The Issue The issue is whether Respondent properly reclassified Petitioner's position as a Senior Management Analyst Supervisor from career service status to selected exempt status pursuant to Sections 110.205(2)(x) and 447.203(4), Florida Statutes (2001).
Findings Of Fact Petitioner worked for Respondent for approximately 30 years. He was a Board Certified Behavior Analyst and had training as a Risk Manager. During his state employment, Respondent became known as Respondent's expert for the Baker Act, Chapter 394, Part I, Florida Statutes (Baker Act). The Baker Act sets the standard in Florida for determining whether people can be involuntarily examined and treated within public and private mental health facilities. Petitioner's work as Respondent's Baker Act expert involved very independent work. He performed extensive research related to the laws of other states in the mental health area. He analyzed and made recommendations on subjects such as misuse of seclusion and restraints, the absence of documentation or doctor's orders, and the availability of medication upon release from a mental health facility. Petitioner's research and review of national accreditation standards led to the development of standards for state-wide Baker Act procedures and associated clinical care in state-run mental health receiving and treatment facilities. Ensuring compliance with these procedures and/or standards impacted state employees administering state facilities. Petitioner reviewed professional journals to learn federal block grant requirements. Petitioner's research and recommendations often resulted in proposed amendments to state law and associated Florida Administrative Code rules. Petitioner's assignments included answering constituent requests about the Baker Act from stakeholders on behalf of legislators and the Governor's Office. He conducted public hearings on the subject and gathered comments from a variety of sources, including but not limited to, the Florida Psychiatric Society, the Florida Psychological Society, the National Alliance on Mental Illness, the Advocacy Center for Persons with Disabilities, the Florida Council for Community Mental Health, and the Florida Alcohol and Drug Abuse Association. In other words, Respondent relied on Petitioner to answer inquiries about the Baker Act from the following: (a) families with members who have mental illness; (b) Respondent's district staff members; (c) the staff members of private provider agencies; (d) labor unions; (d) trade associations; (e) the judiciary; (f) law enforcement; and (g) legislative staff. To say the least, Petitioner's duties regarding the Baker Act were not of a routine clerical or administrative nature. Sometime after 1997, Respondent reorganized its adult mental health unit into two sections. The state mental health treatment facilities constituted one section consisting of six or seven state-operated or state-contracted facilities for people needing long-term care. The other section consisted of community mental health facilities that provided mental health services to people in communities, including people in crisis or with forensic involvement. After the reorganization, Petitioner worked primarily in the adult community mental health section with private providers. Petitioner worked with Ron Kizirian, his counterpart in the state mental health treatment facilities section. Petitioner used his Baker Act expertise, working as a team with Mr. Kizirian, to coordinate and address all issues state-wide regarding the Baker Act. Respondent's staff generally considered the adult community mental health services to be more progressive in attempting to provide patients with appropriate services. The state institution services were typically characterized as reactive, custodial, and generally, not positive. Petitioner's duties after the reorganization included explaining the things he did in the community side so that the institutional side would understand the concepts and issues. At the time of the reorganization, there were approximately 550 to 600 private, not-for-profit community mental health providers with state contracts. The adult community mental health section managed these contracts. Petitioner's duties included engaging in preliminary contract discussions with private providers, clarifying issues, and generally participating in the development of the contracts and their associated budgets and grants. He also was involved in recommending amendments to the contracts. As a contract manager, Petitioner monitored the activities of private providers. He initiated corrective action procedures. Petitioner's duties included the following: (a) making sure private contractors stayed within their budgets; (b) ensuring that private contractors agreed to performance standards; (c) pre-auditing the vouchers of vendors; and (d) submitting vouchers for payment. Petitioner's job included investigating high profile events on Respondent's behalf. For instance, Petitioner was sent to investigate alleged abuses in crisis stabilization units in Orlando, Florida. Petitioner would then draft a report for his superiors. Petitioner would often represent his superiors in meetings. Petitioner also performed as acting supervisor in the absence of his immediate supervisor. On or about October 1, 2000, Petitioner was a career service employee, serving as an Operations and Management Consultant. On March 6, 2001, Respondent changed the title of Petitioner's position to Senior Management Analyst II and then back to Operations and Management Consultant on the same day. On March 16, 2001, Petitioner's position changed again to Senior Management Analyst II. On June 27, 2001, and effective July 1, 2001, Petitioner's position title was reclassified to Senior Management Analyst