Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Henry L. Curry, was employed by Respondent, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, from October 26, 1970 to March 3, 1988. Petitioner was employed at Florida State Hospital, Chattahoochee, as a Human Services Worker I, Forensics, Unit 20, during the winter of 1988. The position was part of the Career Service System in which the Petitioner had attained "permanent" status. On February 1, 1988, Petitioner telephoned a person named Grady James, another employee at Florida State Hospital. (R-1) Petitioner informed Mr. James that, due to illness, Petitioner was not able to work and would bring a "sick slip" when he was able to return to work. Petitioner had no further contact with Respondent until March 28, 1988, when Petitioner's letter, dated March 24, 1988, was received by Florida State Hospital. (P-1) In the letter, Petitioner stated that he was "an inpatient at the VA Medical Center" and that "a letter of verification" of his hospitalization was forthcoming. On March 30, 1988, Florida State Hospital received a letter from the Atlanta Veterans Administration Medical Center's Alcoholism and Drug Dependence Treatment Unit in Decatur, Georgia. The letter, dated March 28, 1988, stated that Petitioner had been hospitalized March 16 - 28, 1988, in said unit. (P-2) There is limited information indicating Petitioner's physical location or functional ability during the period of time between February 1, 1988, when he contacted Mr. James, and March 16, 1988, when he was hospitalized. Petitioner testified that he was not in his "right mind", that he "was possessed", "drugged out", and "couldn't cope". Petitioner slept "in the car, in the crack houses and everywhere". (Testimony of Petitioner) Petitioner was seen once during that time by his father in Quincy, Florida, (Testimony of Perman Curry) and apparently was hospitalized for unexplained reasons in "Montgomery" for some period (Testimony of Petitioner) While Petitioner states that he did not intend to resign from his position, no contact was made with his employer from February 1, 1988 to March 28, 1988, a period of 56 days. Prior to February 1, 1988, Petitioner had been counseled on several occasions, and his attendance had been closely monitored, due to unscheduled absences. (R-1) On February 9, 1988, Dorothy N. Stinson, the supervisor of the unit in which Petitioner worked, sent by certified mail, appropriately addressed, a letter to Petitioner noting the lack of communication from Petitioner and stating that, unless medical certification for the unauthorized absence was provided within three days of receipt of the letter, Petitioner would be considered to have abandoned his position and resigned from employment. The letter was returned as "unclaimed" by the postal service on February 25, 1988, after two unsuccessful attempts to effect delivery. (R-3) On March 4, 1988, Faye H. Alcorn, Deputy Hospital Administrator, sent by certified mail, appropriately addressed, a letter (dated March 3, 1988) to Petitioner which stated that due to his absence without authorized leave from February 2 - March 2, 1988, during which time there had been no contact with Petitioner, he was deemed to have abandoned his position and resigned from the state's career service system pursuant to rules related to separation from employment resulting from abandonment of position. The letter was returned as "unclaimed" by the postal service on March 20, 1988, after two unsuccessful attempts to effect delivery. (R-2) In or around December, 1987, Ms. Stinson became aware that Petitioner had a substance abuse problem. Ms. Stinson testified that it is possible to take "leave without pay" for a period of up to one year and that such leave could possibly be granted to an employee who is ill due to a drug and alcohol addiction. A person seeking to take such leave would either submit a written letter of request or would submit medical certification indicating that the employee was unable to work. Petitioner did not request to be placed on "leave without pay" status. The "leave without pay" status assigned to Petitioner during that period was assigned for administrative purposes and did not indicate that the leave had been authorized or approved. The medical certification submitted by Petitioner is for the period of March 16 - 28, 1988. No medical certification was submitted for the period of February 1 - March 16, 1988.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be issued concluding that the Petitioner abandoned his position and resigned from the Career Service. DONE and ENTERED this 2nd day of August, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of August, 1988. APPENDIX The following constitute rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the panties to this case. Petitioner Accepted. Accepted, however, letter indicated that continued absence would constitute abandonment. Accepted, insofar as the absence from 2/2/88 to 3/2/88, however, Petitioner did not notify Respondent of his situation until 3/28/88, (or 26 days following termination). Accepted. Accepted. Rejected, irrelevant. Accepted, however, such leave must receive prior approval. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Rejected, irrelevant. Rejected. If Petitioner was unable, as counsel asserts, to form the intent to resign from his position he was likewise unable to form the intent to return. Respondent Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Rejected, irrelevant. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Rejected, unnecessary. COPIES FURNISHED: Kathy R. Newman, Esquire Legal Services of North Florida, Inc. 211 East Jefferson Street Quincy, Florida 32351 Dennis X. Crowley, Esquire Florida State Hospital Administration Building Chattahoochee, Florida 32324 Adis Vila, Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Gregory L. Coler, Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner's request for an exemption from disqualification from employment in a position of special trust should be granted.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: This case involves a request by Petitioner, Raymond A. Baker, for an exemption from disqualification from employment in a position of special trust. If the request is approved, Petitioner would be allowed to return to work as a supervisor in a unit for developmentally disabled adults at Florida State Hospital (FSH). Respondent, Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS), is the state agency charged with the responsibility of approving or denying such requests. In a preliminary decision entered on September 2, 1997, a DCFS committee denied the request. Petitioner is now barred from doing such work because of a disqualifying offense which occurred on September 19, 1993. On that date, Petitioner was arrested for the offense of committing a "battery upon his live-in girlfriend," a misdemeanor under Section 784.03(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1993). Since the victim in that case was a person with whom Petitioner was then residing, the offense constituted domestic violence as it subsequently became defined in 1994 by Section 741.28, Florida Statutes. Petitioner entered a plea of No Contest to the charge of "[b]attery-domestic" on October 12, 1993. Adjudication of guilt was withheld, he was fined $150.00, and he was placed on twelve months probation. In addition, he was required to complete "New Hope & Alcohol Counseling," and he was ordered to have no contact with the victim. Petitioner successfully completed all terms of his probation, including counseling courses in both spousal abuse and substance abuse. In October 1993, Petitioner began working at FSH in an Other Personnel Services position. Eventually, he attained the position of unit treatment rehabilitation senior supervisor I in Unit 4, a position involving supervision of developmentally disabled adults. Due to a change in the law, in 1996, he was required to undergo a background screening. That screening uncovered his 1993 offense, and on July 18, 1997, he was disqualified from working in a position of special trust with developmentally disabled adults. Petitioner then accepted a position of fiscal assistant in the financial services section of FSH, a position having no contact with residents. He has continued working in that position pending the outcome of this case. Because of his desire to return to his former position, he has applied for an exemption from disqualification. Petitioner is a graduate of Florida State University with a degree in government and criminology. He also holds a Doctor of Jurisprudence from Howard University School of Law. He eventually plans to take the Florida Bar examination, and if he passes the examination, the Florida Bar will accept him for membership, notwithstanding his 1993 misdemeanor conviction. This assertion was not contradicted. In interpreting the statutory criteria which govern the granting of exemptions, the DCFS considers the following factors, among others, to be important. First, the applicant should not minimize the seriousness of the offense; he must express some remorse; and he must have insight into the seriousness of the incident and the risks involved. A three-person committee preliminarily denied the request in early September 1997 because at that time it believed that Petitioner minimized the incident, that he expressed little or no remorse, and that he had no insight into the seriousness of his offense. More than four years have elapsed since the criminal incident, a sufficient time for rehabilitation. Since that time, there have been no other blemishes on Petitioner's record. Except for a "bleeding toe," which was caused when the victim either cut it on broken glass or accidentally jammed it against the door, there was no injury to the victim. Petitioner has worked continuously at FSH since the incident, and he was described by former colleagues in Unit 4 as having a good rapport with patients and staff. According to co-workers, he also handled crises in the unit "in the right way." During the years 1995, 1996, and 1997, he received satisfactory evaluations from his supervisor. There is no evidence that Petitioner would present a danger to the residents if the exemption is granted. Petitioner's description of the circumstances surrounding the incident was not altogether accurate. This finding is made after considering the testimony of the victim who reluctantly testified on behalf of DCFS. For example, Petitioner recalled that the altercation ensued after the two had an argument over finances. However, it was established that it was caused when the victim attempted to break off the relationship and to leave the premises. In an effort to keep her from leaving, Petitioner tried to disrobe her. Also, he was extremely argumentative when speaking with the investigating law enforcement officer, and he refused to leave the premises when requested. According to the victim, Petitioner's verbally abusive behavior and his refusal to leave, rather than the altercation itself, ultimately led to his arrest that evening. While Petitioner was somewhat evasive and had no recollection about some of the facts surrounding the incident, this is probably attributable, at least in part, to his being highly intoxicated when the incident occurred. Petitioner expressed regret for his actions on the evening of September 19, 1993. His assertion that he has had no problems with alcohol since that night was not contradicted. Given the lapse of time since the incident, a record of continuous employment with the FSH with good evaluations, the completion of two counseling courses, and an expression of regret, the request for an exemption should be granted.