Findings Of Fact Based upon the record evidence adduced as well as the factual stipulation filed by the parties, the following facts are found. The Petitioner, International Cruise Shops (ICS), is a subsidiary company of the Greyhound Corporation. ICS, as pertinent hereto, operates gift shops, bars, beauty salons and exercise rooms and like "passenger amenity" type facilities ("shops") on board cruise ships operating out of the Port of Miami. The particular cruise ships of concern in this case are owned by Norwegian Caribbean Lines (NCL). The parties have stipulated that the vessels owned by NCL, to which this proceeding relates, operate exclusively in foreign commerce and that none of their operating mileage involved herein is in intrastate commerce. Because of this, ICS maintains that the transactions or purchases which are the subject of this proceeding are exempt from taxation under Section 212.08(8), Florida Statutes. The parties have stipulated that the sales tax at issue was not collected by the vendors involved and was not paid on the Items in question. The parties have also stipulated that all of the items in question, purchased in port, were used or consumed on board the NCL vessels involved and that the vessels were operating at the time in foreign commerce. It is also stipulated that ICS recognized at the time of the purchases that they were exempt ones and provided the vendors involved with its export exemption registration number. ICS takes the position that it is exempt from sales and use tax as to these items because the items purchased are "parts of a vessel" within the meaning of the exemption statute set forth at Section 212.08(8), Florida Statutes. It is also stipulated that during the relevant audit period ICS did not furnish the vendors involved in these purchases with the "partial exemption affidavit" described in Section 212.08(8)(b), Florida Statutes, the "partial exemption" statute. The Department in turn argues that ICS is not entitled to the exemption because it is not an "owner, operator or agent of a vessel." ICS maintains, contrarily, that its status as owner, operator or agent of a vessel is not determinative of its entitlement to the exemption, but rather the nature of the goods involved and their use is what is determinative. Be that as it may, the Petitioner maintains that it qualifies as an operator or agent of the vessels involved anyway. The Department also contends that even if ICS is an owner, operator, or agent, it failed to sign the affidavit mentioned above, stating that "the item or items to be partially exempted are [parts of a vessel] and setting forth the extent of such partial exemption." (emphasis supplied) See Section 212.08(8)(b), Florida Statutes. The Department originally served the Petitioner a Notice of Intent (to make sales and use tax audit changes) and a Notice of Proposed Assessment of tax, penalty and interest for the audit period from January 1, 1980, through December 31, 1982. The Department also issued a Notice of Intent to make sales and use tax audit changes, as well as a Notice of Proposed Assessment of Tax Penalty and Interest for the supplemental audit period of January 1, 1983, through April 30, 1983. Additionally, it is stipulated that the documents attached to the stipulation, as exhibits C and D respectively, are true and correct copies of an original shop agreement and bar agreement made and entered into as of January 1, 1980, between NCL and ICS. The parties have stipulated that those two documents represent the contractual agreements between NCL and ICS during the relevant audit periods at issue in this proceeding, and fairly reflect the relationship of the parties, although they do not agree that the language in the agreements to the effect that "ICS shall not be considered the agent" of NCL means that ICS is not the agent of NCL for any purpose at all. Those two agreements, as well as the unrefuted evidence of record, reveal that the services of bar operator and concessionaire, gift shop operator, as well as beauty shops and sauna operator, duty-free shop operator, and operations involving the purchasing for and operating of a shipboard duty-free and non-duty free shop for passengers and crew, are regular facets of cruise ship operations. It is the peculiar purpose of cruise ships to transport passengers, but provide all sorts of amenities and shopping services for passengers and crew of the type mentioned above and elsewhere in these agreements. There is no question that the duties ICS personnel were performing aboard NCL ships are integral functions of the operation of a cruise ship, as that relates to the exempt status claimed herein by ICS. The parties have additionally stipulated that exhibit F, attached to the stipulation, in evidence, is a random list of some of the supplies purchased by ICS during the audit period in question, far which no sales tax were paid. This listing is stipulated to be a representative sampling of the kinds of items for which the Department assessed tax under Schedule B of the assessment at issue. Exhibit G is a true and correct copy of a petition for reassessment of sales and use tax by ICS dated December 21, 1983. On February 9, 1984, ICS representatives attended a conference with the Department's disposition section personnel in Tallahassee. A Notice of Decision was entered September 30, 1985, by the tax conferee of the Department in response to the December 21, 1983 petition by ICS and as a result of that February 9, 1984 informal conference with the Department. A Petition for Reconsideration was filed by ICS dated October 28, 1985, concerning that notice of decision. On November 20, 1985, ICS representatives attended another informal conference with the Department's disposition section of its Office of General Counsel in Tallahassee. A supplemental petition was then filed by ICS dated February 12, 1986. Thereafter, a Notice of Reconsideration dated July 28, 1986, was executed by the tax conferee, Mark A. Zych, in response to the November 20, 1985 petition and informal conference. Thereafter, ICS filed the petition initiating this proceeding on September 19, 1986. The parties have additionally stipulated to, and the evidence of record reveals, that the items involved in this case were purchased by ICS from vendors for use in its shops and bars in the regular course of operation and business aboard the cruise ships. Those items at issue were stipulated to be used or consumed by ICS on Board NCL'S vessels. The shop and bar employees of ICS were paid on NCL's payroll and ICS would then reimburse NCL. Additionally, NCL negotiated a labor contract which covered the shop and bar employees of ICS, as well as its own employees. While they were on duty on board ship, the ICS personnel wore name tags indicating that they were NCL crew members, bearing the NCL logo. ICS personnel also participated in all safety drills and lifeboat drills like any other crew members. Each had specific stations and passenger safety duties assigned them, including lifeboat stations, just as any NCL employee crew members. ICS personnels' living quarters were in the same location as NCL employees' living quarters and ICS personnel were subject to the same duties, obligations and restrictions as NCL employees while on board the NCL ships, including restricted access to passenger areas and restrictions on mingling with passengers. The shop agreement (exhibit C to the stipulation in evidence) reveals that ICS performance of its shop, bar and other operations on board the cruise vessels was subject to the control of NCL. Numerous references in the shop agreement establish that NCL had pervasive control over ICS employees' performance of their duties on board NCL's cruise ships, as set forth at length in Appendix A, attached hereto and incorporated by reference in these findings of fact. One particularly revealing provision of the agreement is worth quoting. Section 16 of the Agreement requires ICS to designate a specific employee to act as supervisor of ICS employees on board the ships. This supervisor must agree to take orders from the master and ship's officers: ... and such qualified NCL personnel as shall be designated by the masters at all times and shall be under the control and direction and report directly to whomever the masters designate on board the vessels. ICS' supervisory personnel are to give prompt obedience to the instructions and orders of the NCL designee in regard to the operation of the shop concession. (emphasis supplied) The bar agreement, in evidence as exhibit D to the stipulation, contains a virtually identical provision. That bar agreement, for purposes of this proceeding, is essentially equivalent to the shop agreement. Additionally, the policy and procedures manual, in evidence as exhibit to the Stipulation, depicts numerous provisions which establish that, for all practical purposes, except for the reimbursement of NCL by ICS for salary for its employees, that ICS employees were considered as a part of the regular crew of the NCL cruise ships and subject to the direction and control of the ships' officers the same as any other crew member. This extended even to direction and control concerning how displays in the shops were set up, and how the shops and bars, were operated. In summary, that policy and procedures manual further demonstrates the pervasive control of NCL over the ICS employees and operations aboard the cruise ships, even to the extent of regulating vacation of ICS employees when they were ashore between cruises, etc. The testimony of ICS witnesses at the hearing confirms the existence of NCL's authority over ICS and its employees and demonstrates clearly that NCL fully exercised that right of control in the normal day to day operations of its cruise vessels. Sonia Jensen, district manager for ICS, has worked for ICS continuously since 1975. She established that NCL personnel supervise, direct and control ICS employees as to safety procedures, lifeboat drills and lifeboat station assignments, and as to all rules and regulations applying to crew members and their behavior. ICS employees on the ships are considered crew members. The testimony of Linda Loddo, district manager for ICS since 1973, corroborated that of Ms. Jensen in establishing that the authority of the NCL ships' officers extends to ICS employees as crew members, whether they are actually aboard ship or on land. Additionally, Ms. Jensen established that, based upon her considerable experience working in the cruise ship industry, that the shops and bars operated by ICS aboard the NCL cruise ships are an integral functioning part of, and appropriate to the operation of, a cruise vessel and a cruise line, in the normal course of its business and operations. Thus, ICS contends that it fits within the Department's interpretation of the relevant exemption statute, Section 212.08(8), Florida Statutes, because ICS is clearly both an "agent" of NCL and an "operator" of cruise ships. Its operations aboard the cruise ships are an integral and necessary function and part of the cruise ships operations in providing for the comfort and recreation of the passengers. ICS contends however, that the exemption, and entitlement to it, is determined by the nature of the items purchased, as that relates to what are considered "parts of vessels" for purposes of the exemption provision and that the exemption is not directly applicable to a particular class of people. The Petitioner argues that the sentence containing the phrase "owner, operator or agent" merely creates a presumption with regard to which items will constitute "parts of a vessel," but that the scope of the exemption, is not limited to purchases by only those three classes of persons.