The Issue The issues in these cases relate to the criteria required of municipal pension plans to qualify for state premium tax monies . Chapters 175 and 185, Florida Statutes, provide for pension plans for firefighters and police officers, and authorize two types of pension plans. "Chapter plans" are created by state law, and "local law plans" are created either by special act of the Legislature or by municipal ordinance. In a series of cases, various municipalities and the LEAGUE OF CITIES have challenged the DIVISION OF RETIREMENT's application of statutory criteria to local law plans. On April 11, 1996, a Final Order was entered in Case No. 95-5089RU finding that the DIVISION's policies in this regard violated Section 120.535, Florida Statutes. The Final Order in case No. 96-5089RU is on appeal to the First District Court of Appeal. On August 6, 1996, a Final Order was entered in consolidated Cases Nos. 96-2724RX, 96-2725RX, 96-2871RU, and 96-2874RU, finding that the DIVISION's policies violated Section 120.56, Florida Statutes. Specifically, the issues in these cases now under consideration, are 1) whether the CITY OF ST. PETERSBURG is entitled to premium tax monies for the 1994 and 1995 calendar years; 2) whether the DIVISION OF RETIREMENT has met the requirements of Section 120.57(1)(b)15, Florida Statutes, and demonstrated that the application of the statutory criteria to local law plans is within the scope of delegated legislative authority; 3) whether the DIVISION's promulgation of proposed rules on July 12, 1996, justifies the DIVISION's withholding of the CITY OF ST. PETERSBURG's premium tax monies for calendar years 1994 and 1995; and, 4) whether the DIVISION has acted in bad faith, thereby entitling the CITY OF ST. PETERSBURG to an award of attorneys fees and costs in this case. The gist of the CITY OF ST. PETERSBURG's Petitions is that the DIVISION is attempting by non-rule policy to impose the same requirements relating to terms, conditions, and benefits on local law plans that the DIVISION requires of chapter plans. Specifically, the alleged non-rule policies of the DIVISION of which the CITY complains are: 1) the definition of "credited service"; 2) the definition of "average final compensation"; 3) the disallowance of a Social Security offset; 4) the interpretation of "disability retirement"; 5) the requirement that all of the CITY's pension plans be in compliance in order to receive state funds; 6) the release of funds to other municipalities not found in compliance; 7) the failure to enforce Rule 60Z-1.004, Florida Administrative Code, which defines "credited service;" and, 8) the application to other municipalities of a declaratory statement issued to the City of Boca Raton. As indicated above, and set forth more fully below, the requirements imposed by the DIVISION OF RETIREMENT for local law plans to receive premium tax monies have been the subject of extensive litigation. In rejecting a challenge to the constitutionality of Chapters 175 and 185, Florida Statutes, the court in City of Orlando v. State Department of Insurance, 528 So.2d 468 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988) stated: Chapters 175 and 185 create a purely voluntary program whereby municipalities may receive state- collected taxes, imposed on property and casualty insurance premiums, with which to fund retirement programs for local police and fire fighters. In exchange for receipt of these funds, the legislature has established certain criteria under which the funds must be operated and managed. Id. at 469. The dispute in these cases again focuses on determining what criteria the legislature has established for the operation and management of such local pension plans in order to establish whether a local plan complies with the statute for purposes of receiving premium tax monies. Petitioner, CITY OF ST. PETERSBURG, and Intervenor, CITIES, take the position that Respondent, DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, has made non-rule policy statements (which are now promulgated as proposed rules), and required compliance therewith, which go beyond the criteria established by the legislature for participation in the program. Petitioner contends that such statements are "rules" under Section 120.52(16), Florida Statutes, that these "rules" violate Section 120.56, Florida Statutes, as invalid exercises of delegated legislative authority, and that the DIVISION is prohibited from applying these policies as justification for withholding premium tax monies. Respondent, DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, takes the position that the policy statements have now been promulgated as proposed rules, that the DIVISION has complied with Section 120.535(5), Florida Statutes, and is authorized to apply the policies of the proposed rules to withhold premium tax monies. The DIVISION further contends that the policy statements (now proposed rules) merely apply the provisions of Chapters 175 and 185, Florida Statutes, as intended by the legislature, and therefore the DIVISION has demonstrated pursuant to Section 120.57(1)(b)15, Florida Statutes, that the policy statements are within delegated legislative authority.
Findings Of Fact To the extent relevant, the Findings of Fact in the Final Order in case No. 95-5089RU are adopted and incorporated by reference. Parties Petitioner, the CITY OF ST. PETERSBURG (CITY), is a municipality of the State of Florida which participates in the voluntary program to receive state- collected taxes imposed on property and casualty insurance (premium tax monies) with which to fund retirement programs for its municipal fire fighters and police under Chapters 175 and 185, Florida Statutes, respectively. Intervenors, CITY OF LARGO, CITY OF PALATKA and the TOWN OF LANTANA, also are State of Florida municipalities participating in such local plans for fire fighters and police. LARGO, PALATKA and LANTANA have had their premium tax monies withheld by the DIVISION for the 1995 calendar year. Intervenor, FLORIDA LEAGUE OF CITIES, represents municipalities voluntarily participating in distribution of Chapter 175 and 185 premium tax monies to fund retirement plans for firefighters and police officers. Respondent, DIVISION OF RETIREMENT (DIVISION), is the agency of the State of Florida charged with the statutory duty to administer the voluntary program by which municipalities receive state-collected taxes imposed on property and casualty insurance (premium tax monies) with which to fund local plans under Chapters 175 and 185, Florida Statutes. Prior to 1993, the Florida Department of Insurance was the responsible state agency to administer Chapters 175 and 185, Florida Statutes. Intervenors, MICHAEL MOORE and RICHARD FEINBERG are municipal fire fighters with the CITY and have standing to intervene in this proceeding. Intervenor, RUSSELL M. RIZZO, is a municipal police officer with the CITY and has standing to intervene in this proceeding. History Chapters 175 and 185, Florida Statutes, relating to pension plans for fire fighters and police, authorize two types of retirement or pension plans. One type is called "chapter plans" and the other is known as "local law plans." Chapter plans are created under state law, and the provisions of Chapters 175 and 185, Florida Statutes, control the plans' terms, conditions and benefits. Local law plans are purely voluntary and are created either by special act of the Legislature or by municipal ordinance. The special act or municipal ordinance contain the provisions relating to the terms, conditions, and benefits of the local law retirement plan. Both chapter plans and local law plans receive funds from the state-collected premium tax on property and casualty insurance. The CITY has operated local law retirement plans for fire fighters and police since 1951. The CITY's police and fire fighter plans were first chartered by special act of the Legislature. The fire fighter charter plan has been closed to new members since approximately 1970. The CITY in 1970 established a supplemental retirement plan for fire fighters which was enacted by CITY ordinance. The CITY's police and fire fighter pension plans are subject to union negotiation, and cannot be unilaterally amended. City of Tallahassee v. Public Employee Relations Commission, 393 So.2d 1147 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). In this respect, the CITY may not have the authority to make unilateral changes to its local law plans in order to comply with directives of the DIVISION. The CITY has voluntarily participated on a continuing basis in the program created under Chapters 175 and 185, Florida Statutes, whereby the CITY has received state-collected taxes imposed on property and casualty insurance premiums with which to fund its local plans for fire fighters and police. The CITY has received such funds until calendar year 1994. In 1986 the Legislature significantly amended Chapters 175 and 185, Florida Statutes. See Chapters 86-41 and 86-42, Laws of Florida. Chapter 86-41 pertained to municipal fire fighters; Chapter 86-42 pertained to municipal police officers. As indicated above, the constitutionality of these statutes was upheld in City of Orlando v. State Department of Insurance, supra. In section 1. of each act, the Legislature added substantially the same legislative intent language: Therefore, the Legislature declares that it is a proper and legitimate state purpose to provide a uniform retirement system for the benefit of fire fighters as hereinafter defined, and intends, in implementing the provisions of s. 14, Art. X of the State Constitution as they relate to municipal fire fighters' pension trust fund systems and plans, that such retirement systems or plans to be managed, administered, operated, and funded in such manner as to maximize the protection of the fire fighters' pension trust funds. This chapter hereby establishes minimum standards for the operation and funding of municipal fire fighters' pension trust fund systems and plans. After the enactment of Chapters 86-41 and 86-42, Laws of Florida, the Department of Insurance undertook rulemaking to implement the provisions of the acts. The CITY and the LEAGUE challenged the proposed rules under Section 120.54, Florida Statutes. The Department's proposed rules were upheld by a DOAH Hearing Officer. On appeal, the First District Court of Appeal reversed the order of the Hearing Officer, and held that the majority of the department's proposed rules were invalid because statutory provisions governing chapter pension plans, which were not made expressly applicable by the Legislature to local fire fighter and police plans, did not preempt municipal power with respect to pension plans. Florida League of Cities, Inc. v. Department of Insurance, 540 So.2d 850 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989) review denied 545 So.2d 1367 (Fla. 1989), [hereinafter referred to as the "Rules Case"]. In 1988 the CITY and the Department of Insurance engaged in litigation regarding the compliance of the CITY's local law plans with the Department's construction of the statute. This litigation was ultimately settled by the Department's agreement not to withhold the CITY's premium tax funds. During 1990 and 1991, the Department of Insurance also engaged in litigation with numerous other municipalities regarding compliance of local law plans with the provisions of Chapters 175 and 185, Florida Statutes. The Department settled these cases and continued to distribute premium tax funds to these local law plans with the understanding that the disputed issues would be better resolved through rulemaking. The Department of Insurance conducted staff workshops to discuss rulemaking; however, the Department did not thereafter initiate formal rulemaking under Chapter 120, Florida Statutes, with regard to promulgation by rule of compliance requirements for local law plans under Chapters 175 and 185, Florida Statutes. In 1993, the Legislature transferred statutory responsibility for the administration of Chapters 175 and 185, Florida Statutes, from the Department of Insurance to the DIVISION. The legislative transfer effected a transfer of all programs as well as personnel. Since the legislative transfer in 1993, the DIVISION has made a continuous and good faith effort to present these issues to the Legislature for resolution. In this continuing effort to address these issue legislatively, during the 1996 Session, HB 1951 and SB 2484 were introduced. These bills specifically provided legislative clarification of the issues presented in these cases. Prior to the 1996 Session, the CITY filed its Petition in case No. 95- 5089RU. On April 11, 1996, the Final Order was entered in case. No. 95-5089RU holding that the DIVISION's non-rule policies violated Section 120.535, Florida Statutes. On May 10, 1996, the CITY filed its Notice of Appeal which is pending in the First District Court of Appeal, Case No. 96-1817. The DIVISION has made a continuing good faith effort to present these issues to the Legislature for resolution. As indicated above, HB 1951 and SB 2484, specifically addressing and clarifying the issues raised in these proceedings, were introduced during the 1996 Session. On April 30, 1996, HB 1951 was passed by the Florida House of Representatives; however, HB 1951 along with SB 2484 died in the Florida Senate on May 4, 1996. The 1996 Florida Legislature failed to enact any legislation addressing or otherwise clarifying the issues raised in these proceedings. On May 31, 1996, the DIVISION noticed a rules workshop addressing these issues in the Florida Administrative Weekly. On June 12, 1996, the DIVISION disseminated proposed rules. On June 21, 1996, the DIVISION conducted the rules workshop. On July 12, 1996, the DIVISION published proposed rules and amendments, 60Z-1.004, 60Z-1.006, 60Z-1.026, 60Z-1.027, 60Z-1.028, 60Z-2.017, 60Z-2.018, and 60Z-2.019, which address the issues raised in these proceedings. On July 30, 1996, the CITY and the LEAGUE OF CITIES, pursuant to Section 120.54 Florida Statutes, filed Petitions challenging the DIVISION's proposed rules. The Section 120.54 petitions, cases Nos.96-3560RP and 96-3561RP, are scheduled for hearing August 29, 1996. On August 6, 1996, the Final Order was entered in consolidated Cases Nos. 96-2724RX, 96-2725RX, 96-2871RU, and 96-2874RU holding that the DIVISION's policies violated Section 120.56, Florida Statutes. Stipulated Facts The following facts verbatim were set forth by the parties in the Prehearing Stipulation: The DIVISION admits to the authenticity of all documents contained within its files, including, but not limited to, interoffice memoranda, correspondence to and from the DIVISION and/or the Department of Insurance which are contained in the files of the Division, and any correspondence copied to the DIVISION and/or the Department of Insurance which are contained in the files of the DIVISION. The DIVISION takes the position that Sections 175.032 and 185.02, Florida Statutes, (Definitions), apply to local law plans. (The) Position of (the agency in) Declaratory Statement DMS-DR-94-18 was issued to the City of Boca Raton pursuant to Section 120.565, Florida Statutes. It is the position of the DIVISION that a plan containing a mandatory retirement age violates the Older Worker Benefits Protection Act; and that pension plans which violate this federal law are not eligible for distribution of premium tax funds under Sections 175.351 and 185.35, Florida Statutes. It is the position of the DIVISION that fire fighters disabled from duties of a fireman as defined in Section 175.032, Florida Statutes, are eligible for disability benefits. The CITY admits that the Social Security offset contained in its supplemental fire pension plans could possibly reduce a fire fighter's pension below two (2) percent for each year of credited service; however, the CITY specifically has no knowledge that this has or will occur. The CITY admits that Sergeant Rizzo has accrued in excess of thirty- two (32) years of service. The CITY admits that the police pension plan contains a maximum pension plan benefit of sixty (60) percent of the highest pay step of the lowest rank held during the previous three (3) years, which benefit Sgt. Rizzo became eligible for after twenty-five (25) years of active service. The CITY admits after thirty (30) years of service Sgt. Rizzo will retire with a pension benefit equal to less than two (2) percent for each year of active service. The CITY admits that Sgt. Rizzo was permitted to cease all employee contributions to his pension plan after twenty-five (25) years of service. The 1994 premium taxes are withheld from the CITY by the DIVISION. Prior to 1994 the DIVISION, or its predecessor agency, the Department of Insurance, have never withheld Chapter 175 or 185 insurance tax premium moneys from the CITY. The DIVISION has not initiated the rulemaking process with regard to definition of the term "average final compensation" in Section 175.351, Florida Statutes, and there are currently no existing promulgated rules that apply to local law plan definitions for "average final compensation" for the DIVISION. The DIVISION has not initiated the rulemaking process with regard to definition of the term "average final compensation" in Section 185.35, Florida Statutes, and there are currently no existing promulgated rules that apply to local law plan definitions for "average final compensation" for the DIVISION. It is the position of the DIVISION that Rule 60Z-1.004, Florida Administrative Code, defining "credited service" contradicts Chapter 185, Florida Statutes, and is not enforced. It is the position of the DIVISION that all municipal pension plans submitted for review must comply with the non-rule policy at issue in the present case in order to receive Chapter moneys pursuant to Sections 175.351 and 185.35, Florida Statutes. It is the position of the DIVISION that the pension plans of the City of St. Petersburg do not fulfill the requirements of Section 175.351, Florida Statutes, to qualify for release of state premium tax moneys. It is the position of the DIVISION that the pension plans of the City of St. Petersburg do not fulfill the requirements of Section 185.35, Florida Statutes, to qualify for release of state premium tax moneys. It is the position of the DIVISION that the term "credited years of service" as used in Sections 175.351(4) and 185.35(1)(d), Florida Statutes, is to be defined in accordance with the term "aggregate number of years of service" and "aggregate number of years of service with the municipality" under Sections 175.032(1)(a) and 185(1)(b), Florida Statutes, respectively. It is the position of the DIVISION that it has the authority under Chapters 175 and 185, Florida Statutes, and Chapter 60Z, Florida Administrative Code, to withhold Chapter 175 and 185 premium tax money to plans not in compliance with Sections 175.351 and 185.35. It is the position of the DIVISION that it has the authority to release payment of Chapter 175 and 185 premium tax moneys to plans not in compliance with Sections 175.351 and 185.35, Florida Statutes, provided the municipality is making good faith efforts to bring the violations into compliance.
