The Issue The issue in this case is whether the land development regulations (LDRs) adopted by Respondent, City of Sunny Isles Beach (City), by Ordinance No. 2002-165 on December 10, 2002, as amended, are in compliance.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the record presented by the parties, the following undisputed findings of fact are determined: The City sits between the Intracoastal Waterway and the Atlantic Ocean in northern Dade County just south of the Town of Golden Beach (Town) and just north of the City of Bal Harbour. It was incorporated in 1997. As required by Section 163.3161, Florida Statutes, on October 5, 2000, the City adopted its first Comprehensive Plan. See Exhibit E. The Plan was amended by Ordinance No. 2002-147 on January 17, 2002. See Exhibit B. The Plan's Future Land Use Map contains a land use category known as Mixed Use-Resort/High Density (MU-R), which is "designed to encourage development and redevelopment within the area east of Collins Avenue for resort style developments catering to tourists and seasonal residents (hotel, hotel/ apartments, vacation resorts and resort style apartments) as well as high quality residential apartments." The category also allows associated retail uses such as restaurants and conference facilities that are internal and accessory to hotel/resort development. Pertinent to this dispute is Policy 15B of the Future Land Use Element (FLUE), which establishes density and intensity standards for the MU-R land use category. More specifically, the policy provides the following standards: This category allows an as-of-right density of a maximum one hundred (100) hotel- apartment units per acre and fifty (50) dwelling units per acre for apartments and a floor area ratio (FAR) intensity of 2.5. The allowable number of hotel rooms is controlled by floor area ratio. Additional residential density and FAR intensity may be permitted for developments that comply with bonus program requirements. Residential densities with bonuses may not exceed eighty (80) units per acre for solely apartments and one hundred twenty five (125) units per acre for hotel- apartments, exclusive of lockout units. (Emphasis added) Under the foregoing policy, a maximum density of 100 units per acre is allowed for hotel-apartment units, a maximum density of 50 units per acre is allowed for apartments, and a floor area ratio (FAR) intensity of 2.5 has been established. However, the underscored portion of the policy authorizes a bonus density and intensity program which allows a developer to exceed the prescribed density and intensity standards for developments "that comply with bonus program requirements." If the bonus density program requirements are satisfied, the policy establishes a cap for the density bonus at 125 hotel-apartment units per acre and 80 residential units per acre. While the policy does not establish a similar cap for the intensity bonus, it essentially defers the amount of the intensity cap and the details of the bonus program to the LDRs, which are to be adopted at a later time. Objective 8 of the Plan provides that the City "shall adopt, maintain, update and enhance development regulations and procedures to ensure that future land use and development in the City of Sunny Isles Beach is consistent with the Comprehensive Plan." Objective 15 of the Plan provides that the "land use densities, intensities and approaches [contained in Policy 15B] shall be incorporated in the Land Development Regulations." Finally, Section 163.3202(1), Florida Statutes, requires that local governments, within one year after submission of their comprehensive plans, "adopt or amend and enforce land development regulations that are consistent with and implement their comprehensive plan." On December 10, 2002, the City approved Ordinance No. 2002-165, which adopted a comprehensive set of LDRs to implement the Plan. See Exhibit C. In 2003, the LDRs were further amended in minor respects by Ordinance Nos. 2003-167, 2003-171, 2003-173, and 2003-178. See Exhibit D. In sum, the LDRs consist of more than one hundred pages of regulations, and except for one of these, Section 703.8.4(i)3, none of the other LDRs directly relates to this dispute. Section 703.8.4(i)3 implements Policy 15B by outlining the criteria and requirements necessary to qualify for additional intensity or FAR through the bonus program. It also establishes a cap on FAR intensity. If the bonus program requirements are satisfied,3 the regulation allows a maximum intensity bonus of 1.5 FAR, or a potential total FAR of 4.0, which exceeds the 2.5 FAR contained in Policy 15B. (Intensity bonuses to increase the FAR can also be obtained through the transfer of development rights under Section 515 of the LDRs. However, those bonuses are not in issue here.) Petitioners include a group of twelve City residents; the Town, which lies adjacent to, and just north of, the City; and two Town residents. There is no dispute that Petitioners will be substantially affected by the LDRs and thus they have standing to bring this challenge. In their Cross-Motion, which essentially tracks the allegations in their Amended Request for Hearing, Petitioners assert that they, and not the City, are entitled to a summary final order in their favor for three reasons. First, they argue that it is beyond fair debate that all of the LDRs, including Section 703.8.4(i)3, are inconsistent with Policies 4A and 4C of the Intergovernmental Coordination Element of the Plan because the City failed to solicit comments from the Town prior to the adoption of the LDRs. Second, they argue that it is beyond fair debate that the City violated Florida Administrative Code Rule 9J-5.005(2)(g) when it adopted Section 703.8.4(i)3. Finally, they contend that it is beyond fair debate that in order to achieve consistency with the Plan, the LDR must not establish a FAR that is beyond the intensity standard (2.5) established in the Plan. Policies 4A and 4C of the Intergovernmental Coordination Element provide as follows: 4A. The City will notify and solicit comments from adjacent jurisdictions and the School Board of any requests for land use amendments, variances, conditional uses or site plan approvals which impact property within 500 feet of a public school or within 500 feet of the boundaries of an adjacent jurisdiction. 4C. The City will notify and solicit comments from adjacent jurisdictions and the School Board of its existing standards or proposed regulations being considered for problematic or incompatible land uses. Nothing in the two policies requires that the City solicit comments from adjacent jurisdictions when adopting the LDRs being challenged here. Rather, these policies specifically address notice and comments as to "land use" changes, not the adoption of LDRs, or to "regulations being considered for problematic or incompatible land uses." Even assuming arguendo that the two policies require some type of prior notice, Petitioners do not dispute the fact (as set forth in the Department's Determination) that prior to the adoption of the LDRs, "the City notified the Town both in writing and orally". (Determination, Finding of Fact 6). Florida Administrative Code Rule 9J-5.005(2) contains general data and analyses requirements for comprehensive plans. Paragraph (2)(g), which Petitioners assert was violated by the City when it adopted Section 703.8.4(i)3, provides as follows: (g) A local government may include, as part of its adopted plan, documents adopted by reference but not incorporated verbatim into the plan. The adoption by reference must identify the title and author of the document and indicate clearly what provisions and edition of the document is being adopted. The adoption by reference may not include future amendments to the document because this would violate the statutory procedure for plan amendments and frustrate public participation on those amendments. A local government may include a provision in its plan stating that all documents adopted by reference are as they existed on a date certain. Documents adopted by reference that are revised subsequent to plan adoption will need to have their reference updated within the plan through the amendment process. Unless documents adopted by reference comply with paragraph 9J-5.005(2)(g), F.A.C., or are in the F.S., the F.A.C., or the Code of Federal Regulations, copies or summaries of the documents shall be submitted as support documents for the adopted portions of the plan amendment. This rule sets forth the manner in which local governments may adopt and incorporate by reference documents into their comprehensive plans. If they choose to do so, they must identify the title and author of the document being incorporated by reference, the edition of the document, and the specific portion of the document relied upon. Whenever an amendment or change to the incorporated document occurs at a future time, the local government must readopt those changes in order for them to be valid and effective. On its face, the rule applies exclusively to the use of incorporated documents in comprehensive plans, or plan amendments, and has no application to LDRs. In the case of Town of Golden Beach et al. v. City of Sunny Isles Beach et al., No. 03-472AP (Fla. 11th Cir.Ct., Appellate Division, June 15, 2004), a copy of which has been submitted as Exhibit G, Petitioners unsuccessfully sought by petitions for writ of certiorari to quash a City Resolution which granted Intervenor's application to construct a condominium at 19505 Collins Avenue, Sunny Isles Beach. The application sought approval of a site plan for the condominium and approval of the use of the property as a receiver site for the transfer of 38,847 square feet of transfer development rights in accordance with the City's LDRs. In that proceeding, Petitioners contended that they were denied due process because the City failed to provide proper notice to neighboring property owners under Section 515.7 of the LDRs; and that the City violated the essential requirements of the law by improperly transferring development rights and additional floor area ratio through bonuses to the developer, in excess of the 2.5 FAR expressly permitted by the City's Plan and LDRs. The court ruled in favor of the City on both issues. The parties agree, however, that a motion for rehearing of that decision has been filed by Petitioners, and the decision is not yet final. Further, the decision does not clearly indicate whether the same consistency arguments raised here were adjudicated in that matter. The notice issue is not the same.
The Issue Whether Petitioner is entitled to reimbursement for expenses incurred in relocating and reestablishment of his small business pursuant to section 421.55, Florida Statutes (2009),1/ as implemented by Florida Administrative Code Rule 14-66.007, which, in turn, incorporates by reference the provisions of 49 Code of Federal Regulations Part 24, Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition for Federal and Federally-Assisted Programs (effective October 1, 2006),2/ and the Florida Department of Transportation Right of Way Manual 9.3.15, and, if Petitioner is entitled to reimbursement, the amount owed to him.
Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence and witnesses' testimony, the undersigned found the following facts: The Department is the state agency that has responsibility for paying certain relocation and reestablishment expenses of businesses that have been displaced because of a public transportation project. See § 421.55, Fla. Stat. Sometime in 1999 to 2000, Mr. Carey purchased eight rental units in Hillsborough County, Florida, as an investment property. Mr. Carey managed the rental property and testified that he would advertise vacancies through "word of mouth." The record shows that these rental units were rented weekly and included written and verbal leases. In 2005, the Department informed Mr. Carey that his rental property would be subject of an eminent domain taking and informed Mr. Carey about the law authorizing the Department to pay certain expenses in relocating and reestablishing a small business. On December 6, 2005, Mr. Carey filled out a Business Survey Questionnaire for the Department, stating his desire to relocate his rental business. The Department acquired Mr. Carey's property on April 18, 2009. By mid July 2009, Mr. Carey contacted Mr. Nappi to determine whether or not he was still eligible to receive relocation and reestablishment reimbursement for his small business. Mr. Nappi determined that Mr. Carey remained eligible to apply for reimbursement and informed him of that fact. On August 28, 2009, Mr. Carey purchased a replacement property located at 19002 Apian Way, Lutz, Florida, for $300,000.00. The replacement property contained a house that had been the homestead property of the prior owner. Mr. Carey credibly testified that the purpose of purchasing this replacement property was "to get back into the rental business" and that he advertised the replacement property for rent by "word of mouth." Receipts introduced into evidence show that Mr. Carey began making repairs and purchasing materials as early as the first week in September. Mr. Carey testified, on cross-examination, that he could not remember the exact date when he listed the replacement property for sale, or the exact date when he entered into a contract for the sale of the replacement property. Mr. Carey testified that he would speculate that the contract for sale of the replacement property occurred in early October 2009. On October 15, 2009, Mr. Nappi went to the replacement property with Mr. Carey to review the work that Mr. Carey had already begun on the replacement property and to discuss the expenses eligible for reimbursement. In reviewing Mr. Carey's claimed expenses, Mr. Nappi found that the following expenses would be eligible for reimbursement: (1) the drywall work detailed in Exhibit A; (2) $561.00 worth of the receipts of materials purchased from Home Depot; and (3) the painting expenses detailed in Exhibit C. Mr. Nappi also testified that in reviewing the claimed expenses that Mr. Carey would be eligible for reimbursement of a portion of the replacement property's ad valorem taxes. According to Mr. Nappi, Mr. Carey would have been eligible to receive the difference of the amount of the property taxes between the acquired property and the replacement property in the amount of $849.56. The only expenses that Mr. Nappi identified as not being reasonable were for hauling away yard waste contained in Exhibit D. According to Mr. Nappi, the Department questioned the amount of the charges and determined that an appropriate amount would be $1,200.00 as opposed to the $2,450.00 sought by Mr. Carey. Consequently, the majority of the expenses claimed by Mr. Carey were eligible items for reimbursement. On November 4, 2009, the Department sent Mr. Carey a letter denying his eligibility to receive reimbursement for expenses in relocating and reestablishing his small rental business. The Department denied Mr. Carey's eligibility because the updated TRIM notice for the property tax, that Mr. Carey provided the Department, showed the replacement property was homestead property. Because the replacement property was homestead, the Department reasoned that Mr. Carey had not reestablished a small business. Mr. Carey informed Mr. Nappi that the replacement property was not homestead property and that the TRIM notice was wrong. In response, on November 9, 2009, Mr. Nappi wrote the Hillsborough County Tax Collector to determine whether or not Mr. Carey's replacement property was homestead property. On November 23, 2009, while the Department waited for a response from the Hillsborough County Tax Collector, Mr. Carey closed on the sale of the replacement property for $332,500.00. Mr. Carey did not inform the Department that the replacement property had been sold. In February 2010, the Hillsborough County Tax Collector informed the Department that the replacement property was not homestead. Also, the Department learned for the first time that Mr. Carey had sold the replacement property. After learning that Mr. Carey had sold the replacement property, Mr. Nappi contacted his supervisor Elbert Johnson (Mr. Johnson). Mr. Nappi informed Mr. Johnson that "it did not appear that the reestablishment status of the landlord had been in fact established[,]" and the claim would be denied. Mr. Nappi testified the Department attempted to determine whether or not Mr. Carey had reestablished his rental business by examining Mr. Carey's efforts to rent the replacement property. Mr. Nappi directed a right-of-way specialist for the Department to contact realtors, who were associated with the property, to determine if Mr. Carey had listed the property for rent; to contact the local newspaper to learn if the property had been advertised for rent; and to conduct an internet search of the property. According to Mr. Nappi, the realtor indicated that she was not aware of whether or not Mr. Carey listed the property for rent and learned nothing from the newspaper or internet search. Mr. Nappi admitted that the Department did not contact Mr. Carey to ask him about his efforts to rent the property. The Department did not contact Mr. Carey or ask him to provide any information about his efforts to rent the property. Consequently, the Department did not have before it any information concerning Mr. Carey's efforts as to "word of mouth" advertising of the property. Mr. Knight, the state administrator of Relocation Assistance, testified that asking Mr. Carey about his efforts to rent the property would have been helpful information to have in considering the reimbursement. However, Mr. Knight acknowledged that Mr. Carey's selling of the home prior to determination of whether or not he was entitled to reimbursement made the issue moot. In the Department's estimation, Mr. Carey had simply "flipped a house" and had not reestablished his business. On March 25, 2010, the Department informed Mr. Carey that it was denying his application for reimbursement because he was not eligible because he had not reestablished his small rental business at the replacement property.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Transportation enter a final order affirming its denial of Mr. Carey's application for reimbursement of reestablishment expenses. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of February, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S THOMAS P. CRAPPS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of February, 2011.