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing findings of fact, stipulations and unrefuted evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore RECOMMENDED that the State of Florida, Department of Revenue enter a final order withdrawing and abating the assessment of sales and use taxes, interest and penalties against International Cruise Shops, Inc., in the particulars, and for the reasons, found and discussed above. It is further, Recommended, that the penalty sought to be imposed against International Cruise Shops by the Respondent, concerning the "bar sales assessment," be abated for the reasons delineated above. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 8th day of December, 1988. P. MICHAEL RUFF Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of December, 1988. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 86-3769 Petitioner's proposed findings of fact Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Rejected, as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter. Rejected, as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter. Accepted, but subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on the subject matter. Rejected as constituting, in large part, a conclusion of law and not a proposed finding of fact and as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter. Rejected as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter. Accepted. Accepted, but subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Respondent's proposed findings of fact The Respondent incorporates by reference the factual stipulation as its proposed findings of fact. Those findings of fact stipulated to have been accepted, of course, by the Hearing Officer, although not necessarily for the material import Respondent asserts they should be accorded through it's proposed recommended order. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert W. Hanula, Esquire The Greyhound Tower, Station 1701 Phoenix, Arizona 85077 Linda G. Miklowitz, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Katie D. Tucker, Esquire Executive Director Department of Revenue 102 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100 William D. Townsend, Esquire Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100
Findings Of Fact 1. Petitioner is a Florida corporation wholly owned by Mr. Thomas C. Birkhead, president. Petitioner owns and operates the Satellite Motel in Cocoa Beach, Florida. The Audit Respondent conducted a sales and use tax audit of Petitioner's business records for the period September 1, 1985, through August 31, 1990. Respondent determined a deficiency and assessed Petitioner for $15,373.62, including tax, penalty, and interest through May 13, 1991. The assessment is for $1,922.42 in sales tax, $7,646.25 in use tax, $2,392.20 in delinquent penalty, and $3,412.75 in interest through May 13, 1991. Interest accrues daily in the amount of $3.15. Respondent made a prima facie showing of the factual and legal basis for the assessment. Petitioner failed to produce credible and persuasive evidence to overcome the prima facie showing. The audit and assessment are procedurally correct. Tax, interest, and penalty are correctly computed. Sampling Petitioner failed to maintain adequate records of its sales and purchases. Respondent properly conducted an audit by sampling Petitioner's available books and records in accordance with Section 212.12(6)(b), Florida Statutes. Although Petitioner's records of sales and purchases were inadequate, Petitioner produced some books and records for the entire audit period. Respondent properly limited the applicable penalty to a delinquent penalty. Audit Period Respondent is authorized to audit Petitioner for the period September 1, 1985, through August 31, 1990. Effective July 1, 1987, the period for which taxpayers are subject to audit was extended from three to five years. 1/ When Respondent conducted the audit, Respondent was authorized to conduct an audit within five years of the date tax was due. 2/ Tax owed by Petitioner for the period beginning September 1, 1985, was not due until the 20th day of the month following its collection. 3/ Therefore, Respondent was authorized to audit Petitioner's records anytime before October 20, 1990. 4/ On September 13, 1990, Respondent issued a Notice Of Intent To Audit Books And Records of the Petitioner (the "Notice Of Intent"). The Notice Of Intent tolled the running of the five year audit period for up to two years. 5/ Respondent completed its audit and issued its Notice Of Intent To Make Sales And Use Tax Audit Changes on May 13, 1991. 2. Sales Tax Petitioner sells snacks and beverages over the counter at the Satellite Motel. The sale of such tangible personal property is subject to sales tax. As a dealer, Petitioner must collect the applicable sales tax and remit it to Respondent. During the audit period, Petitioner failed to collect and remit applicable sales tax. As a dealer, Petitioner is liable for the uncollected sales tax. Respondent properly assessed Petitioner for $1,922.42 in uncollected sales tax. 3. Use Tax Petitioner rents televisions and linens and purchases business forms from Florida vendors. The rental and sale of such tangible personal property is subject to sales tax. During the audit period, Petitioner failed to pay sales tax to Florida vendors and used the televisions, linens, and business forms in its business at the Satellite Motel. Petitioner is liable for use tax on the use of those items during the audit period. Respondent properly assessed Petitioner for use tax in the amount of $7,646.25.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a Final Order upholding the assessment of tax, penalty, and interest through the date of payment. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 25th day of October, 1994. DANIEL MANRY Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of October, 1994.
Findings Of Fact Having heard oral argument on the issues and considered the evidence presented in this cause, it is found as follows: Petitioner, Aerospace Workers, Inc., is a non-profit Florida corporation, which owns record title to the Union Lodge 166, located at 171 Taylor Avenue in Cape Canaveral, Florida. For the 1974 tax year, the Brevard County Property appraiser or Tax Assessor assessed the petitioner's lodge at full market value without allowance of any exemption. The reason given by the assessor for the disapproval of exempt status was that there is no provision under the Florida Statutes for the exemption of labor organizations. The petitioner, through its financial secretary, William J. Boydstun, then appealed the Tax Assessor's denial exempt status to the Brevard County Board of Tax Adjustment, claiming that the building should be tax exempt as one used for charitable purposes. Mr. Boydstun informed the BTA that the building in question "at any time we are not using it, has been thrown open to the public." The BTA was further informed that the building "has been used by the Brevard County Beach Erosion Control District by the Narc Aid Society, by the Avon and Winslow Beach Residents Assn., by the Roosevelt Garden Condominium Apartments, Inc. We have let local weddings take place. It has been used by the concerned Democrats and also by the County Commissioners in a couple of instances. Tomorrow we are letting the County use our building as a polling place." Mr. Boydstun also stated that petitioner's members donated $225,000.00 to the United Fund in Brevard County and had helped support the Brevard Junior Deputies, the Brevard Mental Health Center and various other organizations in the County. Also submitted to the BTA by Mr. Boydstun was a list of persons or groups who had used the building since December of 1973. Included in this list were the Mark Age Society (which petitioner stated during the hearing is a religious group), the Brevard County Beach Erosion Control District, the Avon by the Sea and Winslow Beach Residents' Association, the Roosevelt Garden Condominium Apartments, Inc., Concerned Democrats, political meetings for Senator Lawton Chiles, Mallory Horne and Governor Reubin Askew, and a minister for a local wedding. It was also stated that the building has been used as a polling place and for meetings for the United Fund Drive. The Tax Assessor represented to the BTA that he denied the exemption because labor unions are not given exemptions according to the Florida Law, and that the Department of Revenue denied an exemption for petitioner for that reason the previous year. At the meeting of the BTA on October 4, 1974, Chairman Hurdle moved that petitioner be granted a 50 percent charitable exemption on the basis that the property is used for charitable purposes. The motion carried by a vote of 2 to 1. The Tax Assessor did not concur. In its notice to the Executive Director of the Department of Revenue, the BTA explained its reasons for granting the Petitioner a fifty percent charitable exemption by stating that: "the Board found that the property should receive a 50 percent tax exemption because they felt that the use of the property provided a service which was of such a community service that its discontinuance could result in the allocation of public funds for the continuance of said services. The Board basically found that the use of the building by the general public met the requirements in the description of charitable purposes found in Chapter 196.012(6) of the Florida Statutes and therefore granted a 50 percent charitable tax exemption for the property described in Petition No. 11." In its "Notice of Proposed Agency Action to Invalidate Relief Granted by Board of Tax Adjustment," the Department of Revenue concluded in its "Staff Recommendation" that the BTA's findings and the evidence and testimony upon which they were based, were insufficient to support the ultimate finding that petitioner qualifies for a fifty percent exemption, and that the BTA had not come up with sufficient evidence to overcome the Property Appraiser's presumption of correctness. It was further concluded in said "Staff Recommendation" that there was no showing that the use of the property by the various community organizations was a use of more than 51 percent, and that the BTA's granting of a 50 percent exemption is expressly contrary to F.S. Section 196.012(3). SUMMARY OF ORAL ARGUMENTS The above factual findings constitute the record to which oral argument was limited at the hearing. It was the petitioner's position at the hearing that inasmuch as the Tax Assessor gave an invalid reason for denying the charitable exemption, there is no presumption of correctness attaching to his assessment. It was further contended that, given the reason for denial by the assessor (i.e., that labor organizations could not be exempt), petitioner did not believe it acceded to make a showing of predominant charitable usage. In the alternative, petitioner asserts that there was sufficient evidence before the BTA to permit the BTA to conclude that the property was used predominantly for charitable purposes. It was the respondent's position at the hearing that, regardless of the reason given by the assessor for his denial of exempt status, petitioner failed in its burden to prove the assessment wrong. In other words, it is the assessment itself which carries the presumption of correctness, and not the reasoning behind the assessment. Respondent contended that the record of the proceedings before the BTA is devoid of any evidence entitling petitioner to a charitable exemption.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is my recommendation that the action taken by the Brevard County Board of Tax Adjustment be invalidated and that the denial of exempt status made by the Brevard County Tax Assessor be affirmed. DONE and ORDERED this 4th day of October, 1975, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE D. TREMOR, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Collins Building, Room 104 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675
