Findings Of Fact At all times relevant hereto Thomas P. Elliott was licensed in Florida as an osteopathic physician having been first licensed in Florida in 1977 and issued Certificate No. 0003751. He graduated from an accredited osteopathic school of medicine in Kirksville, Missouri in 1952 and was duly licensed in Missouri where he practiced for some 23 years before entering the U.S. Air Force medical corps for two years. He was assigned to Tyndall AFB in Panama City, Florida. Upon his release from the USAF and licensure in Florida, he moved to Largo, Florida in 1977 where he set up a general practice as an osteopathic physician. Jack Bianco was first seen by Respondent on 12/19/B3 complaining of constant back pain. Examination and x-rays showed the degeneration of lower spine which could result in some pain. Bianco gave a history of an accident while in the military in 1966 which required extensive surgery and use of a brace for several years. Respondent acknowledged that if a patient said he had pain, he was given the benefit of the doubt. Although Bianco had received treatment at VA facilities those records were never asked for nor obtained by Respondent. Bianco stated he was allergic to Codeine and refused prescriptions for anti-inflammatory drugs. On this initial visit he was treated by manipulation, high frequency pulse and given a prescription for Dilaudid. Bianco remained a patient of Respondent until September 1984. At each visit, which occurred at approximately one week intervals, Bianco was treated with manipulation, high frequency pulse therapy and issued a prescription for Dilaudid. During the nine months Bianco was a patient he was given prescriptions for 374 Dilaudid, 4 mg. Dilaudid is the brand name for Hydromorphone Hydrochlorite. It is the strongest form of morphine available for oral ingestion and is a Class II controlled substance because of its highly addictive attributes. Extended use of Dilaudid (beyond two or three weeks) is generally deemed suitable only for terminally ill patients suffering from a painful malady such as cancer. Respondent recognized that Bianco was coming for treatment principally to get Dilaudid but he nevertheless continued to prescribe Dilaudid and never referred Bianco to a drug treatment facility. In March 1984, Respondent reduced the number of Dilaudid prescribed at one time to 8 but in July 1984 increased the number to 10. Respondent testified he attempted to take Bianco off the Dilaudid and Bianco did not return for treatment after receiving his last prescription from Respondent September 6, 1984. However, as noted below, Bianco's records (and others) were seized by the Sheriff's Office September 11, 1984. Records maintained by Respondent on Bianco fail to record results of the treatment given. On nearly every visit the same treatment was given followed by the prescription for Dilaudid. Although Respondent testified + + + + shown on the patient record showed that response to the treatment was first class, there is no record that Bianco's condition was improving, remaining constant or getting worse, or that any effort was made to change the medication to a less addictive drug. Respondent was never registered to participate in a detoxification program. Without such registration it is illegal for a practitioner to prescribe maintenance drugs to an addict. Between 1979 and 1984, Respondent also treated Stanley Berry, Lawrence Brainard, Cheryl Morelli, Michael Morelli; Donald Murray, Nicholas Spano, Linda Valentine, Paul Broussard, Lee Coryell, Arthur Gray, Sherri Gray, Raine Troupe, Bruce Flood, Debora Bolte, Leon Clifford, Gail Outlaw, William Ellmore, Horace Maybee, William Noble, Irene Morelli and Ernest Pingatore, as alleged in the Administrative Complaint. All of these patients complained of pain, generally back pain, on the first visit. Most reported having been involved in an earlier accident and reinjuring the back recently. The examinations given by Respondent consisted of checking the x-rays if the patient presented one to see if there was any skeletal problem that could cause pain. Otherwise he would palpate the patient to find a potential cause of pain. On these initial visits and throughout the period the patient was treated by Respondent, vital signs (blood pressure, temperature and pulse) were rarely, if ever, taken by Respondent or anyone else at his office. Most of these patients were given manipulation, heat or high pulse frequency treatment and prescriptions for Dilaudid on the first visit. Those who presented records showing they had been given Demerol or Percodan were usually given prescriptions for Demerol or Percodan and a muscle relaxant. Both Demerol and Percodan are Class II controlled substances. These patients' charts, like the chart on Bianco, failed to record what, if any, progress was made as the treatment progressed. Petitioner's expert witnesses, who reviewed the patient records and testified in these proceedings, could