The Issue Whether Respondent violated the provisions of chapter 440, Florida Statutes, by failing to secure the payment of workers’ compensation as alleged in the Stop-Work Order and 2nd Amended Order of Penalty Assessment, and, if so, what penalty is appropriate.
Findings Of Fact The Department is the state agency responsible for the enforcement of the workers’ compensation insurance coverage requirements established in chapter 440, Florida Statutes (2014).1/ On March 6, 2006, the Florida Department of State, Division of Corporations, issued articles of corporation to Respondent. Respondent’s address of record is 4441 Radio Avenue, Sanford, Florida 32773. Respondent’s mailing address is 3779 Eagle Preserve Point, Sanford, Florida 32773. On October 22, 2014, Investigator Etheredge conducted a random workers' compensation compliance check at 107 East Circle Drive, New Smyrna Beach, Florida 32169. During the course of the compliance check, Investigator Etheredge observed Matthew Nobles supervising William Boling, who was operating a miter saw, and James Clogston, Jr., who was moving construction materials to the house. These individuals were building a deck on the house in question. Upon questioning by Investigator Etheredge, Matthew Nobles advised that William Boling and James Clogston both worked as employees for Respondent. Matthew Nobles further advised that workers’ compensation exemptions were in effect for himself and James Clogston. Matthew Nobles also informed investigator Etheredge that Respondent did not have a workers' compensation policy. Armed with this information, Investigator Etheredge returned to his vehicle and searched the corporate database of the Florida Department of State, Division of Corporations. The search revealed that Respondent's corporate officers are Matthew S. Nobles, Timothy J. Nobles, and James Clogston. Investigator Etheredge then consulted the Coverage and Compliance Automated System (CCAS). CCAS is the workers’ compensation compliance database for the State of Florida. Through CCAS, insurance companies and employee leasing companies submit to the State insurance information regarding new policies, amendments to existing policies, and cancellations of policies. CCAS also lists any exemptions currently or previously held by any member of a registered company.2/ According to Investigator Etheredge, in reviewing the CCAS database, he did not locate a workers' compensation policy or employee leasing notice for Respondent. CCAS did show, however, that Matthew Nobles had a then-current exemption for the period June 19, 2014, through June 19, 2016. Prior to this exemption, CCAS also showed that Matthew Nobles had an exemption for the period April 3, 2012, through April 3, 2014. CCAS showed that Timothy Nobles had an exemption for the period March 18, 2014, through October 24, 2014. For James Clogston, Jr., CCAS showed an exemption for the period December 10, 2013, through December 10, 2015. Finally, for William E. Boling, CCAS showed an exemption for the period December 10, 2013, through March 17, 2014. On October 22, 2014, William Boling was neither covered by a workers’ compensation policy, nor exempt from being covered by the same. Accordingly, on October 22, 2014, the Department issued to Respondent a Stop-Work Order and a written request for copies of Respondent’s business/payroll records for the two-year period covering October 23, 2012, through October 22, 2014. In response to the Department’s request for business records, Respondent provided approximately a year’s worth of payroll records for the period October 25, 2013, through October 15, 2014. These payroll records are sufficiently detailed, as reflected in the summary of payroll records (Ex. 6), so as to allow the Department to calculate Respondent’s weekly payroll for this period with respect to all employees and corporate officers other than William Boling. Florida Administrative Code Rule 69L-6.028(2) provides as follows: The employer’s period of non-compliance shall be either the same as the time period requested in the business records request for the calculation of penalty or an alternative period of non-compliance as determined by the department, whichever is less. The department shall determine an alternative period of non-compliance by obtaining records from other sources, including, but not limited to, the Department of State, Division of Corporations, the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, licensing offices, building permitting offices and contracts, that evidence a period of non- compliance different than the time period requested in the business records request for the calculation of penalty. For purposes of this rule, “non-compliance” means the employer’s failure to secure the payment of workers’ compensation pursuant to Chapter 440, F.S. (emphasis added). The payroll records provided by Respondent to the Department establish October 25, 2013, through October 22, 2014, as Respondent’s period of non-compliance. The Department failed to offer other evidence sufficient to establish a period of non- compliance commencing prior to October 25, 2013. However, since Respondent did not provide payroll records for the period October 16, 2014, through October 22, 2014, wages for this period shall be imputed for each of Respondent’s employees and corporate officers, as appropriate. Accordingly, Respondent’s penalty shall be calculated based on the above-established period of non- compliance. In support of its 2nd Amended Order of Penalty Assessment, the Department prepared a penalty calculation worksheet showing a total penalty owed of $61,175.36. While the evidence does establish that a penalty amount is owed, the evidence does not support the total penalty amount claimed by the Department. As previously noted, CCAS, as to William Boling, showed an exemption for the period December 10, 2013, through March 17, 2014. The evidence also established that Mr. Boling was observed operating a miter saw at the referenced job site on October 22, 2014. Given that Mr. Boling’s exemption expired on March 17, 2014, and that he was observed working for Respondent on October 22, 2014, Mr. Boling’s wages should be imputed for the period March 18, 2014, through October 22, 2014. The penalty calculation worksheet correctly reflects a penalty, based on imputed wages, in the amount of $539.58 for Mr. Boling for the period October 16, 2014, through October 22, 2014. The worksheet fails, however, to calculate a penalty for Mr. Boling based on imputed wages for the period March 18, 2014, through October 15, 2014. Furthermore, the worksheet entries for Mr. Boling showing penalties totaling $21,940.16 are not supported by the evidence as these penalty entries are based on imputed wages for a time not within the period of Respondent’s non-compliance. The entry on the penalty calculation worksheet for Timothy Nobles and Matthew Nobles correctly reflects a total penalty of $1,217.92 and $1,004.02, respectively, based on information gleaned from Respondent’s payroll records. The penalty calculation worksheet entries for Harold Nobles showing penalties totaling $13,106.38 are not supported by the evidence as these penalty entries are based on imputed wages for a time not within the period of Respondent’s non-compliance. As previously noted, James Clogston had an exemption for the period December 10, 2013, through December 10, 2015. There is no evidence establishing that Mr. Clogston had a business relationship with Respondent prior to the effective date of his exemption. The penalty calculation worksheet entries for James Clogston showing penalties totaling $21,940.16 are not supported by the evidence as these penalty entries are based on imputed wages for a time not within the period of Respondent’s non-compliance. The penalty calculation worksheet for the other listed employees (Messrs. Lisk, Knudsen, Taylor, Pingerin, Farrar and Donat (collectively referred to as “other employees”)) correctly reflects penalties totaling $1,427.14 based on information gleaned from Respondent’s payroll records. Auditor Ruzzo was assigned by the Department to calculate the penalty owed by Respondent. Auditor Ruzzo consulted the classification codes listed in the Scopes® Manual, which has been incorporated by reference into the Department’s rules. Fla. Admin. Code R. 69L-6.021 and 69L-6.031. The classification codes are four-digit numbers assigned to occupations by the National Council on Compensation Insurance, Inc. (NCCI), to assist in the calculation of workers' compensation insurance premiums. Auditor Ruzzo correctly assigned to Mr. Boling, and the other corporate officers and employees listed on the penalty calculation worksheet, NCCI class code 5654, which is for the area of carpentry. Auditor Ruzzo utilized the appropriate formula in calculating the penalty owed by Respondent for failing to secure the payment of worker’s compensation during the determined period of non-compliance.
Recommendation Based on the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Financial Services, Division of Workers’ Compensation, enter a final order finding that Respondent, Nobles Quality Services, LLC, violated the provisions of chapter 440 by failing to secure the payment of workers’ compensation and assessing against Respondent a penalty in an amount consistent with the above Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of December, 2015 in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LINZIE F. BOGAN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of December, 2015.
Findings Of Fact David Keesler was a licensed general contractor holding license #40094 issued by Department of Professional Regulation at all times relating to the allegations which are the basis of this case. David and Sandra Pedersen contracted with Mr. Keesler to construction a house for $88,500 for them on a lot they owned. Mr. Pedersen was aware that Mr. Keesler was over extended financially because Mr. Keesler was building several houses. As a result, Mr. Pedersen opened up an account at Lowes in his name for Mr. Keesler to order building supplies. Mr. Keesler contracted with other material men and subcontractors for other materials and services. A schedule of payments on the construction loan to the Pedersens was established by the lending institution based upon progress of construction. The Pedersens, in turn, released the money to Mr. Keesler for payments to material men and contractors. Mr. Pedersen made periodic payments directly to Lowes. Prior to the last payment, Mr. Keesler asked Mr. Pedersen for additional money to settle with subcontractors and materialmen. Mr. Pedersen and his lending institution made this money available to Mr. Keesler. At the closing, Mr. Keesler was asked to provide affidavits of satisfaction from the materialmen and subcontractors. Mr. Keesler could not provide these affidavits, and turned the matter over to his attorney. Mr. Pedersen contacted an attorney when the lending institution advised them that they looked to him for the payments on the construction loan, and were initiating a foreclosure action. Mr. Pedersen's attorney contacted the materialmen and subcontractors concerning their liens. The money owed to these lien holders exceeded the amount of the last payment less the advance. Mr. Pedersen's attorney made arrangements to settle with the materialmen and subcontractors, with the exception of Lowes, to settle their liens proportionally based upon the money available. Mr. Pedersen, because he was personally obligated, paid Lowes in full. As a result of the failure of Mr. Keesler to complete the house for the contract amount, the Pedersens suffered financial loss and the materialmen and subcontractors suffered financial losses. Notice of the hearing was given to Mr. Keesler in accordance with the statutes and rules. The Petitioner has substantiated by affidavit costs in the amount of $3,079.40.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, it is, RECOMMENDED: That Petitioner enter a final order suspending Respondent's license for a period of two years. That costs of prosecution be awarded in the amount of $3,079.40. DONE and ENTERED this 29th day of December, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of December, 1992. COPIES FURNISHED: William S. Cummings, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792 David Keesler 2172 San Pablo Court Middleburg, FL 32068 Jack McRay, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792 Daniel O'Brien, Executive Director DPR - Construction Industry Licensing Board 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792
