sweely was in a position to give full consideration to the matter at the time they were discussing the forms because he was on morphine, was lethargic, and was having difficulty breathing without a non-rebreather mask. The Petitioner also did not think it was necessary to trouble Sweely with the matter, since the Petitioner believed that the selection of Option 2 on the Form FRS-11o was redundant and also that he was authorized to execute the form for Sweely as his attorney-in-fact under a purported durable power of attorney which Sweely executed on or about February 28, 1990, authorizing the Petitoner to act in Sweely's behalf in all matters. Under the circumstances on the afternoon of August 16, 1990, the Petitioner did not think that Sweely would have wanted to be troubled with the matter unnecessarily. He checked Option 2 and signed Sweely's name to the Form FRS-11o. On numerous previous occasions, the Petitioner had signed Sweely's name on Sweely's personal checks to pay Sweely's bills. In doing so, the Petitioner believed that he was acting properly under the authority of the purported durable power of attorney, and the bank always honored the checks the Petitioner signed this way. But on June 13, 1990, a physician insisted that the Petitioner sign a Division of Retirement medical records release form FR-13b in his own name as attorney-in-fact for Sweely. Himself not thinking well or clearly under the circumstances, the Petitioner assumed that his signature on the Form FRS-11o was valid. The Petitioner testified that it did not occur to him that there were notary services available for his use at the hospital. He testified that, after checking Option 2 and signing the Form FRS-11o, he telephoned his father, who was a notary, and asked him to come to the hospital to notarize something for him. The Petitioner's father confirmed this and also confirmed the Petitioner's testimony that they met in the hallway outside Sweely's hospital room, where the Petitioner gave his father the signed form and asked him to notarize it. Both testified that they did not discuss the form in any detail before the Petitioner returned to Sweely's hospital room. The Petitioner's father testified that he notarized the form thinking that Sweely had signed it. Sweely died two days later on August 18, 1990.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement, enter a final order: (1) that the purported selection, on the Form FRS-11o dated August 16, 1990, of Option 2 for payment of Florida Retirement System disability retirement benefits to Lon Emory Sweely, now deceased, and his beneficiary, the Petitioner, Richard A. Castillo, Jr., was invalid and ineffective; and (2) that the previous selection of Option 1 on the Form FR-13 executed on or about June 20, 1990, is valid and shall be given effect. RECOMMENDED this 20th day of January, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of January, 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER To comply with the requirements of Section 120.59(2), Fla. Stat. (1993), the following rulings are made on the parties' proposed findings of fact: Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact. 1.-9. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. Last sentence, rejected as not proven. Otherwise, accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. Last sentence, rejected as subordinate to facts not proven and as hearsay insufficient in itself to support a finding. (Taking as true that Sweely made such a statement to the Petitioner, his actions were not in accordance with the statement.) Otherwise, accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. 12.-14. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. Last sentence, rejected as subordinate to facts not proven and as hearsay insufficient in itself to support a finding. (Taking as true that Sweely made such a statement to McWilliams, his actions were not in accordance with the statement, and McWilliams also testified that Sweely tried to remain "up-beat," thinking that this might extend his lifetime.) Otherwise, accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. (Specifically, it was clear that Sweely wanted the Petitioner, and no one else, to be his sole beneficiary and to be provided for after his death in the manner and to the extent to which he decided.) Last sentence, not proven (as to expression of "clear and unqualified acknowledgment and understanding); also rejected as subordinate to facts not proven and as hearsay insufficient in itself to support a finding. (Taking as true that Sweely made such a statement to McWilliams, his actions were not in accordance with the statement, and McWilliams also testified that Sweely tried to remain "up-beat," thinking that this might extend his lifetime.) Otherwise, accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. (Specifically, it was clear that Sweely wanted the Petitioner, and no one else, to be his sole beneficiary and to be provided for after his death in the manner and to the extent to which he decided.) 17.-30. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. 31. "Substantially," rejected as not proven. Otherwise, accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. 32.-35. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact. 1.-7. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. Ultimate and penultimate sentences, rejected in part as contrary to facts found and to the greater weight of the evidence. (The evidence was that the Patient Care Technician Records were prepared near the beginning of each nursing shift and reflected conditions at that time. Meanwhile, there was evidence that the patient's mental state would "wax" and "wane." When the patient "waned" and was lethargic, it was difficult to communicate with him. Changes during the course of a shift may or may not be noted in the Progress Notes. While the Patient Care Technician Records indicate that the patient was both oriented and lethargic, the 8 a.m. progress notes indicate "lethargic at times." The progress notes also indicate that, earlier in the day, the patient had difficulty breathing without the non-rebreather mask and that, by 2 p.m., he was wearing the mask continuously. Even disregarding the possibility that the morphine dosage was enough to affect his judgment, the patient's lethargy and his difficulty breathing without the mask probably would have made it difficult for him to communicate on legal matters on the afternoon of August 16, 1990.) Otherwise, accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. Ultimate and penultimate sentences, rejected in part as contrary to facts found and to the greater weight of the evidence. (He did not allege that Sweely could not communicate or write his name. He testified that he did not think Sweely would have been able to think clearly or want to be troubled with the form unnecessarily. He did not think he had to discuss it with Sweely or have Sweely sign it.) Otherwise, accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. However, Dr. Breen's curt medical evaluation of Sweely's general medical condition on August 16, 1990, was not for the purpose of evaluating whether it was possible or prudent to have him considering legal documents and making important legal judgments. In addition, Dr. Breen saw the patient early in the morning and would not have seen changes during the course of the day. 11.-12. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. 13. Rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence that Castillo, Jr., "insist[ed] that Sweely was incompetent, unable to provide or receive meaningful communication on August 16--and could not execute the form himself . . .." (Rather, he testified that he did not think Sweely would have been able to think clearly or want to be troubled with the form unnecessarily.) Otherwise, accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. 14.-16. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. COPIES FURNISHED: Keith F. Roberts, Esquire 201 North MacDill Avenue Tampa, Florida 33609 Robert B. Button, Esquire Department of Management Services Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center, Building C 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560 A. J. McMullian, III, Director Department of Management Services Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center, Building C 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560 William H. Lindner, Secretary Department of Management Services Knight Building, Suite 307 Koger Executive Center 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 Paul A. Rowell, Esquire General Counsel Department of Management Services Knight Building, Suite 312 Koger Executive Center 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Petitioner, Mr. Robert P. Hatcher, is eligible to retire under the Florida Retirement System rather than under the Teachers' Retirement System.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner was employed by the Hillsborough County School Board on August 25, 1959, and was enrolled in the Teachers' Retirement System (TRS) at that time. The Petitioner worked for the Palm Beach County School Board for 27 years, from 1966 through May 15, 1992. The Petitioner worked with no breaks in service during all years in which the Legislature provided open enrollment periods for members of the TRS to transfer to the Florida Retirement System (FRS). The Petitioner was aware of the open enrollment periods, but declined all opportunities to transfer to the FRS. In this regard, the Petitioner specifically rejected membership in the FRS for the 1974 and 1978 open enrollment periods by signed ballots dated November 27, 1974, and November 2, 1978. Petitioner voluntarily terminated his employment with the Palm Beach County School Board on May 15, 1992. Following his termination with the Palm Beach County School Board, Petitioner began seeking employment with an agency that participated in the FRS in order to become eligible to transfer from the TRS to the FRS. The Petitioner's first contact with the Okeechobee County School Board (OCSB) was approximately two years ago when Dr. Mary Gray, Petitioner's acquaintance, introduced Petitioner to Mr. Owens. The Petitioner approached Mr. Owens in an attempt to obtain employment with the OCSB. The Petitioner sought employment with the OCSB for the sole purpose of obtaining entry into the FRS. Mr. Owens recruited and interviewed the Petitioner for the position of Custodian I at the OCSB. At the time the Petitioner was recruited and interviewed, Mr. Owens knew the Petitioner wanted to work for the OCSB for the sole purpose of establishing retirement eligibility. The