not decipher some of the notations made by Respondent on these charts as he used abbreviations, pluses, etc. While it would be very important for a doctor to read the patient record of a patient who had been treated by another physician, there is no specific format or specified abbreviations for maintaining patient records. All of these patients were given prescriptions for Class II drugs with inadequate documentation to justify the use of such drugs in the patient records. They were also given these prescriptions for a much longer time than was indicated for the physical symptoms which could easily lead to addiction, assuming the patient was not already addicted. Many of these patients were referred to Respondent by other patients above named. Those patients with the same surnames were from the same family, generally husband and wife. Respondent testified he gave no significance to the fact that he was prescribing large quantities of Class II drugs to two members of the same family. Frequently drug addicts refer other addicts to a doctor from whom the referrer is able to obtain drugs. Some of these patients were recognized as addicts by Respondent. Nevertheless, he would discuss their dependency with them, continue to prescribe controlled substances for them and never referred any of his patients to a detoxification center. Some of Respondent's patients listed above were given prescriptions for sufficient quantities of Schedule II drugs that they disposed of these drugs on the street. Approximately of those patients above noted were arrested by police for drug related offenses. These practices constitute prescribing controlled substances not in the course of Respondent's professional practice. Donald Murray was a patient of Respondent's from July 1979 through July 1984. During this period he received 198 prescriptions for Dilaudid, 240 prescriptions for Percodan, 16 prescriptions for Tuinol, as well as prescriptions for Tylox and Desoxyn (for narcolepsy). No entry in the patient record justified a diagnosis of narcolepsy for this patient. During the 28-day period between May 18, 1982 and June 28, 1982, Murray was given prescriptions for 72 Dilaudid, 4 mg. and 74, Percodan. In April 1983, Murray was given prescriptions by Respondent for 240 Percodan in less than a 30-day period. Respondent testified Murray needed the drugs to maintain his law practice. Nicholas Spano was a patient of Respondent from July 10, 1980 until September 7, 1984. Between July 19, 1982 and September 7, 1984, Spano received prescriptions for more than 2700 Percodan and prescriptions for 424 Tylox, another Class II drug. At the time these prescriptions were given to Spano, Respondent was aware of a psychiatric report by Dr. Joye dated 3/23/81 that Spano was believed to have a narcotic dependence on Percodan, of Joye's recommendation to discontinue Percodan, and of a report by Dr. Adams dated March 31, 1981 that Spano had been a chronic user of Percodan. In 1982, Detective William Logan in the vice and narcotic squad of the Pinellas County Sheriff's Office contacted Respondent regarding a forged prescription to one of his patients. At that meeting they discussed how not to get involved with drugs. Subsequent thereto Logan received complaints from pharmacies in Largo regarding what appeared to the pharmacist as excess prescriptions for narcotics written by Respondent and an investigation was commenced. On March 6, 1984, Respondent telephoned Logan to say he had read that two of his patients had been arrested, viz. Raine Troupe and Bruce Flood. Respondent acknowledged to Logan that he knew these men were addicts and that he was taking them off slowly. Respondent also admitted having other patients who were questionable. By this time Respondent had become a suspect in the criminal investigation and further telephone calls from Respondent were not returned by Logan. Respondent's office was searched on September 11, 1984, pursuant to a subpoena and patient records of the 23 patients above noted were seized. Respondent was subsequently brought to trial in Circuit Court in and for Pinellas County, entered a plea of nole contendere, and on August 25, 1985, adjudication of guilt of unlawful delivery of controlled substance was withheld, Respondent was placed on probation for three years, ordered to pay certain costs, and prohibited from prescribing Schedule II drugs.