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Children and Family Services enter a final order granting Petitioner's request for an exemption from disqualification for employment in a position of special trust. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of February, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of February, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Gregory D. Venz, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Pete Peterson, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Ben R. Patterson, Esquire Post Office Box 4289 Tallahassee, Florida 32315-4289 John R. Perry, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services 2639 North Monroe Street, Suite 252A Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2949
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: This case involves a request by Petitioner, Charles W. Leverson, Sr., for an exemption from disqualification from employment in a position of special trust. If the request is approved, Petitioner would be allowed to return to work as a unit treatment rehabilitation specialist in a unit for developmentally disabled adults at Florida State Hospital (FSH). Respondent, Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS), is the state agency charged with the responsibility of approving or denying such requests. In a preliminary decision entered on an unknown date, a DCFS committee denied the request principally on the ground that Petitioner had minimized or denied the gravity of his disqualifying offenses. Petitioner is now barred from doing such work because of disqualifying offenses which occurred on December 16, 1990, and March 24, 1992. On the first date, Petitioner was arrested for the offense of aggrevated battery on his wife, a misdemeanor under Section 784.04, Florida Statutes (1990). On the second date, Petitioner was again arrested for five offenses, including battery on his wife in violation of Section 784.03, Florida Statutes (1991). As to the first charge, on January 26, 1993, Petitioner entered a plea of nolo contendere to the charge of battery and was placed on one year's supervised probation. He was also required to "[s]pend 15 weekends in the county jail." In addition, Petitioner was ordered "not [to] possess or consume any alcohol during the term of [his] probation," and to "[c]ontinue with counseling" (of an undisclosed nature). As to the second charge, Petitioner was found guilty by a jury on July 24, 1992, of committing battery on his wife in violation of Section 784.03, Florida Statutes. A "not guilty" verdict was entered as to the remaining four charges. The record does not indicate the sentence, if any, that he received for this offense. Petitioner successfully completed all terms of his probation. Since his arrest in March 1992, he has not consumed any alcoholic beverages. This is an important consideration since both disqualifying offenses occurred when he was intoxicated. Petitioner began working at FSH on September 26, 1979. He was first employed as a support service aide but was eventually promoted to the position of unit treatment rehabilitation specialist, a position involving supervision of developmentally disabled adults. Because of a background screening which occurred in 1997, Petitioner's disqualifying offenses were discovered, and he was forced to resign effective February 12, 1998. He has requested an exemption so that he can return to his employment. Since being forced to resign some four months ago, he has not been employed. The two disqualifying offenses involve battery on Petitioner's long-time wife, Shirler. In both cases, she suffered injuries serious enough to require treatment at a local hospital. Shirler says, however, that Petitioner has "changed" since his 1992 arrest, and he no longer drinks, is communicative with her and the three children, and is a good father. Petitioner attends church, is a member of a lodge in Quincy, Florida, and has a much better attitude since he stopped drinking. He has received good work evaluations during his most recent years of employment at FSH. Former co-workers and supervisors attested to the fact that Petitioner has good rapport with his co-workers and residents, and he performs his stressful job with a "cheerful" and "pleasant" attitude. He was also described as one of the "better" employees in the forensic unit. In March 1987, or more than eleven years ago, Petitioner received a five-day suspension because of an altercation with an inmate in the FSH forensic section laundry room. The suspension was meted out after Petitioner became involved in an argument with an inmate and drew an opened knive in a threatening fashion. Although Petitioner denied that the blade was exposed, testimony by a co-worker established that it was exposed in a threatening fashion. The altercation was resolved, however, before any violence occurred. In mitigation, it was established that Petitioner's possession of a knive in the laundry room was not unlawful since it was necessary for him to use a knive to open the sealed buckets of detergents. On October 13, 1993, Petitioner received a written reprimand for "Abusive and/or Threatening Language." On that occasion, Petitioner was instructed by his supervisor to help fold some