The Issue The issues in this case are whether Respondent, Richard Lindley, committed the offenses alleged in a four-count Administrative Complaint filed with Petitioner, the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, on March 20, 2008, and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, the Department of Business and Professional Regulation (hereinafter referred to as the "Department"), is the agency of the State of Florida charged with the responsibility for, among other things, the licensure of individuals who wish to engage in contracting in the State of Florida; and the investigation and prosecution of complaints against individuals who have been so licensed. See Chs. 455 and 489, Fla. Stat. Respondent, Richard Lindley, is and has been at all times material hereto a certified building contractor in Florida, having been issued license number CB C060555. Mr. Lindley is also a Certified Roofing Contractor, having been issued license number CC C1326286. Both licenses were issued by the Construction Industry Licensing Board (hereinafter referred to as the “Board). At all times material, Mr. Lindley was the primary qualifying agent for HCL, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as “HCL”). HCL has a certificate of authority, QB number 20599. On or about June 8, 2005, Mr. Lindley, doing business as HCL, entered into a written contract (hereinafter referred to as the “Contract”) with Myra Love to re-roof her residence located at 765 Windermere Way, Palm Beach Gardens, Florida 33418 (hereinafter referred to as the “Subject Property”). Pursuant to the Contract, Ms. Love agreed to pay HCL a total of $8,125.00, as follows: $1,625.00 upon signing the Contract; $2,843.75 upon “roof dri in”; $2,843.75 upon “roof load”; and $812.50 upon “final inspection.” Consistent with the Contract, Ms. Love paid HCL $1,625.00 by check dated June 8, 2005, upon entering into the Contract. On June 9, 2005, Mr. Lindley applied for a building permit for the work to be performed pursuant to the Contract. The permit was issued, but expired for lack of final inspection. Ms. Love next paid HCL $2,843.75 by check dated October 20, 2005, upon being informed that the roof had been dried in. Despite having paid for the dry in of the roof, it continued to leak. After making the second payment to HCL in October 2005, no work was performed pursuant to the Contract and all efforts by Ms. Love to contact Mr. Lindley failed. On April 24, 2006, Ms. Love wrote to Mr. Lindley complaining about the condition of her roof and his lack of response to her telephone calls to him. This letter was delivered by certified mail, return receipt. Mr. Lindley did not respond to Ms. Love’s April 24, 2006, letter. No work was performed by Mr. Lindley through October 2006 on the Subject Property, at least a year after work on the Subject Property stopped. Therefore, Ms. Love sent a letter dated October 31, 2006, by certified mail, return receipt, to Mr. Lindley. Ms. Love stated in the letter that “since you abandoned the contract on 6/8/05, and failed to show up on the job, I consider the contract null and void because of your nonperformance. You and your employees are hereby notified to stay off my property.” On November 4, 2006, after informing Mr. Lindley that she considered the Contract null and void, Ms. Love contracted with Gold Coast Roofing to complete the re-roofing of the Subject Property. Ms. Love paid Gold Coast Roofing $14,900.00 for the completion of the re-roofing. Essentially, Gold Coast Roofing, due to the time that had expired since work was abandoned, had to essentially start over on the re-roofing of the Subject Property. The total investigative costs for this matter incurred by the Department, excluding costs associated with any attorney’s time, was $258.56.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered: Finding that Richard Lindley violated the provisions of Section 489.129(1)(j) and (m), Florida Statutes, as alleged in Counts II and IV of the Administrative Complaint; imposing a fine of $2,500.00 and placing Mr. Lindley’s licenses on probation for a period of four years conditioned upon his payment of the fines, restitution and the costs incurred by the Department, and any other conditions determined to be necessary by the Board, for the Count II violation; requiring that Mr. Lindley make restitution in the amount of $4,468.75 to Ms. Love; and requiring that Mr. Lindley pay the costs incurred by the Department in investigating and prosecuting this matter; and Dismissing Counts I and III of the Administrative Complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of March, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. LARRY J. SARTIN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of March, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: Lisa A. Comingore, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street, Suite 42 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202 Richard H. Lindley Richard H. Lindley, d/b/a HCL, Inc. 9146 Arrowhead Drive Greenacres, Florida 33467-1060 Kyle Christopher, Esquire Department of Business & Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street, Suite 42 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202 G. W. Harrell, Executive Director Construction Industry Licensing Board Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Ned Luczynski, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
The Issue The primary factual issue was whether the company which the Respondent had qualified was in fact the contractor on the job from which the allegations in the Amended Administrative Complaint arose. The Petitioner submitted post hearing findings of fact in the form of a proposed recommended order. To the extent that the proposed findings of fact have not been included in this order, they are specifically rejected as being irrelevant, not being based upon the most credible evidence, or not being findings of fact.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Edward Ryan, is a certified building contractor holding license number C3 C006481 and was the qualifying agent for Behr Contracting, Inc. (thereafter "Behr Contracting"), at all times relevant to the allegations of the Amended Administrative Complaint. Behr Contracting was, and is a business engaging in, contracting, selling building materials, and mortgage brokerage. Its operations as a mortgage broker are now carried on under a separate corporation; however, at the time involved in these proceedings, its mortgage brokerage operation was carried out in the name of Behr Contracting, Inc. Willie Mae Williams resides at 1451 Northwest 92nd Street, Miami, Florida. In 1980, Ms. Williams had extensive modifications made to her house at the foregoing address. With regard to the work on her house, Ms Williams' initial contact was with S. J. (Jerome) Farmer. Farmer was an independent contractor who was doing home repairs in early 1980 to several homes close to the Williams home. He was not doing these jobs as an employee of Behr Contracting, and no evidence was introduced that at said time he was an employee of Behr Contracting. After he had already begun working on the Williams home, Farmer approached the Respondent and requested Respondent's assistance in helping him estimate additional repairs and modifications to Ms. Williams' home and assistance in obtaining the financing for this job. Farmer was not affiliated in any manner with Behr Contracting. The Respondent arranged for an estimator to assist Farmer in estimating the cost of the project and in obtaining financing for the project. (Testimony of Ryan, Tr. 58 et seq.) This estimator had two contract forms signed by Ms. Williams, one for financing and one for construction. These documents were identified by Ms. Williams and were received into the record. (See Petitioner's Exhibits 2 and 3.) Petitioner's Exhibit 2 is the contract between Behr Contracting and Ms. Williams for the financing of the modifications to the Williams house. Financing for the project was obtained through the mortgage brokerage operation of Behr Contracting and the money funneled through Behr Contracting to pay for materials purchased through Behr's building materials operation. Ms. Williams has made payments and is making payments as required under said contract to the finance company, Uni Credit of Jacksonville, Florida. Behr Contracting provided cabinets, windows and certain appliances, to include a dishwasher. The Respondent was at Ms. Williams' house approximately three times prior to the delivery of building materials from Behr Contracting. (Testimony of Ryan, Tr. 23.) On none of these occasions was the Respondent there as a building contractor qualifying Behr Contracting. At all times, Farmer was in charge of the project. (See testimony of Williams, Tr. 184.) Farmer was the contractor in fact. Subsequent to installation of the dishwasher, the Respondent was present at the Williams house often because of Ms Williams' complaints about the dishwasher. The Respondent replaced this dishwasher and had Ms. Williams' septic tank pumped in order to solve the drainage problem which was causing the dishwasher to malfunction. This was done to honor the warranty on the dishwasher. (Supra, Tr. 45-51.) A salesman for Behr Contracting gave Ms. Williams an estimate on both the contracting and on the financing for the modifications and remodeling of the Williams house. Under its business practices, Behr Contracting disapproved or rejected the contract for construction, yet approved the financing contract. Approval of a construction contract in the amount of the instant contract, over $11,000, would have required an officer's approval. (See testimony of Stanley Weiss, Tr. 21-28.) Although Ms. Williams identified her signature on the purported construction contract (Petitioner's Exhibit 3), she could not identify the signature appearing on the lefthand side of the page at the bottom of the contract in the area of "Agent" and "Officer." This signature also could not be identified by Stanley Weiss or Margaret Behr, officers of Behr Contracting. It was not the signature of Weiss, Ms Behr or the Respondent, who were the only officers of the corporation authorized to approve a contract of this amount at the time that this contract was prepared. This contract (Petitioner's Exhibit 3) was never accepted by Behr Contracting (See testimony of Weiss, Tr. 35.) Although a copy of Petitioner's Exhibit 3 was discovered by Weiss in the files of Behr Contracting, this was a photo copy given to Weiss by the Respondents who had received it from the Board's investigators when the Respondent first spoke to them about this case. (See page 8, deposition of Ryan taken September 17, 1982; see pages 3, 4 and 8, deposition of Weiss; testimony of Ryan, Tr. 70-75; testimony of Weiss, Tr. 10-12.) The Respondent's involvement in this matter was "limited to providing gratuitous advice to Farmer at Farmer's request on one occasion, concerning a broken major waste drain, and representing Behr Contracting who was a major supplier of materials and appliances for the job. It is specifically found that the Petitioner failed to establish the existence of a construction contract between Ms. Williams and Behr Contracting. Regarding the allegations that the Respondent abandoned the job, the Respondent caused the dishwasher supplied by Behr Contracting to be replaced under warranty service. The septic tank at the Williams house was pumped and cleaned at the request of Uni Credit in an attempt to solve the problem. Finally, over a year after the job had begun, the Respondent had the septic tank and drainfeild rebuilt and solved Ms. Williams' drainage problems. This last action was taken under threat of prosecution by the Board's investigators and was done in spite of the fact, which is uncontroverted, that the construction did not address modifications to the plumbing in the house. After the Respondent had taken these actions, Ms. Williams than wanted the cabinets and other work, which had been done by Farmer, replaced because of water damage caused by the drainage problem.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Amended Administrative Complaint against the Respondent, Edward Ryan, be dismissed. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 20th day of September, 1983, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of September, 1983 COPIES FURNISHED: Michael J. Cohen, Esquire Kristin Building, Suite 101 2715 East Oakland Park Boulevard Fort Lauderdale, Florida 32206 Mr. Edward Ryan 19762 Bel Aire Drive Miami, Florida 33138 Frederick Roche, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 James Linnan, Executive Director Construction Industry Licensing Board Post Office Box 2 Jacksonville, Florida 32202
The Issue At issue in this proceeding is whether proposed Florida Administrative Code Rule 69O-125.005 is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority.
