Findings Of Fact The Petitioners R.G. and M.G. were licensed as foster parents and their home as a Children Youth and Families foster home for dependent children at all times pertinent hereto. The Respondent is an agency of the state of Florida charged with licensure of foster parents and foster homes and with regulating and enforcing the standards of care of children placed in such foster homes as dependent children. This dispute apparently arose on or about April 18, 1990 when M.G., the foster mother, brought the M. children to the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services office on that date to talk with a foster care counselor about problems experienced with the M. children in her home. Apparently the visit to the Department's office arose because M.G. had discovered that one of the children had allegedly stolen one or more articles from a local store in the community, or believed that she had, and was seeking the advise and council of Department's representative concerning the manner in which to address that perceived problem. During the course of that encounter with the Department's representative the M. children or some of them related incidents occurring in the home in the past while they were placed in the custody of the Petitioners which they felt involved or constituted mistreatment by M.G. Upon learning of these reports Department personnel removed the children from the G. home on April 18, 1990. No other children have been placed by the Respondent in the G. foster home since that time. Michelle M. testified that Petitioner M.G. called Marie M. a bitch, a whore and a slut on one occasion and gave Marie M. "the bird" (an obscene gesture). Michelle M. testified that M.G. called Marie M. a slut and stated that "she's just going to grow up to be a whore." Apparently Marie M. and Michelle M. had reported that M.G. called Marie M. a whore when Marie M. told M.G. about borrowing fifty cents from a boy at school. At the hearing, however, Marie M. testified that she borrowed fifty cents from a boy at school and that when M.G. learned of it she said "it would make her look like a whore." Mandy M. testified that M.G. thought that Mandy had called her "a faggot" and that, instead, she told her that she had called her sister that name but that M.G. did not believe her and sent her to her room and shoved her into the room whereupon she fell and hit herself against the bed or bedpost by accident. Michelle M. testified that on a church hayride a boy threw hay and hit M.G. in the face whereupon, thinking Michelle M. had done it, that M.G. hit Michelle on the leg with a flashlight. Mandy M. testified that M.G. hit Michelle on the leg with a flashlight, but her testimony revealed she knew nothing of that incident and her description of it was related to her by one of her sisters. Additionally, Marie M. testified that she saw M.G. pick up an infant by one arm from a crib and scold it for crying as she was picking the infant up to hold the infant in her arms. Michelle and Marie M. testified that M.G. held Marie M.'s mouth open and shoved red hot sauce into her mouth with a spoon as punishment for some perceived infraction. Marie M. testified that M.G. threw hot tea or hot water on the face of Marie M. while the child was asleep on a couch. M.G. categorically denies all the allegations made by the girls, the foster children in question referenced above. She denies ever making obscene gestures, ("the bird"), at any of the girls and denies calling them names such as bitch, slut or whore. She concedes that she may have admonished them or one of them about not "acting like a slut or a whore," etc. She also denies ever having administered hot sauce to any of the children. She said that on one occasion she gave Mandy some mustard on a teaspoon when the child inquired what it tasted like because she had never tasted mustard. She gave her a small amount of it just to show her how it tasted. She denies ever throwing hot tea or hot water on the face of any of the children and denies causing any of the children injury, specifically concerning the bedroom incident when the child apparently bruised her back falling against the bed. M.G. did use confinement for brief periods in a child's room as a form of discipline for inappropriate conduct in the home. She also denies hitting Michelle M. on the leg with a flashlight during the church hayride. In fact due to her position in the haywagon at the other end of the wagon from the child in question, it would have been impossible for her to reach over and hit her with a flashlight and that incident did not occur. M.G.'s testimony concerning the children's conduct and family life in the home with the children is to the effect that the older two girls, particularly the oldest, Michelle M., had a tendency to lie in order to "get their way"; that the girls were unruly and that they, particularly Michelle, used their relationship with HRS to try to intimidate the foster parents, particularly M.G. They had threatened to report M.G. for improper behavior towards the children in the home. The children resented the foster parents authority. Her testimony describes in detail, as do the exhibits submitted by the Petitioners, consisting of the monthly reports M.G. made to HRS, the progress of the girls and conditions generally in the foster home. This testimony and evidence shows that the Petitioners generally provided the children a good, wholesome home environment, with extensive involvement in school and church activities and with ample wholesome recreation activities at the home site on a lake. During the tenure of the girls in the Petitioners' home their scholastic progress improved markedly such that they were all earning "A and B" grades in school and otherwise were progressing well in school. M.G.'s testimony established that the Petitioners were providing a wholesome home environment for the children and were generally conscientious about caring for the children's needs, including medical needs, and with maintaining contact with and reporting to HRS concerning the children's living conditions and their progress in the home and in the school and church environment. The testimony of M.G. to the general effect that the older girls, particularly the oldest child, had a tendency to threaten reporting the parents or M.G. to HRS concerning their conduct as foster parents and their willingness to lie in an attempt to get their way or to intimidate the foster parents is corroborated by the letter in evidence as corroborative hearsay authored by Linda Kennedy. She is an acquaintance of the Petitioners associated with the Petitioners through the foster parent program. That letter indicates that when the girls were being taken to HRS to make statements concerning the incidents in question that they were reported to have said that they wanted to "get back at her" meaning M.G., the Petitioner and that Marie was heard to instruct Mandy not to talk to a lawyer because she "now liked M.G." and that Michelle had commented to the effect that she "wanted to really get her," meaning M.G. This information is taken from a hearsay letter in evidence pursuant to the above cited provision of Section 120.58, Florida Statutes but it corroborates the testimony to the same general effect of M.G. and corroborates testimony of Mandy who, after describing in her testimony some of the alleged parental abuse by M.G., testified that her sisters had asked her to say things to hurt M.G. Because of these revelations contained in the testimony of Mandy M. and the testimony of M.G., as corroborated by the letter in evidence authored by Linda Kennedy, it is deemed that the testimony of the three children can be accorded scant credibility and resultant weight. Accordingly the testimony of M.G. and Petitioner R.G. is accepted over that of the testimony of the three children testifying for the Respondent and it is found that the incidents described by the three children did not occur or did not occur in the way described by the three children such that they can not be deemed to have constituted abusive, disciplinary parenting practices and prohibited disciplinary practices. The testimony of Donna M. establishes that she has overseen the operation and management of foster homes in her capacity with the Department for many years. After the M. children were removed from M.G. and her husband and their foster home she had a number of telephone conversations with M.G. M.G. appeared to her, based upon her observance and her experience, to seem "fairly incoherent" during those telephone conversations on occasion. Consequently she recommended to M.G. that, in the course of the controversy concerning whether or not the foster home should be relicensed, that M.G. obtain a psychological evaluation. M.G. apparently scheduled that evaluation, appeared at the psychologist's office but, as shown by Petitioner's exhibit 5, the psychologist's report, apparently did not genuinely feel that she needed to get an evaluation. She rather merely consulted the psychologist concerning his advice to her about her dealings with HRS. He declined to render such advice and no psychological evaluation was ever made. In view of Ms. Mimms testimony, which is accepted, and in view of the comments made in the letter of Ms. Kennedy, and from the hearing officer's observance of the demeanor of M.G. and consideration of her testimony, it is deemed appropriate that a psychological evaluation of M.G. be obtained as a condition upon relicensure.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law, the evidence of record and the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, it is therefore recommended that a Final Order be entered by the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services granting the application for relicensure of the Petitioners as a Children Youth and Families foster home for dependent children, conditioned on the obtaining of a satisfactory psychological evaluation of M.G. RECOMMENDED this 3rd day of August, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of August, 1992. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 91-5842 Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact (The Petitioners submitted no proposed findings of fact which can be independently and specifically ruled upon). - I. Rejected as not supported by the greater weight and credibility of the evidence. COPIES FURNISHED: Rodney M. Johnson, Esquire HRS District 1 Legal Office P.O. Box 8420 Pensacola, FL 32505-0420 Ronald and Marjorie Grover 4713 Radio Road Milton, FL 32583 Sam Power, Agency Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700 John Slye, General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700
The Issue Should Petitioners' application for family foster home license be granted?