Supervisor, a selected exempt service position. Petitioner was serving in that capacity when Respondent terminated his employment on December 3, 2002. Petitioner never supervised any other employees except to the extent that he served as acting supervisor in his immediate supervisor's absence. He signed a performance evaluation on March 27, 2002, indicating that critical elements involving directing leadership, staffing, performance appraisal/feedback and discipline administration did not apply to his performance for the rating period from October 30, 2001, to March 6, 2002. Petitioner performed the same duties and functions before and after reclassification from career service to selected exempt services. At the time of reclassification, Petitioner inquired of his immediate supervisor why Respondent changed his position from career service to selected exempt service. The immediate supervisor referred Petitioner's inquiry to next higher level supervisor who advised Petitioner not to challenge the determination but to "just keep his job." During the discovery phase of this proceeding, Respondent contended that Petitioner's position was reclassified for the following reason: Petitioner's position was reclassified to Select Exempt Service because his position was managerial with [sic] the meaning of Section 447.203(4), Florida Statutes. Petitioner's duties and responsibilities as Senior Management Analyst Supervisor was not of a routine, clerical or ministerial nature and required the exercise of independent judgment and the position also required the Plaintiff [sic] to develop performance guideline for the state mental health facilities, supervise adult mental health staff and facilitate resolution of complex programmatic, management, administrative or regulatory issues affecting state mental health facilities and districts. During the discovery phase of this proceeding, Respondent produced a generic selected exempt service position description for a Senior Management Analyst Supervisor. The position description contains the duties and responsibilities for senior staff in Respondent's state mental health facilities section and Respondent's adult community mental health facilities section. The position description sets forth some of Petitioner's duties relative to the Baker Act for state-wide public and private mental health institutions and/or facilities and relative to other mental health issues in adult community mental health facilities as follows: (a) provides consultation to the state mental health treatment facilities and districts on operational and programmatic mental health system issues; (b) facilitates resolution of complex programmatic, management, administrative or regulatory issues affecting state mental health treatment facilities and districts; (c) develops/coordinates development of performance guidelines for state mental health treatment facilities; (d) reviews/analyzes data and develops written reports as needed; (e) coordinates or participates as a member of various workgroups and project teams to address issues affecting provision of mental health services within the state; (f) assists with negotiating or developing contracts with private providers as needed; (g) prepares various reports and correspondence; (h) assists with the development of budget and rate amendments for mental health entities; (i) develops and utilizes consultant expertise as need in various projects; (j) researches information regarding mental health programs/systems; and (k) provides on-site visits to districts and state facilities to provide technical assistance regarding administrative and/or programmatic issues.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That Respondent enter a final order finding that Petitioner's position of Senior Management Analyst Supervisor was that of a select exempt employee. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of March, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon Country, Florida. S SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of March, 2008. COPIES FURNISHED: Jerry F. Traynham, Esquire Patterson & Traynham 315 Beard Street Tallahassee, Florida 32315-4289 Juan Collins, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Gregory Venz, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204B 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Robert A. Butterworth, Secretary Department of Children and Family Services Building 1, Room 202 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 John J. Copelan, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant facts are found: Treatment resource personnel, as defined in the "Comprehensive Alcoholism Prevention, Control, and Treatment Act," Chapter 396, Florida statutes, are screened in order to establish their good moral character. A person found guilty of certain enumerated offenses is disqualified from employment at a treatment resource which serves unmarried clients under the age of 18 years. In 1979, the petitioner was found guilty of one of the disqualifying offenses listed in Section 396.0425(1), Florida statutes. She was convicted of lewd and lascivious behavior for removing her clothes at a bar. In connection with this offense, she was jailed and her daughter was removed from her custody and was placed in foster care. The Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services is authorized, in certain instances, to grant an exemption to a treatment resource personnel from disqualification from working with children or the developmentally disabled. Section 396.0425(3), Florida Statutes. The petitioner requested such an exemption and appeared before the Department's Exemption Review Committee in November of 1987. The Committee determined that an inconsistent pattern of rehabilitation existed in her