The Issue Whether Centervillage Limited Partnership has demonstrated, by a preponderance of evidence, that development rights in certain real property it owns have vested against the provisions of the Tallahassee-Leon County 2010 Comprehensive Plan.
Findings Of Fact Procedure. On or about August 6, 1990, Centervillage filed an Application for Vested Rights Determination with the Tallahassee-Leon County Planning Department. (Application VR0027T) The following information concerning the development of the Centervillage property was contained on the Application: "Gerald E. Songy" is listed as the "owner/agent." Question 3 lists the name of the project as "Centervillage Limited Partnership." "Progress . . . Toward Completion" is described as:(1) planning, (2) site preparation, (3) Leon County environmental permits, (4) DER Dredge and Fill Permit, (5) DOT Drainage Connection Permit. Original P.U.D., Rezoning, Minor subdivision Approval and a stormwater agreement with Leon County, are included in Centervillage's application as forms of government approvals and as the actions of government relied on prior to committing funds toward completion of the proposed development. On September 10 and 17, 1990, hearings were held to consider the Application before the Staff Committee comprised of the City Attorney, the Director of Planning for the Tallahassee-Leon County Planning Commission and the Director of Growth Management for the City. By letter dated September 17, 1990, Mark Gumula, Director of Planning of the Tallahassee-Leon County Planning Department informed Centervillage that the Application had been denied. By letter dated September 28, 1990, to Mr. Gumula, Centervillage appealed the decision to deny the Application. By letter dated October 10, 1990, the Division of Administrative Hearings was requested to provide a Hearing Officer to review this matter. By agreement of the parties, the undersigned allowed the parties to supplement the record in this matter on November 26, 1990. The Property. Centervillage currently owns approximately 27.20 acres of property (the Property) located at the Northeast corner of Capital Circle, Northeast, and Centerville Road, Tallahassee, Florida (Application). Centervillage began assembling the Property, through various transactions, in the early 1980's. By October, 1984, Centervillage had acquired the bulk of the Property. (T-3 p. 23) Prior to Centervillage's initial acquisition of the Property, the prior owners of portions of the Property began development of the site as an industrial, mini-warehouse development. This prior development activity involved a series of violations of state and local environmental laws and regulations. (T-3 pp. 50-51, 59) As a result of improper development activities by the prior owners of the Property, fines were imposed and, at the time Centervillage made the initial purchase, the Property was subject to a Florida Department of Environmental Regulation (DER) consent order. (T-3 p. 26) Development Activity. The project that Centervillage proposes to develop is a shopping center containing 200,000 square feet of gross leasable space on approximately 18 of the total 27.20 acres. (T-3 p. 96) The balance of the property is dedicated to stormwater facilities. (T-3 pp. 96-99) During the process of acquiring the 27.20 acres it currently owns, Centervillage began preparing the Property for future development by clearing and demolishing existing structures such as mobile homes, concrete driveways, and wells. (T-1 pp. 27-28) Permits were obtained early in the process to demolish these structures and in December 1984, the front corner of the Property was selectively cleared. (T-1 p. 28) In April, 1986, Leon County (the County) began construction of a ditch on a portion of the perimeter of the Property. The purpose of this ditch was to allow stormwater discharge from a Centerville Road construction project that the County was involved in. The County had been unable to locate an alternative site to provide any catchment and holding facility to handle the stormwater run off and, as a result, had encountered problems with the Florida Department of Environmental Regulation (DER). (T-3, pp. 70-71) At the same time, Centervillage was involved in attempting to resolve problems associated with improper development activity on the Property by its previous owners. These factors led to cooperative efforts on the part of both Centervillage and the County in dealing with the DER and to conceptual agreements between the Centervillage and the County regarding aspects of future development of the Property. Centervillage granted the County a temporary easement for the purpose of constructing the drainage ditch. (T-1 p. 28, T-3 p. 52) The drainage ditch constructed on the site turned out to be a "long, skinny holding pond." (T-1 p. 29) The County constructed over 80 percent of the overall onsite perimeter ditch in mid to late 1986. (T-1 p. 29) The property subject to the temporary easement will be conveyed to the County pursuant to a formalized conceptual agreement between Centervillage and the County. (App. Ex. G, G-8) This agreement will be the subject of expanded discussion later in this Final Order. Construction of the majority of the current improvements on the Property began in June of 1989. The work consisted of: construction of a holding pond sized for commercial development; construction of some two and a half acres of wetlands; and construction of the perimeter ditch from the north end of the project to Centerville Road, then west along Centerville Road under Capital Circle. (T-1 pp. 30-31) The work also included vegetation of the perimeter ditch to create wetlands. (T-1 p. 31) This development activity also involved the placing of 50,000 to 60,000 cubic yards of fill material on the site. (T-1 p. 30) In May and June of 1989, Centervillage acquired over six acres of adjoining property in order to construct a stormwater facility which it had agreed to provide as part of its conceptual agreements with the County and in partial mitigation against prior improper development on the Property. (App. Ex. H, H-2; T-1 p. 11; T-3 pp. 125-126; T-3 pp. 26-27) The two and a half acres of new wetlands Centervillage constructed on the property was also in mitigation for prior improper development activity engaged in by previous owners of the Property. (T-1 p. 30) Further development has been permitted but not constructed. This work is to involve the construction of culverts, crossings, and onsite, upland filtration facilities. (T-1 pp. 31-32) As a result of the 1989 development activity, the northern 7.57 acres of the property has been excavated for the stormwater facility and some 18 acres of the Property have been filled from depths of two to six feet. (T-3 p. 97) Government Approvals. In July, 1984, the City approved Centervillage's request for a Planned Unit Development (P.U.D.) to allow the Property to be developed as a shopping center to be constructed in three phases. Each phase of construction was to involve 50,000 square feet of retail space. (App. Ex. G, G-1) In December, 1984, the City approved an amendment to the previously approved P.U.D., to add additional property and to expand the size of the development by the addition of approximately 20,000 square feet of retail space. (App. Ex. G, G-2) In January, 1988, Centervillage received rezoning approval from the P.U.D. to Commercial Parkway, limited use site plan (CP zoning). (App. Ex. G, G-3; T-3 pp. 25-26) The limited use site plan outlines, among other things, the limited access to the Property and the reestablishment of the canopy road on portions of Centerville Road which abut the property. (App. Ex. G, G-3) In May, 1988, the City approved Centervillage's application for minor subdivision approval. This minor subdivision approval established one parcel as the previously developed mini-warehouse site to the east of the Property and the other parcel as the Property as it currently exists except for 2.79 acres on Capital Circle which had not been acquired at that time. (App. Ex. G, G-4) In October, 1988, the City granted a separate minor subdivision approval which addressed the additional 2.79 acres. (Minor subdivision approval, dated October 26, 1988, signed by Donny Brown, Development Coordinator for the City.) The parcel containing the mini-warehouse facility was sold in 1986, and is no longer part of the Property. (T-1 pp. 37-38) On July 22, 1988, the DER issued an environmental permit to Centervillage. (App. Ex. E, E-9) This permit was a result of extensive negotiations between DER and Centervillage and also involved the County because of the County's own permitting problems with the road improvement Project. (T-1 pp. 63-65) This DER permit specifies that the "permit does not convey any vested rights." (App. Ex. E, E-9, paragraph 3) On August 17, 1988, the County issued Environmental Management Permit #88-0299 to Centervillage. This permit was for "earth work only" and specified that "stormwater runoff [would] be required upon final development plans." (App. Ex. E, E-1) On October 25, 1988, the County accepted Centervillage's hydrological analysis on the Property. (App. Ex. E, E-3) On December 5, 1988, Centervillage received notification from the County that the project site was exempt from site plan review. (App. Ex. E, E- 9) Currently, there is not a city-approved site plan for the Centervillage project. (T-3 p. 115) On May 3, 1989, the County issued Environmental Permit #89-0230. This permit reflects approval of an additional of 630,000 square feet of impervious surface to the site. Centervillage's application for this permit also lists the proposed use of the Property as "M-1 mini-warehouses and CP shopping center." (App. Ex. E, E-5) Centervillage began its construction of the majority of current site improvements in June of 1989. (T-1 p. 30) In meetings between Centervillage and the City it was never confirmed that the approval of an additional 630,000 square feet of impervious surface on the site was a valid assumption. (T-3 p. 138) The County issued two additional environmental permits in 1989, one for tree removal (App. Ex. E, E-6) and one for stormwater permit amendments. (App. Ex. E, E-7) In March, 1990, the County issued an additional environmental permit for tree removal. (App. Ex. E, E-8) In January and in June, 1990, the Florida Department of Transportation (DOT) issued two separate drainage connection permits to Centervillage. (App. Ex. E, E-10, E-11) Until October, 1990, the County performed the environmental regulatory services for both the County and the City. (T-3 p. 56) At the time the County issued the environmental permits described in this Final Order, there was no City of Tallahassee Environmental Ordinance. (T- 3 pp. 73-74) At the time the County issued the environmental permits described in this Final Order, the County Chief of Environmental Management regularly appeared before the Tallahassee City Commission as part of his duties in issuing environmental permits for property within the City. (T-3 p. 56) At the time the County environmental permits described in this Final Order were issued to Centervillage, the City would look to a County environmental permit before issuing a building permit. (T-3 p. 74) At the November 26, 1990, hearing in this case, the Chief of Environmental Management for the County testified that he knew of no specific resolution or ordinance that granted environmental permitting authority within city limits to the County. (T-3 pp. 74-75) However, the testimony at the November 26, 1990, hearing in this case establishes that the City relied on the County's environmental permitting in making its own permitting decisions. (T-3 pp. 56, 73-75) In practice and effect, the County was acting on behalf of the City in granting local environmental permits. (T-3 pp. 73-80) The County has never been delegated the authority to make land use decisions, such as subdivision approvals, for property within the City. (T-3 pp. 74-76) The rezoning of the Property from P.U.D. to CP Zoning, approved by the City in January, 1988, provided no specific approval of densities and intensities for development of the Centervillage project. (T-3 pp. 130-132) When Centervillage requested rezoning of the Property from P.U.D. in January, 1988, its managing general partner assumed that as part of the approved zoning change it received approval for the same density and intensity of development that existed under the P.U.D. (T-3 p. 125) The Conceptual Agreement. In early 1986, the County was in the process of attempting to widen and improve Centerville Road. (T-1 p. 28) During this construction by the County, the DER asserted jurisdiction over the road project and the construction was stalled because the County did not have adequate property on which to construct facilities for the storage and treatment of stormwater runoff generated by the road construction project. (T-3 pp. 70-71, 82-84) During the initial rezoning and permitting process, Centervillage was required to address the effects of prior improper development activity engaged in on a portion of the Property by previous owners. As a result of the prior improper development on the Property, Centervillage was required to mitigate against flooding problems and to facilitate revegetation of a denuded canopy road segment along Centerville Road. (T-3 p. 52) On April 11, 1986, James G. Parrish, Administrator for the County, presented Centervillage with a conceptual agreement whereby, among other things, Centervillage agreed to grant necessary easements to the County for the construction of a drainage ditch on the Property to accept and store stormwater runoff from the County's Centerville Road improvement project. (App. Ex. G, G- 6) During 1986, the County and Centervillage cooperated through a series of permitting contacts specific to the development of a shopping center, to establish a major regional water management facility, to provide water management for the Centerville Road project, and to engage in cooperative efforts to reforest the canopy road. (T-3 pp. 52-53) These cooperative permitting contacts included contacts with the DER. (T-3 p. 53) The conceptual agreement was finally formalized and adopted by the Leon County Commission on July 18, 1989. (App. Ex. G, G-8) In this agreement, Centervillage obligated itself to acquire additional property, construct a stormwater management facility and to convey the completed facility to the County. (App. Ex. G, G-8) In the formalized conceptual agreement, the County agreed to fully cooperate in the efforts of Centervillage to obtain all permits necessary to complete all improvements in accordance with the DER permit issued to Centervillage in July, 1988. (App. Ex. G, G-8) The formalized conceptual agreement further provides that the County will not require any additional stormwater retention or detention above that required by the County environmental permit issued to Centervillage previously. (App. Ex. G, G-8) The agreement also provides that the County will allow Centervillage to develop the southwest portion of the Property, fronting Capital Circle Northeast and Centerville Road," to its fullest commercial potential, subject only to existing zoning ordinances, terms and conditions of the limited use site plan, approval of subsequent short-term applications for environmental management permits, and Leon County Environmental Permit number 88-0299." This portion of the agreement also provides that the property will no longer be "protected from development." (App. Ex. G, G-8, paragraph 8) Centervillage is obligated, pursuant to the agreement, to convey in excess of 7 acres of property and the drainage ditch area for no additional consideration. (T-3 pp. 85-86) Absent the agreement of Centervillage to provide stormwater drainage and retention on the Property and to convey that portion of the Property to the County, the County could not have completed the Centerville Road improvement project. (T-3 pp. 70-71) Centervillage's agreement to donate land to the County was tied to the DER permits issued to both Centervillage and the County. (T-1 p. 41) Centervillage's agreement to provide the 7.57 acre stormwater facility to the County was a required condition in connection with the issuance of the environmental management permit issued by the County. (T-3 p. 88) The City was privy to the conceptual agreement between Centervillage and the County from the development stages through to its final, formal approval by the County Commission in July 1989. The plans for the stormwater facility were discussed with and reviewed by the City, with the understanding that the city would accept and maintain the facilities. (T-3 pp. 86-87) During these discussion with City personnel, there was no indication given that the agreement included land use decisions. (T-3 pp. 90-91) The 7.57 acre stormwater facility serves more than the development area. The facility is a major component of the total drainage system for the City of Tallahassee. (T-3 p. 88) The size of the 7.57 acre stormwater facility is not directly related to the Centervillage development proposal. (T-3 p. 90) Development Expenses. The cost of purchasing the original tract was $1,812,012.00. Centervillage has since sold a portion of the original tract for $738,282.00. Centervillage's net land costs for the Property are $1,073,730.00. (App. Ex. C, C-1) Centervillage incurred costs of $175,000.00 in purchasing land pursuant to the conceptual agreement with the County. (T-3 pp. 123-126) Other than the $175,000.00 expended pursuant to the conceptual agreement, the balance of costs of purchase of land were not incurred in reliance on any act or omission of the City. Interest and property taxes paid by Centervillage were $1,279,753.30. (App. Ex. C, C-1) No significant portion of the costs attributed to interest and property taxes were incurred in reliance on any act or omission of the City. Centervillage incurred $543,624.50 in costs associated with site work, clearing, and landscaping on the Property. Significant portions of these costs were incurred beginning in June, 1989. (T-1 pp. 30-31) These costs were substantially incurred after Centervillage had engaged in extensive negotiations with state and local government entities and after permits were issued by the state DER and DOT as well as environmental permits issued by the County. At the time the County issued these permits it was, in practice and effect, acting on behalf of the City. These negotiations, agreements, permits and approvals are outlined in the Government Approvals portion of this Final Order. Centervillage has established that it expended well in excess of $400,000.00 on testing, inspection, soil investigation, engineer and survey fees, architectural fees, legal and title fees and general development expenses associated with the development of the Property. (App. Ex. C, C-1) Centervillage has proved that a significant portion of these "soft costs" were expanded during the period it engaged in extensive negotiations with and after Centervillage obtained permits and approvals from the various state and local government entities as outlined in the Government Approvals portion of this Final Order. Centervillage would not have made the large expenditure of funds, or made the commitment to convey significant portions of the property to the County pursuant to the Conceptual Agreement if it had not obtained the zoning approvals and environmental permits that were necessary to construct a community size shopping center of approximately 200,000 square feet. (T-1 pp. 68-70; T-3 pp. 127-128) The evidence in this case establishes that Centervillage reasonably relied on the approvals and environmental permits it obtained from state and local governments, as well as on the conceptual agreement between Centervillage and the County in changing its position and in incurring substantial costs associated with the development of the Property. Current Status of the Development. Centervillage took a site that was a drainage way, added properties to it, accomplished an enormous amount of permitting and fill work to come up with a fairly level buildable site suitable for building anything allowed within the zoning and the Comprehensive Plan. (T-1 p. 18) The shopping center project has been pursued by Centervillage for the past several years. Centervillage has never proposed any alternative plans to the City or other governmental authorities in the history of its project. (T-3 pp. 57-60, 82; T-1 pp. 17-18) Environmental Management Permit #89-0230, issued on May 3, 1989, by the County, contemplated approval of the addition of 630,000 square feet of impervious surface to the Property. (App. Ex. E) Centervillage relied on this approval and incurred substantial costs in proceeding with the further development of the Property. At the hearing on November 26, 1990, Centervillage presented the testimony of Richard Moore, a licensed professional engineer. (T-3 p. 94) Mr. Moore has been involved with the Centervillage project for seven years. (T-3 p. 95) Mr. Moore testified that he prepared a layout based on several planning concepts on engineering design and determined that 630,000 square feet of impervious surface allowed 200,000 square feet of gross leasable space and allowed the development of adequate parking with good internal circulation and sufficient green areas to allow for aesthetic landscaping. (T-3 pp. 106-107) Mr. Moore further testified that this square footage ratio is on average with design standards accepted in the engineering community. (T-3 p. 107) According to Mr. Moore's testimony, if Centervillage is required to meet consistency and concurrency requirements of the 2010 Comprehensive Plan, the shopping center development could be limited or delayed because the Property is located on a constrained roadway. (T-3 pp. 103-106) The DOT and the City have scheduled widening of Capital Circle, on which the Centervillage Property fronts, for 1991. (T-3 pp. 109-110) However, based upon Mr. Moore's testimony, Centervillage has established that constrained roadway limitations could limit or delay the project under the 2010 Comprehensive Plan despite the current improvement schedule. According to Mr. Moore's testimony, under the 2010 Comprehensive Plan, the proximity of the Property to Centerville Road, a canopy road, could limit the development of a shopping center to 100,000 square feet of leasable space. (T-3 pp. 103-104) As of July 16, 1990, the date of adoption of the City of Tallahassee Vesting Ordinance, the stormwater facilities on the Property were not complete. Additional water treatment facilities must still be constructed for runoff from the site. (T-3 pp. 19-21) No roadways, water and sewer services or electrical services have been constructed on site. (T-3 p. 108)