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant findings are made: The Department is the agency in the State of Florida responsible for the licensure of family foster homes. Linda Patterson and Robert Patterson (Pattersons), a married couple, applied for licensure as a family foster home. The Pattersons completed the initial training for prospective foster parents in March of 1995. The Department completed a home study on the Pattersons. The results of the home study and background information on the Pattersons, including the Pattersons tenure as foster parents in Connecticut, were considered by the Department before denying the Pattersons' application for licensure as a family foster home for children. On August 24, 1994, the Department issued Notice Of Denial to the Patterson which in pertinent part provides: This letter provides notice to you that your application for a family foster home license is denied, based on Section 409.175(8)(a), Florida Statutes, and Rule 10M-6.023, Florida Administrative Code (FAC). The reasons for this denial are: Mr. Patterson has been charged with numerous law violations in the past. Although none of the law violations auto- matically disqualifies him from fostering, they do reflect a lack of judgment needed to provide adequate care for foster children, indicating an inability to comply with Rule 10-6.023(e). Your home was investigated in August of 1992 because of allegations of sexual abuse on your 18 year old adopted daughter. You admitted inappropriate contact with this child. As a result of this investigation your license was limited, and your home was approved only for males, ages 5 to 11. In April of 1993, your marital coun- selor stated that you have difficulty setting limits with sexuality, and recommended against the placement of any child with a known history of sexual acting out, or approaching puberty. This recommendation was made shortly after an incident of child on child sexual abuse in your home. In September of 1993, a clinical psychologist evaluated you. He stated that Mr. Patterson's ability to control his impulses is "probably" satisfactory, but should not be tested with sexually active adolescent females. He also opined that your family might have some difficulty dealing with sexually abused and acting out children without professional guidance. All of these incidents indicate an inability to comply with Rule 10M-6.023(1)(e), particularly in view of the fact that approxi- mately 85 percent of our foster children fall into the categories of children that should not be placed with Mr. Patterson. Robert Patterson admitted to several law violation between 1960 and 1980. However, most of these violations were misdemeanors and committed while he was a juvenile. There was one felony violation (car theft) by Robert Patterson while he was a juvenile. Robert Patterson admitted that in 1980 he was charged with larceny concerning an alleged fraudulent claim for unemployment compensation to which he pled nolo contendere. Notwithstanding that he pled nolo contendere to the charge, Robert Patterson contended that the unemployment compensation claim was a legal claim. There was no evidence of any further law violations after the nolo contendere plea in 1980. The Pattersons were licensed in Connecticut as foster parents for approximately 10 years. During the time the Pattersons were licensed as a foster home in Connecticut the Patterson home was investigated because of a complaint alleging sexual abuse of a female foster child in the Pattersons' home. Although there was no finding of sexual abuse of this female, Robert Patterson admitted to having unintentionally touched the female's breast and buttocks while they were wrestling. There was another incident where this same female foster child, while inebriated, rubbed Robert Patterson' penis several times. Robert Patterson testified that he felt sexually attracted to this female child, but that he never acted on those feelings. The female child that was the subject of the abuse complaint was not removed from the Pattersons' home, and subsequently the State of Connecticut allowed the Pattersons to adopt this child. After this investigation, the Pattersons requested that their foster care home license be limited to males, ages 5 years to 11 years. This limitation on placement was requested by the Patterson because they felt inadequate to cope with sexually acting out or sexually abused children. The Paterson's marriage counselor in Connecticut advised the Connecticut DCF (the equivalent of Florida DHRS) that the Pattersons had difficulty setting limits with sexuality, and recommended against placement of any child in the Pattersons' home with a known history of sexual acting out, or approaching puberty. Many foster children are victims of sexual abuse and sexual exploitation which causes these foster children to behavior inappropriately. Often the Department is unaware of prior abuse or the resultant behavior when a child is placed in a foster home. A foster parent's ability to deal appropriately with sexually abused and sexually acting out children is a very important attribute, particularly given the number of children in foster care with these difficulties. The Pattersons requested to be licensed for placement of males only, ages 5 years to 11 years. The Department has licensed foster homes with age and sex restrictions on placements. However, the Department attempts to avoid licensing homes with such restrictions. Such restrictions on placement interfere with the Department's statutory duty to keep siblings together, and with the goal of attempting to avoid moving children from foster home to foster home.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law it is recommended that the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services enter a final order denying the Petitioners licensure as a family foster home. RECOMMENDED this 23rd day of September, 1996, at Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of September, 1996. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER CASE NO. 96-1567 The following constitutes my specific rulings, pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the proposed findings of fact submitted by the Department in this case. Petitioners' Proposed Findings of Fact. Petitioners elected not to file any proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. Department's Proposed Findings of Fact. 1. Proposed findings of fact 1 - 19 are adopted in substance as modified in Findings of Fact 1 through 19. COPIES FURNISHED: Gregory D. Venz, Agency Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1317 Winewood Blvd., Bldg. 2, Room 204X Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Richard Doran, General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1317 Winewood Blvd., Room 201 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-07001 Robert and Linda Patterson 8653 Indian Ridge Way Lakeland, Florida 33809 M. Elizabeth Wall, Esquire Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 200 North Kentucky Avenue Lakeland, Florida 33801
The Issue Whether the Petitioners' application for a license to provide foster home care for dependent children should be approved or denied.
Findings Of Fact Petitioners applied for licensure from Respondent as a Family Foster Home in 1995; the application was subsequently amended to a Therapeutic Foster Home. Respondent began the preparation of the Family Portfolio and Petitioners began Pre-Service Training. Petitioners attended and completed the required 21 hours of pre-service training for prospective foster family parents, called Group Preparation and Selection, GPS-MAPP. on June 12, 1995. Petitioner Carmen Delvalle also attended and completed a 40 hour pre- service training for prospective medical foster parents. During this time, in anticipation of being licensed, Petitioners made modifications to their home and purchased furniture that would accommodate the placement of foster children. Respondent, in preparing the Petitioners' Family Portfolio, determined that Petitioners had previously been licensed in Westchester County, New York, as foster parents from May 1987 through December 1988. The inquiry with the county Foster Home Resource Unit revealed that Petitioners' home was closed by mutual decision between Petitioners and the county Department of Social Services. The Department would not recommend that Petitioners be relicensed based on the appearance that Mrs. Delvalle was overwhelmed by the needs of foster children, which resulted in frequent relocation of children placed in her care, and appeared to be unable to understand and cope with the needs of typical foster children. Petitioner Carmen Delvalle testified that Petitioners' termination as foster parents in New York was not due to being overwhelmed by the needs of the children. Rather, it was due to the fact that Petitioners were housed in a walk-up apartment and their neighbors were constantly complaining about the noise the children would make. In addition, they received very little support and training from the Department of Social Services, and the Department was constantly placing 5 and 6 children in her home when they were only licensed to care for three children at a time. Petitioners now feel that they are better prepared to serve as foster parents because they both love children; their own children are now adults and they can give a lot of time and attention to any foster children placed in their home; they are better qualified and trained now, and can deal with the special demands of caring for foster children and medically challenged foster children. The Respondent's Senior Program Analyst prepared the Family Portfolio for the Petitioners, which included two in-home interviews. She was also Petitioners' MAPP trainer. Her evaluation of the Petitioners' application was that they did not meet the standards of Respondent, as set forth in Chapter 10M- 6, Florida Administrative Code, because of her concern that Petitioners could not cope with the stresses of being a foster parent seven days a week, twenty- four hours a day. Respondent's Licensing Administrator Marlene Richmond reviewed the completed Family Portfolio pertaining to the Petitioners and called for a staffing review of their file. She also interviewed Petitioner and determined that, although sincere, Petitioners did not exhibit an understanding of the training they received. They also could not articulate how they would respond to the pressures they would be under once a foster child was placed in their home. In her opinion, Petitioners did not meet the standards. Petitioners are caring, sincere people who wish to offer themselves and their home for the care of children in need of foster care. Petitioners' house meets the physical standards set out by Respondent, and the Petitioners have completed the required pre-service training. However, Petitioners have not articulated an understanding or exhibited the capability to take on the "role" to be successful foster parents. Petitioners do not meet the standards for licensure as foster home or a medical foster home.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Respondent enter a final order DENYING Petitioners' application for licensure as a foster home for dependent children. DONE and ENTERED this 31st day of May, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of May, 1996. COPIES FURNISHED: Antonio Delvalle pro se Carmen Delvalle pro se 7933 Toler Court Orlando, Florida 32822 Laurie A. Lashomb, Esquire Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 400 West Robinson Street, Suite S-827 Orlando, Florida 32801 Gregory D. Venz, Agency Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Richard Doran, General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner should deny the application for renewal of Respondent's foster home license because “skinny dipping” with a foster child at the foster home violates Section 409.175, Florida Statutes (2001), and Florida Administrative Code Rule 65C-13. (All section references are to Florida Statutes (2001). All references to rules are to rules promulgated in the Florida Administrative Code in effect on the date of this Recommended Order.)