case and denied her request for an exemption from disqualification. On or about June 11, 1987, the petitioner entered a plea of guilty to the offense of driving under the influence of alcohol and was placed on probation for a period of one year. Among the terms of her probation were that she refrain from the consumption and possession of alcoholic beverages. In September of 1987, petitioner was adjudicated guilty of trespass in a structure or conveyance, which offense occurred on June 27, 1987. She was ordered to pay restitution and court costs and was placed on probation for six months. Petitioner admits that she has had a problem with alcohol for twenty years. She has no recall of the offenses which occurred in June of 1987, and states that she was in a "total blackout" state on both occasions. In January of 1988, petitioner began attending Alcoholic Anonymous (AA) meetings, often going to two meetings a day. She also attends Junior College and aspires to be a school teacher some day. She states that she realizes that all of her prior problems were alcohol-related. She states that, as of the date of the hearing, March 14, 1988, she has been sober for 49 days. Her daughter confirmed that petitioner was not drinking now, and states that AA has become a big part of their lives.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law recited herein, it is RECOMMENDED that petitioner's request for an exemption from disqualification as a treatment resource personnel be DENIED. Respectfully submitted and entered this 26th day of May, 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE D. TREMOR Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2900 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of May , 1988. COPIES FURNISHED: E.J. Samuel C. Chavers, Esquire Department of HRS District 5 701 94th Avenue North St. Petersburg, Florida 33702 Gregory L. Coler, Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue The issue in the case is whether the allegations of the Administrative Complaint (as limited by the Notice of Limitation of Issues dated June 15, 2004) are correct, and if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact At all times material to this case, the Respondent was a licensed mental health counselor, holding Florida license number ME 5853. In approximately July 2001, the Respondent began to counsel a five-year-old female, allegedly the victim of sexual abuse by an uncle, the brother of the child's mother. The Respondent believed, based on information provided by the father, that the uncle resided with the child's mother. The child's father had custody of the child, and the mother had some type of visitation rights. In approximately November of 2001, the Respondent began counseling the child's father and his girlfriend for various family-related issues. Towards the end of 2001 or early 2002, the father and his girlfriend married. Although the Respondent testified at the hearing that the couple "seemed to have plenty of money to do certain things," including personal care and entertainment expenses, she apparently believed, based on what she was told by the couple, that they had financial difficulties. The couple resided in a home owned by the child's father. Apparently based solely on the couple's representations, the Respondent believed that the father was in arrears on house payments. One of the issues addressed in counseling was the father's concern that, were he to lose his house, the child would be returned to the mother's custody, where the uncle resided. Also apparently based solely on the couple's representations, the Respondent believed that the couple wanted to purchase a new house and that they needed $7,000 to buy the house. In March of 2002, the Respondent loaned the couple $7,000. The couple repaid within a few weeks a total of $9,000 to the Respondent. At the time of the $7,000 loan, the clients owed to the Respondent a balance of approximately $3,200 in unpaid professional fees related to therapeutic services provided to them by the Respondent. The Petitioner asserts that the $9,000 repaid to the Respondent included interest charges of $2,000. Petitioner's Exhibit number one is a copy of a document dated March 20, 2002, and apparently notarized on March 21, 2002. The document appears to require that the couple repay to the Respondent by not later than May 16, 2002, a principal amount of $7,000 plus $2,000 in "interest" for a total of $9,000. The genesis of the document is unclear. At the hearing, the wife testified that the document memorialized the agreement between the Respondent and the couple. The Respondent testified that she did not require preparation or execution of any loan documentation. The Respondent testified that the funds received from the couple included repayment of the loan plus payment of $2,000 towards the unpaid professional fees. Based on the candor and demeanor of the witnesses at the hearing, the Respondent's testimony as to the basis for the payment of the $2,000 is credited. Subsequent to the loan and repayment transactions, the therapeutic situation deteriorated between the Respondent and the couple, particularly as to the wife, who began to believe that the Respondent was romantically involved with the husband. The therapeutic relationship between the couple and the Respondent dissolved acrimoniously within a few months after the loan. At the hearing, the Petitioner presented the expert testimony of Dr. Owen Wunderman, a Florida-licensed mental health counselor, and Dr. Andrew Wenger, a Florida-licensed psychologist. Both testified as to the Florida Statutes and as to ethical standards adopted by the American Counseling Association (ACA) applicable to the fact situation at issue in this proceeding. The Respondent presented the expert testimony Dr. Barbara