Findings Of Fact Background The Parties Respondent, City of Hialeah (City), is a local governmental unit subject to the land use planning requirements of Chapter 163, Florida Statutes. That chapter is administered by respondent, Department of Community Affairs (DCA). The DCA is charged with the responsibility of reviewing comprehensive plans and amendments thereto. Petitioners, Edmond J. Gong and Dana L. Clay (petitioners), reside in Coconut Grove, Florida and own at least two parcels of property within the City. The parties have stipulated that petitioners are affected persons within the meaning of the law and have standing to challenge the remedial amendment in issue here. The Nature of the Dispute In 1991 and 1992, the City adopted three sets of land use amendments to its comprehensive plan known as amendments 91-1, 91-2 and 92-1. Each set of amendments generated objections by the DCA, and the matters were later sent to the Division of Administrative Hearings and were assigned Case Nos. 91-6340GM, 92-3113GM and 92-7517GM, respectively. Petitioners did not participate in any of these proceedings. To resolve the objections raised by the DCA, the City and DCA negotiated a stipulated settlement agreement in December 1993, which was executed by the City on January 28, 1994. Pursuant to that agreement, on April 21, 1994, the City adopted a remedial amendment (Ordinance 94-27) known as amendment 94R-1. After reviewing the amendment, on June 2, 1994, the DCA issued a cumulative notice of intent to find such amendment in compliance. On June 7, 1994, the South Florida Regional Planning Council also found the amendment to be in compliance. Finally, on July 11, 1994, the DCA's motion to dismiss Case Nos. 91-6340GM, 92-3113GM and 92-7517GM was granted. Petitioners, who participated in the local hearings concerning the adoption of amendment 94R-1, timely filed their petition for administrative hearing on June 23, 1994, challenging the propriety of that amendment for various reasons. The petition was assigned Case No. 94-3506GM. Although petitioners failed to plead any procedural issues in the initial petition, respondents have agreed that petitioners may raise certain procedural objections regarding amendment 94R-1 since the procedural issues were raised in their objections and comments filed with the City during the adoption process of the amendment. Procedurally, petitioners argue that the local government did not comply with all statutory requirements in noticing its proposed approval of the settlement stipulation and its later intent to adopt an ordinance. As to the DCA, petitioners argue that the state agency did not comply with the law in publishing its cumulative notice of intent on June 2, 1994, and that the notice contained erroneous rule citations and lacked a geographical map. Substantively, petitioners complain that before final approval of amendment 94R- 1 was given, the local government and DCA did not consider the enactment of Chapter 94-338, Laws of Florida, which created a multijurisdictional tourism, sports and entertainment special district known as the Blockbuster Park Special District, and they did not consider the traffic impacts of a recently opened connector to Interstate 75 and an interchange within the City that connects traffic from the connector to the Florida Turnpike. Finally, they contend that the amendment improperly redesignated more than ten acres of land from residential to commercial land use. Amendments 91-1, 91-2 and 92-1 involve ten amendments to the plan, all originally found not to be in compliance by the DCA. To cure three of those deficiencies, the City rescinded three ordinances leaving seven plan amendments to be remediated. Petitioners challenge the validity of these seven amendments but none change the use on their property. In reality, though, petitioners rely principally on their procedural objections in seeking to have a determination made that the amendment is not in compliance. Were the Notice Requirements Met? After the DCA and City reached an agreement in principle to resolve the DCA's objections to the plan amendments, a settlement agreement was prepared for execution by the City's mayor and DCA Secretary. Before the mayor could sign the agreement, however, the City Council's approval and authorization were required. Such approval and authorization to sign the agreement came in the form of a resolution adopted at a public hearing held on January 25, 1994. The agreement was later signed by the mayor and DCA Secretary on January 28 and March 3, 1994, respectively. The City had originally intended to consider the item at its January 11, 1994 meeting. Timely publication of notice was given for that meeting on December 27, 1993, in the regular edition of The Miami Herald, a newspaper of general paid circulation published daily in Dade County. At the January 11 meeting, however, the City discussed the matter but then deferred final action on the item until its next meeting on January 25, 1994. Accordingly, it republished a notice of its January 25 meeting in the Zone 4 Northwest Neighbors section of the Herald. The Zone 4 Northwest Neighbors section is an insert in the Herald each Thursday and Sunday and contains news pertaining to the northwest portion of Dade County, including the City. Because all copies of the Herald delivered and sold in northwest Dade County contain this particular Neighbors insert, the City complied with the requirement that the advertisement be published in a newspaper of general paid circulation within the jurisdiction of the City. Since petitioners reside and work outside of northwest Dade County, they say they did not receive the Neighbors insert in their paper and thus they were not aware of the January 25 hearing. There is no requirement, however, that the advertisement be published in other parts of Dade County. It is noted that even though they should have received notice of the January 11 hearing through the advertisement published in the regular edition of the Herald on December 27, 1993, they did not attend the hearing. The four-inch notice published on page 15 of the January 16, 1994 edition of the Neighbors section reads as follows: At its regular meeting of January 25, 1994, the Hialeah City Council will consider the following Resolution in addition to other business. Members of the public are invited to attend; the meeting begins at 7:00 p.m. at Hialeah City Hall, 501 Palm Avenue, Hialeah, Florida. RESOLUTION OF THE MAYOR AND CITY COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF HIALEAH, FLORIDA, AUTHORIZING THE MAYOR TO ENTER A STIPULATED SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT IN CASE NOS. 91-6340GM, 92-3113GM AND 92-7517GM, ENTITLED "DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITY AFFAIRS VS. CITY OF HIALEAH" NOW CONSOLIDATED BEFORE THE STATE OF FLORIDA DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS FOR TRANSMITTAL TO THE FLORIDA DEPART- MENT OF COMMUNITY AFFAIRS. Applicable state law (s. 163.3184(16), F.S.) called for the notice to be published at least ten days prior to the hearing. In addition, general provision 3 of the settlement agreement provided in part as follows: This agreement has been approved by the governing body at a public hearing advertised in an adver- tisement published at least 10 but not more than 15 days prior to the hearing in the format prescribed for advertisements in Section 163.3184(15)(c) and Section 163.3187. Assuming the day of the hearing is not counted in computing the ten days, the City would have had to publish the notice by Saturday, January 15, 1994, in order to meet the ten-day requirement. Because the Neighbors section was not published on Saturdays, but rather only on Thursdays and Sundays, the City opted to publish the notice on Sunday, January 16, 1994, or just nine days before the hearing. This was necessary since the item was deferred at the January 11 hearing, and the City presumably was unable to meet the deadline for having an ad published only two days later in the Thursday, January 13, 1994 edition of Neighbors. Even so, petitioners were unable to show any prejudice by virtue of the City failing to meet the ten-day notice requirement. The settlement agreement called for the City to adopt certain remedial amendments by ordinance. These amendments are contained in Ordinance No. 94-27. Although state law (s. 163.3184(16)(d), F. S.) requires that the City hold only one advertised public hearing on a compliance amendment at the adoption stage, in accordance with the City Charter, two hearings were scheduled for that purpose on March 22 and April 12, 1994. A single one-quarter page advertisement in the regular edition of the Herald was published on March 17, 1994, or five days before the first hearing. The law (s. 163.3184(15)(b)2., F. S.) also requires that the hearing be "approximately 5 days after the day that the second (i. e., adoption stage) advertisement is published." The advertisement referred to both hearing dates and noted that their purpose was "to receive comments from interested parties on the Stipulated Settlement Agreement between the City of Hialeah and the Florida Department of Community Affairs related to the 1990 and 1991 Cycles I and II plan amendments to Hialeah's Comprehensive Plan." The advertisement also contained a list of the ten plan amendments and a map showing the portion of the City affected by each of those amendments. Although petitioners contended that the map was illegible in some respects, they nonetheless read the notice in the newspaper and attended both hearings to voice their objections to the ordinance. Notwithstanding petitioners' objections, on April 12, 1994, the City adopted the ordinance. Contrary to petitioners' assertion, the City complied with the notice requirements for both hearings. Assuming arguendo that the statutory notice requirements were not strictly met, petitioners failed to demonstrate that they were prejudiced by such an error. After reviewing the ordinance, on June 2, 1994, the DCA published in the Neighbors section of the Herald a cumulative notice of intent to find the plan amendments and remedial plan amendment in compliance. The advertisement was one-quarter page in size, identified the plan amendments in issue, advised readers that the amendments were in compliance, gave a location where such amendments and comments could be reviewed, and offered a point of entry to affected persons. Therefore, its content was sufficient to inform the public of the action being taken. The DCA concedes that in the notice, however, it cited rule 9J-11.012(8) as the provision dealing with the contents of a petition to challenge the amendments found to be in compliance when in fact the correct citation should have been rule 9J-11.012(7). There is no section (8) in the rule. The notice also cited former rule 22I-6.010 as the rule dealing with intervention when in fact that rule has been renumbered as rule 60Q-2.010. Even so, petitioners were unable to show how they were prejudiced by these minor errors, especially since they knew the nature of the action being proposed by the DCA, and they timely filed their petition for hearing to challenge the amendment. The DCA policy is to publish its notice of intent to find an amendment in compliance in the same local newspaper as the local government uses for its publication. The DCA also pointed out that by advertising in the Neighbors section as opposed to the regular edition of the Herald, it saved several thousand dollars. Therefore, the DCA used the Neighbors section of the Herald. At the same time, the DCA has never included in its advertisement a map showing the location of the land use changes being proposed. This is because the local government advertisements have already included a map, and the DCA notice is simply for the purpose of advising the public which ordinances are in or out of compliance. In the absence of any showing of prejudice, and in view of petitioners' failure to demonstrate to the exclusion of fair debate that the plan amendment as a whole is incompatible with, does not further or take action in the direction of realizing, the goals of the law, the cited procedural errors are insufficient to support a finding that amendment 94R-1 is not in compliance. The plan amendment Since 1986, petitioners have owned two parcels of undeveloped property in the southern one-half and northwestern one-quarter of Tract 24 of Section 28, which is located in the western part of the City. The property consists of approximately six acres located at the northeastern intersection of West 76th Street and the Hialeah-Hialeah Gardens Boulevard. The property has been designated on the future land use map as low density (single-family) residential, which allows up to twelve units per acre. Petitioners have not specifically pled or shown how amendment 94R-1 adversely affects their property. Instead, they simply argue that the plan amendment is not in compliance because the City did not consider the impacts of "drastically changed circumstances" before adopting the remedial ordinance, and the City improperly reclassified a small tract of land. These claims will be considered below. Effective June 3, 1994, Chapter 94-338, Laws of Florida, became law. That law created a multijurisdictional tourism, sports and entertainment special district more commonly known as Blockbuster Park. That legislation, however, is not relevant to this proceeding for several reasons. First, there is no mechanism to consider multijurisdictional impacts in the local planning process. Second, the special act did not become law until after the amendment process here had been completed. Since the City was only required to consider the best available data present at the time the amendment was being reviewed and adopted, consideration of the special law was neither necessary or appropriate. Third, the act itself does not authorize a development. If and when a development order is approved, the City can update its plan to take into account any impacts from the project. As to the contention that the City and DCA failed to take into account the six-lane connector road completed on December 31, 1993, or two years after the plan amendments were adopted, the impact of the connector road is identified and discussed on pages 21 and 23C of the future land use element contained in the remedial amendments. At hearing, it was further explained that the connector road is a limited access regional road under the control of Dade County, and not the City. This means that there is no access to the connector from properties which front on the road, and local access will be limited to three major road intersections. No land use changes along the road have been proposed, and the City has adequately addressed the circulation map requirements in the plan and how the internal circulation routes would be compatible with the major connectors. This being so, it is found that the City and DCA gave adequate planning consideration to the connector. Finally, petitioners contended that certain land was improperly redesignated from single-family residential to multi-family and commercial use. They complain that this is inappropriate since the land is close to a school and does not lie near a major intersection. The evidence shows, however, that such redesignation was appropriate since the land is located at an intersection and lies just across the street from an existing five-acre commercial tract. Moreover, the multi-family part of the tract will serve as a buffer between the commercial use at the intersection and the existing single-family use to the south. Then, too, the proximity of a nearby school to the west will serve to reduce trip time for persons shopping in the area while dropping off or picking up children from the school. Finally, some types of commercial use in residential neighborhoods can serve valid planning purposes, and the City has already established a pattern of having some schools located near commercially designated property. The redesignation is found to be reasonable and based on appropriate planning considerations. Although no proof was submitted by petitioners regarding any other parts of the plan amendment, respondents demonstrated that all remaining parts are supported by adequate data and analysis and are in compliance. Accordingly, petitioners have failed to prove to the exclusion of fair debate that remedial amendment 94R-1 is not in compliance.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Community Affairs enter a final order determining the City of Hialeah comprehensive plan amendment to be in compliance. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of October, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of October, 1994. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 94-3506GM Petitioners: 1-2. Partially accepted in finding of fact 2. 3. Partially accepted in finding of fact 3. 4-20. Partially accepted in findings of fact 5-8. 21-24. Partially accepted in findings of fact 9. Partially accepted in findings of fact 10 and 11. Partially accepted in finding of fact 4. 27-29. Covered in preliminary statement. Rejected as irrelevant. Rejected as unnecessary. 32-35. Rejected as irrelevant. 36-38. Partially accepted in finding of fact 6. 39-41. Partially accepted in finding of fact 11. 42. Rejected as unnecessary. Respondent DCA: 1-12. Covered in preliminary statement. 13. Partially accepted in finding of fact 1. 14. Partially accepted in findings of fact 2 and 13. 15. Partially accepted in finding of fact 1. 16-19. Partially accepted in findings of fact 6-8. 20-22. Partially accepted in finding of 9. 23-25. Partially accepted in findings of fact 10 and 11. 26. Partially accepted in finding of fact 6. 27. Partially accepted in finding of fact 11. 28. Partially accepted in finding of fact 6. 29-30. Partially accepted in finding of fact 10. 31-55. Partially accepted in findings of fact 13-17. Respondent City: Because the City's proposed recommended order was not timely filed, the undersigned has considered the contents of the proposed order but has not made specific rulings on each proposed finding of fact. See Sunrise Community, Inc. v. DHRS, 14 F.A.L.R. 5162 (DHRS, 1992), affirmed 619 So.2d 30 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1993). Note: Where a proposed finding has been partially accepted, the remainder has been rejected as being irrelevant, not supported by the more credible, persuasive evidence, subordinate, or unnecessary to the resolution of the issues. COPIES FURNISHED: Mr. Edmond J. Gong Ms. Dana L. Clay 6161 Blue Lagoon Drive, Suite 370 Miami, FL 33126 Terrell K. Arline, Esquire 2740 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, FL 32399-2100 William M. Grodnick, Esquire 501 Palm Avenue, 4th Floor Hialeah, FL 33010 Linda Loomis Shelley, Secretary Department of Community Affairs 2740 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, FL 32399-2100 Dan R. Stengle, Esquire General Counsel Department of Community Affairs 2740 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, FL 32399-2100
The Issue Whether the Petitioner is eligible for relocation assistance benefits pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 4601 et seq. (P.L. 91-646) and the Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970.