laundry in the laundry room. Petitioner replied that he would not and told him "to get off my fucking back." Petitioner also pointed his fist at the supervisor in a threatening manner and "threatened to kick his butt." On June 27, 1994, Petitioner was suspended for fifteen work days effective July 8, 1994, for using threatening and/or abusive language towards a supervisor. This disciplinary action was taken after Petitioner had again refused to comply with instructions by his supervisor. On that occasion, he became "real mad," called her a "motherfucker," shook his fist at her, and threatened to "get her." Although the supervisor stood her ground against Petitioner, she was "afraid" for her safety. Petitioner was less than candid in describing the incidents which led to him receiving disciplinary action by his employer in 1987, 1993, and 1994. He has, however, expressed remorse for striking his wife in 1990 and 1992, and he regrets the embarrassment he caused his wife and children. For the last four years, Petitioner has had a blemish-free record at FSH, including good evaluations from his supervisors and a reputation as one of the "better" employees in his section. Given these considerations, it is found that Petitioner has sufficiently rehabilitated himself since the disqualifying incidents, and that he will pose no threat to the FSH clients and inmates.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Children and Family Services enter a final order granting Petitioner's request for an exemption from disqualification for employment in a position of special trust. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of June, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of June, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Gregory D. Venz, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 John S. Slye, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Ben R. Patterson, Esquire Post Office Box 4289 Tallahassee, Florida 32315-4289 John R. Perry, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services 2639 North Monroe Street, Suite 252A Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2949
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner should be granted an exemption from disqualification for working in a position of trust with disabled adults and children pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 435, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Since 1979, Petitioner, Vernon Jackson (Petitioner), has been employed by the Department of Children and Family Services (Respondent) or its predecessor government agency, with the exception of a period in 1996-97. He is presently classified as a psychiatric aide. Petitioner worked in a unit of the Florida State Hospital in Chattahoochee, Florida, which provides care to the patients of the facility, and he is a caregiver. It is in that capacity that he is subject to the employment screening requirements of Chapter 435 of the Florida Statutes. On August 23, 1980, Petitioner's girlfriend, Willie Thomas, got into an argument with a 17-year-old girl named Gwendolyn Arnold. When the argument between Thomas and Arnold escalated into a physical fight, Petitioner became involved in the fray. Arnold's 15-year-old brother also joined in the activity. As a result of the incident, Petitioner was charged with the misdemeanor offenses of disorderly conduct, resisting arrest without violence, and battery. Petitioner pled guilty to all three of the charged offenses. Adjudication of guilt was withheld by the court. Petitioner paid a fine of $50, plus costs, for the first two counts, disorderly conduct and resisting arrest without violence, and a fine of $100, plus costs, for the battery charge. In conjunction with the battery charge he was placed on probation for a period of one year. Petitioner's next criminal episode also involved Willie Thomas, his earlier girlfriend. On April 16, 1981, Petitioner was arrested and pled guilty to trespassing at Thomas’ home. He was required to pay a fine of $50. Although, adjudication was again withheld, he was placed on probation to run concurrently with his earlier probation sentence. Some months later, on November 19, 1981, Petitioner pled guilty to disorderly conduct involving a public brawl with two men. He paid a fine of $75 and adjudication of guilt was withheld. Employment screening at the Florida State Hospital was commenced in 1997 for positions of employment similar to that held by Petitioner. Petitioner's 1980 offense and 1981 plea was overlooked until this year. On or about April 20, 2002, after discovery of the battery offense, a decision was made to remove him from a caregiver position pending resolution of his request for an exemption. With a birth date of January 21, 1960, Petitioner was 20 years of age at the time of his first offense and 21 years of age when he last committed a criminal offense. Several supervisors of Petitioner testified that he was at all times a caring and diligent worker. Those supervisors included Karen Alford (“He was good.”); Freddie Culver (described Mr. Jackson as showing a lot of care and kindness); and Helen Conrad (“Excellent”). The parties stipulated that Julia Thomas and Barry Moore would testify to similar conclusion and opinions as to the quality of Petitioner's employment. Petitioner’s performance appraisals were at least satisfactory.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered granting Petitioner an exemption from disqualification. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of October, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DON W. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of October, 2002.
