The Issue Whether or not Charles D. Reynolds, on January 7th, 1976, was arrested and charged with DWI, Aggravated Assault, and Resisting Arrest without Violence; the charge of DWI was reduced to driving with an unauthorized blood alcohol level; Charles D. Reynolds plead guilty, was adjudicated guilty and paid a fine of $200 plus court costs; the aggravated assault charge was nol prossed; he plead guilty and was adjudicated guilty of Resisting Arrest without Violence and paid a fine of $250 plus court costs, his license was revoked, and he was sentenced to DWI School; and due to the above misconduct has failed to perform his duties as an educator as described in Section 231.09, Florida Statutes, thereby subjecting himself to the penalties found in Section 231.28, Florida Statutes. Whether or not Charles D. Reynolds, on December 25th, 1976, was arrested and charged with DWI, and resisting arrest with violence; he plead guilty to the lesser including Offense of Assault on a Law Officer, was put on one year's probation, sentenced to spend weekends in Jail for a period of three months beginning June 11th, 1977; he was allowed to vacate the guilty plea and plead nolo contendere to the charge of Assault on a Law Enforcement Officer with the same conditions as the guilty plea; and due to the above misconduct has failed to perform his duties as an educator as described in Section 231.09, Florida Statutes, thereby subjecting himself to the penalties found in Section 231.28, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Charles D. Reynolds, is presently the holder of Florida Teacher's Certificate Number 316529, Graduate Rank III and is employed in the public schools of Duval County, Florida. This cause has been brought for consideration based upon a recommendation by the State of Florida, Department of Education, Professional Practices Council, Executive Committee, dated May 17th, 1977. Upon examination of the recommendation, the Commissioner of Education found probable cause for filing a petition for the suspension of the Respondent's Florida Teacher's Certificate within the meaning of Section 231.28, Florida Statutes, and in accordance with Rule 6A-4.37, F.A.C. This determination was made on May 17th, 1977. On May 23rd, 1977, a petition for the suspension of the Respondent's Florida Teacher's Certificate was filed. The Respondent has filed his answer to the petition and has opposed the entry of an order of suspension. The case has been forwarded to the Division of Administrative Hearings for consideration by correspondence from the Petitioner dated July 14th, 1977. On January 7th, 1976, Respondent, Charles D. Reynolds a/k/a Chuck Daniel Reynolds was involved in an automobile accident in the parking lot of his residence at the Arrowhead Apartments located in Jacksonville, Florida. Officers of the Jacksonville Sheriff's Office investigated the case and in the course of the investigation asked to enter Respondent's apartment to obtain his driver's license. Reynolds was opposed to them entering his apartment, but they did go in. Reynolds went to the bedroom and obtained the license and came back into the living room area. At that point he became angry with the officers and took a swing in the general direction of a Sergeant Branch. The other officers subdued Reynolds and handcuffed him. He was subsequently taken to the hospital for treatment of wounds received in the scuffle. In addition to the events described, Reynolds also made verbal threats against the witnesses to the accident, to the effect that he would get even with them. During the course of this entire exchange, Reynolds appeared intoxicated as evidenced in slurred speech, erratic actions, excitability and a strong odor of the substance alcohol. He continued to be belligerent and kicked the side of the police car while being transported. It should be indicated that the Respondent did not carry out any of the verbal threats that he made. As a result of the incident, the Respondent was charged with DWI, aggravated assault, and resisting arrest without violence. The charge of DWI was reduced to driving with an unauthorized blood alcohol level and a guilty plea was entered for which he was fined in the amount of $200.00. The aggravated assault charge was nol prossed. The further provision of his sentence was that he attend the DWI school. The particulars of this case may be found in the Petitioner's composite exhibit 1 admitted into evidence, which describes the pleas and the judgment and sentence. The Respondent was fined in the amount of $250.00 for his plea of guilty to resisting arrest without violence. The second incident for which Respondent is charged in the Petition for Suspension, pertains to events on December 25th, 1976. On that date officers of the Jacksonville Sheriff's Office were traveling east on 103rd Street, in Jacksonville, Florida. Reynolds was going west, driving with his bright lights on and straying into the oncoming lane in which the officers were driving. The time was approximately 1:30-2:00 a.m. The officers turned around and pursued Reynolds, who at one point in the pursuit pulled off the road to avoid the officers. The officers finally caught Reynolds on Interstate 295 in Duval County, Florida. After making the stop, they removed Reynolds from the car and noted