Recommendation Application for relocation assistance benefits by Mrs. Marie Lewis Mims be denied. DONE and ORDERED this 14th day of December, 1976 in Tallahassee, Florida. DELPHENE C. STRICKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: William Guy Davis, Jr., Esquire 700 Brent Building Post Office Box 12950 Pensacola, Florida 32576 George L. Waas, Esquire Office of Legal Operations Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Joseph A. Alfes Chief of Right-of-Way Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304
The Issue The issues in each case are whether, pursuant to Sections 489.141 and 489.143, Florida Statutes (2003), a claimant is entitled to payment from the Construction Industries Recovery Fund, and, if so, whether, pursuant to Section 489.143(7), Florida Statutes (2003), Respondent may automatically suspend the residential contractor's license of Petitioner until Petitioner reimburses Respondent for the paid claim.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is licensed as a certified residential contractor, holding license number CRC 013599. Respondent first issued a residential contractor's license to Petitioner in 1978, and Petitioner has been continually licensed since that time. Petitioner has never been disciplined by Respondent or any local governmental agency. On January 29, 2004, Respondent transmitted to the Division of Administrative Hearings seven files containing administrative complaints alleging disciplinary breaches against Petitioner for many of the transactions covered in the nine subject cases. These seven new cases have not yet been heard, and Respondent has not yet entered any restitution orders against Petitioner. In the past, Petitioner has placed his residential contractor's license with various corporations to qualify them to perform residential construction. In February 1999, Petitioner met with Lori Thomson, president of Thomson Homes, Inc., to discuss placing his license with her residential construction company. Now inactive, Thomson Homes, Inc., had been in the residential construction business since at least 1994, operating out of an office in Palm Beach County, which is also the location of all but one of the residential construction jobs that are the subject of these cases. Since 1994, Thomson Homes, Inc., had used the general contractor's license of Ms. Thomson's husband, Steven Thomson, to qualify to perform residential construction. During the time that his license qualified Thomson Homes, Inc., Mr. Thomson believed that he and his wife owned the corporation equally and that she served as the president and he served as the vice-president. In the summer of 1998, Mr. Thomson filed for divorce from Ms. Thomson. In February 1999, Ms. Thomson fired Mr. Thomson from Thomson Homes, Inc. Shortly thereafter, Mr. Thomson learned that Ms. Thomson had caused all of the stock to be issued to her when the corporation was formed, and that she had assumed all of the officer and director positions. In early March 1999, Mr. Thomson cancelled all of the building permits that he had obtained on behalf of Thomson Homes, Inc., and withdrew his general contractor's license from Ms. Thomson's corporation, effective March 20, 1999. When Mr. Thomson withdrew his license from Thomson Homes, Inc., it was in the process of building or preparing to build about ten homes. At no time during Petitioner's discussions with Ms. Thomson was he aware that Thomson Homes, Inc., was actively involved in construction. Eventually, Ms. Thomson and Petitioner agreed that Petitioner would place his residential contractor's license with Thomson Homes, Inc., and would supervise the corporation's construction activities. In return, Thomson Homes, Inc., would pay Petitioner $500 weekly and 35 percent of the profits. After filing the necessary documentation in April 1999, Petitioner qualified Thomson Homes, Inc. effective April 22 or 26, 1999. Petitioner advised Ms. Thomson that he had other work to do for another month, so he could not start with Thomson Homes, Inc. immediately. Ms. Thomson told him that she had to get financing arranged for several signed contracts and did not have any construction taking place at the time. The record is unclear whether this delay took place after the initial agreement between Petitioner and Ms. Thomson or after Petitioner formally placed his license with Thomson Homes, Inc. However, in either event, from the date that Petitioner formally placed his license with Thomson Homes, Inc., he never had a substantive conversation with Ms. Thomson about any construction activities of Thomson Homes, Inc. Not hearing from Ms. Thomson, Petitioner eventually called her to learn when he would start work. At first, Ms. Thomson took Petitioner's calls and kept explaining that the financing paperwork had been delayed. She promised to call Petitioner when construction was ready to proceed. However, Ms. Thomson never contacted Petitioner, and she later stopped taking or returning Petitioner's calls. In early August 1999, Petitioner called Thomson Homes, Inc., and learned that its telephone had been disconnected. He visited the office of Thomson Homes, Inc., but found it closed and the premises vacated. In fact, Thomson Homes, Inc., discontinued business on or about August 1, 1999. Between the date that Petitioner had qualified Thomson Homes and the point at which Thomson Homes ceased doing business, Thomson Homes, Inc., had entered into construction contracts, taken deposits and draws on construction loans, and performed residential construction--all unknown to Petitioner. Also unknown to Petitioner was the fact that Thomson Homes, Inc., had failed to perform its obligations under many, if not all, of its construction contracts during that period. The record is unclear when Petitioner withdrew his license from Thomson Homes, Inc. Petitioner sent Respondent a letter on August 30, 1999, advising of the withdrawal of his license from Thomson Homes, Inc. Later advised that he needed to file another form to effect the withdrawal, Petitioner did so in March 2000. The difference is not important in these cases. At no time did Petitioner receive any money from Thomson Homes, Inc., or any of the claimants who contracted with Thomson Homes, Inc. At no time did Petitioner enter into any contracts with any of the claimants. Only after Thomson Homes, Inc., had taken the claimants' money and abandoned work or failed to commence work did Petitioner learn that Thomson Homes, Inc., had done construction business under his license. DOAH Case No. 03-3540 involves the claim of Sandra Harvey. Ms. Harvey entered into a construction agreement with Thomson Homes, Inc., on September 9, 1998. Pursuant to the agreement, Ms. Harvey agreed to pay Thomson Homes, Inc., $25,500 for a lot and $115,260 for a home, which Thomson Homes, Inc., agreed to construct to "substantial completion" within 120 days from the date of slab pour. After pouring the slab, constructing the shell, and completing the rough plumbing, air conditioning, and electrical, Thomson Homes, Inc., stopped work on Ms. Harvey's home in early 1999. Ms. Harvey learned of the problem when Mr. Thomson called her in early 1999 and said that he could not finish the home because Ms. Thomson had taken over the business. This call probably took place no later than late March 1999, when Mr. Thomas withdrew as the qualifier for Thomson Homes, Inc. The record does not reveal the extent of payments from Ms. Harvey or her lender or the extent of completed work at the time that Thomson Homes, Inc., abandoned the job. Although the complaint is not part of this record, Ms. Harvey commenced a legal action against Thomson Homes, Inc., but not Petitioner. She obtained a default final summary judgment against Thomson Homes, Inc., on March 30, 2001, for a total sum of $46,267.32, including attorneys' fees, costs, and prejudgment interest. The judgment states, in part: Subsequent to entering into the above referenced contract, Defendant breached its contract by accepting Plaintiff's deposits and construction loan disbursements and thereafter abandoning the project and failing to pay subcontractors and/or materialmen for their labor, services and material provided. As a result of Defendant abandoning the project, Plaintiff was compelled to retain a new contractor to complete her home at an additional cost over and above the original contract amount. As a direct result of Defendant abandoning the project, the misapplication of construction funds and financial mismanagement Plaintiff has been forced to borrow additional funds from the construction lender. On May 3, 2001, Ms. Harvey filed a claim with the Construction Industries Recovery Fund (Recovery Fund). In response to a question asking if she had made a diligent effort to collect payment from the contractor, Ms. Harvey answered "yes," explaining she had "filed lawsuit." Ms. Harvey probably filed her claim within two years of when Thomson Homes, Inc., abandoned her job. By the end of March 1999, Mr. Thomson informed Ms. Harvey that his wife had fired him, so he could not work on her home anymore. A change in qualifier does not mean that Thomson Homes, Inc., would necessarily abandon the job, but, as noted in the Conclusions of Law, abandonment presumptively arises upon the expiration of 90 days without work. No work took place on Ms. Harvey's home after Mr. Thomson withdrew as qualifier, so presumptive abandonment took place by the end of June 1999--after May 3, 1999, which is two years prior to the date on which Ms. Harvey filed her claim. By letter dated June 5, 2001, from James Brogan of WEI Consulting Group to Ms. Harvey, Mr. Brogan states that he had investigated the assets of Thomson Homes, Inc. Mr. Brogan found no bankruptcy filing by Thomson Homes, Inc., in Bankruptcy Court in the Southern District of Florida. Thomson Homes, Inc., was a party to 282 legal actions and owed tangible personal property taxes on furniture in a model home, but the furniture was no longer available. On February 28, 2003, Respondent issued an Order approving Ms. Harvey's claim of $25,000 against the Recovery Fund and automatically suspending Petitioner's license until he reimburses the Recovery Fund for the full amount of the paid claim. The Order, copies of which were served on all parties, states that Ms. Harvey is the Petitioner, the Recovery Fund is a Respondent, and "Larry Shimkus, d/b/a Thomson Homes, Inc.," is a Respondent. The Order advises that "you" may seek a formal hearing, pursuant to Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes, if material facts are in dispute. On March 17, 2003, Petitioner filed a Petition for Section 120.57 Formal Administrative Hearing. The petition, which was served on Ms. Harvey and Respondent, contests the payment to Ms. Harvey and the automatic suspension of Petitioner's license. The petition contests the payment of Ms. Harvey's claim because she had made insufficient efforts to satisfy the judgment; she had failed to submit all required exhibits with her claim; her judgment is against Thomson Homes, Inc., and not Petitioner; her judgment does not find that Petitioner violated Section 489.129(1)(g), (j), or (k), Florida Statutes; and Ms. Thomson deceived Petitioner in violation of Section 489.132, Florida Statutes. Additionally, the petition contests the automatic suspension because the payment to Ms. Harvey is not authorized, her claim is incomplete, and her judgment is not against Petitioner. Lastly, the petition seeks attorneys' fees under Section 57.111, Florida Statutes. DOAH Case No. 03-3541 involves the claim of John and Kathleen Whitesides. The Whitesides, who lived at the time in Juno Beach, Florida, entered into a construction contract with Thomson Homes, Inc., on February 7, 1999. Pursuant to the agreement, the Whitesides agreed to pay Thomson Homes, Inc., $154,094 for a home, which Thomson Homes, Inc., agreed to construct to "substantial completion" within 120 days from the date of slab pour. After the Whitesides paid Thomson Homes, Inc., $5000 and secured a construction loan, Thomson Homes, Inc., never commenced construction. In a complaint filed April 3, 2000, the Whitesides commenced a legal action against Thomson Homes, Inc., but not Petitioner. The two-count complaint alleges a breach of contract, based on Thomson Homes' alleged "abandon[ment]" of the job "prior to any construction," and unjust enrichment, based on Thomson Homes' alleged receipt of funds and failure to complete construction. The Whitesides obtained a default final judgment against Thomson Homes, Inc., on December 21, 2000, for a total sum of $20,146.67, including attorneys' fees, costs, and prejudgment interest. The judgment states, in part: "Defendant is in breach of the Contract dated February 7, 1999, and has received unjust enrichment from Defendant's failure to fulfill the terms of the Contract to build a home for Plaintiffs." On August 9, 2001, David Tassell, the Whitesides' attorney in the circuit court action against Thomson Homes, Inc., stated, in an acknowledged statement, that he had performed "numerous" real property searches in Palm Beach and Martin counties' public records and determined that Thomas Homes, Inc., "owns no real property in Martin County." The omission of Palm Beach County in the statement is unexplained. Mr. Tassell's statement adds that he has retained a private investigator, who confirmed that Thomson Homes, Inc., owns no boats, planes, or automobiles. On August 10, 2001, the Whitesides filed a claim with the Recovery Fund. In response to a question asking if they had made a diligent effort to collect payment from the contractor, the Whitesides answered "yes," but did not supply an explanation in the following blank. The completed questionnaire accompanying the claim states that the Whitesides discovered the violation in September 1999 and that it occurred in July to August 1999. On September 17, 2002, Respondent issued an Order approving the Whitesides' claim of $18,526.67 against the Recovery Fund and automatically suspending Petitioner's license until he reimburses the Recovery Fund for the full amount of the paid claim. The Order, copies of which were served on all parties, states that the Whitesides are the Petitioners, the Recovery Fund is a Respondent, and "Larry Shimkus, d/b/a Thomson Homes, Inc.," is a Respondent. The Order advises that "you" may seek a formal hearing, pursuant to Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes, if material facts are in dispute. The Whitesides probably filed their claim within two years of when they reasonably should have discovered that Thomson Homes, Inc., had wrongfully failed to commence construction, as is required for reasons set forth in the Conclusions of Law. As noted in the Conclusions of Law, presumptive abandonment arose when Thomson Homes, Inc., after entering the contract, performed no work for 90 days. Six months elapsed from the signing of the contract to the date that is two years prior to the filing of the claim. Although the record is not well-developed on the point, it is more likely than not that due diligence did not require that the Whitesides discover the abandonment within the first 90 days after it had presumptively arisen. The Whitesides' judgment is probably based on a violation of Section 489.129(1)(g), (j), or (k), Florida Statutes, as is required for reasons set forth in the Conclusions of Law. Although the record is not well-developed on this point either, it is more likely than not that the judgment is based on Thomson Homes' abandonment after entering into the contract. The judgment does not state this basis explicitly, but the complaint, on which the judgment is based, alleges abandonment. On December 23, 2002, Petitioner filed a Petition for Section 120.57 Formal Administrative Hearing. The petition, which was served on Respondent and the Whitesides' attorney in the circuit court action against Thomson Homes, Inc., contests the payment to the Whitesides and the automatic suspension of Petitioner's license. The petition contests the payment of the Whitesides' claim because they did not file certified copies of the final judgment and levy and execution documents and their judgment did not find that Petitioner violated Section 489.129(1)(g), (j), or (k), Florida Statutes. Additionally, the petition contests the automatic suspension because Ms. Thomson deceived Petitioner in violation of Section 489.132, Florida Statutes; Petitioner received no notice of