The Issue Whether the Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction to conduct a formal hearing, under the provisions of Sections 120.569 and 120.57(1), Florida Statutes, if the Petition for Relief was not timely filed pursuant to Sections 760.11(8) and 760.11(4), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a 57-year-old male and a former employee of the Respondent. Respondent is an executive agency of the State of Florida with more than 15 full-time employees and is, therefore, an employer under Sections 760.02(6) and (7), Florida Statutes. On May 19, 1995, Petitioner filed a charge of discrimination with the Florida Commission on Human Relations. He charged his former employer, Respondent, with gender and age discrimination for failure to promote him. The Florida Commission on Human Relations conducted an investigation of the charges. It did not issue a Notice of Determination. The staff of the Commission misled or lulled Respondent into inaction, for a period of time, as follows: Day 0000 - 19 May 1995: Charge of Discrimination submitted to Commission. Day 0061 - 19 July 1995: FCHR Notice of Receipt, Docketing and Dual Filing with EEOC. Day 0110 - 6 September 1995: Respondent submitted response to Commission request for information. Day 0255 - 29 January 1996: Petitioner drove from Orlando to FCHR in Tallahassee and met with Iliana Haddock, who advised him that she had just been assigned to investigate the Discrimination Complaint. Haddock took the opportunity to interview the Respondent relative to the complaint. Day 0312 - 26 March 1996: Telephone conversation between Haddock and Petitioner. Haddock stated that she had reviewed all the applications submitted for the Environmental Manager position and had found evidence of age discrimination. Day 0340 - 23 April 1996: Telephone conversation between Haddock and Petitioner. Haddock stated the investigation was almost complete, but they were waiting for Respondent to submit criteria used for determining who would be interviewed for the Environmental Manager position. Day 0431 - 23 July 1996: Petitioner drove from Orlando to FCHR headquarters in Tallahassee and met with Haddock and her supervisor, Harry Lamb. They told Petitioner that Haddock's investigation was completed and that her report would be submitted to Lamb in 30 to 45 days and from there Lamb would submit it to the FCHR legal staff and then it would go to the Executive Director for his approval and determination. Day 0494 - 24 September 1996: Assistant Enforcement Director Singleton sent Petitioner a letter stating that the Commission had not been able to complete the investigation in this case and stated four options of proceeding, (1) file a civil action in civil court; (2) file petition to have case heard by ALJ in DOAH; (3) request a right to sue so I could bring an action in Federal Court; or (4) allow the commission to continue with the processing, investigation and final action in this matter. Day 0509 - 9 October 1996: Petitioner responded to Singleton's letter by pointing out the contradictions between her letter and what Petitioner had been told at the meeting with Haddock and Lamb on 7/23/96. Petitioner requested more information in order to make a decision concerning the future course of this case. Petitioner submitted 11 questions to Singleton. Day 0521 - 21 October 1996: Commission Investigator Iliana Haddock submitted her report to the FCHR Office of General Counsel. Day 0573 - 12 December 1996: Petitioner sent follow-up letter to FCHR Executive Director advising him that he had not received a reply to the 10/9/96 letter to Singleton. Day 0644 - 21 February 1997: Mathis sent Petitioner a letter about the status of the original complaint of discrimination. Mathis stated that Haddock had submitted her report of investigation, with a recommendation for a cause finding to Harry Lamb; that Haddock was no longer with the Commission; that Lamb was no longer with the Commission but had not forwarded the investigation report before he left; and that the report was now in the hands of Otis Mallory. Day 0795 - 22 July 1997: Mathis sent Petitioner a letter advising that the "initial charge is still located in Mr. Mallory's office and will be reviewed." Day 0805 - 1 August 1997: Assistant Director Snell sent Petitioner a letter stating: "The investigation of your first case has been completed and is in the Employment Enforcement Manger's office for review". Day 0809 - 5 August 1997: The EEOC State and Local Coordinator advised Petitioner by letter that the cases were still being processed by the FCHR. Day 0852 - 27 September 1997: Petitioner sent letter to FCHR Executive Director advising him that Otis Mallory had Discrimination Report for almost a year; that Mallory also had received the Retaliation Report in August 1997; and since Mallory now had both reports, he ought to be able to complete his review and move this matter forward. Day 0986 - 29 January 1998: Petitioner sent letter to FCHR Executive Director attempting to get Investigators' Reports through the internal FCHR review system. Day 1076 - 29 April 1998: Commission issued Notice of Determination on Retaliation Complaint. No action on original discrimination complaint. Day 1252 - 22 October 1998: Petitioner mailed Petition for Relief and Administrative Hearing concerning Discrimination Complaint to FCHR. After filing the Complaint of Discrimination with the FCHR, Petitioner actively pursued the progress and status of the Discrimination Complaint with the Commission. In response to