that he had a strong odor of alcohol about his person, and was staggering around. One officer administered so-called field sobriety tests , specifically the finger to nose and balance test. In the finger to nose test the individual tries to place an index finger on his nose while standing in a certain posture. Reynolds was unable to do this and was also unable to stand on one foot in attempting the balance test. The officers felt that Reynolds was driving while under the influence of alcohol; however, being Christmas Day they intended to give Reynolds the opportunity to have someone come and pick him up and drive his car home, and waive charges. When this was explained to Reynolds, Reynolds replied that he wanted to get back in his car, for purposes of driving away. The officers prohibited him from getting in the car, at which point a struggle ensued between the officers and Reynolds for a period of minutes. Most of the struggle was in the traffic lanes of Interstate 295. In the end, Reynolds was charged with DWI, a couple of traffic violations and resisting arrest with violence. After the struggle Reynolds indicated that the officers were going to be sorry for, "screwing with me." He was taken to the Duval County, Florida Jail and booked for the offenses and given a breathalizer examination which showed his reading to be .27 percent blood alcohol level. This reading nay be found in Petitioner's Exhibit 3 admitted into evidence. He entered a plea of guilty to the lesser included offense under resisting arrest with violence, to wit assault on a law enforcement officer. The Court withheld the adjudication of guilt and placed the Respondent on probation for a period of one year on the condition that he spend weekends in jail for a period of three (3) months, beginning on June 11th, 1977, and pay $10.00 per month for cost of supervision. This plea was subsequently withdrawn and the Court allowed a plea of nolo contendere to be entered in lieu of the guilty plea. The Court also allowed a motion to mitigate the sentence, which motion was filed prior to the imposition of the petition for suspension made by the Petitioner in this cause. The Court's Order Granting the Motion to Mitigate was entered subsequent to the Petition for Suspension made by the Petitioner. The probation terms were modified by memorandum of June 9th, 1977, from the Court, deleting the provision to spend weekends in jail. Subsequently, the Respondent was required to spend time working in a program known as the Jacksonville Probation and Restitution Center, working with young offenders. (The Director of that program testified in the hearing and indicated that Mr. Reynolds did an admirable job of assisting in the program.) For the violations alleged on January 6th, 1976 and December 25th, 1976, the Petitioner has charged Respondent with violations of Section 231.09 and .28, F.S. The two incidents will be discussed chronologically in considering whether the Petitioner has proven the violations or not. The first factual incident discussed pertains to the events of January 7th, 1976. In reviewing the events that led to the arrest and charges previously discussed and the subsequent disposition of those charges in terms of a possible substitute violation of Section 231.09, F.S., the only provision of that section which would seen to have any application would be Section 231.09(2) F.S. No other sub-paragraphs of Section 231.09, F.S. seem to have application under the evidential facts established. The subsection that does have application, i.e., Section 231.09(2), F.S. reads as follows: "EXAMPLES FOR PUPILS -- Labor faithfully and earnestly for the advancement of the pupils in their studies, deportment and morals, and embrace every opportunity to inculcate, by precept and example, the principles of truth, honesty and pat- riotism and the practice of every Christian virtue." This provision of the chapter has been considered in the case of Meltzer vs. Board of Public Instruction of Orange County, Florida, etc., et al., 548 F.2d 559 (5th Circuit Court of Appeals), in that opinion the Court held Section 231.09(2), F.S., to be unconstitutional. However, on petition for rehearing and petition for rehearing en banc, reported at 553 F.2d 1008, The United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, granted rehearing with the right for oral agreement and the opportunity to submit supplemental briefs, with the date of the oral agreement to be announced in the future. The rehearing has not been held at the time of this recommended order, to the knowledge of the undersigned. Consequently, the undersigned will report whether the evidential facts as demonstrated established a violation under the language of Section 231.09(2), F.S., with a caveat that this section may not withstand the final order of the Court in Meltzer, supra. Should Section 231.09(2), F.S. be upheld, the acts of being arrested and pleading guilty to driving with an unlawful blood alcohol level and resisting or opposing a police officer without violence constitute violations of Section 231.09(2), F.S., both in terms of the entry of the plea in those two counts and in terms of the underlying evidential facts which led to the plea of guilty. These facts establish that the Respondent failed to labor faithfully and honestly