Findings Of Fact The Division of Retirement will make no Findings of Fact relating to whether Petitioner's disability was in-line-of-duty. Accordingly, for the reasons mentioned previously, all findings contained in paragraphs 5, 6, 7, and 8, of the recommended order are rejected. However, the Division accepts the remaining Findings of Fact contained in the recommended order. As taken from the order these findings are: Herman Williams was an employee of the Department of Transportation and a member of the Florida Retirement System. The Division of Retirement approved payment of regular disability benefits to Herman Williams. Herman Williams is currently receiving and accepting these benefits. Herman Williams is an illiterate Seminole Indian, 62 years of age. Williams' duties with the Department of Transportation were driving a mowing tractor and cleaning out roadside ditches. Williams worked for the Department of Transportation approximately 21 years 11 months prior to being placed on the retired roles [sic]. On May 1, 1975, Williams was driving his tractor in the course of his regular employment at the Department of Transportation when the power steering of the tractor malfunctioned causing the front wheels to swerve violently, wrenching the steering wheel in Williams' hands and nearly throwing him from the tractor. Repairs had to be made to Williams' tractor by a Department of Transportation mechanic because the tractor was inoperative. The mechanic discovered a loose nut in the power steering assembly when he exchanged the power steering unit in Williams' tractor with another from the maintenance yard. When the new unit was installed in Williams's tractor it functioned normally. When the power steering from Williams' tractor was installed in the other tractor, it also functioned normally. The mechanic stated that the loose nut which he had discovered could cause the tractor to swerve violently in the manner Williams' had described. On the afternoon of May 1, 1975, Williams reported this instant [sic] to his supervisor, David McQuaig. Mr. McQuaig inquired as to any injuries to Williams and the tractor. Williams reported to McQuaig that the tractor had not been harmed and that he was only sore and stiff. No report of injury was prepared by McQuaig whose duty it was to file such reports. Williams' condition did not materially improve after seeking medical treatment by Dr. Albritton. Williams remained on sick leave until August 11, 1975, when it was exhausted. Williams then took annual leave from August 12, 1975 until September 23, 19975, when his retirement became effective. When the Petitioner's sick leave was exhausted, he was contacted by his supervisor in the Department of Transportation. He suggested that Williams could retire on disability if two physicians would state that he was disabled. This letter was read to Williams by his son, Eddie, because Williams is illiterate. Retirement application forms were provided Williams by the Department of Transportation. The physician report forms were completed by Dr. Albritton and Dr. Wilkerson. The statement of disability by employer form was completed by Williams' supervisor, David A. Young, Maintenance Engineer, for the Department of Transportation. Young stated that he completed the Statement of Disability by Employer, indicating that the application was for regular disability benefits because he had determined that no workman's compensation claim had been made by Williams and because Dr. Wilkerson's medical report had stated that the injuries occurred at Williams's home. The determination that the application was for regular disability benefits was solely Young's. The Application for Disability Retirement signed by Williams was prepared by personnel at the Department of Transportation District Office. This form was signed by Herman Williams; however, this form does not make provision for the member to state the nature of the disability benefits sought. Eddie Williams, son of Herman Williams, took his father to sign the forms at the Department of Transportation office. These forms were not explained to Williams, nor did Eddie Williams read them. Herman Williams was also unaware that such a benefit existed. Herman Williams stated he sought disability benefits based upon his injury on the job. Disability retirement was not discussed between Herman Williams and David Young. Based upon the application submitted in his behalf, the Division of Retirement made a determination that Williams was entitled to regular disability benefits. Williams was unaware that he was not receiving the in-line-of-duty benefits until his son inquired as to how much money he was receiving. When he was advised, he told his father that it appeared to be too little money. At this point Eddie Williams discovered that the application had been for regular disability.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Hearing Officer RECOMMENDS: That the administrator permit the applicant to file an amended application for disability in-line-of-duty retirement, and, further, that said application be approved. DONE and ENTERED this 8th day of December, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: J. W. Chalkley, III, Esquire Post Office Box 1793 Ocala, Florida 32670 Douglas Spangler, Jr., Esquire Asst. Division Attorney Division of Retirement 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER ================================================================= STATE OF FLORIDA DIVISION OF RETIREMENT DEPARTMENT OF ADMINISTRATION HERMAN H. WILLIAMS, Petitioner, vs. CASE NO. 77-982 STATE OF FLORIDA, DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, Respondent. / FINAL AGENCY ORDER A petition for formal proceedings having been duly filed, and a request for hearing officer having been duly made, a hearing was held in the above-styled cause pursuant to the provisions of Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes, before the Honorable Stephen F. Dean, Hearing Officer, in Ocala, Florida, on September 15, 1977. The Petitioner requested relief from the Division's determination that Petitioner was not entitled to resubmit an application for disability retirement requesting in-line-of-duty disability retirement benefits because he had previously applied for and accepted regular disability retirement. The purpose of the hearing was to determine the factual basis for Petitioner's claim that he should be allowed to apply for in-line-of-duty disability retirement benefits. APPEARANCES AT THE HEARING: Eric E. Wagner, Esquire J. W. Chalkey, III, Esquire Law Offices of Eric E. Wagner, P.A. Post Office Box 1763 Ocala, Florida 32670 For the Petitioner E. Douglas Spangler, Jr., Esquire Assistant Division Attorney Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center 2639 North Monroe Street Suite 207C-Box 81 Tallahassee, Florida 32303 For the Respondent The Hearing Officer entered his Recommended Order on December 8, 1977, in which he sustained Petitioner's assertion and concluded, on the basis of the findings made as a result of the hearing, that Petitioner should be entitled to resubmit his application and request in-line-of-duty disability benefits. In addition to this determination, the Hearing Officer found that Petitioner was in fact entitled to in-line-of-duty disability retirement benefits. In making this latter conclusion, both as a matter of fact and of law, the Hearing Officer went beyond his scope of authority. As will be developed more fully herein, the Hearing Officer was without jurisdiction to consider the issue of whether Petitioner was in fact entitled to the in-line-of-duty benefits. Therefore, so much of the recommended order as purports to address this issue is of no effect, being the result of a hearing that did not comply with the essential requirements of law.
The Issue Whether the Petitioner is entitled to a refund of or credit for $2,125.88 in employee contributions to the Florida Retirement System ("FRS").
