Findings Of Fact In its 1969 legislative session, the Florida Legislature enacted Section 409.266, Florida Statutes, entitled "Medical Assistance for the Needy," providing the original state legislative basis and authority for Florida's entry into the Medicaid program. Section 409.266(2), Florida Statutes, as enacted, authorized the Florida Department of Social Services or any other department that the Governor might designate to: Enter into such agreement with other state agencies or any agency of the federal government and accept such duties with respect to social welfare or public aid as may be necessary to implement the provisions of subsection (1) and to qualify for federal aid including compliance with provisions of Public Law 86-778 and the "Social Security Amendments of 1965" [estab- lishing Title XIX of the Social Security Act] Section 409.266(3), Florida Statutes, as enacted, stated that: The Department is authorized and directed to prepare and operate a program and budget in order to implement and comply with the provisions of public law 86-778 and the "Social Security Amendments of 1965." No provisions of Florida law other than Section 409.266, Florida Statutes, as enacted, authorized any agency to perform any function specifically to implement the Medicaid program. The State of Florida formally commenced participation in the Medicaid program effective January 1, 1970. At all times pertinent to this controversy, respondent, Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services or its predecessor agencies (referred to as "HRS"), has been and continues to be the "State Agency" identified in 42 U.S.C. Section 1396a(a)(5), and charged under Section 409.266, Florida Statutes, as amended, with the formulation of a State Plan for Medical Assistance ("State Plan"), 42 U.S.C. Section 1396a, and with the ongoing responsibility for the administration of the Medicaid program in the State of Florida. Since Florida's entry into the Medicaid program in 1970, HRS has been authorized essentially to "[e]nter into such agreements with appropriate agents, other State agencies, or any agency of the Federal Government and accept such duties in respect to social welfare or public aid as may be necessary or needed to implement the provisions of Title XIX of the Social Security Act pertaining to medical assistance." Section 409.266(2)(a), Fla. Stat., as amended. HRS has never been authorized to enter into any agreements, accept any duties, or perform any functions with respect to the Medicaid program that are in contravention of or not authorized by Title XIX of the Social Security Act and implementing federal regulations and requirements. As a prerequisite for Florida's entry into the Medicaid program, HRS prepared and filed with the United States Department of Health, Education, and Welfare ("HEW") a State Plan, pursuant to Title XIX of the Social Security Act, and pursuant to its delegated legislative authority set forth in Section 409.266(2)(a), Florida Statutes. (In May, 1980, HEW was redesignated the United States Department of Health and Human Services, but for purposes of this action both shall be referred to as HEW.) C.W. Hollingsworth was the HRS official who had the responsibility for supervising the preparation, the filing, and for obtaining the approval of HEW of Florida's initial State Plan. Florida's initial State Plan was approved by HEW effective January 1, 1970. At the time that Florida received approval of its initial State Plan, Title XIX of the Social Security Act required state plans to provide for the payment of the reasonable cost of inpatient hospital services. At the time that Florida received approval of its initial State Plan, HEW regulations governing reimbursement for inpatient hospital services under Medicaid required the State Plan to provide for reimbursement of Medicaid inpatient hospital services furnished by those hospitals also participating in the Medicare program, applying the same standards, cost reimbursement principles, and methods of cost apportionment used in computing reimbursement to such hospitals under Medicare. 45 C.F.R. Section 250.30(a), and (b), 34 Fed. Reg. 1244 (January 25, 1969). At the time that Florida entered the Medicaid program, Medicare cost reimbursement principles in effect governing reimbursement for the cost of inpatient hospital services required payment of a participating hospital's actual and reasonable costs of providing such services to Medicare beneficiaries, and, moreover, that such payment be made on the basis of the hospital's current costs rather than upon the costs of a prior period or upon a fixed negotiated rate. 42 U.S.C. Section 1395x(v)(1)(A); 20 C.F.R. Sections 405.451(c)(2), 405.402(a) [later renumbered 42 C.F.R. Section 405.451(c)(2) and Section 405.402(a)]. Such Medicare principles and standards also provided for interim payments to be made to the hospital during its fiscal year. At the conclusions of the subject fiscal year, the hospital was required to file a cost report wherein the hospital included all of its costs of providing covered inpatient services to Medicare beneficiaries. A settlement or "retroactive adjustment" process then was required to reconcile the amount of interim payments received by the hospital during the fiscal period with its allowable costs incurred during that period. If the hospital had been overpaid during the year, it was required to refund the amount of that overpayment to the Medicare program. Conversely, if the hospital had been underpaid during the year, the Medicare program was required to make an additional payment to the hospital, retroactively, in the amount of the underpayment. 20 C.F.R. Sections 405.402(b)(2), 405.451(b)(2). Essentially the same Medicare principles and standards governing reimbursement of inpatient hospital services described in the two preceding paragraphs have been in effect at all times pertinent to this controversy. 42 C.F.R. Section 405.401, et seq. Florida's approved State Plan as of January 1, 1970, governing reimbursement of inpatient hospital services under the Medicaid program, committed HRS to reimburse hospitals that also participated in the Medicare program for their reasonable costs of providing inpatient hospital services to Medicaid patients, applying Medicare cost reimbursement principles and standards. The only versions of Florida's State Plan provisions that have been approved by HEW and that have governed HRS's reimbursement of inpatient hospital services prior to July 1, 1981, each commit HRS to reimburse hospitals that also participated in the Medicare program for their reasonable costs of providing inpatient hospital services to Medicaid patients, applying Medicare cost reimbursement principles and standards. Attached as an appendix to the recommended order is the form agreement drafted with the supervision of C.W. Hollingsworth, which has been in use from January 1, 1970, until July 1, 1981. From the inception of the Florida Medicaid program, and as a prerequisite for participation therein, a hospital has been required to execute a copy of the form agreement. A hospital may not participate in the Medicaid program without having executed such an agreement, nor may it propose any amendments thereto. The intent and effect of the form agreement is to require HRS to reimburse hospitals that also participated in the Medicare program for their reasonable costs of providing inpatient hospital services to Medicaid patients, applying Medicare cost reimbursement principles and standards. The form agreement requires HRS to compute a percentage allowance in lieu of the retroactive adjustments ("percentage allowances") in determining the rates that hospitals will be paid for providing inpatient hospital services to Medicaid patients. The form agreement requires HRS to compute a new percentage allowance each year based on hospital cost trends. The meanings of the terms "allowance in lieu of retroactive adjustments" in all pertinent state plans and "percentage allowance for the year in lieu of retroactive payment adjustment" contained in the form agreement are identical. In drafting the form agreement HRS intended that the "percentage allowance for the year in lieu of retroactive payment adjustment" be set at a level sufficient to ensure that hospitals participating in the Medicaid program would be reimbursed their "reasonable costs" of providing inpatient hospital services to Medicaid patients, applying Medicare cost reimbursement principles and standards. At all times pertinent to this controversy, participating hospitals, like petitioner, have been reimbursed by HRS for inpatient hospital services provided to Medicaid patients in the following manner: Within ninety (90) days following the close of its fiscal year, the partici- pating hospital files a Form 2551 or 2552 Annual Statement of Reimbursable Costs, as applicable, with both Blue Cross of Florida, Inc., the major fiscal intermediary respon- sible for the administration of Part A of the federal Medicare program in the State of Florida, and with HRS. This document, also referred to as a "cost report" details various hospital and financial statistical data relating to the patient care activities engaged in by the hospital during the sub- ject fiscal period. Upon receipt of the participating hospital's cost report for a fiscal period, HRS makes an initial determination based upon Medicare cost reimbursement principles and standards of the hospital's total allow- able inpatient costs, charges, and total patient days during the subject fiscal period, and then determines an inpatient per diem reimbursement rate for the period. To the inpatient per diem reimburse- ment rate is then added a percentage allow- ance in lieu of making any further retroactive corrective adjustments in reimbursement which might have been due the hospital applicable to the reporting period. The adjusted inpa- tient per diem reimbursement rate is applied prospectively, and remains in effect until further adjustments in the rate are required. If HRS determines that total inpa- tient Medicaid reimbursement to a partici- pating hospital during a fiscal period exceeds the hospital's allowable and rea- sonable costs of rendering such covered inpatient services applying Medicare cost reimbursement principles and standards, then the hospital is required to remit to HRS the amount of such overpayment. If, however, HRS determines that the total inpatient Medicaid reimbursement received by a participating hospital is less than the hospital's actual and reason- able costs of rendering such covered inpa- tient services to Medicaid patients during the period applying Medicare cost reimburse- ment principles and standards, no further retroactive corrective adjustments are made; provided, however, that should an overpayment occur in a fiscal period, it may be offset and applied retroactively against an under- payment to the participating hospital which occurred during the next preceding fiscal period only. HRS has used the following "percentage allowances" in determining Medicaid reimbursement rates for inpatient hospital services: a. January 1, 1970 - June 30, 1972 . . . 12 percent July 1, 1972 - approximately March 30, 1976 . . . . . . . . . . 9 percent Approximately March 31, 1976 - June 30, 1981 . . . . . . . . . . . 6 percent Since at least January 1, 1976, HRS has not recomputed the "percentage allowance" on an annual basis. Since at least January 1, 1976, HRS has not based the "percentage allowance" that it has applied in determining Medicaid inpatient hospital reimbursement rates upon hospital cost trends. HRS has used no technical methodology based upon hospital cost trends to develop any of the "percentage allowances." At least since January 1, 1974, HRS's "percentage allowances" have been less than the corresponding average annual increases in the costs incurred by Florida hospitals of providing inpatient hospital services. Prior to March 30, 1976, all of HRS's published regulations addressing reimbursement of participating hospitals for their costs of providing inpatient hospital services to Medicaid patients required HRS to reimburse such hospitals in accordance with Medicare cost reimbursement principles and standards. In certain internal documents, Petitioner's Exhibits P-44 and P-12, HRS states that the average costs of providing inpatient hospital services in the State of Florida rose at least 18 percent during calendar year 1975. In November, 1975, the Secretary of HRS was informed by HRS officials that HRS faced a projected budgetary deficit for its fiscal year ended June 30, 1976. A decision memorandum presented options to the HRS Secretary for reducing the projected deficit. Among such options presented to and approved by the HRS Secretary was to reduce the "percentage allowance" from 9 percent to 6 percent. The reduction of the "percentage allowance" by HRS from 9 percent to 6 percent was effected in response to HRS's projected deficit, and was not based upon an analysis of hospital cost trends. HRS incorporated the 6 percent "percentage allowance" into its administrative rules which were published on March 30, 1976. In response to objections raised by the Florida Hospital Association to the reduction in the percentage allowance by HRS from 9 percent to 6 percent, HRS officials reexamined that reduction. During HRS's reexamination of its previous "percentage allowance" reduction, HRS was aware of and acknowledged the fact that Florida hospital costs were increasing at an average annual rate in excess of both the earlier 9 percent and the resulting 6 percent "percentage allowance." In a memorandum dated September 13, 1976, from HRS official Charles Hall to the Secretary of HRS, Petitioner's Exhibit P-45, Charles Hall informed the Secretary that the methods and standards then used by HRS to reimburse participating hospitals for their costs of providing inpatient hospital services to Medicaid patients was out of compliance with federal requirements. Charles Hall further informed the Secretary that the reason HRS had not theretofore been cited by HEW for noncompliance was the manner in which the Florida State Plan had been drafted, i.e., that the State Plan required HRS to reimburse hospitals under Medicaid for the reasonable costs that they would have been reimbursed applying Medicare cost reimbursement principles and standards. In a letter dated September 20, 1976, Petitioner's Exhibit P-31, HEW informed HRS that HEW had received a complaint from the Florida Hospital Association that the methods HRS was actually using to reimburse hospitals for the costs of providing inpatient hospital services to Medicaid patients were in violation of Federal Regulation 45 C.F.R. Section 250.30(a). A proposed amendment to Florida's State Plan submitted by HRS to HEW in November, 1976, Petitioner's Exhibit P-49, if approved, would have allowed HRS to reimburse hospitals for the cost of providing inpatient hospital services to Medicaid patients under methods differing from Medicare cost reimbursement principles and standards (an "alternative plan"). "Alternative plans" have been permitted under applicable federal regulations since October 21, 1974. A state participating in the Medicaid program may elect to establish an "alternative plan, but may not implement such "alternative plan" without the prior written approval of HEW. Florida has not had in effect an "alternative plan" of reimbursing participating hospitals for their costs of providing inpatient hospital services to Medicaid patients that was formally approved by HEW at any time prior to July 1, 1981. By letter dated January 7, 1977, Petitioner's Exhibit P-32, HEW notified HRS that it had formally cited HRS for noncompliance with federal regulations governing