Findings Of Fact Respondent, Larry K. Sechrest, was at all times relevant to the charges contained in the Administrative Complaint, licensed as limited surety agent in the State of Florida representing Allied Fidelity Insurance Company ("Allied"). In February, 1982, Respondent's accounts with Allied were audited by their representative at which time it was discovered that Respondent executed but did not report 202 powers of attorney. The aforementioned powers represented $11,464.51 in premiums due Allied, and an additional $5,732 due the buildup fund. On March 4, 1982, Allied demanded that the Respondent remit to them these premiums and buildup fund payments and account for and return the missing powers of attorney. Respondent had failed to comply with Allied's demands as of the date this Administrative Complaint was filed by Petitioner (July 20, 1982). Respondent subsequently offered to repay Allied at the rate of $1,000 per month, but this was refused. At the final hearing on February 16, 1983, Respondent offered to repay the total amount due within 30 days. On April 29, 1981, Respondent attempted to post a ne exeat bond in the amount of $25,000 for Douglas R. Valentine of Manatee County, Florida, based on power of attorney number FL2800913 issued by Allied. Respondent had not been given authority by Allied to post ne exeat bonds. Power of attorney number FL2800913 was by its language to be issued for appearance bonds only.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That Petitioner enter a Final Order finding Respondent guilty of violating Subsections 648.45(1)(d), (h) and (j), Florida Statutes (1981), as charged in Count I of the Administrative Complaint, and suspending his limited surety agent's license for one year; provided, however, that such license shall not be reinstated until Respondent has made restitution to the Allied Fidelity Insurance Company. DONE and ENTERED this 20th day of May, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. R. T. CARPENTER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of May, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: Clark R. Jennings, Esquire Department of Insurance The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Jerry Surfus, Esquire 150 East Avenue, South Sarasota, Florida 33577 The Honorable Bill Gunter Insurance Commissioner Department of Insurance The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER ================================================================= STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE AND TREASURER IN THE MATTER OF LARRY K. SECHREST Revocation of License and Case No. 82-L-162J Eligibility for Licensure DOAH Case No. 82-2617 Limited Surety Agent / ORDER REVOKING RESPONDENT'S LICENSES AND ELIGIBILITY TO HOLD LICENSES THIS MATTER came on to be considered upon the transcript of record of hearing held on February 16, 1983, in Sarasota, Florida, and the Report, Findings, Conclusions and Recommendations of the Hearing Examiner dated May 20, 1983. Upon consideration thereof and being otherwise fully advised in the premises, it is ORDERED: The Findings of Fact of the Hearing Examiner are adopted. The Conclusions of Law of the Hearing Examiner are adopted. The Recommendation of the Hearing Examiner is rejected for the following reasons: Section 648.49, Florida Statutes prohibits the establishment of a period of suspension in excess of one (1) year. The Department lacks the authority to condition any Order upon financial restitution by a Respondent to any aggrieved party listed in an Administrative Complaint. Revocation of license and eligibility for licensure is an appropriate remedy under the statutory authority cited in the Administrative Complaint, and the Hearing Officer's Conclusions of Law. All licenses of the Respondent, LARRY K. SECHREST, heretofore issued within the purview of the Florida Department of Insurance and eligibility to hold said licenses be, and the same are hereby revoked. DONE and ORDERED at Tallahassee, Florida, this 28th day of June , 1983. BILL GUNTER Insurance Commissioner and Treasurer WILLIAM D. RUBIN Assistant Insurance Commissioner and Treasurer COPIES FURNISHED: Jerry Surfus, Esquire 150 East Avenue, South Sarasota, Florida 33577 Clark R. Jennings, Esquire Department of Insurance 413-B Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Did Respondent knowingly permit a person who had been convicted of or who had pled guilty or no contest to a felony or a crime involving moral turpitude or a crime punishable by imprisonment of one year or more under law of any state, territory or country, regardless of whether adjudication of guilt was withheld, to engage in the bail bond business as an employee of Respondent's bail bond agency? If yes, should Respondent have her limited surety agent license disciplined?
Findings Of Fact At all relevant times Respondent was licensed by Petitioner as a limited surety agent, license no. 224404483. Petitioner has regulatory jurisdiction over that license. For that reason Petitioner may impose discipline should Respondent violate laws pertaining to Respondent's activities associated with the license. Respondent is President and Director of Crews Bonding Agency, Inc., 24 North Liberty Street, Jacksonville, Florida 32222, through which business she performs insurance-related activities concerning bail bonds. Crews Bonding Agency, Inc. was incorporated in Florida on March 31, 1988. The corporation is organized for the purpose of transacting any or all lawful business. The corporation provides bail bonds at the Liberty Street premises. The corporation also runs a parking lot concession at that location. Both businesses were operated at times relevant to the inquiry. On August 28, 1995, Star Legal Research, Inc. was incorporated to operate at 350 East Forsyth Street, Jacksonville, Florida 32202. That street address is the street adjacent to the Liberty Street address. The Star Legal Research business works out of the same building that Crews Bonding Agency uses. The difference being that the entrance to Crews Bonding Agency is on Liberty Street and the Star Legal Research entrance is on Forsyth Street. A 1995-96 occupational license was issued to Star Legal Research c/o Jack I. Etheridge, Jr., Respondent's son, for the period October 1, 1995 to September 30, 1996. Jack I. Etheridge, Jr. owns Star Legal Research. Jack I. Etheridge, Jr. stated