Findings Of Fact Having heard oral argument on the issues and considered the record transmitted to the respondent by the BTA, as supplemented by the "Reconstruction of Incomplete Record", the following pertinent facts are found: For some years preceding 1973 and for the years subsequent to 1973, petitioner has timely applied and has been granted a charitable exemption from ad valorem taxation. For the tax year 1973, the Tax Assessor did not grant petitioner a charitable exemption because the application for exemption was not timely filed. Petitioner appeared before the Broward County Board of Tax Adjustment for the purpose of securing relief from a late filing of the requested tax exemption. The BTA was informed that the late filing was a result of great confusion in the Club due to the impeachment and removal from office of the president of the Club on an alleged charge of embezzling the Club's funds and that the impeached president of the Club had left with many of the papers belonging to the Club. The Tax Assessor recommended that the BTA grant the charitable exemption to petitioner, noting that the exemption would have been granted were it not for the late filing. The BTA, noting the above and that a changing of petitioner's officers had resulted in the late filing, granted petitioner a charitable exemption from ad valorem taxation. The respondent's Executive Director was notified of the change. After certain legal proceedings culminating in the decision of Hollywood Jaycees, Inc. v. State Department of Revenue, 306 So.2d 109 (Fla. 1975), respondent issued its staff recommendation for the invalidation of the action of the BTA. This recommendation was based upon the conclusion that the BTA did not have information before it legally sufficient to warrant the change made in the tax roll since petitioner failed to demonstrate that it was excepted from the waiver provision of F.S. 196.011. Petitioner requested a hearing to review the staff recommendation, the Executive Director of the respondent requested the Division of Administrative Hearings to conduct the hearing, and the undersigned was assigned as the Hearing Officer.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law recited above, it is recommended that the action of the Broward County Board of Tax Adjustment granting the exemption be invalidated. Respectfully submitted and entered this 13th day of February, 1976, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE D. TREMOR, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Mr. J. Ed Straughn Executive Director Department of Revenue Room 102, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Jerome M. Rosenblum, Esquire 1940 Harrison Street Hollywood, Florida 33020 Stephen E. Mitchell, Esquire Assistant Attorney General The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Gaylord Wood, Esquire WOOD & COHEN 603 Courthouse Square Building 200 Southeast Street, 6th Street Ft. Lauderdale, Florida 33301
The Issue This issue is whether proposed amendments to Rules 12A-1.094(1) and 12A-1.094(4), Florida Administrative Code, constitute a valid exercise of delegated legislative authority.
Findings Of Fact Petitioners Florida Home Builders Association, Inc. (FHBA), and Florida A.G.C. Council (FAGC) are trade associations. A substantial number of their members contract with governmental entities for construction services and related sales of tangible personal property. FHBA and FAGC were organized, in part, to represent their members on matters relating to the construction industry, including proceedings involving agency rules. Petitioner Wackenhut Corrections Corporation (Wackenhut) frequently contracts with governmental entities. The proposed rule amendments will result in greater tax liability for Wackenhut in its performance of governmental contracts. Intervenor Florida School Board Association, Inc. (FSBA) represents all 67 local school boards in the State of Florida. FSBA's purpose is to represent its members before governmental agencies, in part to ensure cost containment in the construction, maintenance, and improvement of school facilities. Petitioners and Intervenor will be substantially affected if Respondent adopts the proposed rule amendments. They all have standing in this case. Section 212.05, Florida Statutes, imposes a tax on "retail sales" or "sales at retail." The statute also imposes a companion "use tax" when a retail sale does not occur in this state but the items sold are used here. Section 212.02(14), Florida Statutes, defines "retail sale" or "sale at retail" as a "sale to a consumer or to any person for any purpose other than resale in the form of tangible personal property." Section 212.02(20), Florida Statutes, defines "use" as the "exercise of any right or power over tangible personal property incident to ownership thereof, or interest therein, except it does not include the sale at retail of that property in the regular course of business." Therefore, when tangible personal property is purchased and resold while still tangible personal property, the individual or company that resells the property is a dealer and has an obligation to collect, but not to pay, sales tax. See Sections 212.06(2) and 212.07(1)(a), Florida Statutes. The obligation to pay the tax rests on the final purchaser of the items while they are still tangible personal property. Section 212.08(6), Florida Statutes, creates a sales tax exemption for direct sales to governmental entities. The statute also creates an exception to that exemption for sales to contractors who purchase or manufacture items for the purpose of installing them in a governmental project. At one time, governmental contractors benefited from the same sales tax exemption that governmental entities enjoyed, even when the contractor was the ultimate consumer. Section 212.08(7), Florida Statutes (1957), stated as follows in relevant part: (7) EXEMPTIONS; POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS, INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION, COMMUNICATIONS, ETC.--There shall also be exempt from the tax imposed by this chapter sales made to the United States government, the state or any county, municipality or political subdivision of this state, including sales of tangible personal property made to contractors employed by any such government or political subdivision thereof where such tangible personal property goes into and becomes a part of public works owned by such government or political subdivision thereof. (Emphasis added) Chapter 59-402, Section 2, Laws of Florida, amended this provision by deleting the word "including" and substituting "provided, this exemption shall not include." Section 212.08(6), Florida Statutes (1991), provided as follows in relevant part: (6) EXEMPTIONS; POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS.-- There are also exempt from the tax imposed by this chapter sales made to the United States Government, a state, or any county, municipality, or political subdivision of a state when payment is made directly to the dealer by the governmental entity. This exemption shall not inure to any transaction otherwise taxable under this chapter when payment is made by a government employee by any means, including, but not limited to, cash, check, or credit card when that employee is subsequently reimbursed by the governmental entity. This exemption does not include sales of tangible personal property made to contractors employed either directly or as agents of any such government or political subdivision thereof when such tangible personal property goes into or becomes a part of public works owned by such government or political subdivision thereof, except public works in progress or for which bonds or revenue certificates have been validated on or before August 1, 1959. Rule 12A-1.094, Florida Administrative Code, which implements Section 212.08(6), Florida Statutes, was last amended on August 10, 1992. The existing rule currently provides, as follows, in relevant part: 12A-1.094 Public Works Contracts. This rule shall govern the taxability of transactions in which contractors manufacture or purchase supplies and materials for use in public works, as that term is referred to in Section 212.08(6), This rule shall not apply to non- public works contracts as those contracts are governed under the provisions of Rule 12A-1.051, F.A.C. . . . In applying this rule, the following definitions are used. "Contractor" is one who is engaged in the repair, alteration, improvement or construction of real property. Contractors include, but are not limited to, persons engaged in building, electrical, plumbing, heating, painting, decorating, ventilating, paperhanging, sheet metal, roofing, bridge, road, waterworks, landscape, pier or billboard work. This definition includes subcontractors. "Public works" are defined as construction projects for public use or enjoyment, financed and owned by the government, in which private persons undertake the obligation to do a specific piece of work. The term "public works" is not restricted to the repair, alteration, improvement, or construction of real property and fixed works where the sale of tangible personal property is made to or by contractors involved in public works contracts. Such contracts shall include, but not be limited to, building, electrical, plumbing, heating, painting, decorating, ventilating, paperhanging, sheet metal, roofing, bridge, road, waterworks, landscape, pier or billboard contracts. "Real property" within the meaning of this rule includes all fixtures and improvements to real property. The status of a project as an improvement or affixture to real property is determined by the objective and presumed intent of the parties, based on the nature and use of the project and the degree of affixation to realty. Mobile homes and other mobile buildings are deemed fixtures if they (1) bear RP license tags, or (2) have the mobile features (such as wheels and/or axles) removed, and are placed on blocks or footings and permanently secured with anchors, tie-down straps or similar devices. * * * (4) The exemption in subsection (3)(a) is a general exemption for sales made to the government. The exception in subsection (2)(a) is a specific exception for sales to contractors. A determination of whether a particular transaction is properly characterized as an exempt sale to a government entity or a taxable sale to a contractor shall be based on the substance of the transaction, rather than the form in which the transaction is cast. The Executive Director or the Executive Director's designee in the responsible program will determine whether the substance of a particular transaction is governed by subsection (2)(a) or is a sale to a governmental body as provided by subsection (3) of