Findings Of Fact Petitioners AIA is a trade association made up of 40 groups of insurance companies. AIA member companies annually write $6 billion in property, casualty, and automobile insurance in Florida. AIA's primary purpose is to represent the interests of its member insurance groups in regulatory and legislative matters throughout the United States, including Florida. NAMIC is a trade association consisting of 1,430 members, mostly mutual insurance companies. NAMIC member companies annually write $10 billion in property, casualty, and automobile insurance in Florida. NAMIC represents the interests of its member insurance companies in regulatory and legislative matters throughout the United States, including Florida. PCI is a national trade association of property and casualty insurance companies consisting of 1,055 members. PCI members include mutual insurance companies, stock insurance companies, and reciprocal insurers that write property and casualty insurance in Florida. PCI members annually write approximately $15 billion in premiums in Florida. PCI participated in the OIR's workshops on the Proposed Rule. PCI's assistant vice president and regional manager, William Stander, testified that if the Proposed Rule is adopted, PCI's member companies would be required either to withdraw from the Florida market or drastically reorganize their business model. FIC is an insurance trade association made up of 39 insurance groups that represent approximately 250 insurance companies writing all lines of insurance. All of FIC's members are licensed in Florida and write approximately $27 billion in premiums in Florida. FIC has participated in rule challenges in the past, and participated in the workshop and public hearing process conducted by OIR for this Proposed Rule. FIC President Guy Marvin testified that FIC's property and casualty members use credit scoring and would be affected by the Proposed Rule. A substantial number of Petitioners' members are insurers writing property and casualty insurance and/or motor vehicle insurance coverage in Florida. These members use credit-based insurance scoring in their underwriting and rating processes. They would be directly regulated by the Proposed Rule in their underwriting and rating methods and in the rate filing processes set forth in Sections 627.062 and 627.0651, Florida Statutes. Fair Isaac originated credit-based insurance scoring and is a leading provider of credit-based insurance scoring information in the United States and Canada. Fair Isaac has invested millions of dollars in the development and maintenance of its credit-based insurance models. Fair Isaac concedes that it is not an insurer and, thus, would not be directly regulated by the Proposed Rule. However, Fair Isaac would be directly affected by any negative impact that the Proposed Rule would have in setting limits on the use of credit-based insurance score models in Florida. Lamont Boyd, a manager in Fair Isaac's global scoring division, testified that if the Proposed Rule goes into effect Fair Isaac would, at a minimum, lose all of the revenue it currently generates from insurance companies that use its scores in the State of Florida, because Fair Isaac's credit-based insurance scoring model cannot meet the requirements of the Proposed Rule regarding racial, ethnic, and religious categorization. Mr. Boyd also testified that enactment of the Proposed Rule could cause a "ripple effect" of similar regulations in other states, further impairing Fair Isaac's business. The Statute and Proposed Rule During the 1990s, insurance companies' use of consumer credit information for underwriting and rating automobile and residential property insurance policies greatly increased. Insurance regulators expressed concern that the use of consumer credit reports, credit histories and credit-based insurance scoring models could have a negative effect on consumers' ability to obtain and keep insurance at appropriate rates. Of particular concern was the possibility that the use of credit scoring would particularly hurt minorities, people with low incomes, and young people, because those persons would be more likely to have poor credit scores. On September 19, 2001, Insurance Commissioner Tom Gallagher appointed a task force to examine the use of credit reports and develop recommendations for the Legislature or for the promulgation of rules regarding the use of credit scoring by the insurance industry. The task force met on four separate occasions throughout the state in 2001, and issued its report on January 23, 2002. The task force report conceded that the evidence supporting the negative impact of the use of credit reports on specific groups is "primarily anecdotal," and that the insurance industry had submitted anecdotal evidence to the contrary. Among its nine recommendations, the task force recommended the following: A comprehensive and independent investigation of the relationship between insurers' use of consumer credit information and risk of loss including the impact by race, income, geographic location and age. A prohibition against the use of credit reports as the sole basis for making underwriting or rating decisions. That insurers using credit as an underwriting or rating factor be required to provide regulators with sufficient information to independently verify that use. That insurers be required to send a copy of the credit report to those consumers whose adverse insurance decision is a result of their consumer credit information and a simple explanation of the specific credit characteristics that caused the adverse decision. That insurers not be permitted to draw a negative inference from a bad credit score that is due to medical bills, little or no credit information, or other special circumstances that are clearly not related to an applicant's or policyholder's insurability. That the impact of credit reports be mitigated by imposing limits on the weight that insurers can give to them in the decision to write a policy and limits on the amount the premium can be increased due to credit information. No evidence was presented that the "comprehensive and independent investigation" of insurers' use of credit information was undertaken by the Legislature. However, the other recommendations of the task force were addressed in Senate Bills 40A and 42A, enacted by the Legislature and signed by the governor on June 26, 2003. These companion bills, each with an effective date of January 1, 2004, were codified as Sections 626.9741 and 626.97411, Florida Statutes, respectively. Chapters 2003-407 and 2003-408, Laws of Florida. Section 626.9741, Florida Statutes, provides: The purpose of this section is to regulate and limit the use of credit reports and credit scores by insurers for underwriting and rating purposes. This section applies only to personal lines motor vehicle insurance and personal lines residential insurance, which includes homeowners, mobile home owners' dwelling, tenants, condominium unit owners, cooperative unit owners, and similar types of insurance. As used in this section, the term: "Adverse decision" means a decision to refuse to issue or renew a policy of insurance; to issue a policy with exclusions or restrictions; to increase the rates or premium charged for a policy of insurance; to place an insured or applicant in a rating tier that does not have the lowest available rates for which that insured or applicant is otherwise eligible; or to place an applicant or insured with a company operating under common management, control, or ownership which does not offer the lowest rates available, within the affiliate group of insurance companies, for which that insured or applicant is otherwise eligible. "Credit report" means any written, oral, or other communication of any information by a consumer reporting agency, as defined in the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. ss. 1681 et seq., bearing on a consumer's credit worthiness, credit standing, or credit capacity, which is used or expected to be used or collected as a factor to establish a person's eligibility for credit or insurance, or any other purpose authorized pursuant to the applicable provision of such federal act. A credit score alone, as calculated by a credit reporting agency or by or for the insurer, may not be considered a credit report. "Credit score" means a score, grade, or value that is derived by using any or all data from a credit report in any type of model, method, or program, whether electronically, in an algorithm, computer software or program, or any other process, for the purpose of grading or ranking credit report data. "Tier" means a category within a single insurer into which insureds with substantially similar risk, exposure, or expense factors are placed for purposes of determining rate or premium. An insurer must inform an applicant or insured, in the same medium as the application is taken, that a credit report or score is being requested for underwriting or rating purposes. An insurer that makes an adverse decision based, in whole or in part, upon a credit report must provide at no charge, a copy of the credit report to the applicant or insured or provide the applicant or insured with the name, address, and telephone number of the consumer reporting agency from which the insured or applicant may obtain the credit report. The insurer must provide notification to the consumer explaining the reasons for the adverse decision. The reasons must be provided in sufficiently clear and specific language so that a person can identify the basis for the insurer's adverse decision. Such notification shall include a description of the four primary reasons, or such fewer number as existed, which were the primary influences of the adverse decision. The use of generalized terms such as "poor credit history," "poor credit rating," or "poor insurance score" does not meet the explanation requirements of this subsection. A credit score may not be used in underwriting or rating insurance unless the scoring process produces information in sufficient detail to permit compliance with the requirements of this subsection. It shall not be deemed an adverse decision if, due to the insured's credit report or credit score, the insured continues to receive a less favorable rate or placement in a less favorable tier or company at the time of renewal except for renewals or reunderwriting required by this section. (4)(a) An insurer may not request a credit report or score based upon the race, color, religion, marital status, age, gender, income, national origin, or place of residence of the applicant or insured. An insurer may not make an adverse decision solely because of information contained in a credit report or score without consideration of any other underwriting or rating factor. An insurer may not make an adverse decision or use a credit score that could lead to such a decision if based, in whole or in part, on: The absence of, or an insufficient, credit history, in which instance the insurer shall: Treat the consumer as otherwise approved by the Office of Insurance Regulation if the insurer presents information that such an absence or inability is related to the risk for the insurer; Treat the consumer as if the applicant or insured had neutral credit information, as defined by the insurer; Exclude the use of credit information as a factor and use only other underwriting criteria; Collection accounts with a medical industry code, if so identified on the consumer's credit report; Place of residence; or Any other circumstance that the Financial Services Commission determines, by rule, lacks sufficient statistical correlation and actuarial justification as a predictor of insurance risk. An insurer may use the number of credit inquiries requested or made regarding the applicant or insured except for: Credit inquiries not initiated by the consumer or inquiries requested by the consumer for his or her own credit information. Inquiries relating to insurance coverage, if so identified on a consumer's credit report. Collection accounts with a medical industry code, if so identified on the consumer's credit report Multiple lender inquiries, if coded by the consumer reporting agency on the consumer's credit report as being from the home mortgage industry and made within 30 days of one another, unless only one inquiry is considered. Multiple lender inquiries, if coded by the consumer reporting agency on the consumer's credit report as being from the automobile lending industry and made within 30 days of one another, unless only one inquiry is considered. An insurer must, upon the request of an applicant or insured, provide a means of appeal for an applicant or insured whose credit report or credit score is unduly influenced by a dissolution of marriage, the death of a spouse, or temporary loss of employment. The insurer must complete its review within 10 business days after the request by the applicant or insured and receipt of reasonable documentation requested by the insurer, and, if the insurer determines that the credit report or credit score was unduly influenced by any of such factors, the insurer shall treat the applicant or insured as if the applicant or insured had neutral credit information or shall exclude the credit information, as defined by the insurer, whichever is more favorable to the applicant or insured. An insurer shall not be considered out of compliance with its underwriting rules or rates or forms filed with the Office of Insurance Regulation or out of compliance with any other state law or rule as a result of granting any exceptions pursuant to this subsection. A rate filing that uses credit reports or credit scores must comply with the requirements of s. 627.062 or s. 627.0651 to ensure that rates are not excessive, inadequate, or unfairly discriminatory. An insurer that requests or uses credit reports and credit scoring in its underwriting and rating methods shall maintain and adhere to established written procedures that reflect the restrictions set forth in the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act, this section, and all rules related thereto. (7)(a) An insurer shall establish procedures to review the credit history of an insured who was adversely affected by the use of the insured's credit history at the initial rating of the policy, or at a subsequent renewal thereof. This review must be performed at a minimum of once every 2 years or at the request of the insured, whichever is sooner, and the insurer shall adjust the premium of the insured to reflect any improvement in the credit history. The procedures must provide that, with respect to existing policyholders, the review of a credit report will not be used by the insurer to cancel, refuse to renew, or require a change in the method of payment or payment plan. (b) However, as an alternative to the requirements of paragraph (a), an insurer that used a credit report or credit score for an insured upon inception of a policy, who will not use a credit report or score for reunderwriting, shall reevaluate the insured within the first 3 years after inception, based on other allowable underwriting or rating factors, excluding credit information if the insurer does not increase the rates or premium charged to the insured based on the exclusion of credit reports or credit scores. The commission may adopt rules to administer this section. The rules may include, but need not be limited to: Information that must be included in filings to demonstrate compliance with