The Issue The issue for determination is whether Petitioner's foster care license should be renewed.
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Cathy Taylor (Petitioner) was issued a foster care license by the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (Respondent). On October 25, 1994, Petitioner signed an "Agreement to Provide Substitute Care for Dependent Children (Substitute Care Agreement) with Respondent, agreeing to abide by or with certain conditions which were considered essential for the welfare of foster children in her care. The Substitute Care Agreement provided in pertinent part: We are fully and directly responsible to the department for the care of the child. * * * 6. We will not give the child into the care or physical custody of any other person(s), including the natural parent(s), without the consent of a representative of the department. * * * 9. We will accept dependent children into our home for care only from the department and will make no plans for boarding other children or adults. * * * 11. We will notify the department immediately of any change in our address, employment, living arrangements, family composition, or law enforcement involvement. * * * We will comply with all requirements for a licensed substitute care home as prescribed by the department. * * * We will immediately report any injuries or illness of a child in our care to the department. * * * 19. We will abide by the department's discipline policy which we received during the MAPP training. On October 13, 1993, Petitioner received a certificate from Respondent for successful completion of the MAPP training. On October 25, 1994, Petitioner signed a "Discipline Policy Agreement" (Discipline Agreement). The Discipline Agreement provides in pertinent part: [T]he following disciplinary practices are FORBIDDEN on our children. FAILURE OF THE FOSTER PARENT(S) ... TO COMPLY MAY RESULT IN THE REMOVAL OF THE CHILD(REN) FOR AN INVESTI- GATION AND RESULT IN THE CLOSURE OF YOUR HOME. * * * Hitting a child with ANY object. Slapping, smacking, whipping, washing mouth out with soap, or ANY other form of physical discipline. * * * (6) Delegating authority for punishment to another child or person that is not the Foster Parent(s) ... NO OTHER CHILD, ADOLESCENT, OR ADULT IN THE HOUSEHOLD SHALL HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO DISCIPLINE. On October 11, 1995, Petitioner and Trevor Barnes signed a "Bilateral Service Agreement" (Bilateral Agreement) with Respondent, agreeing to abide by or with several conditions which were considered essential for the welfare of the children placed in the foster home. The Bilateral Agreement provides in pertinent part: 2. We are fully and directly responsible to the Department for the care of the child. * * * We will not give the child into the care or physical custody of any other person(s), including the natural parent(s), without the consent of a representative of the department.... * * * 8. We will accept dependent children into our home for care only from the Department and will make no plans for boarding other children or adults. We will notify the Department if any adult relative or family members returns to live in the home. * * * 10. We will notify the Department immediately of any change in our address, employment, living arrangements, arrest record, health status or family composition, as well as any special needs of the child (i.e. health, school problems, emotional problems). * * * We will comply with all requirements for a licensed foster home as prescribed by the Department. * * * We will provide a nurturing, supportive, family- like home environment. * * * We understand that any breach of the Agreement may result in the immediate removal of the child(ren) and revocation of the license. At that time, Trevor Barnes was Petitioner's fiance. They were married in January 1996 and have, therefore, been married for less than one year. On October 11, 1995, Petitioner and Trevor Barnes signed a Discipline Agreement. The pertinent language of the Discipline Agreement was no different from the one signed on October 25, 1994. In December 1994, minor foster child N.R. was placed in the care of Petitioner. In 1995, minor foster children V.M. and J.M., two sisters, were placed in the care of Petitioner. Petitioner was responsible for the supervision and care of the foster children. Petitioner allowed her sister, an adult, and her sister's son, who was not placed with her under foster care, to live in her home. At the time, her relatives had no other place to live. Petitioner did not inform Respondent that her relatives were living with her. Petitioner violated the Substitute Care Agreement and the Bilateral Agreement. At times, Petitioner left the children under the supervision and in the care of Mr. Barnes and her sister, thereby, violating the Substitute Care Agreement and the Bilateral Agreement. On November 23, 1995, Thanksgiving day, one of Respondent's representatives, who was transporting V.M. and J.M. to visit with their prospective adoptive family, became aware of marks on one of V.M.'s legs. Respondent's representative overheard V.M. tell J.M. to look at what "mommy" had done. Respondent's representative examined V.M.'s leg and discovered marks on V.M.'s leg. She questioned V.M., regarding the marks, and V.M. confirmed what Respondent's representative had overheard. Also, V.M. informed Respondent that Petitioner spanked both she and her sister, J.M. Respondent's representative determined that the marks were consistent with marks which would result from striking the child's leg with a metal hanger. However, she could not determine if the marks were fresh or recent or old scars because she was not trained to make such a determination. There was no other evidence as to any other observations made regarding the marks. Respondent's counselor, assigned to V.M. and J.M., reported the incident. An investigation was begun by Respondent for alleged abuse. Neither V.M. nor J.M. testified at the hearing. The investigator who conducted the investigation on the alleged abuse did not testify. Petitioner denies striking V.M. with a metal hanger or with any object. Moreover, she denies having ever inflicted corporal punishment on the children. Her method of punishing the children was taking away their privileges to do the things that they enjoyed. Further, Mr. Barnes questioned V.M., regarding the marks, who told Mr. Barnes that the natural mother inflicted the marks on V.M. Respondent was unable to provide evidence as to the last period of time that the children had visited with their natural parent(s). Petitioner did not report the marks on V.M.'s leg to Respondent. Petitioner violated the Substitute Care Agreement. Regarding spanking the children, prior to the discovery of the marks on V.M.'s leg, Respondent suspected that Petitioner was spanking the children. Respondent's counselor to V.M. and J.M. questioned Petitioner as to whether she was spanking the children. Petitioner denied any spanking and responded with her method of punishment as indicated above. But, also, Petitioner informed Respondent's counselor that perhaps Mr. Barnes or her sister had spanked the children. Petitioner presented no evidence that she had confronted both her sister and Mr. Barnes as to whether they were spanking the children and that she had instructed them not to do so, as such action was violative of the Discipline Agreement. Further, there is no evidence that Respondent questioned Petitioner's sister or Mr. Barnes. There is insufficient evidence to find that Petitioner used corporal punishment. However, the circumstances presented causes concern to the extent that Respondent was justified in questioning the suitability of Petitioner to be a foster care parent. At all times material hereto, Mr. Barnes did not live with Petitioner. He lived with Petitioner's grandmother. Petitioner never indicated to Respondent that Mr. Barnes either lived in the foster home or did not live in the foster home. Although he spent considerable time at Petitioner's home, the evidence is insufficient to show that he lived with her. Even if Mr. Barnes was living with Petitioner, Respondent became aware of it in October 1995. Respondent's counselor, who was assigned to N.R., believed that Mr. Barnes was living with Petitioner and informed him that, if he was going to live with Petitioner, she had to perform a background check on him. Respondent's counselor obtained the necessary information from Mr. Barnes to perform the background check. At that time, Respondent was aware that Petitioner and Mr. Barnes were planning to be married. Petitioner received a monthly allowance from Respondent for the care of the minor foster children. Petitioner became unemployed. Petitioner did not report her unemployment to Respondent. However, Respondent's counselor, who was assigned to V.M. and J.M., was aware of Petitioner's unemployment but assumed that Mr. Barnes was Petitioner's husband and that he was supporting the family. However, Petitioner and Mr. Barnes were not married, he was not living in Petitioner's home, and he was not supporting the family. Regardless, Petitioner violated the Substitute Care Agreement and the Bilateral Agreement. Petitioner paid too little attention to V.M. and J.M.'s hygiene and personal appearance. The hygiene was inappropriate to the point that the children's school contacted Respondent. The children frequently appeared to be unkept, and Respondent did not observe the children with any new clothes. Because of her unemployment, Petitioner had insufficient income to adequately support the minor foster children. Because of the marks on V.M.'s leg, because of V.M.'s statement to Respondent that Petitioner inflicted the injury to her leg and had spanked both she and her sister, and because Respondent had determined that Petitioner had violated its rules and regulations, Respondent removed the minor foster children from Respondent's home. Furthermore, Respondent refused to renew Petitioner's foster care license. Petitioner no longer wishes to renew her license.3 CONCLUSIONS OF LAW The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this proceeding and the parties thereto pursuant to Subsection 120.57(1), Florida Statutes. Petitioner has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that her foster care license should be renewed. Department of Transportation v. J. W. C. Company, 396 So.2d 778 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981); Balino v. Department of Health and Rehabilitatives, 348 So.2d 349 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977). Section 409.175(1), Florida Statutes, provides in pertinent part: The purpose of this section is to protect the health, safety, and well-being of all children in the state who are cared for by family foster homes, residential child-caring agencies, and child-placing agencies, by providing for the establishment of licensing requirements for such homes and agencies and providing procedures to determine adherence to these requirements. Rule 10M-6, Florida Administrative Code, sets forth the minimum standards by which foster parents must be evaluated. Rule 10M-6.012 provides in pertitnent part: Section 409.175, F.S., mandates that the department establish minimum standards, or rules for the types of care defined in the statute. The standards, once promulgated, have the full force and effect of law. The licensing rules specify a level of care below which programs will not be able to operate. Rule 10M-6.024 provides in pertinent part: (4) Responsibilities of the Substitute Care Parents to the Department. * * * (b) The substitute care parents are required to participate with the department in relicensing studies and in ongoing monitoring of their home, and must provide sufficient information for the department to verify compliance with all rules and regulations. * * * (g) The substitute care parents must notify the department regarding changes which affect the life and circumstances of the shelter or foster family. Rule 10M-6.025 provides in pertinent part: Length of Marriage. If married, substitute care parents should have a stabilized, legal marriage of at least one year prior to being licensed. Income. Substitute care parents must have sufficient income to assure their stability and the security of their own family without relying on board payments. The substitute family must have sufficient income to absorb four to six weeks of a foster child's care until a board payment is received. Petitioner has failed to meet her burden of proof. Petitioner has failed to meet the minimum standards of Rule 10M-6. In addition, during the course of her licensure, Petitioner violated several provisions of the Substitute Care Agreement and the Bilateral Agreement. Regardless, Petitioner has indicated that she no longer wishes to renew her foster care license.4