reimbursement of inpatient hospital services under Medicaid. HRS acknowledged their noncompliance and between November, 1976, and October 30, 1977, HRS attempted to revise its proposed "alternative plan" on at least two occasions in an attempt to obtain HEW approval. In October, 1977, HRS withdrew its proposed "alternative plan" then pending with HEW. HRS then contracted with an outside consultant, Alexander Grant & Company, to assist in the formulation of a new "alternative plan" proposal. In January, 1978, Alexander Grant & Company delivered its draft of an "alternative plan" to HRS. In October, 1978, HRS submitted a draft "alternative plan" to HEW for review and comment, and HEW expected HRS to submit a formal "alternative plan" proposal to HEW for its approval by November 1, 1978. HRS did not submit the formal "alternative plan" proposal to HEW until August 12, 1980. In a letter dated February 21, 1979, from Richard Morris, HEW Regional Medicaid Director, Region IV, to United States Senator Richard Stone of Florida, Mr. Morris advised Senator Stone: For more than two years the Florida Medicaid Program has not met Federal Requirements for inpatient hospital services reimbursement. Their payment methodology under-reimburses certain hospitals year after year. The pros- pective interim per diem rate paid by Florida to hospitals includes a percentage allowance to cover increased costs during the forthcom- ing year that is consistently less than increased costs in some hospitals. If the payments are less than costs, the difference is not reimbursed. This results in underpay- ments. We have worked closely with Florida to develop an acceptable alternative system that would meet Federal requirements. To date, Florida has not implemented such a system despite having received informal HEW agreement on a draft plan developed more than a year ago. It is our understanding that this alternative plan is not a high priority item at this time. We will continue to work with HRS staff to secure Florida compliance re- garding this requirement. Petitioner's Exhibit P-46. Since August 12, 1980, HRS has submitted to HEW for its approval at least four more versions of an "alternative plan." Petitioner's Exhibits P-120, P-121, P-123, and P-152. Each of these versions was approved by the Secretary of HRS, and HRS believes each to comply with applicable Florida law. Mr. Erwin Bodo, Ph.D., was and is the HRS official responsible for the development and drafting of Exhibits P-120, P-121, P-123, and P-152. In June, 1981, HEW approved an "alternative plan" for the State of Florida (Exhibit P-152), and such "alternative plan" was implemented effective July 1, 1981. Until July 1, 1981, HRS continued to use the 6 percent "percentage allowance" to compute inpatient hospital reimbursement under Medicaid. Even after its repeal, Rule 10C-7.39(6), Florida Administrative Code, is applied by respondent in calculating reimbursement for Medicaid services provided between March 30, 1976, and July 1, 1981. From November 20, 1976, until July 1, 1981--the period in which HRS was attempting to secure HEW approval for an alternative plan--HRS was aware that the costs of inpatient hospital se vices were increasing at an average annual rate in excess of the 6 percent "percentage allowance." From September 1, 1976, through July 1, 1981, HRS has been out of compliance with its a proved State Plan provisions, and HEW regulations governing reimbursement for inpatient hospital services under Medicaid because HRS's methods for reimbursing hospitals for the cost of providing those services to Medicaid patients have resulted in a substantial number of hospitals-- including petitioner--being reimbursed at a lower rate than the hospitals would have been reimbursed applying Medicare cost reimbursement principles and standards. Since the quarter ending December 31, 1976, until July 1, 1981, HEW has formally cited HRS as being in contravention of its approved State Plan provisions, and HEW (now HHS) regulations, governing reimbursement for inpatient hospital services under Medicaid because HRS's methods for reimbursing hospitals for the cost of providing those services to Medicaid patients have resulted in a substantial number of hospitals--including petitioner--being reimbursed at a lower rate than the hospitals would have been reimbursed applying Medicare cost reimbursement principles and standards. PAN AMERICAN HOSPITAL CORPORATION Petitioner, Pan American Hospital Corporation, is a not-for-profit corporation, duly organized and existing under the laws of the State of Florida. Petitioner is a tax-exempt organization as determined by the Internal Revenue Service pursuant to Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as amended. At all times pertinent to this controversy, petitioner has operated and continues to operate a duly licensed 146-bed, short-term acute care general hospital, located at 5959 Northwest Seventh Street, Miami, Florida 33126. At all times pertinent to this controversy, petitioner has been and continues to be a duly certified provider of inpatient hospital services, eligible to participate in the Florida Medicaid program since January 27, 1974. The appendix to this recommended order is a true and correct copy of the "Participation Agreement" entered into between petitioner and HRS, whereunder, inter alia, petitioner became eligible to receive payment from HRS for covered inpatient hospital services provided to Medicaid patients. At all times pertinent to this controversy, petitioner has been a certified "provider of services" participating in the Medicare program. During the fiscal periods in dispute in this action, petitioner did provide covered inpatient hospital services to Medicaid patients, and became eligible for payment by HRS of its reasonable costs of providing such services, determined in accordance with Medicare cost reimbursement principles and standards. With respect to each of the fiscal periods in dispute in this action, petitioner timely filed all cost reports and other financial data with HRS or its contracting agents, including Blue Cross of Florida, Inc., to enable HRS to determine petitioner's reasonable costs of providing covered inpatient hospital services to Medicaid patients. During each of the fiscal periods in dispute in this action, to reimburse petitioner for its reasonable costs of providing covered inpatient hospital services to Medicaid patients, determined in accordance with applicable Medicare cost reimbursement principles and standards. Such costs incurred by petitioner were reasonable, necessary, related to patient care, and less than customary charges within the meaning of those Medicare principles and standards. With respect to each of the fiscal periods in dispute, HRS and/or its contracting agent, Blue Cross of Florida, Inc., reviewed and audited the cost reports filed by petitioner, and as a result of such review and audits set or adjusted, as applicable, the Medicaid inpatient per diem reimbursement rate at which petitioner would be paid during the next succeeding fiscal period or until that rate was again adjusted. On May 3, 1976, a Notice of Program Reimbursement was issued to petitioner applicable to its fiscal year ended March 31, 1975, and setting forth the audited amount of petitioner's reasonable costs of providing covered inpatient hospital services to Medicaid patients during such period and the amount of interim Medicaid payments made to petitioner by HRS during the period in respect to those services. During its fiscal year ended March 31, 1975, petitioner received $86,469 less than its reasonable costs of providing covered inpatient hospital services to Medicaid patients, and no retroactive corrective adjustment has been made in connection with such underpayment. On February 14, 1979, a Notice of Program Reimbursement was issued to petitioner applicable to its fiscal year ended March 31, 1976, and setting forth the audited amount of petitioner's reasonable costs of providing covered inpatient hospital services to Medicaid patients during such period and the amount of interim Medicaid payments made to petitioner by HRS during the period with respect to those services. During its fiscal year ended March 31, 1976, petitioner received $199,328 less than its reasonable costs of providing covered inpatient hospital services to Medicaid patients, and no retroactive corrective adjustment has been made in connection with such underpayment. On September 29, 1978, a Notice of Program Reimbursement was issued to petitioner applicable to its fiscal year ended March 31, 1977, and setting forth the audited amount of petitioner's reasonable costs of providing covered inpatient hospital services to Medicaid patients during such period and the amount of interim Medicaid payments made to petitioner by HRS during the period with respect to those services. During its fiscal year ended March 31, 1977, petitioner received $6,083 less than its reasonable costs of providing covered inpatient hospital services to Medicaid patients, and no retroactive corrective adjustment has been made in connection with such underpayment. On March 13, 1980, a Notice of Program Reimbursement was issued to petitioner applicable to its fiscal year ended March 31, 1978, and setting forth the audited amount of petitioner's reasonable costs of providing covered inpatient hospital services to Medicaid patients during such period and the amount of interim Medicaid payments made to petitioner by HRS during the period with respect to those services. During its fiscal year ended March 31, 1978, petitioner received $178,506 less than its reasonable costs of providing covered inpatient hospital services to Medicaid patients, and no retroactive corrective adjustment has been made in connection with such underpayment. On June 30, 1981, a Notice of Program Reimbursement was issued to petitioner applicable to its fiscal year ended March 31, 1979, and setting forth the audited amount of petitioner's reasonable costs of providing covered inpatient hospital services to Medicaid patients during such period and the amount of interim Medicaid payments made to petitioner by HRS during the period with respect to those services. During its fiscal year ended March 31, 1979, petitioner received $302,347 less than its reasonable costs of providing covered inpatient hospital services to Medicaid patients, and no retroactive corrective adjustment has been made in connection with such underpayment. On or about June 30, 1981, the audit of petitioner's Medicaid cost report for the period ending March 31, 1980, was concluded. A formal Notice of Program Reimbursement had not been issued at the time of the hearing. MOTION TO DISMISS DENIED Respondent contends that these proceedings should be summarily concluded "for failure to join an indispensable party," viz., the Federal Government, because it "is Respondent's intention, should any liability result from this action, to make a claim for federal financial participation as to approximately fifty-nine percent of such liability . . . [See generally] 42 U.S.C. Section 1320b-2(a)(2)." Motion to Dismiss, p. 2. This contention must fail for several reasons. Neither the Division of Administrative Hearings nor the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services has the power or means to bring an unwilling party into a proceeding instituted pursuant to Section 120.57, Florida Statutes (1979). At most, "the presiding officer may, upon motion of a party, or upon his own initiative enter an order requiring that the absent person be notified of the proceeding and be given an opportunity to be joined as a party of record." Rule 28-5.107, Florida Administrative Code. There exists no administrative writ for joining a non-petitioning party in a substantial interest proceeding in the way judicial process can join a party within a court's jurisdiction in a pending judicial proceeding. The two cases respondent cites in support of its motion, Bannon v. Trammell, 118 So. 167 (Fla. 1928), and Heisler v. Florida Mortgage Title and Bonding Co., 142 So.2d 242 (Fla. 1932), are inapposite, because both cases involve judicial, not administrative proceedings. HRS does not really seek joinder of the United States Department of Health and Human Services; instead, HRS argues that the petition should be dismissed and the controversy relegated to federal court because it "believes that the Secretary [of the United States Department of Health and Human Services] will not succumb voluntarily to the jurisdiction of the Division of Administrative Hearings." 2/ Motion to Dismiss, p. 3. Participation by the Department of Health and Human Services in the present proceedings would have been welcomed, as the Hearing Officer indicated at the prehearing conference, but neither the Department itself nor either of the parties requested such participation. In any event, petitioner is seeking additional reimbursement from respondent HRS, not from any federal agency. Medicaid providers like petitioner do not receive any funds directly from the Department of Health and Human Services. Since "[t]he contracts involved are clearly between the hospitals and [H]RS [, n]o third party requirement appears," Montana Deaconess Hospital v. Department of Social and Rehabilitation Services, 538 P.2d 1021, 1024 (Mont. 1975), and the Department of Health and Human Services is not an indispensable party to administrative proceedings arising out of contracts between HRS and Medicaid providers. HRS protests that it might find itself making additional reimbursement to petitioner, yet be deprived of the federal component of such expenditures. See 42 U.S.C. Section 1396b. This prospect is an unlikely one in view of the fact that the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare has repeatedly cited HRS for noncompliance because of under-reimbursements to Medicaid providers. If the Federal Government fails to contribute to any additional reimbursement, it would not be for want of a forum in which HRS could present its claim. There are administrative mechanisms within the Department of Health and Human Services, including its Grant Appeals Board. See 42 U.S.C. Section 1116(d). After exhaustion of administrative remedies, HRS would have access to the courts, if necessary. See Georgia v. Califano, 446 F. Supp. 404 (N.D. Ga. 1977). There is no danger that HRS will be deprived of an opportunity to litigate any question about federal contribution because the United States Department of Health and Human Services is not a party to the present proceedings. MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT Petitioner's motion for partial summary judgment was amended ore tenus at the final hearing to delete "and FYE March 31, 1981," on page 1 of the motion, after leave to amend was granted, without objection by respondent. As a technical matter, the motion is a misnomer, since substantial interest proceedings before the Division of Administrative Hearings eventuate in recommended orders, not judgments. But, petitioner's contention that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact is well founded. The parties have so stipulated. (T. 70; Mr. Weiss's letter of November 12, 1981.) At the time the petition was filed, the parties contemplated numerous factual disputes which, however, had all been resolved by the time of final hearing through the commendable efforts of counsel. In the absence of a disputed issue of material fact, the Administrative Procedure Act provides for informal proceedings pursuant to Section 120.57(2), Florida Statutes (1979), "[u]nless otherwise agreed." Section 120.57, Florida Statutes (1979). On December 7, 1981, the parties filed their Stipulation and Agreement to proceed pursuant to Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes (1979), notwithstanding the absence of any factual dispute. DISPUTE COGNIZABLE In the present case, as in Graham Contracting, Inc. v. Department of General Services, 363 So.2d 810 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978), there "can be no doubt that the Department's contract . . . calls for agency action which potentially affects . . . substantial interests," 363 So.2d at 812, of the petitioning contractor. Cf. Solar Energy Control, Inc. v. State Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, 377 So.2d 746 (Fla 1st DCA 1979) (reh. den. 1980) (disappointed bidder substantially affected). See Section 120.52(10)(a), Florida Statutes (1979). In Graham Contracting, Inc. v. Department of General Services, 363 So.2d 810 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978), the petitioner sought "additional money and construction time under its contract," 363 So.2d at 813, with a state agency. The court found "no difficulty . . . with sovereign immunity," 363 So.2d at 813, and held that a contractor with a state agency could invoke the Administrative Procedure Act in order to enforce its contract, even though the contract purported to establish another method for settling the contract dispute. A clause in the contract at issue in the Graham Contracting case contemplated agency action outside the parameters of Chapter 120, Florida Statutes, in resolving certain disputes under the contract. In contrast, each of the successive contracts on which petitioner predicates its claim in the present case contains the following provision: "The hospital agrees to comply with the rules, policies, and procedures required by [HRS's] Division of Family Services for this program." Among the rules thus incorporated by reference into the contracts between petitioner and respondent is Rule 10C-7.35, Florida Administrative Code, which provides: An official representative of a facility participating in Medicaid, . . . or . . . representative, may appeal Medicaid Program policy, procedure, or administrative rulings whenever the provider feels there has been an unfair, illegal or inappropriate action by the Department affecting them or their facility. (1) Provider Appeals The Administrative Procedures [sic] Act, Chapter 120 F.S., provides for provider appeals and hearings, which are conducted by the Division of Administrative Hearings in the Department of Administration. The spe- cific rule relative to the appeal and hearing process is Chapter 28-3 [sic] of the Florida Administrative Rules. . . Since, by reference to Rule 10C-7.35, Florida Administrative Code, the contract in the present case incorporates Chapter 120, Florida Statutes, the applicability of the Administrative Procedure Act is even clearer here than in the Graham Contracting case. THE MERITS The parties have stipulated that petitioner has been reimbursed by respondent less than its reasonable costs of providing covered inpatient hospital services over the time period in question. Under-reimbursement of this kind is not authorized by Section 409.266, Florida Statutes, which incorporates the federal statutory requirement that hospitals which, like petitioner, provide Medicaid services be reimbursed by respondent for reasonable costs incurred, in accordance with an approved State Plan, and not some lesser amount. 42 U.S.C. Section 1396a(a)(13)(B), Pub. L. 89-97, Section 121(a) redesignated 42 U.S.C. Section 1396a(a)(13)(D), Pub. L. 90-248, Section 224(a). All Florida "State Plan provisions . . . approved by HEW and . . . govern[ing] HRS's reimbursement of inpatient hospital services prior to July 1, 1981, commit HRS to reimburse hospitals [like petitioner] that also participated in the Medicare program for their reasonable costs of providing inpatient hospital services to Medicaid patients, applying Medicare cost reimbursement principles and standards." Prehearing Stipulation, Paragraph 19. The record is clear. Respondent consistently reimbursed petitioner less than its reasonable costs of providing inpatient hospital services in order to cut its own expenses and in doing so jeopardized the entire Medicaid program. This cannot be condoned, even though respondent acted under color of law, viz., Rule 10C-7.39(6), Florida Administrative Code [now repealed and declared invalid; see Pan American Hospital Corporation v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, No. 81-1480R (DOAH; December 4, 1981)], and even though a lack of money or, at least, an apparent shortage was the reason for respondent's parsimony. The question remains, however, whether this dereliction on respondent's part should inure to the benefit of petitioner; and the answer turns on the construction of the agreement between the parties attached as an appendix to this order. Petitioner argues cogently that public policy has clearly been enunciated by statute to be full reimbursement for costs reasonably incurred by Medicaid providers in furnishing covered services. There can be no clearer expression of public policy than a statute duly enacted; and the reasons behind the full reimbursement policy are themselves compelling: to deal fairly with the providers, not only for fairness sake, but also to assure their participation in the program, and to remove any temptation to give indigent patients substandard care, inter alia. But, there is surely an overriding public policy requiring that a contractor with state government who voluntarily agrees to forego a claim against the public fisc be held to that agreement in administrative proceedings like these. The form agreement between petitioner and respondent, which they renewed annually, states: "It is understood that reimbursement will be made on the basis of an interim payment plan in the form of a per diem cost rate, plus a percentage allowance for the year in lieu of retroactive payment adjustment. However, . . . in the event the hospital did not receive its audited reasonable costs in the year prior to the current year then the hospital may deduct from the refund the prior year deficiency." (Emphasis supplied.) The agreement thus contemplated under-reimbursement and specified the method for recoupment, if there was to be any. Any "retroactive payment adjustment," as the result of administrative proceedings or otherwise, is specifically ruled out. Elsewhere in the parties' agreement is found this language: [T]he fiscal responsibility of [respondent's] Division of Family Services is subjected [sic] to the appropriation and availability of funds to the Medicaid program . . . by the state legislature every year." The terms of the agreement make clear that under-reimbursement is not in itself a breach. Respondent's failure to compute annually a "new percentage . . . based on hospital cost trends" was attributable to a shortage of funds; and the agreement provided that respondent's "fiscal responsibility" was subject to just such a shortage. In sum, provisions of the agreement petitioner voluntarily entered into with respondent operate in much the same way as a liquidated damages clause and preclude the relief petitioner seeks. Petitioner's invocation of the parol evidence rule is unavailing. Even if the stipulated facts outside the four corners of the form agreement are looked to, the course of dealing between these parties buttresses the construction outlined above. The fact that respondent may have settled a case it litigated against another hospital in some other way, as asserted by petitioner, is technically irrelevant.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That respondent deny the prayer of the petitioner for additional reimbursement. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of December, 1981, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of December, 1981.
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence presented the following facts are found: Petitioners each made application for a certificate of need under the provisions of Sections 381.493 through 381.497, Florida Statutes, 1975, which applications were submitted to the Bureau of Community Medical Facilities and accepted as complete by the bureau. Each application seeks a certificate of need for a third generation computerized axial tomography scanner (whole body unit) hereinafter referred to as a CAT scanner. There is presently in Jacksonville a head scanner installed at St. Vincent Hospital in November, 1975, and a whole body scanner at St. Luke's Hospital which has been in full operation since January, 1976. All three Petitioners are located in Jacksonville, Florida. The applications were processed by the appropriate Health Systems Agency. After due consideration the Health Systems Agency recommended that each of the three applications be granted. At the request of the Bureau of Community Medical Facilities, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, the State Hospital Advisory Council reviewed the applications and upheld the Health Systems Agency's determination that the three applications should be granted certificates of need. After consideration of the applications, the Health Systems Agency's recommendation the State Hospital Advisory Council's recommendation, Mr. Art Forehand, Administrator, Office of Community Medical Facilities, Respondent herein, notified each of the three Petitioners that their applications were not favorably considered. Mr. Forehand's notification set forth three reasons for the unfavorable consideration. Those were (1) lack of demonstrated need for the requested scanner, (2) failure of each application to demonstrate positive action toward containment of cost for services rendered to the public, and (3) lack of demonstrated unavailability, unaccessability, and inadequacy of like services within the Jacksonville area. At the time of his decision Mr. Forehand had no material or information available to him which was not available to the Health Systems Agency or the State Hospital Advisory Council at the time of their decision. At the time the three applications were denied Mr. Forehand felt that there did exist a need for one additional scanner in the Jacksonville area but he did not feel that he should bear the burden of deciding which one of the three applications should be granted and therefore all three were denied. Except for those matters set forth in Mr. Forehand's denial and noted above, none of the parties to this proceeding disputed that the criteria for determining need found in Section 101-1.03(c), F.A.C., were met. A study of computerized axial tomography with suggested criteria for review of certificate of need applications was conducted by the staff of the Health Systems Agency of Northeast Florida relative to the Duval County area. This study was published in April of 1976 and its findings appear to have been accepted by the Health Systems Agency. As one of its suggested criteria for determining need it found that a hospital or applicant should have a potential case load of at least 1,000 CAT scans per year. The study went on to project a potential case load for the three Petitioners herein. That projection for Baptist Memorial Hospital shows a a potential case load of 2,512 scans per year. The study noted that Baptist Memorial projected 1,300 scans for the first year during start up operations and 2,080 scans during the second and third years of their forecast. The study found that Riverside Hospital has a potential case load of 1,196 scans per year compared to their own projections of 1,432 scans per year. The study finally found that the University Hospital has a potential case load of 1,558 scans per year compared to their projection of 2,904. Testimony on behalf of the Respondent shows that in the opinion of Respondent full use of a CAT scanner is 10 scans per day on a 20-day work month working five days a week. As shown by unrebutted testimony the existing scanner at St. Luke's Hospital in Jacksonville is presently averaging 10 scans per day, five-days a week. Further, according to the evidence presented by Respondent, the existing scanner at St. Vincent is being utilized to at least 85 percent of its capacity. Respondent took the position at the hearing that when existing scanners are being used to 85 percent or more of their capacity a need exists for more equipment. Thus, it appears that using the criteria of utilization adhered to by Respondent, the existing CAT scanners in Jacksonville are being utilized to the extent that there is a need for additional scanners. University Hospital has 310 licensed beds and is the community hospital in Duval County with the responsibility of serving the indigent on an emergency and short term basis. It is the trauma center of the city and has the most active emergency room. It is also the major teaching hospital in Duval County. Respondent agrees that it has the greatest need of any hospital in Duval County for a CAT scanner. The University Hospital has approximately 300 visits per month to its emergency room. In the four months prior to the date of final hearing the hospital did 586 skull x-rays due to trauma. In the case of acute trauma patients frequently may not be moved from one hospital to another for the purpose of a CAT scan nor, in some cases, should other dangerous invasive techniques be used for diagnosis. Baptist Hospital has 567 licensed beds and is a major oncology center or cancer center and does a large amount of surgical cancer work in additional to radiation therapy. With the possible exception of University Hospital, Baptist Hospital is the largest pediatric hospital in the area. According to the testimony of the administrator of the hospital it would take 14 to 18 months after receipt of a certificate of need to have a CAT scanner in service. Riverside Hospital has 183 licensed beds. The hospital has been a specialty hospital since its establishment in 1908 and serves the Riverside Clinic. The hospital has approximately 200 specialized physicians, all board certified, on-staff. Riverside is a unique hospital because of its degree of specialty and its relationship to Riverside Clinic. Riverside Hospital does 100 percent of the Riverside Clinic's radiology work. Riverside Hospital has been known as an established diagnostic center. Witnesses for Riverside Hospital testified that if they were not able to have a CAT scanner their reputation and ability to provide first class service would be seriously diminished. CAT scanners represent a significant development in diagnostic medicine. They reduce the need for many dangerous, painful and costly injections of dye, air and radioactive isotopes required by some of the more traditional diagnostic procedures. The three most common tests displaced by CAT scanners are pneumoencephalography, angiography and radioactive isotope scanning. The first two of the foregoing are particularly expensive procedures and require hospitalization. At present, patients at the three Petitioner hospitals have to be transported to another facility in order to use a scanner. The transfer of an inpatient to another hospital for a scan may effectively consume the better part of a patient's day and may require an extra day of hospitalization. The cost of transportation, increased hospital stay and ancillary matters increase the actual cost to the Patient. Patients suffering from severe trauma or otherwise in a critical state, may not be transported out of a hospital to a scanner. All three of the Petitioners have an active neurological and neurosurgical staff and qualified radiologists. The unrebutted testimony indicates that, although CAT scanners are a new development whose potential has not yet been fully explored and whose development may not yet be final, they nevertheless have become an essential diagnostic tool of regular use.