subsection (3). Statistical detail that insurers using credit reports or scores under subsection (5) must retain and report annually to the Office of Insurance Regulation. Standards that ensure that rates or premiums associated with the use of a credit report or score are not unfairly discriminatory, based upon race, color, religion, marital status, age, gender, income, national origin, or place of residence. Standards for review of models, methods, programs, or any other process by which to grade or rank credit report data and which may produce credit scores in order to ensure that the insurer demonstrates that such grading, ranking, or scoring is valid in predicting insurance risk of an applicant or insured. Section 626.97411, Florida Statutes, provides: Credit scoring methodologies and related data and information that are trade secrets as defined in s. 688.002 and that are filed with the Office of Insurance Regulation pursuant to a rate filing or other filing required by law are confidential and exempt from the provisions of s. 119.07(1) and s. 24(a), Art. I of the State Constitution.3 Following extensive rule development workshops and industry comment, proposed Florida Administrative Code Rule 69O-125.005 was initially published in the Florida Administrative Weekly, on February 11, 2005.4 The Proposed Rule states, as follows: 69O-125.005 Use of Credit Reports and Credit Scores by Insurers. For the purpose of this rule, the following definitions apply: "Applicant", for purposes of Section 626.9741, F.S., means an individual whose credit report or score is requested for underwriting or rating purposes relating to personal lines motor vehicle or personal lines residential insurance and shall not include individuals who have merely requested a quote. "Credit scoring methodology" means any methodology that uses credit reports or credit scores, in whole or in part, for underwriting or rating purposes. "Data cleansing" means the correction or enhancement of presumed incomplete, incorrect, missing, or improperly formatted information. "Personal lines motor vehicle" insurance means insurance against loss or damage to any motorized land vehicle or any loss, liability, or expense resulting from or incidental to ownership, maintenance or use of such vehicle if the contract of insurance shows one or more natural persons as named insureds. The following are not included in this definition: Vehicles used as public livery or conveyance; Vehicles rented to others; Vehicles with more than four wheels; Vehicles used primarily for commercial purposes; and Vehicles with a net vehicle weight of more than 5,000 pounds designed or used for the carriage of goods (other than the personal effects of passengers) or drawing a trailer designed or used for the carriage of such goods. The following are specifically included, inter alia, in this definition: Motorcycles; Motor homes; Antique or classic automobiles; and Recreational vehicles. "Unfairly discriminatory" means that adverse decisions resulting from the use of a credit scoring methodology disproportionately affects persons belonging to any of the classes set forth in Section 626.9741(8)(c), F.S. Insurers may not use any credit scoring methodology that is unfairly discriminatory. The burden of demonstrating that the credit scoring methodology is not unfairly discriminatory is upon the insurer. An insurer may not request or use a credit report or credit score in its underwriting or rating method unless it maintains and adheres to established written procedures that reflect the restrictions set forth in the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act, Section 626.9741, F.S., and these rules. Upon initial use or any change in that use, insurers using credit reports or credit scores for underwriting or rating personal lines residential or personal lines motor vehicle insurance shall include the following information in filings submitted pursuant to Section 627.062 or 627.0651, F.S. A listing of the types of individuals whose credit reports or scores the company will use or attempt to use to underwrite or rate a given policy. For example: Person signing application; Named insured or spouse; and All listed operators. How those individual reports or scores will be combined if more than one is used. For example: Average score used; Highest score used. The name(s) of the consumer reporting agencies or any other third party vendors from which the company will obtain or attempt to obtain credit reports or scores. Precise identifying information specifying or describing the credit scoring methodology, if any, the company will use including: Common or trade name; Version, subtype, or intended segment of business the system was designed for; and Any other information needed to distinguish a particular credit scoring methodology from other similar ones, whether developed by the company or by a third party vendor. The effect of particular scores or ranges of scores (or, for companies not using scores, the effect of particular items appearing on a credit report) on any of the following as applicable: Rate or premium charged for a policy of insurance; Placement of an insured or applicant in a rating tier; Placement of an applicant or insured in a company within an affiliated group of insurance companies; Decision to refuse to issue or renew a policy of insurance or to issue a policy with exclusions or restrictions or limitations in payment plans. The effect of the absence or insufficiency of credit history (as referenced in Section 626.9741(4)(c)1., F.S.) on any items listed in paragraph (e) above. The manner in which collection accounts identified with a medical industry code (as referenced in Section 626.9741(4)(c)2., F.S.) on a consumer's credit report will be treated in the underwriting or rating process or within any credit scoring methodology used. The manner in which collection accounts that are not identified with a medical industry code, but which an applicant or insured demonstrates are the direct result of significant and extraordinary medical expenses, will be treated in the underwriting or rating process or within any credit scoring methodology used. The manner in which the following will be treated in the underwriting or rating process, or within any credit scoring methodology used: Credit inquiries not initiated by the consumer; Requests by the consumer for the consumer's own credit information; Multiple lender inquiries, if coded by the consumer reporting agency on the consumer's credit report as being from the automobile lending industry or the home mortgage industry and made within 30 days of one another; Multiple lender inquiries that are not coded by the consumer reporting agency on the consumer's credit report as being from the automobile lending industry or the home mortgage industry and made within 30 days of one another, but that an applicant or insured demonstrates are the direct result of such inquiries; Inquiries relating to insurance coverage, if so identified on a consumer's credit report; and Inquiries relating to insurance coverage that are not so identified on a consumer's credit report, but which an applicant or insured demonstrates are the direct result of such inquiries. The list of all clear and specific primary reasons that may be cited to the consumer as the basis or explanation for an adverse decision under Section 626.9741(3), F.S. and the criteria determining when each of those reasons will be so cited. A description of the process that the insurer will use to correct any error in premium charged the insured, or in underwriting decision made concerning the insured, if the basis of the premium charged or the decision made is a disputed item that is later removed from the credit report or corrected, provided that the insured first notifies the insurer that the item has been removed or corrected. A certification that no use of credit reports or scores in rating insurance will apply to any component of a rate or premium attributed to hurricane coverage for residential properties as separately identified in accordance with Section 627.0629, F.S. Insurers desiring to make adverse decisions for personal lines motor vehicle policies or personal lines residential policies based on the absence or insufficiency of credit history shall either: Treat such consumers or applicants as otherwise approved by the Office of Insurance Regulation if the insurer presents information that such an absence or inability is related to the risk for the insurer and does not result in a disparate impact on persons belonging to any of the classes set forth in Section 626.9741(8)(c), This information will be held as confidential if properly so identified by the insurer and eligible under Section 626.9711, F.S. The information shall include: Data comparing experience for each category of those with absent or insufficient credit history to each category of insureds separately treated with respect to credit and having sufficient credit history; A statistically credible method of analysis that concludes that the relationship between absence or insufficiency and the risk assumed is not due to chance; A statistically credible method of analysis that concludes that absence or insufficiency of credit history does not disparately impact persons belonging to any of the classes set forth in Section 626.9741(8)(c), F.S.; A statistically credible method of analysis that confirms that the treatment proposed by the insurer is quantitatively appropriate; and Statistical tests establishing that the treatment proposed by the insurer is warranted for the total of all consumers with absence or insufficiency of credit history and for at least two subsets of such consumers. Treat such consumers as if the applicant or insured had neutral credit information, as defined by the insurer. Should an insurer fail to specify a definition, neutral is defined as the average score that a stratified random sample of consumers or applicants having sufficient credit history would attain using the insurer's credit scoring methodology; or Exclude credit as a factor and use other criteria. These other criteria must be specified by the insurer and must not result in average treatment for the totality of consumers with an absence of or insufficiency of credit history any less favorable than the treatment of average consumers or applicants having sufficient credit history. Insurers desiring to make adverse decisions for personal lines motor vehicle or personal lines residential insurance based on information contained in a credit report or score shall file with the Office information establishing that the results of such decisions do not correlate so closely with the zip code of residence of the insured as to constitute a decision based on place of residence of the insured in violation of Section 626.9741(4)(c)(3), F.S. (7)(a) Insurers using credit reports or credit scores for underwriting or rating personal lines residential or personal lines motor vehicle insurance shall develop, maintain, and adhere to written procedures consistent with Section 626.9741(4)(e), F.S. providing appeals for applicants or insureds whose credit reports or scores are unduly influenced by dissolution of marriage, death of a spouse, or temporary loss of employment. (b) These procedures shall be subject to examination by the Office at any time. (8)(a)1. Insurers using credit reports or credit scoring in rating personal lines motor vehicle or personal lines residential insurance shall develop, maintain, and adhere to written procedures to review the credit history of an insured who was adversely affected by such use at initial rating of the policy or subsequent renewal thereof. These procedures shall be subject to examination by the Office at any time. The procedures shall comply with the following: A review shall be conducted: No later than 2 years following the date of any adverse decision, or Any time, at the request of the insured, but no more than once per policy period without insurer assent. The insurer shall notify the named insureds annually of their right to request the review in (II) above. Renewal notices issued 120 days or less after the effective date of this rule are not included in this requirement. The insurer shall adjust the premium to reflect any improvement in credit history no later than the first renewal date that follows a review of credit history. The renewal premium shall be subject to other rating factors lawfully used by the insurer. The review shall not be used by the insurer to cancel, refuse to renew, or require a change in the method of payment or payment plan based on credit history. (b)1. As an alternative to the requirements in paragraph (8)(a), insurers using credit reports or scores at the inception of a policy but not for re-underwriting shall develop, maintain, and adhere to written procedures. These procedures shall be subject to examination by the Office at any time. The procedures shall comply with the following: Insureds shall be reevaluated no later than 3 years following policy inception based on allowable underwriting or rating factors, excluding credit information. The rate or premium charged to an insured shall not be greater, solely as a result of the reevaluation, than the rate or premium charged for the immediately preceding policy term. This shall not be construed to prohibit an insurer from applying regular underwriting criteria (which may result in a greater premium) or general rate increases to the premium charged. For insureds that received an adverse decision notification at policy inception, no residual effects of that adverse decision shall survive the reevaluation. This means that the reevaluation must be complete enough to make it possible for insureds adversely impacted at inception to attain the lowest available rate for which comparable insureds are eligible, considering only allowable underwriting or rating factors (excluding credit information) at the time of the reevaluation. No credit scoring methodology shall be used for personal lines motor vehicle or personal lines residential property insurance unless that methodology has been demonstrated to be a valid predictor of the insurance risk to be assumed by an insurer for the applicable type of insurance. The demonstration of validity detailed below need only be provided with the first rate, rule, or underwriting guidelines filing following the effective date of this rule and at any time a change is made in the credit scoring methodology. Other such filings may instead refer to the most recent prior filing containing a demonstration. Information supplied in the context of a demonstration of validity will be held as confidential if properly so identified by the insurer and eligible under Section 626.9711, F.S. A demonstration of validity shall include: A listing of the persons that contributed substantially to the development of the most current version of the method, including resumes of the persons, if obtainable, indicating their qualifications and experience in similar endeavors. An enumeration of all data cleansing techniques that have been used in the development of the method, which shall include: The nature of each technique; Any biases the technique might introduce; and The prevalence of each type of invalid information prior to correction or enhancement. All data that was used by the model developers in the derivation and calibration of the model parameters. Data shall be in sufficient detail to permit the Office to conduct multiple