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: The Division of Retirement is the state agency charged with the responsibility for administering the FRS. Section 121.031, Florida Statutes. Prior to 1975, the FRS was contributory, meaning that members paid a portion of their salaries into the Florida Retirement Trust Fund as a contribution toward their future retirement benefits. Members who have contributed to the trust fund may request a refund of those contributions at the time they leave their FRS-eligible employment. Receipt of such refunds constitutes cancellation of the right to service credit for the subject employment period. Mr. Helms worked for the Polk County Board of County Commissioners, and made contributions to the Florida Retirement Trust Fund. At the time of his termination in June 1974, Mr. Helms had accrued 6.3 years of service in the FRS, and was not vested in the system. In September 1974, the Division received a "Request for Refund" card bearing Mr. Helms' name, social security number, and address; and bearing what purported to be Mr. Helms' signature. It was not unusual at the time for non- vested members such as Mr. Helms to request refunds when they terminated their employment. The refund card was countersigned by Avlee Askew, the personnel clerk for the Polk County Board of County Commissioners, as the representative of Mr. Helms' last Florida employer. The Division diligently searched its records, but was unable to find the actual refund checks because they were destroyed by the Comptroller's Office. However, the Division's computer records indicate that the Comptroller issued two checks totaling $2,125.88 and sent them to Box 988, c/o Clerk's Office, Bartow, Florida 33830, in September 1974. The listed address was and still is the address of the Polk County Board of County Commissioners. At the time, it was standard practice for refund checks to be mailed to the Board's offices, where the former employees would pick them up. In July 2000, Mr. Helms began working for a Hillsborough County agency and began to make inquiries regarding credit for his prior 6.3 years of FRS-eligible employment. Mr. Helms contacted the Division requesting information regarding his retirement benefits and was advised by the Division that its records showed that his accumulated contributions of $2,125.88 were paid to him in 1974. Mr. Helms denied signing the "Request for Refund" card, and denied receiving either of the two refund checks. At the hearing, Mr. Helms contended that the signature on the refund card was a forgery. He introduced several samples of his signature in an effort to show that the signature on the refund card was not his. The "Request for Refund" card itself now exists only as a microfilm facsimile, and the poor quality of the reproduction does not permit a comparison of the signature on the refund card to those samples provided by Mr. Helms. Mr. Helms offered no other evidence to support his claim that he did not sign the card and did not receive the refund. The evidence presented in this case is not sufficient to establish that Mr. Helms is now entitled to a refund of or credit for contributions he made to the Florida Retirement Trust Fund prior to September 1974.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Division of Retirement enter a final order denying the request of Milford Mack Helms for a refund of or credit for contributions he made to the Florida Retirement Trust Fund prior to September 1974. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of April, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ___________________________________ LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of April, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Milford Mack Helms Post Office Box 261 Valrico, Florida 33595 Larry D. Scott, Esquire Department of Management Services Office of the General Counsel 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 260 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 Erin Sojostrom, Director Division of Retirement Department of Management Services Cedars Executive Center, Building C 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560 Monesia Taylor Brown, Acting General Counsel Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950
The Issue Whether Petitioner received a refund of retirement contributions made to the Florida Retirement System ("FRS") for his service from June 1969 to September 1975, thereby waiving his right to receive additional retirement benefits represented by the refunded contributions.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a member of the FRS. He was hired by Miami-Dade County ("County") in 1969, and terminated his employment with the County in 1989. At all times relevant to this proceeding, Respondent, Division of Retirement Services,1/ was the state agency charged with administering the FRS. § 121.031(1), Fla. Stat. (1989).2/ Prior to 1975, the FRS was a contributory system.3/ Under this system, members paid a portion of their salaries into the FRS Trust Fund ("Trust Fund") as a contribution toward future retirement benefits. Members who contributed to the Trust Fund could request a refund of those contributions at the time they left their FRS-eligible employment. Receipt of a refund constituted a waiver of the right to service credit for the employment period for which the contribution was paid. At the time Petitioner terminated his employment with the County, he had accrued 18.77 years of service credit. He had contributed $2,708.94 to the Trust Fund for creditable employment service from June 1969 through September 1975. In April 1990, Petitioner requested an audit of his FRS account. Specifically, he requested an estimate of his retirement benefits based on his total service credit consisting of both contributory and non-contributory service, and an estimate of his retirement benefits based only on his non- contributory service from October 1975 to August 1989. On May 17, 1990, Respondent responded to Petitioner's request. The response letter provided the requested estimates and further informed Petitioner that he had $2,708.94 in contributions in his retirement account for the period between June 1969 and September 1975, that he had 18.77 total years of service, and that he had 12.52 years of non-contributory service credit. The letter explained that if Petitioner wished to receive a lump sum refund of his contributions, he must submit a completed Request For Refund Form, FRS M-81. The letter was mailed to Petitioner at his then-current address4/ of 2221 Northwest 51st Street, Miami, Florida 33142. In addition to the May 17, 1990, letter explaining Petitioner's options, Respondent's staff engaged in several documented telephone discussions with Petitioner to explain the process for obtaining a refund of his contributions and the consequences of doing so. In September 1990, Petitioner submitted a completed Request For Refund Form, FRS M-81, requesting a lump sum refund of the $2,708.94 in retirement contributions he made for the period of June 1969 through September 1975. The form provided in pertinent part: "I give up all rights to receive any benefits from FRS based on service represented by this refund." Petitioner listed his address as 2221 Northwest 51st Street, Miami, Florida 33142, and signed the form. Upon receiving the completed Request For Refund form, Respondent provided pertinent information from the form to the Department of Banking and Finance5/ and requested issuance of a warrant in the amount of $2,708.94, the full amount of Petitioner's retirement contributions for his service between June 1969 and September 1975. The Department of Banking and Finance issued the warrant, dated September 19, 1990, and returned it to Respondent with a computer-generated label listing Petitioner's name and social security number, refund amount, voucher number, and date of the warrant. On September 26, 1990, the warrant was mailed to 2221 Northwest 51st Street, Miami, Florida 33142.6/ Respondent maintains a list of outstanding warrants. This list does not show the warrant sent to Petitioner as being outstanding; thus, Respondent's records establish that the warrant was cashed. In June 1993, Petitioner applied to receive his service retirement benefits. In the course of processing the retirement benefits application, Respondent provided Petitioner an estimate of the service benefits he would receive based on 12.52 years of creditable service. At that time, Petitioner did not question the estimate or that his benefit was based on 12.52 years of creditable service. On February 16, 2012——almost 22 years after the contributions refund warrant was sent to Petitioner and almost 19 years after Petitioner began receiving his retirement benefits based on 12.52 years of service——Petitioner contacted Respondent to inquire why he was not receiving retirement benefits based on 18 years of creditable service. Respondent's staff advised Petitioner that he was not entitled to benefits for 18 years because he had requested and received a refund of the contributions he had paid into the FRS Trust Fund between June 1969 and September 1975.7/ Petitioner insists that he did not submit the Request For Refund Form in 1990 and claims that the signature on the form was forged.8/ He further claims that he never received the warrant because Respondent mailed the warrant to an address using an incorrect zip code. He posits that an employee of Respondent forged his signature and cashed the warrant. However, the credible evidence in the record does not support these claims. The credible, persuasive evidence in the record establishes that Petitioner requested and received a refund of his retirement contributions in the amount of $2,708.94 for his employment service between June 1969 and September 1975, thereby waiving his right to receive retirement benefits for this period.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement, issue a Final Order determining that Petitioner is not entitled to receive retirement benefits for his service between June 1969 and September 1975. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of August, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CATHY M. SELLERS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of August, 2012.
The Issue Whether Respondent is estopped from denying Petitioner's request to rescind her choice to change retirement plans (2nd Election) and requiring her to remain in the Florida Retirement System (FRS) Pension Plan; and, if so, what are Petitioner's options? Because of the complicated nature of FRS and Petitioner's unique circumstances, the issues and parties' positions are summarized herein. After being hired by the University of Florida, Petitioner had three retirement plan options: (1) State University System Optional Retirement Program (SUSORP), (2) FRS Investment Plan (Investment Plan), or (3) FRS Pension Plan (Pension Plan). Petitioner had been an FRS member in a previous job and switched from the Investment Plan to the Pension Plan solely because she was told she could only participate in SUSORP if she first became a Pension Plan member. The Division now admits there is no authority for this requirement, but argues it is not responsible for Petitioner's decision to switch from the Investment Plan to the Pension Plan. Rather, it blames another state agency and non-government agents for her belief that she could not participate in SUSORP unless she first bought into the Pension Plan. Ultimately, the issues in this proceeding are: (1) whether Petitioner was required to switch from the Investment Plan to the Pension Plan to participate in SUSORP; (2) whether the Division is responsible for Petitioner's belief that this was a requirement; and (3) if so, whether Petitioner's funds used to buy into the Pension Plan can be returned to the Investment Plan or transferred to her SUSORP account. PROCEDURAL HISTORY On May 30, 2018, Petitioner, Lee Hayes Byron, elected to switch her FRS plan from the Investment Plan to the Pension Plan. On November 1, 2019, Respondent, Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement (the Division), issued a letter to Petitioner denying her request to essentially rescind this election and/or have her "cost associated with buying into the FRS Pension Plan from the FRS Investment Plan transferred to SUSORP." On November 25, 2019, Ms. Byron submitted a request for an administrative hearing to the Division. Respondent forwarded Petitioner's request to DOAH on December 11, 2019. The matter was originally scheduled for hearing for February 5, 2020, but was continued three times: once at the Division's request and twice due to the state of emergency related to the COVID-19 health crisis. A final hearing was held on April 29, 2020, by Zoom. Petitioner testified on her own behalf and Petitioner's Exhibits P1 through P7 were admitted into evidence without objection.1 The Division offered the testimony of Joyce Morgan (Division Bureau Chief of Contributions), and Respondent's Exhibits R1 through R8 were admitted into evidence without objection. The final hearing was recorded by a court reporter, but neither party ordered a transcript. Petitioner requested 30 days to submit her proposed recommended order, and the Division had no objections to Petitioner's request. By requesting and agreeing to the extension of time, the parties waived the requirements in section 120.57(3)(e), Florida Statutes (2019), for the rendering of a recommended order within 30 days of the hearing. See Fla. Admin. Code. R. 28-106.216(2).2 1 Exhibit P7 is a disk with numerous audio files of telephone conversations between Petitioner and Division employees, other State employees, representatives, and agents. 2 All references to statutes and administrative rules are to the 2019 versions of the Florida Statutes and Florida Administrative Code unless otherwise noted. Accordingly, the proposed recommended orders were due no later than May 29, 2020. Both parties submitted timely Proposed Recommended Orders (PROs), which have been considered in the preparation of this Recommended Order.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Lee Hayes Byron, is currently employed by the University of Florida and eligible to participate in the Investment Plan, Pension Plan, or SUSORP. She is in an optional (not a mandatory) SUSORP position. Respondent, the Division, is a part of the Department of Management Services (DMS). The Division, as part of DMS, is the state entity responsible for oversight and administration of the Pension Plan and SUSORP. See §§ 121.125 and 121.035, Fla. Stat. The Division authorizes provider companies to assist SUSORP members with investments. See § 121.035, Fla. Stat.; Fla. Admin. Code R. 60U-1.011(4). The State Board of Administration of Florida (SBA) is the state agency responsible for oversight and administration of the Investment Plan.3 SBA is not a party to this proceeding. In coordination with DMS, SBA is responsible for dissemination of information regarding the FRS plans. See § 121.4501(10), Fla. Stat. SUSORP is a defined contribution plan authorized by section 121.35, Florida Statutes. The plan is an optional retirement plan in which 3 There was evidence that prior to attempting to undo her election with the Division, Petitioner requested an agency hearing with SBA, which was held on May 21, 2019. The SBA Hearing Officer recommended that SBA grant Petitioner relief by allowing her to rescind the 2nd election. On September 17, 2019, SBA issued a Final Order rejecting the SBA Hearing Officer’s recommendation. Petitioner has appealed the SBA’s Final Order, which is now pending at the Second District Court of Appeal in the matter of Lee Hayes Byron v. State Board of Administration, Case No. 2D19-3930. "eligible employees" of the State University System can elect to participate in lieu of the Pension Plan or Investment Plan. One of the benefits SUSORP offers over the FRS plans is the employer contribution rate is greater. SUSORP and the Investment Plan require an employee to contribute a minimum pretax contribution and allow additional funds to be contributed. Both the Investment Plan and SUSORP allow the employee to allocate the money in the plan account among approved investment funds.4 The ultimate benefit from the Investment Plan and SUSORP received by the employee upon retirement depends on both the amount contributed and the financial markets. The employee is responsible for managing his or her SUSORP or Investment Plan account through approved providers. In comparison, the Pension Plan requires a fixed pretax contribution by an