The Issue Whether, as set forth in the Respondent's letters dated April 28, 1997, and May 19, 1997, health care services provided by the Petitioner to specified Medicaid recipients, for which services the Petitioner was reimbursed under the Medicaid Program, were not medically necessary and, therefore, resulted in overpayments to the Petitioner; and, if so, the amount which the Respondent is entitled to recoup from the Petitioner.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing and on the entire record of these proceedings, the following findings of fact are made: The Respondent, the Agency for Health Care Administration, is the state agency responsible for administering Florida's Medicaid Program, which includes recovery of payments made for services which are retrospectively determined to be medically unnecessary. Section 409.913, Florida Statutes. The Petitioner, Indian River Memorial Hospital, Inc., is an acute care facility that has contracted with the Agency to provide health care goods and services to Medicaid recipients. Indian River Memorial meets all statutory requirements for a Medicaid provider. At the times material to these proceedings, the Keystone Peer Review Organization was under contract with the Agency to conduct retrospective reviews of the medical records and other information related to health care goods and services provided to Medicaid recipients and to determine whether the goods and services qualified for reimbursement under the Medicaid Program. The amount of money the Agency seeks to recoup from Indian River Memorial is based on the results of KePRO's retrospective review of the medical necessity for acute inpatient care for Medicaid recipients admitted for psychiatric treatment to Indian River Memorial in 1992, 1993, and 1994. The process used for retrospective reviews by KePRO consisted of four steps.3 The review process was initiated when the Agency submitted a list of Medicaid cases to KePRO for review. At the times material to these proceedings, the Agency submitted all of the Medicaid cases involving inpatient psychiatric services for peer review, and KePRO was the only peer-review organization authorized to review psychiatric services. The medical records were also sent to KePRO, which employed registered nurses to review the records to determine whether the admission and the number of days of hospitalization for each recipient were justified by the relevant criteria set forth in the Florida Medicaid Criteria Handbook. In the Medicaid cases at issue herein, the relevant criteria were those adult and pediatric psychiatric criteria for intensity of service, severity of illness, and discharge. If the KePRO nurse found that the medical records established that the applicable criteria were met, KePRO approved the payment which had been made for the services. If the KePRO nurse found that the medical records did not support the applicable criteria, the nurse referred the case for further review to a physician licensed in Florida and acting in the capacity of an independent contractor to KePRO. The identities of these physicians were confidential and were not disclosed even to the Agency. The physician who first reviewed a Medicaid case was not required to be a specialist in the type of medicine presented in the case even though the physician was expected to evaluate the medical necessity of the services in light of the requirements of the applicable Medicaid criteria, his or her own clinical judgment, and any other factors deemed relevant. The fact that one of the applicable Medicaid criteria was not satisfied was not dispositive of the question of medical necessity for the services provided. If the physician questioned the medical necessity for some or all of the services provided to a Medicaid recipient, a letter was sent to the provider identifying the case as a pending denial and giving the provider twenty days in which to provide additional information to support the medical necessity for the services. If additional information was submitted, the case was sent to a second physician, who reviewed the additional information and determined whether the preliminary decision of the first physician should be upheld, modified, or reversed. If the second physician upheld the decision, an initial denial letter was sent by KePRO to the provider advising that it was not entitled to reimbursement under the Medicaid Program for the specified services provided to the Medicaid recipient. The initial denial letters were form letters which were modified as needed and included, among other things, a brief description of the basis for the denial, the services for which reimbursement was denied, and notification of the provider's right to request that KePRO reconsider its decision. If the provider requested reconsideration, KePRO scheduled a "reconsideration" and notified the provider that it could submit additional information in the form of testimony and/or documentation. The physician reviewing the case on reconsideration could not be one of the physicians who had previously reviewed the case and had to be board-certified in the relevant medical specialty. During reconsideration, the physician was expected to review the medical records and any additional information that had been submitted; he or she then determined whether the initial decision should be upheld, modified, or reversed. KePRO prepared a letter that notified the provider of the decision on reconsideration and included a brief explanation of the basis for the decision. The reconsideration letter was a form letter that was modified to include information specific to the case under review. The explanation for the decision on reconsideration was prepared by a nurse, who interpreted and summarized the notes of the reconsideration review which had been prepared by the reviewing physician. KePRO initial denial letters and reconsideration letters were signed by William L. Moore, M.D., KePRO's medical director from 1993 through 1996. Dr. Moore is board-certified in family practice and quality assurance and holds a Florida license to practice medicine. Dr. Moore was not involved in the preparation of the letters, and he did not read the medical records of any of the Medicaid recipients except when necessary for purposes of quality control.4 The initial and reconsideration letters were sent to the provider, and copies of the letters were also sent to the Agency. If the provider did not submit repayment to the Agency based on the KePRO letters, the Agency prepared and sent a letter advising the provider that it must repay the Agency for reimbursements it had received under the Medicaid Program for services which KePRO had denied. The letter also advised the provider of its right to request an administrative hearing to be conducted pursuant to Chapter 120, Florida Statutes. Following a retrospective review, KePRO sent initial denial letters to Indian River Memorial and the attending physicians advising them that Indian River Memorial was not entitled to reimbursement for a specified number of days of inpatient care provided to the Medicaid recipients identified in the denial letters because KePRO had determined either that the admission was not medically necessary or that it was not medically necessary for the recipient to receive acute inpatient care for the number of days he or she remained hospitalized.5 After it received the initial denial letters, Indian River Memorial requested that KePRO reconsider a number of its decisions denying reimbursement. KePRO completed the reconsiderations, and sent letters to Indian River Memorial advising it of the decisions to uphold or modify the initial denials. Based on the KePRO decisions on reconsideration, the Agency prepared and sent the April 28, 1997, and May 19, 1997, letters to Indian River Memorial seeking to recoup reimbursements for services provided to seventy-two patients admitted to Indian River Memorial and treated for psychiatric problems in 1992, 1993, and 1994; thirty-two patients were identified in the letter at issue in DOAH Case No. 97-2469, and forty patients were identified in the letter at issue in DOAH Case No. 97-2692. The Agency's decision to seek to recoup reimbursements made on behalf of most of these Medicaid recipients was based on KePRO’s determinations that there was no medical necessity for the hospital admission or that there was no medical necessity for a specified number of days of inpatient care.6 John Sullenberger, M.D., is Chief Medical Advisor for Florida's Medicaid Program, and he makes the final decision for the Agency regarding the medical necessity for health care goods and services provided to Medicaid recipients in Florida. Dr. Sullenberger is board-certified in surgery and in thoracic surgery, and he holds a license to practice medicine in Florida. Dr. Sullenberger reviewed both the initial and the reconsideration letters sent to Indian River Memorial by KePRO for fifty-four of the seventy-two Medicaid recipients identified in the attachments to the April 28, 1997, and May 19, 1997, letters.7 Because Dr. Sullenberger is not a psychiatrist, he did not offer an expert opinion as to the medical necessity for the days of acute inpatient care provided to these Medicaid recipients. Instead, he agreed with the decisions of KePRO with respect to fifty-three of the recipients and believed that the explanations in each of the KePRO letters provided a reasonable basis on which to deny reimbursement under the statutory definition of medical necessity applicable in Florida Medicaid cases; Dr. Sullenberger did not approve of the KePRO decision to deny reimbursement with respect to one recipient.8 Dr. Sullenberger did not review the medical records of any of the fifty-four Medicaid recipients, and he did not review the notes written by the physician advisors reviewing the cases for KePRO.9 Rather, Dr. Sullenberger based his agreement with the KePRO decisions exclusively on the cursory explanations contained in the initial and reconsideration letters. Indian River Memorial presented the testimony of three attending physicians for the Medicaid recipients at issue. Each of these physicians commented on the information contained in the medical records for their patients, explained their reasons for admitting and retaining each patient in an acute care setting, and offered their opinions that acute inpatient care was medically necessary for each of their patients at admission and throughout their hospitalization at Indian River Memorial. Indian River Memorial also presented the testimony of Bernard L. Frankel, M.D. Dr. Frankel is board-certified in psychiatry, is licensed to practice medicine in Florida and Georgia, and is currently a professor of psychiatry at Emory University in Atlanta, Georgia. Dr. Frankel reviewed the medical records for fifty-two of the fifty-three Medicaid recipients whose hospitalization in Indian River Memorial was ultimately placed at issue by Dr. Sullenberger's testimony, and Dr. Frankel offered his opinion as an expert in psychiatry as to the medical justification for the admission and length of stay for each of the fifty-two patients. Dr. Frankel expressed his opinion that, based on the information contained in the medical records and on his clinical judgment, the admission to and length of stay in an acute care facility such as Indian River Memorial was medically justified for each of the fifty-two patients. Dr. Frankel supported his opinions with a summary of the pertinent points documented in the medical records and with his assessment of the medical necessity of the hospitalization for each of the fifty- two patients. Neither Mercedes S. Borromeo, M.D., the attending physician, nor Dr. Frankel testified regarding the medical necessity for the admission and thirty-two-day hospitalization of patient J. P. J. P. was admitted to Indian River Memorial on November 10, 1993, and, in the opinion of the KePRO physicians both initially and on reconsideration, he should have been discharged on December 3, 1993, because he was stable and no longer needed acute inpatient care. Dr. Sullenberger testified that he agreed with the opinion of KePRO that ten days of the thirty-two days of hospitalization were not medically necessary. The Medicaid reimbursement per diem rate of $452.53 was effective from July 1, 1993, through December 31, 1993. The evidence presented by Indian River Memorial is sufficient to establish that, in DOAH Case No. 97-2469, the admission and length of stay was medically necessary for patients P. A.; T. A.; E. A.; D. A.; T. B.; B. B.; E. B.; M. B.; S. B.; J. C.; J. C., Jr.; B. C.; H. C.; B. D.; W. E.; J. F.; A. F.; E. J.; G. J.; M. L.; B. L.; S. L.; V. L.; C. L.; M. M.; R. M.; A. N.; Y. R.; J. S.; and K. B. (C.). The evidence presented by the Agency through Dr. Sullenberger's testimony and the KePRO letters is not sufficient to support the Agency's contention that the services provided these patients were not medically necessary.10 The evidence presented by Indian River Memorial is sufficient to establish that, in DOAH Case No. 97-2692, the admission and length of stay was medically necessary for patients J. B., Jr.; J. P. B.; K. C.; R. C.; M. D.; A. D.; R. D.; L. E.; C. F.; K. H.; M. H.; T. K.; J. L.; H. L.; J. M.; M. M.; R. P.; C. R. S.; J. S.; K. S.; M. S.; and R. W. The evidence presented by the Agency through Dr. Sullenberger's testimony and the KePRO letters is not sufficient to support the Agency's contention that the services provided these patients were not medically necessary.11 Indian River Memorial presented no evidence except the medical records to support the medical necessity for the acute inpatient care provided to patient J. P. from December 4, 1993, through December 13, 1993. In the absence of any expert testimony to establish the medical necessity for these ten days of hospitalization, Indian River Memorial must repay the Agency for the Medicaid reimbursement Indian River Memorial received for ten days of inpatient care for patient J. P., at the applicable per diem rate of $452.53. Finally, the Agency's claim in its Proposed Recommended Order that the Agency is entitled to recoup from Indian River Memorial payments made for a patient identified as R. D. is rejected. The Agency asserts that Indian River Memorial is not entitled to reimbursement under the Medicaid Program for inpatient services provided to R. D. on the basis of a "technical denial," that is, Indian River Memorial's failure to provide medical records for this patient. This assertion is not supported by any evidence of record, either through a KePRO letter or testimony of Dr. Sullenberger.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Health Care Administration enter a final order: Requiring Indian River Memorial Hospital, Inc., to repay the Agency $4,525.30 for ten days of acute inpatient care provided to Medicaid recipient J. P.; and, Finding that the Agency is not entitled to recoup from Indian River Memorial reimbursements made under the Medicaid Program for services provided to any other Medicaid recipients identified in the April 28, 1997, Agency letter, DOAH Case No. 97-2469, or in the May 19, 1997, Agency letter, DOAH Case No. 97- 2692. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of June, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. PATRICIA HART MALONO Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of June, 1999.