regression testing for validation of the credit scoring methodology. Data, including field definitions, shall be supplied in electronic format compatible with the software used by the Office. Statistical results showing that the model and parameters are predictive and not overlapping or duplicative of any other variables used to rate an applicant to such a degree as to render their combined use actuarially unsound. Such results shall include the period of time for which each element from a credit report is used. A precise listing of all elements from a credit report that are used in scoring, and the formula used to compute the score, including the time period during which each element is used. Such listing is confidential if properly so identified by the insurer. An assessment by a qualified actuary, economist, or statistician (whether or not employed by the insurer) other than persons who contributed substantially to the development of the credit scoring methodology, concluding that there is a significant statistical correlation between the scores and frequency or severity of claims. The assessment shall: Identify the person performing the assessment and show his or her educational and professional experience qualifications; and Include a test of robustness of the model, showing that it performs well on a credible validation data set. The validation data set may not be the one from which the model was developed. Documentation consisting of statistical testing of the application of the credit scoring model to determine whether it results in a disproportionate impact on the classes set forth in Section 626.9741(8)(c), A model that disproportionately affects any such class of persons is presumed to have a disparate impact and is presumed to be unfairly discriminatory. Statistical analysis shall be performed on the current insureds of the insurer using the proposed credit scoring model, and shall include the raw data and detailed results on each classification set forth in Section 626.9741(8)(c), F.S. In lieu of such analysis insurers may use the alternative in 2. below. Alternatively, insurers may submit statistical studies and analyses that have been performed by educational institutions, independent professional associations, or other reputable entities recognized in the field, that indicate that there is no disproportionate impact on any of the classes set forth in Section 626.9741(8)(c), F.S. attributable to the use of credit reports or scores. Any such studies or analyses shall have been done concerning the specific credit scoring model proposed by the insurer. The Office will utilize generally accepted statistical analysis principles in reviewing studies submitted which support the insurer's analysis that the credit scoring model does not disproportionately impact any class based upon race, color, religion, marital status, age, gender, income, national origin, or place of residence. The Office will permit reliance on such studies only to the extent that they permit independent verification of the results. The testing or validation results obtained in the course of the assessment in paragraphs (d) and (f) above. Internal Insurer data that validates the premium differentials proposed based on the scores or ranges of scores. Industry or countrywide data may be used to the extent that the Florida insurer data lacks credibility based upon generally accepted actuarial standards. Insurers using industry or countrywide data for validation shall supply Florida insurer data and demonstrate that generally accepted actuarial standards would allow reliance on each set of data to the extent the insurer has done so. Validation data including claims on personal lines residential insurance policies that are the result of acts of God shall not be used unless such acts occurred prior to January 1, 2004. The mere copying of another company's system will not fulfill the requirement to validate proposed premium differentials unless the filer has used a method or system for less than 3 years and demonstrates that it is not cost effective to retrospectively analyze its own data. Companies under common ownership, management, and control may copy to fulfill the requirement to validate proposed premium differentials if they demonstrate that the characteristics of the business to be written by the affiliate doing the copying are sufficiently similar to the affiliate being copied to presume common differentials will be accurate. The credibility standards and any judgmental adjustments, including limitations on effects, that have been used in the process of deriving premium differentials proposed and validated in paragraph (i) above. An explanation of how the credit scoring methodology treats discrepancies in the information that could have been obtained from different consumer reporting agencies: Equifax, Experian, or TransUnion. This shall not be construed to require insurers to obtain multiple reports for each insured or applicant. 1. The date that each of the analyses, tests, and validations required in paragraphs (d) through (j) above was most recently performed, and a certification that the results continue to be applicable. 2. Any item not reviewed in the previous 5 years is unacceptable. Specific Authority 624.308(1), 626.9741(8) FS. Law Implemented 624.307(1), 626.9741 FS. History-- New . The Petition 1. Statutory Definitions of "Unfairly Discriminatory" The main issue raised by Petitioners is that the Proposed Rule's definition of "unfairly discriminatory," and those portions of the Proposed Rule that rely on this definition, are invalid because they are vague, and enlarge, modify, and contravene the provisions of the law implemented and other provisions of the insurance code. Section 626.9741, Florida Statutes, does not define "unfairly discriminatory." Subsection 626.9741(5), Florida Statutes, provides that a rate filing using credit reports or scores "must comply with the requirements of s. 627.062 or s. 627.0651 to ensure that rates are not excessive, inadequate, or unfairly discriminatory." Subsection 626.9741(8)(c), Florida Statutes, provides that the FSC may adopt rules, including standards to ensure that rates or premiums "associated with the use of a credit report or score are not unfairly discriminatory, based upon race, color, religion, marital status, age, gender, income, national origin, or place of residence." Chapter 627, Part I, Florida Statutes, is referred to as the "Rating Law." § 627.011, Fla. Stat. The purpose of the Rating Law is to "promote the public welfare by regulating insurance rates . . . to the end that they shall not be excessive, inadequate, or unfairly discriminatory." § 627.031(1)(a), Fla. Stat. The Rating Law provisions referenced by Subsection 626.9741(5), Florida Statutes, in relation to ensuring that rates are not "unfairly discriminatory" are Sections 627.062 and 627.0651, Florida Statutes. Section 627.062, Florida Statutes, titled "Rate standards," provides that "[t]he rates for all classes of insurance to which the provisions of this part are applicable shall not be excessive, inadequate, or unfairly discriminatory." § 627.062(1), Fla. Stat. Subsection 627.062(2)(e)6., Florida Statutes, provides: A rate shall be deemed unfairly discriminatory as to a risk or group of risks if the application of premium discounts, credits, or surcharges among such risks does not bear a reasonable relationship to the expected loss and expense experience among the various risks. Section 627.0651, Florida Statutes, titled "Making and use of rates for motor vehicle insurance," provides, in relevant part: One rate shall be deemed unfairly discriminatory in relation to another in the same class if it clearly fails to reflect equitably the difference in expected losses and expenses. Rates are not unfairly discriminatory because different premiums result for policyholders with like loss exposures but different expense factors, or like expense factors but different loss exposures, so long as rates reflect the differences with reasonable accuracy. Rates are not unfairly discriminatory if averaged broadly among members of a group; nor are rates unfairly discriminatory even though they are lower than rates for nonmembers of the group. However, such rates are unfairly discriminatory if they are not actuarially measurable and credible and sufficiently related to actual or expected loss and expense experience of the group so as to assure that nonmembers of the group are not unfairly discriminated against. Use of a single United States Postal Service zip code as a rating territory shall be deemed unfairly discriminatory. Petitioners point out that each of these statutory examples describing "unfairly discriminatory" rates has an actuarial basis, i.e., rates must be related to the actual or expected loss and expense factors for a given group or class, rather than any extraneous factors. If two risks have the same expected losses and expenses, the insurer must charge them the same rate. If the risks have different expected losses and expenses, the insurer must charge them different rates. Michael Miller, Petitioners' expert actuary, testified that the term "unfairly discriminatory" has been used in the insurance industry for well over 100 years and has always had this cost-based definition. Mr. Miller is a fellow of the Casualty Actuarial Society ("CAS"), a professional organization whose purpose is the advancement of the body of knowledge of actuarial science, including the promulgation of industry standards and a code of professional conduct. Mr. Miller was chair of the CAS ratemaking committee when it developed the CAS "Statement of Principles Regarding Property and Casualty Insurance Ratemaking," a guide for actuaries to follow when establishing rates.5 Principle 4 of the Statement of Principles provides: "A rate is reasonable and not excessive, inadequate, or unfairly discriminatory if it is an actuarially sound estimate of the expected value of all future costs associated with an individual risk." In layman's terms, Mr. Miller explained that different types of risks are reflected in a rate calculation. To calculate the expected cost of a given risk, and thus the rate to be charged, the insurer must determine the expected losses for that risk during the policy period. The loss portion reflects the risk associated with an occurrence and the severity of a claim. While the loss portion does not account for the entirety of the rate charged, it is the most important in terms of magnitude. Mr. Miller cautioned that the calculation of risk is a quantification of expected loss, but not an attempt to predict who is going to have an accident or make a claim. There is some likelihood that every insured will make a claim, though most never do, and this uncertainty is built into the incurred loss portion of the rate. No single risk factor is a complete measure of a person's likelihood of having an accident or of the severity of the ensuing claim. The prediction of losses is determined through a risk classification plan that take into consideration many risk factors (also called rating factors) to determine the likelihood of an accident and the extent of the claim. As to automobile insurance, Mr. Miller listed such risk factors as the age, gender, and marital status of the driver, the type, model and age of the car, the liability limits of the coverage, and the geographical location where the car is garaged. As to homeowners insurance, Mr. Miller listed such risk factors as the location of the home, its value and type of construction, the age of the utilities and electrical wiring, and the amount of insurance to be carried. 2. Credit Scoring as a Rating Factor In the current market, the credit score of the applicant or insured is a rating factor common to automobile and homeowners insurance. Subsection 626.9741(2)(c), Florida Statutes, defines "credit score" as follows: a score, grade, or value that is derived by using any or all data from a credit report in any type of model, method, or program, whether electronically, in an algorithm, computer software or program, or any other process, for the purpose of grading or ranking credit report data. "Credit scores" (more accurately termed "credit-based insurance scores") are derived from credit data that have been found to be predictive of a loss. Lamont Boyd, Fair Isaac's insurance market manager, explained the manner in which Fair Isaac produced its credit scoring model. The company obtained information from various insurance companies on millions of customers. This information included the customers' names, addresses, and the premiums earned by the companies on those policies as well as the losses incurred. Fair Isaac next requested the credit reporting agencies to review their archived files for the credit information on those insurance company customers. The credit agencies matched the credit files with the insurance customers, then "depersonalized" the files so that there was no way for Fair Isaac to know the identity of any particular customer. According to Mr. Lamont, the data were "color blind" and "income blind." Fair Isaac's analysts took these files from the credit reporting agencies and studied the data in an effort to find the most predictive characteristics of future loss propensity. The model was developed to account for all the predictive characteristics identified by Fair Isaac's analysts, and to give weight to those characteristics in accordance to their relative accuracy as predictors of loss. Fair Isaac does not directly sell its credit scores to insurance companies. Rather, Fair Isaac's models are implemented by the credit reporting agencies. When an insurance company wants Fair Isaac's credit score, it purchases access to the model's results from the credit reporting agency. Other vendors offer similar credit scoring models to insurance companies, and in recent years, some insurance companies have developed their own scoring models. Several academic studies of credit scoring were admitted and discussed at the final hearing in these cases. There appears to be no serious debate that credit scoring is a valid and important predictor of losses. The controversy over the use of credit scoring arises over its possible "unfairly discriminatory" impact "based upon race, color, religion, marital status, age, gender, income, national origin, or place of residence." § 626.9741(8)(c), Fla. Stat. Mr. Miller was one of two principal authors of a June 2003 study titled, "The Relationship of Credit-Based Insurance Scores to Private Passenger Automobile Insurance Loss Propensity." This study was commissioned by several insurance industry trade organizations, including AIA and NAMIC. The study addressed three questions: whether credit-based insurance scores are related to the propensity for loss; whether credit- based insurance scores measure risk that is already measured by other risk factors; and what is the relative importance to accurate risk assessment of the use of credit-based insurance scores. The study was based on a nationwide random sample of private passenger automobile policy and claim records. Records from all 50 states were included in roughly the same proportion as each state's registered motor vehicles bear to total registered vehicles in the United States. The data samples were provided by seven insurers, and represented approximately 2.7 million automobiles, each insured for 12 months.6 The study examined all major automobile coverages: bodily injury liability, property damage