the hearing that resulted in the Order to pay the Whitesides and suspend Petitioner's license; the Whitesides' claim is incomplete; and the Whitesides' judgment is not against Petitioner. Lastly, the petition seeks attorneys' fees under Section 57.111, Florida Statutes. DOAH Case No. 03-3542 involves the claim of Richard and Kathleen Beltz. The Beltzes entered into a construction contract with Thomson Homes, Inc., on July 13, 1999. Pursuant to the agreement, the Beltzes agreed to pay Thomson Homes, Inc., $35,500 for a lot and $140,500 for a home, which Thomson Homes, Inc., agreed to construct to "substantial completion" within 120 days from the date of slab pour. After the Beltzes paid Thomson Homes, Inc., $17,283.70, Thomson Homes, Inc., never appeared at the closing, which had been scheduled for August 10, 1999. Nor did Thomson Homes, Inc., ever commence construction. The record does not disclose the extent, if any, to which Thomson Homes, Inc., completed construction. The Beltzes' discovery of Thomson Homes' failure to commence construction was hampered by the fact that they resided in California at the time. However, the Beltzes had obviously discovered the wrongful acts and omissions of Thomson Homes, Inc., by September 29, 1999, when they sent a letter to Petitioner demanding that he return the money that they had paid Thomson Homes, Inc. On October 19, 1999, the Beltzes signed a claim under the Recovery Fund, but the record contains no indication when the claim was filed. The completed questionnaire attached to the claim does not ask if the claimants had made a diligent effort to collect payment from the contractor. For reasons set forth in the Conclusions of Law, a claim must follow a judgment, so, the Beltzes could not file a valid claim until they had obtained a judgment. Two years from September 29, 1999, at which point the Beltzes obviously knew of a violation, requires that they file the claim, on an already- secured judgment, prior to September 29, 2001. In a complaint filed February 4, 2002, the Beltzes commenced a legal action against Thomson Homes, Inc., but not Petitioner. The two-count complaint alleges a breach of contract, based on Thomson Homes' alleged "abandon[ment]" of the job "prior to any construction" and "fail[ure] and refus[al] to pay subcontractors and/or materialmen which resulted in Claims of Liens against Plaintiffs [sic] residence, which Defendant has failed and refused to satisfy," and unjust enrichment, based on Thomson Homes' alleged receipt of funds and failure to complete construction and pay for goods and services provided by subcontractors and materialmen. The Beltzes obtained a default final summary judgment against Thomson Homes, Inc., on May 22, 2002, for a total sum of $23,280.20, including attorneys' fees, costs, and prejudgment interest. The judgment states, in part: Subsequent to entering into the above referenced contract, Defendant performed some work on the project. However, Defendant breached its contract by accepting deposits and construction loan disbursements and thereafter abandoning the project and failing to pay subcontractors and materialmen for their labor, services and material provided. As a result of Defendant failing to pay Lienors who provided labor, service and materials to Plaintiffs [sic] real property, Construction Liens were recorded against same, which Plaintiffs had to satisfy. As a result of Defendant abandoning the project, Plaintiffs were compelled to retain a new contractor to complete their home at an additional cost over and above the original contract amount. As a direct result of Defendant abandoning the project, failing to pay Lienors, the misapplication of construction funds and financial mismanagement, Plaintiffs were forced to borrow additional funds from their construction lender. By unacknowledged statement dated August 23, 2002, Ms. Beltz declared that someone at the Florida Department of State advised her that Thomson Homes, Inc., was administratively dissolved on September 24, 1999. She also declared that she had found on the internet two pieces of real property owned by Thomson Homes, Inc., but they had been transferred within the past year. Ms. Beltz stated that she searched the database of the "Department of Motor Vehicles in Palm Beach County" in May 2000 and found no vehicles or boats registered to Thomson Homes, Inc. Lastly, she reported that she contacted the "Federal Aviation Association" at an unspecified time and found no "airplanes" registered to Thomson Homes, Inc. On November 26, 2002, Respondent issued an Order approving the Beltzes' claim of $17,222.78 against the Recovery Fund and automatically suspending Petitioner's license until he reimburses the Recovery Fund for the full amount of the paid claim. The Order, copies of which were served on all parties, states that the Beltzes are the Petitioners, the Recovery Fund is a Respondent, and "Larry Shimkus, d/b/a Thomson Homes, Inc.," is a Respondent. The Order advises that "you" may seek a formal hearing, pursuant to Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes, if material facts are in dispute. On December 27, 2002, Petitioner filed a Petition for Section 120.57 Formal Administrative Hearing. The petition, which was served on the Beltzes and Respondent, contests the payment to the Beltzes and the automatic suspension of Petitioner's license. The petition contests the payment of the Beltzes' claim because they did not submit all of the necessary exhibits with their claim; their judgment is against Thomson Homes, Inc., and not Petitioner; and their judgment does not find that Petitioner violated Section 489.129(1)(g), (j), or (k), Florida Statutes. Additionally, the petition contests the automatic suspension because Ms. Thomson deceived Petitioner in violation of Section 489.132, Florida Statutes; the Beltzes' claim is incomplete; and the Beltzes' judgment is not against Petitioner. Lastly, the petition seeks attorneys' fees under Section 57.111, Florida Statutes. DOAH Case No. 03-3543 involves the claim of Keith and Karen Deyo. The Deyos entered into a construction contract with Thomson Homes, Inc., on October 31, 1998. Pursuant to the agreement, the Deyos agreed to pay Thomson Homes, Inc., $25,500 for a lot and $123,400 for a home, which Thomson Homes, Inc., agreed to construct to "substantial completion" within 120 days from the date of slab pour. Although the Deyos clearly suffered damages from the acts and omissions of Thomson Homes, Inc., the record does not disclose how much they paid the company, how much they had to pay unpaid suppliers and laborers, and how much construction the company completed before abandoning the job. Thomson Homes, Inc., began construction on the Deyos' home about 30-45 days after the parties signed the contract, but all work stopped in July 1999. In an undated complaint, the Deyos commenced a legal action against Thomson Homes, Inc., but not Petitioner. The two-count complaint alleges a breach of contract, based on Thomson Homes' alleged "abandon[ment] of the project prior to completion" and "fail[ure] and refus[al] to pay subcontractors and/or materialmen which resulted in Claims of Liens against Plaintiffs [sic] residence, which Defendant has failed and refused to satisfy," and unjust enrichment, based on Thomson Homes' alleged receipt of funds and failure to complete construction and pay for goods and services provided by subcontractors and materialmen. The Deyos obtained a final summary judgment against Thomson Homes, Inc., on March 15, 2000, for a total sum of $55,458.64, including attorneys' fees, costs, and prejudgment interest. The judgment states, in part: Subsequent to entering into the above referenced contract, Defendant partially performed work under the Contract. However, it breached its contract by accepting deposits and construction loan disbursements and thereafter abandoning the project and failing to pay subcontractors and materialmen for their labor, services and material provided. As a result of Defendant failing to pay lienors who provided labor, services and materials to Plaintiffs [sic] residence, construction liens were recorded against same, which Plaintiffs had to satisfy. As a result of Defendant abandoning the project, Plaintiffs were compelled to retain a new contractor to complete their home at an additional cost over and above the original contract amount. As a direct result of Defendant abandoning the project, failing to pay lienor's [sic], the misapplication of construction funds and financial mismanagement Plaintiffs have been forced to borrow additional funds from their construction lender. On April 27, 2000, the Deyos signed a claim under the Recovery Fund, but the record contains no indication when the claim was filed. A cover letter dated May 8, 2000, suggests that the Deyos mailed their claim a couple of weeks after signing it, so it was probably filed in mid-May 2000, although their questionnaire bears a revision date of November 2001, which would be beyond two years after the violation. In the questionnaire, the Deyos did not respond to the question asking if they had made a diligent effort to collect payment from the contractor. By an undated and unacknowledged statement, Mr. Deyo declared that someone at the Florida Department of State advised him that Thomson Homes, Inc., was administratively dissolved on September 24, 1999. He also declared that he had found on the internet two pieces of real property owned by Thomson Homes, Inc., but they had been transferred within the past year. Mr. Deyo stated that he searched the database of the "department of motor vehicles in Palm Beach County" in on April 14, 2000, and found no motor vehicles or boats registered to Thomson Homes, Inc. Lastly, he reported that he contacted the "Federal Aviation Association" on April 21, 2000, and found no "airplanes" registered to Thomson Homes, Inc. On January 22, 2003, Respondent issued an Order acknowledging the Deyos' claim of $55,458.64, approving the payment of the statutory limit of $25,000 against the Recovery Fund, and automatically suspending Petitioner's license until he reimburses the Recovery Fund for the full amount of the paid claim. The Order, copies of which were served on all parties, states that Mr. Deyo is the Petitioner, the Recovery Fund is a Respondent, and "Larry Shimkus, d/b/a Thomson Homes, Inc.," is a Respondent. The Order advises that "you" may seek a formal hearing, pursuant to Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes, if material facts are in dispute. On February 3, 2003, Petitioner filed a Petition for Section 120.57 Formal Administrative Hearing. The petition, which was served on Respondent and the Deyos' attorney who represented them in the action against Thomson Homes, Inc., contests the payment to the Deyos and the automatic suspension of Petitioner's license. The petition contests the payment of the Deyos' claim and suspension of Petitioner's license because Petitioner did not receive notice of the hearing at which Respondent entered the Order; the Deyos did not satisfy all requirements for payment from the Recovery Fund; their claim was not accompanied by certified copies of the levy and execution documents; their judgment is against Thomson Homes, Inc., and not Petitioner; their judgment does not find that Petitioner violated Section 489.129(1)(g), (j), or (k), Florida Statutes; and Ms. Thomson deceived Petitioner in violation of Section 489.132, Florida Statutes. Lastly, the petition seeks attorneys' fees under Section 57.111, Florida Statutes. DOAH Case No. 03-3544 involves the claim of Sylvia Reinhardt. Ms. Reinhardt entered into a construction contract with Thomson Homes, Inc., on October 14, 1998. Pursuant to the agreement, Ms. Reinhardt agreed to pay Thomson Homes, Inc., $45,000 for a lot and $147,150 for a home, which Thomson Homes, Inc., agreed to construct to "substantial completion" within 120 days from the date of slab pour. After Ms. Reinhardt paid Thomson Homes, Inc., $144,769, directly and indirectly, by way of her construction lender, the house was little more than half complete when Thomson Homes, Inc., abandoned the job. Thomson Homes also failed to pay various suppliers that filed liens, so Ms. Reinhardt had to pay $8550.41 to RTS Roofing, $882 to Palm Beach Garage Door, and $3421.32 to Woodworks, Inc. In an undated complaint filed in 1999 (actual date illegible), Ms. Reinhardt commenced a legal action against Thomson Homes, Inc., but not Petitioner. The two-count complaint alleges a breach of contract, based on Thomson Homes' alleged "abandon[ment]" of the job "prior to completion" and "fail[ure] and refus[al] to pay subcontractors and/or materialmen which resulted in Claims of Liens against Plaintiff's residence, which Defendant has failed and refused to satisfy," and unjust enrichment, based on Thomson Homes' alleged receipt of funds and failure to complete construction and pay for goods and services provided by subcontractors and materialmen. Ms. Reinhardt obtained a final summary judgment against Thomson Homes, Inc., on March 28, 2000, for a total sum of $61,471.15, including attorneys' fees, costs, and prejudgment interest. The judgment states, in part: Subsequent to entering into the above referenced contract, Defendant performed work under the Contract. However, it breached its contract by accepting deposits and construction loan disbursements and thereafter abandoning the project and failing to pay subcontractors and materialmen for their labor, services and materials provided. As a result of Defendant failing to pay lienors who provided labor, services and materials for the construction of Plaintiff's residence, construction liens were recorded against same, which Plaintiff had to satisfy. As a result of Defendant abandoning the project, Plaintiff was compelled to retain a new contractor to complete their [sic] home at an additional cost over and above the original contract amount. As a direct result of Defendant abandoning the project, failing to pay lienor's [sic], the misapplication of construction funds and financial mismanagement Plaintiff has been forced to borrow additional funds from her construction lender. On April 17, 2000, Ms. Reinhardt filed a claim with the Recovery Fund. In response to a question asking if she had made a diligent effort to collect payment from the contractor, Ms. Reinhardt answered "yes" and explained: "Telephone calls were unanswered. Certified mail requesting response were [sic] never answered. Our attorney made written and personal contact with the owner and there was no intention to pay." The claim states that the violation took place in July 1999. By acknowledged statement dated July 21, 2000, Ms. Reinhardt declared that she had completed a "reasonable search and inquiry" and had not found any property or assets against which to satisfy her judgment. Ms. Reinhardt stated that someone at the Florida Department of State advised her that Thomson Homes, Inc., was administratively dissolved on September 24, 1999. She also declared that she had found one parcel of property owned by Thomson Homes, Inc., and valued at $115,387, but this had been sold to "Joan Thomson" on February 1, 2000. Ms. Reinhardt stated that she had found tangible personal property worth $5000. She added that she had not found any motor vehicles registered with the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles, nor had she found anything registered with the "FAA." On November 26, 2002, Respondent issued an Order acknowledging Ms. Reinhardt's claim of $58,661.44, approving the payment of the statutory limit of $25,000 against the Recovery Fund, and automatically suspending Petitioner's license until he reimburses the Recovery Fund for the full amount of the paid claim. The Order, copies of which were served on all parties, states that Ms. Reinhardt is the Petitioner, the Recovery Fund is a Respondent, and "Larry Shimkus, d/b/a Thomson Homes, Inc.," is a Respondent. The Order advises that "you" may seek a formal hearing, pursuant to Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes, if material facts are in dispute. On December 24, 2002, Petitioner served a Petition for Section 120.57 Formal Administrative Hearing. The petition, which was served on Ms. Reinhardt and Respondent, contests the payment to Ms. Reinhardt and the automatic suspension of Petitioner's license. The petition contests the payment of Ms. Reinhardt's claim and suspension of Petitioner's license because