that the purpose for incorporating Star Legal Research was to provide work for Jack I. Etheridge, his father and Respondent's husband, in a setting in which Mr. Jack Etheridge, Jr. contends would be unassociated with Crews Bonding Agency. The attempt to disassociate Mr. Jack Etheridge from Crews Bonding Agency will be subsequently explained. When the hearing was convened Jack I. Etheridge had been working in an office in the building where Crews Bonding Agency has its business. That employment was under the guise of Star Legal Research. The office where Jack I. Etheridge works in the building is separated from the office associated with Crews Bonding Agency by a door. Jack I. Etheridge uses a separate entrance into the office where he works. That entrance is from Forsyth Street rather than the Bonding agency entrance from Liberty Street. The business done by Star Legal Research, according to Jack Etheridge, Jr., is one where "you can research any type of legal matters . . . that's pretty much it". Again, Jack Etheridge, Jr. states that his father, Jack Etheridge, ". . . researches legal, you know, business". Under this arrangement, Jack Etheridge is supposedly no longer affiliated with the Crews Bonding Agency in operating its parking lot or otherwise. From the record, it is unclear exactly what is meant by Jack Etheridge's performance of legal research. At present, the bail bond business is done in the front office to the building that houses Crews Bonding Agency and Star Legal Research. That office faces Liberty Street. In addition to the office where bail bond activities are conducted and the back office which faces Forsyth Street, where Star Legal Research is housed, there is a kitchen in the building. That constitutes the rooms in that building. Contrary to the claim by his son that Jack Etheridge is no longer affiliated with Crews Bonding Agency, Respondent identified that the present circumstances are such that Jack Etheridge helps with the Crews Bonding Agency parking lot business "if he sees a car and I don't, he will go there . . .". Respondent identified that she principally handles the parking lot when she is there at the business premises, but that on one occasion, she was in the hospital and was not available to do that work. Further, she stated that her physician did not really want her "running back and forth to the parking lot". Respondent intends to transfer the parking lot business from Crews Bonding Agency to Star Legal Research by January 1997. At one time, Jack Etheridge had been licensed by Petitioner as an insurance agent entitled to participate in bail bond activities. Prior to the passage of Section 648.44(3), Florida Statutes (1983), he had been convicted of a felony in Florida. Section 648.44(3), Florida Statutes (1983), stated: No person who has been convicted of or who has pleaded guilty or no contest to any felony, regardless of whether adjudication of guilt was withheld, may participate as a director, officer, manager, or employee of any bail bond agency or office thereof or own shares in any closely held corporation which has any interest in any bail bond business. Having a concern that Section 648.44(3), Florida Statutes (1983), might disqualify him from continuing to act as an insurance agent in the bail bond business, Jack Etheridge brought suit in the Circuit Court, Fourth Judicial Circuit, In and For Duval County, Florida, Case No. 82-10537CA, Division K. Petitioner was named defendant in that suit. As a result, an order was entered stating: The provisions of Florida Statutes 648.44(3), Fla. Stat. (1983), or its successor(s) do not and cannot be determined to effect the status of plaintiff, Jack I. Etheridge, in his individual capacity as an officer and director of F.G.C. Bonding Insurance Corporation nor his ability to continue to maintain stock ownership of shares of F.G.C. Bonding Insurance Corporation. The provisions of this paragraph shall serve as notice to all interested parties that said statute does not apply to Jack I. Etheridge, individually, nor in his capacity as an officer, director and stockholder in F.G.C. Bonding Insurance Corporation. Subsequently, in a case in the United States District Court, Middle District of Louisiana, Case No. CR.89-40-A-M1, Jack Etheridge pled guilty and was found guilty and convicted of the offense of mail fraud, in accordance with 18 U.S.C. 1341-2. For this offense, he was imprisoned for a period of five years and ordered to make restitution in the amount of $237,393.83. The sentence was imposed on April 6, 1990. At that time, Jack Etheridge was not licensed by Petitioner. Respondent had separated from Mr. Jack Etheridge in 1986. She was reunited with her husband in 1989. Respondent was aware that her husband had been convicted in Florida in state court, the offense for which he sought relief in Circuit Court Case No. 82-10537CA, Division K, and that he had committed the federal offense in Case No. CR.89-40-A-M1. In August or September, 1992, federal probation officers came to the Crews Bonding Agency and spoke to Respondent about her husband's pending release from federal prison. In particular, those persons indicated that Mr. Jack Etheridge was going to be released in December of 1992. In this conversation, the probation officers told Respondent that they expected the husband to work for Crews Bonding Agency in a capacity that did not involve the handling of bail. Respondent told them that her husband could not work at the agency because she did not wish to jeopardize her Florida insurance license and livelihood. This is taken to mean that she was concerned about having a convicted felon working for her at the bail bond agency. In the conversation with the probation officers, Respondent was persuaded that the probation officers had the authority to place her husband with the bail bond agency to give the husband employment in some capacity, other than dealing with bail bond activities. The probation officers did not indicate the specific authority for requiring this placement. Respondent replied to the probation officers that her husband could run the parking lot and clean up. In offering that arrangement, Respondent operated on the assumption that the probation officers were familiar with the requirements in the Florida Insurance Regulations and Statutes. In the conversation between Respondent and the federal probation