for the advancement of the pupils in their department and morals, in accordance with Section 231.09(2), F.S., assuming this latter section of the law to be constitutional. Again, the evidential facts spoken of are those established in the events reported in the hearing pertaining to the incident of January 7th, 1976, in which Respondent was driving with an unlawful blood alcohol level and resisted the police without violence. In connection with the events of January 7th, 1976, there is a further allegation of a violation of Section 231.28, F.S. In pertinent part, Section 231.28(1), F.S., states that the license can be suspended in accordance with the following language: * * * "(1) It can be shown that such person obtained the teaching certificate by fraudulent means, or has proved to be incompetent to teach or to perform his duties as an employee of the public school system, or to teach in or to operate a private school, or has been guilty of gross immorality or an act involving moral turpitude, or has had his certificate revoked in another state, or has been convicted of a mis- demeanor, felony, or any other criminal charge, other than a minor traffic vio- lation , or upon investigation has been found guilty of personal conduct which seriously reduces his effectiveness as an employee of the school board, or has otherwise violated the provisions of the law, the penalty for which is the revocation of the teaching certificate, or has refused to comply with the re- gulations of the State Board of Education or the school board in the district in which he is employed." In reviewing the language of that section in comparison to the facts established in the events of January 7th, 1976, it is established that Respondent is guilty of a violation of that section because he has plead guilty to driving with an unauthorized blood alcohol level and resisting arrest without violence, which are misdemeanors or other criminal charges, other than minor traffic violations. This activity was also an act involving moral turpitude. No other violations of this section were shown as a result of the matters of January 7th, 1976. Turning to a consideration of the factual matters established in this hearing as it pertains to December 25th, 1976, and in view of the discussion of Section 231.09(2), F.S., pertaining to January 7th, 1976, a violation has been shown. The events of December 25th, 1976, are likewise subject to the caveat pertaining to the case of Meltzer, supra. The events of the arrest and subsequent pleas in Court after the factual events of December 25th, 1976, have shown the Respondent has failed to labor faithfully and honestly to the advancement of pupils and their deportment and morals, by his condition while driving and by his resistance to the authorities who were trying to enforce the laws of the State of Florida. No other violations of Section 231.09, F.S., were shown for the December 25th, 1976 incident. The events of December 25th, 1976, show a violation of Section 231.28(1), F.S., in that the act of the Respondent's driving and resistance to the authorities who were enforcing the laws of the State of Florida were acts involving moral turpitude. Also by the entry of the plea of nolo contendere which the Court accepted in lieu of the guilty plea, the Respondent has been convicted of a misdemeanor other than a minor traffic violation. No other violations of Section 231.28, F.S. were shown for the events of December 25th, 1976. By the guilty plea entered to the offenses of driving with an unlawful blood alcohol level and resistance without violence in the charges of January 7th, 1976, and the nolo contendere plea to the offense of assault on a law enforcement for the events of December 25th, 1976, the Petitioner has made a prima facie proof of grounds for revocation of the Respondent's teaching certificate, as set forth in Section 231.28(3), F.S. These prima facie grounds have not been refuted by the Respondent.
Recommendation In the course of the hearing, certain witnesses testified as to the Respondent's good character and teaching proficiency. These witnesses were various members of the community and members of the staff of the school in which the Respondent teaches and pupils of the Respondent. Although these witnesses were not aware of the events involved in the incidents of January 7th, 1976, and December 25th, 1976, they were nonetheless impressed with Respondent's abilities as a teacher. In considering their testimony and the testimony offered which established the alleged violations, it is
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings Of Fact and Conclusions Of Law, it is recommended that the Petitioner, the Department of State, Division of Licensing, enter a final order finding the Respondent, Velda Sue Hopkins, guilty of violating Sections 493.304(4), 493.313(6), and 493.319(1)(g) , Florida Statutes (1987), and imposing a fine of $500. RECOMMENDED this 27th day of June, 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of June, 1988.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Finding of Fact and Conclusion of Law, it is recommended that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief in this case. RECOMMENDED this 28th day of February, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of February, 1990.