Petitioner requested that he be hired to work only long enough to establish retirement eligibility by working for a state employer that was a member of the Florida Retirement System. Prior to the Petitioner's request, the OCSB had never had such a request before. The OCSB hired the Petitioner with the knowledge that he had health problems and believing that he would not be able to perform the duties of custodian for more than a short period of time. By letter dated June 23, 1993, the OCSB approved the Petitioner's employment as Custodian I for the OCSB effective June 30, 1993. The Custodian I position was classified as a regular position, not a short-term position. The Petitioner reported to work at the Okeechobee High School on June 30, 1993. He answered phones for several hours, performed some inventory work, then resigned that afternoon. The OCSB acknowledged receipt of the Petitioner's resignation letter, effective June 30, 1993, by letter dated August 2, 1993. The Petitioner submitted an application for membership in the FRS to the OCSB on June 30, 1993. Prior to his employment with the OCSB, the Petitioner investigated the possibility of transferring from the TRS to the FRS. The Petitioner was neither told nor did he receive any written communication by the DOR that he could transfer to the FRS based upon employment for one day. By letter dated August 16, 1993, the Respondent notified the Petitioner that he could not obtain entry into the FRS because his employment was not bona fide, but that he could retire under the TRS. If the Petitioner were to retire under the TRS, his Option 1 monthly benefit payment would be $2,571.64; his Option 3 monthly benefit payment would be $2,396.25. Under the FRS, Petitioner's Option 1 monthly benefit payment would be $3,054.91; his Option 3 monthly benefit payment would be $2,771.20.
Recommendation On the basis of all of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that the Division of Retirement issue a final order concluding that the Petitioner is not eligible for participation in the Florida Retirement System and denying Petitioner's application for transfer from the Teachers' Retirement System to the Florida Retirement System. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of January 1994 in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MICHAEL M. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of January 1994. APPENDIX The following are my specific rulings on all proposed findings of fact submitted by all parties. Findings submitted by Petitioner: Paragraphs a and b: Accepted in substance. Paragraph c: Accepted in part and rejected in part; accepted that the Petitioner obtained the described employment, but rejected that the employment was bona fide. Paragraph d: Accepted in part and rejected in part. The conclusion that the one day was sufficient to qualify the Petitioner for transfer to FRS is rejected as incorrect and as not warranted by the evidence; the remainder of the facts in this paragraph are accepted. Paragraph e: Rejected as constituting a conclusion of law, rather than a proposed finding of fact; a conclusion which is, in any event, not warranted by the evidence in this case. Paragraph f: Rejected as constituting a conclusion of law, rather than a proposed finding of fact; a conclusion which is, in any event, not warranted by the evidence in this case. Findings submitted by Respondent: All of the proposed findings of fact submitted by the Respondent have been accepted in whole or in substance in the Findings of Fact made in this Recommended Order. COPIES FURNISHED: Jodi B. Jennings, Esquire Division of Retirement Building C Cedars Executive Center 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560 Allan L. Hoffman, Esquire 1610 Southern Boulevard West Palm Beach, Florida 3406 J. McMullian, III, Director Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center, Building C 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560 William H. Lindner, Secretary Department of Management Services Knight Building, Suite 307 Koger Executive Center 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 Sylvan Strickland, Acting General Counsel Department of Management Services Knight Building, Suite 309 Koger Executive Center 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950
The Issue Whether the effective date of Petitioner's retirement should be changed from May 1, 2002, to February 23, 2000, or, in the alternative, August 23, 2000, as requested by Petitioner.1
Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole,2 the following findings of fact are made: Petitioner is a retired member of the Florida Retirement System, who turned 62 years of age earlier this year. He worked for the State of Florida for approximately 11 and a half years. He last worked for the State of Florida in February of 1983. On May 2, 1994, the Division received the following written inquiry, dated April 11, 1994, from Petitioner: I was employed by the state from June 1971 until February 1983. Please advise me when I would be eligible to receive retirement benefits and approximately how much my monthly benefits would be. Your assistance in this matter is greatly appreciated. The Division responded to Petitioner's inquiry by sending Petitioner two "Estimates of Retirement Benefit," one based on a retirement date of May 1, 