officers, Respondent made no mention of the ruling in the Circuit Court Case No. 82-10537CA, Division K, concerning her husband's exemption from Section 648.44(3), Florida Statutes (1983), and its effects, or any subsequent law. After the conversation with the probation officers, and prior to her husband's release from prison, Respondent sought advice of counsel concerning the propriety of having her husband employed by Crews Bonding Agency. Robert Persons, Esquire is corporate counsel for Crews Bonding Agency. He incorporated the business. He has done work for the business as corporate counsel, beginning in 1988. He was aware that Mr. Jack Etheridge had been incarcerated in the federal corrections system. Before Mr. Jack Etheridge was released, Mr. Persons reviewed the previously-quoted language in Circuit Court Case No. 82-10537CA, Division K, in response to Respondent's request for legal advice. Respondent had told Mr. Persons that it was possible that she was going to hire her husband to run the parking lot for the Crews Bonding Agency. She wanted to know if there would be a problem with Petitioner's statutes that prohibited a bonding agency from operating with a felon working for it. Specifically, Respondent asked Mr. Persons if her husband could work in the parking lot. Mr. Persons told Respondent that his interpretation of the order was that the statutory prohibition against felons working for a bonding agency did not apply to her husband. For that reason, he did not believe that there would be a problem having the husband work at the parking lot. Moreover, he told Respondent that he did not believe that it presented a problem, in that the activities by the husband, when running the parking lot business, did not involve employment with the bail bonding operation. When he gave this advice, Mr. Persons was familiar with the parking lot concessions operation, having used the parking lot himself. He was also familiar with the bail bond business conducted by Crews Bonding Agency. John Gary Baker, Esquire was retained to assist Mr. Jack Etheridge in meeting the terms of the federal parole granted the client. This included correspondence with the probation office in an attempt to obtain early release. Once Mr. Jack Etheridge was released, Mr. Baker went with the client and spoke to probation officer, Diane Thomas. This conversation took place sometime in late August or early September, 1993. Ms. Thomas told Mr. Baker and Mr. Etheridge that Mr. Etheridge needed to obtain a job as a means to meet requirements for restitution. In this conversation, Ms. Thomas inquired concerning Respondent's income in an attempt to determine the amount that Mr. Etheridge should pay in the way of restitution. Mr. Baker tried to impress Ms. Thomas with the fact that Respondent's income and business were separate from Mr. Etheridge's circumstance. In the conversation, Mr. Etheridge told Ms. Thomas that he wished to be a bus driver. That was his profession prior to being involved in the insurance business in Louisiana, which led to his incarceration. Ms. Thomas would not agree to that arrangement. She indicated that Mr. Etheridge had to be located in a place where the probation officers could come and see him at anytime, day or night. Ms. Thomas asked the question about whether Mr. Etheridge could work for his wife at Crews Bonding Agency, and Mr. Etheridge stated that he did not wish to work for his wife. Ms. Thomas responded to these remarks by saying that she had an order that indicated that Mr. Etheridge could work at the Crews Bonding Agency. This refers to the Circuit Court Case No. 82-10537CA, Division K. Ms. Thomas further told Mr. Etheridge that Mr. Etheridge needed to work at Crews Bonding Agency. Before the date upon which the meeting was held with Ms. Thomas, Mr. Baker had not been acquainted with the circuit court order. When Mr. Baker and Mr. Etheridge left the meeting with Ms. Thomas, they went to the Crews Bonding Agency office; and Mr. Etheridge produced a copy of the circuit court order. Respondent was there at that time. Mr. Baker reviewed the order and expressed an opinion to Respondent and her husband that the husband could work at Crews Bonding Agency in any capacity, other than giving out forms or advice about bail bonds. At that point, there was conversation about the husband running the parking lot. That arrangement was one which Mr. Baker stated would be acceptable and would satisfy the terms of Mr. Etheridge's probation. Moreover, Mr. Baker offered the advice that the circuit court order would allow the husband to attend to clerical matters, such as answering the telephones. David R. Fletcher, Esquire was acquainted with Respondent. Mr. Fletcher was aware that Jack Etheridge had been incarcerated in a federal facility. Mr. Fletcher was approached by Respondent, who asked Mr. Fletcher about the Circuit Court Case No. 82-10537CA, Division K, and the meaning of the order. In particular, Respondent made Mr. Fletcher aware that she was concerned about the federal probation office's instructions or the condition upon which Mr. Etheridge's probation would be served as an employee at Crews Bonding Agency. Respondent told Mr. Fletcher that she was concerned that this would create a problem because of the husband's prior record, taken to mean felony record. When Mr. Fletcher read the order, he expressed the opinion that the husband was exempt from the disqualifying provisions for felons working in a bail bond agency. At the time the conversation was held between Mr. Fletcher and Respondent concerning the husband's status as a felon, Mr. Fletcher understood that the husband would be returning from incarceration and working at the bail bond agency as a parking lot attendant. Respondent relied upon advice of counsel in deciding to allow her husband to work at the bail bond agency as a parking lot attendant. As contemplated by the instructions which the probation officers gave Mr. Jack Etheridge, he took employment at the Crews Bonding Agency. His duties included running the parking lot, vacuuming the building where the bond agency was located, and answering the telephone at the bail bond agency. When he would answer the telephone, Respondent noted that Jack Etheridge would state that he was not a bail bond agent and that the person who was calling would need to speak to the "bonds man". At times, Respondent received calls that