Herlihy, a professor at the University of New Orleans and a licensed professional counselor in Louisiana and Texas. Dr. Herlihy has been involved with the adoption of the existing ACA standards and has written texts related to the issue of dual relationships in counseling situations. As identified during the hearing, the ACA standards address the issue of dual relationships as follows: Avoid when possible. Counselors are aware of their influential positions with respect to clients and they avoid exploiting the trust and dependency of clients. Counselors make every effort to avoid dual relationships with clients that could impair professional judgment or increase the risk of harm to clients. (Examples of such relationships include, but are not limited to, familial, social, financial, business, or other close personal relationships with clients.) When a dual relationship cannot be avoided, counselors take appropriate professional precautions such as informed consent, consultation, supervision, and documentation to ensure that judgment is not impaired and no exploitation occurs. Both Dr. Wunderman and Dr. Wenger testified that by making the $7,000 loan to her clients, the Respondent entered into a dual relationship (counselor and creditor) with the couple, and that in doing so, the Respondent failed to meet minimum standards of performance in professional activities when measured against generally prevailing peer performance, as well as violated the ACA standards. Dr. Wunderman testified that there was a meaningful risk of non-repayment of the $7,000 loan, given that the clients were several thousand dollars in arrears in paying professional fees, thereby increasing the likelihood that the therapist/creditor would have to take legal action against the clients for repayment, an action likely to impair professional judgment or increase the potential risk of harm to the clients, whether or not legal action was actually initiated. Dr. Herlihy testified that she did not regard the fact situation at issue in this case as a dual relationship because she viewed it as a "one-time" short-term loan and that there was no evidence that the counseling relationship between the parties was harmed. Dr. Herlihy testified that she viewed the situation as a "boundary crossing." Dr. Herlihy acknowledged that short of loaning a client a small sum for cab fare, she was unaware of any mental health counselor making a loan to a client such as occurred in this case. She also acknowledged that she was not familiar with professional performance standards as specifically applied to Florida practitioners. The weight of the evidence establishes that Drs. Wunderman and Wenger are more familiar with the minimum standards of professional performance as measured against generally prevailing peer performance within the State of Florida. The testimony of Dr. Wunderman and Dr. Wenger is credited.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Health enter a final order finding the Respondent has violated Subsection 491.009(1)(r), Florida Statutes (2002), and imposing a fine of $1,000, a reprimand, and a one-year period of probation. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of January, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of January, 2005. COPIES FURNISHED: Ellen M. Simon, Esquire Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin C-65 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3265 William N. Swift, Esquire William N. Swift, Attorney at Law 901 Southwest Martin Downs Boulevard Suite 208 Palm City, Florida 34990 Susan Foster, Executive Director Board of Clinical Social Work, Marriage and Family Therapy & Mental Health Counseling Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin C-08 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 R.S. Power, Agency Clerk Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A-02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 Quincy Page, Acting General Counsel Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A-02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701
The Issue The issues are whether the Respondent should be disciplined under sections 464.204(1)(b) and 456.072(1)(z), Florida Statutes2/; and, if so, the appropriate discipline.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner regulates the practice of nursing and nursing assistants in Florida. The Respondent holds license CNA 140254, which allows her to work as a certified nursing assistant (CNA). She became licensed in 2006 and worked as a CNA at Quality Health Care Center (“Quality Health Care”) in Winter Garden from 2007 through 2016. There is no evidence that the Petitioner was aware of any concerns about the Respondent’s ability to practice as a CNA with reasonable skill and safety until May 2016. In May 2016, the Respondent sent an e-mail to the Petitioner’s Medical Quality Assurance Consumer Services Unit that said: Hi this is Francoise Utegg license # 140254 CNA. I m impossible since 2005 after I bought an house with my husband at 2004 Kruger Dr Modesto CA 95355 Since in the next day we finished repair the house I m impossible they executed me and video track me I face cults culture deaths I’m living an abandoned live people talking inside me it s not in my brain you can verify my work and I never give up to work I found out a gang tracking me to force me to give up my life. I was at work yesterday someone talk in me said I will cheats you, They pushed me down verbal harassing terracing terrified terrorize everywhere I m it s feel like I don’t have any right They say that I m assaulted to take care of children. They dissolution my married and pushed me down they wasting me in nightmares Thanks for your concern. It s can be anyone’s else The Respondent’s intent in sending this e-mail