this rule based on all of the facts and circumstances surrounding the transaction as a whole. The Executive Director or the Executive Director's designee in the responsible program will give special consideration to factors which govern the status of the tangible personal property prior to its affixation to real property. Such factors include provisions which govern bidding, indemnification, inspection, acceptance, delivery, payment, storage, and assumption of the risk of damage or loss for the tangible personal property prior to its affixation to real property. Assumption of the risk of damage or loss is a paramount consideration. A party may be deemed to have assumed the risk of loss if the party either: bears the economic burden of posting a bond or obtaining insurance covering damage or loss; or enjoys the economic benefit of the proceeds of such bond or insurance. Other factors that may be considered by the Executive Director or the Executive Director's designee in the responsible program include whether: the contractor is authorized to make purchases in its own name; the contractor is jointly or severally liable to the vendor for payment: purchases are not subject to prior approval by the government; vendors are not informed that the government is the only party with an independent interest in the purchase; and whether the contractors are formally denominated as purchasing agents for the government. Sales made pursuant to so called "cost-plus", "fixed-fee", "lump sum", and "guaranteed price" contracts are taxable sales to the contractor unless it can be demonstrated to the satisfaction of the Executive Director or the Executive Director's designee in the responsible program that such sales are, in substance, tax exempt sales to the government. Section 212.08(6), Florida Statutes, was last amended by Chapter 98-144, Laws of Florida. The statute currently states, as follows, in pertinent part: (6) EXEMPTIONS; POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS.-- There are also exempt from the tax imposed by this chapter sales made to the United States Government, a state, or any county, municipality, or political subdivision of a state when payment is made directly to the dealer by the governmental entity. This exemption shall not inure to any transaction otherwise taxable under this chapter when payment is made by a government employee by any means, including, but not limited to, cash, check, or credit card when that employee is subsequently reimbursed by the governmental entity. This exemption does not include sales of tangible personal property made to contractors employed either directly or as agents of any such government or political subdivision thereof when such tangible personal property goes into or becomes a part of public works owned by such government or political subdivision. A determination whether a particular transaction is properly characterized as an exempt sale to a government entity or a taxable sale to a contractor shall be based on the substance of the transaction rather than the form in which the transaction is cast. The department shall adopt rules that give special consideration to factors that govern the status of the tangible personal property before its affixation to real property. In developing these rules, assumption of the risk of damage or loss is of paramount consideration in the determination. Chapter 98-144, Laws of Florida, was the result of Respondent's "map-tracking" exercise to ensure that its rules were supported by appropriate legislation. Proposed amendments to Rules 12A-1.094(1) and 12A-1.094(4), Florida Administrative Code, are at issue here. Those rules, as revised by the proposed amendments, read as follows: This rule shall govern the taxability of transactions in which contractors manufacture or purchase supplies and material for use in public works contracts, as that term is referred to in Section 212.08(6), F.S. This rule shall not apply to non-public works contracts for the repair, alteration, improvement, or construction of real property, as those contracts are governed under the provisions of Rule 12A-1,051, F.A.C. In applying this rule, the following definitions are used. 1. "Contractor" is one that supplies and installs tangible personal property that is incorporated into or becomes a part of a public facility pursuant to a public works contract with a governmental entity exercising its authority in regard to the public property or facility. Contractors include, but are not limited to, persons engaged in building, electrical, plumbing, heating, painting, decorating, ventilating, paperhanging, sheet metal, roofing, bridge, road, waterworks, landscape, pier, or billboard work. This definition includes subcontractors. "Contractor" does not include a person that furnishes tangible personal property that is not affixed or appended in such a manner that it is incorporated into or becomes a part of the public property or public facility to which a public works contract relates. A person that provides and installs tangible personal property that is freestanding and can be relocated with no tools, equipment, or need for adaptation for use elsewhere is not a contractor within the scope of this rule. "Contractor" does not include a person that provides tangible personal property that will be incorporated into or becomes part of a public facility if such property will be installed by another party. Examples. A vendor sells a desk, sofas, chairs, tables, lamps, and art prints for the reception area in a new public building. The sales agreement requires the vendor to place the furniture according to a floor plan, set up the lamps, and hang the art prints. The vendor is not a contractor within the scope of this rule, because the vendor is not installing the property being sold in such a way that it is attached or affixed to the facility. A security system vendor furnishes and install low voltage wiring behind walls, motion detectors, smoke alarms, other sensors, control pads, alarm sirens, and other components of a security system for a new county courthouse. The components are direct wired, fit into recesses cut into the walls or other structural elements of the building, and are held in place by screws. The vendor is a contractor within the scope of this rule. The security system is installed and affixed in such a manner that it ha been incorporated into the courthouse. A vendor enters an agreement to provide and install the shelving system for a new public library. The shelves are built to bear the weight of books. The shelf configuration in each unit maximizes the number of books the shelves can hold. The number and size of the units ordered is based on the design for the library space. The units will run floor to ceiling and will be anchored in place by bolts or screws. The vendor is a contractor within the scope of this rule. The shelving system will be affixed in such a manner that it becomes a part of the public library. e. A manufacturer agrees to provide the prestressed concrete forms for a public parking garage. A construction company is awarded the bid to install those forms and build the garage. The manufacturer is not a contractor within the scope of this rule, because the manufacturer will not install any tangible personal property that becomes part of the garage. The construction company is a contractor within the scope of this rule. "Governmental entity" includes any agency or branch of the United States government, a state, or any county, municipality, or political subdivision of a state. The term includes authorities created by statute to operate public facilities using public funds, such as public port authorities or public-use airport authorities. "Public works" are defined as construction projects for public use or enjoyment, financed and owned by the government, in which private persons undertake the obligation to do a specific piece of work that involves installing tangible personal property in such a manner that it becomes a part of a public facility. For purposes of this rule, a public facility includes any land, improvement to land, building, structure, or other fixed site and related infrastructure thereon owned or operated by a governmental entity where governmental or public activities are conducted. The term "public works" is not restricted to the repair, alteration, improvement, or construction of real property and fixed works, although such projects are included within the term. "Real property" within the meaning of this rule includes all fixtures and improvements to real property. The status of a project as an improvement or fixture to real property will be determined by reference to the definitions contained in Rule 12A-1.051(2), F.A.C. * * * (4)(a) The exemption in s. 212.08(6), F.S., is a general exemption for sales made directly to the government. A determination whether a particular transaction is properly characterized as an exempt sale to a governmental entity or a taxable sale to or use by a contractor shall be based on the substance of the transaction, rather than the form in which the transaction is cast. The Executive Director or the Executive Director's designee in the responsible program will determine whether the substance of a particular transaction is a taxable sale to or use by a contractor or an exempt direct sale to a governmental entity based on all of the facts and circumstances surrounding the transaction as a whole. The following criteria that govern the status of the tangible personal property prior to its affixation to real property will be considered in determining whether a governmental entity rather than a contractor is the purchaser of materials: Direct Purchase Order. The governmental entity must issue its purchase order directly to the vendor supplying the materials the contractor will use and provide the vendor with a copy of the governmental entity's Florida Consumer's Certification of Exemption. Direct Invoice. The vendor's invoice must be issued to the governmental entity, rather than to the contractor. Passage of Title. The governmental entity must take title to the tangible personal property from the vendor at the time of purchase or delivery by the vendor. 