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency charged with regulating the practice of medicine pursuant to Section 20.30, Florida Statutes, and Chapter 458, Florida Statutes. Respondent is and has been at all times material hereto a licensed physician in the State of, Florida having been issued license No. 0033496. Respondent's address is 133 Darnell Avenue, Spring Hill, Florida 33626. Respondent rendered medical care and treatment to patient B.R. during the period July 11, 1985 to July 15, 1985 while she was a patient at the Oak Hill Community Hospital, Spring Hill, Florida for, among other things, acute transmural myocardial infarction. On or about July 15, 1985, patient B.R. died from acute myocardial infarction after resuscitative procedures were unsuccessful. Patient B.R. was brought to the emergency room at Oak Hill Community Hospital on July 11, 1985 by her husband after complaining of chest pains. Shortly after arrival she suffered a myocardial infarction and "coded." She was resuscitated and placed in the intensive care unit. As the medical services physician on call, Respondent was contacted and assumed the care of patient B.R., a 65 year old female. Respondent is Board-certified in internal medicine and is Board eligible in cardiology having completed a fellowship in cardiology at George Washington University in 1968. B.R. had formerly worked as a licensed practical nurse who suffered a back injury some years ago which resulted in back surgery three times. In 1978, some 10 years before her demise, B.R. suffered a heart attack. She also had a history of diabetes and recently had undergone a thyroidectomy. With this medical history she presented a complex case for care and treatment. With patient presenting the history and symptoms of B.R., a reasonably prudent physician would have ordered daily chest X-rays, had an echocardiagram taken, inserted a Swan-Ganz catheter and consulted with a cardiologist on the treatment of this patient. None of these were done by Respondent. While acknowledging those procedures above listed were clearly indicated, Respondent testified he suggested those procedures to B.R. but, while she was fully competent to understand his recommendation, B.R. refused to be further X-rayed, refused the echocardiagram because she thought it produced some type of nuclear radiation, and also specifically refused to have any tubes inserted in her veins which would result if the Swan-Ganz catheter was inserted. None of the patient's refusals to accept recommended procedures was charted in B.R.'s hospital records. Respondent testified that B.R. specifically directed him to not chart on her hospital record her refusal to undergo the test and procedures recommended by Respondent. Respondent further testified that following her refusal to undergo the test and procedures and under directions to him not to chart those refusals on the hospital chart, he put this history in his office notes. To corroborate thin testimony Respondent presented Exhibit 5, a copy of those office notes containing entries dated July 12, 13, 14, 15, and 23, August 13, September 26, December 13, 1985 and January 29, 1986, comprising 4 typewritten pages. While a patient has a absolute right to refuse treatment or procedures recommended by his/her physician, the patient does not have the right to direct the physician to prepare an incomplete record of his treatment and progress. The principal purpose of the chart is to record medical evidence of the patient's condition, treatment rendered and results obtained to provide a history from which another physician can, if necessary, adequately take over the care of the patient. The record also provides a history of the patient's response to treatment. Respondent's explanation that if he had expected to be away and another physician had to take over the care and treatment of B.R. he would have made the other physician aware of B.R.'s refusal to undergo the recommended procedures totally failed to satisfy the need for a complete record of the patient in one place. To prove the validity of the office notes as a "business record," Respondent testified that for the past 30 years he has maintained office notes in which he has placed information the patient didn't want in the hospital record. An expert witness in the field of questioned documents testified that each dated entry on Exhibit 5 was typed following a new insertion of the paper in the typewriter rather than all entries being typed at the same time or with the same insertion of the paper in the typewriter and this was consistent with what would be expected in normal office procedures. Respondent's office manager and secretary during the times reported on Exhibit 5 testified she was the one who normally transcribed Respondent's dictated notes, that Exhibit 5 was consistent with the normal office practice which would be to date the entries when they were typed, and, although she does not specifically recall typing each entry on Exhibit 5, they were probably all typed by her. Evidence questioning the validity of Respondent's testimony that the office notes were dictated contemporaneously with his treatment of B.R. and typed on the dates indicated included the testimony of the husband of B.R. that B.R. had a zest for life and it would be contrary to her nature to refuse certain procedures or consultations; the fact that on July 14, 1985 B.R. was intubated with the Respondent present; that there was no financial consideration involved as B.R. was adequately insured; the office manager and secretary of Respondent during the period the office notes are alleged to have been prepared is the daughter of Respondent; and the fact that at the peer review committee inquiry into the facts surrounding the death of B.R., Respondent never mentioned the existence of office notes although he was extensively questioned regarding his failure to maintain a more complete medical record in this case. From the foregoing it is found that B.R.'s refusal to submit to the procedures allegedly recommended by Respondent were not contemporaneously recorded in Respondent's office notes and Exhibit 5 was prepared after Respondent appeared before the hospital peer review committee if not also after the administrative complaint was filed in this case.