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant hereto Respondent was licensed as a physician in the State of Florida having been issued license number ME0040318. Respondent completed a residency in internal medicine and later was a nephrology fellow at Mayo Clinic. He was recruited to Florida in 1952 by Humana. In 1984 he became associated with a Health Maintenance Organization (HMO) in an administrative position but took over treating patients when the owner became ill. This HMO was affiliated with IMC who assimilated it when the HMO had financial difficulties. At all times relevant hereto Respondent was a salaried employee of IMC and served as Assistant Medical DIRECTOR in charge of the South Pasadena Clinic. On October 17, 1985, Alexander Stroganow, an 84 year old Russian immigrant and former cossack, who spoke and understood only what English he wanted to, suffered a fall and was taken to the emergency Room at a nearby hospital. He was examined and released without being admitted for inpatient treatment. Later that evening his landlady thought Stroganow needed medical attention and again called the Emergency Medical Service. When the ambulance with EMS personnel arrived they examined Stroganow, and concluded Stroganow was no worse than earlier when he was transported to the emergency Room, and refused to again take Stroganow to the emergency Room. The landlady then called the HRS hotline to report abuse of the elderly. The following morning, October 18, 1985, an HRS case worker was dispatched to check on Stroganow. Upon arrival, she was admitted by the landlady and found an 84 year old man who was incontinent, incoherent, and apparently paralyzed from the waist down, with whom she could not engage in conversation to determine his condition. She called for a Cares Unit team to come and evaluate Stroganow. An HRS Cares Unit is a two person team consisting of a social worker and nurse whose primary function is to screen clients for admission to nursing homes and adult congregate living facilities (ACLF). The nurse on the team carries no medical equipment such as stethoscope, blood pressure cuff, or thermometer, but makes her evaluation on visual examination. Upon arrival of the Cares Unit, and, after examining Stroganow, both members of the team agreed he needed to be placed where he could be attended. A review of his personal effects produced by his landlady revealed his income to be above that for which he could qualify for medicaid placement in a nursing home; that he was a member of IMC's Gold-Plus HMO; his social security card; and several medications, some of which had been prescribed by Dr. Dayton, Respondent, a physician employed by IMC at the South Pasadena Clinic. The Cares team ruled out ACLF placement because Stroganow was not ambulatory, but felt he needed to be placed in a hospital or nursing home and not left alone with the weekend approaching. To accomplish this, they proceeded to the South Pasadena HMO clinic of IMC to lay the problem on Dr. Dayton, who was in charge of the South Pasadena Clinic, and, they thought, was Stroganow's doctor. Stroganow had been a client of the South Pasadena HMO for some time and was well known at the clinic as well as by EMS personnel. There were always two, and occasionally three, doctors on duty at South Pasadena Clinic between 8:00 and 5:00 daily and, unless the patient requested a specific doctor he was treated by the first available doctor. Stroganow had not specifically requested to be treated by Respondent. When the Cares unit met with Respondent they advised him that Stroganow had been taken to Metropolitan General Hospital Emergency Room the previous evening but did not advise Respondent that the EMS squad had refused to return Stroganow to the emergency Room when they were recalled for Stroganow the same evening. Respondent telephoned the Metropolitan General Emergency Room and had the emergency Room medical report on Stroganow read to him. With the information provided by the Cares unit and the hospital report, Respondent concluded that Stroganow needed emergency medical treatment and the quickest way to obtain such treatment would be to call the EMS and have Stroganow taken to an emergency Room for evaluation. When the Cares unit arrived, Respondent was treating patients at the clinic. A clinic, or doctors office, is not a desirable or practical place to have an incontinent, incoherent, and non-ambulatory patient brought to wait with other patients until a doctor is free to see him. Nor is the clinic equipped to perform certain procedures that may be required for emergency evaluation of an ill patient. At a hospital emergency Room such equipment is available. EMS squads usually arrive within minutes of a call being placed to 911 for emergency medical treatment and it was necessary that someone be with Stroganow when the EMS squad arrived. Accordingly, Respondent suggested that the Cares team return to Stroganow and call 911 to transport Stroganow to an emergency Room for an evaluation. Upon leaving the South Pasadena clinic the Cares team returned to Stroganow. Enroute they stopped to call a supervisor at HRS to report that the HMO had not solved their problem with Stroganow. The supervisor then called the Administrator at IMC Tampa Office to tell them that one of their Gold-Plus HMO patients had an emergency situation which was not being property handled. Respondent left the South Pasadena Clinic around noon and went to IMC's Tampa Office where he was available for the balance of the afternoon. There he spoke with Dr. Sanchez, the INC Regional Medical Director, but Stroganow was not deemed to be a continuing problem. By 2:00 p.m. when no ambulance had arrived the Cares Unit called 911 for EMS to take Stroganow to an emergency Room. Upon arrival shortly thereafter the EMS squad again refused to transport Stroganow. The Cares team communicated this to their supervisor who contacted IMC Regional Office to so advise. At this time Dr. Sanchez authorized the transportation of Stroganow to Lake Seminole Hospital for admission. Although neither Respondent nor Sanchez had privileges at Lake Seminole Hospital, IMC had contracted with Lake Seminole Hospital to have IMC patients admitted by a staff doctor at Lake Seminole Hospital. Subsequent to his meeting with the Cares team Respondent received no further information regarding Stroganow until well after Stroganow was admitted to Lake Seminole Hospital. No entry was made on Stroganow's medical record at IMC of the meeting between Respondent and the Cares Unit. Respondent was a salaried employee whose compensation was not affected by whether or not he admitted an IMC Gold-Plus patient to a hospital.
Conclusions Having reviewed the Administrative Complaint, and all other matters of record, the Agency for Health Care Administration finds and concludes as follows: 1. The Agency has jurisdiction over the above-named Respondent pursuant to Chapter 408, Part II, Florida Statutes, and the applicable authorizing statutes and administrative code provisions. 2. The Agency issued the attached Administrative Complaint and Election of Rights form to the Respondent. (Ex. 1) The Election of Rights form advised of the right to an administrative hearing. 3. The parties have since entered into the attached Settlement Agreement. (Ex. 2) Based upon the foregoing, it is ORDERED: 1. The Settlement Agreement is adopted and incorporated by reference into this Final Order. The parties shall comply with the terms of the Settlement Agreement. 2. The Respondent shall pay the Agency $1,600.00. If full payment has been made, the cancelled check acts as receipt of payment and no further payment is required. If full payment has not been made, payment is due within 30 days of the Final Order. Overdue amounts are subject to statutory interest and may be referred to collections. A check made payable to the “Agency for Health Care Administration” and containing the AHCA ten-digit case number should be sent to: Office of Finance and Accounting Revenue Management Unit Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, MS 14 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Filed August 23, 2011 4:13 PM pivlsion of Administrative Hearings ORDERED at Tallahassee, Florida, on this 7 7 day of Heegerat , 2011. Elizabeth Dudek, Secretary Agency for Health Care Administration
Other Judicial Opinions A party who is adversely affected by this Final Order is entitled to judicial review, which shall be instituted by filing one copy of a notice of appeal with the Agency Clerk of AHCA, and a second copy, along with filing fee as prescribed by law, with the District Court of Appeal in the appellate district where the Agency maintains its headquarters or where a party resides. Review of proceedings shall be conducted in accordance with the Florida appellate rules. The Notice of Appeal must be filed within 30 days of rendition of the order to be reviewed. CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I CERTIFY that a true and correct a of this Final Order was served on the below-named persons by the method designated on this ay of , u fi “0k , 2011. f/f? Richard Shogp, Agency Clerk Agency fos Health Care Admigéstration 2727 Mahan Drive, Bldg. #3, Mail Stop #3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403 Telephone: (850) 412-3630 Jan Mills Finance & Accounting Facilities Intake Unit Revenue Management Unit (Electronic Mail) (Electronic Mail) Mary Daley Jacobs _| Bruce D. Lamb Office of the General Counsel Attorney for the Respondent Agency for Health Care Administration Ruden McClosky, P.A. (Electronic Mail) 401 East Jackson Street, 27" Floor Tampa, Florida 33602 U.S. Mail) Errol H. Powell Division of Administrative Hearings (Electronic Mail)
The Issue At issue in this proceeding is whether Respondent’s denial of Petitioner’s Level II appeal should be upheld or whether the inpatient residential mental health services provided to R.H. by McLean Hospital’s 3 East Dialectical Behavior Therapy (“DBT”) program from September 9, 2015, through September 22, 2015, and again from October 15, 2015, through December 11, 2015, were “medically necessary” and therefore covered under the terms of the State Employees’ PPO Group Health Insurance Plan.