his pursuit, the staff of the Commission told the Petitioner throughout the above time-line, that his Complaint was being investigated; the investigation was completed; the report would be submitted; the report was submitted; the report was in for review; and the report would be reviewed. Thus, the Petitioner was misled or lulled into believing by the staff of FCHR not only that the Complaint was going to result in a Determination, but also that the Determination was going to be a cause-finding. On September 24, 1996, a year and four months after filing the Complaint, the Commission advised Petitioner that he had four options relating to the charges, including having the Commission continue with the processing, investigation, and final action in this matter. When Petitioner requested further information so he could make an informed choice, the staff of the Commission failed to respond to his letter. In addition, other staff took no further action on his case. However, Petitioner waited more than two years from issuance of the letter of September 24, 1996, to the filing of his Petition for Relief, dated October 22, 1998. Although Petitioner was misled or lulled into inaction for a period of time by the staff of the FCHR, the Petitioner has failed to demonstrate equitable estoppel or excusable neglect in his failure to file the Petition within a reasonable period of time after the statutorily mandated time limit.
Conclusions The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction on the parties and the subject matter pursuant to Sections 120.569, 120.57(1) and 760.11, Florida Statutes. The Florida Commission on Human Relations has the authority to investigate a charge of discrimination with alleges that an employee has committed an unlawful employment practice by its failure to promote Petitioner based on his sex and/or age. Section 760.10(1) and 760.11, Florida Statutes. When a complaint has been filed with the Commission, it has the duty to investigate the allegations in the complaint and make a determination within 180 days of the filing of the Complaint, if there is reasonable cause to believe that a discriminatory practice has occurred in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992. After a determination is made, the Commission is charged with the duty to notify the aggrieved person and the Respondent of the determination, the date of such determination, and the options available under the law. Section 760.11(3), Florida Statutes. In this case, the Commission failed to make a reasonable cause determination; and three and one-half years after first filing his Complaint, Petitioner requested a formal administrative hearing under Sections 120.569 and 120.57(1), Florida Statutes. Therefore, Sections 760.11(8), (4) and (6), Florida Statutes, applied to this case. These sections read, in pertinent part: In the event that the commission determines that there is reasonable cause to believe that a discriminatory practice has occurred in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, the aggrieved person may either: Bring a civil action against the person named in the complaint in any court of competent jurisdiction; or Request an administrative hearing under ss 120.569 and 120.57. The election by the aggrieved person of filing a civil action or requesting an administrative hearing under this subsection is the exclusive procedure available to the aggrieved person pursuant to this act. * * * (6) Any administrative hearing brought pursuant to paragraph (4)(b) shall be conducted under ss. 120.569 and 120.57. . . . An administrative hearing pursuant to paragraph (4)(b) must be requested no later than 35 days after the date of determination of reasonable cause by the commission. . . . * * * (8) In the event that the commission fails to conciliate or determine whether there is reasonable cause on any complaint under this section within 180 days of the filing of the complaint, an aggrieved person may proceed under subsection (4), as if the commission determined that there was reasonable cause. Although it appears unjust that Petitioner's case should be dismissed because of the failure of a state agency to complete its statutory duty to make a reasonable cause determination, nevertheless, the court in Milano v. Moldmaster, Inc., 703 So. 2d 1093 at 1094 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997) held that the 35-day limitation on requesting an administrative hearing begins to run at the expiration of the 180-day period in which the Commission was to make a reasonable cause determination. Therefore, the Petition for Relief is untimely because it was filed nearly three years after the presumed date of determination of cause by the Commission. See Section 760.11(6), Florida Statutes (1997); Wright v. HCA Central Florida Regional Hospital, Inc., 18 FALR 1160 (1995); Pusey v. George Knupp, Lake County Sheriff's Office, 20 FALR 791 (1997); cf. St. Petersburg Motor Club v. Cook, 567 So. 2d 488 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990) and Milano v. Moldmaster, Inc., 703 So. 2d 1093 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997). This procedure has been determined to be constitutional, under Florida law. McElhath v. Burley, 707 So. 2d 836 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998). The record does establish some evidence of excusable neglect, which might, under certain circumstances, excuse delinquent filing. See, for example, Machules v. Department of Administration 523 So. 2d 1132 (Fla. 1988). In Machules, the Florida Supreme Court described the parameters of the "equitable tolling" doctrine as follows: Generally, the tolling doctrine has been applied when the plaintiff has been misled or lulled into inaction, has in some extraordinary way been prevented from asserting his rights, or has timely asserted his rights mistakenly in the wrong forum. 