had been patched through from the bail bond agency to another location, through efforts by Jack Etheridge. Respondent is aware that her husband took messages for the bail bond agency, as well. Respondent observed that Jack Etheridge principally stayed in the back office, which fronts Forsyth Street, when he worked for the Crews Bonding Agency as parking lot attendant. Specific remarks made by Jack Etheridge in receiving calls for the bonding agency would be "Crews Bonding, would you hold please". If someone needed to speak to Respondent immediately, Mr. Etheridge would state "she is busy, hold please, if you will give me your number, I will have her call you back". Once while Jack Etheridge was employed at the Crews Bonding Agency, following release from federal prison, Ms. Thomas came to the agency to check on his status. Upon that occasion, Respondent spoke to Ms. Thomas and asked if her husband could drive a bus, instead of being employed by the bail bond agency. Ms. Thomas replied in the negative and stated that the husband had to stay with the agency and work with Respondent. Ms. Thomas told Respondent that Mr. Jack Etheridge had to be paid a check from the bonding agency. Respondent honored that request. The reason given for requiring that Mr. Jack Etheridge be paid a check was based upon the statement by Ms. Thomas that the husband had to take evidence of the check being issued and present that to the probation office. According to the Florida Department of Labor and Employment Security, Jack Etheridge was paid $800.00 for four weeks worked in the third quarter of 1993; $2,800.00 for 13 weeks worked in the fourth quarter of 1993; $2,419.23 for 12 weeks worked in the first quarter of 1994; $2,854.61 for 13 weeks worked in the second quarter of 1994; and $3,080.00 for 13 weeks worked in the third quarter of 1994. Jack Etheridge, Jr. observed that his father, upon taking the position as parking lot attendant, worked in the kitchen area of the premises most of the time for a period and then moved into the back office, which fronts Forsyth Street, later on. The kitchen area is separated from the room where the bail bonding business is conducted. The room on Liberty Street is where Respondent has traditionally conducted her bail bond business. Jack Etheridge, Jr. never observed his father work in a bail bond capacity once the father returned from incarceration. He did observe that when a car came into the parking lot, his father would direct the driver where to park the car and then return to the building. Jack Etheridge, Jr. made these observations while working in the front office, where bail bond business was conducted, and never noted his father being in that front office. Jack Etheridge, Jr. was at the premises most every day before attending the police academy. After attending the police academy, he spends most of his time at the bail bond agency, pending employment as a policeman. Mr. Persons goes to the location of the bail bond agency two to three times per week and uses a parking space in the parking lot. On those occasions, he sees Jack Etheridge in the parking lot. Mr. Persons has seen Jack Etheridge at the location of the Crews Bonding Agency numerous times, following Jack Etheridge's release from prison. Mr. Persons has gone to that location 150 times within two and one-half years, and it would be uncommon for Jack Etheridge not to have been at the location when Mr. Persons came by. On some visits Mr. Persons has spent as much as 15 or 20 minutes with Respondent and her son at the bail bond agency. On occasions when he visited the bail bond agency, he has never observed Mr. Jack Etheridge do anything related to the bail bond business, unless one considers that answering the telephone at the bail bond agency, when Respondent is unable to, constitutes bail bond business. Mr. Persons has seen Jack Etheridge put a caller on hold and then refer the call to Respondent. The observation by Mr. Persons, where Mr. Jack Etheridge was involved with answering the telephone in the bail bond office, was not the usual circumstance. In the past, when Mr. Persons observed the operation at the bail bond agency, the door separating the room that faces Liberty Street and the room that faces Forsyth Street was open. More recently, that door has been closed between the two rooms. Mr. Persons observed that in the more recent circumstances, Jack Etheridge was using the office that fronts Forsyth Street. Mr. Persons observed that at the time the hearing was conducted, Jack Etheridge was still maintaining the parking lot. Mr. Persons observed that prior to the creation of the Star Legal Research business, Jack Etheridge, when not located in the parking lot, would be found in the office which fronts Forsyth Street. In summary, under the present circumstances, it is unclear what Mr. Jack Etheridge is principally involved with at the premises primarily associated with Crews Bonding Agency and its businesses. Following advice by Mr. Baker that it would be acceptable for Mr. Jack Etheridge to work at the bail bond agency, he has been in the Crews Bonding Agency office approximately 100 times. On almost every occasion, Jack Etheridge would be in the back room on Forsyth Street. Nine out of ten times, Jack Etheridge would be in that location when observed by Mr. Baker. The only times that Mr. Baker would observe Jack Etheridge in the front office, where the bail bonding business was being conducted, would be if other bail bond agency employees were out making a bond or something of that nature. In that instance, Jack Etheridge would be sitting in the front office, where the bail bond business is conducted; and if someone came to park their car, he would take care of that business. If someone came into the office and asked about a bail bond, Jack Etheridge would remark, "Look, Anne (Respondent) is going to be back in a half hour, she is making a bond, or Clara will be back. Come back, or you can sit over there and wait". Clara refers to another employee of the bail bond agency. Mr. Baker also observed that on the occasion on which Jack Etheridge was in the front office, he would refuse to give information about bail bonds and limit himself to handling parking duties and answering the telephone if no one else was available to answer the telephone. Mr. Fletcher has seen Jack Etheridge at the bail bond agency location approximately