5. Assumption of the Risk of Loss. Assumption of the risk of damage or loss by the governmental entity at the time of purchase is a paramount consideration. A governmental entity will be deemed to have assumed the risk of loss if the governmental entity bears the economic burden of obtaining insurance covering damage or loss or directly enjoys the economic benefit of the proceeds of such insurance. Sales are taxable sales to the contractor unless it can be demonstrated to the satisfaction of the Executive Director or the Executive Director's designee in the responsible division that such sales are, in substance, tax-exempt direct sales to the government. Respondent's staff assisted various industry groups in drafting proposed legislation for the 2001 and 2002 legislative sessions that would expand the sales tax exemption for public works contracts. The Legislature did not enact any of these proposals. The proposed rule amendments reflect Respondent's current practice regarding tax exemptions for public works contracts. The proposed amendments detail all factors, criteria, and standards that Respondent considers in determining whether transactions qualify for the exemption set forth in Section 212.08(6), Florida Statutes. The existing version of Rule 12A-1.094, Florida Administrative Code, as revised in 1992, does not reflect these factors. In drafting the proposed revisions to Rule 12A-1.094, Florida Administrative Code, Respondent's staff considered statutory language, questions asked by taxpayers, and cases involving protests of audit assessments. Respondent's staff also considered areas that it believed failed to provide clear guidance as to how taxpayers could structure transactions to avoid the tax. Finally, Respondent's staff considered the decisions in Housing by Vogue, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 403 So. 2d 478 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981), and Housing by Vogue, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 422 So. 2d 3 (Fla. 1982). As a general rule, a for-profit corporation instead of the contractor is liable to pay sales tax when the contractor agrees to purchase items and to resell the items to the corporation such that the corporation takes possession and ownership thereof. This would be true regardless of whether the contractor or some other individual eventually installs the items on the for-profit corporation's property or in its facility. In either instance, the contractor, as a reseller of tangible personal property, is a dealer who has the obligation to collect the sales tax from the for-profit corporation. The for-profit corporation would be the ultimate consumer of the items. If a contractor resells items to a non-governmental customer, who enjoys tax-exempt status, while the items are still tangible personal property, no sales tax is due. In such a case, it makes no difference whether the contractor or some other individual later installs the items. The taxability of sales to or by contractors who repair, alter, improve and construct real property pursuant to non-public works contracts is governed by Rule 12A-1.051, Florida Administrative Code, which states as follows in relevant part: Scope of the rule. This rule governs the taxability of the purchase, sale, or use of tangible personal property by contractors and subcontractors who purchase, acquire, or manufacture materials and supplies for use in the performance of real property contracts other than public works contracts performed for governmental entities, which are governed by the provisions of Rule 12A-1.094, F.A.C. . . . Definitions. For purposes of this rule, the following terms have the following meanings: * * * (c)1. "Fixture" means an item that is an accessory to a building, other structure, or to land, that retains its separate identity upon installation, but that is permanently attached to the realty. Fixtures include such items as wired lighting, kitchen or bathroom sinks, furnaces, central air conditioning units, elevators or escalators, or built-in cabinets, counters, or lockers. 2. In order for an item to be considered a fixture, it is not necessary that the owner of the item also own the real property to which the item is attached. . . . * * * (g) "Real property" means land, improvements to land, and fixtures. It is synonymous with the terms "realty" and "real estate." Pursuant to the statute and the proposed rule amendments, contractors who purchase tangible personal property that goes into or becomes a part of a public works are not entitled to an exemption from paying sales tax. Such a contractor would be the ultimate consumer of the tangible personal property and not a dealer. The statute and the rule at issue here require Respondent to look at the substance instead of the form of each transaction to determine when sales tax is due. To say that no tax is due anytime a contractor agrees to purchase and resell items to a governmental customer, such that the governmental customer takes possession and ownership thereof before the same contractor installs the items, would be contrary to the statute. To find otherwise would place form over substance, allowing the contractor and the governmental entity to avoid the statutorily imposed tax by casting the transaction as a resale. The proposed rule amendments do not expand the sales and/or use tax imposed by Chapter 212, Florida Statutes. Instead, they implement the statutory provision requiring governmental contractors to pay sales tax when they supply and install items in a governmental project pursuant to a public works contract. Depending on the circumstances, "public works" include a construction project on a job site where the governmental entity owns the real property. It also includes a construction project on a job site where the governmental entity owns a public facility located on real property owned by a private individual. The term "public works" includes a public facility which is owned and operated by a governmental entity for the purpose of conducting governmental activities regardless of who owns the real property on which it is located. According to the statute, Respondent's rules must give special consideration to the status of tangible personal property "before its affixation to real property." This provision does not mean that a transaction is not taxable unless the tangible personal property becomes a "fixture" or "appurtenance" to real property. Instead, Respondent's proposed rule amendments properly implement the broader legislative intent to tax any sale to a contractor who supplies and installs tangible personal property in public works. Respondent looks first to see whether the tangible personal property will be a fixture or improvement to real property. Next, Respondent must determine whether the tangible personal property will be permanently attached and function as a part of a public works project that does not fit the definition of real property. For example, a port authority may operate an office out of a permanently docked ship. The statute directs Respondent to consider the assumption of risk of damage or loss to be most important but not the only factor in determining whether the sale of tangible personal property is taxable. In addition to the assumption of risk of loss, the proposed rule amendments require a nontaxable sale to show the following: (a) a direct purchase order to the vendor who will supply materials to the contractor; (b) a direct invoice from the vendor rather than the contractor; (c) direct payment to the vendor; and (d) passage of title at time of purchase or delivery. The five factors are inclusive of the elements that Respondent will consider when determining whether of a sale is, in substance, a direct nontaxable sale to a governmental entity.
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner is subject to tax based on a lease or license to use real property pursuant to Sections 212.031, 212.054, and 212.55, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Jack and Joan Peoples bought and began operating a bait and tackle shop/fish camp in Jacksonville, Duval County, Florida, in approximately 1971. The name of the business was Clark's Fish Camp and Seafood. As the business grew, Mr. and Mrs. Peoples began operating a restaurant in the shop. Initially, they lived on the business premises in an apartment adjoining the shop. When the restaurant became more successful, the restaurant was enlarged to include the apartment area and the family bought a home at another location. In January 1990, Mr. and Mrs. Peoples incorporated their business as a Florida Subchapter S Corporation. Pursuant to the organizational minutes, Mr. Peoples was elected president and Mrs. Peoples was elected vice-president and secretary. Petitioner issued common stock to Mr. and Mrs. Peoples as the sole shareholders, each owning a 50 percent interest, in exchange for the good will and name of Clark's Fish Camp and Seafood. Mr. and Mrs. Peoples did not transfer any real property, fixtures, or equipment to Petitioner. At all times material to this case, Mr. and Mrs. Peoples or Mrs. Peoples, in her sole capacity, owned the real property and fixtures utilized by Petitioner in the operation of the restaurant business. At all times relevant here, Mrs. Peoples acted as hostess, cook, and/or manager for the business. She controlled Petitioner's checkbook along with her kitchen manager, Florence Hatfield, and general manager, Steve Morris. During the audit at issue here, Russ Deeter, an accountant, and his associate/former employee, Maxine Downs were responsible for performing all of Petitioner's formal bookkeeping. Mr. Deeter had served as Petitioner's bookkeeper since the early 1970s. He sold his accounting business to Ms. Downs in 1981, but he continued to assist her with the routine bookkeeping for certain clients including Petitioner. Pursuant to the arrangement between Mr. Deeter and Ms. Downs, she created a general ledger in a computer using Petitioner's checkbook, sales receipts, invoices, etc., as source documents. The source documents were then returned to Petitioner. Additionally, Mr. Deeter prepared state and federal tax returns for Petitioner and Mr. and Mrs. Peoples. Mrs. Peoples maintained all of the source documents for Petitioner's business records in a construction trailer/office located behind the restaurant on the property's highest ground. Because the property was prone to flooding, Petitioner placed the source documents and other business records on shelves in the trailer/office. The only file cabinets in the office were used to store restaurant supplies. On or about October 28, 1998, Respondent sent Petitioner a Notice of Intent to Audit Books and Records for sales and use taxes for the period October 1, 1993, to September 30, 1998. The notice also advised Petitioner that Respondent intended to conduct an audit of Petitioner's corporate intangible taxes for the period January 1, 1994, to January 1, 1998. The audit was scheduled to commence some time after December 28, 1998. In the meantime, Mr. Peoples became so ill that Mrs. Peoples closed their home and moved into a mobile home located on the business property. This move allowed Mrs. Peoples to oversee the restaurant business while she nursed her husband. Mr. Peoples died in March 1999. Thereafter, Mrs. Peoples became Petitioner's sole owner. Mrs. Peoples receives a bi-weekly salary from Petitioner in the amount of $3,000. She also makes draws from its bank account to pay business and personal expenses on an as-needed basis. Mrs. Peoples has an eighth grade education. However, she is, in large part, responsible for the success of Petitioner, which during the audit period grossed between $2,500,000 and $3,000,000 a year. Mrs. Peoples asserts that she does not remember signing any tax returns but admits that she signs documents without examining them when requested to do so by Mr. Deeter. By letter dated March 24, 1999, Respondent advised Petitioner that it was rescinding the October 28, 1998, Notice of Intent to Audit Books and Records and replacing it with a new notice. The new Notice of Intent to Audit Books and Records dated March 24, 1999, included an examination of Petitioner's charter city systems surtax for the period March 1, 1994, through February 28, 1999; Petitioner's sales and use tax from March 1, 1994, through February 28, 1999; and Petitioner's intangible personal property tax from January 1, 1995, through January 1, 1999. The new notice stated that the audit would begin on or before May 24, 1999. On May 23, 1999, Petitioner requested a postponement of the audit due to the death of Mr. Peoples. As a result of this request, Respondent postponed the audit until January 10, 2000. On May 25, 1999, Mrs. Peoples signed a Power of Attorney for Mr. Deeter to represent the business