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services enter a final order denying the renewal of Cathy Taylor's foster care license. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of November 1996 in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ERROL H. POWELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of November 1996.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioners R.G. and M.G. were licensed as foster parents and their home as a Children Youth and Families foster home for dependent children at all times pertinent hereto. The Respondent is an agency of the state of Florida charged with licensure of foster parents and foster homes and with regulating and enforcing the standards of care of children placed in such foster homes as dependent children. This dispute apparently arose on or about April 18, 1990 when M.G., the foster mother, brought the M. children to the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services office on that date to talk with a foster care counselor about problems experienced with the M. children in her home. Apparently the visit to the Department's office arose because M.G. had discovered that one of the children had allegedly stolen one or more articles from a local store in the community, or believed that she had, and was seeking the advise and council of Department's representative concerning the manner in which to address that perceived problem. During the course of that encounter with the Department's representative the M. children or some of them related incidents occurring in the home in the past while they were placed in the custody of the Petitioners which they felt involved or constituted mistreatment by M.G. Upon learning of these reports Department personnel removed the children from the G. home on April 18, 1990. No other children have been placed by the Respondent in the G. foster home since that time. Michelle M. testified that Petitioner M.G. called Marie M. a bitch, a whore and a slut on one occasion and gave Marie M. "the bird" (an obscene gesture). Michelle M. testified that M.G. called Marie M. a slut and stated that "she's just going to grow up to be a whore." Apparently Marie M. and Michelle M. had reported that M.G. called Marie M. a whore when Marie M. told M.G. about borrowing fifty cents from a boy at school. At the hearing, however, Marie M. testified that she borrowed fifty cents from a boy at school and that when M.G. learned of it she said "it would make her look like a whore." Mandy M. testified that M.G. thought that Mandy had called her "a faggot" and that, instead, she told her that she had called her sister that name but that M.G. did not believe her and sent her to her room and shoved her into the room whereupon she fell and hit herself against the bed or bedpost by accident. Michelle M. testified that on a church hayride a boy threw hay and hit M.G. in the face whereupon, thinking Michelle M. had done it, that M.G. hit Michelle on the leg with a flashlight. Mandy M. testified that M.G. hit Michelle on the leg with a flashlight, but her testimony revealed she knew nothing of that incident and her description of it was related to her by one of her sisters. Additionally, Marie M. testified that she saw M.G. pick up an infant by one arm from a crib and scold it for crying as she was picking the infant up to hold the infant in her arms. Michelle and Marie M. testified that M.G. held Marie M.'s mouth open and shoved red hot sauce into her mouth with a spoon as punishment for some perceived infraction. Marie M. testified that M.G. threw hot tea or hot water on the face of Marie M. while the child was asleep on a couch. M.G. categorically denies all the allegations made by the girls, the foster children in question referenced above. She denies ever making obscene gestures, ("the bird"), at any of the girls and denies calling them names such as bitch, slut or whore. She concedes that she may have admonished them or one of them about not "acting like a slut or a whore," etc. She also denies ever having administered hot sauce to any of the children. She said that on one occasion she gave Mandy some mustard on a teaspoon when the child inquired what it tasted like because she had never tasted mustard. She gave her a small amount of it just to show her how it tasted. She denies ever throwing hot tea or hot water on the face of any of the children and denies causing any of the children injury, specifically concerning the bedroom incident when the child apparently bruised her back falling against the bed. M.G. did use confinement for brief periods in a child's room as a form of discipline for inappropriate conduct in the home. She also denies hitting Michelle M. on the leg with a flashlight during the church hayride. In fact due to her position in the haywagon at the other end of the wagon from the child in question, it would have been impossible for her to reach over and hit her with a flashlight and that incident did not occur. M.G.'s testimony concerning the children's conduct and family life in the home with the children is to the effect that the older two girls, particularly the oldest, Michelle M., had a tendency to lie in order to "get their way"; that the girls were unruly and that they, particularly Michelle, used their relationship with HRS to try to intimidate the foster parents, particularly M.G. They had threatened to report M.G. for improper behavior towards the children in the home. The children resented the foster parents authority. Her testimony describes in detail, as do the exhibits submitted by the Petitioners, consisting of the monthly reports M.G. made to HRS, the progress of the girls and conditions generally in the foster home. This testimony and evidence shows that the Petitioners generally provided the children a good, wholesome home environment, with extensive involvement in school and church activities and with ample wholesome recreation activities at the home site on a lake. During the tenure of the girls in the Petitioners' home their scholastic progress improved markedly such that they were all earning "A and B" grades in school and otherwise were progressing well in school. M.G.'s testimony established that the Petitioners were providing a wholesome home environment for the children and were generally conscientious about caring for the children's needs, including medical needs, and with maintaining contact with and reporting to HRS concerning the children's living conditions and their progress in the home and in the school and church environment. The testimony of M.G. to the general effect that the older girls, particularly the oldest child, had a tendency to threaten reporting the parents or M.G. to HRS concerning their conduct as foster parents and their willingness to lie in an attempt to get their way or to intimidate the foster parents is corroborated by the letter in evidence as corroborative hearsay authored by Linda Kennedy. She is an acquaintance of the Petitioners associated with the Petitioners through the foster parent program. That letter indicates that when the girls were being taken to HRS to make statements concerning the incidents in question that they were reported to have said that they wanted to "get back at her" meaning M.G., the Petitioner and that Marie was heard to instruct Mandy not to talk to a lawyer because she "now liked M.G." and that Michelle had commented to the effect that she "wanted to really get her," meaning M.G. This information is taken from a hearsay letter in evidence pursuant to the above cited provision of Section 120.58, Florida Statutes but it corroborates the testimony to the same general effect of M.G. and corroborates testimony of Mandy who, after describing in her testimony some of the alleged parental abuse by M.G., testified that her sisters had asked her to say things to hurt M.G. Because of these revelations contained in the testimony of Mandy M. and the testimony of M.G., as corroborated by the letter in evidence authored by Linda Kennedy, it is deemed that the testimony of the three children can be accorded scant credibility and resultant weight. Accordingly the testimony of M.G. and Petitioner R.G. is accepted over that of the testimony of the three children testifying for the Respondent and it is found that the incidents described by the three children did not occur or did not occur in the way described by the three children such that they can not be deemed to have constituted abusive, disciplinary parenting practices and prohibited disciplinary practices. The testimony of Donna M. establishes that she has overseen the operation and management of foster homes in her capacity with the Department for many years. After the M. children were removed from M.G. and her husband and their foster home she had a number of telephone conversations with M.G. M.G. appeared to her, based upon her observance and her experience, to seem "fairly incoherent" during those telephone conversations on occasion. Consequently she recommended to M.G. that, in the course of the controversy concerning whether or not the foster home should be relicensed, that M.G. obtain a psychological evaluation. M.G. apparently scheduled that evaluation, appeared at the psychologist's office but, as shown by Petitioner's exhibit 5, the psychologist's report, apparently did not genuinely feel that she needed to get an evaluation. She rather merely consulted the psychologist concerning his advice to her about her dealings with HRS. He declined to render such advice and no psychological evaluation was ever made. In view of Ms. Mimms testimony, which is accepted, and in view of the comments made in the letter of Ms. Kennedy, and from the hearing officer's observance of the demeanor of M.G. and consideration of her testimony, it is deemed appropriate that a psychological evaluation of M.G. be obtained as a condition upon relicensure.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law, the evidence of record and the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, it is therefore recommended that a Final Order be entered by the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services granting the application for relicensure of the Petitioners as a Children Youth and Families foster home for dependent children, conditioned on the obtaining of a satisfactory psychological evaluation of M.G. RECOMMENDED this 3rd day of August, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of August, 1992. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 91-5842 Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact (The Petitioners submitted no proposed findings of fact which can be independently and specifically ruled upon). - I. Rejected as not supported by the greater weight and credibility of the evidence. COPIES FURNISHED: Rodney M. Johnson, Esquire HRS District 1 Legal Office P.O. Box 8420 Pensacola, FL 32505-0420 Ronald and Marjorie Grover 4713 Radio Road Milton, FL 32583 Sam Power, Agency Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700 John Slye, General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700
The Issue Whether denial of Respondent's re-licensure application as a Foster Care Home for the reasons stated in the Department's denial letter of October 30, 2000, was appropriate.