1994 (hereinafter referred to as the "First Estimate") and the other based on a "deferred retirement at age 62" (hereinafter referred to as the "Second Estimate"), along with a pamphlet entitled, "Preparing to Retire" (hereinafter referred to as the "Pamphlet"). The First Estimate contained the following "comments" (at the bottom of the page): To retain a retirement date of 5/1/94, you must complete and return the enclosed application for service retirement, Form FR- 11, within thirty days of the date this estimate was mailed. The Second Estimate contained the following "comments" (at the bottom of the page): This estimate is based on a deferred retirement at age 62. Refer to the enclosed deferred retirement memorandum, DR-1, for additional information. The Pamphlet read, in pertinent part, as follows: If you are preparing to retire, you should take certain steps to ensure there will be no loss of benefits to you. Following are some suggestions. * * * 3. Apply For Retirement Benefits. Three to six months before your retirement complete an application for retirement, Form FR-11, which is available from either your personnel office or the Division of Retirement. Your personnel office must complete part 2 of the Form FR-11 and then they will forward the application to the Division. The Division will acknowledge receipt of your application for benefits and advise you of anything else needed to complete your application. * * * Effective Retirement Date- Your effective date of retirement is determined by your termination date and the date the Division receives your retirement application. You may make application for retirement within 6 months prior to your employment termination date. If your retirement application is received by the Division prior to termination of employment or within 30 calendar days thereafter, the effective date of the retirement will be the first day of the month following receipt of your application by the Division. You will not receive retroactive benefits for the months prior to the effective date of retirement. Remember, your application can be placed on file and any of the other requirements (such as option selection, birth date verification, payment of amount due your account, etc.) met at a later date. Petitioner did not "complete and return the enclosed application for service retirement." Petitioner next contacted the Division in April of 2002, this time by telephone. During this telephone conversation, he was advised that he could apply for retirement immediately. Petitioner requested a "Florida Retirement System Application for Service Retirement" form from the Division. Upon receiving it, he filled it out and sent the completed form to the Division. The Division received the completed form on April 26, 2002. On April 29, 2002, the Division sent Petitioner a letter "acknowledging receipt of [his] Application for Service Retirement" and advising him that his effective retirement date was "05/2002." In or around December of 2002, after receiving several monthly retirement payments from the Division, Petitioner requested that his retirement date be made retroactive to 1994 because he was not adequately advised by the Division, in 1994, that he was then eligible, upon proper application, to receive retirement benefits. By letter dated February 5, 2003, the Division advised Petitioner that it was unable to grant his request. By letter dated March 6, 2003, Petitioner "appeal[ed]" the Division's decision.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Division issue a final order denying Petitioner's request that the effective date of his retirement be changed. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of July, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of July, 2003.
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner is eligible to purchase her employee service as a CETA employee with a state agency as credible service in the Florida Retirement Service.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Sherry Stearns, was employed by the State of Florida, Department of Labor and Commerce, in the Florida State Unemployment office from January 1976 until September 30, 1977. The records maintained by the Department of Retirement based upon payroll data submitted by the Department of Revenue reflect that Petitioner was not in a permanent position as reflected by the Code 0303 and the entry of "zz" in the last column showing she was not eligible for retirement benefits. The Petitioner offered no evidence in support of her claim to show that she was employed in a position which was covered or for which she could claim prior service credit.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, it is RECOMMENDED: That Petitioner's claim be DENIED. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of July, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of July, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Sherry Stearns 360 South Senaca Boulevard Daytona Beach, Florida 32114 Stanley N. Danek, Esquire Department of Management Services Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center, Building C 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560 William H. Linder, Secretary Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 Paul A. Rowell, General Counsel Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950