liability, medical payments coverage, personal injury protection coverage, comprehensive coverage, and collision coverage. The study concluded that credit-based insurance scores were correlated with loss propensity. The study found that insurance scores overlap to some degree with other risk factors, but that after fully accounting for the overlaps, insurance scores significantly increase the accuracy of the risk assessment process. The study found that, for each of the six automobile coverages examined, insurance scores are among the three most important risk factors.7 Mr. Miller's study did not examine the question of causality, i.e., why credit-based insurance scores are predictive of loss propensity. Dr. Patrick Brockett testified for Petitioners as an expert in actuarial science, risk management and insurance, and statistics. Dr. Brockett is a professor in the departments of management science and information systems, finance, and mathematics at the University of Texas at Austin. He occupies the Gus S. Wortham Memorial Chair in Risk Management and Insurance, and is the director of the university's risk management and insurance program. Dr. Brockett is the former director of the University of Texas' actuarial science program and continues to direct the study of students seeking their doctoral degrees in actuarial science. His areas of academic research are actuarial science, risk management and insurance, statistics, and general quantitative methods in business. Dr. Brockett has written more than 130 publications, most of which relate to actuarial science and insurance. He has spent his entire career in academia, and has never been employed by an insurance company. In 2002, Lieutenant Governor Bill Ratliff of Texas asked the Bureau of Business Research ("BBR") of the University of Texas' McCombs School of Business to provide an independent, nonpartisan study to examine the relationship between credit history and insurance losses in automobile insurance. Dr. Brockett was one of four named authors of this BBR study, issued in March 2003 and titled, "A Statistical Analysis of the Relationship between Credit History and Insurance Losses." The BBR research team solicited data from insurance companies representing the top 70 percent of the automobile insurers in Texas, and compiled a database of more than 173,000 automobile insurance policies from the first quarter of 1998 that included the following 12 months' premium and loss history. ChoicePoint was then retained to match the named insureds with their credit histories and to supply a credit score for each insured person. The BBR research team then examined the credit score and its relationship with prospective losses for the insurance policy. The results were summarized in the study as follows: Using logistic and multiple regression analyses, the research team tested whether the credit score for the named insured on a policy was significantly related to incurred losses for that policy. It was determined that there was a significant relationship. In general, lower credit scores were associated with larger incurred losses. Next, logistic and multiple regression analyses examined whether the revealed relationship between credit score and incurred losses was explainable by existing underwriting variables, or whether the credit score added new information about losses not contained in the existing underwriting variables. It was determined that credit score did yield new information not contained in the existing underwriting variables. What the study does not attempt to explain is why credit scoring adds significantly to the insurer's ability to predict insurance losses. In other words, causality was not investigated. In addition, the research team did not examine such variables as race, ethnicity, and income in the study, and therefore this report does not speculate about the possible effects that credit scoring may have in raising or lowering premiums for specific groups of people. Such an assessment would require a different study and different data. At the hearing, Dr. Brockett testified that the BBR study demonstrated a "strong and significant relationship between credit scoring and incurred losses," and that credit scoring retained its predictive power even after the other risk variables were accounted for. Dr. Brockett further testified that credit scoring has a disproportionate effect on the classifications of age and marital status, because the very young tend to have credit scores that are lower than those of older people. If the question is simply whether the use of credit scores will have a greater impact on the young and the single, the answer would be in the affirmative. However, Dr. Brockett also noted that young, single people will also have higher losses than older, married people, and, thus, the use of credit scores is not "unfairly discriminatory" in the sense that term is employed in the insurance industry.8 Mr. Miller testified that nothing in the actuarial standards of practice requires that a risk factor be causally related to a loss. The Actuarial Standards Board's Standard of Practice 12,9 dealing with risk classification, states that a risk factor is appropriate for use if there is a demonstrated relationship between the risk factor and the insurance losses, and that this relationship may be established by statistical or other mathematical analysis of data. If the risk characteristic is shown to be related to an expected outcome, the actuary need not establish a cause-and-effect relationship between the risk characteristic and the expected outcome. As an example, Mr. Miller offered the fact that past automobile accidents do not cause future accidents, although past accidents are predictive of future risk. Past traffic violations, the age of the driver, the gender of the driver, and the geographical location are all risk factors in automobile insurance, though none of these factors can be said to cause future accidents. They help insurers predict the probability of a loss, but do not predict who will have an accident or why the accident will occur. Mr. Miller opined that credit scoring is a similar risk factor. It is demonstrably significant as a predictor of risk, though there is no causal relationship between credit scores and losses and only an incomplete understanding of why credit scoring works as a predictor of loss. At the hearing, Dr. Brockett discussed a study that he has co-authored with Linda Golden, a business professor at the University of Texas at Austin. Titled "Biological and Psychobehavioral Correlates of Risk Taking, Credit Scores, and Automobile Insurance Losses: Toward an Explication of Why Credit Scoring Works," the study has been peer-reviewed and at the time of the hearing had been accepted for publication in the Journal of Risk and Insurance. In this study, the authors conducted a detailed review of existing scientific literature concerning the biological, psychological, and behavioral attributes of risky automobile drivers and insured losses, and a similar review of literature concerning the biological, psychological, and behavioral attributes of financial risk takers. The study found that basic chemical and psychobehavioral characteristics, such as a sensation-seeking personality type, are common to individuals exhibiting both higher insured automobile losses and poorer credit scores. Dr. Brockett testified that this study provides a direction for future research into the reasons why credit scoring works as an insurance risk characteristic. 3. The Proposed Rule's Definition of "Unfairly Discriminatory" Petitioners contend that the Proposed Rule's definition of the term "unfairly discriminatory" expands upon and is contrary to the statutory definition of the term discussed in section C.1. supra, and that this expanded definition operates to impose a ban on the use of credit scoring by insurance companies. As noted above, Section 626.9741, Florida Statutes, does not define the term "unfairly discriminatory." The provisions of the Rating Law10 define the term as it is generally understood by the insurance industry: a rate is deemed "unfairly discriminatory" if the premium charged does not equitably reflect the differences in expected losses and expenses between policyholders. Two provisions of Section 626.9741, Florida Statutes, employ the term "unfairly discriminatory": (5) A rate filing that uses credit reports or credit scores must comply with the requirements of s. 627.062 or s. 627.0651 to ensure that rates are not excessive, inadequate, or unfairly discriminatory. * * * (8) The commission may adopt rules to administer this section. The rules may include, but need not be limited to: * * * (c) Standards that ensure that rates or premiums associated with the use of a credit report or score are not unfairly discriminatory, based upon race, color, religion, marital status, age, gender, income, national origin, or place of residence. Petitioners contend that the statute's use of the term "unfairly discriminatory" is unexceptionable, that the Legislature simply intended the term to be used and understood in the traditional sense of actuarial soundness alone. Respondents agree that Subsection 626.9741(5), Florida Statutes, calls for the agency to apply the traditional definition of "unfairly discriminatory" as that term is employed in the statutes directly referenced, Sections 627.062 and 627.0651, Florida Statutes, the relevant texts of which are set forth in Findings of Fact 18 and 19 above. However, Respondents contend that Subsection 626.9741(8)(c), Florida Statutes, calls for more than the application of the Rating Law's definition of the term. Respondents assert that in the context of this provision, "unfairly discriminatory" contemplates not only the predictive function, but also "discrimination" in its more common sense, as the term is employed in state and federal civil rights law regarding race, color, religion, marital status, age, gender, income, national origin, or place of residence. At the hearing, OIR General Counsel Steven Parton testified as to the reasons why the agency chose the federal body of law using the term "disparate impact" as the test for unfair discrimination in the Proposed Rule: Well, first of all, what we were looking for is a workable definition that people would have some understanding as to what it meant when we talked about unfair discrimination. We were also looking for a test that did not require any willfulness, because it was not our concern that, in fact, insurance companies were engaging willfully in unfair discrimination. What we believed is going on, and we think all of the studies that are out there suggest, is that credit scoring is having a disparate impact upon various people, whether it be income, whether it be race. . . . Respondents' position is that Subsection 626.9741(8)(c), Florida Statutes, requires that a proposed rate or premium be rejected if it has a "disproportionately" negative effect on one of the named classes of persons, even though the rate or premium equitably reflects the differences in expected losses and expenses between policyholders. In the words of Mr. Parton, "This is not an actuarial rule." Mr. Parton explained the agency's rationale for employing a definition of "unfairly discriminatory" that is different from the actuarial usage employed in the Rating Law. Subsection 626.9741(5), Florida Statutes, already provides that an insurer's rate filings may not be "excessive, inadequate, or unfairly discriminatory" in the actuarial sense. To read Subsection 626.9741(8)(c), Florida Statutes, as simply a reiteration of the actuarial "unfair discrimination" rule would render the provision, "a nullity. There would be no force and effect with regards to that." Thus, the Proposed Rule defines "unfairly discriminatory" to mean "that adverse decisions resulting from the use of a credit scoring methodology disproportionately affects persons belonging to any of the classes set forth in Section 626.9741(8)(c), F.S." Proposed Florida Administrative Code Rule 69O-125.005(1)(e). OIR's actuary, Howard Eagelfeld, explained that "disproportionate effect" means "having a different effect on one group . . . causing it to pay more or less premium than its proportionate share in the general population or than it would have to pay based upon all other known considerations." Mr. Eagelfeld's explanation is not incorporated into the language of the Proposed Rule. Consistent with the actuarial definition of "unfairly discriminatory," the Proposed Rule requires that any credit scoring methodology must be "demonstrated to be a valid predictor of the insurance risk to be assumed by an insurer for the applicable type of insurance," and sets forth detailed criteria through which the insurer can make the required demonstration. Proposed Florida Administrative Code Rule 69O-125.005(9)(a)-(f) and (h)-(l). Proposed Florida Administrative Code Rule 69O-125.005(9)(g) sets forth Respondents' "civil rights" usage of the term "unfairly discriminatory." The insurer's demonstration of the validity of its credit scoring methodology must include: [d]ocumentation consisting of statistical testing of the application of the credit scoring model to determine whether it results in a disproportionate impact on the classes set forth in Section 626.9741(8)(c), F.S. A model that disproportionately affects any such class of persons is presumed to have a disparate impact and is presumed to be unfairly discriminatory.11 Mr. Parton, who testified in defense of the Proposed Rule as one of its chief draftsmen, stated that the agency was concerned that the use of credit scoring may be having a disproportionate effect on minorities. Respondents believe that credit scoring may simply be a surrogate measure for income, and that using income as a basis for setting rates would have an obviously disparate impact on lower-income persons, including the young and the elderly. Mr. Parton testified that "neither the insurance industry nor anyone else" has researched the theory that credit scoring may be a surrogate for income. Mr. Miller referenced a 1998 analysis performed by AIA indicating that the average credit scores do not vary significantly according to the income group. In fact, the lowest income group (persons making less than $15,000 per year) had the highest average credit score, and the average credit scores actually dropped as income levels rose until the income range reached $50,000 to $74,000 per year, when the credit scores began to rise. Mr. Miller testified that a credit score is no more predictive of income level than a coin flip. However, Respondents introduced a January 2003 report to the Washington State Legislature prepared by the Social & Economic Sciences Research Center of Washington State University, titled "Effect of Credit Scoring on Auto Insurance Underwriting and Pricing." The purpose of the study was to determine whether credit scoring has unequal impacts on specific demographic groups. For this study, the researchers received data from three insurance companies on several thousand randomly chosen customers, including the customers' age, gender, residential zip code, and their credit scores and/or rate classifications. The researchers contacted about 1,000 of each insurance company's customers and obtained information about their ethnicity, marital status, and income levels. The study's findings were summarized as follows: The demographic patterns discerned by the study are: Age is the most significant