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency responsible for licensing and regulating foster homes in Florida. A foster home license is valid for a period of one year and must be renewed annually. Various privatized entities supervise licensed foster homes, review applications for foster home licenses, and make recommendations to Petitioner regarding the applications. However, the recommendations are not binding on Petitioner. Petitioner, rather than the private entity, is the licensing agency. For example, Petitioner rejected the recommendation from the private entity with responsibility for reviewing the application at issue in this proceeding. Petitioner first issued a foster home license to Respondent on January 28, 2000. Petitioner licensed Respondent to operate a therapeutic foster home. A therapeutic license authorized Respondent to operate a foster home for children with psychological or emotional disorders and for children without such disorders. Therapeutic foster homes operate under the auspices of a private entity known as Personal Enrichment through Mental Health, Inc. (PEMHS). PEMHS recommended that Petitioner issue the original foster home license on January 28, 2000, and a renewal license that Petitioner issued on January 28, 2001, for the second year. The second therapeutic foster home license expired on January 27, 2002. Petitioner never took action to discipline or revoke Respondent’s therapeutic foster home license. In July 2001, Respondent applied for a non- therapeutic foster home license. The non-therapeutic license that Respondent seeks authorizes a licensee to operate a foster home only for children without psychological or emotional disorders. Non-therapeutic foster homes operate under the auspices of a private entity known as Family Continuity Programs (Family Continuity). Family Continuity recommended that Petitioner approve the application for a non-therapeutic foster home license. However, Petitioner did not follow the recommendation of Family Continuity and denied the application. Petitioner's denial of Respondent's application for a non-therapeutic foster home license is the proposed agency action that is at issue in this proceeding. Respondent's application for a non-therapeutic foster home license is not an application for a new license. Rather, it is an application for renewal of an existing license. Both the therapeutic license that Respondent held at the time of the application and the non-therapeutic license that Respondent seeks authorize the licensee to operate a foster home for children without psychological or emotional disorders. By applying for a non-therapeutic foster home license before the expiration of his therapeutic foster home license, Respondent sought to renew his license to operate a foster home for children without psychological and emotional disorders. The non-therapeutic license that Respondent seeks does not impose any requirements in addition to those that Respondent had already satisfied when Petitioner granted the therapeutic license to Respondent. The requirements for the therapeutic license are more stringent than those that must be met to qualify for a non-therapeutic license. The requirements for a therapeutic license are more comprehensive, and Petitioner requires an applicant for a therapeutic license to have more training than an applicant for a non-therapeutic license. A non-therapeutic license does not impose requirements in addition to those imposed for a therapeutic license. Petitioner proposes to deny the application for renewal of Respondent's foster home license on the sole ground that Respondent went "skinny dipping" with two minor males. One of those males was a foster child assigned to Respondent. The foster child is a victim of past sexual abuse and has psychological and emotional disorders. The child suffers from oppositional defiance disorder and mood disorder. The symptoms of the disorders include self-injury, such as head banging, aggression, anger, and low self-esteem. However, many of the behavioral problems diminished during the 15 months that the foster child was in Respondent's care. The "skinny-dipping" events occurred between six and nine times during the 15 months that the foster child was in Respondent's care. During that time, the foster child was between 12 and 14 years old. The foster child swam nude in the swimming pool at Respondent's residence and bathed nude in the hot tub adjacent to the pool. On some of those occasions, Respondent was nude in the hot tub and swimming pool with the foster child and at other times the two were in the swimming pool and hot tub independently of each other while both were nude. The local sheriff's office investigated the foster home and found no indicators of abuse. Once PEMHS learned of the "skinny dipping" events, neither PEMHS nor Petitioner sought to revoke Respondent's therapeutic foster home license or to provide Respondent with remedial training. Rather, PEMHS removed the foster child from the foster home and refused to assign any more foster children to Respondent's foster home. At the administrative hearing, Petitioner sought the post-hearing deposition testimony of Dr. Cotter for several purposes. One of those purposes was to show the impact on the foster child from the "skinny dipping" events. Another purpose was to show that the "skinny dipping" was "grooming behavior" for future pedophilia. The ALJ sustained Respondent's objection to the admissibility of the expert deposition testimony for the purpose of showing the impact on the foster child and for the purpose of showing that the "skinny dipping" was "grooming behavior" for future pedophilia. Dr. Cotter could not render an opinion concerning the actual impact on the foster child from the "skinny dipping" events or whether those events were actually intended by Respondent as "grooming behavior" for future pedophilia. Dr. Cotter did not intend to evaluate either the foster child or Respondent before rendering his opinions and, in fact, never evaluated either individual. Any expert opinion by Dr. Cotter concerning "grooming behavior" for pedophilia was not relevant to the grounds stated in the Notice of Denial. That expert opinion was relevant only to grounds not stated in the Notice of Denial. Nudity in a swimming pool and hot tub are not synonymous with "grooming behavior" for pedophilia. Nudity and "grooming behavior" for pedophilia are separate grounds for denying the application for renewal of Respondent's license to operate a foster home. Petitioner failed to provide adequate notice prior to the administrative hearing that Petitioner sought to deny the renewal of Respondent's license on the separate ground that Respondent engaged in "grooming behavior" for pedophilia. Fundamental principles of due process prohibit a state agency from notifying a regulated party of the allegations against the party and then, at the hearing, proving-up other allegations. One of the primary functions of an ALJ is to assure that an administrative hearing is a fair hearing. Respondent was not prepared at the administrative hearing to submit evidence, including expert testimony, to refute any allegation not stated in the Notice of Denial. The admission of evidence relevant to allegations not stated in the Notice of Denial would have required a continuance of the administrative hearing to provide Respondent with an opportunity to refute the allegation. A continuance would have denied Respondent a remedy during the period of continuance, increased the economic burden on Respondent, and frustrated judicial economy. Nothing prevents Petitioner from bringing a separate proceeding against the licensee based on the allegation that Respondent engaged in "grooming behavior" for pedophilia. The ALJ limited the testimony of Dr. Cotter to those grounds for denial that Petitioner stated in the Notice of Denial. In relevant part, the Notice of Denial states: After careful review and consideration, your application has been denied. Our decision is based on the following: Your admission that you and two minor boys, one of which was a foster child under your supervision, participated in several "skinny dipping" incidents during your recent licensure as a foster parent for Pinellas Enrichment Through Mental Health Services (PEMHS). As you are aware, the nature of a boy's early experiences may affect the development of his sexual attitudes and subsequent behavior. Therefore, foster parents are expected to provide opportunities for recreational activities appropriate to the child's age. "Skinny dipping" in a hot tub with two minor boys violates the intent of this rule. These incidents reflect poor judgment for a person who is a licensed foster parent. Respondent's Exhibit 1. The Notice of Denial essentially states four grounds for denying the application for renewal of Respondent's license. One ground is the impact on the development of the foster child's sexual attitudes and subsequent behavior. Another ground is nudity between a foster parent and a foster child. A third ground is that Respondent exercised poor judgment. The remaining ground is that Respondent provided recreational activities that were not appropriate to the foster child's age. No evidence shows that the "skinny dipping" events had any adverse impact on the development of the foster child's sexual attitudes and subsequent behavior. Dr. Cotter did not evaluate the foster child to determine the actual impact of the events on the foster child. Contrary to the statements in the Notice of Denial, Petitioner's representative testified at the hearing that Petitioner did not consider the impact on the child that resulted from skinny dipping with Respondent. The preponderance of evidence shows that the actual impact of the foster care provided by Respondent during the 15 months in which the "skinny dipping" events occurred was positive. Many of the foster child's behavioral problems greatly diminished. The foster child made remarkable progress in his behavior both at home and at school. The foster child bonded with Respondent, and Respondent was an exemplary foster parent. The placement of the child with Respondent was so successful that Family Continuity published an article in their magazine about the successful match between the foster child and Respondent. Family Continuity considers Respondent to be an exemplary foster parent and wishes to have Respondent in its foster care program. If Petitioner grants the application for renewal, Family Continuity intends to return the foster child to Respondent for adoption. The second ground stated in the Notice of Denial is nudity between the foster parent and foster child. Without considering the impact on the foster child, Petitioner determined that being naked in the presence of a foster child, without more, was sufficient to close a foster home, remove a child, and revoke a foster home license. Petitioner cited no written statute or rule that prohibits nudity between a foster parent and foster child; or that establishes intelligible standards for regulating such nudity. Petitioner failed to submit competent and substantial evidence to explicate an unwritten policy that prohibits or regulates nudity. Rather, some evidence shows that nudity between foster parents and foster children is generally unavoidable and common. The third ground stated in the Notice of Denial is that Respondent exercised poor judgment. Several witnesses at the hearing and Dr. Cotter opined that Respondent exercised poor judgment. It is unnecessary to determine whether Petitioner exercised poor judgment because Petitioner cited no written rule or policy that defines or prohibits "poor judgment." For reasons stated in the Conclusions of Law, Petitioner must base a denial of a license application on a finding that the applicant violated a specific statute or rule. Petitioner cannot use the Notice of Denial to invent requirements that are not authorized by statute or rule. Petitioner cited no statute or rule that defines "poor judgment" or that establishes intelligible standards to guide the discretionary determination of whether an applicant has exercised poor judgment. In the absence of intelligible standards, the determination of whether an applicant has exercised poor judgment is necessarily an exercise of unbridled agency discretion. The use of unbridled agency discretion to make findings of fact violates fundamental principles of due process. Unbridled agency discretion creates the potential that agency decision-makers may define poor judgment by relying on their personal predilections rather than on those standards authorized by the legislature. Even if it were determined that poor judgment is a standard authorized by the legislature and that Respondent violated that standard, the determination is not dispositive of whether Petitioner should renew Respondent's license to operate a foster home. For example, representatives for Family Continuity and PEMHS agreed in their testimony that Respondent exercised poor judgment. However, Family Continuity recommends that Petitioner issue the non- therapeutic foster home license while PEMHS recommends against renewal of the license. The remaining allegation in the Notice of Denial is that "skinny dipping" is not an age-appropriate recreational activity. Rule 65C-13.010(1)(b)8a. states: 8. Recreation and community. a. The substitute parents are expected to provide opportunities for recreational activities for children. The activities must be appropriate to the child's age and abilities. Swimming in a swimming pool and bathing in a hot tub are recreational activities within the meaning of Rule 65C- 13.010(1)(a)8a. Swimming nude and bathing nude in a hot tub with a nude adult are not appropriate for a child who is between 12 and 14 years old and whose psychological and emotional abilities are diminished by past sexual abuse.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Petitioner enter a final order finding that Respondent violated Rule 65C-13.010(1)(b)8 and granting Respondent’s application for a therapeutic foster home license. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of May, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ___________________________________ DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of May, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Frank Nagatani, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services 11351 Ulmerton Road, Suite 314 Largo, Florida 33778-1630 Gary A. Urso, Esquire 7702 Massachusetts Avenue New Port Richey, Florida 34653 Paul Flounlacker, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204B Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Josie Tomayo, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