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the Administrative Complaint, Dr. Turner has been licensed as a chiropractor in the State of Florida, holding license CH 1454. He has maintained offices as a chiropractic physician at 7650 South U.S. Highway One, Fort Pierce, Florida 34952 since May 19, 1985. Prior Discipline The Board of Chiropractic Examiners has maintained other prosecutions against Dr. Turner. On August 28, 1972 a Final Order was entered revoking Dr. Turner's license for solicitation for prostitution and giving oral medication and injections to a person, but his licensure was reinstated by Order dated September 11, 1974. Thereafter, on July 14, 1977, his licensure was revoked for a second time. Although the Administrative Complaint which had been filed in the second prosecution had alleged sexual misconduct towards patients and staff, those charges were not sustained. The revocation was imposed for obtaining prescriptions for narcotics, stimulants or habit-forming drugs under false pretenses from medical doctors and dentists in an amount so large as to show either drug abuse by Dr. Turner or the offering and administration of drugs to patients, employees, or other persons without lawful authority to do so. Ultimately, Dr. Turner was relicensed, and reestablished his practice in 1985. Alteration of Records The applicable paragraph of the Administrative Complaint alleges that On or about October 25, 1989 a former employee of the Respondent issued a sworn statement, to the State Attorney's Office. In her statement the former employee stated that the Respondent had her change her therapist's notes on a patient to reflect that certain treatments were not being used. The former employee also stated in this interview that the Respondent frequently had her and "other employees" change patient notes in order to mislead future "attorneys" reviewing said notes. Turner hired Debbie Corderre as a therapist and staff member in 1987, and she remained in his employ into 1989. One of the patients to whom she provided therapy was patient E.M. The physical therapists in Dr. Turner's office are not persons who are graduates of a physical therapy school approved for the educational preparation of physical therapists by an accrediting agency recognized by the Council on Post-Secondary Accreditation or who have passed an examination administered by the Department of Professional Regulation to determine fitness to practice as a physical therapist. See Section 486.031 Florida Statutes (1989). Rather, they are persons who have received brief on-the-job training of two weeks or so to provide such therapy as might be ordered by Dr. Turner as part of his office practice. Ms. Corderre testified that Dr. Turner had ordered her to alter the medical records of E.M. to remove diathermy as a therapy given. Diathermy is the heating of body tissues due to their resistance to the passage of high- frequency electromagnetic radiation, electric currents, or ultrasonic waves. (Dorland's Illustrated Medical Dictionary, 26th Edition 1985). The office therapies included massage, traction, electric muscle stimulation, the use of hot packs and ultrasound treatment. Electric muscle stimulation and ultrasound treatment involved the use of a machine with pads; gel was put on the patient and the pads were attached. Ultrasound was performed using the same machine; lotion was placed on the patient and an instrument attached to the machine was rubbed over the body part being treated. How these treatments differ from diathermy, or what constituted diathermy at Dr. Turner's office, was never adequately explained at the hearing. The office notes maintained for Dr. Turner's patients were broken into four sections, each of which were identical, and permitted notes to be made for four separate visits on one sheet. The notes for each individual visit was made up of five parts. The first included a space for the date and abbreviations for the different therapies next to which a check mark could be placed. These spaces were checked off by therapists for billing purposes. None of these spaces ever were checked in any of the extant records for patient E.M. Below the abbreviations was a larger space for therapists