twice per week, following Mr. Etheridge's release from incarceration. On these occasions, Mr. Fletcher would give Jack Etheridge keys to Mr. Fletcher's car and seek assistance in parking. In these visits to the agency, Mr. Fletcher never observed Jack Etheridge perform work as a bail bond agent. In fact, he never observed Jack Etheridge work anywhere other than in the parking lot. Respondent and her husband brought further action in Circuit Court Case No. 82-10537CA, assigned to Division CV-F. At that time, the previous judge, who had issued the aforementioned order on March 27, 1984, was not presiding in the case. That refers to the Honorable Henry Lee Adams, Jr., who now serves as a federal district judge. The judge who presided in the reopening of the circuit court case was the Honorable Lawrence D. Fay, Circuit Judge. On October 30, 1995, Judge Fay entered an order in Case No. 82- 10537CA, Division CV-F, enjoining consideration of Count I to the present administrative complaint, in which he ordered: The Plaintiff's Motion for Injunction is here- by GRANTED with respect to Count I of the Administrative Complaint and First Amended Administrative Complaint filed by Defendant against Plaintiff, Anne Evans Etheridge, and Defendant shall be enjoined from proceeding against Plaintiff, Anne Evans Etheridge, as to Count I of same in DOAH Case No. 95-3964. Judge Fay also ruled: The Plaintiff's Motion for Injunction is here- by DENIED with respect to the filing of any complaints under Section 648.44(7), Florida Statutes, relative to convictions, guilty pleas, or no contest pleas by Jack I. Ethe- ridge entered subsequent to March 27, 1984. Plaintiffs have failed to exhaust adminis- trative remedies. Based upon the orders by Judge Fay, administrative prosecution has proceeded to resolve Count II to the administrative complaint addressed in DOAH Case No. 95-3964.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and the conclusions of law, it is, RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be entered which dismisses the First Amended Administrative Complaint. DONE and ENTERED this 15th day of February, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of February, 1996. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER CASE NO. 95-3964 The following discussion is given concerning the proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law by the parties. Petitioner's Findings: Paragraphs 1 through 4 are subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 5 constitutes legal argument. Respondent's Findings: Paragraph 1 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 2 is not necessary to the resolution of the dispute. Paragraph 3 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 4 is established through the Preliminary Statement. Paragraphs 5 and 6 are subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 7 is subordinate to facts found, with the exception that several other local attorneys were not contacted for advice. One additional attorney was sought out for advice, Mr. Baker. Paragraph 8, the first sentence is not necessary to the resolution of the dispute. The remaining sentences are subordinate to facts found. Paragraphs 9 through 13 are subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 14 is not necessary to the resolution of the dispute. Paragraphs 15-16 are subordinate to facts found. COPIES FURNISHED: Dickson E. Kesler, Esquire Department of Insurance Division of Agent and Agency Services 8070 North West 53rd Street, Suite 103 Miami, FL 33166 Judy Groover, Esquire 24 North Market Street, Suite 301-A Jacksonville, FL 32202 Bill Nelson, State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner Department of Insurance and Treasurer The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, FL 32399-0300 Dan Sumner, Acting General Counsel Department of Insurance and Treasurer The Capitol, PL-11 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0300
Findings Of Fact C & W Sales, Inc., was licensed as a dealer in agricultural products under license No. 1367 and was so licensed at all times here relevant. At the time of the incorporation of C & W Sales, Inc., Henry T. Watson was listed as an officer (President) and director of the company. The company was run by Philip A. Roberts, the brother-in-law of Watson. Roberts applied on behalf of C & W Sales, Inc., to FFB for an agriculture bond in the amount of $20,000 for the period 5/19/79 until 5/19/80 (Exhibit 1) . As a condition for issuing this bond FFB required and obtained a general agreement of indemnity from Roberts and Watson and their wives (Exhibit 2) which was executed on 2 May 1979. In addition to agreeing to save Florida Farm Bureau harmless from all claims arising out of the bond paragraph 14 provided: That this indemnity is continuing and will apply to any and all bonds, as provided in the opening paragraph of this Agreement which the Company may have executed or procured the execution of from time to time, and over an indefinite period of years; however, any Indemnitor may by written notice to the Company at its Home Office, Gainesville, Florida disavow his liability as to bond(s) which may be executed by the Company subsequent to fifteen days after receipt by the Company of such notice. Agriculture bond (Exhibit 4) was issued on 5/19/79 for one year and upon expiration on 5/19/80 the bond was renewed for an additional period of one year (Exhibit 5). Subsequent to the expiration of the 1979-80 bond (Exhibit 4) and reissuance of the 1980-81 bond (Exhibit 5) but within the prescribed time for submitting a claim against the agriculture dealer and his bond, John T. Brantley, Jr., filed a claim against C & W Sales in the amount of $8,317.05 for payment owed on a transaction which occurred during the 1979-80 period. When C & W Sales failed to pay or respond to the Commissioner of Agriculture's demands for payment, claim was made on the 1979-80 bond and FFB remitted to the Commissioner of Agriculture a check for the Brantley claim (Exhibit 6). Around February 1980 Watson became disenchanted with Roberts' running of C & W Sales, Inc. and wanted out. He told Roberts to get someone to buy his (Watson) stock and to get his name out of the company. Roberts said he would. Watson never advised FFB that he would no longer be an indemnitor under the bond. During the period covered by the bond year beginning 5/19/80 