The Issue The issue in the case is whether the Respondent is quilty of the violation alleged in the Administrative Complaint; and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent was certified by the Commission on February 28, 1992, and was issued Law Enforcement certificate number 122723. (Stipulation) The Respondent was employed as a Special Agent for the Department of Business Regulation, Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco, from September 13, 1991, to October 18, 1996. (Stipulation) Kenneth Hunter is employed as a deputy sheriff with the Leon County Sheriff's Office, and has been so employed since July 5, 1989. Deputy Hunter has known the Respondent since 1991, when they attended law enforcement academy together. Deputy Hunter and the Respondent kept in touch over that period of time. On June 17, 1995, at approximately 9:00 a.m., the Respondent called Deputy Hunter at his residence. The Respondent told Deputy Hunter that the Respondent's brother, Reverend Gregory James, had been beaten up by Colby Richardson, and that Richardson had stolen some money from his brother, a local minister. The Respondent told Deputy Hunter that the amount stolen was $1,500.00. Some of the money which was taken was money which Reverend James had withdrawn intending to give it to the Respondent. The Respondent stated to Hunter that the prior evening he had spoken to Colby Richardson, and that Mr. Richardson had agreed to return the money taken from Reverend James. The Respondent asked Deputy Hunter to accompany him to Quincy, Florida, to find Richardson. When Respondent called Hunter, the Respondent was on his way to Pensacola, Florida, for a professional course, and was driving his state-issued vehicle which was equipped with a police radio and strobe light. The Respondent picked up Deputy Hunter at Hunter's residence, and introduced Hunter to Reverend James, who was riding in the back seat of the vehicle. Deputy Hunter asked the Respondent why his brother had not reported the robbery, and the Respondent stated that his brother was well known in the community, and did not want to make "a big stink" about it. The Respondent, Deputy Hunter, and Reverend James traveled to Quincy, Florida. While in Quincy, the Respondent spoke to two females who knew Mr. Richardson, and gave the Respondent the telephone number of Mr. Richardson's girlfriend, Rosilyn Copeland. The Respondent telephoned Ms. Copeland and asked for and received directions to her residence. The Respondent, Respondent's brother, and Deputy Hunter traveled to Ms. Copeland's residence in Quincy, Florida. The Respondent knocked on the door, and when Ms. Copeland answered the door, introduced himself as "Agent James," and introduced Deputy Hunter as "Officer Hunter." The Respondent was wearing black pants, a black polo shirt, and a black baseball cap. A conflict in the testimony exists regarding whether the Respondent, who was wearing a badge on a chain around his neck, removed his Special Agent badge from beneath his shirt and showed it to Ms. Copeland. Ms. Copeland later believed that the Respondent was a law enforcement officer who was looking for Mr. Richardson to recover money Mr. Richardson had stolen from Respondent's brother. The Respondent testified at hearing, and stated he was wearing a black shirt on the day in question, and his badge could have been visible. Deputy Hunter gave a statement to the investigator. It is noted that Hunter was also outside his jurisdiction and was the subject or the potential subject of an investigation into his activities in association with the Respondent during this incident. Hunter stated that he never identified himself to anyone they met, and that the Respondent identified himself as “Agent James” and him as “Deputy Hunter.” Hunter stated that he informed the Respondent that it was inappropriate to introduce themselves as officers, and told him not to do that. The Respondent continued to talk with Ms. Copeland about Mr. Richardson's location, and Ms. Copeland told them that she had driven Mr. Richardson to his mother's house. The Respondent asked Ms. Copeland how he could get in touch with Mr. Richardson, and she stated that she would call Mr. Richardson. Ms. Copeland contacted Mr. Richardson on the telephone, and the Respondent, who was standing outside, entered the apartment and took the telephone from Ms. Copeland. The Respondent talked to Mr. Richardson and told him that he had better give back the money. The Respondent told Deputy Hunter to talk to Mr. Richardson. Mr. Richardson stated to Hunter that he wanted to return the money, but was worried about what would happen to him. Deputy Hunter informed Mr. Richardson that nothing would happen to him, and that they only wanted the money back. Mr. Richardson stated that he didn't have all of the money, but would have it by 1:00 p.m. The Respondent gave Mr. Richardson a pager number with which to get in touch with him when Richardson had the money. The Respondent, his brother, and Hunter left Copeland’s, and drove to the residence of Bruce (last name unknown), where the robbery had occurred. Bruce was not there when they arrived, but they met Bruce driving up as they drove away. In the conversation