notes, in which the therapist would write the therapy provided to the patient during that visit. Below the therapist's note area was a space of equal size containing the acronym SOAP, in which Dr. Turner would make his notes when he saw the patient, after his therapist had already completed the therapy. The fourth portion of the record of a visit is a line to note any material dispensed to the patient during the visit, and the fifth portion is a line to note any X-rays that may have been taken. In none of the records for patient E.M. have any of the abbreviations for any of the different types of therapy been checked off, even though Dr. Turner maintains that these notes are the source of billing information (Tr. 240-41). It is incomprehensible that from the period October 27, 1987 through April 12, 1988, over a total of 59 visits, that a therapist never correctly filled out the portion of the patient record which another employee would need in order to render a bill for the service provided that day. By way of contrast, however, the records for another patient entered into evidence, B.S., do for the most part, have check marks in that portion of the record for a visit which would be useful for billing. The inference which is drawn from the absence of any billing entries in the records for patient E.M. over so long a period of time is that the records which purport to be the contemporaneous records for E.M. are in fact records generated after the fact by the therapist, Debbie Corderre at the instruction of Dr. Turner. Dr. Turner's contention that Ms. Corderre failed to keep appropriate records is rejected. Ms. Corderre testified that Dr. Turner had instructed her to remove reference to diathermy given to patient E.M. Dr. Turner counters by noting that the insurance claim forms submitted by his office on behalf of patient E.M. to the Workers Compensation insurance carrier for E. M.'s employer never showed that diathermy was administered. Dr. Turner argues that Ms. Corderre's testimony must be wrong, for the insurance billings would have shown a charge for diathermy, if the testimony of Ms. Corderre were correct. Dr. Turner's point is well taken, but it does not negate the core of Ms. Corderre's testimony. Ms. Corderre had told the State Attorney's office before the hearing that she thought Dr. Turner had instructed her to change the records to remove any reference to having provided patient E.M. with ultrasound therapy. Based upon all the evidence I find that the records for patient E.M. were changed by Ms. Corderre in some significant way at the direction of Dr. Turner. Because the original records were necessarily lost, and all that remains are revised records, it is not possible to determine with certainty in what way the records were altered. On this aspect of her testimony the recollection of Ms. Corderre is faulty. Her testimony that she changed all records for patient E.M. is persuasive, and the absence of any entry in the portion of the records used for billing reinforces this conclusion. Why Dr. Turner wanted to have the records changed and the manner in which he told Ms. Corderre to change them are not particularly significant. Dr. Turner regarded the change as sufficiently important to have Ms. Corderre spend almost a full day of filling out the newly created records. He then manufactured what are supposed to be contemporaneous entries of his own in the portion of the records which are his notes (the SOAP notes). Improper Sexual Touching of a Patient Dr. Turner employed Brenda Stanley, who later became Brenda Sika by marriage, during the period August 1988 to 1989. She was trained as a physical therapist at the office. About a month after she was employed, in September 1988, Brenda Sika was injured in an automobile accident, and had gone to the hospital emergency room. She discussed her condition and her need for treatment with Dr. Turner, who agreed to examine her and treat her. Dr. Turner first saw Brenda Sika as a patient on September 13, 1988. Ms. Sika's principle complaints included back pain over the whole back, but which was worse in the lower back; neck pain, and ankle pain, all of which had resulted from the automobile accident. She also had bruising and tenderness of her chest due to the action of her seat belt in the accident. Ms. Sika contends that while she was lying on her stomach in a treatment room on several occasions Dr. Turner had placed his hand on her ankle, and slid it up until his hand was on her buttocks, and that on one occasion he had placed his hands between her legs while she was lying face down, with the inside of his hands on the inside of her legs and his thumb on the outside. She also alleged that on the Sunday following the initial visit on September 13, she sought additional treatment from Dr. Turner, and in the course of that treatment he requested her to remove her bra, remained in the room while she undressed, and afterwards asked her to stretch out her