The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner is liable for the sales and use tax assessment issued by Respondent on February 21, 1995.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: In this proceeding, Respondent, Department of Revenue (DOR), has issued a proposed sales and use tax assessment in the amount of $24,546.54, plus $6,640.12 in penalties, plus interest from the date of the assessment, against Petitioner, Florida Truck Dock Company (Petitioner or taxpayer). As of March 20, 1997, the assessment totaled $55,195.27, and it continues to increase by $8.07 each day. The assessment constitutes taxes, penalties, and interest allegedly due from Petitioner for various materials and supplies purchased by Petitioner for use in the performance of real property contracts for Petitioner's customers. In its response to the assessment, Petitioner denied that it owed the money. Petitioner's business activities consisted primarily of purchasing truck loading dock equipment from suppliers, principally Kelly Company, Inc. (Kelly), and then installing such equipment as an improvement to real estate. Its records indicate that purchased equipment was generally brought into Florida and installed in real property in the state under a contract whereby parts and labor were furnished for one lump sum contract price. The foregoing contracts were Class A or lump sum contracts within the meaning of Rule 12A-1.051(2)(a), Florida Administrative Code. Class A contracts are considered contracts for the improvement of real estate, not contracts for the resale of tangible personal property. In addition, when the equipment was purchased, Petitioner had not issued resale certificates to its vendors. Under these circumstances, Petitioner was properly treated as an end-user of the equipment in question and owed use taxes on all such purchases of tangible personal property. This controversy began on March 30, 1992, when DOR issued a Notification of Intent to Audit Books and Records of the taxpayer in conjunction with a routine audit. The notice requested that Petitioner make available various corporate records pertaining to its sales and use tax and intangible tax liability. However, only the sales and use tax is in issue here. DOR later advised the taxpayer that the audit period would run from March 1, 1987, through February 29, 1992, and that instead of a detailed audit, only a three-month sampling of the full audit period would be necessary. An initial audit revealed that Petitioner was entitled to a refund. None was given, however, because of information supplied by an employee of the taxpayer regarding the possible destruction and alteration of certain records by the taxpayer, and the auditor's conclusion that a three-month sampling of the records was not representative for the full five-year audit period. In addition, the auditor concluded that the results of the sample period were not reasonable. For these reasons, the scope of the audit was expanded. The auditor then requested, among other things, that copies of all sales (summary) journals for the entire five-year period be produced. Although Petitioner has always contended that these journals were merely "commission" journals for transactions between its vendors and customers, the auditor's finding that they are records of cash transactions is consistent with the language on the face of the journals, referring to "deposits" and "total deposits." Further, a comparison of the journals with Petitioner's own bank statements confirms this finding. At least twelve months of the records were missing, and the taxpayer agreed to recreate the missing records. Once a copy of all journals (both original and recreated) was produced, the auditor tested their validity and then made various audit adjustments, which are reflected on Schedule A-2 of Exhibit 5. In those instances where inadequate cost price information concerning equipment purchases was provided by the taxpayer, the auditor properly used estimates in making his adjustments. The tax liability for each taxable transaction was recorded by the taxpayer under Account 367 on the sales journals. The auditor then examined the source documents (original invoices) to verify the accuracy of the recorded amounts. These numbers were then compared with the taxes paid by the taxpayer on its monthly tax returns filed with DOR. This comparison produced a deficiency which represents approximately 75 percent of the total assessment. However, in those instances where Petitioner collected sales tax from its customers, and remitted the same to DOR, Petitioner was not assessed with a tax for those same items. A sampling of the audit period established that Petitioner also had a number of lump-sum contracts with various governmental customers on which it neither paid taxes to the vendor when the equipment was purchased, nor did it collect taxes from the end-user when the equipment was resold. Thus, it was responsible for the use taxes on these transactions. The deficiency is detailed on Schedule B-3 of the final audit report (Exhibit 6), and it accounts for approximately 14 percent of the total assessment. The remaining part of the assessment is related to four miscellaneous transactions which are unrelated to the sales journals. Two of the transactions occurred during the short period of time when the service tax was in effect in 1987, while the remaining two relate to small purchases of equipment and supplies by the taxpayer for its own consumption. There was no evidence that the taxpayer paid the taxes due on these transactions. DOR met with the taxpayer, its accountant, and its original counsel on various occasions in an effort to obtain more documentation favorable to the taxpayer's position. In most cases, the taxpayer refused to provide more records. At one meeting, however, the taxpayer produced additional source documents (invoices) that appeared to be altered from the original invoices previously given to the auditor. These are shown in Exhibit 7 received in evidence. When asked by the auditor for copies of the same invoices sent to customers so that the discrepancy could be resolved, the taxpayer refused to comply with this request. During the audit process, the taxpayer contended that its primary supplier, Kelly, had already paid taxes on a number of the transactions. No documentation was produced, however, to support this contention. It also complained that there was bias on the part of DOR's auditor. As to this contention, the record shows that the auditor had no relationship with the taxpayer prior to this audit, and for the intangible personal property tax, the auditor's field work actually resulted in a refund for Petitioner. Finally, the taxpayer contended that rather than using the originally supplied records, the auditor should have used Petitioner's recreated or altered records in making the audit adjustments. This latter contention has been rejected.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Revenue enter a final order sustaining its original assessment against Petitioner. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of November, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of November, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Linda Lettera, Esquire Department of Revenue 204 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100 Jeffrey M. Dikman, Esquire Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol, Tax Section Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Benjamin K. Phipps, Esquire Post Office Box 1351 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 L. H. Fuchs, Executive Director Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: Background Petitioner, Gainesville Amateur Radio Society, Inc. (GARS or petitioner), a Florida non-profit corporation, was incorporated on December 31, 1975. Its stated purpose is to promote an interest in amateur radio operation. Among other things, GARS provides preparation for Federal Communication Commission licensing examinations, supports community activities with free communication services, and encourages public awareness of ham radio activities through the publication of a monthly newsletter called the GARS-MOUTH. Respondent, Department of Revenue (DOR), is charged with the responsibility of administering and implementing the Florida Revenue Act of 1949, as amended. It has the specific task of collecting sales taxes and enforcing the state tax code and rules. By law, certain transactions are exempt from the state sales and use tax. Among these are sales