Findings Of Fact Based upon observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, the documentary materials received in evidence and the entire record complied herein, the following relevant facts are found: Under Section 409.175, Florida Statutes (2001), the Department of Children and Family Services is the State Agency responsible for evaluating, qualifying, licensing, and regulating family foster care homes. Petitioner, a single male, previously employed with an abused children agency in Broward County, Florida, was granted a foster care parent license by the DCF's Foster Care Licensing unit effective August 10, 1999, through November 10, 1999. A second child specific foster home license for G.K. was issued to Petitioner, effective from March 3, 2000, through August 10, 2000. DCF takes the position that Petitioner is not eligible for re-licensure as a family foster home primarily because he exhibited "poor judgment" relative to a single medical treatment, taking the temperature of an eleven-year-old male foster child through his rectum during the month of August 2000. DCF further alleges that Petitioner has willfully violated specific statutes and rules relating to the conduct and maintenance of the foster home. Those alleged violations are specified in the licensure denial letter dated October 30, 2000, from the DCF to Petitioner. Nicara Daniels is a foster care licensing unit worker with the DCF since November 1999. Ms. Daniels had on-the-job- training and some Professional Development Center Training for new employees. In the licensing unit, Ms. Daniels had training in physical abuse, sexual abuse, drug abuse, and emotional abuse toward children. The DCF used Ms. Daniels to provide testimony regarding each violation as they appeared in the letter of denial. Herein below the allegations are chronologically addressed. Medication and cooking wines in Petitioner's bathroom. On or about July 31, 2000, a period when Petitioner was licensed, Ms. Daniels, Child Protection Investigator assigned Petitioner, made an unannounced visit to Petitioner's home during a period when Petitioner was medicating himself. During her walk through Petitioner's bedroom she entered his bathroom and saw Petitioner's medication for his diabetes on the bathroom shelf along with several bottles of cooking wines. Ms. Daniels acknowledged that she observed the cooking wines in the bathroom. Along with bottles of medication she also observed the lock box in which Petitioner kept his medications and cooking wines when not in use. The door to Petitioner's bedroom and bathroom each had operative locks on them. Ms. Daniels knew that Petitioner took medication for his diabetic condition prior to this inspection and she acknowledged having no experience with the use of cooking wines. Rule 65C-13.011(14)(a) and (b), Florida Administrative Code, requires all medication, poisonous chemicals, and cleaning materials to be in a locked place and inaccessible to children, and that alcoholic beverages should be stored out of the reach of small children; with the recommendation that these beverages be kept in a locked place. Ms. Daniels admitted that for the children, all of whom were 11 years or older, to have access to the medication or cooking wines, they must enter the bedroom, go into the bathroom and open the lock box. There is no evidence presented of any foster care child having access to Petitioner's bedroom, bathroom or the locked medicine box at any time. In making the foregoing finding, I have considered Ms. Daniel's testimony that she knew Petitioner was on medication. Ms. Daniels, however, never questioned the children whether they entered or attempted to enter Petitioner's bedroom at any time when he was not present. I find the mere presence of medications and cooking wines in Petitioner's bathroom, absent other evidence, is not a violation of the cited rule. John Snider in Petitioner's Foster Care home. Ms. Daniels testified that during an early morning visit on an unspecified date in July of 2000, she observed a young man, John Snider, in Petitioner's home. After she advised Mr. Snider had to be screened, Petitioner followed the DCF's process and a screening application for Mr. Snider was submitted to the Department. The Department screened and cleared Mr. Snider and advised Petitioner and Mr. Snider by letter on August 21, 2000. Rule 65C-13.010(4)(g), Florida Administrative Code, requires that the foster care parent notify the department of the presence of such person. Rule 65C-13.007(1), Florida Administrative Code, requires screening for "all persons that provide respite care in the . . . home on an overnight basis must be screened." Rule 65C-13.009(6)(a)5., Florida Administrative Code, requires a criminal records check for "all persons 18 years and older residing in the . . . home." Petitioner, during a telephone conversation with Ms. Daniels on July 31, 2000, informed her that Broward Juvenile Justice placed Mr. Snider in his home on July 27, 2000. It is Ms. Daniels' opinion that a four-day period between entry and notifying DCF is not reasonable notification. This "unreasonable" delay formed the basis for violation of the cited rule, notwithstanding the particular circumstances. Rule 65C-13.007(1), Florida Administrative Code, which requires "all persons that provide respite care . . . must be screened.” I find Ms. Daniels' opinion that four days is not "reasonable" notification not based upon any protocol, policy or rule of the DCF. In making the foregoing finding, I have considered the following. Petitioner informed Ms. Daniels by telephone that there were matters to discuss; however, the discussion took place four days later when Ms. Daniels was available. The Department of Juvenile Justice for Broward County placed Mr. Snider in Petitioner's home. After submitting an application, Mr. Snider was screened and cleared by the DCF. Considering the evidence as a whole, I find Mr. Snider's presence in Petitioner's home, under authority of the Broward County Juvenile Justice unit, and with telephonic notice to the DCF's licensing unit worker four days after entry into the home is not unreasonable, under the circumstances. Home Department's placing of T.J. in Petitioner's Foster Sometime during the first week of August 2000, Robert Mistretta, Department's child protection investigator and T.J.'s initial case worker, removed T.J. from his family and sought overnight foster care for him. Mr. Mistretta, aware of T.J.'s family situation, his medical, physical, emotional, and sexually abusive history sought a foster care home with those factors in mind. The Department's placement unit instructed him to take T.J. to Petitioner's home for an overnight stay. Mr. Mistretta took T.J. to Petitioner's home with the intention of an overnight stay and reassessment of the situation the following morning. After discussion with Petitioner of T.J.'s need for an overnight stay, Petitioner agreed. Mr. Mistretta chose not to provide Petitioner with information regarding T.J.'s medical, social, physical, emotional, or abusive family history. However, Mistretta gave Petitioner the DCF's emergency pager phone number [570-3081] for use during non-working hours and for emergencies should the need arise. Rectal Temperature Taking What had begun as an overnight stay resulted in a permanent placement and on or about August 6 or 7, 2000, T.J. became ill. His illness began during the day and continuing into the night. According to Petitioner, T.J. exhibited symptoms of a cold or flu, including fever, chills and headache. During the night, he was restless, tossing and turning in his sleep. Petitioner, having no medical history on T.J., became concerned about T.J.'s condition. He made several calls to the Department's emergency pager number [570-3081] provided him by Bob Mistretta, without success. Petitioner then attempted to contact Dr. Stuart Grant, a pediatrician, to no avail. Petitioner thereafter attempted to use his MAPP training first aid guide provided by the Department, but found those instructions unclear. Petitioner then sought information concerning fever and temperature taking from the internet. During the night while T.J. was asleep, Petitioner used a rectal thermometer to take T.J.'s temperature, causing him to awaken suddenly, somewhat startled. Petitioner talked with T.J., explained his concerns with his condition and the reason for taking T.J.'s temperature in that fashion. T.J. responded in a positive manner and went back to sleep. The following morning, Petitioner contacted Mistretta and explained what had happened with T.J. the night before. Mistretta took T.J. aside and privately inquired if he understood "good" touching from and "bad" touching. T.J. stated he understood the difference. When asked about Petitioner's manner of touching him while taking his temperature during the night, T.J. affirmed that Petitioner's touching was a "good" touch and not a "bad" touch. Mistretta, based upon his experience working with children who had suffered abuse, accepted T.J.'s response as true. Satisfied that no "bad" touching occurred during the rectal temperature taking process, Mistretta reported the incident to his supervisor, including his conclusion that nothing sexually or abusive had occurred and concluded his report in part as follows: "This case is closed with no indicators. There is no maltreatment that addressed a bad choice of judgment by a caretaker. There are licensing [unit] concerns regarding Mr. Marlowe's choice to use a rectal thermometer on an 11 year old child." (Emphasis Added) Mr. Mistretta testified that his understanding of the sequence of events the night T.J. was ill were: T.J. was running a high fever and had trouble falling asleep. Petitioner tried cold cloths to reduce the fever that, according to Petitioner's monitoring, was getting too high. Since T.J. was having trouble sleeping and once he did sleep, Petitioner thought a rectal thermometer would be best to try not to awaken him, Petitioner chose to use that form of temperature taking. T.J. reacted with a little bit of pain. Based on Petitioner's history of dealing with sexually abused kids, that reaction is not normal. When Petitioner talked with him about what happened, T.J. disclosed his history to Petitioner. In the process of making the decision as to the appropriate