Findings Of Fact In August, 1980, the home of Jacob and Donna Vermeulen was licensed by Petitioner as a pre-school foster home. Under that licensure, the Vermeulens were able to care for children from birth to four years of age. The subject of this proceeding, hereinafter referred to as S.L., was born on May 26, 1976. When S.L. was four years old he and his younger sister were removed from the custody of his natural mother (after he witnessed the homicide by bludgeoning of his father by his mother) because S.L. and his sister had been physically abused by both natural parents. Petitioner placed S.L. and his sister into the Vermeu1en foster home. After S.L. and his sister had been living with the Vermeulens for approximately six months, Petitioner removed them from the Vermeulen home and returned them to the custody of their natural mother. After approximately six months, the two children were again removed from their natural mother since she again physically abused them. Petitioner requested the Vermeulens to again take custody of S.L. and his sister. The Vermeulens were reluctant to do so since both S.L, and his sister were now older than was allowed under the Vermeulens' license, and because S.L. had problems relating with the other foster children living in that home during his first stay there. However, Petitioner's social workers begged the Vermeulens to take the children back since Petitioner was unable to find any other placement for S.L. The Vermeulens agreed to make their home available to S.L. and his sister, and the two children thereafter lived in the Vermeulen home for approximately two and one-half years prior to April 16, 1984. S.L. is a difficult child to care for; he is very emotional, developmentally immature, fearful, and fidgety. He has difficulty sleeping or listening, has a very low self-esteem, and is unable to complete tasks since he becomes emotionally frustrated. Not only is S.L. a clumsy child (most probably due to medication), he also throws himself onto the floor and onto his toys, both as part of his aggressive play behavior and also in conjunction with throwing temper tantrums. S.L. initiates fights in school, on the school bus and at home with the other children in the Vermeulen home to such an extent that fighting somewhere would have been almost a daily occurrence. His excessive demands for attention were often accompanied by negative behavior, such as hitting other children and throwing temper tantrums. On December 21, 1983, S.L. was evaluated by psychiatrist Josephine Perez. Perez diagnosed S.L. as suffering from Attention Deficit Disorder with Hyperactivity. Perez determined that the high dosages of anti-psychoic medication that S.L. had been taking were inappropriate, and she prescribed different medication for him. Perez recalls that during S.L.'s initial evaluation in December she noticed that his legs and arms were filled with bruises. S.L. began treating weekly with Perez from January 16, 1984, until April 16, 1984. On each visit at least one of the Vermeulens was present, and each visit contained a seasion between Perez and the foster parent discussing the child's progress and training the foster parent in the use of behavioral modification techniques. During those several months S.L. appeared at Perez's office on one occasion with a black eye and on another occasion with a bruising above his eye. One injury resulted from a fall in the bath tub, and another resulted from a fall out of bed; both falls were probably attributable to changes Perez made in S.L.'s medication. The Vermeulens discussed both incidents with Perez since they were concerned that S.L,'s medication was still not in the proper dosage. The Vermeulens testified that sometimes when S.L.'s medication was changed, he was unable to control even his arms and was unable to sit still long enough to eat. In January, 1984, when S.L. began treating with Dr. Perez there were six children living in the Vermeulen home: four foster children, one adopted child, and one natural child. The Vermeulens and Dr. Perez discussed the number of children living in the Vermeulen home, which prohibited giving S.L. the excessive amount of time required by him to satisfy his need for attention. Perez told the Vermeulens that in her professional opinion S.L. should be in a home with no more than one other child. In turn, the Vermeulens told Perez that they had been requesting Petitioner to remove S.L. from their home out of their concern (1) for S.L. since he needed so much more attention than was available to him and (2) for the other children not only because S.L. would kick and hit them but also because the Vermeulens had discovered S.L. in his sister's bedroom standing over her with a knife in his hand on two occasions. Although Perez agreed that S.L. should be placed a different foster setting, she did nothing to assist in obtaining a different placement and did not discuss with any employee of the Petitioner ("HRS") her recommendation and the Vermeulens' desire that S.L. be placed in a setting, preferably, where he was the only child. The Vermeulens, however, continued to request of HRS employees, including the visiting social workers and medical personnel, that S.L. be removed from their home, with visitation rights being given to the Vermeulens if possible. During this time period the Vermeulens determined that they wished to adopt Michelle, a foster child in their care. On Friday, April 13, 1984, an HRS employee went to the Vermeulen home to discuss that petition for adoption and to advise the Vermeulens that HRS would not allow them to adopt Michelle. Mr. and Mrs. Vermeulen S.L., and the rest of the children living in the home were present during that discussion. The Vermeulens were advised that they would not be permitted to adopt Michelle so long as S.L. was living in their home since he is a "therapeutic foster child" and Petitioner's rules would prohibit the adoption while a "therapeutic child" was in the home. Mrs. Vermeulen was unable to understand Petitioner's position: its refusal to remove S.L. from her home after repeated requests and its refusal to allow her to adopt Michelle for the reason that S.L. was in her home. Mrs. Vermeulen became upset, and S.L. told her and Petitioner's employee to put him in a foster home indicating he would rather be sent away than prevent Michelle from being adopted by the Vermeulens. Since the HRS employee was having a difficult time discussing HRS's position, she left the Vermeulen home. On Friday, April 13, 1984, or on Monday, April 16, 1984, S.L. became involved in a fight on the school bus on the way home from school. The bus driver told Mrs. Vermeulen about the fight. On Monday April 16, 1984, Mrs. Vermeulen took S.L. to his weekly therapy session with Dr. Perez. During that session, S.L. indicated to Perez that he had been bad and had been "paddled" on the legs. He would give her no details, but Perez believed it was Donna Vermeulen who paddled S.L. Rather than discuss it with Mrs. Vermeulen, Perez acted as though nothing had been said. Further, although a medical doctor, she did not examine S.L. Instead, Perez discussed with Mrs. Vermeulen behavioral modification techniques to be utilized with S.L. and sent them home. She then telephoned HRS, and a child abuse report was completed. On April 18, 1984, an HRS employee went to S.L.'s school, removed the child from his class, and took the child to be examined by the Child Protection Team. S.L. was first examined by the nurse. When S.L. was unable to explain to the nurse from where each mark on his body originated (or refused to), she interrogated him with questions such as "Did your mommy hit you?" The nurse made notations on a chart indicating numerous marks or bruises on S.L.'s body. However, an HRS employee saw S.L. disrobed when he was being examined by the doctor on the team and saw only two marks on his lower back. Other HRS employees went to the Vermeulen home and removed all the children. No one discussed the incident or accusation with either Mr. or Mrs. Vermeulen until the following day. Until he was removed from her class on April 18, 1984, S.L. was taught by Debbie Froug an Exceptional Education teacher for emotionally disturbed children. Although Froug describes S.L. as a basically honest child, she testified that he sometimes gets very confused. A careful review of the videotaped testimony of S.L. and of the conflicting testimony of the witnesses in this case indicates that Froug's latter description is probably an understatement. No witness in this case heard the same explanation (or accusation) as any other witness. S.L's videotaped testimony illustrates why: there is no statement made by S.L. that is not contradicted by him a few seconds later. For example the videotaped deposition contains on page 27 the following: O. Did you ever have a black eye? A. No. O. Didn't you talk to Dr. Perez about having a black eye once? A. Yes, but I didn't. How did you get the black eye? One of the kids on the bus. Things stated in the affirmative by S.L. in his deposition are also stated in the negative in that same deposition. Further, it is sometimes impossible to ascertain if S.L. is describing being hit by his real father, by his real mother, or by his foster mother. Although no accusation appears to ever have been made, including in the Administrative Complaint, that Jacob Vermeulen ever struck S.L., by the time of S.L.'s deposition eight months after the alleged incident when S.L. was asked if Jacob ever hit him, that question was answered in the affirmative. In short, the evidence is clear that S.L. had some bruises or marks on his body on April 18, 1984; that those bruises or marks were both received accidentally and intentionally inflicted, and that the bruises or marks on S.L.'s body were received as a result of S.L. falling from being uncoordinated or overmedicated, from S.L. flinging himself onto the floor or onto or against objects, and from being hit or kicked by other children with whom S.L. engaged in almost-daily physical combat. Donna and Jacob Vermeulen used only approved behavior modification techniques with S.L. and did not hit S.L. with or without any object, spank S.L., or otherwise inflict physical abuse upon him. Although the Vermeulens' license as a foster home was in effect at all times material hereto, it has lapsed. A foster home license is not automatically renewed but rather requires an annual licensing study. Other than "the incident" charged herein the Vermeulens have received no prior complaints from HRS.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is REC0MENDED that a Final Order be entered dismissing with prejudice the Administrative Complaint filed herein and directing that any licensure study performed regarding the renewal or extension of Respondents' license be made omitting therefrom consideration of any of the matters set forth herein. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 19th day of July, 1985 at Tallahassee, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of July,1985. COPIES FURNISHED: Leonard Helfand, Esquire Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 401 N.W. 2nd Avenue, Suite 1070 Miami, Florida 33128 Thomas J. Walsh, Esquire 590 English Avenue Homestead, Florida 33030 David Pingree, Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Petitioner's foster care license should be renewed.