or lease transactions involving "scientific organizations." In order for an organization to be entitled to an exemption, it must make application with DOR for a consumer's certificate of exemption and demonstrate that it is a qualified scientific organization within the meaning of the law. Once the application is approved, the certificate entitles the holder to make tax exempt purchases that are otherwise taxable under Chapter 212, Florida Statutes. In the case of petitioner, a certificate would enable it to save a hundred or so dollars per year. Claiming that it was entitled to a certificate of exemption as a charitable organization, GARS filed an application with DOR on December 21, 1993. After having the application preliminarily disapproved by DOR on the ground it did not expend "in excess of 50.0 percent of the . . . organization's expenditures toward referenced charitable concerns, within (its) most recent fiscal year," a requirement imposed by DOR rule, GARS then amended its application to claim entitlement on the theory that it was a scientific organization. Although DOR never formally reviewed the amended application, it takes the position that GARS still does not qualify for a certificate under this new theory. Is GARS a Scientific Organization? Under Section 212.08(7)(o)2.c., Florida Statutes, a scientific organization is defined in relevant part as an organization which holds a current exemption from the federal income tax under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. A DOR rule tracks this statute almost verbatim. Accordingly, as a matter of practice, in interpreting this statutory exemption, DOR simply defers to the final determination of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). If the IRS grants an organization a 501(c)(3) status based on the determination that it is a scientific organization, then DOR accepts this determination at face value. DOR does not make an independent determination whether the organization is "scientific" or question the decision of the IRS. This statutory interpretation is a reasonable one and was not shown to be erroneous or impermissible. GARS received a federal income tax exemption from the IRS regional office in Atlanta, Georgia by letter dated August 12, 1993. The record shows that GARS was granted an "exempt organization" status as a "charitable organization" and as an "educational organization" under Treasury Regulation Section 1.501(c)(3). However, GARS did not receive an exempt status as a "scientific organization" nor did the IRS make that determination. Therefore, GARS does not qualify as a scientific organization within the meaning of the law. While petitioner submitted evidence to show that it engages in what it considers to be a number of scientific endeavors, these activities, while laudable, are irrelevant under Florida law in making a determination as to whether GARS qualifies for a sales tax exemption as a scientific organization. Therefore, the application must be denied.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that respondent enter a final order denying petitioner's application for a consumer certificate of exemption. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of June, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of June, 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 94-1200 Petitioner: 1-2. Partially accepted in finding of fact 4. 3. Partially accepted in finding of fact 6. 4. Partially accepted in finding of fact 1. 5. Rejected as being irrelevant. 6. Rejected as being unnecessary. 7. Partially accepted in finding of fact 5. 8-9. Partially accepted in finding of fact 7. 10. Partially accepted in finding of fact 5. 11. Partially accepted in finding of fact 7. 12. Partially accepted in finding of fact 6. 13. Rejected as being unnecessary. 14. Partially accepted in finding of fact 6. Respondent: 1. Partially accepted in finding of fact 1. 2. Partially accepted in finding of fact 2. 3. Rejected as being unnecessary. 4. Rejected as being cumulative. 5-12. Partially accepted in finding of fact 7. 13-14. Partially accepted in finding of fact 4. 15. Partially accepted in finding of fact 3. 16. Covered in preliminary statement. 17. Partially accepted in finding of fact 4. 18-19. Partially accepted in finding of fact 6. 20-21. Rejected as being unnecessary. 22. Partially accepted in finding of fact 5. 23-24. Partially accepted in finding of fact 6. Note - Where a proposed finding has been partially accepted, the remainder has been rejected as being irrelevant, unnecessary for a resolution of the issues, not supported by the evidence, cumulative, subordinate, or a conclusion of law. COPIES FURNISHED: Mr. Larry Fuchs Executive Director Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0100 Linda Lettera, Esquire General Counsel Department of Revenue 204 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0100 Sidney Schmukler, Esquire 3922 N. W. 20th Lane Gainesville, Florida 32605-3565 Olivia P. Klein, Esquire Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol-Tax Section Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioners are liable for the sales and use tax audit assessment and charter transit system surtax audit assessment, as reflected in Respondent's Notices of Reconsideration dated March 17, 1998.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: From 1988 through 1993, Petitioner, Dane W. Lucas (Lucas), operated the Annabelle Lee, a cruise boat, under the name of River Entertainment. On January 1, 1994, Lucas incorporated his business under the name of River Cruises, Inc. (the corporation), which is also a Petitioner in this cause. In 1996, Respondent, Department of Revenue (DOR), conducted an audit of the records of both Petitioners to determine whether all sales and use taxes and charter transit system surtaxes had been properly reported and paid. As a result of the audit, DOR issued two proposed assessments dated January 28, 1997, against Lucas individually and two assessments dated July 22, 1997, against the corporation. However, the latter two assessments reflect the combined liability of both Lucas individually as well as the corporation and cover the five-year audit period from March 1, 1990, through February 28, 1995. After a protest letter was filed by Petitioners, DOR issued two Notices of Reconsideration on March 17, 1998. As to Lucas individually, the Notice of Reconsideration reflects that as of March 11, 1998, he owed $44,083.56 for sales and use taxes, with interest to accrue from that date at the rate of $7.26 per day. It further asserted that he owed $3,290.35 in charter transit system surtaxes as of the same date, with interest to accrue at the rate of $.058 per day. As to the corporation, the Notice of Reconsideration reflects that as of March 11, 1998, it was liable for $17,906.53, with interest to accrue as of March 11, 1998, at the rate of $2.97 per day. Also, it asserts that as of March 11, 1998, the corporation was liable for $5,839.94 for charter transit system surtaxes, with interest to accrue at the rate of $0.25 per day. On April 24, 1998, Petitioners remitted a check in the amount of $9,626.92, which represented what they believed was the proper tax assessment. As to the remaining portion, they deny that any moneys are owed; alternatively, they have requested that the amounts be compromised on the basis that they have no ability to pay the amount claimed by DOR.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Revenue enter a final order sustaining its original assessment against Petitioner. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of July, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of July, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Linda Lettera, General Counsel Department of Revenue 204 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100 Eric J. Taylor, Esquire Department of Legal Affairs 28 West Central Boulevard, Suite 310 Orlando, Florida 32801 Dane W. Lucas 1511 Montana Avenue Jacksonville, Florida 32207-8642 Larry Fuchs, Executive Director Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100
The Issue The issues in this bid protest are, first, whether, as Petitioner alleges, Intervenor's failure to attach copies of "occupational licenses" to its proposal was a deviation from the requirements of the Request for Proposal; second, whether any such deviation was material; and third, whether Respondent's preliminary decision to award Intervenor the contract at issue was clearly erroneous, arbitrary or capricious, or contrary to competition.