during the audit. In anticipation of the audit, Mrs. Peoples and her staff began going through the source documents stored in the trailer/office. Mr. Deeter also gathered pertinent records and computer printouts. All documents required for the audit were placed in boxes or sacks on the floor of the trailer/office. In September of 1999, Petitioner's property flooded due to a hurricane. The water rose above the elevated entrance to the trailer/office. Mrs. Peoples and Petitioner's employees made no effort to protect the documents on the floor of the trailer/office from the floodwaters. Petitioner's September 1999 insurance claims due to flood loss do not contain a claim for loss of documentation. The 1999 flood loss claims were small in comparison to the flood loss claims for 2001 even though the 1999 floodwaters rose high enough to destroy the records. Record evidence indicates that the trailer/office has flooded on more than one occasion. In September 1999, all of the documents on the floor of the office were destroyed. Subsequently, Mrs. Peoples and Ms. Hatfield disposed of the documents, including but not limited to, the printouts of the general ledger, bank statements, and cancelled checks. On January 7, 2000, Petitioner requested another postponement of the audit until July 1, 2000. Petitioner made the request due to the death of Ms. Downs in December 1999. After her death, Mr. Deeter discovered that Ms. Downs' computer and all backup tapes located in her home office were either stolen or otherwise unaccounted for. The missing computer records included Petitioner's bookkeeping records for the audit period at issue here. On January 15, 2000, Petitioner agreed to extend the time for Respondent to perform the audit. The agreement stated that Respondent could issue an assessment at any time before October 28, 2001. On July 6, 2000, Respondent issued a formal demand for Petitioner to produce certain records. The only records available were Mr. Deeter's own work papers, post-September 1999 materials that had not been placed in the trailer/office prior to the flood, or records prepared after the flood and death of Ms. Downs. On July 17, 2000, the parties signed an Audit Agreement. The agreement states that the audit of sales of tangible personal property would be controlled by the sampling method. On July 17, 2000, Mr. Deeter informed Respondent that Petitioner's records covering the period from 1993 through the middle of 1999 were not available because a flood had damaged them in September 1999. However, using his work papers, Mr. Deeter was able to provide Respondent with copies of some of the original federal tax returns that he had prepared for Petitioner and Mr. and Mrs. Peoples. During the hearing, Mr. Deeter asserted that he had delivered the original tax returns to Mr. and Mrs. Peoples who had the responsibility to sign, date, and file them with the U.S. Internal Revenue Service (IRS) at the appropriate times. Mrs. Peoples testified that she could not remember signing any returns. She believed that Mr. Deeter had assumed responsibility for filing the returns. The unsigned and undated copies of the returns that Mr. Deeter provided Respondent on July 17, 2000, included Petitioner's U.S. Income Tax Return for an S Corporation (Form 1120S) for 1996, 1997, and 1998. These returns showed that Petitioner took the following deductions from income for a lease expense: (a) 1996--$225,546; (b) 1997--$332,791; and 1998--$290,493. These are the amounts that Respondent seeks to tax as rent. Mr. Deeter also provided Respondent with an unsigned and undated copy of Mr. and Mrs. Peoples' 1998 U.S. Individual Income Tax Return (Form 1040). The return included both pages of Schedule E showing rents received from Petitioner. On July 28, 2000, Mr. Deeter provided Respondent with revised copies of Petitioner's 1120S forms and revised copies of Mr. and Mrs. Peoples' 1040 forms. The auditor's file does not contain copies of the revised returns because the auditor did not accept them. The record also indicates that Mr. Deeter did not want to leave the revised returns with Respondent because they were not copies of the original returns. During the hearing, Mr. Deeter testified that he furnished Respondent with revised returns to show that there was no difference in the amount of federal income tax due and payable by Mr. and Mrs. Peoples regardless of whether Petitioner reported a lease expense or a distribution of profit on its 1120S forms and regardless of whether Mr. and Mrs. Peoples reported Petitioner's income as rent received or a profit distribution on their 1040 forms. According to Mr. Deeter, he prepared the revised 1120S returns using his pencil copies of the original handwritten returns because he had never used a computer software program to prepare 1120S forms. Mr. Deeter had a computer software program to prepare 1040 forms, so he used that program to generate the revised 1040 returns. However, Mr. Deeter's testimony that the revised returns were drafts showing Petitioner's deduction of a lease expense and Mr. and Mrs. Peoples' receipt of rent is not persuasive. In November 2000, Respondent obtained copies of Petitioner's 1120S forms and Mr. and Mrs. Peoples' 1040 forms for 1994 and 1995 from the IRS. The IRS did not have copies of these returns for the years 1996 through 1999. However, there is record evidence that Mr. and Mrs. Peoples paid some income taxes for all years in question. The record does not contain copies of the 1994 and 1995 returns. Competent evidence indicates that, consistent with Respondent's routine practice, the auditor reviewed the 1040 and 1120S forms and returned them to the IRS without making copies for Respondent's file. Based on the auditor's review of Petitioner's 1120S returns, Respondent seeks to tax Petitioner for lease expense in the amounts of $152,782.24 in 1994 and $220,355.85 in 1995. During the hearing, Mr. Deeter conceded that he prepared Petitioner's 1120S forms for 1994 and 1995 showing deductions for a lease expense and Mr. and Mrs. Peoples' 1040 forms showing rent received from Petitioner. His testimony that he prepared all returns in subsequent years showing no lease expense for Petitioner and profit distributions instead of rent received for Mr. and Mrs. Peoples is not persuasive. In November 2000, Respondent issued a Notice of Intent to Make Audit Changes. The notice made no adjustment with respect to Petitioner's reported taxable sales. The only adjustment was based on lease payments from Petitioner to Mr. and Mrs. Peoples as consideration for the rent of the building and fixtures utilized by Petitioner in the conduct of its business. On January 26, 2001, Mr. Deeter had an audit conference with Respondent's staff. During the conference, Mr. Deeter requested that Respondent review Petitioner's amended 1120S forms for the years 1996, 1997, 1998, and 1999. The amended 1120S returns did not include deductions for a lease expense. Respondent would not accept the amended returns, but informed Mr. Deeter that it would review the amended returns if he could document that they had been filed with the IRS. On March 7, 2001, the IRS stamped the amended 1120S forms for 1996, 1997, 1998 and 1999 as having been received. Mrs. Peoples had signed the returns as Petitioner's president but she did not date her signatures. Mr. Deeter testified that his wife, Roberta Lawson, signed the amended 1120S returns as the tax preparer. Mrs. Lawson's purported signatures on the forms were dated appropriately for each tax year. However, Mrs. Lawson did not testify at the hearing. Mr. Deeter's testimony that the returns filed with the IRS on March 7, 2001, after the audit was completed were, in fact, exact copies of the returns that he and his wife prepared for Petitioner each year and provided to Respondent on July 17, 2000, is not persuasive. After receiving the amended 1120S returns, Respondent decided not to consider them in the audit because they were self-serving. On August 6, 2001, Respondent issued a Notice of Proposed Assessment of sales and use tax and charter transit system surtax. By letter dated October 2, 2001, Petitioner filed a timely informal protest of the proposed assessment. Petitioner asserted that it had never paid any rent to Mr. and Mrs. Peoples. On January 29, 2002, Respondent issued a Notice of Decision upholding the proposed assessments. However, Petitioner never received this notice. Therefore, Respondent reissued the Notice of Decision without any additional changes on August 14, 2002. During discovery, Petitioner provided Respondent with unsigned and undated copies of Mr. and Mrs. Peoples' 1040 forms for 1996, 1997, 1998, and 1999. These returns show taxable income derived from an S corporation on line 17, passive income and losses from Petitioner on page 2 of Schedule E, and depreciation on Form 4562. In other words, the returns reflect corporate distributions of profit from Petitioner and do not reference any income from rental real estate. Mr. Deeter's testimony during hearing that the 1040 returns provided to Respondent during discovery are exact copies of the original 1040 returns is not persuasive. As of December 12, 2002, Mr. and Mrs. Peoples had not filed 1040 returns for the years 2001, 2000, 1999, 1998, 1997, or 1996 with the IRS. The audit at issue here was based on the best information provided at the time of the audit. Respondent completed the audit on or about January 26, 2001. Petitioner does not assert that the calculation of the assessment was in error. Instead, Petitioner protests that any assessment is due. Petitioner could have requested its bank to provide it with copies of its statements and cancelled checks for the relevant period. Petitioner did not make such a request and Respondent was not under an obligation to do so. There is no evidence that a written lease for Petitioner to use Mr. and Mrs. People's property ever existed. However, the greater weight of the evidence indicates that Petitioner leased the restaurant property from Mr. and Mrs. Peoples for all relevant years. Mr. Deeter is an experienced accountant with over 30 years of experience. Petitioner and Mr. and Mrs. Peoples relied upon Mr. Deeter's advice as to what, if any, taxes should be paid on the lease. Armed with all of the necessary information, Mr. Deeter gave Petitioner obviously erroneous advice concerning the tax consequences associated with Petitioner leasing the property and paying 100 percent of its profits as consideration for the lease. To compound the problem, Mrs. Peoples negligently failed to ensure that Petitioner's business records, gathered specifically in anticipation of Respondent's audit, were safely preserved from hurricane floodwaters. Petitioner has had no previous tax compliance difficulties. It has not been subject to prior audits or assessments. Even so, the facts of this case indicate that Petitioner and Mr. and Ms. Peoples did not exercise ordinary care and prudence in complying with the revenue laws of Florida. Mr. Deeter testified that the fair market value or reasonable consideration for the lease is an amount equivalent to Mr. and Mrs. Peoples' depreciation. According to the depreciation schedules, which accompanied the 1040 forms provided to Respondent during discovery, the annual cost for the use of the property and fixtures were as follows: (a) 1996--$98,296; (b) 1997--$104,840; and (c) 1998--$114,106 ($179,554 less a one time extraordinary loss of $65,448 due to flood damage). Mr. Deeter also testified that using the information on the 1040 forms for 1996, the depreciation expense for 1994 and 1995 can be computed as follows: (a) 1994--$63,000 to $67,000; and (b) 1995--$77,000 to $79,000. Mr. Deeter's testimony that the fair market value of the lease is equivalent to the depreciation set forth on 1040 returns never filed with the IRS is not persuasive. Mr. Deeter testified that an estimate of reasonable net profits for a corporation of similar size and make-up could be determined by reference to ratio profiles prepared by Robert Morris and Associates. Mr. Deeter's testimony regarding average profit distributions to shareholders of similarly situated corporations and reasonable profit distributions for Petitioner are speculative and not persuasive.