treatment, Petitioner consulted with a Johnson and Johnson book and several medical web sites. The documents from the medical web sites were subsequently provided by Petitioner. I find Mr. Mistretta's testimony credible regarding his conversation with Petitioner immediately after the T.J.'s incident. Following the above, Ms. Mistretta, in addition to his duty as T.J.'s caseworker, was also assigned by his supervisor to investigate a hotline abuse report. Mr. Mistretta investigated the alleged abuse narrative report and found no indication of maltreatment. He recommended the hotline abuse report be closed. Upon being presented with the hotline abuse report narrative with suggestions and allegations of sexual abuse, Mr. Mistretta testified: "The information generated in this narrative in the reporter page that has reporter information states that the CPI, Robert Mistretta, told reporter about allegations. So the source of this report is me. The reporters made their own clarifications, answered their own questions regarding some things instead of calling me back to clarity, talked amongst themselves, found out that they didn't like what happened, and some of the narrative is not true. It is blown out of the water, if you would. The narrative was started by a report. When Mr. Marlowe talked to me, I talked to somebody who talked to somebody, who talked to somebody. The next thing you know we have sexual abuse. The narrative is not true. I did not agree with the removal of T.J. (Emphasis Added) I find Mr. Mistretta's testimony on this issue to be consistent and credible. In making the foregoing finding, I have considered the testimony of the DCF's other witnesses, none of whom had personal knowledge of the abuse report contents. However, Mr. Mistretta is the only witness with personal knowledge of events acquired in his positions as T.J.'s initial caseworker, his placement agent, the interviewer of T.J. and Petitioner, and the originator of the initial report. I have considered the fact that this incident occurred during the week of August 6-12, 2000. Petitioner's license expired on August 10, 2000. However, the DCF did not remove T.J. from Petitioner's home until September 6, 2000, almost a month later. I have also considered Ms. Daniels' testimony that during Petitioner's unlicensed period, DCF's placement unit continued to place children in Petitioner's home. I have also considered the deposition of Dr. Patricia Buck, M.D., pediatrician and Child Protection Team member for District 14 [Polk, Highland and Hardee counties], who was qualified as an expert in pediatrics and child abuse. After her review of documents provided by DCF and given the circumstances by DCF's counsel and Petitioner, Dr. Buck opined that use of a rectal thermometer would not have been her recommendation, had she been the care provider. According to Dr. Buck, anal temperature taking as a medical procedure is not abuse. Adding that the more medical history one has on a patient, the less likely a mistake in patient treatment. The evidence as a whole, including Mistretta's testimony and Dr. Buck's opinion, is persuasive as it relates to the issue of the circumstances and the "appropriateness" of the rectal temperature taking procedure. Accordingly, the testimony of Ms. Daniels, the licensing unit informs placement and other Department units of those parents who were licensed, parents who were not licensed or parents whose licenses had expired. She recalled attending the staffing meeting regarding the T.J. temperature incident and recalled informing staff that Petitioner was not a licensed foster care home after August 10, 2000. According to Ms. Daniels, placing children in a non-licensed home is not permissible. However, its her testimony that in this case, DCF's placement unit placed children in Petitioner's home during a period of time he was not licensed, and during the time T.J. was in Petitioner's home because of [DCF] "it being in a crisis situation with the number of homes we had." In making this finding, I have considered both the DCF's need for foster care beds and its concern for the safety of foster care children. I have also considered the DCF's use of Petitioner's home when they were "in a crisis situation with the number of homes we had." Screening of Ms. Scott Regarding the screening of Ms. Scott, Ms. Daniels testified Petitioner informed her that the screening application papers for Ms. Scott were submitted to the Department and had apparently come up missing. Ms. Daniels acknowledged that she had no evidence to support her conclusion that Ms. Scott was a respite sitter for Petitioner's foster care children; that she had never checked with the DCF to ascertain whether or not Ms. Scott had been screened. Not inquiring whether Ms. Scott had been screened renders Ms. Daniels' testimony questionable. I find Ms. Daniel's testimony regarding Petitioner's failure to provide the Department with Ms. Scott's application for screening not credible. Unwillingness to Provide Information on Mary Poe At some unspecified date, Ms. Daniels recalled she had a conversation with Petitioner regarding his next door neighbor, Ms. Poe, someone who would "check" on the foster children from time to time when Petitioner was late returning from work. Ms. Daniels did not recall if Ms. Poe entered Petitioner's home or gave the key to the children to enter in the home on days he was late returning from work. Ms. Daniels recalled only that, Petitioner's attitude regarding screening Ms. Poe was "uncooperative" and "defiant." During cross-examination Ms. Daniels could not recall the conversation with Petitioner when she was informed that Petitioner's condominium covenants required the manager to have a key to his apartment in case of emergencies. She did recall that Petitioner told her Ms. Poe was the mother of the condominium manager. Ms. Daniels recalled when she voiced concern with the situation Petitioner retrieved his key from Ms. Poe and returned it to the condominium manager for pick up by the children when they returned from school. I find Ms. Daniel's testimony regarding Petitioner's unwillingness to provide information concerning Mary Poe evasive, inconsistent and not credible. In making the foregone finding, I have considered Ms. Daniel's inability to recall facts, dates, times, places, regarding the matter to which she testified. I have considered the fact that Petitioner, when Ms. Daniels voiced concern, corrected the situation by removing the key from Ms. Poe's possession, thereby removing the need for screening by the Department. I have also considered Ms. Daniels' inability to recall facts regarding an incident the DCF considered an intentional refusal by Petitioner to "cooperate" and "communicate" with Department's staff. Confidentiality in Keeping a Life Book on Foster Care Children Ms. Daniels testified that Petitioner informed her the foster care children had a computer life book (photo album) website. After being directed to the website by Petitioner and after viewing the website, Ms. Daniels concluded Petitioner had "released" the names and photos of the foster children on the websites. Without providing a rational basis, she testified that keeping required foster child life books in an electronic format is, in and of itself, inappropriate. She further testified that placing the names and photos on the web site violated DCF's rule of confidentiality. Rule 65C.010(1)(c)4., Florida Administrative Code, requires the foster care parent to maintain the children's records which ensures confidentiality for the child and the biological parents. Petitioner maintained that each child made an individual and personal decision to use the computers he made available in his home. To his knowledge each child placed his personal information, name, foster care status, photos, etc., on the web sites during chats and exchange of information with others users in various chat-room conversations. Ms. Daniels never inquired of the foster children whose names and status were found on the book of life web sites to ascertain whether they or Petitioner placed personal information on the web site. I find her testimony on this issue to be questionable, but reliable. In making the foregoing findings, I have considered Ms. Daniels' testimony and the absence of evidence in support thereof. I find Petitioner's testimony that he never divulged any confidential information on the web sites regarding foster children in his care credible, but not persuasive. As the custodial parent, Petitioner has the ultimate responsibility to maintain and protect the confidentiality of the children in his care and under his supervision. Permitting children of divulge personal/confidential and potentially endangering information on the web site is a breach of Petitioner's parental responsibility. Removal of G.K. from medication prescribed by a Doctor DCF alleged that Petitioner removed G.K. from prescribed medication in violation of Rule 65C-13.010(1)(b)7.a, Florida Administrative Code, which imposes on the foster parent the responsibility for dispensing the medication as prescribed by the physician and recording the exact amount prescribed. In support of this allegation, the Department offered the testimony of Ms. Daniels. Ms. Daniels, by her admission, had no personal knowledge regarding G.K. and Petitioner's actions with G.K.'s medication. Her testimony was based upon what she had previously read in the file prepared by Stephanie Gardner, DCF's Representative and Petitioner's caseworker before the case reassignment to Ms. Daniels. When Ms. Daniels initially inquired of Petitioner about G.K.'s medication, he informed her that before he discontinued G.K.'s medication, he consulted with a nurse who in turn consulted with the prescribing doctor about the matter. Based on the response received from this consultation he discontinued G.K.'s psychotropic medication. Ms. Daniels based her conclusion of unauthorized discontinuance of medication on her conversations with Ray Mallette, a Department mental health counselor. In his letter to Petitioner, Mr. Mallette stated, in pertinent part: "To my knowledge, G.K. was not taking any psychotropic medication while under my care. Treatment was terminated in June of 1999, by mutual agreement, as no further care needed." Ms. Daniels testified that