Findings Of Fact On September 18, 2009, Respondent Department of Transportation ("Department") issued Request for Proposal No. RFP-DOT-09/10-4007FS (the "RFP"). Through the RFP, which is entitled, "Treasure Coast Road Ranger Service Patrol," the Department solicited written proposals from qualified providers who would be willing and able to perform towing and emergency roadside services on Interstate 95 in Martin County, St. Lucie County, and Indian River County. The Department intended to award a three-year contract to the "responsive and responsible Proposer whose proposal is determined to be the most advantageous to the Department." The Department anticipated that the contract would have a term beginning on December 1, 2009, and ending on November 31, 2012. The annual contract price was not to exceed $1.59 million. Proposals were due on October 13, 2009. Four firms timely submitted proposals in response to the RFP, including Petitioner Sunshine Towing @ Broward, Inc. ("Sunshine") and Intervenor Anchor Towing and Marine of Broward, Inc. ("Anchor"). An evaluation ensued, pursuant to a process described in the RFP, during which the Department rejected two of the four proposals for failing to meet minimum requirements relating to technical aspects of the project. As a result, Sunshine and Anchor emerged as the only competitors eligible for the award. Sunshine offered to perform the contractual services for an annual price of $1,531,548. This sum was less than the price that Anchor proposed by $46,980 per year. Despite Sunshine's lower cost, Anchor nevertheless edged Sunshine in the final score, receiving 92.86 points (out of 100) from the Department's evaluators, to Sunshine's 87.75. On November 30, 2009, the Department duly notified the public of its intent to award the contract to Anchor. Sunshine promptly initiated the instant protest, whereby Sunshine seeks to have Anchor's proposal disqualified as nonresponsive, in hopes that the Department will then award the contract to Sunshine as the highest-ranked (indeed the sole) responsive proposer. Sunshine alleges that Anchor's proposal failed to conform strictly to the specifications of the RFP, principally because Anchor did not attach copies of its "occupational licenses" to the proposal. Anchor insists that its proposal was responsive but argues, alternatively, that if its proposal deviated from the specifications, the deviation was merely a minor irregularity which the Department could waive. Anchor further contends that Sunshine's proposal contains material deviations for which it should be deemed nonresponsive. The Department takes the position that Anchor's failure to attach "occupational licenses" was a minor irregularity that could be (and was) waived.1 The RFP includes a "Special Conditions" section wherein the specifications at the heart of this dispute are located. Of particular interest is Special Condition No. 8, which specifies the qualifications a provider must have to be considered qualified to perform the services called for under the contract to be awarded. Special Condition No. 8 provides as follows: QUALIFICATIONS General The Department will determine whether the Proposer is qualified to perform the services being contracted based upon their proposal demonstrating satisfactory experience and capability in the work area. The Proposer shall identify necessary experienced personnel and facilities to support the activities associated with this proposal. Qualifications of Key Personnel Those individuals who will be directly involved in the project should have demonstrated experience in the areas delineated in the scope of work. Individuals whose qualifications are presented will be committed to the project for its duration unless otherwise excepted by the Department's Project Manager. Where State of Florida registration or certification is deemed appropriate, a copy of the registration or certificate should be included in the proposal package. Authorized To Do Business in the State of Florida In accordance with sections 607.1501, 608.501, and 620.169, Florida Statutes, foreign corporations, foreign limited liability companies, and foreign limited partnerships must be authorized to do business in the State of Florida. Such authorization should be obtained by the proposal due date and time, but in any case, must be obtained prior to the posting of the intended award of the contact. For authorization, [contact the Florida Department of State].[2] Licensed to Conduct Business in the State of Florida If the business being provided requires that individuals be licensed by the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, such licenses should be obtained by the proposal due date and time, but in any case, must be obtained prior to the posting of the intended award of the contract. For licensing, [contact the Florida Department of Business and Professional Regulation]. References and experience must entail a minimum of three (3) years of experience in the towing industry in Florida. NOTE: Copies of occupational licenses must also be attached to the back of Form 'F'. (Boldface in original.) Special Condition No. 19, which defines the term "responsive proposal," provides as follows: RESPONSIVENESS OF PROPOSALS Responsiveness of Proposals Proposals will not be considered if not received by the Department on or before the date and time specified as the due date for submission. All proposals must be typed or printed in ink. A responsive proposal is an offer to perform the scope of services called for in this Request for Proposal in accordance with all the requirements of this Request for Proposal and receiving fifty (50) points or more on the Technical Proposal.[3] Proposals found to be non-responsive shall not be considered. Proposals may be rejected if found to be irregular or not in conformance with the requirements and instructions herein contained. A proposal may be found to be irregular or non-responsive by reasons that include, but are not limited to, failure to utilize or complete prescribed forms, conditional proposals, incomplete proposals, indefinite or ambiguous proposals, and improper and/or undated signatures. (Emphasis and boldface in original.) In the "General Instructions to Respondents" section of the RFP there appears the following reservation of rights: 16. Minor Irregularities/Right to Reject. The Buyer reserves the right to accept or reject any and all bids, or separable portions thereof, and to waive any minor irregularity, technicality, or omission if the Buyer determines that doing so will serve the State's best interests. The Buyer may reject any response not submitted in the manner specified by the solicitation documents. Anchor did not attach copies of any "occupational licenses" to the back of Form 'F' in its proposal. Anchor contends that it did not need to attach such licenses because none exists. This position is based on two undisputed facts: (1) The Florida Department of Business and Professional Regulation ("DBPR") does not regulate the business of providing towing and emergency roadside assistance; therefore, neither Anchor nor Sunshine held (or could hold) a state-issued license to operate, and neither company fell under DBPR's regulatory jurisdiction. (2) The instrument formerly known as an "occupational license," which local governments had issued for decades, not for regulatory purposes but as a means of raising revenue, is presently called (at least formally) a "business tax receipt," after the Florida Legislature, in 2006, amended Chapter 205 of the Florida Statutes, changing the name of that law from the "Local Occupational License Tax Act" to the "Local Business Tax Act." See 2006 Fla. Laws ch. 152. Sunshine asserts that the terms "occupational license" and "business tax receipt" are synonymous and interchangeable, and that the RFP required each offeror to attach copies of its occupational licenses/business tax receipts to the proposal. Sunshine insists that Anchor's failure to do so constituted a material deviation from the specifications because, without such documentation, the Department could not be sure whether an offeror was authorized to do business in any given locality. Sunshine presses this argument a step further based on some additional undisputed facts. As it happened, at the time the proposals were opened, Anchor held a local business tax receipt from the City of Pembroke Pines, which is the municipality in which Anchor maintains its principal place of business. Anchor had not, however, paid local business taxes to Broward County when they became due, respectively, on July 1, 2008, and July 1, 2009. Anchor corrected this problem on December 14, 2009, which was about two weeks after the Department had posted notice of its intent to award Anchor the contract, paying Broward County a grand total of $248.45 in back taxes, collection costs, and late penalties. As of this writing, all of Anchor's local business tax obligations are paid in full. Sunshine contends, however, that during the period of time that Anchor's Broward County business taxes were delinquent, Anchor was not authorized to do business in Broward County and hence was not a "responsible" proposer eligible for award of the contract. In support of this proposition, Sunshine relies upon Section 20-15 of the Broward County, Florida, Code of Ordinances ("Broward Code"), which states: Pursuant to the authority granted by Chapter 205, Florida Statutes, no person shall engage in or manage any business, profession or occupation, as the same are contemplated by Chapter 205, Florida Statutes, unless such person first obtains a business tax receipt as required by this article, unless other exempt from this requirement . . . . On this latter point regarding Anchor's authority to operate in Broward County, Sunshine appears to be correct, at least in a narrow legal sense. It is abundantly clear, however, and the undersigned finds, that, as a matter of fact, Anchor was never in any danger of being shut down by the county. Indeed, even under the strict letter of the local law, Anchor was