employee. The Pension Plan is responsible for investing the contributions and accumulated funds in the member's pension account. Upon retirement, the employee receives a lifetime monthly benefit using a formula based on his or her length of service and salary. The employee has no control over how the money in the pension account is invested but is guaranteed a fixed, predictable benefit. PETITIONER'S FRS HISTORY Ms. Byron originally enrolled in FRS as an employee of Sarasota County on July 11, 2005. At that time she had the option to participate in either the Investment Plan or Pension Plan. On December 28, 2005, Ms. Byron made a timely election to participate in the FRS Investment Plan, effective January 1, 2006. As part of the FRS system, she had one more chance to switch to the Pension Plan. The subsequent decision to change FRS plans is referred to as the "2nd Election." On April 20, 2018, Petitioner began employment with the University of Florida in a SUSORP-eligible position. At this point, as explained in the 4 SBA recommends acceptable SUSORP investment products to the DMS; the DMS has final approval of such products. See § 121.035(6)(c), Fla. Stat. Conclusions of Law, Petitioner would begin participation in SUSORP unless she opted to remain in the FRS System (in either the Investment Plan or Pension Plan) or failed to enroll in a SUSORP-approved investment fund. See § 121.35(3), Fla. Stat. INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS A handout distributed by the Division titled, "Florida Retirement System (FRS) Investment Plan • Members With a Remaining FRS Election Inquiring About State University System Optional Retirement Program (SUSORP) Membership" (SUSORP Handout) provides information for an Investment Plan member who wants to participate in SUSORP. The SUSORP handout states in relevant part: You will need to use your 2nd (and last) election to transfer from the Investment Plan to the Pension Plan before you will be eligible to elect participation in the SUSORP. * * * There is a cost associated with using your 2nd election to transfer to the Pension Plan. * * * The estimated transfer cost is calculated using your salary, service credit, membership class, and other actuarial assumptions used in the annual FRS actuarial valuation. The payment for the amount of the transfer cost is required to complete the transfer to establish your Pension Plan membership. The amount of money liquidated from your Investment Plan account to pay for your transfer cost will not transfer to the SUSORP. If the value of your Investment Plan account is less than the transfer cost, you may use personal resources including a direct transfer from a qualified plan … to make up the difference. Any personal resources paid will not transfer to the SUSORP. * * * Your membership in SUSORP will not begin until you have completed the transfer process and will be entirely funded by future (after the transfer) employer and employee contributions submitted on your behalf. * * * Your SUSORP account will begin with a zero balance and will be funded by future employer and employee contributions. The Division's witness, Ms. Morgan, confirmed the SUSORP Handout is a Division document. Ms. Morgan further stated that although this version of the SUSORP Handout was not provided to Petitioner, it was the Division's position at the time she was eligible for participation in SUSORP. Ms. Morgan also conceded that there is no statutory authority for the requirement that an employee would need to use his or her 2nd Election to transfer from the Investment Plan to the Pension Plan before becoming eligible to elect participation in SUSORP. As explained in the Conclusions of Law, this is an unpromulgated requirement that has no statutory authority, and therefore cannot be applied to determine Petitioner's substantial interests. The Division approves provider companies to provide information and investment products to SUSORP members. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 60U- 1.012(1)(a). AXA Advisors (AXA) is one of the provider companies listed on the SUSORP Enrollment Form. See Form ORP-ENROLL-1, available at https://www.flrules.org/Gateway/reference.asp?No=Ref-06117. On April 24, 2018, Petitioner received an email from Patrick Ashe with AXA. Mr. Ashe described AXA as a resource to help Petitioner select the best retirement plan: Pension, Investment, or SUSORP. Mr. Ashe eventually spoke to Ms. Byron on the phone and sent her FRS information. He also provided her with contact information for the Division and an FRS general phone number. On May 3, 2018, Mr. Ashe provided Petitioner with a document titled, "Welcome to the Florida Retirement System for State University System SUSORP-Eligible Employees" (Comparison Brochure), dated January 2018. The Division alleges the Comparison Brochure is published by SBA, not the Division. Although SBA is responsible for providing educational information about retirement options to eligible employees, it must do so in coordination with DMS. See § 121.4501(10)(a) and (10)(c)7., Fla. Stat. Regardless of who published the Comparison Brochure, it is clear that it is an official document used to advise SUSORP members, and AXA was authorized to advise Ms. Byron regarding her FRS retirement options and SUSORP. The Comparison Brochure explains the differences between SUSORP, the Investment Plan, and the Pension Plan. The Comparison Brochure also provides deadlines for the election to participate in each plan. According to the Comparison Brochure, from the date of hire, a SUSORP-eligible employee has 90 days to choose to participate in SUSORP. If he or she does not elect to participate in SUSORP, the employee has until 4:00 p.m. (E.S.T.) on the last business day of the eighth month after the month of hire to choose between the Investment Plan and the Pension Plan. If the employee does not make an election, FRS automatically enrolls the employee in the Investment Plan. As explained in the Conclusions of Law, this is contrary to the SUSORP statute. Regarding changes made after an initial election, the Comparison Brochure provides: SUSORP Plan Investment Plan Pension Plan Can I change plans after I make my initial election? No. If you elect the SUSORP, you will remain in this plan for as long as you remain at this employer in a SUSORP-eligible position. You have a one-time 2nd Election that you can use during your FRS career to change to the other FRS retirement plan, provided you are actively employed by an FRS-participating employer at the time your 2nd Election is received.4 (Footnote in original, see ¶20 below). The Comparison Brochure explains that once an employee chooses to participate in SUSORP, the employee cannot change to a different plan, and will remain in SUSORP as long as the employee is in a SUSORP eligible position. Once an employee elects to participate in the Investment Plan or the Pension Plan, he or she has only one opportunity (the 2nd Election) during his or her entire FRS career to change between the Investment and Pension Plans. Regarding changing to SUSORP from the Investment Plan or Pension Plan, footnote 4 in the Comparison Brochure explains: If you are enrolled in the Investment Plan and move to a SUSORP-eligible position, you must use your 2nd Election (if available) to buy back into the Pension Plan in order to enroll in the SUSORP. You are not permitted to make a direct transfer from the Investment Plan to the SUSORP (unless in a mandatory SUSPORP position). Again, during the hearing, Ms. Morgan admitted there was no statutory authority for the requirement that Petitioner use her 2nd Election to buy into the Pension Plan before she could enroll in SUSORP. On May 4, 2018, Mr. Ashe sent Ms. Byron a follow-up email that explained the procedure to switch from the Investment Plan to the Pension Plan so she could enroll in SUSORP: It sounds like you are currently in the Investment Plan so if you decide to stay in that plan just verify with [FRS] that you want to make sure you automatically are re-enrolled in that plan. If you elect to switch to either the Pension or the SUSORP plan then we would just fill out the 1 page 2nd election form and fax that to FRS to utilize the switch. That would put you in the Pension Plan. From there if you would like to enroll in the SUSORP plan then I will get those forms to you and we will get that set up. … The main factor on whether the switch would be in your best interest would be based on the differential between the Pension and Investment Plans at your current number of years in the FRS system. * * * In the Investment Plan the university is contributing 3.3% to match your mandatory 3% contribution and in the SUSORP plan they would contribute 5.14% in addition to your 3% contribution. The differential involved in switching to the Pension Plan so that you could then enroll in the SUSORP plan would be the major factor in whether picking up the extra employer contribution would be beneficial in the long run. (emphasis added). Mr. Ashe's email erroneously indicated Ms. Byron must use her 2nd Election to go into the Pension Plan before she could enroll in SUSORP. He also acknowledged she should weigh whether the cost to buy into the Pension Plan was worth the extra contributions available if she ultimately decided to go into SUSORP. In this email, Mr. Ashe reiterated he had the authority to provide the SUSORP paperwork and "get that set up." Ms. Byron testified she believed Mr. Ashe was authorized by the Division to advise and enroll her into SUSORP. Although the Division argues other people who spoke with Ms. Byron were not Division employees, it does make this same assertion regarding Mr. Ashe. See Resp. PRO, ¶¶ 44-47 (claiming Ernst and Young's employee was an SBA agent, not a Division agent). Given that AXA was a approved by the Division as a provider company, the undersigned finds that AXA and Mr. Ashe were authorized by the Division to provide Ms. Byron with information about SUSORP and administer her SUSORP account. See § 121.35(6), Fla. Stat. On May 29, 2018, Ms. Byron called the FRS Financial Guidance Line and was put in contact with "Mike with Ernst & Young." During the call, Ms. Byron explained to Mike that she was in the Investment Plan, but wanted to "move to the SUSORP." Specifically, she called because she understood she would "have to maybe pay a fee to get into the pension plan and then move to the SUSORP." She had been told that she should call the FRS Financial Guidance Line to figure out what that fee might be. Mike confirmed Petitioner would need to be a member of the Pension Plan before getting into SUSORP. Again, this information is not accurate and contrary to the SUSORP statute and Division rules. He also stated there is a 90-day window for her to move to SUSORP. During the call, Mike could not give Petitioner a quote for the buy in cost of switching from the Investment Plan to the Pension Plan and indicated it could take up to six weeks to get that information. He also informed her it could take a full month to process the paperwork and payment amount to become a Pension Plan member. He urged her to submit the 2nd Election form to switch from the Investment Plan to the Pension Plan before the end of the month (May 31, 2018), and then not to pay the cost if she concluded it is was too much or did not want to go forward with the switch. Ms. Byron: Okay. So, what is the risk of submitting the [2nd Election] form? I know I only get one chance to make the change. If I submit the form and change my mind, does that count as my chance? Mr. Mike: I mean, you have the full month following to rescind. * * * Ms. Byron: And if I don't submit the form, then nothing happens. If I do submit the form, and I don't want to pay it, I have to not pay it and nothing happens … [i]f it automatically happens and I still don't want to do it, I have a month. Mr. Mike: Yeah. Based on the information she received from Mr. Ashe and her conversation with Mike, Ms. Byron understood she had 90 days, or until July 19, 2018, to buy into the Pension Plan and then elect to participate in SUSORP. Because she had been led to believe only Pension Plan participants could elect to participate in SUSORP, she reasonably concluded she would need to use her 2nd Election to change from the Investment Plan to the Pension Plan before she could participate in SUSORP. On May 31, 2018, Ms. Byron submitted a "2nd Election Retirement Plan Enrollment Form" (2nd Election form) by facsimile to the number designated on that form. Ms. Byron selected the following option: Option 1: Change from the FRS Investment Plan or Hybrid Option to the FRS Pension Plan. I want to transfer from the Investment Plan to the Pension Plan and use my existing Investment Plan account balance and possibly other personal resources to 'buy' into the Pension Plan. The 2nd Election form does not make any reference to SUSORP. On May 31, 2018, Petitioner called the FRS Financial Guidance Line to confirm that the 2nd Election form was received by FRS. During this call, Ms. Byron was transferred to Misty, who identified herself as an Investment Plan administrator. Ms. Byron indicated she wants to make sure the 2nd Election form had been received, but Misty could not confirm this. Misty explains it may take a few hours to show up "in her system." Ms. Byron was concerned she may not be talking to the right person. Ms. Byron: Okay. Now, am I –are you sure I'm with the right person? Because I'm switching from investment to the pension with the intention of eventually switching to SUSORP. Ms. Misty: You're switching from investment plan to pension with the intention of switching to the [sic] something entirely outside of the pension? Ms. Byron: To SUSORP. Ms. Misty: Okay. I don't know what that is, I apologize. Let's go ahead and get you over to pension just to be sure since they are a separate department. * * * Ms. Byron: Who's in charge of switching from the investment to the pension? Ms. Misty: We [SBA and the Division] would both be involved in it. (emphasis added). She then instructed Ms. Byron to press Option 4 for the Pension department when she returned back to the automated system. From this conversation and the other conversations Ms. Byron had with people on the FRS Financial Guidance Line, the undersigned finds both the Division (as the agency administering the Pension Plan) and SBA (as the agency administering the Investment Plan) were responsible for processing Ms. Byron's 2nd Election form. On June 4, 2018, FRS sent Ms. Byron a "Confirmation of 2nd Election – Pension Plan" (Confirmation). It indicated that her election to move from the Investment Plan to the Pension Plan was effective as of June 1, 2018, but that it was not finalized. The Confirmation informed Petitioner "you will need to buy into the FRS Pension Plan using the available balance in your FRS Investment Plan account. If your account is not sufficient to cover the cost of the buy in, you will need to submit personal funds." Although the Confirmation did not state whether it was sent from SBA or the Division, the second page indicated: If you feel this retirement Plan election was made in error, you may be able to cancel it. Please call the MyFRS Financial Guidance Line at 1-866-446- 937, Option 2. Failure to notify us no later than 4:00 PM EST on the last business day of the month following your election month will void your right to cancel this election. The Confirmation directed members to contact the Division (not SBA) at the same number, Option 3, for specific questions. Based on the date of the submittal of her 2nd Election form (May 31, 2018), Ms. Byron had until June 29, 2018, to rescind her 2nd Election form, and thereby reverse her decision to go from the Investment Plan to the Pension Plan. At this point, however, even though she had executed the 2nd Election form, Petitioner's election transfer from the Investment Plan to the Pension Plan was not final because she had not submitted the buy in payment. The Confirmation did not address what would happen if the buy in amount was not submitted, or if it was, what would happen if an employee canceled the 2nd Election and did not remain in the Pension Plan. The Confirmation did not make any reference to SUSORP. On June 18, 2018, Ms. Byron spoke with Leah at the Division. In this call, Ms. Byron explained she received the Confirmation, but she had not received a bill for the buy in amount. Leah replied that a letter with the amount was generated on June 14, 2018, but has not been mailed out. Ms. Byron was concerned about the last day she has to rescind the election. Ms. Byron: So what is my deadline