Ms. Reinhardt did not submit certified copies of the levy and execution documents; her judgment is against Thomson Homes, Inc., and not Petitioner; her judgment does not find that Petitioner violated Section 489.129(1)(g), (j), or (k), Florida Statutes; and Ms. Thomson deceived Petitioner in violation of Section 489.132, Florida Statutes. Lastly, the petition seeks attorneys' fees under Section 57.111, Florida Statutes. DOAH Case No. 03-3545 involves the claim of Louis and Ann Mahoney. The Mahoneys entered into a construction contract with Thomson Homes, Inc., on June 28, 1999, for the construction of a home in Martin County. Pursuant to the agreement, the Mahoneys agreed to pay Thomson Homes, Inc., $32,000 for a lot and $149,000 for a home, which Thomson Homes, Inc., agreed to construct to "substantial completion" within 150 days from the date of slab pour. After the Mahoneys paid Thomson Homes, Inc., $14,500, directly and indirectly, by way of their construction lender, they suffered damages due to the acts and omissions of Thomson Homes, Inc., although, again, the record does not describe specifically how Thomson Homes caused them damage. In an undated complaint that bears no filing date, the Mahoneys commenced a legal action against Thomson Homes, Inc., but not Petitioner. The two-count complaint alleges a breach of contract, based on Thomson Homes' alleged "abandon[ment]" of the job "prior to completion" and "fail[ure] and refus[al] to pay subcontractors and/or materialmen which resulted in Claims of Liens against Plaintiffs [sic] residence, which Defendant has failed and refused to satisfy," and unjust enrichment, based on Thomson Homes' alleged receipt of funds and failure to complete construction and pay for goods and services provided by subcontractors and materialmen. The Mahoneys obtained a final summary judgment against Thomson Homes, Inc., on April 13, 2000, for a total sum of $43,084.49, including attorneys' fees, costs, and prejudgment interest. The judgment states, in part: Subsequent to entering into the above referenced contract, Defendant breached its contract by accepting Plaintiffs' deposits and construction loan disbursements and thereafter abandoning the project and failing to pay subcontractors and/or materialmen for their labor, and/or services provided. As a result of Defendant failing to pay lienor's [sic] who provided labor, services and materials for the construction of Plaintiffs [sic] residence, a construction lien was recorded against Plaintiffs' property, which Plaintiffs will have to satisfy. As a result of Defendant abandoning the project, Plaintiffs were compelled to retain a new contractor to complete their home at an additional cost over and above the original contract amount. As a direct result of Defendant abandoning the project, failing to pay lienor's [sic], the misapplication of construction funds and financial mismanagement Plaintiffs have been forced to borrow additional funds from their construction lender. On April 30, 2000, the Mahoneys signed a claim under the Recovery Fund. Although the claim form bears no filing date, the completed questionnaire attached to the claim was filed on May 3, 2000, so that is the likely filing date of the claim. In response to a question asking if they had made a diligent effort to collect payment from the contractor, the Mahoneys answered "yes" and explained: "This is explained in General Allegations, enclosed with this paperwork." Evidently, the reference is to a copy of the circuit court complaint. By acknowledged statement dated April 8, 2002, Mr. Mahoney declared that he had completed a "reasonable search and inquiry" and had not found any property or assets against which to satisfy his judgment. Mr. Mahoney stated that someone at the Florida Department of State advised him that Thomson Homes, Inc., was administratively dissolved on September 24, 1999. He also declared that an internet search had disclosed no property owned by Thomson Homes, Inc. Mr. Mahoney stated that the "department of motor vehicles in Palm Beach County" found no motor vehicles or boats registered to Thomson Homes, Inc., and that the "FAA" had found nothing registered to Thomson Homes, Inc. On February 28, 2003, Respondent issued an Order acknowledging the Mahoneys' claim of $38,185, approving the payment of the statutory limit of $25,000 against the Recovery Fund, and automatically suspending Petitioner's license until he reimburses the Recovery Fund for the full amount of the paid claim. The Order, copies of which were served on all parties, states that the Mr. Mahoney is the Petitioner, the Recovery Fund is a Respondent, and "Larry Shimkus, d/b/a Thomson Homes, Inc.," is a Respondent. The Order advises that "you" may seek a formal hearing, pursuant to Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes, if material facts are in dispute. On March 17, 2003, Petitioner served a Petition for Section 120.57 Formal Administrative Hearing. The petition, which was served on the Mahoneys and Respondent, contests the payment to the Mahoneys and the automatic suspension of Petitioner's license. The petition contests the payment of the Mahoneys' claim and suspension of Petitioner's license because they did not submit all of the required exhibits; their judgment is against Thomson Homes, Inc., and not Petitioner; their judgment does not find that Petitioner violated Section 489.129(1)(g), (j), or (k), Florida Statutes; and Ms. Thomson deceived Petitioner in violation of Section 489.132, Florida Statutes. Lastly, the petition seeks attorneys' fees under Section 57.111, Florida Statutes. DOAH Case No. 03-3546 involves the claim of Dennis and Carolyn DeStefanis. The DeStefanises entered into a construction contract with Thomson Homes, Inc., on April 7, 1999. Pursuant to the agreement, the DeStefanises agreed to pay Thomson Homes, Inc., $137,455 for a home, which Thomson Homes, Inc., agreed to construct to "substantial completion" within 150 days from the date of slab pour. After the DeStefanises paid Thomson Homes, Inc., $15,765, directly and indirectly, by way of their construction lender, Thomson Homes, Inc. never did any work, except to contract with a surveyor, who, unpaid, filed a claim of lien against the DeStefanises's lot. In an undated complaint bearing no filing date, the DeStefanises commenced a legal action against Thomson Homes, Inc., but not Petitioner. The two-count complaint alleges a breach of contract, based on Thomson Homes' alleged "abandon[ment]" of the job "prior to completion" and "fail[ure] and refus[al] to pay subcontractors and/or materialmen which resulted in Claims of Liens against Plaintiffs [sic] residence, which Defendant has failed and refused to satisfy," and unjust enrichment, based on Thomson Homes' alleged receipt of funds and failure to complete construction and pay for goods and services provided by subcontractors and materialmen. The DeStefanises obtained a final summary judgment against Thomson Homes, Inc., on March 15, 2000, for a total sum of $36,701.87, including attorneys' fees and costs. The judgment states, in part: Subsequent to entering . . . into the above referenced contract, Defendant, [sic] breached its contract by accepting Plaintiffs [sic] deposits and construction loan disbursements and thereafter abandoning the project. [sic] As a result of Defendant abandoning the project, Plaintiffs were compelled to retain a new contractor to complete their home at an additional cost over and above the original contract amount. As a direct result of Defendant abandoning the project, the misapplication of construction funds and financial mismanagement Plaintiffs have been forced to borrow additional funds from their construction lender. On April 19, 2000, the DeStefanises filed a claim with the Recovery Fund. In response to a question asking if they had made a diligent effort to collect payment from the contractor, the DeStefanises answered "yes" and explained: "Went to DBPR Investigative Services, hired Attorney Barry W. Taylor [attorney in circuit court action], got Final Summary Judgment against Thomson Homes, Inc." On March 20, 2003, Respondent issued an Order acknowledging the DeStefanises' claim of $34,965.52, approving the payment of $15,765 against the Recovery Fund, and automatically suspending Petitioner's license until he reimburses the Recovery Fund for the full amount of the paid claim. The Order, copies of which were served on all parties, states that the DeStefanises are the Petitioners, the Recovery Fund is a Respondent, and "Larry Shimkus, d/b/a Thomson Homes, Inc.," is a Respondent. The Order advises that "you" may seek a formal hearing, pursuant to Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes, if material facts are in dispute. On April 7, 2003, Petitioner filed a Petition for Section 120.57 Formal Administrative Hearing. The petition, which was served on the DeStefanises and Respondent, contests the payment to the DeStefanises and the automatic suspension of Petitioner's license. The petition contests the payment of the DeStefanises' claim and suspension of Petitioner's license because they did not submit all of the required exhibits; their judgment is against Thomson Homes, Inc., and not Petitioner; their judgment does not find that Petitioner violated Section 489.129(1)(g), (j), or (k), Florida Statutes; and Ms. Thomson deceived Petitioner in violation of Section 489.132, Florida Statutes. The petition contests the suspension of Petitioner's license on the additional ground that he was not the qualifier for Thomson Homes, Inc., when it and the DeStefanises entered into the construction contract. Lastly, the petition seeks attorneys' fees under Section 57.111, Florida Statutes. DOAH Case No. 03-3547 involves the claim of James and Donna Barr. The Barrs entered into a construction contract with Thomson Homes, Inc., on September 12, 1998. Pursuant to the agreement, the Barrs agreed to pay Thomson Homes, Inc., $30,000 for a lot and $140,900 for a home, which Thomson Homes, Inc., agreed to construct to "substantial completion" within 120 days from the date of slab pour. The Barrs paid Thomson Homes, Inc., $8500 in the form of a down payment. They or their construction lender paid Thomson Homes, Inc., considerably more money and suffered the imposition of claims of lien by unpaid subcontractors and suppliers, but, after negotiating with the bank, emerged from the transaction having lost only the $8500 down payment. Thomson Homes, Inc., obtained permits in April 1999 and started construction in May 1999. Before abandoning the job, Thomson Homes, Inc., worked on the home in May, June, and July of 1999. The Barrs and their lender did not make additional payments after the Barrs found the Thomson Homes, Inc., office empty on August 1, 1999. In a complaint filed October 6, 1999, the Barrs commenced a legal action against Thomson Homes, Inc., but not Petitioner. The two-count complaint alleges a breach of contract, based on Thomson Homes' alleged "abandon[ment]" of the job "prior to completion" and "fail[ure] and refus[al] to pay subcontractors and/or materialmen which resulted in Claims of Liens against Plaintiffs [sic] residence, which Defendant has failed and refused to satisfy," and unjust enrichment, based on Thomson Homes' alleged receipt of funds and failure to complete construction and pay for goods and services provided by subcontractors and materialmen. The Barrs obtained a final summary judgment against Thomson Homes, Inc., on May 8, 2000, for a total sum of $45,435.62, including attorneys' fees, costs, and prejudgment interest. The judgment states, in part: Subsequent to entering into the above referenced contract, partially performed work under the Contract. However, Defendant breached the contract by accepting Plaintiffs [sic] deposits and construction loan disbursements and thereafter abandoning the project and failing to pay subcontractors and/or materialmen for their labor services and materials provided. As a result of Defendant failing to pay lienors who provided labor, services and materials for the construction of Plaintiffs [sic] residence, construction liens were recorded against same, which Plaintiffs will have to satisfy. As a result of Defendant abandoning the project, Plaintiffs will be compelled to retain a new contractor to complete their home at an additional cost over and above the original contract amount. As a direct result of Defendant abandoning the project, failing to pay lienors, the misapplication of construction funds and financial mismanagement Plaintiffs will be forced to borrow additional funds from their construction lender. On June 2, 2000, the Barrs filed a claim under the Recovery Fund. In response to a question asking if they had made a diligent effort to collect payment from the contractor, the Barrs answered "yes" and explained: "I have looked into the assets of Thomson Homes Inc. and they do not have any. My affidavit is attached." The completed questionnaire states that the Barrs discovered the violation on August 11, 1999. They therefore failed to file their claim within two years of the discovery of the violation. By acknowledged statement dated May 23, 2000, Ms. Barr declared that she had completed a "reasonable search and inquiry" and had not found any property or assets against which to satisfy her judgment. Ms. Barr stated that someone at the Florida Department of State advised her that Thomson Homes, Inc., was administratively dissolved on September 24, 1999. She also declared she had found no property owned by Thomson Homes, Inc., in Palm Beach County. Ms. Barr stated that the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles found no motor vehicles or boats registered to Thomson Homes, Inc., and that the internet site of the "FAA" had revealed nothing registered to Thomson Homes, Inc. On November 26, 2002, Respondent issued an Order approving the payment of the Barrs' claim of $8500 against the Recovery Fund and automatically suspending Petitioner's license until he reimburses the Recovery Fund for the full amount of the paid claim. The Order, copies of which were served on all parties, states that the Barrs are the Petitioners, the Recovery Fund is a Respondent, and "Larry Shimkus, d/b/a Thomson Homes, Inc.," is a Respondent. The Order advises that "you" may seek a formal hearing, pursuant to Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes, if material facts are in dispute. On December 27, 2002, Petitioner served a Petition for Section 120.57 Formal Administrative Hearing. The petition, which was served on the Barrs and Respondent, contests the payment to the Barrs and the automatic suspension of Petitioner's license. The petition contests the payment of the Barrs' claim and suspension of Petitioner's license because they did not submit a certified copy of the levy and execution documents; their judgment is against Thomson Homes, Inc., and not Petitioner; their judgment does not find that Petitioner violated Section 489.129(1)(g), (j), or (k), Florida Statutes; and Ms. Thomson deceived Petitioner in violation of Section 489.132, Florida Statutes. Lastly, the petition seeks attorneys' fees under Section 57.111, Florida Statutes. DOAH Case No. 03-3633 involves the Joanne Myers. Ms. Myers entered into a construction contract with Thomson Homes, Inc., on February 7, 1999. Pursuant to the agreement, Ms. Myers agreed to pay Thomson Homes, Inc., $29,500 for a lot and $125,400 for a home, which Thomson Homes, Inc., agreed to construct to "substantial completion" within 120 days from the date of slab pour. Ms. Myers directly or indirectly paid Thomson Homes, Inc., $12,840. According to Ms. Myers' claim, Thomson Homes, Inc., never commenced construction before going out of business in August 1999. In an undated complaint bearing no filing date, Ms. Myers commenced a legal action against Thomson Homes, Inc., but not Petitioner. The two-count complaint alleges a breach of contract, based on Thomson Homes' alleged "abandon[ment]" of the job "prior to completion" and "fail[ure] and refus[al] to pay subcontractors and/or materialmen which resulted in Claims of Liens against Plaintiff's residence, which Defendant has failed and refused to satisfy," and unjust enrichment, based on Thomson Homes' alleged receipt of funds and failure to complete construction and pay for goods and services provided by subcontractors and materialmen. Ms. Myers obtained a final summary judgment against Thomson Homes, Inc., on May 31, 2000, for a total