Findings Of Fact DSGI is the state agency responsible for administration of the state group insurance program, pursuant to section 110.123, Florida Statutes. Petitioner, A.H., is a State of Florida employee and was insured through the State Employees’ PPO Group Health Insurance Plan (the “Plan”). R.H., the child of A.H., was eligible for coverage under A.H.’s health insurance policy as of September 1, 2015. Pursuant to contract, Florida Blue acts as DSGI’s third-party medical claims administrator for employee health insurance benefits. New Directions is Florida Blue’s subcontractor and third-party administrator for mental health and substance abuse reviews and authorizations. “Utilization management” is the process of reviewing a service claim to determine whether the service is a covered benefit under the Plan and whether the service is “medically necessary” as that term is defined in the Plan. In cases involving mental health or substance abuse services, the service must also satisfy the more detailed and specific coverage guidelines, titled “Medical Necessity Criteria,” established by New Directions.1/ Consistent with general practice in the field, the “medical necessity” criteria of the New Directions document observe the following levels of care, in increasing order of intensity: psychiatric outpatient; psychiatric intensive outpatient; psychiatric partial hospitalization; psychiatric residential; and psychiatric acute residential. In the interests of conserving medical resources and preserving patient liberty, safety, and dignity, every effort is made to place patients in the least intensive level of care consistent with effective treatment of their presenting condition. R.H., a female who was 15 years old during the period relevant to this proceeding, has been diagnosed with borderline personality disorder and has a history of eating disorders. Her treating psychologist in Florida, Nicolle Arbelaez Lopez, noted that R.H. was also being treated for generalized anxiety disorder. R.H. had an inpatient admission to the Renfrew Center in Florida for eating disorder treatment in May 2015. R.H. transitioned to partial hospitalization over the summer, followed by a step down to the Renfrew Center's intensive outpatient program, then by a step up back to partial hospitalization when her eating disorder behaviors worsened. Though less intensive than a full residential admission, intensive outpatient treatment and partial hospitalization allow patients to receive comparatively intensive treatment while remaining in their home environment.2/ R.H.’s final discharge from the Renfrew Center was on August 21, 2015. At the time she was admitted to McLean Hospital’s 3 East DBT program, R.H. had a recent history of engaging in superficial cutting of her arm. On August 30, 2015, R.H. intentionally hit herself in the hand with a hammer. R.H.’s mother took her to the emergency room for treatment and told the treating personnel that R.H. had fallen down some stairs. The hammer blow caused swelling and bruising but no broken bones. R.H. was also continuing to purge and restrict her food intake. R.H.’s treating psychiatrist, Dr. Thania V. Quesdada, and her psychologist, Ms. Lopez, both urged that she be admitted to one of three nationally-recognized immersion DBT programs. Her family chose the program at McLean Hospital. DBT is a cognitive behavioral treatment that was originally developed to treat chronically suicidal individuals diagnosed with borderline personality disorder, though it is now employed for treatment of other conditions, including eating disorders. DBT teaches behavioral coping skills such as mindfulness, distress tolerance, interpersonal effectiveness, and emotional regulation. At the hearing, DSGI did not dispute the general efficacy of DBT treatment. However, DSGI did dispute whether R.H.’s presentation merited “immersion” DBT, i.e., a residential inpatient admission. McLean Hospital’s 3 East DBT program is self-pay and requires a minimum stay of 28 days. The program does not accept insurance and does not assist patients with insurance reimbursement efforts. Because of its stance on insurance, the 3 East DBT program is obviously not an in-network provider under the Plan. Prior to admission, Petitioner was aware that the 3 East DBT program did not accept insurance. R.H. was in residential treatment at McLean Hospital from September 9, 2015, through September 22, 2015. While at McLean Hospital, R.H. engaged in restricting and purging behaviors that led to medical instability. She was discharged to Cambridge Eating Disorder Center on September 23, 2015. She remained at the Cambridge Center until October 15, 2015. R.H.’s stay at the Cambridge Center was pre-certified by New Directions and is not at issue in this proceeding. On October 15, 2015, R.H. returned to McLean Hospital, again as a residential inpatient admission. She remained at McLean Hospital until her discharge on December 11, 2015. The total billed amount for R.H.’s two stays at McLean Hospital was $96,950, which was paid by the family out-of- pocket. Section 3-5 of the Plan sets forth the following under the heading “Mental Health and Substance Dependency Services”: “Physician office visits, Intensive Outpatient Treatment, Inpatient and Partial Hospitalization and Residential Treatment Services are covered based on medical necessity.” The general definition of “Medically Necessary” is set forth at section 15-4 of the Plan: [s]ervices required to identify or treat the Illness, injury, Condition, or Mental and Nervous Disorder a Doctor has diagnosed or reasonably suspects. The service must be: consistent with the symptom, diagnosis and treatment of the patient’s Condition; in accordance with standards of good medical practice; required for reasons other than convenience of the patient or the Doctor; approved by the appropriate medical body or board for the illness or injury in question; and at the most appropriate level of medical supply, service, or care that can be safely provided. The fact that a service, prescription drug, or supply is prescribed by a Doctor does not necessarily mean that the service is Medically Necessary. Florida Blue, CVS/Caremark, and DSGI determine whether a service, prescription drug, or supply is Medically Necessary. New Directions’ Medical Necessity Criteria guidelines provided the following admission criteria for psychiatric residential admissions: Must meet all of the following: A DSM diagnosis is the primary focus of active, daily treatment. There is a reasonable expectation of reduction in behaviors/symptoms with treatment at this level of care. The treatment is not primarily social, custodial, interpersonal, or respite care. The member has documented symptoms and/or behaviors that are a significant deterioration from baseline functioning and create a significant functional impairment in at least three (3) of the following areas: primary support social/interpersonal occupational/educational health/medical compliance ability to maintain safety for either self or others Must have one of the following: The member’s family members and/or support system demonstrate behaviors that are likely to undermine goals of treatment, such that treatment at a lower level of care is unlikely to be successful. This lack must be situational in nature and amenable to change as a result of the treatment process and resources identified during a residential confinement. The member has a documented history of an inability to be managed at an intensive lower level of care. There is a recent (in the last six months) history of multiple brief acute inpatient stays without a successful transition to a lower level of care, and at risk of admission to inpatient acute care. New Directions’ Medical Necessity Criteria guidelines provided the following admission criteria for eating disorder residential admissions: Must meet 1-4 and either 5, 6, or 7 A DSM diagnosis found in the Feeding and Eating Disorder section is the primary focus of active, daily treatment. There is a reasonable expectation of reduction in behaviors/symptoms with treatment at this level of care. The treatment is not primarily social, custodial, interpersonal, or respite care. The member has documented symptoms and/or behaviors that are a significant deterioration from baseline functioning and create a significant functional impairment in at least three (3) of the following areas: primary support social/interpersonal occupational/educational health/medical compliance ability to maintain safety for either self or others Must have one of the following: The member’s family members and/or support system demonstrate behaviors that are likely to undermine goals of treatment, such that treatment at a lower level of care is unlikely to be successful. This lack must be situational in nature and amenable to change as a result of the treatment process and resources identified during a residential confinement. The member has a documented history of an inability to be managed at an intensive lower level of care. There is a recent (in the last six months) history of multiple brief acute inpatient stays without a successful transition to a lower level of care, and at risk of admission to inpatient acute care. There are active biomedical complications that require 24-hour care, including, but not limited to: Adults Children/Adolescents Pulse <40 <50 Blood Pressure <90/60 <80/50 Orthostatic changes in BP Systolic: >20 point drop Systolic: > 20 point drop (Supine to standing) Diastolic: > 10 point drop Diastolic: > 10 point drop Potassium < 3 meq/l Hypokalemia Body temperature < 97 F Abnormal core temperature Electrolytes/ serum chemistry Significant deviation from normal Significant deviation from normal Must have either a. or b.: A low body weight that can reasonably lead to instability in the absence of intervention as evidenced by one of the following: Less than 85% of IBW or a BMI less than 16.5. Greater than 10% decrease in body weight within the last 30 days. In children and adolescents, greater than 10% decrease in body weight during a rapid growth cycle. Persistence or worsening of eating disorder behavior despite recent (with [sic] the last three months), appropriate therapeutic intervention in a structured eating disorder treatment setting. If PHP or IOP is contraindicated, documentation of the rationale supporting the contraindication is required. One of the following must be present: Compensatory behaviors (binging, purging, laxative abuse, excessive exercise, etc.) have caused significant physiological complications. Compensatory behaviors occur multiple times daily and have failed to respond to treatment at a lower level of care and acute physiologic imbalance can reasonably be expected. New Directions’ contact notes for this case indicate that it was called by someone named “Rachelle” on behalf of A.H.’s family on September 3, 2015. This person asked about the authorization process for McLean Hospital. No witness was presented who had direct knowledge of the contents of this conversation. The note indicates that “Rachelle” was advised that any authorization process must be initiated with New Directions by McLean Hospital. On September 9, 2015, the day R.H. was admitted to McLean Hospital, Florida Blue received what its notes reference as a “critical inquiry” message regarding this admission. A Florida Blue employee phoned the number attached to the message but discovered it was not for A.H. but for “someone at AllState Insurance who is out of the office.” (This person turned out to be Pearl Harrison, R.H.’s grandmother and qualified representative in this proceeding, who had not yet obtained a release to receive confidential medical information concerning R.H.). No number for A.H. could be found. Florida Blue contacted New Directions, which confirmed that no request for pre-authorization3/ had been received from McLean Hospital or the member. R.H.’s stays at McLean Hospital were not emergency admissions. The term “medical emergency” was not specifically defined in the 2015 Plan, but expert testimony at the hearing established that it is a term of common meaning and usage in the medical community. An emergency situation is one in which there is an immediate risk of death, serious bodily harm, or creation of an irreversible condition. If care is not administered immediately, the person will harm herself or someone else. Michael Shaw, the utilization management team leader for New Directions, explained that emergency care is not provided at the residential level of care, but in an inpatient setting under lock and key. The medical records indicated that R.H.’s last incident of self-harming behavior occurred about a week prior to her admission to McLean Hospital. Her injuries were superficial and she was in no immediate danger or risk of irreversible damage. Section 7-1 of the Plan provides for hospital admissions, including the following pertinent language as to non-emergency admissions to non-network hospitals and pre- certification for stays at non-network hospitals: Non-Network Hospital: Non-emergency Admission Every non-emergency admission to a non- network Hospital must be pre-certified. This means that before services are provided Florida Blue must certify the Hospital admission and provide the number of days for which certification is given. Precertification of non-network Hospital stays is your responsibility, even if the Doctor admitting you or your dependent to the Hospital is a Network Provider. Failure to obtain pre-certification will result in penalties (higher out-of-pocket costs). For more information on penalties, see “If You Do Not Pre-Certify Your Stay” within this section below. To pre-certify your stay in a non-network Hospital, ask your Doctor to call Florida Blue at (800) 955-5692 before your Hospital admission and provide the reason for hospitalization, the proposed treatment or surgery, testing, and the number of Hospital days anticipated. Florida Blue will review your Doctor’s request for admission certification and immediately notify your Doctor or the Hospital if your admission has been certified and the number of days for which certification has been given. If the admission is not certified, your Doctor may submit additional information for a second review. If your Hospital stay is certified and you need to stay longer than the number of days for which certification was given, your Doctor must call Florida Blue to request certification for the additional days. Your Doctor should make this call as soon as possible. * * * If You Do Not Pre-Certify Your Stay: Non- Network Hospital Benefits for covered services will be reduced by 25 percent of the covered charges, not to exceed a maximum benefit reduction of $500 IF you are admitted to a participating Hospital (Payment for Hospital Services or PHS Provider)[4/] that is not part of the Preferred Patient Care (PPC) Network and admission certification has not been requested on your behalf or the request is denied. This Plan will not pay room and board benefits for your first two days of hospitalization IF your non-network Hospital admission is denied, but you are admitted to a non-network Hospital anyway. This Plan will not pay room and board benefits for your entire Hospital stay IF you are admitted to a non-network Hospital without having your Doctor call prior to the admission. This Plan will not pay room and board benefits for the additional days that were not certified IF your non-network Hospital admission is certified but your stay is longer than the number of days for which the admission was certified. The Plan’s pre-certification requirement was not met. Neither A.H. nor McLean Hospital requested pre-certification. Mr. Shaw testified that he spoke to three different people at McLean Hospital, all of whom stated that the 3 East DBT program does not accept or work with insurance. Mr. Shaw was unable to generate the paperwork needed to begin the pre-certification process because McLean Hospital declined to share with him the necessary clinical information about R.H.5/ Although pre-certification was not obtained for R.H.’s stays at McLean Hospital, Florida Blue conducted a post-service review to determine whether the claim was eligible for reimbursement. Petitioner submitted a request for a Level I appeal pursuant to Section 12 of the Plan, under which a person denied benefits or payment of a claim for medical services may obtain a review by Florida Blue. Petitioner submitted a package of R.H.’s medical records for review. Prest & Associates, Inc., a URAC-approved independent review organization,6/ was retained to conduct an independent review of Petitioner’s claim. Dr. Barbara Center, a staff psychiatrist with Prest & Associates, performed a review designed to determine the medical necessity of R.H.’s stays at McLean Hospital. Dr. Center is board-certified in General Psychiatry, Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, and