arms, after which he felt her breasts, including placing his hand around the fleshy part of her breasts. Finally, Ms. Sika alleges that while in the X-ray room, Dr. Turner asked to check if her groin muscle had been pulled, and in the process used his thumb and index finger to squeeze or grip her in the groin. It is difficult to accept the contention that Dr. Turner had engaged in inappropriate and unwarranted sexual touching of Ms. Sika's breasts, buttocks or groin area, in view of the continuing employment relationship. Ms. Sika had only recently been hired when she was injured. It seems unlikely that she would have remained in the employ of someone who had engaged in lecherous touching while she was supposedly being treated. She remained an employee of Dr. Stanley for a substantial amount of time, and only left that employment when she went to Michigan for her wedding. What is more significant, however, is that after she returned to Florida following her wedding, she decided to return to employment with Dr. Turner (Tr. 75). Ms. Sika did not tell other employees such as Deborah Coderre or Tammy Prescott that Dr. Turner had engaged in unwarranted sexual advances or made sexual innunendoes to her at the office. With respect to the accusation of fondling of a breast, after the accident Dr. Turner had conducted an examination which included palpation in the area of the rib cage underneath the breast, where there was a bruise caused by the seatbelt in Ms. Sika's car. That sort of touching in an area of complaint is appropriate. The charge with respect to running Dr. Turner's hands from the ankle to the buttocks is unconvincing. Attempting to determine whether there was involvement of a groin muscle would be appropriate, but the description of the examination given by Ms. Sika would have constituted inappropriate conduct, had the examination occurred as described. As stated above, given her continued employment, and reemployment after she had left work with Dr. Tuner at the time of her wedding, the evidence of sexual misconduct is not convincing.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Board of Chiropractic enter a final order revoking the licensure of Dr. Turner, without right of reinstatement or relicensure. RECOMMENDED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 9th day of November, 1990. WILLIAM R. DORSEY, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of November, 1990. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER DOAH CASE NO. 90-5707 Rulings on the proposed findings by the Department: Adopted in Finding 1. Adopted in Finding 1. Adopted in Finding 4. Adopted in Finding 4. Adopted in Finding 9. Recounted in Finding 6, but the testimony that the alteration was to remove diathermy is not accepted. Rejected as unnecessary, because not within in the allegations of the Administrative Complaint. Rejected as unnecessary, because not within the allegations of the Administrative Complaint. Rejected as unnecessary, because not within the allegations of the Administrative Complaint. Rejected as unnecessary, because not within the allegations of the Administrative Complaint. Rejected as unnecessary, because not within the allegations of the Administrative Complaint. Rejected because the testimony was not sufficiently specific to establish that other medical records were altered. The testimony with respect to patient E.M. is sufficiently specific. Rejected because the testimony was not sufficiently specific with respect to alteration of records other than those of E.M. Moreover, the charge made in paragraph 3 is not one with respect to purposeful mis-billing. See, Finding 3. See, ruling on Finding 13. Adopted in Finding 12. Adopted in Finding 13. Adopted in Finding 13. Adopted in Finding 14. The testimony is recounted in Finding 15. The testimony is recounted in Finding 15. The testimony is recounted in Finding 15. The testimony is recounted in Finding 15. The testimony is recounted in Finding 15. The testimony is recounted in Finding 15. The testimony is recounted in Finding 15. The testimony is recounted in Finding 15. The testimony is recounted in Finding 15. The testimony recounted in Findings 19-27 is rejected for the reasons stated in Finding 16. Included in Finding 14. Rejected as irrelevant. Rejected as irrelevant. Rejected as irrelevant to the allegations of the Administrative Complaint. Adopted in Finding 2. Rulings on findings proposed by Dr. Turner: Adopted in Finding 1. Adopted in Finding 1. Rejected as unnecessary, because Dr. Turner's skills are not at issue. Rejected as unnecessary, because Dr. Turner's skills are not at issue. Rejected as unnecessary, because Dr. Turner's skills are not at issue. Rejected as unnecessary, because Dr. Turner's skills are not at issue. Adopted in Finding 12. Adopted in Finding 13. 9 and 10. Rejected as irrelevant. Rejected as unnecessary. Generally accepted for the reasons given in Finding 16. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in Finding 16. Adopted in Finding 17. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. To the extent necessary, adopted in Finding 17. Generally adopted in Finding 17. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. To the extent persuasive, these arguments are covered in Findings 16 and 17. Accepted in Finding 17. Adopted in Finding 4. Generally rejected as a recitation of testimony, and because the argument that Dr. Turner had not required Ms. Corderre to change records of diathermy is accepted, but the argument that Dr. Turner did not instruct Ms. Corderre to make some significant changes in E. M.'s record is rejected. The testimony is recounted in Finding 10. Rejected as unnecessary. What is significant is that Ms. Corderre changed records at the direction of the doctor, the exact nature of the change is not essential. See, Finding 11. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary; any motivation Ms. Corderre might have had to be untruthful has been considered in evaluating her testimony. Rejected as unnecessary, any motivation Ms. Corderre might have had to be untruthful has been considered in evaluating her testimony. Rejected as unnecessary, any motivation Ms. Corderre might have had to be untruthful has been considered in evaluating her testimony. Accepted in that the only findings made with respect to Dr. Turner's conducts are made with respect to the records of E.M. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected. I have accepted most of the testimony of Ms. Corderre. Rejected as unnecessary. No "Taylor" case is at issue here. Rejected. See, especially Finding 9. Rejected as unnecessary. COPIES FURNISHED: Patricia Guilford, Executive Director Department of Professional Regulation Board of Chiropractic 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792 Kenneth E. Easley, General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792 Michael A. Mone', Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792 Elizabeth R. Alsobrook, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792 Harold M. Braxton, Esquire 9100 South Dadeland Boulevard Suite 400 Miami, FL 33156-7115 Donald C. Dowling, Esquire 501 East Atlantic Avenue Delray Beach, FL 33483
The Issue The issues in this case are whether Respondent, a physician specializing in obstetrics and gynecology, committed medical malpractice in delivering a baby and/or failed to maintain medical records justifying the course of the mother's treatment; if so, whether Petitioner should impose discipline on Respondent's medical license within the applicable penalty guidelines or take some other action.
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant to this case, Respondent Mark N. Scheinberg, M.D., was licensed to practice medicine in the state of Florida. He is board-certified in obstetrics and gynecology. Petitioner Department of Health (the "Department") has regulatory jurisdiction over licensed physicians such as Dr. Scheinberg. In particular, the Department is authorized to file and prosecute an administrative complaint against a physician, as it has done in this instance, when a panel of the Board of Medicine has found that probable cause exists to suspect that the physician has committed a disciplinable offense. Here, the Department alleges that Dr. Scheinberg committed two such offenses——namely, medical malpractice and failure to keep records justifying the course of treatment——in connection with the vacuum-assisted vaginal delivery of an infant born to Patient L.G. on February 2, 2005, at West Boca Medical Center. The crux of this case (though not the sole issue) is whether, as the Department contends, the standard of care required Dr. Scheinberg to perform a Caesarean section ("C- section") on L.G. due to the passage of time, instead of allowing her to continue to labor for approximately 13 hours and, ultimately, deliver vaginally. The events giving rise to this dispute began on February 1, 2005, at around 11:00 a.m., when L.G., whose pregnancy was at term, checked into the hospital after having experienced ruptured membranes. At 12:30 p.m. that day, L.G. signed a form bearing the title "Authorization for Medical and/or Surgical Treatment," which manifested her consent to a vaginal delivery or C-section together with, among other things, "such additional operations or procedures as [her physicians might] deem necessary." Immediately above L.G.'s signature on the form is an affirmation: "The above procedures, with their attendant risks, benefits and possible complications and alternatives, have been explained to me " The evidence is not clear as to when, exactly, Dr. Scheinberg first saw L.G., but that fact is unimportant. The medical records reflect that at 8:30 p.m. on February 1, 2005, Dr. Scheinberg gave a telephone order to initiate an IV push of the antibiotic Ampicillin; therefore, he had taken charge of L.G.'s care by that time. The nurses' notes indicate that at 10:00 p.m., L.G.'s