for canceling? I'm just panicking about if it's – if it's not what I want to do because I don't have the bill yet, when can I cancel the second election? Ms. Leah: Typically they give you a 60-day period. Let me double check. One moment. Okay. So you'll have until no later than the last business day of the month following the election. During the call, Ms. Byron pressed Leah on the letter with the buy in figure, and questioned her as to why the Confirmation was sent if the election was not final. Leah determined the letter was issued by the Investment Plan (SBA), not by the Pension Plan (the Division), and transferred Ms. Byron to Rick with the Investment Plan. It is apparent from the audio recording that Ms. Byron was exasperated (justifiably), but remained patient. Once transferred to Rick, Ms. Byron was informed that any questions regarding the buy in had to go through the Pension Plan. Rick offered to transfer her back to the "pension department." On June 21, 2018, before the deadline to rescind her 2nd Election, Mr. Ashe sent Ms. Byron two documents: (1) a SUSORP enrollment form, and a risk tolerance questionnaire to identify Ms. Byron's investment strategy for SUSORP. There was no discussion of the buy in payment to transfer into the Pension Plan. On July 3, 2018, Ms. Byron called the FRS Financial Guidance Line and was transferred to Durriya with Ernst & Young. During this call, Ms. Byron explained she received an invoice for the buy in amount to switch to the Pension Plan and needed a "letter of acceptance" for the financial firm handling her Investment Plan to release the funds. Durriya said could not help her and offered to transfer Ms. Byron to someone else. Durriya transferred Ms. Byron to Phyllis at the Division who was able to help her. Phyllis stated she would request for the letter and it would be mailed to Ms. Byron as soon as possible. Ms. Byron expressed concern that the letter might not get to her by July 19, 2018, the date she needed to elect to participate in SUSORP. Ms. Byron: So help me with the deadline. I was hired April 20th. I have made my intention known to go into the SUSORP, but I can't physically do that with the money until all of this happens. And I'm worried it won't happen by July 20th, July 19th, which is my deadline for selection. Am I going to be okay? Ms. Phyllis: Let's see. Okay. So you have until August 16th for us [the Division], but you need it by July 19th? Ms. Byron: That's when my selection of the – which plan I want to be in has to be in. And I submitted my, I want to be in SUSORP [ ], but I can't physically be in … SUSORP until all the money's there [Pension Plan]. Does that matter? * * * Ms. Phyllis: Okay. So, basically you are switching from investment to pension and then to SUSORP, right? Ms. Byron: Yeah. (emphasis added). Phyllis did not advise Petitioner she could start participation in SUSORP without first switching from the Investment Plan to the Pension Plan or buying into the Pension Plan. At this point, Petitioner's 2nd Election was not finalized because she had not submitted the buy in funds. Had she been informed that she did not have to be in the Pension Plan first, Petitioner could have simply not submitted the buy in funds, kept her existing funds in the Investment Plan, and started in SUSORP. Rather, Phyllis advised she would place a notation in the system that Ms. Byron was attempting to make an election to participate in SUSORP, and "asked them to rush it." Ms. Byron then asked Phyllis about the deadline for her to get into SUSORP. Phyllis could not help her, but offered to transfer her to the Optional Retirement Program department. What is clear from the call is that Ms. Byron is very concerned about getting the buy in funds to the Division to participate in the Pension Plan because she believed she had to be a Pension Plan member before the SUSORP election deadline. On August 3, 2018 (after both the deadline to rescind her 2nd Election form and the deadline to enroll in SUSORP had passed), Ms. Byron contacted the Division and spoke to Leah. At the outset of the call, Ms. Byron informed Leah that called to see if her 2nd Election status was final because she had submitted the funds to buy into the Pension Plan. Although it is unclear from the record how much Petitioner paid to buy into the Pension Plan, she used her entire savings from her Investment Plan plus additional monies. The Investment Plan was valued at approximately $138,000. Leah confirmed the switch from the Investment Plan to the Pension Plan had gone through, and advised Ms. Byron that she had 13 years of service under the Pension Plan. Ms. Byron was audibly upset and stated, "Well, I actually didn't want to end up in the pension, I wanted to end up in the SUSORP, so how do I make sure that that choice is recorded? We had to do the pension first and transfer it to SUSORP." From the audio recording, it is clear Leah was confused. Leah then placed Ms. Byron on hold and had a separate call with another Division employee, Phyllis. Leah relayed the conversation with Ms. Byron to Phyllis and Phyllis suggested Leah call another extension. Leah then checked back in with Ms. Byron to let her know she was still looking for someone who can help her. Ms. Byron agreed to stay on hold. On a separate line (which Ms. Byron could not hear), Leah received an automated recording announcing that she had reached the "Florida Division of Retirement Optional Program O-R-P unit." Leah then spoke with Jim at the Division. Leah explained to Jim that Ms. Byron did not want to remain in the Pension Plan, but rather wanted to transfer to SUSORP. Leah remained confused. [Mr. Jim]: You don't transfer to SUSORP. You're either in it or you're not in it. There is no way to buy into it … there's no way to get from investment by going through pension to get to SUSORP. You take a job that's eligible for SUSORP and you make the choice to be in it or not. * * * Ms. Leah: Well, she had questions about the forms that she would need to submit, but doesn't look like she's going to be – Mr. Jim: Just put up the wall. She's not going to be able to do it. What Jim told Leah is consistent with the SUSORP statute: it does not matter whether one is in the Investment Plan or Pension Plan; one is in SUSORP when he or she is eligible. Jim seemed to be telling Leah that what Ms. Byron wanted (to have her retirement funds in SUSORP) was not possible, but that Leah should not do anything about it. Jim agreed to speak with Ms. Bryon but joked with Leah that it was Friday, and he had one hour left on his shift. He also sarcastically told Leah she may want to stay on the line as it might be "entertaining or educational." Again, Ms. Byron did not hear this conversation between Leah and Jim. Leah then patched Ms. Bryon through to Jim. At this point, Ms. Byron, Jim, and Leah were all on the call. Ms. Byron: I submitted my second election form to go from investment to pension with the intention of going into SUSORP and I need to check if you have all my forms necessary to make that happen. Jim: So, you've just taken a job with one of the universities?Ms. Byron: Yes. Mr. Jim: Okay. It looks like everything's in place. Jim informed Ms. Byron a letter of acceptance to SUSORP was mailed to her on July 5, 2018, and that she could call back to make sure everything had been processed in a few days. He did not tell Ms. Byron what he had explained to Leah: "You don't transfer to SUSORP. You're either in it or you're not in it." After Ms. Byron ended the call, Jim and Leah continued to discuss Ms. Byron's situation. Mr. Jim: Great. Understand now, Ms. Byron just spent a whole bunch of money. That money's gone except that it purchased her some years of pension service. Ms. Leah: Right. Mr. Jim: Okay. Her new SUSORP account starts at zero. Oh, did I hear a great intake of breath? Ms. Leah: Are you serious? Mr. Jim: Absolutely serious. At no point during the conversation between Ms. Byron and Leah or Jim was Ms. Byron informed she did not have to use her 2nd Election and buy into the Pension Plan before she could participate in SUSORP. In fact, at no time during these numerous emails and telephone conversations did anyone affiliated with DMS, the Division, AXA, Ernst & Young, or SBA tell Ms. Byron that she was essentially enrolled in SUSORP (unless she choose to go with an FRS plan or failed to pick a provider) when she started the position at the University of Florida. No one told her that she did not need to exercise her 2nd Election or buy into the Pension Plan to participate in SUSORP.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement, enter a final order rescinding Petitioner's 2nd Election and either: (1) return the buy in monies to the Investment Plan, (2) transfer the buy in monies from her Pension Plan to SUSORP, or (3) refund these monies to Petitioner. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of June, 2020, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S HETAL DESAI Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of June, 2020. COPIES FURNISHED: Lee Hayes Byron 2414 River Ridge Drive Sarasota, Florida 34239 Thomas E. Wright, Esquire Office of the General Counsel Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 160 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed) William Chorba, General Counsel Office of the General Counsel Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 160 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed) David DiSalvo, Director Division of Retirement Department of Management Services Post Office Box 9000 Tallahassee, Florida 32315-9000 (eServed)
The Issue The issue for determination is whether the Florida Retirement System's retirement benefit option selected by Petitioner's deceased son should be changed from Option 1 to Option 2.
Findings Of Fact Ms. Kerr is the mother of the late Mr. Kerr. Mr. Kerr was employed by the Broward County Sheriff's Office (BSO) from January 2, 1990 through September 28, 2004. Mr. Kerr was a detective, hereinafter referred to as Det. Kerr. As a result of being an employee of the BSO, Det. Kerr was a member of the Florida Retirement System (FRS). During his employment, BSO, not Det. Kerr, made contributions to the FRS for his benefit. Retirement is the agency charged with the responsibility of administering the FRS. In complying with its duties, FRS publishes and provides an informational handbook and forms regarding retirement issues to its FRS members. FRS' staff also provide counseling to FRS members who inquire about FRS issues. A website is also maintained by FRS for its members to inquire about FRS issues and obtain information about retirement. On July 29, 2004, Det. Kerr completed an Application for Disability Retirement (Application), which was signed and notarized. The Application indicated, among other things, that he was applying for regular disability benefits and that Dr. Garry Friedberg was one of his treating physicians. Det. Kerr designated Ms. Kerr as his primary beneficiary on the Application. On August 2, 2004, Retirement received the completed application. Det. Kerr had over 16 years of creditable service, and he was, therefore, vested as a Special Risk member of the FRS and eligible for retirement benefits. Retirement acknowledged receipt of the documents needed to make a determination on Det. Kerr's disability retirement application. Also, Retirement advised him that, if his disability retirement application was approved, further documents would be required before he could be placed on the retirement payroll. One of the additional documents requested by Retirement was Form FRS-11o, which was FRS' Option Selection Form for its members. FRS-11o must be completed before retirement benefits can be paid. FRS-11o notices the member of four different options for payment of retirement benefits and contains a narrative describing the effect of the selection of each of the four options. Option 1 yields the maximum monthly benefit, but when the retiree dies there is no survivor benefit. Option 2 yields a reduced monthly benefit for 10 years, but, if the retiree dies before the end of the 10 years, the benefit is paid to the surviving beneficiary for the balance of the 10 years. Option 3 provides a reduced benefit for the joint lifetimes of the retiree and beneficiary. Option 4 provides a reduced benefit for the lifetime of the retiree and beneficiary, which benefit is reduced by 33 1/3 percent upon the death of either. By letter dated August 19, 2004, Retirement advised Det. Kerr that his application for disability retirement was approved. The letter further advised him, among other things, of other documents that he had to submit, including a completed FRS-11o, before he could be placed on the retirement payroll. By letter dated August 23, 2004, Retirement advised Det. Kerr of his estimated monthly disability retirement benefits under Option 1 ($2,364.84) and Option 2 ($2,189.13). Insufficient information was available to Retirement to calculate the estimated monthly disability retirement benefits under Options 3 and 4, so none were provided. The letter further advised Det. Kerr as to what was required for Retirement to calculate monthly estimates for Options 3 and 4. Additionally, the August 23rd letter, enclosed a blank FRS-11o for Det. Kerr to complete and return. Furthermore, the letter included an informational document, entitled "What Retirement Option Should You Choose?," regarding making his option selection. This informational document is a standard document included by Retirement, with Retirement's estimates of disability retirement benefits. As to changing an option choice, the document provides in pertinent part: Once you cash or deposit a benefit payment, or begin the Deferred Retirement Option Program (DROP), your [option] selection cannot be changed. Therefore, it is important to carefully study your personal circumstances before [your] decision. Regarding Option 2, the document provided in pertinent part: [T]his option would be particularly appropriate if you are in ill health and your future physical condition is uncertain at the time of retirement since independent children, other heirs, charities, organizations, or your estate or trust can be designated as beneficiaries for Option 2. The document invites FRS members to contact Retirement with any questions. No evidence was presented to demonstrate the Det. Kerr contacted Retirement regarding questions as to the options. On August 27, 2004, Det. Kerr completed and had notarized FRS-11o. FRS-11o reflected, among other things, the following: the selection of Option 1 by an "X" and being circled; and his marital status as being not married. The language describing Option 1 next to the selection was as follows: A monthly benefit payable for my lifetime. Upon my death, the monthly benefit will stop and my beneficiary will receive only a refund of any contributions I have paid which are in excess of the amount I have received in benefits. This option does not provide a continuing benefit to my beneficiary. Also, on FRS-11o was Option 2. The language describing Option 2 next to the selection was as follows: A reduced monthly benefit payable for my lifetime. If I die before receiving 120 monthly payments, my designated beneficiary will receive a monthly benefit in the same amount as I was receiving until the monthly benefit payments to both of us equal 120 monthly payments. No further benefits are then payable. On September 1, 2004, Retirement received Det. Kerr's FRS-11o, on which Option 1 was selected and which was properly completed, signed, and notarized. It is undisputed that Det. Kerr's FRS-11o met all requirements as to being in a status of completion. Typically, FRS-11o is the only indication as to a member's wishes regarding his or her option selection. According to Retirement, usually, the disability retirement application is completed prior to receiving an estimate of benefits, and, therefore, it is not uncommon for an FRS member to designate a primary beneficiary and later select Option 1 after reviewing his or her estimate of benefits. According to Retirement, only a member or someone acting on his or her behalf, such as a legal guardian or attorney-in-fact, can make a retirement option selection for the member. No evidence was presented that Det. Kerr, himself, requested a change to his selection of Option 1. On September 28, Det. Kerr resigned from the BSO. October 1, 2004, was established as Det. Kerr's effective disability retirement date. Det. Kerr died on October 20, 2004, less than a month after resigning, without receiving his first disability retirement benefit