during her conversations with Mr. Mallette she recalled his stating that he did not authorize discontinuation of G.K.'s medication. Ms. Daniels could not state with any certainty if Mr. Mallette's use of the term "medication" included psychotropic medications or other medications. Petitioner provided Ms. Daniels the name of the Broward County physician with whom Petitioner had conferred through his nurse and who authorized taking G.K. off medication. There is no evidence that Ms. Daniels attempted to verify whether the medical persons provided by Petitioner had given instructions to take G.K. off psychotropic medications. I find Ms. Daniels' testimony on the issue of G.K.'s medication to be incomplete, confused and, not creditable. In making the foregoing finding, I have considered Mr. Mallette's letter reflecting that he is not a medical doctor or dentist; therefore, he cannot prescribe nor discontinue a prescribed medication to a patient. I. Use of profanity and general unwillingness to work cooperatively with the Department Rule 65C-13.010(1)(c)1., Florida Administrative Code, requires foster care parents to "work" cooperatively with the counselor as a member of a treatment team in seeking counseling, participating in consultation, and preparing and implementing the performance agreement or permanent placement plan for each child. In support of the above allegations, the DCF offered only the testimony of Ms. Daniels who stated: ". . . [A]lso during a conversation Mr. Marlowe used profanity. As far as [sic] concerned as just being uncooperative and maybe someone being uncooperative meaning there's something else behind it as far as, you know, not one to follow the rules that are set by the Department." I find the above testimony of Ms. Daniels to be vague and questionable. In making the foregoing finding, I have taken into consideration the fact that Ms. Daniels could not recall the date, time, place, words, or the circumstances of her conversation with Petitioner in which the alleged profanity was uttered. I have also taken into consideration the testimony of Ms. Stephanie Gardner, regarding Petitioner's uncooperativeness. Ms. Gardner, acknowledging that she did not know, did not remember nor did she recall; then went on to state: " . . . that at some unknown time and date, Petitioner stated, mentioned or indicated some information about a child or foster child that he had parented before. I don't know if it was Gary or one of the children that were actually at the Broward County at the Outreach Broward facility where he worked, but it was some information, and it was kind of alarming." I find the testimony of Ms. Daniels and the testimony of Ms. Gardner regarding the alleged profanity and regarding alleged uncooperativeness of Petitioner with the DCF questionable. Excluding the foregone evidence, other testimony regarding Petitioner and his conduct addressing matters that are related to those specific issues raised in DCF's denial letter of October 30, 2000, is neither material nor relevant to issues under consideration in this cause and disregarded.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is
Findings Of Fact In August, 1980, the home of Jacob and Donna Vermeulen was licensed by Petitioner as a pre-school foster home. Under that licensure, the Vermeulens were able to care for children from birth to four years of age. The subject of this proceeding, hereinafter referred to as S.L., was born on May 26, 1976. When S.L. was four years old he and his younger sister were removed from the custody of his natural mother (after he witnessed the homicide by bludgeoning of his father by his mother) because S.L. and his sister had been physically abused by both natural parents. Petitioner placed S.L. and his sister into the Vermeu1en foster home. After S.L. and his sister had been living with the Vermeulens for approximately six months, Petitioner removed them from the Vermeulen home and returned them to the custody of their natural mother. After approximately six months, the two children were again removed from their natural mother since she again physically abused them. Petitioner requested the Vermeulens to again take custody of S.L. and his sister. The Vermeulens were reluctant to do so since both S.L, and his sister were now older than was allowed under the Vermeulens' license, and because S.L. had problems relating with the other foster children living in that home during his first stay there. However, Petitioner's social workers begged the Vermeulens to take the children back since Petitioner was unable to find any other placement for S.L. The Vermeulens agreed to make their home available to S.L. and his sister, and the two children thereafter lived in the Vermeulen home for approximately two and one-half years prior to April 16, 1984. S.L. is a difficult child to care for; he is very emotional, developmentally immature, fearful, and fidgety. He has difficulty sleeping or listening, has a very low self-esteem, and is unable to complete tasks since he becomes emotionally frustrated. Not only is S.L. a clumsy child (most probably due to medication), he also throws himself onto the floor and onto his toys, both as part of his aggressive play behavior and also in conjunction with throwing temper tantrums. S.L. initiates fights in school, on the school bus and at home with the other children in the Vermeulen home to such an extent that fighting somewhere would have been almost a daily occurrence. His excessive demands for attention were often accompanied by negative behavior, such as hitting other children and throwing temper tantrums. On December 21, 1983, S.L. was evaluated by psychiatrist Josephine Perez. Perez diagnosed S.L. as suffering from Attention Deficit Disorder with Hyperactivity. Perez determined that the high dosages of anti-psychoic medication that S.L. had been taking were inappropriate, and she prescribed different medication for him. Perez recalls that during S.L.'s initial evaluation in December she noticed that his legs and arms were filled with bruises. S.L. began treating weekly with Perez from January 16, 1984, until April 16, 1984. On each visit at least one of the Vermeulens was present, and each visit contained a seasion between Perez and the foster parent discussing the child's progress and training the foster parent in the use of behavioral modification techniques. During those several months S.L. appeared at Perez's office on one occasion with a black eye and on another occasion with a bruising above his eye. One injury resulted from a fall in the bath tub, and another resulted from a fall out of bed; both falls were probably attributable to changes Perez made in S.L.'s medication. The Vermeulens discussed both incidents with Perez since they were concerned that S.L,'s medication was still not in the proper dosage. The Vermeulens testified that sometimes when S.L.'s medication was changed, he was unable to control even his arms and was unable to sit still long enough to eat. In January, 1984, when S.L. began treating with Dr. Perez there were six children living in the Vermeulen home: four foster children, one adopted child, and one natural child. The Vermeulens and Dr. Perez discussed the number of children living in the Vermeulen home, which prohibited giving S.L. the excessive amount of time required by him to satisfy his need for attention. Perez told the Vermeulens that in her professional opinion S.L. should be in a home with no more than one other child. In turn, the Vermeulens told Perez that they had been requesting Petitioner to remove S.L. from their home out of their concern (1) for S.L. since he needed so much more attention than was available to him and (2) for the other children not only because S.L. would kick and hit them but also because the Vermeulens had discovered S.L. in his sister's bedroom standing over her with a knife in his hand on two occasions. Although Perez agreed that S.L. should be placed a different foster setting, she did nothing to assist in obtaining a different placement and did not discuss with any employee of the Petitioner ("HRS") her recommendation and the Vermeulens' desire that S.L. be placed in a setting, preferably, where he was the only child. The Vermeulens, however, continued to request of HRS employees, including the visiting social workers and medical personnel, that S.L. be removed from their home, with visitation rights being given to the Vermeulens if possible. During this time period the Vermeulens determined that they wished to adopt Michelle, a foster child in their care. On Friday, April 13, 1984, an HRS employee went to the Vermeulen home to discuss that petition for adoption and to advise the Vermeulens that HRS would not allow them to adopt Michelle. Mr. and Mrs. Vermeulen S.L., and the rest of the children living in the home were present during that discussion. The Vermeulens were advised that they would not be permitted to adopt Michelle so long as S.L. was living in their home since he is a "therapeutic foster child" and Petitioner's rules would prohibit the adoption while a "therapeutic child" was in the home. Mrs. Vermeulen was unable to understand Petitioner's position: its refusal to remove S.L. from her home after repeated requests and its refusal to allow her to adopt Michelle for the reason that S.L. was in her home. Mrs. Vermeulen became upset, and S.L. told her and Petitioner's employee to put him in a foster home indicating he would rather be sent away than prevent Michelle from being adopted by the Vermeulens. Since the HRS employee was having a difficult time discussing HRS's position, she left the Vermeulen home. On Friday, April 13, 1984, or on Monday, April 16, 1984, S.L. became involved in a fight on the school bus on the way home from school. The bus driver told Mrs. Vermeulen about the fight. On Monday April 16, 1984, Mrs. Vermeulen took S.L. to his weekly therapy session with Dr. Perez. During that session, S.L. indicated to Perez that he had been bad and had been "paddled" on the legs. He would give her no details, but Perez believed it was Donna Vermeulen who paddled S.L. Rather than discuss it with Mrs. Vermeulen, Perez acted as though nothing had been said. Further, although a medical doctor, she did not examine S.L. Instead, Perez discussed with Mrs. Vermeulen behavioral modification techniques