cervix had dilated to "rim" or approximately nine centimeters—— meaning that the dilation was complete, or nearly so. At this time, and throughout the duration of L.G.'s labor, an external fetal heart monitor was in place to detect and record the baby's heartbeats and the mother's uterine contractions. An intrauterine pressure catheter ("IUPC")——a device that precisely measures the force of uterine contractions——was not inserted into L.G.'s uterus at any time during this event. The Department argues (although it did not allege in the Complaint) that, at some point during L.G.'s labor, the standard of care required Dr. Scheinberg either to place an IUPC or perform a C-section. Pet. Prop. Rec. Order at 10, ¶36. The Department's expert witness, Dr. John Busowski, testified unequivocally and unconditionally, however, that the standard of care does not require the use of an IUPC. T. 36. The undersigned credits this evidence and finds that Dr. Scheinberg's nonuse of an IUPC did not breach the standard of care. Dr. Scheinberg conducted a physical at around 2:00 a.m. on February 2, 2005, which included taking L.G.'s complete history and performing a vaginal examination. L.G.'s cervix remained dilated to approximately nine centimeters, and her labor had not substantially progressed for about four hours. Dr. Scheinberg noted in L.G.'s chart that the baby was in the posterior position at 2:00 a.m. The Department argues, based on Dr. Busowski's testimony, that as of 2:00 a.m., the standard of care required [Dr. Scheinberg to] choose one of the following options: (1) watch the patient for a few more hours to allow for progress; (2) place an IUPC to determine the adequacy of Patient L.G.'s contractions; (3) start Pitocin without the placement of an IUPC; or (4) perform a C- section. Pet. Prop. Rec. Order at 9-10, ¶ 32. The Department contends that Dr. Scheinberg breached the standard of care by choosing "simply to watch the patient for approximately 10 more hours"—— which was tantamount to "choosing to do nothing." Id. at 10, ¶¶ 33-34. In fact, Dr. Scheinberg chose to watch the patient, which was, according to Dr. Busowski, within the standard of care. Obviously, at 2:00 in the morning on February 2, 2005, Dr. Scheinberg did not choose to wait for 10 more hours, because at that point he (unlike the parties to this litigation) did not know what was about to happen. The nurses' notes reflect that L.G. was under close observation throughout the early morning hours, and that Dr. Scheinberg was following the situation. At 4:30 a.m., L.G. was set up to push and at 4:45 a.m. was pushing well. At 6:15 a.m., the notes indicate that Dr. Scheinberg was aware of the mother's attempts to push. At 6:45 a.m., he reviewed the strips from the fetal heart monitor. At 7:45 a.m., he was present and aware of L.G.'s status. From 7:00 a.m. until 8:00 a.m., no contractions were identifiable on the external monitor. At 8:00 a.m., however, L.G. was comfortable and pushing well. She stopped pushing at 8:30 a.m., but remained comfortable. Dr. Scheinberg then ordered the administration of Pitocin, a medicine which is used to strengthen contractions and hasten delivery. Although the Department faults Dr. Scheinberg for giving L.G. Pitocin at this relatively late stage of her labor, Dr. Busowski (the Department's expert witness) admitted being unable to say "that Dr. Scheinberg should have started Pitocin earlier " T. 72. The Department therefore has no clear evidential basis for second-guessing Dr. Scheinberg's professional judgment in this particular, and neither does the undersigned. At 9:10 a.m., L.G. resumed pushing. The baby's fetal heart tones (heartbeats) were stable. L.G. continued pushing, with her family present, until around 11:00 a.m., at which time Dr. Scheinberg discussed the situation with the patient and her family. Dr. Scheinberg explained to L.G. or her husband the risks of, and alternatives to, performing a vacuum-assisted vaginal delivery. Either L.G. or her husband gave verbal consent to the use of a vacuum device to assist in the delivery. Between 11:00 a.m. and 11:10 a.m., the fetal heart monitor detected some variable decelerations, meaning a decrease in heart rate that could be a sign of fetal distress. Dr. Scheinberg delivered the baby at 11:23 a.m., using a vacuum device to help pull the infant out of the birth canal. In his post-operative notes, Dr. Scheinberg wrote that his "pre-operative diagnosis" was "+3 station — prolonged second stage 2½ hrs." As a "post-operative diagnosis," Dr. Scheinberg recorded, "same + tight cord." He reported the following "findings": "tight cord cut on perineum[;] mec[onium] aspirated on perineum."
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Board of Medicine enter a final order finding Dr. Scheinberg not guilty of the charges set forth in the Complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of June, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of June, 2011.