that followed, the Respondent identified himself as Agent James. The Respondent was confrontational with Bruce and accused him of setting his brother up. Bruce denied having been involved, but Hunter was suspicious of Bruce’s version of events. Deputy Hunter told the Respondent that the facts did not sound right, and that they should report the matter to local law enforcement. The Respondent, Deputy Hunter and Reverend James went to the local police department; however, they were advised that the Gadsden County sheriff had jurisdiction. They did not seek assistance from the sheriff's department because of a personal conflict between Respondent's brother and the watch officer at the sheriff's department. Thereafter, the Respondent called Ms. Copeland to find out where Mr. Richardson was living. The Respondent, Reverend James, and Deputy Hunter traveled to the area known as Coon Bottom in the vicinity of State Road 12 in Gadsden County looking for Mr. Richardson. They encountered three boys, and the Respondent identified himself as Agent James. He asked them if they knew where Mrs. Richardson lived, and the boys pointed out her house. The Respondent, Respondent's brother, and Deputy Hunter went to her house and asked her where her son, Colby, was. When she asked why they wanted to know, the Respondent identified himself as "Agent James" and stated that they were looking for Colby. Ms. Richardson stated that she did not know where he was. Deputy Hunter wrote the Respondent's beeper number on the back of his (Hunter's) business cards, gave it to Ms. Richardson, and they left. Later that day, when Colby did not contact them, Deputy Hunter again suggested to the Respondent and Reverend James that they report the offense to the local sheriff. They obtained the mobile number of an investigator with the local Sheriff's Office. Reverend James dialed the number and handed the phone to Deputy Hunter who advised the sheriff investigator of the information as he knew it. On March 18, 1996, eight months after the incident, the Respondent gave a sworn statement to Internal Inspector John W. Harris of the Department of Business and Professional Regulation. Prior to giving his statement, the Respondent was allowed to review the statements previously given by Ms. Copeland and Deputy Hunter. The Respondent was placed under oath and notified that giving a false statement under oath constituted perjury. The Respondent stated to the investigator that he was in Tallahassee on June 17, 1995, on his way to a Narcotics Investigations Identification school in Pensacola. The Respondent stated that he and Deputy Hunter traveled to Quincy in his state vehicle to find the individual identified as Colby Richardson, who had robbed his brother. The Respondent stated that he was driving his police car, carrying his weapon and wearing his badge around his neck. Respondent stated they went to Colby Richardson's girlfriend's house, and that he introduced himself as "James" and that he introduced Deputy Hunter as "Hunter." When the Respondent was asked if he introduced himself as "Agent James" to Ms. Copeland, he stated, "No, I just said James." When asked if he had shown Ms. Copeland a badge, he stated, "No, I can't recall showing her a badge." When he was again asked if he reached inside his shirt and pulled out his badge to show her, he stated, "No, not that I can recall." The Respondent was asked if he showed his badge to anyone while he was near Colby Richardson's mother's house. The Respondent stated that he did not show his badge to the juveniles nor to Ms. Richardson. Respondent admitted that he wore his badge on a chain around his neck, and that he had it on his neck when he was talking to Ms. Copeland. The Respondent believes that Ms. Copeland knew that he was wearing a badge because she could see the outline of the badge under his shirt. There is no evidence and it is not alleged that Respondent knew at the time of the incident that his brother had not been robbed.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, it is RECOMMENDED: That Respondent be found guilty of failure to maintain good moral character, as required by Subsection 943.13(7), Florida Statutes, (1995), and that Respondent's certifications be suspended for a period of twelve months and until he presents evidence to the commission that he has taken such courses as the commission may direct on professional responsibility. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of December, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of December, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Richard D. Courtemanche, Jr., Esquire Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Theodore E. Mack, Esquire Powell & Mack 803 North Calhoun Street Tallahassee, Florida 32303 A. Leon Lowry, II, Director Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Michael Ramage, General Counsel Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