Addiction Medicine. Dr. Center reviewed the claim in terms of the New Directions criteria for psychiatric residential admissions and for eating disorder residential admissions. She performed two reviews, one for the admission starting on September 9, 2015, and another for the admission starting on October 15, 2015. Dr. Center stated that the McLean Hospital medical records provided by Petitioner gave a detailed description of R.H.’s history of present illness, past psychiatric history, and other elements of her history that were adequate for making a medical necessity determination. As to the September 9 admission, Dr. Center concluded that medical necessity criteria were not met for either a psychiatric residential or an eating disorder residential admission. As to the psychiatric residential criteria, Dr. Center concluded that R.H.’s admission failed to satisfy criteria 3, 4, and 5. Dr. Center testified that criterion 4 looks at symptoms and behaviors that represent a significant deterioration from the patient’s baseline functioning in several areas. R.H.’s primary support structures were stable. Her mother was clearly involved in her care and had the support of other family members. Dr. Center stated that the medical records showed no sign of substantial social or interpersonal deterioration, aside from some typical difficulty in starting high school. R.H. was having no medical instability at the time of admission. She was not at a dangerously low body weight. She had a recent onset of self-harming behaviors, but there was no documentation of acute risk issues that warranted placement in 24-hour care. As to criterion 5, Dr. Center testified that the records showed no indication that R.H.’s family and support system was unsupportive or unable to take her to treatment and participate in her care. There was no documentation that R.H. could not progress in a less intensive level of care. Dr. Center noted that R.H.’s prior treatment for eating disorders had been at varying levels of care and that R.H. had not had multiple brief acute inpatient stays. Criterion 3 is a diagnosis of exclusion, meaning that if there is no apparent medical necessity for the residential placement, then the reason must be “primarily social, custodial, interpersonal or respite care.” Dr. Center found in the records no support for a 24-hour residential placement. She noted that R.H.’s self-injury was of a recent onset and that McLean Hospital had ruled out any immediate prospect of self-injury or serious threat to other people. Cutting is not uncommon among adolescents and does not rise to the level of requiring residential care. Mental health providers distinguish between self-injurious behaviors and suicidal ideation, and McLean Hospital did not describe R.H. as suicidal. Dr. Center testified that, at the request of Mr. Shaw, she also reviewed R.H.’s admission in terms of the New Directions eating disorder residential criteria. Dr. Center noted that R.H. was not at a dangerous body weight (122 pounds, with a BMI of 22.2) at the time of her admission on September 9. There was no indication of medical instability or of out-of- control eating disorders requiring 24-hour care. Dr. Center testified that DBT is routinely taught on an outpatient basis and that she recommended outpatient treatment for the stay beginning on September 9. She opined that R.H. did not meet numbers 3 through 7 of the New Directions eating disorder residential criteria. As to the McLean Hospital admission beginning on October 15, 2015, Dr. Center recommended intensive outpatient treatment. Dr. Center knew that R.H. had been transitioned from McLean Hospital to the Cambridge Center to address the eating disorder as her primary symptom. Dr. Center felt that continuing R.H. in an intensive outpatient setting would help her stabilize and maintain the progress she had made at the Cambridge Center. Dr. Center stated that a basic tenet of medical care, and especially psychiatric care, is that the patient be treated in the least restrictive setting possible under the circumstances. She stated that it is always best to treat people in the environment they live in. Treatment in the 24- hour residential setting removes the patient from the stressors she will have to deal with when she goes home. Upon her readmission to the McLean Hospital from Cambridge Center, R.H. denied suicidal ideation and homicidal ideation, and the record disclosed nothing to indicate suicidal thoughts. R.H. denied auditory or visual hallucinations and her mood was described as “euthymic,” i.e., essentially normal. Dr. Center acknowledged that the medical record showed that R.H. had been in intensive outpatient treatment for her eating disorder at the Renfrew Center in Florida from July 23 through August 21, 2015, with limited success. Dr. Center stated that the issue for R.H. had recently changed from her eating disorder to her self-harming behavior and believed that an intensive outpatient program focusing on skills to deal with self-injurious behaviors would be the appropriate placement under the circumstances. Dr. Center also acknowledged that her review did not include the records of R.H.’s treating psychiatrist and therapist during her stay at Renfrew, and that their notes indicated that R.H.’s condition had regressed while in intensive outpatient care. Dr. Center testified that these records might have persuaded her to recommend a higher level of care, such as a partial hospital program, but that she still would not have recommended residential placement. After Dr. Center rendered her opinion that R.H.’s residential stays at McLean Hospital were not medically necessary, the claim was reviewed by Dr. Frank Santamaria, Florida Blue’s care management medical director. In rendering his opinion, Dr. Santamaria reviewed the medical records sent by Petitioner and McLean Hospital, the log of contact notes kept by New Directions, and Dr. Center’s report.7/ He testified that the available records were adequate to allow him to render an opinion as to medical necessity. Dr. Santamaria concluded that, as to the New Directions criteria for psychiatric residential admissions, R.H. failed to meet criteria 3, 4, and 5. He opined generally that when assessing the need for a residential stay, he is looking for someone who is at risk of self-harm or harming others or who has an acute severe psychiatric condition such as a psychotic disorder that requires confinement. Dr. Santamaria noted that R.H.’s eating disorder was not the primary concern at the time of her admissions to McLean Hospital; however, because the eating disorder was occurring at the same time as the psychiatric problem, he was also looking for medical manifestations of the eating disorder, such as severe weight loss affecting blood chemistry. Criterion 4 requires documented symptoms and/or behaviors that are a significant deterioration from baseline functioning and create a significant functional impairment in at least three of five listed areas. Under area 4a, “primary support,” Dr. Santamaria noted that R.H. had good support from her mother and grandmother. He did not believe that primary support was a problem.8/ As to area 4b, “social/interpersonal,” the notes indicated that R.H. recently had an altercation with a friend. Dr. Santamaria did not find such an altercation out of the ordinary for a 15-year-old and thus found no functional impairment under 4b. Area 4c, “occupational/educational,” appeared to pose no problem because the records indicated that R.H. was an A-B student, despite her rocky first week of high school. As to area 4d, “health/medical compliance,” Dr. Santamaria noted that R.H. had been compliant with medical instructions and her family had been good about seeking care for her. As to area 4e, “ability to maintain safety for either self or others,” Dr. Santamaria acknowledged that R.H. had hit her hand with a hammer and acted in other self-injurious ways, chiefly superficial cutting. He testified that such behaviors are not uncommon in younger populations and do not necessarily make the person a candidate for residential care. Self-injury alone does not satisfy the criterion, unless there is a concern for suicide or homicide. The hammer incident occurred in August, at least one week before R.H.’s admission to McLean Hospital. The McLean Hospital admission note of September 9, 2015, indicates no reported history of suicidal thinking. Dr. Santamaria found no documentation to indicate R.H. was aggressive against herself or others. She had no acute conditions such as psychotic disorders. Dr. Santamaria noted that even if area 4e were deemed to have been met, criterion 4 requires significant functional impairment and degradation from baseline functioning in at least three of the listed areas, and that R.H. at most satisfied one area of the criterion. Criterion 5 of the New Directions psychiatric residential criteria requires that one of three conditions relating to the patient’s support system or treatment history be met. Dr. Santamaria concluded that none of the three conditions were met. Condition 5c requires a recent history of multiple brief acute inpatient stays without a successful transition to a lower level of care. Dr. Santamaria conceded that the record he examined disclosed little information about prior therapies that had been tried with R.H., but he concluded that the record was sufficient to confirm that R.H. did not have multiple brief inpatient stays. He was reasonably confident that McLean Hospital would have documented such stays had they occurred because they would be a very significant part of her history. Dr. Santamaria also noted that R.H. had been able to transition to an intensive outpatient program from her inpatient admission to the Renfrew Center in May 2015. Condition 5a requires that family members or the patient’s support system demonstrate behaviors that are likely to undermine the goals of treatment, such that treatment at a lower level of care is unlikely to be successful. The record disclosed that R.H.’s mother, who was her custodial guardian, had a history of substance abuse but had gone through a rehabilitation program, attended Narcotics Anonymous regularly, and had been sober for one year at the time of R.H.’s October 15, 2015, admission to McLean Hospital. Dr. Santamaria testified that if R.H.’s mother were currently using drugs and R.H. had nowhere else to go, then condition 5a might be met. However, the actual situation presented by the medical record did not establish that R.H. was living in an unsafe environment that could undermine her treatment. As to condition 5b, a documented history of an inability to be managed at an intensive lower level of care, Dr. Santamaria concluded that R.H. had responded to various therapies in the past. As noted above, criterion 3 of the New Directions psychiatric residential criteria is exclusionary, i.e., if the placement appears not to be medically necessary, then one begins to seek another motivation, such as the desire for a change of pace or a respite for the family. Dr. Santamaria noted that DBT does not require placement at the residential level. It can be done at an intensive outpatient or partial hospitalization level, both of which are lower levels of care than residential.9/ This fact made Dr. Santamaria suspect that the prime motive for R.H.’s placement may have been custodial. Dr. Santamaria testified that he also analyzed R.H.’s admission under the New Directions eating disorder residential criteria. He stated that he could not be certain from the record whether McLean Hospital was treating R.H.’s eating disorder, as well as providing DBT, but he knew that McLean Hospital was mindful of the eating disorder. He also knew that R.H.’s transfer to the Cambridge Center was partly because her eating disorder was becoming worse. Dr. Santamaria concluded that R.H. did not satisfy criteria 3 through 7 for an eating disorder residential admission. Dr. Santamaria testified that R.H. did not meet eating disorder residential criteria 3 through 5 for the same reasons she did not meet the identical criteria 3 through 5 of the psychiatric residential criteria. Criterion 6 concerns biomedical complications of an eating disorder. Dr. Santamaria reviewed the medical records and concluded that R.H. presented none of the complications that would require 24-hour care at the time of her admission on September 9, 2015. Dr. Santamaria likewise found that R.H. satisfied neither factor 7a nor 7b of Criterion 7. As to 7a, R.H. did not present with a low body weight and there was no documentation that she had lost 10 percent of her body weight in the last 30 days. As to 7b, there was no evidence that R.H.’s “compensatory behaviors,” i.e., binging and purging, had caused “significant physiological complications” or that such behaviors occurred multiple times daily and did not respond to treatment “at an intensive lower level of care.” Dr. Santamaria testified that his analysis as to the October 15, 2015, admission was identical to that for the September 9, 2015, admission. As to both admissions, he believed that intensive outpatient was the appropriate level of care. Dr. Santamaria defined “intensive outpatient” as three hours of intensive therapy for at least three days per week. He believed that this level of care could address all of R.H.’s issues, including her self-injurious behavior. Dr. Santamaria concluded that if R.H. tried the intensive outpatient level of care and failed, then a higher level could be considered. Like Dr. Center, he stated that he might have recommended a partial hospitalization setting had he known that intensive outpatient had been tried and failed, but he still would not have recommended a 24-hour residential admission. Petitioner’s presentation implied that Florida Blue and/or Prest & Associates base their coverage decisions on financial considerations rather than strictly on the merits of the claims. Dr. Center and Dr. Santamaria both testified that they had no incentive, financial or otherwise, to deny a claim for reimbursement. Their testimony on this point is credible. Petitioner offered no direct evidence that Florida Blue or Prest & Associates directly pressure their physician employees to reject meritorious claims, and there is no evidence that Dr. Santamaria or Dr. Center based their recommendations on anything other than their assessment of R.H.’s medical records in light of the relevant medical necessity criteria. Petitioner raised questions about the completeness of the records examined by Dr. Santamaria and Dr. Center and sounded a skeptical note as to the diligence of the physicians’ efforts to obtain additional documentation. As found above, both Dr. Santamaria and Dr. Center testified that they had adequate documentation to render an opinion as to medical necessity in this case. Both physicians stated that in other cases they have taken additional steps to obtain missing information, including making peer-to-peer calls to the treating physicians or reaching out to the case managers, but that no such steps were necessary in this case. Both physicians conceded that not all of the medical records were available to them at the time of their reviews. They did not have records from R.H.’s stays at the Renfrew Center and the Cambridge Center or the notes of R.H.’s treating physicians in Florida. Both Dr. Center and Dr. Santamaria credibly testified that nothing in these additional records would have changed their opinion as to the medical necessity of residential treatment for R.H. Section 12 of the Plan, which sets forth the appeal process for a denied claim, expressly states: “Your appeal may include any additional documentation, information, evidence or testimony that you would like reviewed and considered during the appeal process.” This language is included in the explanations for both the Level I and Level II appeals. Nothing prevents the member from providing any documentation whatsoever during the appeal process. Dr. Center and Dr. Santamaria are physician reviewers, not medical investigators. If something Petitioner asserted to be relevant to the decision was missing from the files, it was not the fault of the reviewing physicians. It is ultimately the member’s responsibility to provide appropriate documentation for review. By letter dated April 5, 2016, Florida Blue notified Petitioner that it “remains unable to approve additional coverage and/or payment for the Residential Treatment.” The letter set forth the following rationale for the denial: Per the State Employees’ PPO Plan Booklet and Benefits Document page 5-5: “Services or supplies that are not Medically Necessary, as determined by Florida Blue and/or CVS Caremark clinical staff and Division of State Group Insurance, are non- covered.” Specifically, coverage for the Mental Health (Eating Disorder) Residential stays is denied as it does not meet the definition of medical necessity. This is for