entitled to continue operating in Broward County unless and until the county took steps to compel the payment of the delinquent taxes. Broward Code Section 20-22, which deals with the enforcement of the business tax provisions, provides: Whenever any person who is subject to the payment of a business tax or privilege tax provided by this article shall fail to pay the same when due, the tax collector, within three (3) years from the due date of the tax, may issue a warrant directed to the Broward County Sheriff, commanding him/her to levy upon and sell any real or personal property of such person liable for said tax for the amount thereof and the cost of executing the warrant and to return such warrant to the tax collector and to pay him/her the money collected by virtue thereof within sixty (60) days from the date of the warrant. . . . The tax collector may file a copy of the warrant with the Clerk of the Circuit Court of Broward County[, which shall be recorded in the public records and thereby] become a lien for seven (7) years from the due date of the tax. . . . Any person subject to, and who fails to pay, a business tax or privilege tax required by this article, shall, on petition of the tax collector, be enjoined by the Circuit Court from engaging in the business for which he/she has failed to pay said business tax, until such time as he/she shall pay the same with costs of such action. There is no evidence suggesting that the county ever sought to enjoin, or that a court ever issued an injunction prohibiting, Anchor from engaging in business, nor does it appear, based on the evidence, that a tax warrant ever was issued, filed, or executed to force Anchor to pay its back taxes. Given the relatively small amount of tax due, the likelihood of such enforcement actions being taken must reasonably be reckoned as slim to none. While paying taxes when due is certainly the obligation of a good corporate citizen, it would not be reasonable, based on the facts established in this case, to infer that Anchor is a scofflaw for failing to timely pay a local tax amounting to about $80 per year. Anchor, in short, was a responsible proposer. Sunshine's other argument has more going for it. The RFP clearly and unambiguously mandated that "occupational licenses" be attached to a proposal. If, as Sunshine maintains, the terms "occupational license" and "business tax receipt" are clearly synonymous, then Anchor's proposal was noncompliant. For reasons that will be explained below, however, the undersigned has concluded, as a matter of law, that the term "occupational license" does not unambiguously denote a "business tax receipt"——at least not in the context of Special Condition No. 8. The specification, in other words, is ambiguous. No one protested the specification or otherwise sought clarification of the Department's intent. The evidence shows, and the undersigned finds, that the Department understood and intended the term "occupational license" to mean the instrument now known as a "business tax receipt." The Department simply used the outdated name, as many others probably still do, owing to that facet of human nature captured by the expression, "old habits die hard." The Department's interpretation of the ambiguous specification is not clearly erroneous and therefore should not be disturbed in this proceeding. Based on the Department's interpretation of Special Condition No. 8, the undersigned finds that Anchor's failure to attach copies of its occupational licenses was a deviation from the requirements of the RFP. That is not the end of the matter, however, for a deviation is not necessarily disqualifying unless it is found to be material. The letting authority may, in the exercise of discretion, choose to waive a minor irregularity if doing so will not compromise the integrity and fairness of the competition. There is no persuasive direct evidence in the record that the Department made a conscious decision to waive the irregularity in Anchor's proposal. Documents in the Department's procurement file show, however, that the Department knew that Anchor's proposal lacked copies of occupational licenses, and in any event this was a patent defect, inasmuch as nothing was attached to the back of Anchor's Form 'F'. It is therefore reasonable to infer that the Department elected to waive the irregularity, and the undersigned so finds. Necessarily implicit in the Department's action (waiving the deficiency) is an agency determination that that the irregularity was a minor one. The question of whether or not Anchor's noncompliance with Special Condition No. 8 was material is fairly debatable. Ultimately, however, the undersigned is unable to find, for reasons more fully developed below, that the Department's determination in this regard was clearly erroneous. Because the Department's determination was not clearly erroneous, the undersigned accepts that Anchor's failure to submit occupational licenses was a minor irregularity, which the Department could waive. The Department's decision to waive the minor irregularity is entitled to great deference and should be upheld unless it was arbitrary or capricious. The undersigned cannot say that waiving the deficiency in question was illogical, despotic, thoughtless, or otherwise an abuse of discretion; to the contrary, once it has been concluded that the irregularity is minor and immaterial, as the Department not incorrectly did here, waiver seems the reasonable and logical course of action. The upshot is that the proposed award to Anchor should be allowed to stand. The foregoing determination renders moot the disputed issues of fact arising from Anchor's allegation that Sunshine's proposal was nonresponsive. It is unnecessary, therefore, for the undersigned to make additional findings on that subject.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a Final Order consistent with its preliminary decision to award Anchor the contract at issue. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of April, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of April, 2010.
The Issue The issue is whether respondent's license as a public adjuster should be revoked, suspended, or otherwise disciplined after his conviction for aiding in the preparation of a false tax return in violation of 26 U.S.C. Section 7206(2).
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that Mr. Lesser be found guilty of violation of Section 626.611(7), Florida Statutes (1987), and that his licensure as a public adjuster be suspended for a period of six months. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 28th day of December, 1989. WILLIAM R. DORSEY, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of December, 1989. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER DOAH CASE NO. 89-0502 Rulings on findings proposed by the Department: 1 and 2. Adopted in finding of fact 3. Adopted in finding of fact 4. Implicit in findings of fact 5 and 6. Adopted in finding of fact 6. Adopted in finding of fact 8. Adopted in finding of fact 8. Adopted in finding of fact 8. Implicit in finding of fact 11. Rulings on findings proposed by Mr. Lesser: 1-11. Inapplicable. Adopted in finding of fact 3. Adopted in finding of fact 3, to the extent necessary. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in finding of fact 5. Adopted in finding of fact 5. Adopted in finding of fact 5, though finding of fact 5 includes certain logical deductions or inferences. Made more specific in findings of fact 5 and 6. Adopted as modified in finding of fact 7. Rejected. Not only were the laundering transactions illegitimate because they allowed Benevento Maneri to mischaracterize the source of their income, they also created false expenses for Lesser and Company, Inc., which artificially lowered the income of Lesser and Company, Inc., by the amount of the expense. Adopted as modified in finding of fact 7. It is difficult to determine what Mr. Lesser actually thought the source of the money was, but he knew it was illicit. See, finding of fact 7. Adopted as modified in finding of fact 8. Adopted as modified in finding of fact 9. 25 and 26. Adopted as modified in finding of fact 9. Adopted as modified in finding of fact 10 The extent of Mr. Lesser's danger cannot be determined from this record, although he was in some danger. Covered in finding of fact 9 Adopted as modified in finding of fact 11. Rejected. See, finding of fact 8. The IRS first contacted Mr. Lesser. He then went to Mr. Weinstein to set matters straight. Adopted as modified in finding of fact 11. Adopted as modified in finding of fact 4. Adopted as modified in finding of fact 12. Adopted as modified in finding of fact 12. A light sentence implies the factors set out in finding of fact 35, were taken into consideration, but does not prove that they were all the reasons the U.S. District Judge took into consideration. To the extent necessary, mentioned in finding of fact 12. Rejected as procedural. 38-51. Covered in findings of fact 13 and 14. The proposed findings are subordinate to the findings made in findings of fact 13 and 14. COPIES FURNISHED: S. Marc Herskovitz, Esquire Robert V. Elias, Esquire Office of Legal Services 412 Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 William W. Corry, Esquire Jack M. Skelding, Jr., Esquire Patrick J. Phelan, Jr., Esquire Parker, Skelding, Labasky & Corry 318 North Monroe Street Post Office Box 669 Tallahassee Florida 32301 Honorable Tom Gallagher State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner Department of Insurance and Treasurer The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Don Dowdell, General Counsel Department of Insurance and Treasurer The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
The Issue Whether Petitioner collected and remitted to the Florida Department of Revenue the correct amount of sales tax on Petitioner's retail sales; and Whether Petitioner remitted to the Florida Department of Revenue the proper amount of sales tax on Petitioner's general and fixed assets purchases and on its commercial lease.