sum of $28,307.77, including attorneys' fees, costs, and prejudgment interest. The judgment states, in part: Subsequent to entering . . . into the above referenced contract, Defendant breached the contract by accepting Plaintiff's deposits and construction loan disbursements and thereafter abandoning the project and failing to pay subcontractors and/or materialmen for their labor services and materials provided. As a result of Defendant failing to pay lienor's [sic] who provided labor, services and/or materials for the construction of Plaintiff's residence, construction liens were recorded against same, which Plaintiff will have to satisfy. As a result of Defendant abandoning the project, Plaintiff will be compelled to retain a new contractor to complete her home at an additional cost over and above the original contract amount. As a direct result of Defendant abandoning the project, failing to pay lienor's [sic], the misapplication of construction funds and financial mismanagement Plaintiff will be forced to borrow additional funds from her construction lender. On September 18, 2000, Ms. Myers filed a claim with the Recovery Fund. In response to a question asking if she had made a diligent effort to collect payment from the contractor, Ms. Myers answered "yes" and explained: "Contractor closed corporate office--would not answer telephone calls." By letter dated November 30, 2000, from James Brogan of WEI Consulting Group to Ms. Myers, Mr. Brogan states that he had investigated the assets of Thomson Homes, Inc. Mr. Brogan found no bankruptcy filing by Thomson Homes, Inc., in the Southern District of Florida. Thomson Homes, Inc., was a party to 282 legal actions and owed tangible personal property taxes on furniture in a model home. On February 28, 2003, Respondent issued an Order approving the payment of Ms. Myers' claim of $14,080.66 against the Recovery Fund and automatically suspending Petitioner's license until he reimburses the Recovery Fund for the full amount of the paid claim. The Order, copies of which were served on all parties, states that Ms. Myers is the Petitioner, the Recovery Fund is a Respondent, and "Larry Shimkus, d/b/a Thomson Homes, Inc.," is a Respondent. The Order advises that "you" may seek a formal hearing, pursuant to Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes, if material facts are in dispute. On March 17, 2003, Petitioner filed a Petition for Section 120.57 Formal Administrative Hearing. The petition, which was served on Ms. Myers and Respondent, contests the payment to Ms. Myers and the automatic suspension of Petitioner's license. The petition contests the payment of Ms. Myers' claim and suspension of Petitioner's license because she did not submit evidence of a diligent search for assets; she did not submit all of the required exhibits; her judgment is against Thomson Homes, Inc., and not Petitioner; her judgment does not find that Petitioner violated Section 489.129(1)(g), (j), or (k), Florida Statutes; and Ms. Thomson deceived Petitioner in violation of Section 489.132, Florida Statutes. Lastly, the petition seeks attorneys' fees under Section 57.111, Florida Statutes. On January 4, 2004, Ms. Myers died. However, the probate court of Lancaster County, Pennsylvania, issued letters testamentary on her estate to James W. Myers III, in whose name Ms. Myers' claim is now being prosecuted. At the hearing, Petitioner contended that most, if not all, of the claims failed because the claimants had not exercised reasonable diligence in searching for assets, although Petitioner has dropped this contention in its proposed recommended order. In his petitions for hearing, Petitioner raised this contention only as to Ms. Myers. Ms. Myers, as well as the remainder of the claimants, made or caused to be made a reasonable search and inquiry for the assets of Thomson Homes, Inc. It is obvious that Thomson Homes, Inc., had no assets by the first letter from Mr. Brogan, dated November 30, 2000, nor did it have assets when Mr. Brogan issued his later letter on June 5, 2001, or when the attorney issued his affidavit on August 9, 2001. What is reasonable, in terms of a search, is dictated here by the fact that Thomson Homes, Inc., had no discoverable assets against which it could be made to answer for the considerable fraud that it perpetrated against these nine claimants. Respondent provided all of the parties, including Petitioner, with notice of its hearings at which it entered Recovery Fund orders. The petitions contend that Petitioner received no such notice in the Whitesides and Deyos cases. Although not litigated at the hearing, the presumption of notice, pursuant to the recitations set forth in each of Respondent's orders, results in a finding that Petitioner received timely notice in all cases.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a final order dismissing the claims against the Recovery Fund of the Beltzes and Barrs; paying the claims against the Recovery Fund of the remaining claimants, pursuant to the provisions of the orders of Respondent already issued in these cases and pursuant to the provisions of Section 489.143(1)-(6), Florida Statutes; and dismissing Respondent's request for the automatic suspension of Petitioner's license, pursuant to Section 489.143(7), Florida Statutes, without prejudice to any separate disciplinary proceedings that Respondent has commenced or may commence against Petitioner or others for the acts and omissions involved in these nine cases. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of February, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of February, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Bruce G. Kaleita Law Office of Bruce G. Kaleita, P.A. 1615 Forum Place, Suite 500 West Palm Beach, Florida 33401 Adrienne C. Rodgers Assistant General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street, Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1023 Tim Vaccaro, Director Construction Industry Licensing Board Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Nancy Campiglia, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202
The Issue Whether Petitioner, Villas Social Club, Inc. ("Villas"), properly revived its expired restrictive covenants and other governing documents in accordance with sections 720.403-720.407, Florida Statutes (2017).
Findings Of Fact Villas is a homeowners' association established pursuant to restrictive covenants recorded in 1967, 1968, and 1969. Originally created as a retirement community, Villas elected to become a "55 and over" community pursuant to the 1995 federal Housing for Older Persons Act. The community consists of 309 parcels upon which single family homes are located. By operation of the Marketable Record Title Act ("MRTA"), chapter 712, Florida Statutes, the restrictive covenants of Villas expired during the period of 1997 to 1999. However, Villas has continued to operate since then as a functioning "55 and over" homeowners' association without challenge from anyone. Sections 720.403-720.407 provide the mechanism by which a homeowners' association, such as Villas, may revitalize its restrictive covenants because they expired by operation of MRTA. DEO is a state agency statutorily obligated to review and determine whether an association has satisfied the requirements of sections 720.403-720.407 in order to revitalize expired restrictive covenants. In an effort to revitalize the expired restrictive covenants pursuant to the requirements of sections 720.403- 720.407, Villas submitted a revitalization package to DEO on March 9, 2016. On May 10, 2016, DEO denied the proposed revitalization for the following three reasons. First, Villas failed to timely submit the revitalization package to DEO pursuant to section 720.406(1)—the package was submitted to DEO more than 60 days after the last verified vote approving the revived covenants was signed. Second, Villas failed to provide DEO with the original bylaws pursuant to section 720.406(1)(b), which states that "a verified copy of the previous declaration of covenants and other previous governing documents for the community . . ." must be included in the submission to DEO. Third, the 2002 and 2004 bylaws submitted to DEO were more restrictive on the parcel owners in violation of section 720.405(4)(d). DEO's denial letter provided Villas a clear point of entry to challenge DEO's proposed decision and request a formal administrative hearing by filing a petition with the agency clerk of DEO within 21 days of receipt of the denial letter. However, Villas did not file a petition to challenge the proposed decision and request a hearing. Instead, Villas re-submitted another revitalization package to the parcel owners and DEO in 2017 in an effort to revitalize the expired restrictive covenants. The agency action subject to review in this proceeding is DEO's letter dated September 5, 2017, denying approval of Villas' request for revitalization. The revitalization package sent to the parcel owners in 2017 failed to include the address and telephone number of each member of the revitalization organizing committee. Nyoka Stewart, one of the members of the organizing committee for the revitalization, has owned her home at Villas located at 5140 Northwest 43rd Court, Lauderdale Lakes, Florida 33319, at all pertinent times. The "5410" Northwest 43rd Court, Lauderdale Lakes, Florida 33319, address listed for her in the revitalization package was a typographical error. Eslyn Williams, one of the members of the organizing committee for the revitalization, has owned her home at Villas located at 4051 Northwest 43rd Court, Lauderdale Lakes, Florida 33319, at all pertinent times. The "5041" Northwest 43rd Court, Lauderdale Lakes, Florida 33319, address listed for her in the revitalization package was a typographical error. The revitalization package sent to the parcel owners in 2017 included the telephone number (954-473-4733) of the management company for Villas, Alliance Property Systems. Alliance Property Systems does not own a parcel in the community, and it is not a member of the organization committee. One of the organizing committee members identified in the package, Renee Dichren, was not an owner at Villas on July 5, 2017, when the revitalization package was submitted to the parcel owners and DEO, because she was deceased. By failing to provide the address and telephone number of each revitalization member, Villas failed to comply with section 720.405(1). The revitalization package sent to DEO in 2017 included the full text of the proposed revived declaration of covenants and articles of incorporation and bylaws of Villas. However, Villas failed to include the original bylaws. The original bylaws of Villas have been lost. The most recent version of Villas' bylaws from 1990 were included in the revitalization package sent to DEO. By failing to include the original bylaws in the revitalization package sent to DEO, Villas failed to comply with section 720.406(1)(b). A majority of the parcel owners did not vote to approve the proposed revived declaration and other governing documents submitted by Villas in 2017. Not all of the 162 votes were to approve the proposed revived declaration and other governing documents submitted by Villas in 2017. In fact, there was only one vote from a parcel owner on the proposed revised governing documents. All of the other votes were dated 2015 and 2016, prior to Villas' submission of its initial revitalization package to DEO in 2016. By failing to obtain a majority vote of the parcel owners to approve the proposed revived declaration and other governing documents submitted in 2017, Villas failed to comply with section 720.405(6).
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Economic Opportunity enter a final order disapproving the revitalization of Villas' expired restrictive covenants and other governing documents. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of March, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DARREN A. SCHWARTZ Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of March, 2018. COPIES FURNISHED: Stephanie Chatham, Agency Clerk Department of Economic Opportunity Caldwell Building, MSC 110 107 East Madison Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-4128 (eServed) Thomas Tighe, Esquire Tucker & Tighe, P.A. 800 East Broward Boulevard, Suite 710 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301 (eServed) Jon F. Morris, Esquire Ross Marshman, Esquire Department of Economic Opportunity Caldwell Building, MSC 110 107 East Madison Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-4128 (eServed) Cissy Proctor, Executive Director Department of Economic Opportunity Caldwell Building 107 East Madison Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-4128 (eServed) Peter Penrod, General Counsel Department of Economic Opportunity Caldwell Building, MSC 110 107 East Madison Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-4128 (eServed)
Findings Of Fact Based upon my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, and the documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant facts are found. During times material herein, Respondent, Sebastian R. Sirven, was a certified general contractor and has been issued license numbers CG C003075 and CG CA03075. At all times material, Respondent was sole qualifier of Dynamic Construction Land Development Corporation. Dynamic Construction Land Development Corporation (herein Dynamic) was the developer of homes in the Gil-Mar Subdivision in Sweetwater, having been listed as such on all pertinent official records, including all building permits obtained for the aforesaid homes. Dynamic commenced construction on Lots 19 through 28, Block 3 in Gil- Mar Subdivision without first obtaining building permits there for. In this regard, construction had progressed to various stages in several of the homes, including the pouring of footings in some and the erection of walls and roofs on others before permits were issued. (TR p. 13, Respondent) It was noted that while application for the building permits for the above-referred homes had been filed by the President of Dynamic, Jorge Gomez, such applications had not been approved by the City of Sweetwater until a date subsequent to the commencement of construction. (See, Exhibit #1, pages 38 and 56.) Tie beams were poured on residences being constructed on Lots 19, 20, 21 and 22 of the Gil-Mar Subdivision without first having been inspected pursuant to the code. (Testimony of Delaney and Respondent) Frank Lubien, building official for Dade County, issued several verbal stop work orders to Dynamic which were briefly obeyed, and then were consistently and repeatedly ignored. On July 28, 1980, written stop orders were issued which again were disregarded by employees and representatives of Dynamic. (Testimony of Lubien and Delaney; Exhibit #1, pages 9, 45-50) Respondent, while not being directly in control of construction until after Dade County Building Department issued stop work orders for Dynamic at the subject subdivision, frequently visited the construction site subsequent to the issuance of the stop work orders. As testified to by Inspector Lubien, inspections of the subject construction activities by Dynamic were made and appeared to have been in conformity with acceptable contracting practices. In this regard, evidence reveals that the code violations as to the method of permissible construction alleged in Count VI of the Administrative Complaint filed herein, were timely corrected. Respondent avers that he was not at fault in the constructing activities here complained of inasmuch as he was not on the scene until it came to his attention that stop orders had been issued for the construction project. In support thereof, Respondent refers to the fact that he was working on another construction project in Volusia County, Florida and was unaware of the alleged violations here complained of. Finally, Respondent contends that once he came to the construction site, no further violations occurred by Dynamic.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED: That the Petitioner find Respondent guilty of Counts I through V and be ordered to pay an administrative fine of $100 per count; That the Respondent's licenses to practice contracting (License Nos. CG C003075 and CG CA03075) be placed on probation for a period of one (1) year. RECOMMENDED this 15th day of April, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of April, 1983.