hospital stay on and after 09/09/2015 and 10/15/2015. The final decision to proceed with the requested services is between the provider and the member. Records show that the member was not deemed to be a present risk to self or to others. Though the member had a preoccupation with weight sand [sic] eating, there was no evidence of inability to adequately care for self with functioning in multiple sphere areas, including stabilization of the eating disorder issues. There was no report of medical instability or psychosis. The member was in a body weight range. The member was described as having her eating disorder symptoms under control. From the clinical evidence, this member could have been safely treated at each occasion at a lesser level of care such as in an eating disorder intensive outpatient setting. This review was done using New Directions Clinical Care criteria and is based on the opinion of a board certified psychiatrist. Services that are not medically necessary are not covered under your health benefit plan. The denial letter provided Petitioner with information regarding the Level II appeal process to DSGI, including a reference to the pertinent section of the Plan. The denial letter reiterated that Petitioner could submit any information or documentation that Petitioner believed could assist in DSGI’s review of the appeal. Petitioner submitted a request for a Level II appeal to DSGI on May 23, 2016. The Level II appeal was reviewed by DSGI’s legal nurse coordinator, Kathy Flippo. Ms. Flippo reviewed all of the documents reviewed by Dr. Center and Dr. Santamaria, plus additional records submitted by Petitioner with the Level II appeal request. Ms. Flippo determined that the stays at issue were non-emergency admissions that required pre-certification and that the pre-certification requirements of the Plan were not met. Ms. Flippo reached the same conclusions as Dr. Center and Dr. Santamaria regarding the New Directions psychiatric residential criteria. Ms. Flippo concluded that R.H. did not meet criteria 3, 4, or 5. Ms. Flippo testified that she did not review the case pursuant to the New Directions eating disorder residential criteria because Petitioner’s Level II appeal addressed only the psychiatric issues and because R.H.’s eating disorder stay at the Cambridge Center was covered by Florida Blue. By letter dated July 29, 2016, signed by Tami Fillyaw, director of DSGI, Petitioner was informed that the Level II appeal had been denied. The letter informed Petitioner of his rights under the Plan to file a petition for a formal or an informal hearing contesting the denial of the appeal and/or to request a binding external review from an Independent Review Organization (“IRO”).10/ Petitioner requested both an administrative hearing and an external review.11/ The external review was conducted under the auspices of the Medical Review Institute of America, Inc. (“MRIoA”), a URAC-accredited external review network. The MRIoA assigned a physician whom it stated is board-certified by the American Board of Psychiatry and Neurology in the specialties of General Psychiatry and Child & Adolescent Psychiatry.12/ The external review upheld the adverse determinations regarding coverage for the McLean Hospital stays. In its decision letter dated November 11, 2016, the MRIoA provided the following relevant clinical summary and findings: At the time in question, the patient was a 15 year old female with a variety of difficulties related to depression, anxiety, eating disorder symptoms, and symptoms of obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD) with self-harming behaviors. This review has to do with a question of whether residential treatment center (RTC) level of care (LOC) for two episodes of service 9/9/15-9/22/15 and 10/15/15-12/11/15 met the plan criteria for medical necessity. It is noted that the patient was treated in a special eating disorders program on the dates between these two episodes. * * * The patient’s presentation did not meet the plan criteria for medical necessity for the dates in question. Specifically, the patient did not meet criteria #5 of the Admission Criteria. The patient is noted to have a caring and effective support system that would have supported a less intensive level of care. There was no recent history of inability to be effectively treated at an intensive level of service below residential treatment center (RTC) level of care (LOC), and there was no recent history of inability to transition from inpatient treatment into a less intensive level of care. At the time of admission to residential treatment, it is clear that the patient struggled with mood dysregulation along with episodes of food restriction and self- harming behaviors. She was not responding to attempts at outpatient treatment. The residential program in question was sought out specifically due to its approach to the utilization of DBT (dialectical behavior therapy). However, there is no indication that the patient could not have responded to attempts to escalate her treatment in the outpatient setting through the use of either intensive outpatient or partial hospitalization services. In particular, the patient could have been involved in a formal DBT program without utilization of residential treatment. Her symptom severity for the dates in question was not of a severity to require the use of round the clock observation and treatment. As a result, there was no medical necessity for residential treatment center (RTC) level of care (LOC). * * * The appeal letters from the patient’s family, outpatient providers, and residential facility discuss the need for residential treatment due to the patient’s symptoms severity, particularly the patient’s episodes of self-harming behavior and the need for her to participate in the immersive DBT program utilized at the residential program in question. The patient’s need for more intensive treatment is acknowledged. However, the patient’s recent treatment history was one of outpatient treatment with a previous history of residential treatment for eating disorder symptoms. For the DOS in question, the patient could have obtained appropriate and effective DBT in a less restrictive setting, such as either a partial hospitalization program (PHP) or an intensive outpatient program (IOP). Based on the above, the previous determination has been upheld. At the hearing, Petitioner complained that, prior to receiving the letter denying the Level II appeal, he had no inkling that medical necessity determinations were based on criteria produced by New Directions. The Plan’s definition of “medically necessary” does not reference the fact that Florida Blue relies on the New Directions criteria for medical necessity determinations in psychiatric and eating disorder admissions. Petitioner basically argues that not having the precise language of the New Directions medical necessity criteria deprived him and the medical providers of the ability to frame the coverage requests in such a way as to satisfy the criteria. The record evidence shows Florida Blue does not make the New Directions medical necessity criteria directly available to its members. In fact, New Directions is nowhere mentioned in the Plan. Witnesses for DSGI correctly stated that anyone can download the criteria from the New Directions website, but Petitioner pointed out that one must be aware the criteria exist before one can download them. If this case is typical, it appears that a Florida Blue member must be denied coverage and go through the appeal process before Florida Blue makes him aware of precisely how the determination of medical necessity is made. Dr. Santamaria testified that Florida Blue does not expect its members to have any knowledge of the New Directions criteria or to “understand all the medical jargon.” The member is expected to present Florida Blue with the best and most accurate medical information available (preferably before the services are rendered) and rely on Florida Blue to make the decision. Dr. Santamaria stated, “Your role is not to do the utilization management. That’s my role. Your role is, if you disagree with a coverage determination, to appeal it and to even have your doctor speak on your behalf or write a letter or do whatever. It’s not your role to access the documents and to use them on your own. That--that’s not what they were created for.” Dr. Santamaria emphasized that the member’s “role” is not to “meet criteria” but to provide Florida Blue with information sufficient to allow its experts to apply the criteria. While his phrasing may be condescending, Dr. Santamaria’s statement is basically accurate: the medical records determine whether the criteria have been met. Petitioner’s awareness of the particulars of the criteria would not change the substance of the medical record. The undersigned tends to agree with Petitioner that Florida Blue’s process could be more transparent. However, Petitioner failed to show how the outcome would have been different if the New Directions medical necessity criteria had been available to him or McLean Hospital. Every expert who examined the medical records agreed that R.H. did not meet the criteria for medical necessity. Their opinions are credited. Ms. Flippo emphasized that Florida Blue did not deny coverage merely because McLean Hospital’s 3 East DBT program was self-pay. If the member had been able to obtain pre- certification for hospitalization and a proper bill had been presented to Florida Blue, it would have been covered at the allowable non-network coverage amount. Ms. Flippo also stated that even if pre-certification had been obtained, Florida Blue would certainly not have covered the 70 days that R.H. spent in McLean Hospital. Ms. Flippo had never seen more than 15 days at a time approved, even for members who were floridly psychotic and admitted under the Baker Act. With modern treatments and medications, it is seldom necessary to keep patients at a residential level of care for months at a time. All of the experts agreed that DBT is more commonly provided on an outpatient basis. Additionally, Mr. Shaw pointed out that the ability of the insurer to pay the non-contracted, non-network rate to the hospital is contingent on the hospital’s willingness to accept insurance payments. McLean Hospital’s 3 East DBT program did not accept insurance. Mr. Shaw succinctly stated, “We’re not obligated to pay you back because you made the choice to go to a facility that takes your money but not ours.”
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Management Services, Division of State Group Insurance, issue a final order denying Petitioner’s claim for coverage under the State Employees’ PPO Plan for R.H.’s residential treatment at McLean Hospital from September 9, 2015, to September 30, 2015, and October 15, 2015, to December 11, 2015. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of May, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of May, 2017.
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant hereto Daniel Francis Sanchez was licensed as a physician by the Florida Board of Medical Examiners having been issued license number ME0038795. At all times relevant hereto Respondent was Regional Medical Director of IMC which operated HMO offices in Hillsborough and Pinellas Counties. On October 17, 1985, Alexander Stroganow, an 84 year old Russian immigrant and former cossack, who spoke and understood only what English he wanted to, suffered a fall and was taken to the emergency room at Metropolitan General Hospital. He was checked and released without being admitted for inpatient treatment. Later that evening his landlady thought Stroganow needed medical attention and again called the Emergency Medical Service. The ambulance with EMS personnel arrived and concluded Stroganow was no worse than earlier when taken to the emergency room and they refused to transport him again to the hospital. The landlady then called the HRS hotline to report abuse of the elderly. The following morning, October 18, 1985, an HRS case worker was dispatched to the place where Stroganow lived. She was let in by the landlady and found an 84 year old man who was incontinent, incoherent, apparently paralyzed from the waist down, with whom she could not carry on a conversation to find out what condition he was in. She called for a Cares Unit to come and evaluate the client. An HRS Cares Unit is a two person team consisting of a social worker and nurse whose primary function is to screen clients for admission to nursing homes and adult congregate living facilities (ACLF). The nurse on the team carries no medical equipment such as a stethoscope, blood pressure cuff, or thermometer, but makes her determination on visual examination only. Upon arrival of the Cares Unit both members felt Stroganow needed to be placed where he could be attended. A review of his personal effects produced by his landlady showed his income to be over the maximum for which he could qualify for medicaid placement in a nursing home; that he was a member of IMC's Gold- Plus HMO; his social security card; and several medications, some of which had been prescribed by Dr. Dayton, a physician employed by IMC at the South Pasadena Clinic. The Cares team ruled out ACLF placement for Stroganow at the time because he was not ambulatory but felt he needed to be placed where he could be attended to and not left alone over the coming weekend. To accomplish this, they proceeded to the South Pasadena HMO clinic of IMC to lay the problem on Dr. Dayton, the Assistant Medical Director for IMC in charge of the South Pasadena Clinic. Stroganow had been a client of the South Pasadena HMO for some time and was well known at the clinic and by EMS personnel. There were two and sometimes three doctors who treated patients at this clinic and, unless the patient requested a specific doctor, he was treated by the first doctor available. Stroganow had not specifically requested he be treated by Dr. Dayton. When the Cares team met with Dr. Dayton they advised him that Stroganow had been taken to Metropolitan General Hospital Emergency Room the night before but did not advise Dayton that the EMS team had refused to transport Stroganow to the hospital emergency room a second time the previous evening. Dayton telephoned the emergency room at Metropolitan General to ascertain the medical condition of Stroganow when brought in the evening before. With the information provided by the Cares team and the hospital, Dayton concluded that Stroganow should be given a medical evaluation and the quickest way for that to occur was to call the EMS and have Stroganow taken to an emergency room for evaluation. When the Cares team arrived, Dayton was treating patients at the clinic. A doctor's office, or clinic, is not a desirable place to have an incontinent, incoherent, non- ambulatory patient brought to wait with other patients until a doctor is free to see him. Nor is the clinic equipped to do certain procedures frequently needed in diagnosing the illness and determining treatment needed for an acutely ill patient. EMS squads usually arrive within minutes of a call to 911 for emergency medical assistance and it was necessary for someone to be with Stroganow with the EMS squad arrived. Accordingly, Dayton suggested that the Cares team return to Stroganow and call 911 for assistance in obtaining a medical evaluation of Stroganow. If called from the HMO office, the EMS squad would have arrived long before the Cares team could have gotten back to Stroganow. Dr. Dayton did not have admitting privileges at any hospital in Pinellas County at this time. Upon leaving the South Pasadena HMO clinic, the Cares team returned to Stroganow. Enroute, they stopped to call a supervisor at HRS to report that the HMO had not solved their problem. The supervisor then called the Administrator at IMC to tell them that one of their Gold-Plus patients had an emergency situation. Respondent, Dr. Sanchez, called and advised that Dr. Dayton would take care of the problem. Later, around 2:00 p.m. when no ambulance had arrived, the Cares team called 911 from a telephone a block away from Stroganow's residence and arrived back just before the emergency squad. The EMS squad again refused to transport Stroganow to an emergency room and this information was passed back to Sanchez who directed that Stroganow be taken to Lake Seminole Hospital. This was the first time either Dayton or Sanchez was aware that the EMS squad had refused to transport Stroganow to an emergency room. Although Sanchez did not have admitting privileges at Lake Seminole Hospital, IMC had a contractual agreement with Lake Seminole which provided that certain staff doctors at Lake Seminole would admit patients referred to Lake Seminole by IMC. Pursuant to this contractual arrangement, Stroganow was admitted to Lake Seminole Hospital where he was treated for his injuries and evaluated for his future medical needs.