The Issue Whether or not, the Petitioner, Zemour, Inc., t/a La Bonne Maison should be granted a license by the State of Florida, Division of Beverage, the license no. 23-2612-SRX series 4-COP.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Zemour, Inc., through its owner Edgard Zemour, purchased the restaurant known as Left Guard Restaurant located at 7444 Biscayne Boulevard, Miami, Florida. After making the purchase the Petitioner made application to transfer the beverage license held by the Left Guard Restaurant, which license is no. 23-2612-SRX series 4-COP. In addition application was made to change the name of the restaurant from Left Guard Restaurant to La Bonne Maison. These applications to transfer the license and change the name were filed with the State of Florida, Division of Beverage. By letter of February 15, 1977, the Director of the Division of Beverage has denied the transfer and the change of name applications. The denial was premised upon the statement that the application corporate officer, Edgard Zemour was not believed to be of good moral character, as required by Section 561.15, F.S. In addressing the question of his moral character, the owner and President of Zemour, Inc., Edgard Zemour filed a personal data sheet with the State of Florida, Division of Beverage. This data sheet lists arrests and/or inquiries made by the French Government against Edgard Zemour. Edgard Zemour gave testimony in the subject hearing on the application for transfer and change of name of the licensed premises, which augmented the personal data sheet. In 1956, Edgard Zemour was charged by the French Authorities with car theft or using the car without the permission of the owner. At the time, Edgard Zemour was 18 years of age and he and a friend decided to go dancing and stole someone's car and went to a discotheque to dance. He was arrested and sent to jail for two weeks, followed by four months probation. During this same year, 1956, Edgard Zemour was arrested for assault and battery for a fight which he had with an American sailor in a bar in Brest, France. Edgard Zemour was fined approximately $25.00 for that incident. From 1953 thru 1963, Edgard Zemour was in the wine business as a salesman, until the French Police told him to not operate in such a capacity, and Edgard Zemour responded by ceasing his activities. In 1958, while in the wine business, as a salesman "door to door", Edgard Zemour was charged with wine fraud. This incident involved his company placing approximately 30 gallons of wine in a cask when a customer wanted 25 gallons, and the customer being charged for the full 30 gallons. Zemour was not convicted of this charge. In 1959 Zemour was charged with abuse of trust while operating the wine business, due to the late arrival of wine which had been purchased by customers. He was not convicted of this offense. In 1960, he was charged on two separate occasions for wine fraud, in that Zemour was allegedly responsible for the customer paying for 30 gallons of wine when in fact only 25 gallons had been ordered. Edgard Zemour was found not guilty on those two occasions. In 1960, Edgard Zemour was charged with indecent conduct with a female for an incident which occurred with a girl in an automobile. This case did not go to court. Edgard Zemour was released from the charge. (This incident relates to the no's 6 and 7 found in his personal data sheet answers.) In December 1961, Edgard Zemour was charged with possession of weapons, but was not responsible since this weapon belonged to his father who served in World War I. This charge had been placed by the French Authorities. During May 1967, Edgard Zemour was charged with fraud while operating in the textile business. The textile business would mean the clothing business. This charge was placed by the French Authorities and pertained to the activities of one of the salesmen working for a company in which Edgard Zemour was part owner. The salesman had lied about the type of materials used in the clothing and the clothing did not properly fit the customers to whom he had sold the clothing. Zemour, as owner of the corporation for whom the salesman worked, was charged with complicity which is apparently some form of conspiracy. Edgard Zemour had a trial on the issue and the judge found him guilty and placed him on two years probation. Zemour appealed the sentence and the appellate court upheld the conviction and sentenced Zemour to two years in prison. Edgard Zemour learned of the actual sentence before going back to court to face the sentence and fled France until 1972. When Edgard Zemour left France, he went to Israel. While in Israel, Edgard Zemour was in the restaurant business. On one occasion while Zemour was in the restaurant business, a homicide occurred in his restaurant and the Israeli police took him to jail and kept him there for 23 to 25 days, after which time he was released when the police found the actual assailant. On one other occasion while living in Israel Zemour tried to stop a fight in his restaurant and the police took him to the police station as a part of their investigation of the fighting incident, but subsequently released Zemour from charges. In 1973, Edgard Zemour's father became ill and Edgard Zemour left Israel by way of Frankfurt, Germany to return to France to see his father who was thought to be dying. Zemour took the passport of one of the employees in the restaurant in Israel, and had someone in Frankfurt, Germany place