payment. At the time of his death, Det. Kerr was not married and had no children. Further, no parent was his legal guardian or dependent upon him for support. Det. Kerr's circumstances surrounding his option selection do not place his situation in the usual or typical category of FRS members referred to above by Retirement. Det. Kerr was suffering from AIDS. His symptoms first appeared in 1995. He was being treated by Garry Friedberg, M.D., a physician whose specialty was infectious diseases. As Det. Kerr's treating physician, on July 26, 2004, (approximately three months before Det. Kerr's death) Dr. Friedberg completed a "Disability Insurance - Attending Physician's Statement" form, regarding Det. Kerr's medical condition. The form contained several questions, including those as to diagnosis, prognosis, and mental and cognitive limitations. Dr. Friedberg diagnosed Det. Kerr with the end- stage of AIDS, which included wasting, assistance with activities of daily living, 12 to 15 loose stools per day, and pain in his stomach. Dr. Friedberg determined Det. Kerr's prognosis as terminal. Dr. Friedberg described Det. Kerr's mental and cognitive limitations as poor memory, difficulty concentrating, and inattentiveness. Question 5.c. of the form asked whether Det. Kerr was competent to endorse checks and direct the use of proceeds, to which Dr. Friedberg checked the yes box. It is undisputed that Det. Kerry had a close, loving- relationship with his mother and nephews. Det. Kerr's mother testified as to her son's desires and wishes for his retirement benefits. The undersigned finds her testimony credible. As her son's health deteriorated, Det. Kerr made her co-owner of his home in order for the home to become hers at his death. Det. Kerr had a loving relationship with his nephews and he wanted to make sure that their education would be paid-for through his retirement benefits. Det. Kerr informed his mother that he designated her as the beneficiary of his disability retirement plan so that she could keep his house and pay for the education of his nephews. In a letter dated May 18, 2005, Det. Kerr's healthcare providers gave insight into his medical condition and his intent regarding his disability benefits. The undersigned finds the letter persuasive. Among other things, they indicate that they were Det. Kerr's healthcare providers for several years and that, throughout 2004, Det. Kerr was administered opium to help control his chronic wasting diarrhea and administered opioid- based analgesics for chronic pain. Det. Kerr made it clear to his healthcare providers that his intent was to provide financially for his family at the event of his death. Without question, they insist that the narcotic regimen in Det. Kerr's treatment, caused him to mistakenly mark Option 1, which was the opposite of and completely contrary to the whole intent of what he wanted to do with his disability benefits. Furthermore, they indicate that Det. Kerr intended to check Option 2 in that it would provide for Det. Kerr's family as Det. Kerr had intended. One of Dr. Friedberg's clerical employees, John Carriere, notarized the option selection form at Dr. Friedberg's office for Det. Kerr on August 27, 2004. At that time, the employee had known Det. Kerr for approximately five years and knew what Det. Kerr's intentions were towards his (Det. Kerr's) family, concurring that Det. Kerr wanted his disability retirement benefits to provide for his (Det. Kerr's) mother and nephews. The employee observed that on that day Det. Kerr had lost considerable weight, was sweating, and was not looking well. The undersigned finds the clerical employee's testimony persuasive. Det. Kerr was friends with Robert Brown for 16 years. Mr. Brown is a certified financial planner but was not Det. Kerr's financial planner. The undersigned finds Mr. Brown's testimony credible. Mr. Brown was well aware that Det. Kerr wanted to make sure that his (Det. Kerr's) mother and nephews were taken care of with his disability retirement benefits. Det. Kerr sought advice from his friend regarding the disability retirement benefits. Mr. Brown and Det. Kerr met with the BSO's human resource counselor to discuss the different options available. Det. Kerr knew that he was dying, and he decided upon Option 2 because only it provided the benefits that he wanted for his mother and nephews upon his death. On August 27, 2004, Det. Kerr was at Dr. Friedberg's office and was completing FRS-11o (the option selection form), and he called Mr. Brown, who was busy at work. Det. Kerr requested Mr. Brown to remind him which option number to select. Mr. Brown requested Det. Kerr to call him after working-hours, but Det. Kerr insisted that Mr. Brown talk with him then and provide the requested information. Mr. Brown, not recalling the option number that had been previously determined to be selected but recalling only what the selection provided, informed Det. Kerr that the option decided upon was the one that left the money to his (Det. Kerr's) mother for ten years. Det. Kerr yelled back that he knew what the selection provided that he wanted, but now he only wanted the option number. Mr. Brown requested Det. Kerr to wait a few hours and call him back; but Det. Kerr did not. Later, when Mr. Brown and Det. Kerr were together, Mr. Brown asked Det. Kerr whether he needed any assistance with the retirement paperwork. Det. Kerr responded in the negative, indicating that he had finished the paperwork by himself and convincingly stating that the family was protected. Mr. Brown asked to review the form, but Det. Kerr did not have the form with him. With Det. Kerr so convincingly expressing himself that the family was protected, Mr. Brown did not think of the retirement paperwork again. A finding of fact is made that Det. Kerr at all times had decided on Option 2 and at all times had intended to check Option 2. A finding of fact is made that the medical evidence is sufficient to demonstrate that, due to Det. Kerr's terminal illness and the medications given to him, his mental capacity to make an informed choice at the time that he selected Option 1 was affected; and that he mistakenly checked Option 1, whereas Option 2 would have protected his family as he had intended, which intent had never wavered or changed. By letter dated December 6, 2004, Retirement advised Det. Kerr's family that his estate was entitled to the disability retirement benefits due for the month of October 2004. Additionally, included with the letter was a "Joint Annuitant Information" document, and the family was advised that, if Det. Kerr had a survivor who qualified as a joint annuitant, a monthly benefit may be payable to such person. A joint annuitant was mentioned in several of the letters from Retirement to Det. Kerr, prior to his death, regarding his disability retirement. In a letter dated July 30, 2004, related to completing FRS-11o, a joint annuitant is mentioned only in relationship to Options 3 and 4 and calculations therefor; in the Application, a joint annuitant is again mentioned only in relationship to Options 3 and 4 and calculations therefor; in a letter dated August 10, 2004, again, a joint annuitant is mentioned only in relationship to Options 3 and 4 and calculations therefor; in two letters dated August 19, 2004, a joint annuitant is again mentioned only in relationship to Options 3 and 4 and calculations therefor; in the Estimate of Retirement Benefit document, a joint annuitant is mentioned only as it relates to Options 3 and 4; in an Estimate of Disability Retirement Benefits document, dated August 23, 2004, a joint annuitant is mentioned only as to Options 3 and 4 and calculations therefor; in a document provided to Det. Kerr by Retirement, entitled "What Retirement Option Should You Choose?" a joint annuitant is mentioned as it relates to all of the available options; in FRS-11o, a joint annuitant is mentioned only for Options 3 and 4; and in a letter dated December 6, 2004, after Det. Kerr's death, Retirement refers to a joint annuitant and includes information regarding a joint annuitant. No information was received by Retirement as to a joint annuitant. Further, at hearing no assertion of Ms. Kerr being a joint annuitant was made. Ms. Kerr is the personal representative of her son’s, Det. Kerr's, estate. On September 26, 2005, Retirement received a letter from Ms. Kerr's counsel requesting Retirement to change Det. Kerr's option selection from Option 1 to Option 2, explaining, among other things, Det. Kerr's intent but that his medical condition prevented him from following through with his intent. No mention was made in the letter of a survivor who qualified as a joint annuitant. Retirement contends that an option selection can only be changed in the event the designated beneficiary qualifies as a joint annuitant. On October 14, 2005, Retirement, by final agency action letter, denied the request to change Det. Kerr's option selection but erroneously cited Section 121.091(6)(h), Florida Statutes, as the statutory basis for the decision to deny the request, which stated as follows: (h) The option selected or determined for payment of benefits as provided in this section shall be final and irrevocable at the time a benefit payment is cashed or deposited or credited to the Deferred Retirement Option Program as provided in Subsection (13). Retirement admits that the basis for the denial stated in the final agency action letter is incorrect. No benefit payment had been issued, cashed or deposited. Retirement has never amended or sought to amend its denial-letter.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement enter a final order granting the request of Rosalie J. Kerr and changing the retirement option selection of her deceased son, Robert R. Kerr, from Option 1 to Option 2. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of July, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ERROL H. POWELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of July, 2006.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law the Hearing Officer would recommend that the decision of the Division of Retirement to terminate the retirement benefits of Peter C. Versage be sustained, and that said benefits be terminated until the amount of $1,261.96 is repaid to the trust together with interest at ten percent per annum from the date of May 23, 1977. DONE and ORDERED this 2nd day of April, 1979, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: L. Keith Pafford, Esquire Division of Retirement Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Peter C. Versage 6929 NW 34th Avenue Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33309
The Issue The issues to be resolved in this proceeding concern whether the Petitioner, Community Health Charities of Florida (CHC), is entitled to an award of attorney's fees and costs as a "prevailing small business party" pursuant to Section 57.111, Florida Statutes (2008), by being a prevailing small business party in the underlying case of Community Health Charities of Florida, et. al v. Florida Department of Management Services, DOAH Case No. 07-3547, Recommended Order February 29, 2008; Final Order May 29, 2008. Also, at issue is whether the Respondent Agency's actions, with regard to the underlying case, were substantially justified or whether special circumstances exist which would render an award of attorney's fees and costs unjust.
Findings Of Fact This cause arose upon the filing of a motion or petition for attorney's fees and costs on July 22, 2008, by the Petitioners, CHC and the Charities (the American Liver Foundation, Cystic Fibrosis Foundation, Crohn's and Colitis Foundation, Prevent Blindness Florida, Children's Tumor Foundation, March of Dimes, Lupus Foundation of America, Florida Chapter, Florida Hospices and Palliative Care, Hemophilia Foundation of Greater Florida, National Parkinson Foundation, American Diabetes Association, Leukemia and Lymphoma Society, American Lung Association, ALS Association, Alzheimer's Association, Juvenile Diabetes Research Foundation, Arthritis Foundation, Florida SIDS Alliance, Sickle Cell Disease Association of Florida, Easter Seals Florida, St. Jude Children's Research Hospital, Muscular Dystrophy Association, Nami Florida, National Kidney Foundation, National Multiple Sclerosis Foundation, Huntington's Disease Society of America, and Association for Retarded Citizens). This attorney fee and cost motion was filed in connection with the above Charities having received distribution of undesignated contributions from the 2006 Florida State Employees' Charitable Campaign (FSECC). The Charities made application for the funds and then contested the initial decision of the Steering Committee charged with determining distribution of undesignated contributions (by fiscal agent area). Ultimately, after obtaining a Writ of Mandamus from the First District Court of Appeal, requiring an administrative proceeding and hearing before the Division of Administrative Hearings on the contested claims, the Charities received additional distribution of undesignated contributions. Those additional distributions represent an additional benefit the Charities received upon the entry of the Recommended Order and the Final Order in the underlying proceeding. Therefore, one Petitioner, CHC, in the motion for attorney's fees and costs asserts that it is thus a prevailing party and a small business for purposes of Section 57.111, Florida Statutes, and is entitled to an award of attorney's fees and costs. The Respondent is an Agency of the State of Florida with authority to establish an maintain the FSECC.1/ It administers the decision-making process involving distribution of undesignated funds and issued the Final Order in the original proceeding. The attorney fee and cost proceeding was initially assigned to Administrative Law Judge Charles Adams. Thereafter the case was re-assigned to Administrative Law Judge T. Kent Wetherell, II. He issued an Order, sua sponte, on July 29, 2008, instructing the Petitioners to show cause why the case should not be held in abeyance pending disposition of the appeal of the Final Order in Community Health Charities of Florida v. State of Florida, Department of Management Services, 1D08-3126, the appeal before the First District Court of Appeal. The Petitioners filed a response to the Order to Show Cause stating, in essence, that the issues preserved for appeal involved discreet claims under Section 120.56(4), Florida Statutes. The parties agreed that the portions of the Final Order in the underlying proceeding which granted undesignated fund distributions to the Charities were separable, and not the subject of the appeal to the First District Court of Appeal in the above-cited case. The parties thus stipulated that the case could proceed on the matter of fees and costs, notwithstanding the pending appeal. An Order was entered by Judge Wetherell on August 11, 2008, based upon the responses to the Order to Show Cause. The Order references the parties' agreement that the case could go forward notwithstanding the pending appeal of the Final Order in the underlying case and then, significantly, Judge Wetherell made the following finding: "a closer review of the motion [the motion seeking the award of attorney's fees and costs] reflects that the only Petitioner alleged to be a prevailing small business party entitled to an award of fees under that statute [Section 57.111, Florida Statutes] is Community Health Charities of Florida." Judge Wetherell thereupon proceeded to order that the case style be amended to identify Community Health Charities of Florida (CHC), as the "only Petitioner in this fee case." The Petitioner, CHC, is a Florida non-profit corporation that employs less than 25 full-time employees and has a net worth of less than two million dollars. It is a "federation" under the FSECC Act. A "federation" is defined as an umbrella agency that supplies "common fund raising, administrative and management services to . . . charitable constituent member organizations. . . ." Fla. Admin. Code R. 60L-39.0015(1)(j). Federations were required to file with the Committee (the Steering Committee) a Direct Local Certification Form, describing the direct services that each member charity provided in the various fiscal agent areas. In this capacity, the Petitioner CHC represented 27 member charities in the 2006 charitable campaign. Charitable organizations that provide "direct services in a local fiscal agent's area" are entitled to receive "the same percentage of undesignated funds as the percentage of designated funds they receive." § 110.181(2)(e), Fla. Stat. (2006). CHC