to be utilized with S.L. and sent them home. She then telephoned HRS, and a child abuse report was completed. On April 18, 1984, an HRS employee went to S.L.'s school, removed the child from his class, and took the child to be examined by the Child Protection Team. S.L. was first examined by the nurse. When S.L. was unable to explain to the nurse from where each mark on his body originated (or refused to), she interrogated him with questions such as "Did your mommy hit you?" The nurse made notations on a chart indicating numerous marks or bruises on S.L.'s body. However, an HRS employee saw S.L. disrobed when he was being examined by the doctor on the team and saw only two marks on his lower back. Other HRS employees went to the Vermeulen home and removed all the children. No one discussed the incident or accusation with either Mr. or Mrs. Vermeulen until the following day. Until he was removed from her class on April 18, 1984, S.L. was taught by Debbie Froug an Exceptional Education teacher for emotionally disturbed children. Although Froug describes S.L. as a basically honest child, she testified that he sometimes gets very confused. A careful review of the videotaped testimony of S.L. and of the conflicting testimony of the witnesses in this case indicates that Froug's latter description is probably an understatement. No witness in this case heard the same explanation (or accusation) as any other witness. S.L's videotaped testimony illustrates why: there is no statement made by S.L. that is not contradicted by him a few seconds later. For example the videotaped deposition contains on page 27 the following: O. Did you ever have a black eye? A. No. O. Didn't you talk to Dr. Perez about having a black eye once? A. Yes, but I didn't. How did you get the black eye? One of the kids on the bus. Things stated in the affirmative by S.L. in his deposition are also stated in the negative in that same deposition. Further, it is sometimes impossible to ascertain if S.L. is describing being hit by his real father, by his real mother, or by his foster mother. Although no accusation appears to ever have been made, including in the Administrative Complaint, that Jacob Vermeulen ever struck S.L., by the time of S.L.'s deposition eight months after the alleged incident when S.L. was asked if Jacob ever hit him, that question was answered in the affirmative. In short, the evidence is clear that S.L. had some bruises or marks on his body on April 18, 1984; that those bruises or marks were both received accidentally and intentionally inflicted, and that the bruises or marks on S.L.'s body were received as a result of S.L. falling from being uncoordinated or overmedicated, from S.L. flinging himself onto the floor or onto or against objects, and from being hit or kicked by other children with whom S.L. engaged in almost-daily physical combat. Donna and Jacob Vermeulen used only approved behavior modification techniques with S.L. and did not hit S.L. with or without any object, spank S.L., or otherwise inflict physical abuse upon him. Although the Vermeulens' license as a foster home was in effect at all times material hereto, it has lapsed. A foster home license is not automatically renewed but rather requires an annual licensing study. Other than "the incident" charged herein the Vermeulens have received no prior complaints from HRS.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is REC0MENDED that a Final Order be entered dismissing with prejudice the Administrative Complaint filed herein and directing that any licensure study performed regarding the renewal or extension of Respondents' license be made omitting therefrom consideration of any of the matters set forth herein. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 19th day of July, 1985 at Tallahassee, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of July,1985. COPIES FURNISHED: Leonard Helfand, Esquire Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 401 N.W. 2nd Avenue, Suite 1070 Miami, Florida 33128 Thomas J. Walsh, Esquire 590 English Avenue Homestead, Florida 33030 David Pingree, Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Did Respondent violate Section 409.175(8)(b)1, Florida Statutes, or Rule 65C-13.011(d) and (f)1, Florida Administrative Code, and, if so, should Respondent's license as a foster home be revoked?
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant findings of fact are made: At times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent was licensed as a foster home, having been issued such license on October 23, 1997. The Department is the agency of the state charged with the responsibility and duty to carry out and enforce the provisions of Chapter 409, Florida Statutes. Respondent received the Department's Model Approach to Partnership Parenting (MAPP) training to become a foster parent between September 1995 and December 1995. The Department provides MAPP training to teach persons how to become foster parents. The MAPP training that Respondent received included instructions concerning appropriate sleeping arrangements, namely that an adult should not sleep in the same bed with a foster child. Respondent agreed that the MAPP training was very useful and that he gained insight from that training on how to be a foster parent. Respondent received his foster care license on October 23, 1997, and the Department placed its first foster child with Respondent in January 1998. Foster child D.D., born October 23, 1985, was placed with Respondent by the Department January 20, 1998, and stayed with Respondent until March 12, 1998, when he was removed by the Department. Foster child E.T., born December 12, 1984, was placed with Respondent on January 12, 1998, and stayed with Respondent until January 21, 1998, when he was removed by the Department. E.T. was again placed by the Department with Respondent on January 23, 1998, and stayed with Respondent until March 12, 1998, when he was removed by the Department. Foster child R.M., born October 10, 1984, was placed with Respondent by the Department on March 2, 1998, and stayed with Respondent until March 9, 1998, when he was removed by the Department due to an alleged incident between R.M. and E.T. which occurred on March 9, 1998. The incident resulted in the Department's conducting an investigation concerning an alleged abuse on the foster child, E.T. by the foster child, R.M.. It appears from the record that the allegations were unfounded. In any event, R.M. was removed from Respondent's foster home on March 9, 1998, because his record indicated that in an earlier incident R.M. had sexually victimized another child (not E.T.). Also, because E.T. had been sexually victimized by another child (not R.M.) previous to being placed in Respondent's care the Department decided to remove E.T. from Respondent's home. It should be noted that the Department was aware of these prior incidents concerning R.M. and E.T. and the sleeping arrangements at Respondent's foster home at the time these foster children were placed with Respondent by the Department. Foster children, B.B. and C.L., dates of birth not in evidence, were placed with the Respondent by the Department on February 24, 1998, and stayed with Respondent until February 25, 1998, when they were removed by the Department. During the investigation concerning the alleged abuse incident involving R.M. and E.T. and at the hearing, Respondent admitted to sleeping in the same bed as E.T. and D.D. Respondent testified that on at least five occasions E.T. had slept in the same bed as Respondent. The facts surrounding this sleeping arrangement was that E.T. was suffering from an upper respiratory problem and would go to sleep on Respondent's bed before Respondent, who stayed up late reading, was ready for bed. As a result Respondent would sleep with E.T. to keep from waking him. There was no allegation, and certainly no evidence, that Respondent sexually or otherwise molested E.T. at any time. Respondent also admitted to sleeping in the same bed as D.D. on one occasion. Again, there was no allegation, and certainly no evidence, that Respondent sexually or otherwise molested D.D. At the time the Respondent applied for and was granted a foster home license and during the intervening time, the Department's personnel who worked with Respondent were well aware of the lack of sleeping spaces in Respondent's home. In fact, one of the Department's employees upon being advised of Respondent's sleeping arrangements commented that "it was better than sleeping on the floor at HRS." Upon being advised of the restriction on adults sleeping with foster children, the Respondent did not at first fully understand the risk of harm to the children. However, after being reminded of his MAPP training and the risk of harm to children in such a sleeping arrangement, Respondent realized his mistake in allowing such sleeping arrangements. Under Respondent's tutelage, E.T. and D.D. thrived academically and have continued to thrive since they left Respondent's home. The Department had some concern that Respondent's son was living in the home and that it had not been made aware of that circumstance. However, the Department knew, when Respondent's license was issued, that his son was living in the home.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and the mitigating circumstances, it is recommended that the Department enter a final order suspending Respondent's foster home license for a period of one year, staying the suspension and imposing such reasonable conditions as the Department deems necessary to further educate Respondent as to his responsibilities as a foster parent. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th of July, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6947 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of July, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Jack E. Farley, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services 4720 Old Highway 37 Lakeland, Florida 33813-2030 Thomas D. Wilson, Esquire Law Office of Gregory Ruster 1525 South Florida Avenue Suite 3 Lakeland, Florida 33803 Gregory D. Venz. Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 John S. Slye, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue Whether the Respondents are entitled to renewal of their foster home license.