was to do a public service by alerting the Petitioner to the possibility that many other people might come under similar attacks, to the detriment of their health and safety. The result was that the Petitioner immediately began an investigation into the Respondent’s ability to practice with reasonable skill and safety due to a physical or mental illness. The investigation included an interview with the Respondent and an inquiry to the Intervention Project for Nurses (IPN), which reported that the Respondent was not a program participant. In July 2016, the Petitioner ordered the Respondent to undergo a mental and physical examination to determine her ability to practice and the need for IPN. An examination by Jamie Smolen, M.D., was scheduled for February 13, 2017. In December 2016, the Respondent was at work in the dining room at Quality Health Care when she began hearing voices telling her that she was “a domestique,” i.e., in her native Haitian patois, no more than a common house maid. This insulted and angered the Respondent, who was very proud of having passed her licensure examination and worked as a licensed nursing assistant for almost ten years. The Respondent controlled her anger while working with her patients but then began to angrily and loudly dispute what the voices were saying and angrily threw dirty dishes and utensils into a wash tub, which made loud crashing sounds. The family of one of the patients heard and saw this incident and reported it to the administration of Quality Health Care. Quality Health Care investigated the family’s report and required the Respondent to be evaluated and cleared before returning to work. Dr. Smolen examined the Respondent as scheduled on February 13, 2017. He diagnosed schizophrenia, paranoid type, continuous. Schizophrenia is a mental disorder characterized by abnormal social behavior and a failure to understand what is real. Symptoms include: delusions; hallucinations; and disorganized speech. Dr. Smolen recommended that the Respondent did not have reasonable skill and safety to return to practice as a CNA; that she should receive psychiatric medication management; that she should agree to a mental health monitoring contract with IPN; that she should not be allowed to return to work until she demonstrated full compliance with the IPN contract, including medication management and psychiatric follow-up to confirm remission in response to treatment; and that she should be evaluated at that time for recovery status and return to work. Dr. Smolen’s opinion is based in part on information provided to him by the Respondent. She is a Haitian woman, aged approximately 50, who married a Canadian and accompanied him when he returned to Canada in 1996. They moved to Modesto, California, and in 2005 they undertook to renovate a home they purchased there. They worked long and hard. As the repairs were being finished, the Respondent perceived strange things happening to her. She believed something was in the house trying to harm her. She also believed she was under video surveillance and that a remote-controlled device was implanted in her abdomen. She also began to suffer from auditory hallucinations, hearing disembodied voices speaking French creole. She believed the voices may have been spirits, a “gang cult” in the air, or a “satanic legion.” She thought she had been “voodoo-ized.” She suffered physical symptoms, such as weight loss, recurrent headaches, and abdominal pain that she attributed to the implanted device. She also imagined being hit in the face by an invisible hand and an invisible tightening around her hands. The Respondent’s husband did not believe she was cursed, but instead believed she suffered from schizophrenia, and he took her to a doctor for treatment. The Respondent called the doctor a “witch psychologist” who prescribed Risperdal, an anti- psychotic medication. The Respondent thought the dosage she received caused her to “float as though she did not exist” and feel “limp like a snake.” In the Respondent’s mind, this confirmed that she was cursed, not schizophrenic. The Respondent had blood drawn for her examination by the “witch psychologist.” She later saw marks, possibly hematomas, where the blood was drawn. The Respondent interpreted the marks as signs that something evil was happening to her. After what happened to her in Modesto, the Respondent and her husband divorced, and she moved to Orlando, Florida. In Orlando, the Respondent’s abdominal pain persisted. When the Respondent sought medical advice, she was referred to mental health specialists, and the Respondent refused treatment. Not only did she not believe she had a mental illness, she seemed to believe the mental health professionals were part of the “attack” against her by the evil spirits, or whoever or whatever was tormenting her. In 2006, despite her troubles, the Respondent somehow managed to become licensed as a nursing assistant, and managed to get a job as a CNA at Quality Health Care Center. It appears that she held the job for approximately ten years. The Respondent proudly reports that she frequently was asked to work overtime. No testimony or evidence was presented from anyone other than the Respondent concerning her job performance during those ten years. It is possible that her work was uninterrupted by her torments, but not likely, given the Respondent’s self- reporting of some of the incidents during those ten years. The Respondent testified that she has called the police more than ten times over the years to report the harassing voices she hears because she thinks they could harm others, too. The usual police response has been to handcuff the Respondent and transport her to a mental health facility for observation and treatment. Typically, the Respondent refuses treatment or