Findings Of Fact Petitioning Taxpayer, Surface Preparation Group, Inc., is a "C" corporation, incorporated in the State of Texas. The Taxpayer's product or service is the sale, service, and rental of surface preparation equipment. The Taxpayer has been registered with the Department since October 7, 1999. By letter dated January 12, 2005, the Department notified the Taxpayer of its intent to audit the Taxpayer's books and records to verify the Taxpayer's compliance with Florida's sales and use tax statutes. The audit period in this case is from December 1, 2001, through November 30, 2004. When the audit started, the Taxpayer had a presence in LeGrange, Georgia. During the course of the audit and negotiations, the Taxpayer removed itself back to its Texas headquarters. Specific records were requested to be made available for the Department's auditor to review. Four subject areas were developed in the audit plan: (1) sales; (2) fixed expense; (3) general expense; and (4) commercial rent. Although the Taxpayer provided some sales data, the information contained therein did not correlate with other information the Department had concerning the Taxpayer's Florida sales. For instance, auditors had traced through general ledgers to Petitioner’s federal tax return and compared the return with the company’s Florida sales and use tax return, and the figures did not correlate. Despite repeated requests by the Department's auditor, the Taxpayer provided no information explaining the reasons for this discrepancy, nor was any information provided regarding the Taxpayer’s general purchases, fixed asset purchases, or its commercial lease expenses. Therefore, in order to complete the audit process, the Department had to use the best information available to estimate the additional tax due on fixed assets, general purchases, and commercial rent. That information in this case consisted of materials provided by the Taxpayer and industry averages and past audit assessments of businesses in similar industries. Because total sales reported by the Taxpayer on its DR-15 monthly sales returns were different than the amounts the Taxpayer reported in response to the audit request, there was no assurance that the reported taxable sales and exempt sales were correct. Accordingly, the Department's auditor disallowed all exempt sales as reported by the Taxpayer. Because the Taxpayer had a location in Polk County, Florida, during part of the audit period, it must have had fixed assets there. This meant that a use tax was due for all the Taxpayer’s purchases in Florida, without credit for sales tax paid to vendors who in many cases were located in Georgia. No information was provided by the Taxpayer for general expenses or rental expenses. Without any information from the Taxpayer for general expenses or rental location, the Department had to proceed differently than it would have normally proceeded. In anticipation of submitting more documents to be analyzed by the Department as part of the audit, Mr. Hillebrand, tax manager for Petitioner, signed, on October 24, 2005, a consent to extend the statute of limitations and time for completing the audit to July 31, 2006. (Exhibit R-2, page 000030). On March 15, 2006, Mr. Schnaible, one of the Taxpayer’s Controllers, signed a consent to extend until December 31, 2006. (Exhibit R-2, page 000029). On September 26, 2006, after analyzing all that had been received from the Taxpayer up to that date, the Department mailed a Notice of Intent to Make Audit Changes (NOI) to Petitioner, along with the work papers supporting the changes, and a letter from the auditor explaining the findings. The amount of tax assessed totaled $197,714.38, and comprised: Schedule A01: Disallowed Exempt Sales $169,994.38; Schedule B01: Estimated Fixed Asset Purchases $10,080.00; Estimated General Expenses: $5,040.00; and Estimated Commercial Rental $12,600.00. Interest accrued through September 26, 2006, totaled $57,353.50. The penalty at that date totaled $49,428.09, bringing the total assessment amount to $304,496.47. The Department’s September 26, 2006, letter offered the Taxpayer another opportunity to provide records if it disputed the auditor's findings, and another option to continue the audit process. (Exhibit R-2, pages 000044 through 000045). On October 25, 2006, Mr. Spomer, Taxpayer’s Controller who eventually signed the Petition and Amended Petition herein, wrote a letter (Exhibit R-2, page 000042) to the auditor stating that he requested to extend the audit and that he would mail back the signed, correct form. Normally, a DR-872e form to extend the statute and audit period must be signed within 30 days of the NOI. In this case, it was signed two months later. Apparently, one such form signed by Mr. Spomer was inadvertently filled-in by the Department with the extension date of "June 30, 2006," (copy attached to Amended Petition). Therefore, a second form was executed by Mr. Spomer on November 1, 2006. This form bears the correct extension date of June 30, 2007. (Exhibit R-2, page 000028). No additional information was provided by the Taxpayer which would change any of the tax amounts identified in the NOI. Therefore, on January 31, 2007, the Department issued it Notice of Proposed Assessment (NOPA). Therein, the amount of tax due remained unchanged. The amount of accrued interest through January 31, 2007, increased to $65,023.73, and the penalty was reduced to zero. The Department currently seeks $262,738.11, with interest accruing on the unpaid tax liability at the statutory rate.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Revenue enter a final order sustaining the Notice of Proposed Assessment dated January 31, 2007. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of December, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of December, 2007. COPIES FURNISHED: Bruce Hoffmann, General Counsel Department of Revenue The Carlton Building, Room 204 501 South Calhoun Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100 Lisa Echeverri, Executive Director Department of Revenue The Carlton Building, Room 104 501 South Calhoun Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100 John Mika, Esquire Office of the Attorney General The Capital - Revenue Litigation Bureau Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Dale Spomer International Surface Preparation Group (Texas), Inc. 6330 West Loop South, Suite 900 Houston, Texas 77401
The Issue Whether the Department of Revenue properly denied Petitioner's March 10, 2000, Application For Refund of Sales and Use Tax, Petitioner having asserted that the Department of Revenue obtained the Closing Agreement through misrepresentation and intimidation.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Tuskawilla Learning Center, is a Florida corporation which operates a private Montessori School in Oviedo, Seminole County, Florida. Petitioner has elected to be an "S" corporation for federal income tax reporting purposes. Tuskawilla Learning Center is owned by its shareholders, Thomas E. Phillips; his wife, Lois; his daughter, Terry Lynn DeLong; and his son-in-law, Daniel F. DeLong. At all times material to this matter, a partnership comprised of the above-named owners of the Tuskawilla Learning Center also owned the real property upon which the Tuskawilla Learning Center operated. In early July 1997, Respondent audited Petitioner's corporate transactions for the period from July 1, 1992, through June 30, 1997, for compliance with sales and use tax and the local government infrastructure surtax. During the audit Petitioner was requested to provide all information and documents which Petitioner felt supported its business activities. Respondent issued a Notice Of Intent To Make Audit Changes on September 25, 1997, which advised Petitioner that the audit revealed that Petitioner had failed to pay use tax on purchases Petitioner made from out-of-state vendors, which Petitioner acknowledged and paid. The audit also revealed that Petitioner failed to pay sales tax on the monthly rental charges that Petitioner paid to the property owner on which the Tuskawilla Learning Center operated. Petitioner did not agree with Respondent's position on the sales tax on monthly rental charges. On October 28, 1997, an audit conference was held in Orlando, Florida, where the tax assessment on the monthly rental charges was discussed. The parties were unable to resolve the issue, and Petitioner requested that the issue be referred to Tallahassee for further review. The review in Tallahassee essentially confirmed the original audit findings, and a Notice of Proposed Assessment was issued on January 26, 