factor. In almost every analysis, older drivers have, on average, higher credit scores, lower credit-based rate assignments, and less likelihood of lacking a valid credit score. Income is also a significant factor. Credit scores and premium costs improve as income rises. People in the lowest income categories-- less than $20,000 per year and between $20,000 and $35,000 per year-- often experienced higher premiums and lower credit scores. More people in lower income categories also lacked sufficient credit history to have a credit score. Ethnicity was found to be significant in some cases, but because of differences among the three firms studied and the small number of ethnic minorities in the samples, the data are not broadly conclusive. In general, Asian/Pacific Islanders had credit scores more similar to whites than to other minorities. When other minority groups had significant differences from whites, the differences were in the direction of higher premiums. In the sample of cases where insurance was cancelled based on credit score, minorities who were not Asian/Pacific Islanders had greater difficulty finding replacement insurance, and were more likely to experience a lapse in insurance while they searched for a new policy. The analysis also considered gender, marital status and location, but for these factors, significant unequal effects were far less frequent. (emphasis added) The evidence appears equivocal on the question of whether credit scoring is a surrogate for income. The Washington study seems to indicate that ethnicity may be a significant factor in credit scoring, but that significant unequal effects are infrequent regarding gender and marital status. The evidence demonstrates that the use of credit scores by insurers would tend to have a negative impact on young people. Mr. Miller testified that persons between ages 25 and 30 have lower credit scores than older people. Petitioners argue that by defining "unfairly discriminatory" to mean "disproportionate effect," the Proposed Rule effectively prohibits insurers from using credit scores, if only because all the parties recognize that credit scores have a "disproportionate effect" on young people. Petitioners contend that this prohibition is in contravention of Section 626.9741(1), Florida Statutes, which states that the purpose of the statute is to "regulate and limit" the use of credit scores, not to ban them outright. Respondents counter that if the use of credit scores is "unfairly discriminatory" toward one of the listed classes of persons in contravention of Subsection 626.9741(8)(c), Florida Statutes, then the "limitation" allowed by the statute must include prohibition. This point is obviously true but sidesteps the real issues: whether the statute's undefined prohibition on "unfair discrimination" authorizes the agency to employ a "disparate impact" or "disproportionate effect" definition in the Proposed Rule, and, if so, whether the Proposed Rule sufficiently defines any of those terms to permit an insurer to comply with the rule's requirements. Proposed Florida Administrative Code Rule 69O-125.005(2) provides that the insurer bears the burden of demonstrating that its credit scoring methodology does not disproportionately affect persons based upon their race, color, religion, marital status, age, gender, income, national origin, or place of residence. Petitioners state that no insurer can demonstrate, consistent with the Proposed Rule, that its credit scoring methodology does not have a disproportionate effect on persons based upon their age. Therefore, no insurer will ever be permitted to use credit scores under the terms of the Proposed Rule. As discussed more fully in Findings of Fact 73 through 76 below, Petitioners also contend that the Proposed Rule provides no guidance as to what "disproportionate effect" and "disparate impact" mean, and that this lack of definitional guidance will permit the agency to reject any rate filing that uses credit scoring, based upon an arbitrary determination that it has a "disproportionate effect" on one of the classes named in Subsection 626.9741(8)(c), Florida Statutes. Petitioners also presented evidence that no insurer collects data on race, color, religion, or national origin from applicants or insureds. Mr. Miller testified that there is no reliable independent source for race, color, religious affiliation, or national origin data. Mr. Eagelfeld agreed that there is no independent source from which insurers can obtain credible data on race or religious affiliation. Mr. Parton testified that this lack of data can be remedied by the insurance companies commencing to request race, color, religion, and national origin information from their customers, because there is no legal impediment to their doing so. Mr. Miller testified that he would question the reliability of the method suggested by Mr. Parton because many persons will refuse to answer such sensitive questions or may not answer them correctly. Mr. Miller stated that, as an actuary, he would not certify the results of a study based on demographic data obtained in this manner and would qualify any resulting actuarial opinion due to the unreliability of the database. Petitioners also object to the vagueness of the broad categories of "race, color, religion and national origin." Mr. Miller testified that the Proposed Rule lacks "operational definitions" for those terms that would enable insurers to perform the required calculations. The Proposed Rule places the burden on the insurer to demonstrate no disproportionate effect on persons based on these categories, but offers no guidance as to how these demographic classes should be categorized by an insurer seeking to make such a demonstration. Petitioners point out that even if the insurer is able to ascertain the categories sought by the regulators, the Proposed Rule gives no guidance as to whether the "disproportionate effect" criterion mandates perfect proportionality among all races, colors, religions, and national origins, or whether some degree of difference is tolerable. Petitioners contend that this lack of guidance provides unbridled discretion to the regulator to reject any disproportionate effect study submitted by an insurer. At his deposition, Mr. Parton was asked how an insurer should break down racial classifications in order to show that there is no disproportionate effect on race. His answer was as follows: There is African-American, Cuban-American, Spanish-American, African-American, Haitian- American. Are you-- you know, whatever the make-up of your book of business is-- you're the one in control of it. You can ask these folks what their ethnic background is. At his deposition, Mr. Parton frankly admitted that he had no idea what "color" classifications an insurer should use, yet he also stated that an insurer must demonstrate no disproportionate effect on each and every listed category, including "color." At the final hearing, when asked to list the categories of "color," Mr. Parton responded, "I suppose Indian, African-American, Chinese, Japanese, all of those."12 At the final hearing, Mr. Parton was asked whether the Proposed Rule contemplates requiring insurers to demonstrate distinctions between such groups as "Latvian-Americans" and "Czech-Americans." Mr. Parton's reply was as follows: No. And I don't think it was contemplated by the Legislature. . . . The question is race by any other name, whether it be national origin, ethnicity, color, is something that they're concerned about in terms of an impact. What we would anticipate, and what we have always anticipated, is the industry would demonstrate whether or not there is an adverse effect against those folks who have traditionally in Florida been discriminated against, and that would be African-Americans and certain Hispanic groups. In our opinion, at least, if you could demonstrate that the credit scoring was not adversely impacting it, it may very well answer the questions to any other subgroup that you may want to name. At the hearing, Mr. Parton was also questioned as to distinctions between religions and testified as follows: The impact of credit scoring on religion is going to be in the area of what we call thin files, or no files. That is to say people who do not have enough credit history from which credit scores can be done, or they're going to be treated somehow differently because of that lack of history. A simple question that needs to be asked by the insurance company is: "Do you, as a result of your religious belief or whatever [sect] you are in, are you forbidden as a precept of your religious belief from engaging in the use of credit?" When cross-examined on the subject, Mr. Parton could not confidently identify any religious group that forbids the use of credit. He thought that Muslims and Quakers may be such groups. Mr. Parton concluded by stating, "I don't think it is necessary to identify those groups. The question is whether or not you have a religious group that you prescribe to that forbids it." Petitioners contend that, in addition to failing to define the statutory terms of race, color, religion, and national origin in a manner that permits insurer compliance, the Proposed Rule fails to provide an operational definition of "disproportionate effect." The following is a hypothetical question put to Mr. Parton at his deposition, and Mr. Parton's answer: Q: Let's assume that African-Americans make up 10 percent of the population. Let's just use two groups for the sake of clarity. Caucasians make up 90 percent. If the application of credit scoring in underwriting results in African-Americans paying 11 percent of the premium and Caucasians paying 89 percent of the premium, is that, in your mind, a disproportionate affect [sic]? A: It may be. I think it would give rise under this rule that perhaps there is a presumption that it is, but that presumption is not [an irrebuttable] one.[13] For instance, if you then had testimony that a 1 percent difference between the two was statistically insignificant, then I would suggest that that presumption would be overridden. This answer led to a lengthy discussion regarding a second hypothetical in which African-Americans made up 29 percent of the population, and also made up 35 percent of the lowest, or most unfavorable, tier of an insurance company's risk classifications. Mr. Parton ultimately opined that if the difference in the two numbers was found to be "statistically significant" and attributable only to the credit score, then he would conclude that the use of credit scoring unfairly discriminated against African-Americans. As to whether his answer would be the same if the hypothetical were adjusted to state that African-Americans made up 33 percent of the lowest tier, Mr. Parton responded: "That would be up to expert testimony to be provided on it. That's what trials are all about."14 Aside from expert testimony to demonstrate that the difference was "statistically insignificant," Mr. Parton could think of no way that an insurer could rebut the presumption that the difference was unfairly discriminatory under the "disproportionate effect" definition set forth in the proposed rule. He stated that, "I can't anticipate, nor does the rule propose to anticipate, doing the job of the insurer of demonstrating that its rates are not unfairly discriminatory." Mr. Parton testified that an insurer's showing that the credit score was a valid and important predictor of risk would not be sufficient to rebut the presumption of disproportionate effect. Summary Findings Credit-based insurance scoring is a valid and important predictor of risk, significantly increasing the accuracy of the risk assessment process. The evidence is still inconclusive as to why credit scoring is an effective predictor of risk, though a study co-authored by Dr. Brockett has found that basic chemical and psychobehavioral characteristics, such as a sensation-seeking personality type, are common to individuals exhibiting both higher insured automobile losses and poorer credit scores. Though the evidence was equivocal on the question of whether credit scoring is simply a surrogate for income, the evidence clearly demonstrated that the use of credit scores by insurance companies has a greater negative overall effect on young people, who tend to have lower credit scores than older people. Petitioners and Fair Isaac emphasized their contention that compliance with the Proposed Rule would be impossible, and thus the Proposed Rule in fact would operate as a prohibition on the use of credit scoring by insurance companies. At best, Petitioners demonstrated that compliance with the Proposed Rule would be impracticable at first, given the current business practices in the industry regarding the collection of customer data regarding race and religion. The evidence indicated no legal barriers to the collection of such data by the insurance companies. Questions as to the reliability of the data are speculative until a methodology for the collection of the data is devised. Subsection 626.9741(8)(c), Florida Statutes, authorizes the FSC to adopt rules that may include: Standards that ensure that rates or premiums associated with the use of a credit report or score are not unfairly discriminatory, based upon race, color, religion, marital status, age, gender, income, national origin, or place of residence. Petitioners' contention that the statute's use of "unfairly discriminatory" contemplates nothing more than the actuarial definition of the term as employed by the Rating Law is rejected. As Respondents pointed out, Subsection 626.9741(5), Florida Statutes, provides that a rate filing using credit scores must comply with the Rating Law's requirements that the rates not be "unfairly discriminatory" in the actuarial sense. If Subsection 626.9741(8)(c), Florida Statutes, merely reiterates the actuarial requirement, then it is, in Mr. Parton's words, "a nullity."15 Thus, it is found that the Legislature contemplated some level of scrutiny beyond actuarial soundness to determine whether the use of credit scores "unfairly discriminates" in the case of the classes listed in Subsection 626.9741(8)(c), Florida Statutes. It is found that the Legislature empowered FSC to adopt rules establishing standards to ensure that an insurer's rates or premiums associated with the use of credit scores meet this added level of scrutiny. However, it must be found that the term "unfairly discriminatory" as employed in the Proposed Rule is essentially undefined. FSC has not adopted a "standard" by which insurers can measure their rates and premiums, and the statutory term "unfairly discriminatory" is thus subject to arbitrary enforcement by the regulating agency. Proposed Florida Administrative Code Rule 69O-125.005(1)(e) defines "unfairly discriminatory" in terms of adverse decisions that "disproportionately affect" persons in the classes set forth in Subsection 626.9741(8)(c), Florida Statutes, but does not define what is a "disproportionate effect." At Subsection (9)(g), the Proposed Rule requires "statistical testing" of the credit scoring model to determine whether it results in a "disproportionate impact" on the listed classes. This subsection attempts to define its terms as follows: A model that disproportionately affects any such class of persons is presumed to have a disparate impact and is presumed to be unfairly discriminatory. Thus, the Proposed Rule provides that a "disproportionate effect" equals a "disparate impact" equals "unfairly