Findings Of Fact Prior to the re-licensing at issue in this proceeding, the Respondents were licensed foster care parents with whom the Department placed minor children for care. When their license came up for renewal in December 1998, the Department informed the Respondents that their license would not be renewed as they had not met the minimum standard for foster parenting. The Respondents have a history of minor incidents which, taken as a whole, have suggested to the Department that they are not able to provide the quality of care to foster children as contemplated by the statute and rules governing foster care providers. More specifically, the Respondents have left minor children ages four and nine in the care of developmentally delayed adolescents. Respondents were not authorized to leave the children with the adolescents nor did they provide meaningful supervision for the young minors. The incident resulted in a call to police who were summoned when the children called their mother. Respondent, Estoria Walker, has also used disparaging comments to and in front of a minor child who was placed in her care. In this instance, in front of the child's case worker, Respondent complained to the child of the volume of food consumed by the child. She sought additional funds to feed the child as she felt the child's board rate was inadequate to cover the costs of feeding her. Also, the Respondent complained about how the child kept herself. These disparaging remarks to and in front of the child did not contribute to a nurturing environment for the child. The child was ultimately moved from Respondents' home as she was miserable there, and the Respondents did not want her to remain. On another occasion the Respondents were caring for a teenager who became pregnant. Respondents delegated the task of informing the Department of the pregnancy to the teen. As foster parents they assumed no responsibility for notifying the caseworker of the situation. As a result, the caseworker for the teen was not promptly advised of the pregnancy. Respondents gave an adolescent in their care permission to leave their home for an extended visit to the child's relative. They did so without the caseworker's approval or knowledge of the visit. They did so without following Department guidelines for extended visits outside of the foster home. Most of the complaints to the Department resulted from the Respondents' failure to provide a loving, nurturing environment for the foster children placed in their home. Nevertheless, other incidents resulted from a claim of improper discipline, including spanking. As to all of these complaints the Department sought to work with the Respondents, to counsel them for performance improvement, and to allow them to retain children in their home despite serious reservations. From as early as 1995, the Department received complaints from the foster children in the Respondents' home that they had been inappropriately disciplined with spanking. As a result, Mrs. Walker was required to review and execute the disciplinary policy to assure the Department that the Respondents would not use physical discipline with the children. Despite this reminder, additional complaints of physical discipline were made against the Respondents. When the time came for the Department's committee to consider the renewal of Respondents' license, the entire licensing file documenting all of the above-identified issues was considered. Thereafter, the Department determined it would not renew the license.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Children and Family Services enter a final order denying Respondents' request for license renewal as foster care parents. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of August, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. J. D. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of August, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Deborah Guller, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services 201 West Broward Boulevard Suite 502 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301 Albert and Estoria Walker 5311 Southwest 25th Street Hollywood, Florida 33023 Gregory D. Venz, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204B 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 John S. Slye, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204B 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue Whether the Department of Children and Family Services (DCF) may revoke Respondent's family foster care license due to her continued contact with her husband after he was convicted of sexual molestation of their teen-aged daughter.
Findings Of Fact Lila and Charles Dean were licensed foster parents from 1986 through 1991, when they adopted their daughter who was then six years old. The couple subsequently had two natural daughters. In January 2001, the 16-year-old adopted daughter reported that Charles Dean had been sexually abusing her for approximately two years. Lila Dean immediately had Charles Dean move out of the family home. She has been consistently supportive of their daughter and went with her through the whole abuse and rehabilitation system. Charles Dean was convicted in 2001 of sexually abusing his adopted daughter and is a registered sex offender. Lila Dean has been separated from Charles Dean since January 2001, but she has not filed for divorce. On March 13, 2002, Lila Dean was relicensed by DCF as a family foster parent. George Payne, DCF Family Counselor III, testified that during the family foster home re-licensing process prior to March 13, 2002, Lila Dean admitted to him that she was seeing her husband away from the home once every two or three months to discuss child support, insurance, etc., and that he had no contact with the children. She also admitted that with the permission of his probation officer, Charles Dean had come to the home, while the children were at school, to make needed repairs. At Mr. Payne's urging, she promised to get someone else to make any future repairs. The licensing process took eleven months because of DCF's concerns about Mrs. Dean's contacts with her husband, but DCF licensed her individually on March 13, 2002, because of her previous excellent record as a foster parent in another district supervised by Mr. Payne from 1985 to 1989. On May 13, 2002, upon receiving an abuse report that Mrs. Dean had been having regular contacts with her husband; that Mrs. Dean had made comments in the community that Mr. Dean's sexual abuse was not that serious because the girl was his adopted, not his biological child; and that Mrs. Dean had spoken on Mr. Dean's behalf requesting that he be spared a prison sentence, DCF removed the two non-verbal, toddler, foster children who were then in Mrs. Dean's foster care and instituted a further abuse investigation. After the abuse report had been received regarding Mrs. Dean's 2002 contacts with her husband, she told Mr. Payne that she was not looking for a relationship with any other men because they might want a sexual relationship with her, but that sex was not an issue with her husband, so she felt comfortable with him. The abuse report, which related the couple's more frequent contacts, suggests the family is "working toward reconciliation," something Mrs. Dean has denied to Mr. Payne. The abuse report verifies the old abuse information as to the adopted daughter. It does not verify the tipster's allegation that Mrs. Dean does not view Mr. Dean's molestation of their adopted daughter as less serious than it would have been with a natural daughter. There is no direct testimony or otherwise reliable evidence on this issue, on the issue of whether or not she has spoken publicly on his behalf, or on the issue of whether or not a reconciliation is anticipated. There is no evidence that Charles Dean has been in the home since Lila Dean was relicensed. DCF sent a license revocation letter to Mrs. Dean after becoming aware of the increasing frequency of her contacts with her husband. The basis for revocation was given as: . . . pursuant to Section 409.175(8)(b)3. [now Section 409.175(9)(b)3] Florida Statutes, because your continued and repeated contacts with Charles Dean are inconsistent and incompatible with your role as a foster parent. It is not in the best interests of vulnerable foster children to be placed with a foster parent who considers it appropriate to have a relationship with a registered sex offender. [Clarification of statutory citation agreed-to and supplied]. Mr. Payne was unaware of any DCF rules Mrs. Dean broke by having contact with her husband. Mr. Payne has no indication that any children, natural or foster, were at greater risk post-licensing than pre- licensing due to Mr. And Mrs. Dean's increased contact. DCF cannot constantly monitor a foster parent to ensure that the children in her care are not placed at risk by her personal associations.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Children and Family Services enter a final order reinstating the family foster home license of Lila Dean and specifically limiting any appearance on the foster home premises by Charles Dean. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of January, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of January, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: Lucy Goddard, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services Post Office Box 390, Mail Stop 3 Gainesville, Florida 32602 Robert Vest, Esquire 613 St. Johns Avenue Suite 212 Post Office Box 2525 Palatka, Florida 32177 Paul F. Flounlacker, Jr., Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204B Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Josie Tomayo, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Respondent, the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS), should grant the application of the Petitioners, Charles Wenz and Janet Gallagher, for a family foster home license. 1/
Findings Of Fact Through series of circumstances, the Petitioners in this case--Charles Wenz and Janet Gallagher, husband and wife--came to know the children of a woman named N. M. 4/ Their priest told them about Nancy and her predicament. A serious drug and alcohol addict, and already the single mother of two boys (J. D., born December 30, 1977, and B. F., born January 7, 1983), each of whom had a different biological father, she was about to have another child by yet another man. The Petitioners were asked to help the family, and they agreed. Shortly after the third child--a girl, N. F., born November 4, 1988-- was released from the hospital, the mother asked the Petitioners to let the family live with them temporarily. Not long afterward, the mother slipped back to her way of abusing drugs and alcohol and left, leaving the children with the Petitioners. For some time, the Petitioners cared for the children without being licensed as a family foster home and without any financial assistance from HRS. Later, in approximately March, 1991, they became licensed as a family foster home for the specific and limited purpose of caring for the children of M. 5/ When it came to the children in their care, the Petitioners generally were very attentive to their needs for food, clothing, shelter and medical care, and they provided very well for the children, following up on all doctor appointments and the like. They were very conscientious in this regard. Generally, they got along well with the children, and the children tended to view them as if they were their real parents. As a result of their involvement with the family, the Petitioners came to know the children's maternal grandparents. While initially the Petitioners got along fairly well with the maternal grandparents, they had the opportunity to form opinions of them based on personal experience and stories related by the children and, later, by the fathers of the two boys. Essentially, the Petitioners thought the maternal grandparents were good grandparents, and they encouraged and cooperated in the maintenance of a relationship between the children and the maternal grandparents. At the same time, they did not perceive the maternal grandparents as a good option for permanent placement of the children. Besides the maternal grandparents' age and limited physical and emotional capabilities, and their lack of interest in being permanently responsible for the children on a full-time basis, the Petitioners also had a concern about what they understood to be the maternal grandfather's drinking habits. Instead, since reunification with the mother did not seem feasible to either the Petitioners or to HRS, the Petitioners felt the best option, at least for the boys, would be to investigate their reunification with their fathers. Along with HRS, the Petitioners were instrumental in locating the fathers of the boys and reestablishing contacts between them and their sons. Along with HRS, they actively encouraged and fostered the strengthening of the relationship between the boys and their fathers and worked with HRS to bring the men into a position to begin to care for their sons permanently on a full-time basis. When the Petitioners became licensed as a child-specific family foster home in approximately March, 1991, they agreed to work within the policies and procedures established by the Department and to accept supervision by a foster care counselor. There was no evidence that they were not supportive of the efforts outlined in the foster care agreement or plan. 6/ But problems between the Petitioners and the maternal grandparents developed between the time of the Petitioners' licensure and September, 1991. The problems got so bad that the HRS counselor assigned to the case had to conduct visitation in his office to ascertain who was causing the problems and how to best resolve them. The problems culminated in the maternal grandparents' ultimatum that they no longer could work with the Petitioners as foster parents and that they wanted the children placed with them, the grandparents. The problems worsened as HRS began to investigate the possibility of placing the children with the grandparents. 