is not a provider of services or direct services. Therefore, it, itself, did not receive any undesignated funds. The charitable organizations named above, are the entities which received undesignated funds related to direct services they provided in local fiscal agents' areas. Some received them through the initial decision of the subject Steering Committee, and some after the underlying administrative proceeding was litigated through Final Order. On February 28, 2007, the Steering Committee, under the Respondent's auspices, conducted a public meeting in which it found the charities named above provided direct services in 18 percent of the fiscal agent areas in which they had applied. The Committee therefore denied Charities their share of undesignated funds in the remaining fiscal agent areas. That Committee decision was announced by memorandum of March 12, 2007, which provided the Petitioners with a point of entry to dispute the initial decision in an administrative proceeding. On March 30, 2007, the Petitioners filed an Amended Petition which alleged that they had provided direct services in all the fiscal agent areas in which they applied for undesignated funds, and identified alleged deficiencies in the Committee's decision-making process. That Amended Petition was ultimately referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings for conduct of a formal proceeding, by Order of the First District Court of Appeal, requiring the Agency to refer the Amended Petition to the Division of Administrative Hearings. With the Amended Petition pending before the Division of Administrative Hearings, the Steering Committee called an unscheduled meeting on September 10, 2007, to further address the Petitioners' claims and re-visit the earlier decision denying some applications for undesignated funds. Thereafter, the Respondent changed its initial decision by increasing the percentages of fiscal agent areas where direct services were provided and undesignated funds awarded to the Petitioners, the Charities, as a result of the September 10, 2007, meeting. This percentage thus increased from 18 percent to 77 percent as a result of "additional review of material provided by Petitioners." The Respondent Agency ultimately rendered a Final Order that adopted the decision of the Statewide Steering Committee, approving 77 percent of the Petitioners' previous submittals, as well as the finding of the Administrative Law Judge with regard to the three additional member charities. The Respondent had maintained in the original proceeding that the Committee must limit its consideration to the Direct Local Certification Form. The Petitioners, on the other hand, argued that they were entitled to a de novo review of the Agency action before the Division of Administrative Hearings. Reserving ruling on that matter, Judge Adams permitted the Petitioners, at the Final Hearing, to introduce additional evidence of direct services provided in those fiscal agent areas in which their applications had been denied by the Committee. The issue of direct services was considered de novo before the Division. The judge considered not only the direct local services certification form, but also supporting evidence of direct services introduced by the Petitioners at the Final Hearing. On considering that evidence, the Administrative Law Judge found that three additional member charities, not previously approved by the Committee, had provided direct services, which entitled them to receive undesignated funds. The Final Order entered by the Respondent Agency adopted the Administrative Law Judge's ruling. No exceptions were filed to that Recommended Order, thus the Agency waived its appellate rights with respect to any issue it might have raised, and the Charities prevailed as to the relief they sought in the Amended Petition. In their affidavits filed with the Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs on July 22, 2008, the attorneys Byrne and Hawkins, for the above-named Petitioners, stated that they were "retained" by those Petitioners, meaning all the above- named charities and also the Petitioner CHC. In the affidavits they stated that those Petitioners "incurred" the attorney's fees and costs to which the affidavits relate. As stated above, the attorney's fee Motion was filed and joined-in by all the above-named charities and CHC. The Petitioners in the underlying case, which was appealed to the First District Court of Appeal, were all the above-named charities and CHC. Nonetheless, the Petitioner CHC took the position at the hearing in this proceeding that an agreement or understanding existed with the affiliate charities, whereby CHC would bear the attorney's fees and costs on behalf of all the affiliate charities. CHC has an agreement concerning how revenue it receives is shared with its national office and member charities. CHC pays its national office a percentage of revenue. It sends money to the national office and the national office also sends an allocation of funds to CHC. CHC is a member of the Arlington, Virginia-based Community Health Charities of America. For the fiscal year beginning July 1, 2006, CHC withheld 25 percent of charitable donations from Florida employees to its affiliated charities as its fee. This is the maximum amount authorized by Florida law in order for it to participate in the FSECC. § 110.181(1)(h)1., Fla. Stat. (2006). In the 2006 campaign at issue, CHC did not file an application in its own name to the Steering Committee for receipt of undesignated funds. As Ms. Cooper testified "we did not apply." CHC received no allocation or award of undesignated funds either in the initial Steering Committee consideration process or as a result of the underlying proceeding through the Agency's Final Order. All the undesignated fund distributions were made to the charities themselves, who were the entities who filed applications to the Steering Committee seeking receipt of undesignated funds. The Steering Committee, which made the initial decisions about distribution of undesignated funds is composed of appointed volunteers. The members of the committee are not compensated and do not have support staff to assist them in their fact-finding review of applications concerning receipt of undesignated funds. The committee members personally review all applications. Review of the applications takes many hours by each member of the committee, much more time than is spent in actual committee meetings. The combined net worth and number of employees of some or all of the Charities, was not established. It was not established that the net worth of one or more of the charities filing this Motion for Attorney's Fees and participating as Petitioners in the underlying case, is less than two million dollars, nor that one or more of them have less than 25 employees. The legislature appropriated $17,000.00 dollars to DMS to administer the FSECC for 2006. Substantially more than that appropriated sum has been expended by DMS to administer the campaign. DMS has no insurance coverage which would pay attorney's fees and costs if they were awarded. DMS is also subject to at least a four percent budget "hold back" for the current fiscal year and is contemplating laying off employees in January 2009, due to budget reductions. If DMS is ordered to pay attorney's fees and costs to CHC, DMS will bill the fiscal agent, United Way, for payment of those amounts from the FSECC charitable contributions. Contrary to the situation with the Petitioner Charities, who made the original filing of the Amended Petition in the underlying case and were named as parties in the filing of the Motion for Attorney's Fees at issue in this case, CHC did offer evidence that its net worth was less than two million dollars and that it had less than 25 employees. Thus, it established this threshold for being considered a small business party. It is also true, however, that the Recommended Order from the Administrative Law Judge and the Final Order from the Agency in the underlying proceeding specifically make no mention of CHC as a prevailing party and award nothing of benefit to CHC, as opposed to the other actual charities, who filed the subject applications.
The Issue The ultimate issues in this case are: 1) whether certain agency statements made by the Respondent, DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, regarding the application of the provisions of Chapters 175 and 185, Florida Statutes, to pension plans for municipal fire fighters and police officers are "rules" as defined by Section 120.52(16), Florida Statutes; 2) if so, whether the agency is required to promulgate such "rules" in accordance with Section 120. 535, Florida Statutes; and 3) whether such "rules" constitute an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority in violation of Section 120.56, Florida Statutes Specifically, the issues in this case relate to the criteria required of municipal pension plans to qualify for state funds. Chapters 175 and 185, Florida Statutes, provide for pension plans for fire fighters and police officers, and authorize two types of pension plans. "Chapter plans" are created by state law, and "local law plans" are created either by special act of the Legislature or by municipal ordinance. The gist of the CITY OF ST. PETERSBURG's Section 120.535 Petition is that the DIVISION is attempting by non-rule policy to impose the same requirements relating to terms, conditions, and benefits on local law plans that the DIVISION requires of chapter plans. Specifically, the alleged non-rule policies of the DIVISION of which the CITY complains are: 1) the definition of "credited service"; 2) the definition of "average final compensation"; 3) the disallowance of a Social Security offset; 4) the interpretation of "disability retirement"; 5) the requirement that all of the CITY's pension plans be in compliance in order to receive state funds; 6) the release of funds to other municipalities not found in compliance; 7) the failure to enforce Rule 60Z-1.004, Florida Administrative Code, which defines "credited service;" and, 8) the application of a declaratory statement issued to the City of Boca Raton to other municipalities. As set forth below, the requirements for local law plans have been the subject of extensive prior litigation. In rejecting a challenge to the constitutionality of these statutes, the Court in City of Orlando v. State Department of Insurance, 528 So.2d 468 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988) stated: Chapters 175 and 185 create a purely voluntary program whereby municipalities may receive state-collected taxes, imposed on property and casualty insurance premiums, with which to fund retirement programs for local police and fire fighters. In exchange for receipt of these funds, the legislature has established certain criteria under which the funds must be operated and managed. Id. at 469. The dispute in this case again focuses on determining what criteria the legislature has established for the operation and management of such local pension plans in order to establish whether a local plan complies with the statute for purposes of receiving state-collected tax funds. Petitioner, CITY OF ST. PETERSBURG, and Intervenors, FLORIDA LEAGUE OF CITIES and CITY OF LARGO, take the position that Respondent, DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, has made non-rule policy statements, and required compliance therewith, which go beyond the criteria established by the legislature for participation in the program. Petitioner contends that such statements violate Section 120.535, Florida Statutes, because the statements constitute unpromulgated rules, and further that such statements violate Section 120.56, Florida Statutes, because the statements constitute invalid exercises of delegated legislative authority. Respondent, DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, takes the position that the statements are not "rules" as defined in Section 120.56(12), Florida Statutes, that even if the statements are "rules" it is not practicable or feasible for the agency to promulgate the statements as rules, and that the statements merely apply the provisions of Chapters 175 and 185, Florida Statutes, as intended by the legislature, and therefore do not violate Section 120.56, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Parties Petitioner, the CITY OF ST. PETERSBURG (CITY), is a municipality of the State of Florida which participates in the voluntary program to receive state- collected taxes imposed on property and casualty insurance with which to fund retirement programs for its municipal fire fighters and police under Chapters 175 and 185, Florida Statutes, respectively. Intervenor, CITY OF LARGO (LARGO), also is a State of Florida municipality participating in such local plans for fire fighters and police. LARGO has standing to intervene in this proceeding. Intervenor, FLORIDA LEAGUE OF CITIES (LEAGUE), represents municipalities participating in such local plans for fire fighters and police. The LEAGUE has standing to intervene in this proceeding. Respondent, DIVISION OF RETIREMENT (DIVISION), is the agency of the State of Florida charged with the statutory duty to administer the voluntary program by which municipalities receive state-collected taxes imposed on property and casualty insurance with which to fund local plans under Chapters 175 and 185, Florida Statutes. Prior to 1993, the Florida Department of Insurance was the responsible state agency to administer Chapters 175 and 185, Florida Statutes. Intervenors, MICHAEL MOORE and RICHARD FEINBERG are municipal fire fighters with the CITY and have standing to intervene in this proceeding. (Russell M. Rizzo, a municipal police officer and an intervenor in case No. 95- 2637, did not request to intervene in the Section 120.535 action, case No. 95- 5089.) History Chapters 175 and 185, Florida Statutes, relating to pension plans for fire fighters and police, authorize two types of retirement or pension plans. One type is called "chapter plans" and the other is known as "local law plans." Chapter plans are created under state law, and the provisions of Chapters 175 and 185, Florida Statutes, control the plans' terms, conditions and benefits. Local law plans are purely voluntary and are created either by special act of the Legislature, or by municipal ordinance. The special act or municipal ordinance contain the provisions relating to the terms, conditions, and benefits of the local law retirement plan. Both chapter plans and local law plans receive funds from the state-collected premium tax on property and casualty insurance. The CITY has operated local law retirement plans for fire fighters and police since 1951. The CITY's police and fire fighter plans were first chartered by special act of the Legislature. The fire fighter charter plan has been closed to new members since approximately 1970. The CITY in 1970 established a supplemental retirement plan for fire fighters which was enacted by CITY ordinance. The CITY's police and fire fighter pension plans are subject to union negotiation, and cannot be unilaterally amended. City of Tallahassee v. Public Employee Relations Commission, 393 So.2d 1147 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). In this respect, the CITY may not have the authority to make unilateral changes to its local law plans in order to comply with directives of the DIVISION. The CITY has voluntarily participated on a continuing basis in the program created under Chapters 175 and 185, Florida Statutes, whereby the CITY has received state-collected taxes imposed on property and casualty insurance premiums with which to fund its local plans for fire fighters and police. The CITY has received such funds until calendar year 1994. In 1986 the Legislature significantly amended Chapters 175 and 185, Florida Statutes. See Chapters 86-41 and 86-42, Laws of Florida. Chapter 86-41 pertained to municipal fire fighters; Chapter 86-42 pertained to municipal police officers. As indicated above, the constitutionality of these statutes was upheld in City of Orlando v. State Department of Insurance, supra. In section 1. of each act, the Legislature added substantially the same legislative intent language: Therefore, the Legislature declares that it is a proper and legitimate state purpose to provide a uniform retirement system for the benefit of fire fighters as hereinafter defined, and intends, in implementing the provisions of s. 14, Art. X of the State Constitution as they relate to municipal fire fighters' pension trust fund systems and plans, that such retire- ment