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That Respondent enter a final order upholding the tax assessment. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of April, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of April, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: David B. Ferebee, Esquire Post Office Box 1796 Jacksonville, Florida 32201-1796 J. Bruce Hoffmann, General Counsel Department of Revenue 204 Carlton Building Post Office Box 6668 Tallahassee, Florida 32314-6668 R. Lynn Lovejoy, Esquire Office of the Attorney General The Capitol, Tax Section Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 James Zingale, Executive Director Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioners are liable for the sales and use tax audit assessment and charter transit system surtax audit assessment, as reflected in Respondent's Notices of Reconsideration dated March 17, 1998.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: From 1988 through 1993, Petitioner, Dane W. Lucas (Lucas), operated the Annabelle Lee, a cruise boat, under the name of River Entertainment. On January 1, 1994, Lucas incorporated his business under the name of River Cruises, Inc. (the corporation), which is also a Petitioner in this cause. In 1996, Respondent, Department of Revenue (DOR), conducted an audit of the records of both Petitioners to determine whether all sales and use taxes and charter transit system surtaxes had been properly reported and paid. As a result of the audit, DOR issued two proposed assessments dated January 28, 1997, against Lucas individually and two assessments dated July 22, 1997, against the corporation. However, the latter two assessments reflect the combined liability of both Lucas individually as well as the corporation and cover the five-year audit period from March 1, 1990, through February 28, 1995. After a protest letter was filed by Petitioners, DOR issued two Notices of Reconsideration on March 17, 1998. As to Lucas individually, the Notice of Reconsideration reflects that as of March 11, 1998, he owed $44,083.56 for sales and use taxes, with interest to accrue from that date at the rate of $7.26 per day. It further asserted that he owed $3,290.35 in charter transit system surtaxes as of the same date, with interest to accrue at the rate of $.058 per day. As to the corporation, the Notice of Reconsideration reflects that as of March 11, 1998, it was liable for $17,906.53, with interest to accrue as of March 11, 1998, at the rate of $2.97 per day. Also, it asserts that as of March 11, 1998, the corporation was liable for $5,839.94 for charter transit system surtaxes, with interest to accrue at the rate of $0.25 per day. On April 24, 1998, Petitioners remitted a check in the amount of $9,626.92, which represented what they believed was the proper tax assessment. As to the remaining portion, they deny that any moneys are owed; alternatively, they have requested that the amounts be compromised on the basis that they have no ability to pay the amount claimed by DOR.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Revenue enter a final order sustaining its original assessment against Petitioner. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of July, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of July, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Linda Lettera, General Counsel Department of Revenue 204 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100 Eric J. Taylor, Esquire Department of Legal Affairs 28 West Central Boulevard, Suite 310 Orlando, Florida 32801 Dane W. Lucas 1511 Montana Avenue Jacksonville, Florida 32207-8642 Larry Fuchs, Executive Director Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100
Findings Of Fact St. Petersburg Steel Corporation is a Florida corporation which manufactures and sells steel products in Florida and to out-of-state purchasers. During the three-year audit period ending May 31, 1981, some $1.9 million was billed by Petitioner for sales made. In conducting the audit for the period from June 1, 1978, through May 31, 1981, Respondent was provided all invoices and records of Petitioner. Due to the large volume of invoices involved, the auditor prepared the assessments by using Petitioner's sales register and did not check the entries therein with the source documents (invoices, bills of lading, sales slips, etc.). Some of the vendees were out of state, some were no longer in business, and the names of some could have been misread by the auditor since they were handwritten. Unless Petitioner was able to present a resale certificate for a vendee or the sales register did not show the sales tax paid, that sale was included in the assessment. Some of those vendees were no longer in business and could not be located by Petitioner to obtain their resale certificate numbers. Purchases for which Petitioner was assessed a use tax included some equipment such as fans and file cabinets and rent paid to its lessor on which Petitioner could not show a sales tax had been paid. Petitioner contended that the audit was improperly conducted because the source documents were not used as the basis for the assessment. The only evidence presented to support this contention was the testimony of Esposito, who did not qualify as an expert witness able to credibly present such opinion testimony. Petitioner further contended that he had remitted to Respondent some $1,900 in sales taxes improperly collected by him on out-of-state sales for which no tax was due. No claim for a refund of those taxes was made in these proceedings and no documentary evidence to support this contention was submitted by Petitioner.
The Issue Is Petitioner entitled to a tax exemption certificate based upon its status as an "educational institution" as defined in Section 212.08(7)(o)2.d, Florida Statutes?
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a non-profit organization. Its purpose is to identify and improve library resources and services within the Florida Panhandle geographic area. More specifically, Petitioner provides services and information to support interlibrary cooperative activities, that will strengthen resource sharing among libraries in the Panhandle and improve the effectiveness of the member libraries, with the ultimate goal being to facilitate access to library materials by library users. Respondent is an agency of the State of Florida which has the responsibility to consider applications for Consumer Certificates of Exemption from taxation. See Section 212.008(7), Florida Statutes. When Respondent refused to grant Petitioner a Consumer Certificate of Exemption, for reasons stated in its notice of intent, Petitioner challenged that preliminary decision. As indicated in the notice of intent to deny, the reason for denial is as follows: Your organization is not a state tax- supported, parochial, church or nonprofit private school, college or university which conducts regular classes and courses of study required for accreditation by, or membership in, the Southern Association of Colleges and Schools, the Department of Education, the Florida Council of Independent Schools, or the Florida Association of Christian Colleges and Schools, Inc. The purpose of your organization is not to raise funds for schools teaching grades kindergarten through high school, colleges or universities. Your organization is not a state, district, or other governing or administrative office the function of which is to assist or regulate the customary activities of educational organizations and members. Your organization fails to meet the qualifications for exemption from sales and use taxation, as set forth in Section 212.08(7), Florida Statutes. The grounds for denial found in the third and fourth paragraph constitute the remaining dispute between the parties to be resolved. Paragraph three is in relation to language set forth in Section 212.08(7)(o)2.d., Florida Statutes. Petitioner provides its services and support to member organizations who provide library services. The member organizations include university, community college, other college, military, county school district, municipal, county and other governmental public libraries. A list of the members is found in Petitioner's Exhibit one. Petitioner receives funding through grant programs sponsored by federal and state government. Some of the budget for the Petitioner comes from local sources, such as membership dues. The arrangements promoted by the Petitioner create library consortia among the members in Petitioner's network. To become a member the respective libraries have to execute a letter of agreement and be approved by Petitioner's Board of Directors. To maintain the membership, a member library must agree to freely loan materials outside its library, have their records added to the Florida Bibliographic and Serials databases, and to upkeep the library records in the databases. (Reference to serials databases, refers to periodicals available through the member libraries.) The failure to meet those requirements would cause a member library to be dropped from membership. In executing the letter of agreement, the member libraries commit to the following: Abide by the Bylaws and Articles of Incorporation of PLAN. Provide free loan and photocopies of materials consistent both with the policies and procedures prescribed in the PLAN Interlibrary Loan Code, the Florida Library Information Network (FLIN) Manual of Policies, Protocols and Procedures, and with the library's customary lending policies. This service will be provided to PLAN participants. Share machine-readable bibliographic records for inclusion in the PLAN database. This database will be built on OCLC. Libraries with machine-readable records in MARC format agree to permit the loading of those records and the setting of the holdings information in the OCLC database. Conditions for loading those records will be subject to plans developed by the PLAN Board of Directors. Libraries with records in the OCLC database agree to allow their bibliographic and holdings records to be used in off-line products produced from the OCLC database for resource sharing activities of Panhandle libraries. Develop a plan and show evidence of progress in that plan toward (1) converting their records to MARC format, and (2) including their records in the PLAN database. Participate in further development of PLAN within bounds determined by participatory decision-making. Each library should provide the resources to meet the ordinary needs and interests of its primary clientele. Material requested from another library should generally be limited to those that do not conform to the library's collection development policy or for which there is no recurring demand. Have trained staff to handle