523 So. 2d at 1134. Petitioner asserts that the staff of the Commission lulled him into inaction. That assertion is accepted as true for purposes of ruling on the Motion for Summary Recommended Order. However, Petitioner is claiming he was lulled into inaction for two additional years after he was advised of his options under the statute. The District Court of Appeal has held that Petitioner may not enjoy a manipulable open-ended time extension which could render the statutory limitation meaningless. It held that a Petitioner should be required to assume some minimum responsibility himself for an orderly and expeditious resolution of his dispute. Milano v. Moldmaster, Inc., supra, at 1095. Although this result is harsh, two other district courts have followed this precedent and it is, therefore, binding on this tribunal. Joshua v. City of Gainesville, So. 2d , 1999 WL 71523 (Fla. 1st DCA, February 17, 1999) and Adams v. Wellington Regional Medical Center, Inc., So. 2d , (Fla. 4th DCA, March 17, 1999).
Recommendation Based on the foregoing facts and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered dismissing with prejudice the petition of Donald A. Garrepy in DOAH Case No. 98-5090; FCHR Case No. 95-5752. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of April, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of April, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Gary C. Smallridge, Senior Attorney Department of Environmental Protection 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Mail Station 600 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 Donald A. Garrepy Post Office Box 276 Portsmouth, New Hampshire 03802 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Dana Baird, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149
The Issue Whether Petitioner abandoned her position of employment with Respondent and resigned from the career service.
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Petitioner was employed the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (DHRS) at South Florida State Hospital (SFSH) as a Human Services Worker I, a career service position. Petitioner was absent without authorized leave or explanation on February 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, and 13, 1991. Petitioner was not at work on February 11 and 12, 1991, but those were scheduled days off. On February 13, 1991, David A. Sofferin, Hospital Administrator at SFSH, notified Petitioner by letter that DHRS had no choice but "... to consider you to have abandoned your Human Services Worker I position and resigned from the State of Florida Career Service at South Florida State Hospital. ..." This letter also advised Petitioner of her right to challenge this action. Petitioner wrote DHRS a letter which was received by DHRS on February 25, 1991. In this letter Petitioner admitted that she had violated the personnel rules and asked for a second chance. Petitioner's letter stated that she had been abducted by a boyfriend on February 11, 1990 (sic), 1/ and taken to Bradenton. The letter did not attempt to explain her absences on February 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10. 1991. Petitioner was provided a copy of DHRS' Employee Handbook on April 20, 1990. Petitioner had been previously advised of Respondent's attendance policies and she had been previously reprimanded for failing to adhere to those policies. The following is found on page 13 of the Employee Handbook under the paragraph entitled "Absences": If you expect to be absent from work for any reason, you must request leave from your supervisor as much in advance as possible, so that suitable disposition of your work may be made to avoid undue hardship on fellow employees and clients. As soon as you know you will be late or absent from work you must notify your supervisor. Absences without approved leave is cause for disciplinary action. If you are absent for three consecutive workdays without authorization, you may be considered to have abandoned your position and thus resigned. (Emphasis added.) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction over this matter. Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes. Rule 22A-7.010(2)(a), Florida Administrative Code, provides, in pertinent part, as follows: An employee who is without authorized leave of absence for 3 consecutive workdays shall be deemed to have abandoned the position and to have resigned from the career service . ... . The foregoing rule creates a rebuttable presumption. DHRS has established that Petitioner was absent without authorized leave so that she is rebuttably presumed to have abandoned her position of employment and to have resigned from the career service. Petitioner has failed to rebut that presumption.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered which finds that Petitioner, Carol Wheeler, has abandoned her position of employment with the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services and which further finds that she has resigned from the career service. DONE AND ORDERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 13th day of November, 1991. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of November, 1991.