The Issue Whether Respondent, while serving as an appointed member of the Ocoee Planning and Zoning Commission, violated section 112.313(7)(a), Florida Statutes (2015)1/ by having a contractual relationship that conflicted with his official responsibilities; and, if so, the appropriate penalty.
Findings Of Fact At all times material to the complaint, Respondent served as an appointed member of the Ocoee P & Z Commission. Respondent is subject to the requirements of part III, chapter 112, Florida Statutes, the Code of Ethics for Public Officers and Employees, for his acts and omissions during his tenure on the P & Z Commission. As a member of the P & Z Commission, Respondent is subject to the “Ocoee Florida Land Development Code, Section 3, Planning and Zoning Commission [Land Development Code].” Section 3-2 of Land Development Code provides in part as follows: Establishment and Membership The Planning and Zoning Commission shall consist of nine (9) members appointed by the City Commission and one member appointed by the School Board of Orange County as a non- voting member. The member appointed by the School Board of Orange County shall attend those meetings at which the Planning and Zoning Commission considers comprehensive plan amendments and rezonings that would, if approved, increase residential density on the property that is the subject of the application. No member shall be an employee of the City of Ocoee and all members, except the member appointed by the School Board of Orange County, shall be residents of the City of Ocoee. When selecting members to the Planning and Zoning Commission, the City Commission shall attempt to select persons from different geographical areas within the City so as to create geographical diversity and representation. * * * E. Compliance with Laws The Planning and Zoning Commission, and its individual members, shall comply with all applicable laws relative to public bodies, including disclosure of interests and procedure[s] for refraining from participation [when] a conflict of interest exists. * * * G. Duties and Responsibilities To act as the Local Planning Agency (LPA) of the City of Ocoee, pursuant to Section 163.3174, Florida Statutes, and to prepare on its own initiative recommendations for amendments to the Comprehensive Plan of the City of Ocoee, including text and/or maps, and to forward such amendments to the City Commission for consideration. No such recommendation shall be made except after a public hearing held in accordance with State and local requirements. To review and make recommendations to the City Commission on applications for amendments to the Comprehensive Plan. No such recommendation shall be made except after a public hearing held in accordance with State and local requirements. To prepare on its own initiative recommendations for amendments to this Code, text and/or maps, and to forward such amendments to the City Commission for consideration. No such recommendation shall be made except after a public hearing held in accordance with State and local requirements. To review and make recommendations to the City Commission on applications for amendments to this Code, including applications for annexation or change of zoning. Pursuant to Section 163.3174(4)(c), Florida Statutes, the Planning and Zoning Commission shall also have the responsibility to review and make a finding as to the consistency of the proposed land development regulation with the adopted Comprehensive Plan and to report such finding to the City Commission. No such recommendation shall be made except after a public hearing held in accordance with State and local requirements. To review and make recommendations to the City Commission on applications for various development approvals or permits as provided within this Code, including, but not limited to Planned Unit Developments (PUD), special exceptions, subdivisions, and any other application for which the City Commission requests a report and/or recommendation. Where a public hearing is required by the applicable procedural section, no such recommendation shall be made except after a public hearing held in accordance with State and local requirements. To act in an advisory capacity to the City Commission on land use and land development issues and to make such studies and to conduct such investigations as may be requested from time to time by the City Commission. To review zoning of newly annexed lands when it represents an increase in intensity of use or a conflict with the Comprehensive Plan pursuant to requirements of State law and City ordinance. In addition to serving on the P & Z Commission, Respondent buys and sells commercial real estate. Respondent is a manager and shareholder in W.O.R.Y. INVESTORS, LLC (WORY), an entity that is also in the business of buying and selling commercial real estate. Respondent, in his individual capacity, owned approximately four acres, which abutted six acres owned by WORY. Both properties have an address on West Road in Ocoee, Florida, and will be referred to collectively herein as the “West Road property.” The Contract On or about November 11, 2015, Respondent, in his individual capacity, and as manager for WORY, executed an “Agreement of Sale” wherein the West Road property was to be purchased by Charter Schools Development Group, LLC (buyer), for $1,890,540. According to the Agreement of Sale, the buyer wanted to “develop and construct on the Property a K-8 public charter school.” The Agreement of Sale contained a number of contingencies, referred to in the contract as “Buyer Required Approvals,” that Respondent was required to satisfy prior to finalization of the sale of the West Road property. Paragraph six of the Agreement to Sale sets forth a number of the pre-sale contingencies imposed on Respondent, and the same provides as follows: 6. Development The Buyer intends to develop and construct on the Property a K-8 public charter school and adjacent commercial development acceptable to Buyer consisting of buildings and other improvements including, but not limited to recreation fields, related landscaping, open space, storm water, and appropriate parking (the "Project"). Buyer's obligation to complete the purchase of the Property from Seller in accordance with the terms of this Agreement is contingent upon the satisfaction of each of the following conditions with regard to the Property (each of which may be waived in whole or in part in writing by Buyer): Buyer has obtained final, unappealed and unappealable approvals from all necessary governmental authorities (including governmental agencies), for zoning, utilities and any other approvals (including necessary parking requirements) Buyer deems necessary, in its sole discretion, permitting the construction and use of the improvements comprising the Project, including but not limited to any required special exception. Buyer has obtained final, unappealed and unappealable approvals and/or permits required by any and all governmental authorities (including governmental agencies) so that the Property shall have immediate and adequate access to water, sewer and all other utilities in accordance with the final approved site development plan. Buyer has obtained final, unappealed and unappealable approvals and/or permits required by any and all governmental authorities (including governmental agencies) for storm water management; including easements and agreements for constructing and maintaining storm water basins; all wetlands studies and approvals in such form that wetlands, if any, shall not preclude construction of roads, utilities, storm water management facilities, any other required improvements for erection of buildings on the Property. Buyer has obtained all permits and approvals, and all conditions thereof shall have been satisfied, so as to allow for recording of the final plan and issuance of building permits subject only to satisfaction of the following requirements by Buyer at or after Closing (i) submission of construction drawings in accordance with applicable law, (ii) execution by the Buyer of the necessary development agreements, (iii) execution and funding by Buyer of the necessary escrow agreements for municipal improvements, and sewer and water improvements, and (iv) payment by the Buyer of all municipal fees and charges associated therewith. Subject to Seller's obligation set forth in Section 6(f) below, Buyer has obtained any and all other easements, approvals and/or permits that may be necessary to construct and use the improvements comprising the Project. Buyer shall obtain, at no additional cost to Seller, all easements and roads that in Buyer's sole reasonable discretion are necessary for property access, utilities and signage to the Property in accordance with Buyer's final approved site development plan. The items referred to in subsections 6(a) through 6(f) hereof shall hereafter be referred to as the "Buyer Required Approvals." After the end of the Inspection Period, Buyer shall diligently proceed with the filing of all applications necessary for obtaining the Buyer Required Approvals. Seller agrees, at no expense to Seller, to cooperate with buyer in connection with the Buyer Required Approvals to the extent of signing all applications necessary for obtaining the buyer Required Approvals and appearing and testifying at the various hearings. Seller's cooperation as aforesaid shall not entitle Seller to any additional compensation. All permit fees, studies, deposit and investigation costs incurred in connection with the Buyer Required Approvals shall be the sole responsibility of buyer and buyer agrees to affirmatively use its good faith efforts to obtain all of the Buyer Required Approvals without delay and as expeditiously as reasonably possible. Seller hereby grants to Buyer a power of attorney to file, on Seller's behalf, all applications related to the Buyer Required Approvals; provided, however, that the Land shall not be rezoned prior to the expiration of the Inspection Period. Seller acknowledges that buyer will likely contact, meet with and/or obtain consents for the Project from neighboring property owners during the Inspection Period and in the process of obtaining the Buyer Required Approvals. (emphasis added). None of the provisions of paragraph six of the Agreement of Sale were waived by either party. Paragraph 15(b) of the Agreement of Sale provides as follows: (b) If Seller shall violate or fail (in breach of its obligations hereunder) to fulfill or perform any of the terms, conditions or undertaking set forth in this Agreement within ten (10) days written notice from Buyer or (five (5) days written notice in the event of a monetary default), Buyer shall be entitled to: (i) terminate this Agreement and receive the return of the Deposit and reimbursement of Buyer's documented out-of-pocket due diligence expenses up to $15,000.00, and, thereupon, the parties hereto will be released and relieved from all provisions of this Agreement, or (ii) pursue specific performance. Paragraph 17 of the Agreement of Sale states that “[b]uyer and Seller agree to cooperate with each other and to take such further actions as may be requested by the other in order to facilitate the timely purchase and sale of the Property.” Paragraphs 6, 15(b) and 17 of the Agreement of Sale obligated Respondent to take all steps necessary, including “appearing and testifying at the various hearings,” for ensuring that the “Buyer Required Approvals” were satisfied, which in turn would allow Respondent to receive his share of the purchase price for the West Road property. Section 112.311(1), provides in part that “[i]t is essential to the proper conduct and operation of government that public officials be independent and impartial and that public office not be used for private gain other than the remuneration provided by law.” Rezoning and Respondent’s Role In order for a charter school to be built on the West Road property, it was necessary to rezone the existing planned unit development land use plan covering the property. Ocoee City Planner Michael Rumer testified that there are two types of rezoning. There is a straight rezoning to a zoning category listed in the land development code and there is rezoning to a planned unit development (PUD). Both types of zoning use the following process: an application is filed; then there is a review process by a development review committee, which is a staff level review; that review is forwarded to the P & Z Commission for a recommendation; and then it goes to the Ocoee City Commission for two readings of an ordinance for rezoning if the rezoning is approved. This is the process that was followed for the West Road property PUD. On February 9, 2016, the issue of whether to recommend rezoning of the West Road property to allow for the charter school referenced in the Agreement of Sale came before the P & Z Commission. Respondent was present for the meeting. During the meeting, Respondent spoke in favor of the rezoning request for the West Road property. When a fellow commissioner made a request for more time to review the rezoning issue, Respondent opposed the delay by stating “[i]f you don't give them a go now, you basically kill the deal because it's a time sensitive thing that they want the kids in there in August.” During the meeting, the commissioners struggled with whether to recommend denial of the West Road property zoning request, recommend approval of the request without conditions, or recommend approval of the request with conditions. After two previous motions regarding the zoning request died for lack of a “second,” a third motion was made wherein approval was recommended “with the condition that we’re all going to look at the traffic movement with the final site plan design.” When it appeared as though this motion was also likely to fail for lack of a “second,” Respondent encouraged the chairman of the P & Z Commission to voice a “second” for the motion since Respondent was unable to do so.2/ Respondent’s actions during the meeting of February 9, 2016, were consistent with his obligations under the Agreement of Sale to assist the buyer of the West Road property with securing the “Buyer Required Approvals.”
Recommendation Based on the Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a civil penalty of $10,000.00 be imposed against Respondent due to his violation of section 112.313(7)(a) and that Respondent also be publicly censured and reprimanded. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of April, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LINZIE F. BOGAN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of April, 2017.
The Issue Whether the School Board of Seminole County's, notice of intent to award Bid No. 102589, for air filter maintenance, service, and replacement to Filter Service and Installation Corporation was clearly erroneous, contrary to competition, arbitrary, or capricious.
Findings Of Fact The Seminole County School District is a political subdivision of the State of Florida, created by Article IX, Section 4, Florida Constitution. The powers and duties of the school board are enumerated in Chapter 230, Florida Statutes. The Superintendent of the Seminole County School District is a constitutional officer, whose office is created by Article IX, Section 5, Florida Constitution. The powers and duties of the Superintendent are enumerated in Chapter 230, Florida Statutes. The Seminole County School Board issued a call for bids for air filter maintenance service and replacement under Bid No. 102589 on September 14, 1998. Bids were submitted by Con-Air Industries, Inc., the protester, and Filter Service & Installation Corp., the apparent low bidder. The bids were opened on September 28, 1998, and were evaluated. Each bidder was determined to be a responsible bidder to the CFB. Intervenor submitted the lowest numerical bid. On October 1, 1998, Respondent's staff recommended that the CFB be awarded to Intervenor. The decision to recommend the award of the filter service Bid No. 102589 complies with the bid specifications. The instructions to bidders, as stated on the Proposal Form, direct a bidder to total lines A-C and to enter the total at line D. The instructions state that a bidder is not to include the cost as stated at lines E & F in the total. The proposal form then states that the total cost, as stated at line D shall be used to determine the apparent low bidder. The bid proposal document stated that the total of the prices stated at items A, B, and C would be used to determine the lowest numerical bid. The bid proposal document stated that the Respondent reserves the right to negotiate unit cost proposed for item E. The line D total submitted by the Petitioner is stated at $3.45. The line D total submitted by the apparent low bidder, is stated at $2.60. Intervenor submitted the lowest numerical bid. Intervenor does business under the fictitious name Filter Sales & Service. That fictitious name has been registered with the Secretary of State for the State of Florida. Filter Service & Installation Corp., and Filter Sales & Service are one and the same. The reference by Intervenor at line F to "Per Price Sheet" and the failure of Filter Service & Installation Corp. to attach a price sheet to its proposal form is not a material deviation from the requirements of the bid specifications. The total at line D is the total used to determine the lowest bidder. Filter Service & Installation Corp. is the lowest and best bid from a responsive and responsible bidder. The Petitioner followed the procedure set forth in the bid proposal document in making a determination that the Intervenor was the lowest numerical bidder. Petitioner reserved the right to reject all bids and to waive any informalities. Petitioner failed to prove that the notice of intent to award the bid to Intervenor was clearly erroneous, contrary to competition, arbitrary, or capricious.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Respondent award the contract for filter maintenance, service, and replacement under Bid No. 102589 to the Intervenor, Filter Service and Installation Corp., as recommended by its staff. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of December, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of December, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert N. Hering, President Con-Air Industries, Inc. 3055 Pennington Drive Orlando, Florida 32804 Ned N. Julian, Jr., Esquire Seminole County Public Schools Legal Services Department 400 East Lake Mary Boulevard Sanford, Florida 32773-7127 Robert W. Smith, Esquire 430 North Mills Avenue, Suite 1000 Orlando, Florida 32803 Dr. Paul J. Hagerty, Superintendent Seminole County Public Schools 400 East Lake Mary Boulevard Sanford, Florida 32773-7127