discontinues it after a period of compliance, and the pattern repeats itself. On February 22, 2017, the Respondent was admitted to Aspire Healthcare on an inpatient status. She stayed for five days and was discharged on Zyprexa, an anti-psychotic medication, with clearance to return to work. She returned to work at Quality Health Care shortly after that and was compliant with her medication for a time. There was no evidence of any incidents at work after that. In April 2017, the Petitioner filed an Administrative Complaint against the Respondent alleging her inability to practice as a nursing assistant with reasonable skill and safety by reason of her mental illness and her intentional refusal to comply with recommended treatment. At some point, Quality Health Care was informed about the Administrative Complaint and placed the Respondent on leave from her employment. When the Respondent received the Administrative Complaint in June 2017, she disputed the charges and asked for a hearing. All of this greatly upset the Respondent, who stopped taking her Zyprexa, as futile, and decompensated. A neighbor witnessed bizarre behavior in her home garden and reported her to the police, who handcuffed her and transported her to a mental health facility for observation and treatment. On November 3, 2017, Dr. Smolen re-evaluated the Respondent. His opinion as to the Respondent’s mental illness and ability to practice with reasonable skill and safety did not change. The Respondent denies that she has a mental illness. As a result, she does not recognize the need for treatment or medication or monitoring. Nonetheless, she has shown some willingness to do what is necessary to remove the restrictions on her license so she can return to work, and she claims to have tried to contact IPN, but without success. However, she has not followed through for long before she gets frustrated with how long it takes to get cleared to return to work. When that happens, she stops treatment and medication.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Board of Nursing enter a final order: finding the Respondent to be in violation of section 456.071(1)(z); suspending her license until she enters into a mental health contract with IPN, and appears before the Board to demonstrate, through an evaluation by IPN, that she can practice as a nursing assistant with reasonable skill and safety to patients; imposing such additional conditions and/or probation at the time of reinstatement; and imposing costs of investigation and prosecution. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of February, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of February, 2018.
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner is qualified to take the examination for licensure as a mental health counselor.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner executed an application for licensure as a mental health counselor on June 13, 1989. He filed the application with the Board of Clinical Social Workers, Marriage & Family Therapists, and Mental Health Counselors on July 6, 1989. The application was accompanied by the appropriate fee and disclosed that Petitioner satisfied all of the educational requirements for taking the examination. However, Respondent determined that the application was incomplete because Petitioner failed to show that he had had the requisite clinical experience under the supervision of a qualified person. By letter dated July 17, 1989, Respondent informed Petitioner that his application was incomplete pending receipt of, among other things, documentation of the requisite clinical experience under the supervision of a qualified person. A second letter dated January 17, 1990, from Respondent to Petitioner restated that the application was still missing the items set forth in the prior letter. By Order of Intent to Deny filed April 12, 1990, Respondent informed Petitioner that it was denying his application on the grounds set forth above. Petitioner obtained a master's degree in clinical psychology from the University of Central Florida on December 20, 1985. From October 4, 1985, through October 20, 1988, Petitioner worked full- time as a psychological specialist at the Polk Correctional Institution under the supervision of Gerd Garkisch, Ph.D., who was head of the mental health department at the prison. Petitioner's work qualifies as clinical experience in mental health counseling. Dr. Garkisch does not hold any Florida professional licenses, such as a mental health counselor or psychologist. He is not so licensed in any other state, although he is licensed as a psychologist in Puerto Rico. Dr. Garkisch does not meet the education criteria required for licensure as a mental health counselor. Dr. Garkisch earned a master's degree in clinical psychology, which would otherwise satisfy the educational requirement for licensure as a mental health counselor. However, he received his degree from the Pontifical Catholic University of Rio Grande do Sul, Institute of Psychology, which is located in Brazil. The school is not accredited by an accrediting agency approved by the U.S. Department of Education, Council on Postsecondary Accreditation, or Association of Universities and Colleges of Canada.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department of Professional Regulation deny Petitioner's application for licensure as a mental health counselor. ENTERED this 11th day of October, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of October, 1990. COPIES FURNISHED: Kenneth E. Easley General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792 Linda Biederman, Executive Director Board of Mental Health Counseling 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792 Vytas J. Urba, Staff Attorney Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street, Suite 60 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792 Suresh Paul Pushkarna, pro se 309 Hidden Hollow Court Sanford, FL 32773