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Cathy Taylor (Petitioner) was issued a foster care license by the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (Respondent). On October 25, 1994, Petitioner signed an "Agreement to Provide Substitute Care for Dependent Children (Substitute Care Agreement) with Respondent, agreeing to abide by or with certain conditions which were considered essential for the welfare of foster children in her care. The Substitute Care Agreement provided in pertinent part: We are fully and directly responsible to the department for the care of the child. * * * 6. We will not give the child into the care or physical custody of any other person(s), including the natural parent(s), without the consent of a representative of the department. * * * 9. We will accept dependent children into our home for care only from the department and will make no plans for boarding other children or adults. * * * 11. We will notify the department immediately of any change in our address, employment, living arrangements, family composition, or law enforcement involvement. * * * We will comply with all requirements for a licensed substitute care home as prescribed by the department. * * * We will immediately report any injuries or illness of a child in our care to the department. * * * 19. We will abide by the department's discipline policy which we received during the MAPP training. On October 13, 1993, Petitioner received a certificate from Respondent for successful completion of the MAPP training. On October 25, 1994, Petitioner signed a "Discipline Policy Agreement" (Discipline Agreement). The Discipline Agreement provides in pertinent part: [T]he following disciplinary practices are FORBIDDEN on our children. FAILURE OF THE FOSTER PARENT(S) ... TO COMPLY MAY RESULT IN THE REMOVAL OF THE CHILD(REN) FOR AN INVESTI- GATION AND RESULT IN THE CLOSURE OF YOUR HOME. * * * Hitting a child with ANY object. Slapping, smacking, whipping, washing mouth out with soap, or ANY other form of physical discipline. * * * (6) Delegating authority for punishment to another child or person that is not the Foster Parent(s) ... NO OTHER CHILD, ADOLESCENT, OR ADULT IN THE HOUSEHOLD SHALL HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO DISCIPLINE. On October 11, 1995, Petitioner and Trevor Barnes signed a "Bilateral Service Agreement" (Bilateral Agreement) with Respondent, agreeing to abide by or with several conditions which were considered essential for the welfare of the children placed in the foster home. The Bilateral Agreement provides in pertinent part: 2. We are fully and directly responsible to the Department for the care of the child. * * * We will not give the child into the care or physical custody of any other person(s), including the natural parent(s), without the consent of a representative of the department.... * * * 8. We will accept dependent children into our home for care only from the Department and will make no plans for boarding other children or adults. We will notify the Department if any adult relative or family members returns to live in the home. * * * 10. We will notify the Department immediately of any change in our address, employment, living arrangements, arrest record, health status or family composition, as well as any special needs of the child (i.e. health, school problems, emotional problems). * * * We will comply with all requirements for a licensed foster home as prescribed by the Department. * * * We will provide a nurturing, supportive, family- like home environment. * * * We understand that any breach of the Agreement may result in the immediate removal of the child(ren) and revocation of the license. At that time, Trevor Barnes was Petitioner's fiance. They were married in January 1996 and have, therefore, been married for less than one year. On October 11, 1995, Petitioner and Trevor Barnes signed a Discipline Agreement. The pertinent language of the Discipline Agreement was no different from the one signed on October 25, 1994. In December 1994, minor foster child N.R. was placed in the care of Petitioner. In 1995, minor foster children V.M. and J.M., two sisters, were placed in the care of Petitioner. Petitioner was responsible for the supervision and care of the foster children. Petitioner allowed her sister, an adult, and her sister's son, who was not placed with her under foster care, to live in her home. At the time, her relatives had no other place to live. Petitioner did not inform Respondent that her relatives were living with her. Petitioner violated the Substitute Care Agreement and the Bilateral Agreement. At times, Petitioner left the children under the supervision and in the care of Mr. Barnes and her sister, thereby, violating the Substitute Care Agreement and the Bilateral Agreement. On November 23, 1995, Thanksgiving day, one of Respondent's representatives, who was transporting V.M. and J.M. to visit with their prospective adoptive family, became aware of marks on one of V.M.'s legs. Respondent's representative overheard V.M. tell J.M. to look at what "mommy" had done. Respondent's representative examined V.M.'s leg and discovered marks on V.M.'s leg. She questioned V.M., regarding the marks, and V.M. confirmed what Respondent's representative had overheard. Also, V.M. informed Respondent that Petitioner spanked both she and her sister, J.M. Respondent's representative determined that the marks were consistent with marks which would result from striking the child's leg with a metal hanger. However, she could not determine if the marks were fresh or recent or old scars because she was not trained to make such a determination. There was no other evidence as to any other observations made regarding the marks. Respondent's counselor, assigned to V.M. and J.M., reported the incident. An investigation was begun by Respondent for alleged abuse. Neither V.M. nor J.M. testified at the hearing. The investigator who conducted the investigation on the alleged abuse did not testify. Petitioner denies striking V.M. with a metal hanger or with any object. Moreover, she denies having ever inflicted corporal punishment on the children. Her method of punishing the children was taking away their privileges to do the things that they enjoyed. Further, Mr. Barnes questioned V.M., regarding the marks, who told Mr. Barnes that the natural mother inflicted the marks on V.M. Respondent was unable to provide evidence as to the last period of time that the children had visited with their natural parent(s). Petitioner did not report the marks on V.M.'s leg to Respondent. Petitioner violated the Substitute Care Agreement. Regarding spanking the children, prior to the discovery of the marks on V.M.'s leg, Respondent suspected that Petitioner was spanking the children. Respondent's counselor to V.M. and J.M. questioned Petitioner as to whether she was spanking the children. Petitioner denied any spanking and responded with her method of punishment as indicated above. But, also, Petitioner informed Respondent's counselor that perhaps Mr. Barnes or her sister had spanked the children. Petitioner presented no evidence that she had confronted both her sister and Mr. Barnes as to whether they were spanking the children and that she had instructed them not to do so, as such action was violative of the Discipline Agreement. Further, there is no evidence that Respondent questioned Petitioner's sister or Mr. Barnes. There is insufficient evidence to find that Petitioner used corporal punishment. However, the circumstances presented causes concern to the extent that Respondent was justified in questioning the suitability of Petitioner to be a foster care parent. At all times material hereto, Mr. Barnes did not live with Petitioner. He lived with Petitioner's grandmother. Petitioner never indicated to Respondent that Mr. Barnes either lived in the foster home or did not live in the foster home. Although he spent considerable time at Petitioner's home, the evidence is insufficient to show that he lived with her. Even if Mr. Barnes was living with Petitioner, Respondent became aware of it in October 1995. Respondent's counselor, who was assigned to N.R., believed that Mr. Barnes was living with Petitioner and informed him that, if he was going to live with Petitioner, she had to perform a background check on him. Respondent's counselor obtained the necessary information from Mr. Barnes to perform the background check. At that time, Respondent was aware that Petitioner and Mr. Barnes were planning to be married. Petitioner received a monthly allowance from Respondent for the care of the minor foster children. Petitioner became unemployed. Petitioner did not report her unemployment to Respondent. However, Respondent's counselor, who was assigned to V.M. and J.M., was aware of Petitioner's unemployment but assumed that Mr. Barnes was Petitioner's husband and that he was supporting the family. However, Petitioner and Mr. Barnes were not married, he was not living in Petitioner's home, and he was not supporting the family. Regardless, Petitioner violated the Substitute Care Agreement and the Bilateral Agreement. Petitioner paid too little attention to V.M. and J.M.'s hygiene and personal appearance. The hygiene was inappropriate to the point that the children's school contacted Respondent. The children frequently appeared to be unkept, and Respondent did not observe the children with any new clothes. Because of her unemployment, Petitioner had insufficient income to adequately support the minor foster children. Because of the marks on V.M.'s leg, because of V.M.'s statement to Respondent that Petitioner inflicted the injury to her leg and had spanked both she and her sister, and because Respondent had determined that Petitioner had violated its rules and regulations, Respondent removed the minor foster children from Respondent's home. Furthermore, Respondent refused to renew Petitioner's foster care license. Petitioner no longer wishes to renew her license.3 CONCLUSIONS OF LAW The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this proceeding and the parties thereto pursuant to Subsection 120.57(1), Florida Statutes. Petitioner has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that her foster care license should be renewed. Department of Transportation v. J. W. C. Company, 396 So.2d 778 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981); Balino v. Department of Health and Rehabilitatives, 348 So.2d 349 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977). Section 409.175(1), Florida Statutes, provides in pertinent part: The purpose of this section is to protect the health, safety, and well-being of all children in the state who are cared for by family foster homes, residential child-caring agencies, and child-placing agencies, by providing for the establishment of licensing requirements for such homes and agencies and providing procedures to determine adherence to these requirements. Rule 10M-6, Florida Administrative Code, sets forth the minimum standards by which foster parents must be evaluated. Rule 10M-6.012 provides in pertitnent part: Section 409.175, F.S., mandates that the department establish minimum standards, or rules for the types of care defined in the statute. The standards, once promulgated, have the full force and effect of law. The licensing rules specify a level of care below which programs will not be able to operate. Rule 10M-6.024 provides in pertinent part: (4) Responsibilities of the Substitute Care Parents to the Department. * * * (b) The substitute care parents are required to participate with the department in relicensing studies and in ongoing monitoring of their home, and must provide sufficient information for the department to verify compliance with all rules and regulations. * * * (g) The substitute care parents must notify the department regarding changes which affect the life and circumstances of the shelter or foster family. Rule 10M-6.025 provides in pertinent part: Length of Marriage. If married, substitute care parents should have a stabilized, legal marriage of at least one year prior to being licensed. Income. Substitute care parents must have sufficient income to assure their stability and the security of their own family without relying on board payments. The substitute family must have sufficient income to absorb four to six weeks of a foster child's care until a board payment is received. Petitioner has failed to meet her burden of proof. Petitioner has failed to meet the minimum standards of Rule 10M-6. In addition, during the course of her licensure, Petitioner violated several provisions of the Substitute Care Agreement and the Bilateral Agreement. Regardless, Petitioner has indicated that she no longer wishes to renew her foster care license.4
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services enter a final order denying the renewal of Cathy Taylor's foster care license. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of November 1996 in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ERROL H. POWELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of November 1996.