claims against C & W Sales, Inc., were submitted to the Commissioner of Agriculture by Henry L. Watson in the amount of $32,326.50; Hugh D. Martin in the amount of $1,932.80; Jesse J. Wilson in the amount of $1,490.00; John T. Brantley, Jr., in the amount of $15,024.40; and Philip Dean and Willie Bass in the amount of $4,919.13, for a total of $55,692.83. The Commissioner of Agriculture notified C & W Sales of these claims and advised them of the opportunity to contest the validity of the claims. No response was received from C & W Sales and Roberts appears to have departed the area to parts unknown. An order demanding payment was submitted to C & W Sales and when payment of these claims was not made, FFB, as surety on the bond, was notified by the department of its surety on the bond, was notified by the department of its obligation under the bond and a demand for payment of $20,000 to the department was made. There is no dispute regarding the accuracy or validly of the claims against C & W Sales contained in Finding 7 above. Nor does FFB contest its liability under the agriculture bond it issued for the 1980-81 bond year. However, FFB claimed an equitable setoff for the percentage of the $20,000 that would go to Watson. This setoff is claimed by virtue of Watson's indemnity agreement. By the stipulation the parties have agreed that the FFB is entitled to the pro rata share of the $20,000 to Watson.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent is guilty of a violation of bail bondsmen disciplinary statutes.
Findings Of Fact At all material times, Respondent has been licensed in the State of Florida as a bail bondsman. He operates Freedom Bail Bonds in Orlando, Florida. On May 28, 1988, law enforcement officers of the Orange County Sheriff's Office arrested John P. Moody and placed him in the Orange County jail. Mr. Moody had never previously been arrested. After he was arrested, Mr. Moody contactedRespondent about obtaining a bail bond in order to get out of jail. Respondent agreed to come to the jail and interview Mr. Moody to determine if Freedom Bail Bonds could provide him a bond. When Respondent arrived at the jail on the evening of May 28, he was informed by an officer of the three charges that were pending against Mr. Moody. The bond was $1000 per charge, and the premium was 10% of the bond. Respondent met with Mr. Moody and asked him whether he had any assets to secure the bond. Mr. Moody explained that he had no assets such as a car, cash, or cash equivalent. However, he said that he owned jointly with his mother some land in Orange County. At the conclusion of the interview, Respondent had decided to write the bond. Respondent then learned from the booking officer that another charge had been added. Following a brief conversation between Respondent and Mr. Moody concerning the new charge, Respondent learned from the booking officer that a fifth charge had been added. After another conversation with Mr. Moody, Respondent learned in this manner that a sixth, and final, charge had been added. In all, Mr. Moody was charged with one count of failing to return a hired automobile and five counts of fraudulent bank deposits. Each charge carried a $1000 bond, so Mr. Moody now required a total bond of $6000, which in turn required a total premium of $600. Due to the increased amount of the bond, Respondent informed Mr. Moody that he would have to secure the bond with a mortgage on the property jointly held with his mother. Mr. Moody agreed, but asked Respondent not to contact Mr. Moody's mother immediately. It was the middle of the night, and Mr. Moody's mother is an invalid. Respondent agreed to allow Mr. Moody to contact his mother later and obtain her signature on a mortgage. Because Mr. Moody lacked the funds, a friend, Marion Reed Johnson, agreed to pay the premium. Knowing that Mr. Moody would not be able to obtain that evening his mother's signature to a mortgage, Respondent insisted on some interim security and agreed to accept six $1000 promissory notes from Mr. Johnson. These notes were payable on demand, but, according to their terms, became void if Mr. Moody appeared in court when ordered to do so and discharged all of the obligations of the bail bond. Respondent gave Mr. Johnson receipts for the $600 premium and six $1000 notes as soon as Respondent received these items. At the same time, also on the evening of May 28, Respondent completed a bail bond application and indemnity form, on which Mr. Moody provided certain background information. Mr. Moody and Mr. Johnson also signed indemnifications in favor of the surety. The application form states that the surety: shall have control and jurisdiction over the principal during the term for which the bond is executed and shall have the right to apprehend, arrest and surrender the principal to the proper officials at any time as provided by law. The application form also provides: In the event surrender of principal is made prior to the time set for principal's appearances, and for reason other than as enumerated below is paragraph 3, then principal shall be entitled to a refund of the bond premium. It is understood and agreed that the happening of any one of the following events shall constitute a breach of principal's obligations to the Surety hereunder, and the Surety shall have the right to forthwith apprehend, arrest and surrender principal, and principal shall have no right to any refund of premium whatsoever. Said events which shall constitute a breach of principal's obligations hereunder are: If principal shall depart the jurisdiction of the court without the written consent of the court and the Surety or its Agent. * * * If principal shall commit any act which shall constitute reasonable evidence of principal's intention to cause a forfeiture of said bond. * * * The application and indemnities were signed. Mr. Johnson paid the $600 premium and executed and delivered the six $1000 demand notes. Respondent then caused Freedom Bail Bond to issue the bond. Mr. Moody was released from the jail during the evening of his arrest (actually during the predawn hours of May 29). May 28 was a Saturday. The following Monday, Respondent gave one of his employees a copy of the warranty deed from Mr. Moody's mother to herself and Mr. Moody. Mr. Moody hadgiven a copy of the deed to Respondent during their initial interview in order to allow Respondent