1998. Petitioner filed a protest and requested a further review of the Notice of Proposed Assessment. As a result, the entire audit was reviewed, and Petitioner was allowed to provide additional documentation to support its position. On August 4, 1998, Respondent issued a Notice of Decision which essentially confirmed the findings of the original audit. At this point, Petitioner had certain rights of appeal which had to be exercised within specific time limits, or Petitioner could elect to pay the taxes and interest as set forth in a Closing Agreement in which Respondent waived the penalties which had accrued for failure to pay the tax. The various time deadlines passed without Petitioner electing one of the avenues of appeal nor did Petitioner execute the Closing Agreement. After all deadlines for appeal had passed, Petitioner contacted Respondent through an attorney seeking relief. Respondent found no basis for relief but renewed the opportunity for Petitioner to sign the Closing Agreement. On February 5, 1999, Petitioner executed the Closing Agreement and paid $71,693.87 (a $285.31 overpayment). The Closing Agreement clearly states: The taxpayer waives any and all rights to institute any judicial or administrative proceedings, including the remedies provided by ss. 213.21(2)(a) and 72.011(1), F.S., to recover, compromise, or avoid any tax, penalty or interest paid or payable pursuant to this agreement. This agreement is for the sole purpose of compromising and settling taxpayer's liability to the State of Florida . . . This agreement is final and conclusive with respect to the audit assessment or specific transaction/assessment and period described . . . and no additional assessment may be made by the Department against the taxpayer for the specific liability referenced above, except upon showing of fraud or misrepresentation of material fact . . . . On March 10, 2001, Petitioner filed an Application for Refund of the taxes and interest paid with the Closing Agreement. Attached to the Application for Refund was Petitioner's four-page "position paper," which outlined facts and arguments related to the sales tax issue. Petitioner's Application for Refund states that "the State has misled us." The Application for Refund went through the review process. On May 5, 2000, Respondent issued a Notice of Proposed Denial for the refund claim. Petitioner sought an informal review of the proposed refund denial. After an informal review of the proposed refund denial, on June 16, 2000, Respondent issued a Notice of Decision denying Petitioner's Application for Refund. On August 12, 2000, Petitioner forwarded a letter to Respondent, which was interpreted as a request for an administrative hearing to review the decision to deny the Application for Refund which resulted in the instant administrative hearing. Thomas E. Phillips has a Ph.D. in accounting from the University of Nebraska, is a Certified Public Accountant, and had taught accounting at the University of Central Florida for 23 years prior to his retirement. He and his family founded the Tuskawilla Learning Center. On behalf of Petitioner, Dr. Phillips maintains that the tax audit and subsequent review process were "intimidating" and that Respondent "misled" Petitioner. Notwithstanding Dr. Phillips' assertion that the audit and review process were "intimidating," he testified that he found the auditor and her supervisor "not intimidating, but were very pleasant." Dr. Phillips testified about several aspects of the audit and review process and activities that occurred during the audit and review process that he found objectionable. For example, Dr. Phillips testified that Respondent failed to respond to his inquiries in an appropriate way and that Respondent had misinterpreted certain case law that he felt applicable. Nothing offered by Dr. Phillips suggests any impropriety or misrepresentation by Respondent.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that Respondent enter a final order denying Petitioner's Application for Refund. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of April, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JEFF B. CLARK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of April, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Joseph C. Mellichamp, III, Esquire Office of the Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol, Plaza Level 01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 John Mika, Esquire Office of the Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol, Tax Section Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Thomas E. Phillips 1625 Montessori Point Oviedo, Florida 36527 Linda Lettera, General Counsel Department of Revenue 204 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100 James Zingale, Executive Director Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Lloyd Enterprises, Inc. (Lloyd) has requested that it be awarded $22,006.00 in attorney's fees and out-of-pocket expenses of $589.31 for a total of $22,595.31. All fees and expenses listed by Lloyd were incurred in its successful appeal of the adverse decision in its Section 120.57(1) F.S. proceeding challenging the Respondent agency's tax assessment. All fees and costs claimed were incurred during appeal after the recommended and final orders were entered against Lloyd in a formal tax assessment proceeding, Lloyd Enterprises, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, DOAH Case No. 92-2348. The formal tax assessment proceeding arose pursuant to Section 72.011 and Chapter 212 F.S. concerning the balance ($57,471.43) of a greater sales and use tax assessment levied against Lloyd for its alleged failure to pay sales tax on goods and services sold to customers of concession stands on Daytona Beach for an audit period before Lloyd owned and operated the stands. Because Lloyd was unable to provide records of predecessors in interest, the agency estimated tax on the basis of Lloyd's existing records after purchasing the stands. Also, Lloyd was assessed sales taxes (approximately $6,004.38 of the assessed tax liability) for all beach concession fees it had paid to Volusia County during the audit period of 11/1/85--12/31/90, pursuant to Section 212.031, F.S. [1989]. Lloyd's petition for formal hearing before DOAH was a letter previously utilized in the parties' informal negotiations. FDOR moved for a more definite statement and time to file an answer if Lloyd were required to file a more definite statement or a more definite petition. An order dated May 19, 1992 denied the agency's request for more definite statement and provided, in pertinent part, "...As Respondent's motion has observed, an answer in this type of proceeding is not mandatory. Respondent is, however, granted 10 days from the date of this order in which to file an answer should the agency elect to do so." The agency elected to stand on its prior notices of proposed assessment. Therefore, for purposes of this proceeding, the agency's "petition," as contemplated by Section 120.575(5) F.S. is the original tax assessment. The tax assessment proceeding went to formal hearing pursuant to Section 120.57(1) F.S. without any motions to dismiss or for other summary relief filed by either party. The recommended order found in favor of the agency's assessment, with some minor arithmetical adjustments required. The final order adopted the recommended order in toto. Lloyd appealed the final order. In Lloyd Enterprises, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 651 So. 735 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995), decided upon Lloyd Enterprises, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, DOAH Case No. 92-2348, (RO entered by the undersigned Hearing Officer on 4/01/93; FDOR's FO entered 5/24/93), Lloyd argued that Section 212.031, F.S. [1989], had been erroneously applied to the beach concession fees charged by Volusia County and that Section 212.10 [1989] was unconstitutional as applied to Lloyd in this case and that the "projection" method used by FDOR's auditors to determine the amount of taxes due was unauthorized, unreasonable, and arbitrary. FDOR argued that the transfer and annual fees charged by the County to beach concessionaires pursuant to its Unified Beach Code and Ordinance, (Volusia County Ordinance 88-32), constituted rent payments for the various beach locations. The Fifth District Court of Appeal partially agreed with Lloyd and reversed. The court did not reach Lloyd's argument that Section 212.10 F.S. is arbitrary and capricious and, therefore, unconstitutional but did agree with Lloyd that under the facts of this case and the