The Issue Whether Petitioner's application for renewal of her family foster home license should be denied on the grounds set forth in the June 20, 1995, letter from the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS), Respondent's predecessor, to Petitioner.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at hearing and the record as a whole, the following findings of fact are made: Respondent is (as was its predecessor, HRS) a state government licensing and regulatory agency. From September of 1989 to June 30, 1995, Petitioner was licensed by HRS (on a yearly basis) to operate a family foster home at her residence in Palm Beach County. In May of 1994, as part of the licensure renewal process, Petitioner signed an "Agreement to Provide Substitute Care for Dependent Children" (Agreement). In so doing, she agreed that she would, as a licensed foster parent, among other things, "comply with all requirements for a licensed substitute care home as prescribed by the department," "immediately report any injuries or illness of a child in [her] care," and "abide by the department's discipline policy." The previous day (May 23, 1994), Petitioner had received and signed a copy of HRS's "discipline policy," which provided as follows: FOSTER PARENT(S): You are aware that for some time, Health and Rehabilitative Services has discouraged the use of Physical punishment, including spanking, for children in foster care. Now, however, we have an Administrative Rule statewide which prohibits foster parents from using corporal punishment on foster children. This section of administrative Rule 10M- 6, which deals with discipline is reproduced in the following paragraph. "Licensing and relicensing procedure developed by the Department shall include the presentation of written foster care disciplinary policies to applicants and licensed foster parents to ensure that appropriate nonabusive disciplinary practices are used in dealing with foster children's behavior. Discipline is a training process through which the child develops the self- control, self-reliance and orderly conduct necessary for them to assume responsibilities, make daily living decisions and live according to accepted levels of social behaviors. The purpose of discipline is education and rational. It focuses on deterring unacceptable behavior by encouraging the child to develop internal controls. Foster parents are expected to define rules which establish limits and types of acceptable behavior. These rules must be clearly explained to each child and applied equally to all children. Prohibited disciplinary practices include group punishments for misbehavior of individuals; withholding of meals, mail or family visits; hitting a child with an object; spanking a child; physical, sexual, emotional and verbal abuse; humiliating or degrading punishment which subjects the child to ridicule; being placed in a locked room; and delegation of authority for punishment to other children or persons not known to the child. The use of isolation shall be used only for short periods of time as a therapeutic measure when a child's behavior is temporarily out of control. Such periods of isolation shall be observed and supervised by the foster parent to ensure the safety of the child." If you have problems with this new rule, please discuss this with your licensing counselors who will be able to help you work out alternative disciplinary techniques for each child, according to his/her needs. My signature acknowledges that I have read this statement, that I understand the content and agree to abide by it. A. G. is a 12 year-old foster child who currently resides in Boys Town in Tallahassee. Before entering the foster care system, he had been the victim of abuse. In 1994, A. G. lived in Petitioner's family foster home along with three other male foster children, J. W., M. M., and B. P., all of whom were teenagers with troubled pasts and juvenile records. On or about December 15, 1994, the day before A. G. was scheduled to leave Petitioner's home for another foster home, the other boys angrily reported to Petitioner that A. G. had misappropriated a gift certificate that belonged to M. M. and a watch that belonged to B. P. M. M. was particularly upset and angry about what A. G. had done. Upon receiving this report, Petitioner instructed the boys to "take care of" the matter. The boys then went to A. G.'s room and proceeded to hit A. G. with their hands and a belt. A. G. sustained a number of bruises on his buttocks and the back of his legs as a result of the attack. A. G. yelled and screamed as he was being hit. Petitioner was in her bedroom, which was adjacent to the room where the beating took place. At no time during the attack did she leave her bedroom to tell the boys to stop beating A. G., nor did she take any other action to stop the beating. Petitioner exercised extremely poor judgment in instructing the older boys to "take care of" the matter. She should have realized that the carte blanche she gave J. W., M. M., and B. P., who were upset and angry with A. G., placed A. G.'s physical safety at risk. She compounded her error by not carefully monitoring the older boys subsequent activities to make sure that they resolved the matter appropriately without harming A. G. The following morning, A. G. left Petitioner's home for another foster home, that of Janet Kerimoglu and her husband. A. G. arrived at the Kerimoglu home with very few belongings. Moreover, his physical appearance concerned Ms. Kerimoglu. A. G. appeared to be very thin. Furthermore, he had head lice and fresh bruises on his body. When asked about the bruises, A. G. explained that he had been beaten up by some teenagers the day before at Petitioner's home. A report that A. G. had been the victim of abuse while at Petitioner's home was made to HRS's abuse registry. The report was investigated by HRS's protective services investigative unit. On January 10, 1995, following the completion of the investigation, FPSS Report No. 94-117809 issued. The report classified as "proposed confirmed" the allegation that Respondent was guilty of neglect in connection with the beating that A. G. received at her home on or about December 15, 1994. According to the report, the beating occurred "because of [Petitioner's] lack of supervision and [her] failure to protect [A. G.]," a finding which is supported by the preponderance of the record evidence in the instant case. A request to expunge or amend the report was denied on June 6, 1995. By letter dated June 20, 1995, Petitioner was advised that her foster family home license would not renewed because of the finding of neglect made in FPSS Report No. 94-117809.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a Final Order denying Petitioner's application for renewal of her family foster home license. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of September, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of September, 1998.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent should revoke Petitioner's license to operate a foster care home.
Findings Of Fact At all times material to this proceeding, Petitioner was licensed as a therapeutic foster parent. Respondent issued this license to Petitioner through the Devereux Foundation, which operates and maintains a network of foster homes to serve dependent children in Respondent's custody. Respondent places children in therapeutic foster when they have been exposed to a severe degree of physical, emotional, and/or sexual abuse, as well as extreme neglect and/or abandonment. Such children require special care and cannot be disciplined like children in a stable nuclear family. Therapeutic foster parents should never spank or use other physical methods of punishment or behavior management on these children. Many therapeutic foster children have acute and unresolved issues with control and authority. In such cases, attempts by authority figures to assert rigid control over the children will likely provoke emotionally charged oppositional reactions by the children. This is especially true when the children have not developed a relationship with the authority figures. The likelihood that such oppositional reactions will occur is much greater when authority figures attempt to impose their will on the children with the use of physical force. Children in foster care experience great difficulty in learning to trust others. The inability to trust others is reinforced when a near-stranger makes demands on therapeutic foster children, then uses physical force to compel submission. Children from dysfunctional families often experience violence in the homes of their natural parents. The children learn at an early age to respond with violence to stressful situations. The use of physical force on foster children thus generates a real and severe risk of physical injury to the foster children, the foster parents, and innocent bystanders. One purpose of therapeutic foster care is to help children learn that violent behavior is not acceptable. When foster parents use physical force to compel obedience, they reinforce the lessons learned in the homes of their natural parents at the expense of the lessons the foster care program attempts to teach. Therapeutic foster parents undergo special training before they become licensed. The Model Approach to Parenting and Partnership (MAPP) training that all foster parents receive places special emphasis on the emotional fragility of children in foster care and the consequent need to avoid confrontation with foster children. In other words, MAPP training teaches foster parents not to engage in power struggles with their charges. MAPP training emphasizes the use of positive discipline for the inevitable situations in which foster children test the boundaries set by the foster parents. These methods include reinforcing acceptable behavior, verbal disapproval, loss of privileges, and redirection. Any form of verbal abuse or physical force is strictly prohibited. Petitioner received all of the training described above. In March 2001, a sibling group of two sisters (S.M.1 and S.M.2) and a brother (D.M.) were living in a therapeutic foster home operated by Brad and Sharon Carraway through the Devereux Foundation. Mr. and Mrs. Carraway were licensed therapeutic foster parents. Respondent and the Devereux Foundation have a policy that allows for substitute foster care when therapeutic foster parents need some time away from their foster children. In that case, Devereux arranges for another licensed therapeutic foster home in its network to care for the foster children for a period of time, usually a weekend. This arrangement is known as respite foster care. During March 2001, the Carraways needed a weekend away from their foster children to take care of some family business. At that time, Loretta Kelly was the foster care program manager for Devereux in the North Florida area. Ms. Kelly made arrangements for Petitioner and his wife to take the children during the weekend of March 23-25, 2001. The children arrived in Petitioner's home late in the afternoon of Friday, March 23, 2001. As S.M.1 and S.M.2 settled into their room, Petitioner advised them that supper would be served in five minutes. S.M.1 then announced that she was not hungry and would not be going to supper. Petitioner replied that S.M.1 could either go to the table for supper or he would be back in five minutes and make her go to the table. Five minutes later, Petitioner returned to the bedroom. He told S.M.1, who was sitting on the bed, to come in to supper. When S.M.1 refused again, Petitioner grabbed S.M.1 by the wrists and tried to drag her into the dining room. A struggle ensued with S.M.1 yelling for Petitioner to let go. During the struggle, S.M.1's wrist watch broke, leaving scratches on her arm. S.M.2 was in the hall. Hearing her sister call for help, S.M.2 ran in to help S.M.1. S.M.2 pushed Petitioner away from her sister. Petitioner then grabbed S.M.2 by the wrists and struggled with her for over a minute. During the struggle, S.M.2 slid down to a sitting position with her back against the wall. S.M.2 then used her feet in an attempt to break free from Petitioner. The struggle left S.M.2 with a scar from a scratch she received on her arm. Petitioner finally gave up and called the girls' therapist, Lori Farkas, to complain about the situation. S.M.2 heard Petitioner state that he wanted the girls out of his home. The incident was reported to Respondent. Subsequently, Respondent commenced a child protective investigation into the allegations; the investigation was still open on April 20, 2001. Petitioner became angry when he learned what the children told Respondent's investigators. He telephoned Ms. Kelly on the afternoon of April 20, 2001. He accused the children of lying and asserted that they should be punished. He threatened to file battery charges against the children and have them arrested if they did not change their story and "tell the truth." Next, Petitioner telephoned Ms. Carraway. He told Ms. Carraway that she ought to be teaching the girls morals and honesty. He accused the girls of lying. Petitioner informed Ms. Carraway that he was going to consult an attorney and have the girls arrested at school for assault and battery. Petitioner told Ms. Carraway that he would be more believable in light of the children's background. S.M.1 was with Ms. Carraway during Petitioner's telephone call. Ms. Carraway and S.M.1 wrote notes to each other regarding Petitioner's comments during the telephone call. Both girls were apprehensive for some time after this telephone call about the possibility of being arrested. Ms. Carraway called Ms. Kelly immediately after talking to Petitioner. Ms. Kelly then called Petitioner to instruct him not to make any further calls to the Carraway home.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That Respondent enter a final order revoking Petitioner's therapeutic foster license. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of April, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of April, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: David L. Motes 2023 Duneagle Lane Tallahassee, Florida 32311 John R. Perry, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services 2639 North Monroe Street, Suite 252A Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2949 Peggy Sanford, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204B Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Josie Tomayo, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioners should be licensed to operate a foster home in Marianna, Jackson County, Florida.