to prepare the mortgage that Mr. Moody had agreed to provide. Respondent instructed the employee to use the legal description from the warranty deed to prepare a mortgage and send it to Mr. Moody for execution by his mother and him. The employee did as instructed and promptly mailed the mortgage to Mr. Moody with instructions for execution, witnessing, and notarization. After about a week, Respondent asked the employee if she had received the executed mortgage. She replied that she had not and proceeded to telephone Mr. Moody. When she asked him about the mortgage, Mr. Moody did not express any unwillingness to sign it, but said that he had not received it. Confirming the mailing address, the employee agreed to send him another mortgage and did so on June 6, 1988. Several times after mailing the second mortgage, the employee contacted Mr. Moody and discussed the need to get the document fully executed and delivered to Freedom Bail Bonds. On one occasion, Mr. Moody agreed to return the executed mortgage on June 22. But on the last of these conversations, Mr. Moody informed the employee, for the first time, that he had no intention of providing the mortgage. The employee told Respondent what Mr. Moody had said and returned the file to Respondent for further action. At about the same time that Respondent's officehad sent the mortgage to Mr. Moody the second time, Mr. Moody's sister telephoned Respondent. Estranged from her brother, she was concerned that Mr. Moody, whom she believed had misused funds of their invalid mother in the past, might try to obtain their mother's signature on a mortgage to secure a bond in order to get out of jail. Mr. Moody's sister informed Respondent that her brother was not authorized to obtain their mother's signature on the mortgage. She said that her brother was not to be trusted, had improperly removed money from their mother's trust in the past, and had defaulted on at least one debt so as to require the creditor to lien the jointly held property in order to be repaid. At about the same time, a different employee of Respondent received an anonymous telephone tip that Mr. Moody was about to depart, or had already departed, on a trip to Alabama with another man. The informant described what turned out to be a vehicle owned by Mr. Johnson, with whom Mr. Moody had been living since his release from jail on May 29. Several attempts by Respondent's employees to reach Mr. Moody over the next two to four days were unsuccessful. In fact, Mr. Moody had gone to Alabama, which is outside the jurisdiction of the Orange County Circuit Court. On July 18, 1988, one of Respondent's employees contacted the Clerk of Court's office and learned that Mr. Moody had not qualified for the services of a Public Defender. In addition, the employee had been notified on or about July 6, byreceipt of a notice of hearing on a Determination of Counsel, that Mr. Moody had not been diligent in obtaining counsel. After determining that other Determination of Counsel hearings had been and were being set by the Court, the employee reasonably concluded that Mr. Moody was not diligently trying to obtain counsel or independently resolve the pending criminal matters. The employee communicated this information to Respondent on July 18. Respondent contacted Mr. Moody by telephone on July 18 and asked when he was going to supply the executed mortgage. Mr. Moody responded that he had determined that Respondent did not need the additional security and was not going to provide it. At this point, Respondent concluded that it was likely that Mr. Moody had in fact left the state without permission. Respondent also concluded that Mr. Moody no longer represented an acceptable risk. Respondent thus directed another employee to join him to arrest Mr. Moody and surrender him to the Orange County Sheriff's Office. Respondent and his employee immediately visited Mr. Moody and asked him whether he had left the state. Mr. Moody admitted doing so. Respondent and the employee then arrested Mr. Moody and returned him to jail. Mr. Moody remained in jail for 63 days until he pleaded guilty to the charges. He was sentenced to the time served, placed on probation for four years, and required to makerestitution, which he has done so far in accordance with the schedule. Following his release from jail, Mr. Moody returned to live with Mr. Johnson and gradually repaid him the $600 that he owed him. Although Mr. Moody demanded return of the $600, he never offered any proof of payment to Mr. Johnson. Mr. Johnson never demanded the return of the money. Respondent has retained the $600 premium. The six $1000 notes were automatically voided when Mr. Moody was arrested on July 18.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department of Insurance and Treasurer enter a final order dismissing the Administrative Complaint. ENTERED this 22nd day of March, 1991, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399 (904) 488 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of March, 1991. COPIES FURNISHED: Hon. Tom Gallagher State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, FL 32399 Bill O'Neil, General Counsel Department of Insurance The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, FL 32399 Attorney David D. Hershel Division of Legal Services 412 Larson Building Tallahassee, FL 32399 Attorney Alan B. Robinson 56 East Pine Street Orlando, FL 32801
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, as well as the stipulated facts, the following relevant facts are found: At all times relevant to this proceeding, respondent Joseph Aloysius Von Waldner has been licensed as a limited surety agent. He has been in the bail bond business for nine years and has had no previous or subsequent complaints issued against him. On five occasions during January and February of 1979, respondent did authorize, hire and remunerate Delbert Leroy Sams to pick up principals or skips and surrender them to the Orange County Jail. Delbert Leroy Sams was not and has not been previously licensed in any capacity by the Department of Insurance. On March 2, 1979, Mr. Sams was denied a license by the Department of Insurance. At the time respondent engaged the services of Mr. Sams, respondent believed that Mr. Sams was working as a bail bond runner for another bail bondsman. Respondent did not inquire of Sams as to whether Sams was or was not licensed by the Department of Insurance. Respondent knew that other bail bondsmen had used Sams as a runner, and Sams showed respondent some business cards and forms which Sams used when picking up principals. Respondent admits that he was negligent for not inquiring into Mr. Sams' licensure. Respondent was called in for an investigation by the petitioner's chief investigator, Melvin R. Thayer, on February 28, 1979. After talking with Mr. Thayer and becoming aware that Mr. Sams was not licensed, respondent no longer used Sams as a runner.