discriminatory," without defining any of these terms in such a way that an insurer could have any clear notion, prior to the regulator's pronouncement on its rate filing, whether its credit scoring methodology was in compliance with the rule. Indeed, Mr. Parton's testimony evinced a disinclination on the part of the agency to offer guidance to insurers who attempt to understand this circular definition. The tenor of his testimony indicated that the agency itself is unsure of exactly what an insurer could submit to satisfy the "disproportionate effect" test, aside from perfect proportionality, which all parties concede is not possible at least as to young people, or a showing that any lack of perfect proportionality is "statistically insignificant," whatever that means. Mr. Parton seemed to say that OIR will know a valid use of credit scoring when it sees one, though it cannot describe such a use beforehand. Mr. Eagelfeld offered what might be a workable definition of "disproportionate effect," but his definition is not incorporated into the Proposed Rule. Mr. Parton attempted to assure the Petitioners that OIR would take a reasonable view of the endless racial and ethnic categories that could be subsumed under the literal language of the Proposed Rule, but again, Mr. Parton's assurances are not part of the Proposed Rule. Mr. Parton's testimony referenced federal and state civil rights laws as the source for the term "disparate impact." Federal case law under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2, has defined a "disparate impact" claim as "one that 'involves employment practices that are facially neutral in their treatment of different groups, but that in fact fall more harshly on one group than another and cannot be justified by business necessity.'" Adams v. Florida Power Corporation, 255 F.3d 1322, 1324 n.4 (11th Cir. 2001), quoting Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 609, 113 S. Ct. 1701, 1705, 123 L. Ed. 2d 338 (1993). The Proposed Rule does not reference this definition, nor did Mr. Parton detail how OIR proposes to apply or modify this definition in enforcing the Proposed Rule. Without further definition, all three of the terms employed in this circular definition are conclusions, not "standards" that the insurer and the regulator can agree upon at the outset of the statistical and analytical process leading to approval or rejection of the insurer's rates. Absent some definitional guidance, a conclusory term such as "disparate impact" can mean anything the regulator wishes it to mean in a specific case. The confusion is compounded by the Proposed Rule's failure to refine the broad terms "race," "color," and "religion" in a manner that would allow an insurer to prepare a meaningful rate submission utilizing credit scoring. In his testimony, Mr. Parton attempted to limit the Proposed Rule's impact to those groups "who have traditionally in Florida been discriminated against," but the actual language of the Proposed Rule makes no such distinction. Mr. Parton also attempted to limit the reach of "religion" to groups whose beliefs forbid them from engaging in the use of credit, but the language of the Proposed Rule does not support Mr. Parton's distinction.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Department of Legal Affairs (Department) is an agency of the State of Florida. Petitioner, Calvin L. Fox (Fox), was employed by the Department from April 24, 1978 to June 26, 1987, and consequently accrued nine years, two months and two days of creditable state service. Immediately prior to his employment with the Department, Fox had been employed by a county government. That employment, which commenced March 17, 1976, is creditable under the state retirement system but is not considered creditable state service for other termination benefits. Upon his resignation from the Department, Fox was paid $966.31 for accumulated sick leave based on the erroneous conclusion that March 17, 1976, as opposed to April 24, 1978, was the date he commenced creditable state service. 1/ Commencing in 1985, Fox was engaged in litigation against the Department arising from his employment with the State of Florida. While the record does not disclose the specifics of that litigation, it does establish that the parties resolved their dispute through the execution of a mutual release dated August 7, 1987, and a joint stipulation of voluntary dismissal with prejudice of a Federal court action on the same date. Pertinent to this case, the joint stipulation provided: In consideration for such mutual releases and voluntary dismissal with prejudice, the parties agree to provide the consideration agreed upon in the Mutual Release attached as Exhibit 1 as full settlement of all claims alleged or which could have been alleged in this cause of action. By accepting the terms of this stipulation and the mutual release which may pertain, the parties do not admit liability or wrongdoing in this action. The parties agree to mutual releases and the payment of consideration solely to accomplish the compromise and settlement of any and all claims, demands, actions, causes of action, or suits of any kind or nature whatsoever, including all attorney fees and costs, arising from Plaintiff's employment or non- employment, by the Defendants. All parties stipulate and agree that this document, with the attached release, represents the entire agreement between them, and that the terms contained herein may not be changed or altered without the express written consent of all parties. The mutual release provided: In consideration of Employee Fox's voluntary dismissal with prejudice and his voluntary resignation, the sufficiency of which is hereby acknowledged, the State, for itself and its legal representatives and assigns, agrees to release, acquit, satisfy and forever discharge Employee Fox, his agents or servants and all heirs, legal representatives, successors or assigns, from all claims alleged or which could have been alleged in the above-styled actions and from all causes of action, claims or demands whatsoever in law or in equity as a result of any loss known or unknown at this time, or which may hereafter become known, develop or accrue, occasioned by or arising out of, directly or indirectly, any of the matters set forth or which could have been set forth in the above-referenced or any other litigation between the parties. * * * The undersigned have read the foregoing release and fully understand it and voluntarily accept it for the purpose of making a full and final compromise, adjustment and settlement of any and all claims based upon the allegations of the above-referenced litigation or any other litigation between the parties and for the express purpose of precluding forever any further or additional claims arising out of Employee Fox's employment or non-employment. In March 1988, the erroneous payment of accumulated sick leave to Fox was disclosed during a routine audit of the Department by the Auditor General. Fox has denied liability for the repayment of such monies predicated on the parties execution of the joint stipulation and mutual release discussed supra.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a final order which terminates any further efforts to collect the subject monies from Fox. DONE and ENTERED this 31st day of March, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM J. KENDRICK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of March, 1989.
The Issue The issues are whether Respondent violated Chapter 440, Florida Statutes, by failing to obtain workers' compensation insurance, and if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency responsible for enforcing the statutory requirement that employers secure the payment of workers' compensation for the benefit of their employees as required by Section 440.107, Florida Statutes (2008). Respondent is a Florida Corporation that engages in the painting business. Abner Gonzalez is Respondent's President. Painting is a workplace operation that satisfies the criteria of the term "construction industry" as set forth in the Basic Manual of the National Council on Compensation Insurance, Inc. (NCCI). On May 15, 2009, Petitioner's investigator, Allen DiMaria conducted an investigation at the intersection of Normandy Boulevard and Guardian Drive in Jacksonville, Florida. Mr. DiMaria observed one worker on a ladder and another worker on the ground painting a block and masonry entrance to a development. The workers at the site identified themselves to Mr. DiMaria as Abner Gonzalez and César Silvestre. Mr. Gonzalez stated that Respondent had a contract to paint the wall and that he and Mr. Silvestre were Respondent's employees. Mr. Gonzalez stated that, as a corporate officer, he had an exemption for workers' compensation. Mr. Gonzalez admitted that Respondent had not secured workers' compensation for Mr. Silvestre. Mr. DiMaria was able to confirm that Mr. Gonzalez had a current valid construction exemption, specifically for painting. However, Mr. Gonzalez did not have a painting exemption for the entirety of the prior three years. On May 15, 2009, Mr. DiMaria issued and personally served on Respondent a Stop-Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment for failure to comply with statutory requirements. Mr. DiMaria also issued Respondent a Request for Production of Business Records for Penalty Assessment Calculation. Because Respondent did not promptly provide Petitioner with the requested business records, Petitioner's staff imputed Respondent's payroll and calculated the penalty as the average weekly wage rate multiplied by 1.5. pursuant to Section 440.107, Florida Statutes. Petitioner then issued the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment in the amount of $26,180.24 on June 11, 2009. Respondent subsequently provided Petitioner with business records. The records included Respondent's bank statements for the prior three years and Respondent's 2007 Employer's Quarterly Federal Tax Returns. The records also showed that Respondent provided employment without workers' compensation insurance to persons other than Mr. Gonzalez and Mr. Silvestre during the prior three years. On June 26, 2009, Petitioner issued the Second Amended Order of Penalty Assessment based upon Respondent's business records in the amount of $7,641.14. The Second Amended Order of Penalty Assessment, showing the reduced penalty, was served on Respondent by certified mail.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That Respondent issue a final order affirming the Stop-Work Order and Second Amended Order of Penalty Assessment in the amount of $7,641.14. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of October, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of October, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: Paige Billings Shoemaker, Esquire Department of Financial Services 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-4229 Abner Gonzales 1924 Firefly Drive Green Cove Springs, Florida 32043 Tracy Beal, Agency Clerk Department of Financial Services 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0390 Benjamin Diamond, General Counsel Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0307 Honorable Alex Sink Chief Financial Officer Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
The Issue The issue to be resolved in this proceeding concerns whether the Petitioner is owed the sum of $4,787.00 representing 14 shipments of cucumbers supplied to the Respondent for which the Petitioner has allegedly not been paid. Consequently, it must be determined whether the Petitioner is entitled to recompense from the bond posted by the Respondent, through its surety, in accordance with the provisions of Sections 604.15-604.34, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Long & Scott Farms, Inc., is a grower of cucumbers for the commercial market. The Respondent, Mo-Bo Enterprises, Inc., is a buyer and broker of such agricultural produce. During the fall 1994 harvesting and shipping season for cucumbers, a problem arose in the business relationship between the Petitioner and the Respondent, which had not previously occurred. On October 21, 1994, the Petitioner sold and shipped to the Respondent, or to its consignee, a shipment of 84 crates of dill-pickle-sized cucumbers, at a price of $15.00 per crate. Thus, the invoice billing for that shipment was $1,260.00. The payment for that shipment was delayed for a long period of time; but finally, on February 15, 1994, a partial payment of $1,071.00 was made for that shipment and invoice. The Respondent's representatives assured the Petitioner that the remainder of that bill would be paid promptly, but no payment has ever been made. Between the dates of October 21, 1994 and November 8, 1994, some 13 other shipments of cucumbers were made on the order and purchase of the Respondent, sold and shipped by the Petitioner, for which the Respondent has never paid any amount to the Petitioner. The 14 shipments resulted in a balance due to the Petitioner from the Respondent of $4,787.00. That amount includes the deficiency in payment for the shipment of October 21, 1994, for which the above-referenced partial payment was made. The Petitioner and the Respondent had a business arrangement, whereby the Respondent would notify the Petitioner of any problem with any shipment, such as deficient quality, rot, or other deterioration, shortage in amount shipped, and the like. This arrangement, whereby notification of any problem with a shipment should be provided to the Petitioner within eight hours of the shipment's arrival, was printed on each invoice form, which forms were submitted to the Respondent upon the dispatch of each shipment. The Respondent never informed the Petitioner of any problems with any of the shipments involved in this proceeding. The shipments were all duly and timely made to the Respondent and received by it or its consignees. Moreover, in their prior discussions and negotiations concerning the relevant unpaid bill, the Respondent has never denied owing that amount. It simply has not paid the amount due, although it or its representatives have offered to negotiate some sort of payment arrangement. The unrefuted evidence thus shows that the Respondent and its surety company, Armor Insurance Company, are indebted to the Petitioner in the amount of $4,787.00 and that payment for that amount has not been made.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered by the Department ordering the Respondent to pay the above-referenced sum of $4,787.00 to the Petitioner and in the event of failure of the Respondent to remit such payment, that the Respondent, Armor Insurance Company, pay over to the Department the amount herein found to be due and owing from the bond posted by that surety company for the Respondent dealer, which sum should then be remitted over to the Petitioner. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of October, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of October, 1995. COPIES FURNISHED: Mr. Frank D. Scott Post Office Box 1228 Zellwood, FL 32798 Charles D. Barnard, Esq. 200 S.E. 6th St., Ste. 205 Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301 Mark J. Albrechta, Esq. Armor Insurance Company Box 15250 Tampa, FL 33684-5250 Honorable Bob Crawford Commissioner of Agriculture Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0810 Richard Tritschler, Esq. General Counsel Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0810