Findings Of Fact Respondent licensed Petitioners to operate a foster home in Respondent's District No. 9, West Palm Beach, Florida, beginning in 1995 through April 1, 2000. The Department of Health, under its Children's Medical Services Program, licensed Petitioners as medical foster parents for almost two years of that time. At all times material to this proceeding, Petitioners had five children living with them in West Palm Beach, Florida. Two boys, aged six and three, were Petitioners' adopted sons. A two-year-old boy, A.B., and his one-year-old sister, T.B. were medical foster children. C.S. was a two-year-old female foster child. In August 1999, Petitioners bought a home in Respondent's District No. 2, which includes Marianna, Jackson County, Florida. Mr. Mayes is a carpenter and intended to make repairs to the home before moving his family to North Florida. Petitioners knew their foster home license in District No. 9 was not transferable to District No. 2. Therefore, they applied for a foster home license in District No. 2. Petitioners wanted their three foster children to move with them to Mariana, Florida. Petitioners hoped to adopt C.S. and to keep A.B. and T.B. in the same placement until another family adopted them. All of the foster children had been in Petitioners' home since they were a few days old. A.B. was a very active two-year-old child. He regularly climbed out of his crib. On one occasion he climbed up on the stove and turned on the burners. He seemed to "have no fear." In the fall of 1999, Mrs. Mayes requested Respondent to provide her with behavior management assistance for A.B. Because Petitioners were planning to move out of District No. 9, Respondent decided to wait until A.B. was settled after Petitioners' move to perform the behavior management evaluation. In the meantime, Petitioners could not keep A.B. in his highchair during mealtime. They had difficulty keeping him in his crib. They bought a safety harness and attempted to use it to keep A.B. in his crib on one occasion and in his highchair on another occasion. A.B. was able to wiggle out of the harness on both occasions. Petitioners subsequently discarded the harness. They resorted to tightening the highchair's feeding tray in order to keep A.B. still long enough to feed him. Petitioners never used and never intended to use the harness to punish A.B. Petitioners usually disciplined the children by placing them in timeout for one minute per year of age. Timeout for Petitioners' foster children usually meant being held in Mrs. Mayes' lap. Mrs. Mayes admitted using the safety harness on A.B. during a telephone conversation with Respondent's medical foster care counselor in January 2000. The counselor informed Ms. Mayes that foster parents are not allowed to use a harness to restrain foster children. Prospective foster parents must participate in and complete training classes designed by Respondent. Persuasive evidence indicates that Respondent teaches prospective foster parents during this training that children should never be restrained by a harness. Petitioners have taken these training classes. If A.B. and the other children were free to go into a bedroom, they would pull everything out of the chest of drawers. They would flush objects down the toilet in the bathroom. Mr. Mayes put a hook-type latch on the door to the Petitioners' bedroom, A.B.'s bedroom, and the bathroom in the hall. The primary purpose of the door latches was to keep the children out of unsupervised areas of the home. Petitioners never used the door latches as a means of discipline. On two occasions Mrs. Mayes latched the door to A.B.'s room while he was in the room asleep. The first time she latched the door while she went to the mail box in front of her home. The other time, she latched the door while she bathed another child who had a doctor's appointment later that afternoon. On both occasions, A.B. was locked in his room for only a few minutes. Petitioners knew that they needed permission from Respondent in order to take A.B., T.B., and C.S. out of the state on vacations. On several occasions, Respondent's staff gave Petitioners permission to take the foster children to North Florida for short visits during the time that Mr. Mayes was remodeling the home. Respondent's staff approved these short visits as if they were vacations. Petitioners knew that they needed to be licensed in Respondent's District No. 2 before Respondent's staff in District No. 9 could approve the permanent transfer of the foster children. At the same time, the Respondent's staff in District No. 2 could not license Petitioners until they actually made the move with all of their furniture. Petitioners discussed their dilemma with several members of Respondent's staff in District No. 9. During these conversations, Petitioners asked Respondent if they could take the children with them and treat the time that they would be temporarily unlicensed as if it were a vacation. At least one member of Respondent's staff responded that treating the move initially as if it were a vacation was "an option that could be explored." Respondent's staff subsequently advised Petitioners that under no circumstances could the foster children move to Jackson County, temporarily or permanently, until Petitioners were properly licensed. Petitioner's never attempted to deceive Respondent; to the contrary, they were openly looking for an acceptable way to take the foster children with then when they moved. They never intended to circumvent the proper licensing process. Based on Petitioners' former experience with Respondent, they believed that treating the move as a vacation would be an appropriate way to solve what was otherwise a "catch twenty-two" situation. By letter dated March 14, 2000, Respondent's staff in District No. 2 advised Petitioners that they would receive a provisional foster home license as soon as information furnished by Petitioners and copies of Petitioners' file from the licensing unit in District No. 9 could be sent to Respondent's office in Panama City, Florida. Respondent removed the three foster children from Petitioners' home just before Petitioners moved to Jackson County on April 1, 2000. In a memorandum dated April 19, 2000, Respondent listed Petitioners' home as one of two medical foster homes in Jackson County, Florida. Despite the representation in this memorandum, Respondent issued the letter of denial on June 5, 2000.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That Respondent enter a final order denying Petitioners a foster home license. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of October, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of October, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: James Mayes Gail Mayes 4561 Magnolia Road Marianna, Florida 32448 John R. Perry, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services 2639 North Monroe, Suite 252-A Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2949 Virginia A. Daire, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204B 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Josie Tomayo, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioners should be issued a family foster home license.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the testimony, exhibits, and stipulated facts in the Joint Stipulation, the following Findings of Fact are made: Parties and Process Petitioners, who are husband and wife, submitted an application for licensure as a family foster home. Although this was an application for initial licensure, Petitioners were previously licensed as a foster home from August 2013 to October 2019.1 The Department is the state agency responsible for licensing foster care parents and foster homes, pursuant to section 409.175, Florida Statutes, and Florida Administrative Code Chapter 65C-45. Petitioners voluntarily relinquished their foster home license on or about October 28, 2019, around the time two female foster children, S.W. and H.C.S., were removed from their care. It is unclear whether the children were removed because of an abuse investigation related to H.C.S., or whether they were removed because Petitioners closed their home to foster children. Regardless, Mrs. Gilio testified that they let their license lapse because they needed a break after fostering H.C.S. The Department administers foster care licensing by contracting with third-party private entities. In Circuit 13, where Petitioners are located, the Department contracted with Eckerd Community Alternatives, doing business as Eckerd Connects (Eckerd), to be the agency responsible for facilitating foster care licensing. Eckerd has subcontracted with Children's Home Network (CHN) to facilitate foster care licensing. 1 Petitioners had previously been denied a foster care license in 2009. At the time relevant to Petitioners, the Department used the "attestation" model of foster home licensing. In this model, a private licensing agency with whom the Department has contracted will conduct a home study on the foster home applicants and attest to the applicants' fitness to be licensed. The Department does not have the discretion to deny the license once the licensing agency has attested to the appropriateness of the applicants, except if they have been named as caregivers in three or more abuse reports within five years. If there are such abuse reports, the Department is required to review those reports and make a final decision regarding the application. There is no requirement that the reports result in a finding of actual abuse for them to be reviewed by the Department.2 Although it is unclear when Petitioners submitted their application for the foster care license in this case, sometime in late 2019, CHN conducted and compiled a Unified Home Study (home study), which included Petitioners' background screening; previous reports of abuse, abandonment, or neglect involving the applicants, and references from all adult children. The home study was reviewed at a meeting on December 19, 2019, by Eckerd, through the Committee. The Committee considered the application, home study, and licensing packet and heard from various agency staff. Petitioners were also allowed to voice comments and concerns at this meeting. Had the Committee approved the application, it would have been sent to the Department along with an attestation that stated the foster home meets all requirements for licensure and a foster home license is issued by the Department. However, the Committee unanimously voted not to recommend approval of a foster home license to Petitioners. 