statutory framework, the best estimate provisions of Section 212.12(5)(b), F.S. [1989], could not be invoked to impose liability upon Lloyd as a "successor" dealer. (615 So.2d 735 at 736). The appellate court ruled with regard to the first issue raised on appeal that, The hearing officer erred in deciding it was proper to impose a sales tax on the fees Volusia County charged Lloyd for the privilege of selling and renting goods and services to the public on public beaches and that these privileges constituted taxable events under Rule 12A-10.070 F.A.C. and Section 212.031 F.S.. It ruled further that, The hearing officer arrived at this ruling simply by deferring to the Department's interpretation of the rule and by noting there was no contrary case law. The hearing officer correctly pointed out that deference should be given to an agency's interpretation of its rules and the statutes it is charged to administer. However, the agency's interpretation is subject to review and is not conclusive. (651 So.2d 735 at 736). The court went on to say, We hold that, in exercising the duties imposed on it by the Unified Beach Code, the County did not enter into the business of renting, leasing, or licensing real property. Accordingly, the tax liability assessed on the basis of the concession- aire fees being a license or lease of land is reversed. (651 So.2d 735 at 737) The appellate court also stated that, At the time Lloyd purchased the concessions, neither Lloyd nor the sellers were aware of the duties imposed by Section 212.10 [1989] which imposed on a purchasing or successor dealer the sales tax liabilities of a selling dealer under certain circumstances, and Lloyd concedes it did not comply with the statute. (651 So.2d 735 at 738). The Fifth District Court of Appeal majority opinion criticized the agency for relying solely on Lloyd's own, adequate records for the more current years after Lloyd purchased the concessions which are records not listed in Section 212.12(5)(b) F.S. as usable even if that section were applicable. It further criticized the agency for making no effort to obtain or project--or estimate--sales tax liabilities of the prior concessionaires on the basis of their own records which would have been for the relevant taxable period. However, the appellate court's ultimate ruling on the second issue raised on appeal was that the agency was not entitled to invoke Section 212.12(5)(b) F.S. without showing that Lloyd was guilty of a default listed by the statute. The opinion relies on the fact that, because there was no statutory or regulatory mechanism in place by which Lloyd could have ascertained the prior owners' tax liability, Lloyd, the taxpayer, could not be in default. The court observed the longstanding and frequently reiterated precedent that, "tax laws should be construed strongly in favor of the taxpayer and against the government with all ambiguities or doubts resolved in the taxpayer's favor." The opinion stops short of finding the statute unconstitutional as written or as applied to Lloyd. The foregoing rulings by the appellate court are res judicata for purposes of determining whether or not there was any justiciable issue of law or fact raised by the agency's initial tax assessment. The recommended and final orders appealed from did not reserve jurisdiction to determine entitlement to any fees or costs. The Petitioner made no request for fees and costs to the appellate court and none were awarded. There is no order of the appellate court requiring FDOR or DOAH to award fees or costs. Petitioner makes its claim herein only pursuant to Sections 57.111 and 120.575(5), F.S. The agency has never entered a final order on remand in accord with the decision of the Fifth District Court of Appeal, but clearly, Lloyd ultimately prevailed at the appellate level. Petitioner filed its original fees and costs petition with DOAH within 60 days of the appellate court's mandate. That petition was dismissed by an order herein dated June 28, 1995. The second paragraph of the June 28, 1995 order read, "Petitioner shall have 15 days from date of this order to amend its motion (sic=petition)." The fifteenth day was July 13, 1995. The Amended Petition was served and filed with DOAH on July 14, 1995. Respondent set forth no showing of prejudice by the one day's delay.
The Issue The issue in this proceeding is whether the Florida Corporate Income Tax Code subjects to taxation items realized for federal income tax purposes prior to the effective date of the Code but recognized for federal purposes after the effective date of the Florida Code.
Findings Of Fact In a joint stipulation filed with the Hearing Officer, the parties stipulated to the relevant facts of this proceeding. Findings (1) through (6) listed below are quoted directly from that stipulation of facts. In 1965 MORRIS TRADING CORPORATION (whose name at that time was Morris Grain Corporation) exchanged certain property used in its trade or business with Continental Grain Company for six thousand seven hundred twenty three (6,723) acres of real estate located in Florida a description of which is attached hereto and made a part hereof as Exhibit 1 containing a layout of the ranch acreage acquired by MORRIS TRADING CORPORATION from Continental Grain Company, including the nine hundred fifty eight (958) acre parcel sold in the fiscal year ending in 1968, the one thousand (1,000) acre parcel sold in the fiscal year ending in 1969, and the remaining acreage sold in the fiscal year ending in 1973, as well as a small parcel of property retained by the Corporation. Although MORRIS TRADING CORPORATION realized income for federal tax purposes in 1965 when it exchanged a grain elevator and other property for real estate described on Exhibit 1, the Corporation did not recognize any income for federal tax purposes in 1965 pursuant to Section 1031 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 as amended. The real estate acquired in exchange for the property traded by MORRIS TRADING CORPORATION had a fair market value in 1965 of ONE MILLION SIX HUNDRED THIRTEEN THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED TWENTY AND NO/100 DOLLARS ($1,613,520.00), or TWO HUNDRED FORTY AND NO/100 DOLLARS ($240.00) per acre. The tax cost basis of the property given up by MORRIS TRADING CORPORATION in the exchange was TWO HUNDRED SIXTY SEVEN THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED THIRTY TWO AND SIXTY SIX/100 DOLLARS ($267,832.66). MORRIS TRADING CORPORATION paid TWENTY THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED FIFTY THREE AND FIFTY FIVE/100 DOLLARS ($20,453.55) in cash for the purchase of mineral rights to the four thousand six hundred five (4,605) acres sold during the fiscal year ending in 1973 and there were ONE HUNDRED SIXTY TWO THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED TWENTY TWO AND FIFTY FIVE/100 DOLLARS ($162,522.55) of costs connected with the sale of the property consisting of commissions of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY THREE THREE HUNDRED AND NO/100 DOLLARS ($133,300.00), attorneys fees of EIGHTEEN THOUSAND AND NO/100 DOLLARS ($18,000.00), and documentary" stamps and miscellaneous expenses of ELEVEN THOU- SAND TWO HUNDRED TWENTY TWO AND FIFTY FIVE/100 DOLLARS ($11,222.55). MORRIS TRADING CORPORATION sold four thousand six hundred five (4,605) acres-of the property acquired in the exchange in 1965 during its fiscal year ending May 31, 1973, for a gross sales price of TWO MILLION NINE HUNDRED SIXTY ONE THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED SEVEN AND NINETY SIX/100 DOLLARS ($2,961,807.96). On its Florida corporate income tax return for the fiscal year ending May 31, 1973, Petitioner excluded income from the 1973 sale of the 4,605 acres, although this income was reported as recognized on its federal income tax return. The Respondent, Department of Revenue, issued its proposed deficiency for the 1973 fiscal year assessing Petitioner $121,389.33. This assessment was based upon the gain received by Petitioner for the 1973 transaction, said gain being measured by the difference between the original cost of the property exchanged in 1965 and the adjusted sales price of the property sold in 1973. The Petitioner filed a protest against the proposed deficiency. An informal conference failed to resolve the matter and the Petitioner thereafter filed its petition for an administrative hearing. On August 4, 1976, the parties entered into a joint motion for stay of proceedings pending the Florida Supreme Court's resolution of the case of Dept. of Revenue v. Leadership Housing, Inc. and Leadership Communities, Inc., 343 So.2d 611 (Fla. 1977). Thereafter, a prehearing conference was held to narrow and define the issues, briefs were filed and a hearing was held to receive oral argument on the legal issues involved.