The Issue Whether Petitioner's request for exemption from disqualification from mental health personnel employment should be granted pursuant to Section 435.07, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Jack V. Fulford, at the time of hearing, was twenty-nine years old. In June of 1997, he was hired as a member of the mental health personnel at the Heart of Florida Behavioral Center. In order to continue in the position, Mr. Fulford was subject to "level 2 screening," a type of security background check conducted under Chapter 435, Florida Statutes. The background check indicated that Mr. Fulford had been found guilty of a felony prohibited under one of the provisions of the Florida Statutes (or under any similar statute of another jurisdiction) listed in Section 435.04(2), Florida Statutes. It is not clear from the record whether Heart of Florida or the Department notified Mr. Fulford that he was disqualified for employment, but he was so notified. Mr. Fulford then sought an exemption from the disqualification. The Department of Children and Family Services is the licensing agency with discretionary power "to grant to any employee otherwise disqualified from employment [in this case, Mr. Fulford] an exemption from disqualification for . . . [f]elonies committed more than three years prior to the date of disqualification . . .". Section 435.07, Florida Statutes. The Department denied Mr. Fulford's request for the exemption following the recommendation by an Exemption Review Committee that the exemption be granted. An FBI record introduced into evidence shows that Mr. Fulford has a long history of drug and alcohol abuse. Mr. Fulford admitted as much in testimony in which he described in some detail the destructive consequences the abuse has caused to friends, family and himself. His use of drugs and alcohol, begun in high school, continued to the point of unquestionable abuse while he was in the United States Navy, from which he received a discharge classified by the Navy as "other than honorable." Mr. Fulford participated in several programs and different treatment centers after his discharge. Although successfully able to discontinue drug use in the early part of this decade after a fourteen to fifteen-month stint in prison for violation of probation, Mr. Fulford continued to drink. In February of 1997, a conviction for DUI convinced him that he could drink no more. At the time of hearing, Mr. Fulford had been drug and alcohol free for at least 15 months. During that fifteen months he had consumed "no drugs, alcohol or mind- altering substances, whatsoever." (Testimony of Mr. Fulford.) The FBI record introduced into evidence by the Department, although difficult to decipher without any supporting explanation, is full of arrests and convictions suffered by Mr. Fulford since 1987. The only item that reflects an offense that falls within the list for "level 2 screening" is a plea of nolo contendere with a disposition of "guilty/convicted" (Petitioner's No. 1, page 6) for the third degree felony of possession of cocaine. The arrest leading to the disposition occurred on March 2, 1990; the disposition, twenty days later, on March 22, 1990. During his service in the Navy, Mr. Fulford received training in the medical field. He worked as an orderly, emergency room technician, and a mental health facilitator. He was trained in CPR. The only meaningful employment he has enjoyed during his adult life has been in a hospital environment. In one of the treatment programs in which Mr. Fulford participated, one of the steps in the multi-step pdrocess was to participate as a facilitator providing therapy to other patients or participants. Mr. Fulford reached that step. When asked about his work experience, therefore, in the papers reviewed by the Exemption Review Committee, Mr. Fulford listed his "work" as a facilitator for other participants in the abuse program in which he was also a patient or participant. The Exemption Review Committee recommended that Mr. Fulford be granted an exemption. Prior to exemption becoming finalized, however, one of the department's employees, Mr. Miller, discovered that the "work" done by Mr. Fulford in the treatment program was not done as an employee of the program but as a patient/participant progressing along a multi-step process. Thinking that Mr. Fulford had filled out papers of the committee falsely, Mr. Miller advocated that the Department reject the review committee's recommendation. The Department did so. On February 25, 1998, the Department advised Mr. Fulford that his request for an exemption had been denied "because [he had] failed to show clear and convincing evidence that [he had] been sufficiently rehabilitated." Letter from Sue B. Gray, District 14 Administrator, filed with the Department Clerk on April 2, 1998.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recommended that the Department enter a final order either: Granting the exemption subject to a probationary period, (the terms of the probation could include participation by Mr. Fulford as an out-patient in a drug rehabilitation program, monitoring at work at the Heart of Florida Behavioral Center, and participation in regular attendance at Narcotics and Alcoholics Anonymous Groups;) or Denial of the exemption without prejudice to reapply and obtain an exemption upon a showing of rehabilitation by sufficient evidence at the appropriate time in the future. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of October, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DAVID M. MALONEY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of October, 1998.