2 The categories of findings for an abuse report are "no indicator," "not substantiated," and "verified." "No indicator" means there was no credible evidence to support a determination of abuse. "Not substantiated" means there is evidence, but it does not meet the standard of being a preponderance to support that a specific harm is the result of abuse. "Verified" means that there is a preponderance of credible evidence which results in a determination that a specific harm was a result of abuse. Frank Prado, Suncoast Regional Managing Director for the Department, ultimately decided to deny Petitioners' application for a family foster home license due to their prior parenting experiences, the multiple abuse reports regarding their home, and the recommendation of the Committee. Mr. Prado expressed concern about the nature of the abuse reports and Petitioners' admission that they used corporal punishment on a child they adopted from the foster care system in the presence of other foster children. Petitioners' Parenting History Petitioners have seven children: one is the biological son of Mr. Gilio; another is the biological son of Mrs. Gilio; and five were adopted through the foster care system in Florida. Of these seven children, six are now adults. Three of the adopted children, Jay, Sean, and Jameson, are biological brothers who Petitioners adopted in 2001. Shawna, who was adopted around 2003, is the only adopted daughter. The Petitioners' one minor child, H.G., is a nine-year-old boy and the only child who resides in their home. H.G. suffers from oppositional defiance disorder. Petitioners admitted they adopted Shawna after there had been allegations of inappropriate behavior made against Jay, by a young girl who lived next door to Petitioners. Later, while they were living with Petitioners, Jay, Sean, and Jameson were arrested for sexually abusing Shawna at different times. As a result, one or more of the sons were court-ordered to not be around Shawna, and the other brothers were required to undergo treatment and never returned to Petitioners' home. During the hearing, both Petitioners seem to blame Shawna, who was nine years old when the sexual abuse by Jay in their home allegedly began, for disrupting their home. They accused her of being "not remorseful" and "highly sexualized." Regarding the abuse by Sean and Jameson, which occurred when Shawna was approximately 12 years old, Mr. Gilio stated Shawna thought it was okay to have sex with boys, and it was "hard to watch every minute of the day if they're, you know, having sex." When Shawna was about 19 years old, she filed a "Petition for Injunction for Protection Against Domestic Violence" against Mr. Gilio in circuit court. The Petition outlined allegations of past sexual comments and inappropriate disciplinary behavior from 2007 to 2012, while she lived with Petitioners. Mr. Gilio denied at the hearing having any knowledge about the Petition against him, but admitted he made comments about Shawna's breasts. As part of the application and home study process, the CHN collected references from Petitioners' former foster children and adult children. Shawna (Petitioners' only adopted daughter) gave them a negative reference and specifically stated she would not want female foster children to live with Petitioners. Reports of Abuse Petitioners were involved in 24 abuse reports during their time of licensure between 2013 and 2019. During the past five years, Petitioners were named as either alleged perpetrators or caregivers responsible in eight reports that were made to the Florida Child Abuse Hotline (Hotline). Of those eight reports, five of them named Mr. Gilio as the alleged perpetrator causing a physical injury, one report named Mr. Gilio as the caregiver responsible for a burn on a foster child, and one report named Mr. Gilio as an alleged perpetrator of sexual abuse against a foster child. Mrs. Gilio was named as an alleged perpetrator of asphyxiation as to a foster child. Seven of the reports in the last five years against Petitioners were closed with no indicators of abuse. One of the abuse reports was closed with a "not substantiated" finding of physical injury. In this report, Mr. Gilio was the alleged perpetrator and the victim was H.G., Petitioners' minor adopted son. Additionally, after Petitioners let their foster license lapse in October 2019, a subsequent report was made against Mr. Gilio for improper contact with a former foster daughter. This incident was discussed at the Committee meeting, but it was unclear if this allegation was ever investigated. Corporal Punishment According to the Department's rules, discussed below, foster parents are forbidden to engage in corporal punishments of any kind. In 2019, there were two reports alleging Mr. Gilio of causing physical injury by corporal punishment on H.G. At the time, there were other foster children in the household. Technically, Mr. Gilio was allowed to use corporal punishment on H.G. because he was no longer a foster child and had been adopted from foster care. If a parent uses corporal punishment on a child, there can be no findings of abuse unless the child suffered temporary or permanent disfigurement. However, foster care providers are not permitted to use corporal punishment. More than one witness at the hearing had concerns about the use of corporal punishment against H.G. because of his operational defiance disorder and because other foster children (who may have been victims of physical abuse) were in the household. Brendale Perkins, who is a foster parent herself and serves on the Hillsborough County Family Partnership Alliance, an organization that supports licensed foster parents, testified she witnessed Mr. Gilio treating a foster child in his care roughly. At the time, she was concerned because this was not the way children in foster care (who may have previously been victims of abuse) should be treated. She did not, however, report it to any authorities. The Department established through testimony that the policy against using corporal punishment is taught to all potential foster families. Mr. Gilio, however, denied ever being instructed not to use corporal punishment against foster children or while foster children were in the home. He also claimed that H.G.'s therapist had never recommended any specific punishment techniques. The undersigned finds Mr. Gilio's testimony not credible. Cooperation with Fostering Partners The Department established that decisions regarding foster children are made within a "system of care" which includes input from case managers, guardian ad litem (GAL), and support service providers. The relationship between Petitioners and others working as part of this system during the time of fostering was not ideal; it was described by witnesses as "tense" and "disgruntled." One witness, a supervisor at CHN, testified Mr. Gilio was not receptive or flexible when partnering with other agencies, and was not always open to providing information when questioned. As an example, Petitioners fired a therapist without consulting with the CHN staff or the GAL for the child. At the final hearing, Mr. Gilio continued to claim he did nothing wrong by not consulting with others in the system regarding this decision. Kristin Edwardson, a child protection investigator for the Hillsborough County Sheriff's Office, was tasked with investigating the reports of abuse and neglect against Petitioners that had been reported to the Hotline. She testified she was concerned with the level of cooperation they provided her and other investigators. Although they ultimately would cooperate, Petitioners made it difficult for the investigators and would often "push back" and make the situation more stressful. She described Mr. Gilio as being disrespectful, belittling, and dismissive of her. Licensing Review Committee On December 19, 2020, the Committee, made up of eight individuals, was convened to review Petitioners' application for a foster home license. When determining whether a family should receive a foster home license, the Committee is to evaluate the applicants' background, parenting experience, references from community partners, and the family's openness and willingness to partner. Sheila DelCastillo, a regional trainer with the GAL program, was a Committee member. She had prior knowledge of Petitioners from a report that a foster child's room in Petitioners' home smelled strongly of urine during a home visit and that GAL staff had found a prescription bottle beside the child’s bed that belonged to Mr. Gilio. With regards to Petitioners' application, she read the licensing review packet and home study that contained numerous abuse reports. Ms. DelCastillo was concerned about the 24 abuse reports Petitioners’ received during their time of licensure, the negative reference from Shawna, their use of corporal punishment on H.G., and Petitioners' downplaying of the events that led to multiple abuse reports. Michelle Costley, a licensing director with CHN in charge of level 2 traditional foster homes, also served on the Committee. Ms. Costley has 14 years of experience, with seven of those years spent in foster care licensing. As director of licensing, Ms. Costley was concerned about the number of abuse reports received regarding Petitioners; Mr. Gilio's inability to be open and flexible when working in partnership with other agencies; and the needs of Petitioners' child, H.G. She was also concerned about Petitioners' decision to fire a therapist of a foster child without consulting the GAL or the other individuals involved with that child. Regarding the alleged abuse, Ms. Costley was concerned that most of the reports regarding Petitioners involved allegations of physical abuse, inappropriate touch of a sexual nature, or sexual abuse, with most alleged victims being younger than eight years old. She explained that even though these reports could not be "verified," these types of allegations are harder to establish because testimony by children of that age often is unreliable and there usually must be evidence of physical injury, which no longer is present by the time the alleged abuse is investigated. Ms. Perkins also served on the Committee. Ms. Perkins served as a foster parent mentor, working with foster parents to help them build co- parenting strategies and navigate the system of care. She has been a licensed foster parent for 13 years and has adopted 11 children from foster care. As stated earlier, she was familiar with Petitioners from the Hillsborough County Family Partnership Alliance meetings. Ms. Perkins was concerned with the number of abuse reports with similar allegations, but different victims. She also discussed Petitioners' use of corporal punishment, noting that they could have been using verbal de-escalation methods instead of corporal punishment due to the traumatic histories of many foster care children. Ms. Edwardson also served on the Committee. In addition to her personal interactions with Petitioners, Ms. Edwardson was concerned about the totality of the information presented to the Committee regarding the abuse reports and Mr. Gilio's lack of cooperation. She noted that although they were not substantiated, the number and nature of the reports related to young children were of concern. Based on the Committee notes and transcript of the meeting, Petitioners were allowed to respond to the Committee's questions at the December 2019 meeting. They argued that none of the abuse reports were proven true and any injuries were not their fault. They seemed more concerned about who made the abuse reports and why the abuse reports were called in than whether the foster children were protected in their care. For example, although Mr. Gilio admitted to hitting H.G. with a stick twice as big as a pencil, he denied any bruising was caused by the stick. A report of a burn on another child was explained by Mr. Gilio as an accident that occurred while he was teaching her how to iron; he could not understand why this was reported as possible abuse. Ms. Gilio explained that H.C.S. was a very active child which resulted in her needing stitches and requiring restraint. After hearing from Petitioners, the Committee members discussed their concerns that Petitioners were not forthcoming about the various abuse incidents, and would not take responsibility for any of the injuries or issues raised by the abuse reports. All eight members voted to not move Petitioners' application forward.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Department of Children and Families denying a family foster home license to Petitioners, Mary and James Gilio. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of November, 2020, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S HETAL DESAI Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of November, 2020. COPIES FURNISHED: Anthony Duran, Esquire Tison Law Group 9312 North Armenia Avenue Tampa, Florida 33612 (eServed) Deanne Cherisse Fields, Esquire Department of Children and Families 9393 North Florida Avenue Tampa, Florida 33612 (eServed) Lacey Kantor, Esquire Department of Children and Families Building 2, Room 204Z 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 (eServed) Javier A. Enriquez, General Counsel Department of Children and Families Building 2, Room 204F 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 (eServed) Chad Poppell, Secretary Department of Children and Families Building 1, Room 202 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 (eServed)