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law recited above, it is recommended that the proposed corporate income tax deficiency for the Petitioner's fiscal year ending in 1973 be held invalid. Said deficiency should be recomputed by subtracting from the gross, sales price of the real estate sold in 1973 the amount realized on Petitioner's federal return in 1965, the selling expenses and the purchase of additional mineral rights. Respectfully submitted and entered this 15th day of February, 1978, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE D. TREMOR, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Gerald T. Hart Thompson, Wadsworth, Messer, Turner and Rhodes Post Office Box 1876 Suite 701, Lewis State Bank Building Tallahassee, Florida 32302 E. Wilson Crump, II Assistent Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs Post Office Box 5377 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact Based on the stipulations of the parties, on the exhibits received in evidence, and on the testimony of the witnesses at the hearing, I make the following findings of fact: Petitioner is a state government licensing and regulatory agency, charged with the responsibility and duty to prosecute Administrative Complaints pursuant to the laws of the state of Florida, in particular Section 20.30, Florida Statutes, Chapters 120, 455 and 475, Florida Statutes, and rules promulgated pursuant thereto. Respondent is now and was at all times material hereto a licensed real estate broker in the state of Florida having been issued license number 0120021 in accordance with Chapter 475, Florida Statutes. The last license issued was as a broker at 1170 John Anderson Drive, Ormond Beach, Florida 32074. On November 26, 1986, Respondent signed a plea of guilty to the felony offense of willfully aiding or assisting in the preparation and presentation to the Internal Revenue Service of a false or fraudulent corporation federal income tax return in violation of 26 U.S.C. Sec. 7206(2), as charged in Count 7 of an indictment filed against Respondent and others. The indictment count to which Respondent pled guilty read as follows: That on or about January 13, 1983, in Volusia County, Florida in the Middle District of Florida, NORMA F. NEWFIELD, defendant herein, a resident of Ormond Beach, Volusia County, Florida, did willfully aid and assist in, procure, counsel, and advise the preparation and presentation to the Internal Revenue Service of a U.S. Corporation Income Tax Return, Form 1120, for the fiscal year ending October 31, 1982 for the corporation Aron P. Newfield, D.O., P.A., 255 South Yonge Street, Ormond Beach, Florida, which was false and fraudulent as to a material matter, in that the said corporate tax return represented the gross receipts for the corporation Aron P. Newfield, D.O., P.A., to be $361,366.00 for the fiscal year ending October 31, 1982, whereas, the defendant then and there well knew and believed the gross receipts for the corporation Aron P. Newfield, D.O., P.A., for the fiscal year ending October 31, 1982 were in excess of that heretofore stated; all in violation of Title 26, United States Code, Section 7206(2). On December 15, 1986, in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida, Respondent was found guilty of the felony offense described above. The Judgment And Probation/Commitment Order issued that date included the following disposition: The court asked whether defendant had anything to say why judgment should not be pronounced. Because no sufficient cause to the contrary was shown, or appeared to the court, the court adjudged the defendant guilty as charged and convicted and ordered that the defendant pay a fine to the United States of America in the amount of TWENTY- THOUSAND DOLLARS ($20,000.00). It Is Further Ordered that imposition of a sentence of imprisonment is suspended and the defendant is placed on probation with the probation office of the Court for a period of THREE (3) YEARS under the standing conditions of probation and the Special Conditions that the defendant perform 250 hours of community service and that the defendant serve FIVE (5) DAYS in a jail-type institution reporting to the institution designated by the Bureau of Prisons no later than Noon January 15, 1987. Said institution to be the Seminole County Jail. Following the completion of her 250 hours of community service, Respondent's Probation Officer recommended the Respondent be discharged from probation. By order dated April 21, 1987, the court discharged Respondent from probation. By letter dated May 18, 1987, and received May 20, 1987, counsel wrote to the Florida Real Estate Commission on Respondent's behalf and advised the Commission of Respondent's plea of guilty and of Respondent's conviction. The letter had attached to it copies of the judgment and sentence and the order terminating probation. The letter of May 18, 1987, was the first notification to the Commission by or on behalf of the Respondent regarding her plea of guilty and her felony conviction. The corporation named "Aron P. Newfield, D.O., P.A.," is an incorporated medical practice of Aron P. Newfield, who is Respondent's husband. The corporation named "Aron P. Newfield, D.O., P.A.," is not involved in the business of real estate brokerage.
Recommendation Based on all of the foregoing, it is recommended that the Florida Real Estate Commission issue a final order in this case to the following effect: Dismissing the allegations in Count One of the Administrative Complaint; Finding the Respondent guilty of violation of Section 475.25(1)(f), Florida Statues, as alleged in Count Two of the Administrative Complaint; Finding the Respondent guilty of a violation of Section 475.25(1)(p), Florida Statutes, as alleged in Count Three of the Administrative Complaint; Imposing an administrative fine in the amount of One Thousand Dollars ($1,000.00) for the violation of Section 475.25(1)(f), Florida Statutes; Imposing an administrative fine in the amount of Five Hundred Dollars ($500.00) for the violation of Section 475.25(1)(p), Florida Statutes; and Suspending Respondent's license for a period of three (3) years for the violation of both Section 475.25(1)(f) and Section 475.25(1)(p) DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of September, 1987, at Tallahassee, Florida. MICHAEL M. PARRISH, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of September, 1987. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 87-2571 The following are my rulings on the findings of act proposed by the parties in their respective proposed recommended orders. Findings Proposed by Petitioner The findings of fact in this recommended order contain the substance of all of the findings proposed by Petitioner. Findings Proposed by Respondent Ruling on the findings of fact proposed by Respondent has been complicated by the fact that at pages three through nine of the Respondent's proposed recommended order the proposed findings are intertwined with proposed conclusions of law and legal arguments. I have attempted to glean the proposed facts from the mixture of facts, conclusions, and arguments, and the findings of fact in this recommended order contain the substance of all of the findings of fact proposed by Respondent, except as specifically noted below. Proposed findings regarding Respondents application for restoration of civil rights are rejected as irrelevant. Proposed findings regarding a disgruntled former employee are rejected as irrelevant. Proposed findings regarding Respondents character traits for responsibility, honesty, and integrity are rejected in part because they are irrelevant and also in large part because they are not fully supported by persuasive competent substantial evidence. Most of the testimony about Respondent's character had to do with how generous and kind she was in her personal life rather than how she conducted her business activities. Proposed findings regarding notice to the Commission by Margaret Penoyer are rejected as irrelevant. COPIES FURNISHED: James H. Gillis, Esquire Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 James M. Russ, Esquire Tinker Building 18 West Pine Street Orlando, Florida 32801-2697 Harold Huff, Executive Director Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Tom Gallagher, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 William O'Neil, General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750