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law recited herein, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Insurance enter a final order finding that respondent violated the provisions of Florida Statutes, s648.45(1)(j) and imposing an administrative penalty against respondent in the amount of $100.00, said penalty to be paid within thirty (30) days of the date of the final order. Respectfully submitted and entered this 27th day of June, 1980, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE D. TREMOR Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 101 Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of June, 1980. COPIES FURNISHED: Thomas A. T. Taylor, Esquire Room 428-A, Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Richard L. Wilson, Esquire 100 South Orange Avenue Orlando, Florida 32801 Insurance Commissioner Bill Gunter The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: At all times relevant hereto, respondent, Robert Mitchell Thomas, was licensed and eligible for licensure and appointment as a limited surety agent (bail bondsman) by petitioner, Department of Insurance and Treasurer (Department). When the events herein occurred, respondent was employed as manager/agent of the Fort Myers office of Hamilton Bonding, Inc. (Hamilton). At hearing respondent represented he has been licensed as a bail bondsman for approximately fifteen years. The facts which underlie this dispute are as follows. On November 16, 1989, Debra Rahn, a resident of Cape Coral, Florida and the wife of Richard A. Rahn, had Richard arrested for possession of a controlled substance and/or narcotic paraphanelia. She did this so that Richard could be placed in a drug treatment program. His bond was thereafter set in the amount of $2500. In order to get Richard released from jail and placed in the drug program, Debra contacted respondent at Hamilton's Fort Myers office and, after conferring with respondent, agreed to enter into an indemnity agreement with Thomas wherein respondent, acting as agent for Hamilton, agreed to post a $2500 surety bond with the Lee County Sheriff's Department for the release of Richard. In return for this service, Debra paid respondent a premium in the amount of $250. In addition to paying the foregoing sum of money, Debra was asked to sign a blank security agreement, notice of lien and power of attorney, and to deliver to respondent the title to her 1983 Chevrolet Chevette. After doing so, she received a receipt for the premium and automobile title. Finally, Debra was told there would be no other fees for this service. A few weeks later, Debra decided she wanted off of the bond because Richard was not responding favorably to the drug treatment. She accordingly telephoned Thomas who offered her several alternatives. One alternative suggested by respondent was for Debra to file new charges against Richard so that he would be arrested and shown to be in violation of the terms of the bond. Acting on respondent's advice, in early January 1990 Debra filed additional unspecified charges against her husband. On January 10, 1990, Ronald W. Millette, a licensed bail bondsman who had worked for respondent on previous occasions, was told by respondent that Debra wanted off of the bond and to pick up Richard and return him to the Lee County jail. He was paid a $50 fee for this service. That evening Millette went to Debra's house and advised her to go to respondent's office because Richard might seek retribution against her. Later on that evening, Millette apprehended Richard and carried him to respondent's office. Respondent and Millette then transported Richard to the jail. It may be reasonably inferred from the evidence that on a later date, the obligation of the surety on the bond was released by the court. In accordance with Millette's instructions, Debra went to respondent's office the evening of January 10 and was told by respondent that Richard was handcuffed in the next room. Whether this statement was accurate is not of record. In any event, respondent told Debra she must pay an additional $250 pick-up fee or he would not return her automobile title. This amount was derived by taking ten percent of the original $2500 bond. Respondent requested this fee even though there is no evidence that he forfeited any portion of Richard's bond or that the court ordered any fees. Debra replied she did not have the money but would return on Saturday to pay the money due. On a later undisclosed date, Debra's Chevette was "totaled" in an automobile accident. Because of this, she claimed she was unable to promptly pay the $250 fee. Even so, respondent continued to make demands for the money. The record does not show whether the automobile title was returned to Debra although Millette believes another employee in respondent's office did so at a later date. On May 29, 1990, respondent sent Debra a letter in which he again demanded payment of the $250 fee. However, based upon advice from a Department employee, he apologized to her for calling the fee a "pick-up fee" and instead characterized the charge as a "principal's apprehension fee" for expenses incurred in having Millette place Richard in custody on January 10. The record reflects that on June 10, 1990, Debra sent respondent a $10 check as partial payment on the demand but the check was never cashed. There is no evidence that respondent's license has ever been disciplined during his lengthy tenure as a bail bondsman.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that respondent be found guilty of violating Subsections 648.44(1)(g), 648.45(2)(d), (g), (j), (l), and 648.45(3)b) and (d), Florida Statutes (1989), and that his license be suspended for ten days and a $500 administrative fine be imposed. DONE and ENTERED this 22nd day of August, 1991, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of August, 1991.