both their in-house PLAN online services and management of their resource sharing responsibilities. Petitioner's responsibilities under the agreement with its member libraries are as follows: PLAN will notify the [Member Library] through countersigning this letter whether its participating status is authorized or if there are any conditions which prevent it from being included. PLAN will notify the [Member Library] and all PLAN libraries of the date it will be accorded member library status by other PLAN libraries. By its membership, the member library gains the following advantage: The [Member Library] will be entitled to all benefits as a PLAN member it chooses to utilize including, but not limited to, access to the Panhandle Union List of Serials (PULSE) and the PLAN fax/courier network, and eligibility for special projects and programs sponsored by the PLAN. The procedures for removing a member from the network are as follows: Failure of the [Member Library] to comply with PLAN protocols and procedures or failure to fulfill its assurances as a participant will constitute grounds for PLAN to cancel the [Member Library]'s status as a PLAN library, in which case PLAN shall give written notice to the library. The [Member Library] may cancel its participation in PLAN at the end of any PLAN fiscal year by serving notice in writing at least thirty (30) days before the end of the fiscal year. In fiscal year 1996 Petitioner held 52 workshops. Staff from all library members took part in workshops conducted by Petitioner. It is reasonably inferred that the purposes of the workshops coincided with the overall purpose of Petitioner in its coordinating function to facilitate sharing information among its library members. Information through the program coordinated by the Petitioner is produced in several formats: on-line, CD-ROM and paper. That information is given to libraries at no cost, if the libraries produce their holdings as part of the exchange of information. In the past Petitioner loaned member libraries CD-ROM players, fax machines, and PC's, together with other equipment that would assist its members. Petitioner has directly assisted in making information available to its membership by creating information and loading it on a database. This refers to conversion of paper card catalogs into machine readable electronic digital records. These activities by the Petitioner are at its costs. In carrying out its functions Petitioner attempts to put its members in the position to individually carry out day to day service for the benefit of library patrons. Petitioner's role does not extend to the control of the operation of the member libraries in their provision of library services to the public. In its brochure, Petitioner's exhibit 4, Petitioner's services are further described as: Internet Access - PLAN provides Internet access and training for its member libraries. Libraries without the necessary equipment may apply for a free equipment loan from PLAN. PULSE - The Panhandle Union List of Serials contains the periodical holdings of 33 member libraries and the State Library. Over 29,000 titles are currently accessible on-line, and in print. PLAN inputs and updates the member's periodical holding as well as providing each member with copies of PULSE. Interlibrary Loan - PLAN coordinates the addition of select libraries to become a Group Access member on the OCLC ILL subsystem. We also provide initial training and documentation on using OCLC Interlibrary Loan. Monographic Database - PLAN provides access through its monographic database to almost 4 million titles owned by PLAN members. Each year additional titles are added via updates and retrospective conversion. Equipment Loan - PLAN offers a free equipment loan program to member libraries. Libraries may apply for the loan of a PC, fax machine, CD-ROM player, and/or modem. The fax machines can be used to send ILL requests and receive photocopied ILL materials. Workshops and Continuing Education - PLAN conducts many workshops on a variety of topics of interest to librarians. Tracks include cataloging, reference, management, technology and resource sharing. The workshops are conducted throughout the panhandle region. PLAN members may send two attendees to each workshop at no cost to the library. Consulting - PLAN provides its members with consulting services on automation and other library topics. Retrospective Conversion - PLAN provides conversion services for member libraries without MARC records. Documentary Delivery - PLAN is constantly striving to improve the delivery of documents between member libraries. In addition to fax and U.S. Postal Service, we provide UPS delivery of rush materials. FirstSearch - PLAN provides its members with access to OCLC's databases. These databases contain: books and other materials in libraries worldwide; index of articles and table of contents of nearly 12, 500 journals; index of articles with text online or by e- mail; U.S. government publications; journal articles and reports in education; and abstracted articles from medical journals, etc.
Recommendation Based upon the facts found and the conclusions of law reached it is, RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered which denies Petitioner's application for Consumer Certificate of Exemption from taxation. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of June, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of June, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Dr. William P. Conniff, Executive Director Panhandle Library Access Network Miracle Strip Loop, Suite 2 Panama City Beach, Florida 32407 William B. Nickell, Esquire Department of Revenue 501 South Calhoun Street, Suite 204 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100 Linda Lettera, General Counsel Department of Revenue 204 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100 Larry Fuchs, Executive Director Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100
Findings Of Fact The facts in this cause are essentially undisputed. The Pen Haven Company was a Subchapter "S" corporation for federal income tax purposes and therefore incurred no State income tax liability. It was formed in 1960 and retained its Subchapter "S" status thorough 1976 for federal income tax purposes. In December of 1977, the capital stock of Pen Haven Sanitation Company was sold to the Board of County Commissioners of Escambia County. Inasmuch as the sole corporate stock holder then was no longer an individual, but rather a governmental entity, the corporation Subchapter "S" election for federal income tax purposes was terminated. Escambia County did not wish to own stock in a private corporation so it accordingly liquidated Pen Haven and its assets were distributed to the County's direct ownership. Thereafter the Corporation filed a final corporate income tax return for 1977 which reflected capital gains on the assets of the corporation which had been distributed. Some of those assets had tax bases which had been reduced to zero through reduction by depreciation, most of which had been charged off prior to January 1, 1972, the effective date of the Florida corporate income tax code. All of the depreciation deductions had been taken prior to the termination of the Subchapter "S" status of the Pen Haven Company. On disposition of the Pen Haven assets however, a gain was reported equal to the fair market value or salvage value, less the basis. This gain was accordingly reported on Pen Haven's federal income tax return, and on the 1977 Florida corporate income tax return, albeit under the protest as to the Florida tax return. Inasmuch as Pen Haven had previously deducted depreciation since its inception, and had the benefit thereof for federal tax purposes, it was required by the Internal Revenue Service to recapture the depreciation for federal tax purposes upon its sale and the filing of its tax return in 1977. The same recapture of depreciation treatment was required of West Florida Utilities. Thereafter an application was made by the Petitioner corporations for Florida Corporate Income Tax Refunds asserting that they should have not paid taxes on the amount of gains which represented a recapture of depreciation which had been taken as a deduction prior to the effective date of the Florida corporate income tax on January 1, 1972. In effect the Petitioner is contending that the so- called "income" which is the subject of the tax in question was not realized in 1977, but rather merely "recognized" in that year by the federal tax law and that it represented income actually "realized" during the years when the depreciation was taken as a deduction prior to January 1, 1972. The Petitioners contend that "realization" for federal income tax purposes occurs when the taxpayer actually receives an economic gain. "Recognition" on the other hand refers only to that time when the tax itself becomes actually due and payable. The Petitioners maintain that when the tax became due and payable in 1977 that was merely the point of "recognition" of the subject taxable gain and not "realization" in that the gain was actually realized prior to the Florida Jurisdictional date of January 1, 1972, in the form of the economic benefit derived from those depreciation deductions applied to federal tax liability prior to that date. The Petitioners cite SRG Corporation vs. Department of Revenue, 365 So2d 687 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978), for the proposition that Florida could not tax those gains accruing to the taxpayer prior to Florida's having the constitutional and statutory power to impose a corporate income tax. The Respondent in essence agrees that the question of when the economic benefit to the Petitioners was received by them or was "realized" is the key question in this cause. The Respondent contends, however, that "realization" of a taxable gain occurred when the assets were disposed of by the Petitioners in 1977, well after the date when Florida's power to tax such a gain was enacted. The underlying facts in the case of West Florida Utilities are substantially similar. This corporation, however, was organized in 1962 and has never been clothed with Subchapter "S" corporate status. The only grounds upon which it can therefore claim a refund is its assertion that Florida does not have authority to tax that portion of the capital gains attributable to recapture of depreciation which was originally charged off as a deduction prior to January 1, 1972. The Department of Revenue and the Comptroller of the State of Florida both denied the refund claim made on behalf of the Petitioners, and thereafter they seasonably petitioned for a formal administrative hearing pursuant to Chapter 120.57(1), Florida Statutes.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the evidence in the record, the candor and demeanor of the witness and pleadings and arguments of counsel it is, therefore RECOMMENDED this 3rd day of September, 1981, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 904/488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of September, 1981. COPIES FURNISHED: Thurston A. Shell Post Office Box 1831 Pensacola, Florida 32578 Robert A. Pierce, Esquire General Counsel Department of Revenue Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Michael Basile, Esquire Deputy General Counsel Office of Comptroller The Capitol, Suite 1302 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Wilson Crump, II, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32310