7/ The Petitioners were against this and attempted to use their positions as foster parents to thwart HRS efforts in that direction. A senior HRS counselor replaced the initial counselor in an effort to shepherd the grandparent placement, with its attendant visitations. But, although regular visitations by the grandparents was prearranged during the fall of 1991, 8/ the Petitioners consistently raised various obstacles to the grandparent visitations, requiring multiple interventions by the HRS senior counselor and others at HRS. Three times, despite HRS interventions, visitation had to be cancelled. The Petitioners' case was taking such an inordinate amount of time that the HRS senior counselor went to his supervisor for relief. The grandparents felt the need to go to court to have the court establish visitation over the Christmas holidays. A hearing had to be held on or about December 10, 1991, and the court granted the grandparents overnight visitation from December 25 through 30, 1991. On inquiring of the children on their return, the Petitioners believed the grandparents did not properly administer prescribed medications for two of the children and accused the grandparents of child abuse. HRS investigated and found that the grandparents had been in direct telephone communication with two of the children's doctors to resolve a discrepancy between two of their medication prescriptions and had followed the telephone instructions of the doctor in charge of the prescription. In connection with the problems with the grandparents, the Petitioners exhibited a clear tendency to try to manipulate the foster care system to their advantage, even unintentionally to the detriment of the interests of the children, and sometimes, out of overzealousness, through use of untruths and half truths. On one occasion, in an attempt to persuade the first HRS counselor not to pursue placement of the children with the grandparents, they told the counselor that an HRS protective services worker had told them that the maternal grandfather had a drinking problem. In fact, it was the Petitioners who had alleged to the protective services worker that the maternal grandfather had a drinking problem. On another occasion, to avoid allowing the grandparents to pick up the children for visitation, the Petitioners cited a supposed statute or rule making it illegal for the grandparents to provide transportation for the children. 9/ Once the boy, B. F., lost a hospital pass for use to visit his grandparents because of problems raised by the Petitioners concerning the legality of the grandparents providing transportation for him. In addition to the problems with the maternal grandparents, the Petitioners exhibited a certain tendency to take things into their own hands when closer contact and consultation with HRS would have been advisable. Once they made arrangements for one of the boys to be admitted to a psychiatric hospital without consulting with HRS and did not advise the counselor until shortly before admission. To attempt to justify their actions to the HRS counselor, the Petitioner told the counselor that the boy's family therapist strongly favored hospitalization for psychiatric treatment. In fact, the counselor later found that the family therapist only had said that it might become necessary at some point to hospitalize the boy. Once the Petitioner, Charles Wenz, used corporal punishment on one of the boys although he knew it was against HRS policy for operators of a family foster home to use corporal punishment. He explained that, due to the history of the Petitioners' relationship with these children, the Petitioners felt more like parents than foster parents and that he did not think it was appropriate in their case for the usual prohibition against corporal punishment to apply to them. Later, Mr. Wenz had another occasion to use a form of corporal punishment on the other boy. 10/ In January, 1992, the Petitioners applied to renew their "child- specific" license as a family foster home. On or about February 1, 1992, the court placed the children with the maternal grandparents, and the Petitioners converted their application to one for general licensure as a family foster home.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Petitioner, the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS), enter a final order granting the application of Charles Wenz and Janet Gallagher for general licensure as a family foster home. RECOMMENDED this 13th day of July, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of July, 1992.
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioners' application for relicensing as a foster home should be approved.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: In this licensing dispute, Petitioners, Leo and Connie Smith (the Smiths), seek to have their foster care license renewed. In a preliminary decision rendered on October 8, 1999, Respondent, Department of Children and Family Services (Department), denied the request on the ground that Petitioners improperly used corporal punishment on a child under their care, and that the Department "cannot [be] assured that [Petitioners] will not lose control again and use excessive corporal punishment." The underlying facts are relatively brief. Petitioners were first issued a therapeutic foster care license in September 1998. Thereafter, and until their application for renewal was denied, they used the license to care for two therapeutic foster children, a type of foster child that has far more severe emotional problems than a regular foster child. On July 25, 1998, or before the license was issued, Connie Smith (Connie) was babysitting a two-year-old child in her home. When the child "messed in its pants" a second time after being previously warned not to do it again, Connie struck the child with a ruler which left bruises on the child's buttocks. The incident was investigated by the Department and culminated in the issuance of an abuse report on October 9, 1998, which is identified as abuse report number 98-084291. Apparently, that report was not contested, for it remains a confirmed report in the abuse registry. Because the Department's background screening on the Smiths was completed in May 1998, or before the abuse incident occurred, the Department was unaware of the matter when it issued the license in September 1998. The abuse report contains an admission by Connie to the mother of the child that "she had lost her temper with the baby" and struck him. At hearing, however, she denied that she "lost control" and maintained instead that the spanking was simply a form of discipline for the child. Even if Connie's version of events is accepted, the fact remains that the child was struck so hard that he suffered bruises on his buttocks. Through accepted testimony presented at hearing, the Department expressed the concern that if Connie lost control supervising a normal two-year-old child, she would have far more difficulty with older children having severe emotional problems, such as therapeutic foster children. This is a legitimate concern, and Petitioners failed to demonstrate that this concern was not well-founded.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Children and Family Services enter a final order denying Petitioners' request for renewal of their foster care license. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of November, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of November, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Virginia A. Daire, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204B 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Josie Tomayo, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Leo and Connie Smith 12134 County Road 684 Webster, Florida 33597 Ralph J. McMurphy, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services 1601 West Gulf Atlantic Highway Wildwood, Florida 34785-8158
The Issue The issue to be resolved in this proceeding concerns whether Petitioners committed violations of Florida Statutes and Florida Administrative Code sufficient to justify revocation of Petitioners’ license to operate a foster care facility.
Findings Of Fact Petitioners’ foster home is a private agency foster home licensed by Respondent to provide substitute care for children in foster care. On or about August 24, 2000, a report was made to the Florida Abuse Registry indicating that a child, A.C., who suffers from Downs Syndrome and who resided in Petitioners’ care at the time, had suffered a burn mark that was three to four inches long. The burn reportedly appeared to be from an iron. Pursuant to this report, Respondent’s Child Protective Investigator commenced an investigation of the matter on August 24, 2000. During the course of the August 24, 2000, investigation, Respondent’s investigator observed the burn on A.C.’s arm. Testimony of the investigator establishes the presence of such a burn on A.C.’s arm at the time. That testimony is corroborated by photographs in Respondent’s Composite Exhibit No. 3 and fairly and accurately depicts A.C.’s burned arm as it appeared on August 24, 2001. Petitioner Carol Golden, when asked about the situation, stated that she was unaware of the burn on A.C.’s right arm until the matter was brought to her attention by the investigation which commenced on August 24, 2000, following the discovery of the child's injury by school personnel. Interviews with other children in the home revealed that another child was ironing clothes on the evening of August 23, 2000, and left the iron unattended momentarily, during which time A.C. burned his arm on the iron. Respondent’s investigator referred A.C. to the Child Protection Team for an examination of his injury. Subsequently, A.C. was removed from Petitioners’ foster home after the findings of the Child Protection Team revealed that the child’s injury was indicative of inadequate supervision. Respondent’s investigator concluded her investigation and closed the case, Abuse Report 2000-133049, with verified findings for lack of supervision and failure to seek medical attention for A.C. Subsequently, Petitioners’ foster care license was revoked because of the verified findings of neglect and inadequate supervision found in Abuse Report 2000-133049. Medical examination of A.C.’s injury, as it appeared on August 24, 2000, reveals that the injury was on the child’s right arm; was five by eight centimeters in size; and was a charred burn in the shape of an iron with the circles for the steam holes clearly visible. The burn was in such a place, and of such a size, that any caretaker responsible for the bathing and clothing of A.C. should have seen the injury. Attempts by Respondent’s employees to conduct an assessment of A.C. were not successful. He was friendly and interacted well; however, he only pointed to his injury and could not communicate how it happened.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law, the evidence of record, and the testimony of the witnesses, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be entered confirming the revocation of Petitioner’s foster license. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of January, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DON W. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of January, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Charles Golden Carol Golden 7939 Denham Road Jacksonville, Florida 32208 Robin Whipple-Hunter, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services Post Office Box 2417 Jacksonville, Florida 32211 Peggy Sanford, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204B Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Josie Tomayo, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