systems or plans to be managed, administered, operated, and funded in such manner as to maximize the protection of the fire fighters' pension trust funds. This chapter hereby establishes minimum standards for the operation and funding of municipal fire fighters' pension trust fund systems and plans. After the enactment of Chapters 86-41 and 86-42, Laws of Florida, the Department of Insurance undertook rulemaking to implement the provisions of the acts. The CITY and the LEAGUE challenged the proposed rules under Section 120.54, Florida Statutes. The Department's proposed rules were upheld by a DOAH Hearing Officer. On appeal, the First District Court of Appeal reversed the order of the Hearing Officer, and held that the majority of the department's proposed rules were invalid because statutory provisions governing chapter pension plans, which were not made expressly applicable by the Legislature to local fire fighter and police plans, did not preempt municipal power with respect to pension plans. Florida League of Cities, Inc. v. Department of Insurance, 540 So.2d 850 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989) review denied 545 So.2d 1367 (Fla. 1989), [hereinafter referred to as the "Rules Case"]. In 1988 the CITY and the Department of Insurance engaged in litigation regarding the compliance of the CITY's local law plans with the Department's construction of the statute. This litigation was ultimately settled by the Department's agreement not to withhold the CITY's premium tax funds. During 1990 and 1991, the Department of Insurance also engaged in litigation with numerous other municipalities regarding compliance of local law plans with the provisions of Chapters 175 and 185, Florida Statutes. The Department settled these cases and continued to distribute premium tax funds to these local law plans with the understanding that the disputed issues would be better resolved through rulemaking. The Department of Insurance conducted staff workshops to discuss rulemaking; however, the Department did not thereafter initiate formal rulemaking under Chapter 120, Florida Statutes, with regard to promulgation by rule of compliance requirements for local law plans under Chapters 175 and 185, Florida Statutes. In 1993 the Legislature transferred statutory responsibility for the administration of Chapters 175 and 185, Florida Statutes, from the Department of Insurance to the DIVISION. The legislative transfer effected a transfer of all programs as well as personnel. Since the legislative transfer in 1993, the DIVISION has made a continuous and good faith effort to present these issues to the Legislature for resolution. During the 1996 Session, HB 1951 and SB 2484 have been introduced. These bills specifically address the issues presented in this case. Stipulated Facts The following facts verbatim were set forth by the parties in the Prehearing Stipulation: The DIVISION admits to the authenticity of all documents contained within its files, including, but not limited to, interoffice memoranda, correspondence to and from the DIVISION and/or the Department of Insurance which are contained in the files of the Division, and any correspondence copied to the DIVISION and/or the Department of Insurance which are contained in the files of the DIVISION. The DIVISION takes the position that Sections 175.032 and 185.02, Florida Statutes, (Definitions), apply to local law plans. (The) Position of (the agency in) Declaratory Statement DMS-DR-94-18 was issued to the City of Boca Raton pursuant to Section 120.565, Florida Statutes. It is the position of the DIVISION that a plan containing a mandatory retirement age violates the Older Worker Benefits Protection Act; and that pension plans which violate this federal law are not eligible for distribution of premium tax funds under Sections 175.351 and 185.35, Florida Statutes. It is the position of the DIVISION that fire fighters disabled from duties of a fireman as defined in Section 175.032, Florida Statutes, are eligible for disability benefits. The CITY admits that the Social Security offset contained in its supplemental fire pension plans could possibly reduce a fire fighter's pension below two (2) percent for each year of credited service; however, the CITY specifically has no knowledge that this has or will occur. The CITY admits that Sergeant Rizzo has accrued in excess of thirty- two (32) years of service. The CITY admits that the police pension plan contains a maximum pension plan benefit of 60 percent of the highest pay step of the lowest rank held during the previous three years, which benefit Sgt. Rizzo became eligible for after twenty-five (25) years of active service. The CITY admits after thirty (30) years of service Sgt. Rizzo will retire with a pension benefit equal to less than two (2) percent for each year of active service. The CITY admits that Sgt. Rizzo was permitted to cease all employee contributions to his pension plan after twenty-five (25) years of service. The 1994 premium taxes are withheld from the CITY by the DIVISION. Prior to 1994 the DIVISION, or its predecessor agency, the Department of Insurance, have never withheld Chapter 175 or 185 insurance tax premium moneys from the CITY. The DIVISION has not initiated the rulemaking process with regard to definition of the term "average final compensation" in Section 175.351, Florida Statutes, and there are currently no existing promulgated rules that apply to local law plan definitions for "average final compensation" for the DIVISION. The DIVISION has not initiated the rulemaking process with regard to definition of the term "average final compensation" in Section 185.35, Florida Statutes, and there are currently no existing promulgated rules that apply to local law plan definitions for "average final compensation" for the DIVISION. It is the position of the DIVISION that Rule 60Z-1.004, Florida Administrative Code, defining "credited service" contradicts Chapter 185, Florida Statutes, and is not enforced. It is the position of the DIVISION that all municipal pension plans submitted for review must comply with the non-rule policy at issue in the present case in order to receive Chapter moneys pursuant to Sections 175.351 and 185.35, Florida Statutes. It is the position of the DIVISION that the pension plans of the City of St. Petersburg do not fulfill the requirements of Section 175.351, Florida Statutes, to qualify for release of state premium tax moneys. It is the position of the DIVISION that the pension plans of the City of St. Petersburg do not fulfill the requirements of Section 185.35, Florida Statutes, to qualify for release of state premium tax moneys. It is the position of the DIVISION that the term "credited years of service" as used in Section 175.351(4) and 185.35(1)(d), Florida Statutes, is to be defined in accordance with the term "aggregate number of years of service" and "aggregate number of years of service with the municipality" under Sections 175.032(1)(a) and 185(1)(b), Florida Statutes, respectively. It is the position of the DIVISION that it has the authority under Chapters 175 and 185, Florida Statutes, and Chapter 60Z, Florida Administrative Code, to withhold Chapter 175 and 185 premium tax money to plans not in compliance with Sections 175.351 and 185.35. It is the position of the DIVISION that it has the authority to release payment of Chapter 175 and 185 premium tax moneys to plans not in compliance with Sections 175.351 and 185.35, Florida Statutes, provided the municipality is making good faith efforts to bring the violations into compliance.
The Issue Whether deceased retiree's prior selection of Option One retirement benefit pay-out and his receipt and negotiation of retirement several checks should now be set aside, due to his wife's alleged forgery of her signature on the Spousal Acknowledgement (Form FR-11).
Findings Of Fact 1. Irvin M. Carpenter was born November 16, 1934, and died of cancer on November 18, 1997. Mr. Carpenter was employed by the Hillsborough County Aviation Authority as a police officer on September 10, 1984, and attained the rank of police sergeant at the time of his retirement. Mr. Carpenter was a member of the Florida Retirement System. 2. On January 20, 1991, Irvin M. Carpenter and Susan Ann Prescott were married. Susan Ann Carpenter is now, and has been at all time pertinent to these proceeding, employed by the Hillsborough County Aviation Authority as a police officer. Susan Carpenter is a member of the Florida Retirement System. 3. In October of 1996, Irvin Carpenter and Susan Carpenter separated and continued to live separately. Dissolution of marriage proceedings were initiated but was not finalized at the time of Irvin Carpenter's death in November 1997. At all times pertinent to these proceedings, Irvin Carpenter and Susan Ann Carpenter were husband and wife. 4. On July 8, 1997, Irvin Carpenter executed a Florida Retirement System form styled "Application for Service Retirement" (Form FR-11). This form provides the retiree with information pertaining to the four options by which his retirement benefits can be paid. One full page of the form provides an explanation of each option. By use of this form, Irvin Carpenter selected Option One retirement benefit payout plan. The explanation of Option One on Form FR-11 is as follows: Option 1: A monthly benefit payable for my lifetime. Upon my death, the monthly benefit will stop and my beneficiary will receive only a refund of any contributions I have paid which are in excess of the amount I have received in benefits. This option does not provide a continuing benefit to my beneficiary. 5. The FR-11 also contained the following information in bold lettering: THIS SECTION MUST BE COMPLETED IF YOU SELECT OPTION 1 OR 2 MARRIED YES[ ] NO [ ] IF YES, YOUR SPOUSE MUST SIGN BELOW: SPOUSAL ACKNOWLEDGEMENT : I, (Signature) Susan A. Carpenter,’ being the spouse of the above named member, acknowledges that the member has elected either Option 1 or 2. (Signature Irvin Carpenter 11-27-96 Signature of Spouse Date If your spouse does not sign, you must attach a signed statement explaining why your spouse did not acknowledge your selection. 6. The "yes" or "no" blocks requesting marriage status were blank on the FR-11 submitted by the retiree to the Agency. The Spousal Acknowledgement block contained the signature of "Susan Ann Carpenter." Susan Carpenter alleged this signature to be a forgery. 7. The form FPR-11 also contained the following statement in capital letters: I UNDERSTAND I MUST TERMINATE ALL EMPLOYMENT WITH FRS EMPLOYERS TO RECEIVE A RETIREMENT BENEFIT UNDER CHAPTER 121, FLORIDA STATUTES. I ALSO UNDERSTAND THAT I CANNOT ADD ADDITIONAL SERVICE, CHANGE OPTIONS, OR CHANGE MY TYPE OF RETIREMENT (REGULAR, DISABILITY AND EARLY) ONCE MY RETIREMENT BECOMES FINAL. MY RETIREMENT BECOMES FINAL WHEN ANY BENEFIT PAYMENT IS CASHED OR DEPOSITED. 8. Between the date of his retirement and the date of his death, Irvin Carpenter received, cashed, or deposited a minimum of three retirement checks from the Florida Retirement System, pursuant to his selection of Option One benefit payout plan. 9. After the death of Mr. Carpenter, the Agency, by letter dated November 24, 1997, addressed to: FAMILY OF IRVIN M. CARPENTER, 3602 W. Tampa Circle, Tampa, Florida 33629, informed the family of the retirement benefit due beneficiaries for November and the income tax deduction therefrom. 10. By letter to the Agency dated July 13, 2000, Susan Carpenter stated: My Husband, Irvin M. Carpenter, DOB 11/16/34, SSN 263-42-0146, retired from the Tampa International Airport Police Department on 07/31/1997. At the time of his retirement, we were separated but still Married. He passed away less than three months later in November 1997. I inquired as to any benefits and informed by the Hillsborough County Aviation Authority, the parent organization of the Tampa International Airport Police Department, that he had changed his beneficiary to his daughter, Anita Carpenter. Just recently, I became aware of the Florida Retirement System provisions concerning retirement options. I ama police officer with the Tampa International Airport Police Department and these matters were covered in a pre-retirement briefing conducted by Human Resources. It is my understanding that if you are married and select option 1 or 2, the spouse must acknowledge that selection in writing. Since I had not signed any such acknowledgement, it occurred to me that my deceased husband's remaining options both provide for the joint annuitant. I posed this question to the HCAA Human Resources and was informed that my deceased husband did not retire. The Department announced his retirement, his name was added to the plaque listing retired officers and Department personnel files indicate a retirement date of 07/31/1999. I questioned my police captain and Chief of Police and both of them were emphatic that my husband retired on 07/31/1999. With my superiors providing information contrary to Human Resources, I have some doubt as to the status of my deceased husband with regards to the Florida Retirement System. Please confirm the status of Irvin M. Carpenter. Did he retire from FRS? If not, what was his status at the time he passed away? I am sure you understand the significance of my determining the correct status. Thank you for any assistance you can provide. 11. The Agency denied Susan Carpenter's request to void Irvin Carpenter's selection of Option One retirement pay-out. The Agency's letter of November 15, 2000, asserted the position that the selection cannot be changed since the retirement checks were cashed or deposited and cited the following portions of Section 121.091(6) (a), Florida Statutes: "The spouse of any member who elects to receive the benefit provided under subparagraph 1. or subparagraph 2. shall be notified of and shall acknowledge any such election." The law does not require the spouse to agree with the members' retirement option selection. The Form FR-11, Application for Service Retirement, submitted by Irvin Carpenter included Susan Carpenter's signature acknowledging that she was aware of the Option 1 selection. We receive numerous applications monthly and we do not investigate to determine if each signature is authentic. Although Mrs. Carpenter contends that her signature was forged, once a member cashes or deposits a check the option selection cannot be changed. The statutes do not require the spouse to agree with the members option selection, only to be made aware. Your request to void the Option 1 selection is denied. 12. Susan Carpenter denies having signed the Form FR-11, Application for Service Retirement submitted by Irvin Carpenter. Susan Carpenter alleges that the signature, "Susan Ann Carpenter," appearing on the Form FR-11 is a forgery. 13. During the final hearing and in the presence of the undersigned, Susan Carpenter signed "Susan A. Carpenter" three times, Petitioner's Exhibit F. At the request of the undersigned Susan Carpenter signed "Susan Ann Carpenter" once. A review of the four signature samples provided by Susan Carpenter, the sample signature, "Susan Ann Carpenter," proved to the satisfaction of the undersigned evidence of the genuineness of the written signature in dispute. Accordingly, and as a finding of fact, the Form FR-11 signature "Susan Ann Carpenter" is not a forgery. 14. Susan Carpenter's assertion that the Agency is under legal obligation to contact each spouse or otherwise verify the signature of each spouse on the Form FR-11ls received in the Agency's normal course of business is without foundation in law and in fact. 15. Only the circuit court has jurisdiction and authority in dissolution of marriage cases to enter final orders determining property rights of marital assets. Petitioner proffered no such order as evidence. Accordingly, all testimony and evidence based on alleged spousal rights and entitlements pursuant to Chapter 61, Florida Statutes, are not considered
Conclusions For Petitioner: Scott W. Fitzpatrick, Esquire Southeast Building, Suite 1500 St. Petersburg, Florida 33703 For Respondent: Thomas E. Wright, Esquire Department of Management Services Cedars Executive Center, Building Cc 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact an Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a final order denying Susan Carpenter's request to change the retirement option 13 selected by Mr. Irvin Carpenter, including benefits due, and denying all such other relief. lo& DONE AND ENTERED this = day of July, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division _of Administrative Hearings this J2% day of July, 2001.