Zemour's picture on the French passport belonging to the restaurant employee. This was done to avoid detection by the French authorities who would arrest Zemour to serve the two year sentence for the fraud case in 1969. When Zemour arrived in France he was arrested for having a false identification and for showing the false identification passport to the French Authorities. He went to court and was given a one month sentence for having a false identification and a one month sentence for showing a false passport to the French Police, in addition to the two year sentence which was pending on the fraud case of 1969. Zemour served between 8 and 9 months on these cases and was placed on probation. Edgard was with his brother and uncle and some friends in a bar in France between 4:00 p.m. and 4:15 p.m., during the year 1975. At this time Zemour was on probation and did not wish the police to see him in the bar, although he felt his probation would allow him to be in that bar. A group of policemen entered the bar and shot and killed his brother and uncle and one friend. The police also shot Zemour five times. Zemour claims that this incident involved some political dispute in France. Zemour was charged with fighting with the police. Before standing such charge, he spent one year in the hospital most of which time was spent in the prison hospital. Zemour was acquitted of the offense of fighting with the police and left France. In March 1976, Edgard Zemour went to Brussels, Belgium for one week and from there to Martinque for two weeks and subsequently to Miami, Florida, in April of 1976, and has remained in Miami, Florida since that time.
Recommendation It is recommended that the application for transfer and change of name as filed by Zemour, Inc., t/a La Bonne Maison, concerning the license no. 23-2612- SRX, 4-COP, be denied. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of March, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Cy Chadroff, Esquire Charles F. Tunnicliff, Esquire Suite 2806 Division of Beverage 120 Biscayne Boulevard, North The Johns Building Miami, Florida 33132 725 Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32304
Findings Of Fact Through October 1, 1987, Respondent held a Class "K" license number K- 00-00347 for the instruction of persons seeking a Class "G" license to bear a firearm. While working at a security guard service, Respondent met Enrique Bonet, who asked Respondent if he would be interested in teaching firearm classes to students solicited by Mr. Bonet. Respondent agreed. After teaching not more than 25 students supplied by Mr. Bonet, Respondent terminated the arrangement with Mr. Bonet shortly after it began. Thereafter, Mr. Bonet continued to train persons seeking a Class "G" license, even though Mr. Bonet was not licensed to do so. Following each training session, Mr. Bonet forged Respondent's signature to the certificate that was submitted to Petitioner on behalf of each applicant. Respondent was unaware of Mr. Bonet's unlawful actions until one of Petitioner's employees contacted Respondent and informed him that scores were missing on one certificate bearing Respondent's signature. When asked for these scores, Respondent promptly stated that he had not trained anyone during the period of training shown on the application. After a copy of the application was provided to Respondent, he promptly identified his signature as a forgery.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a Final Order dismissing the Administrative Complaint. Entered this 26th day of August, 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of August, 1988. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 88-1404 Treatment Accorded Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact Adopted. Adopted in substance. Adopted in substance although there is insufficient evidence as to when Respondent conducted the classes with students supplied by Mr. Bonet. Rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. Mr. Purcell's identification was uncertain and was not clear and convincing evidence. Rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. Petitioner's case can be largely reduced to the word of Respondent against the word of Mr. Bonet. Respondent attended the hearing, testified candidly, and assisted Petitioner's investigation by promptly identifying a fraudulent certificate. Respondent's demeanor was good. On the other hand, Mr. Bonet has vanished, leaving behind a trail of fraud and deceit by his own admission. In a statement not subject to cross-examination, Mr. Bonet asserted that Respondent was involved in Bonet's fraudulent activity. This assertion does not qualify as an admission against interest so as to be admis- sible under the hearsay exception. Nor does Mr. Bonet's hearsay statement supplement or explain other admissible evidence. Even if Mr. Bonet's statement were admissible, it would be rejected as against the greater weight of the evidence. Mr. Bonet's absence and admitted deceit militate against taking his testimony over Respon- dent's. Moreover, Petitioner produced only one person to corroborate Mr. Bonet's testimony concerning the involvement of Respondent in Mr. Bonet's unlawful activities. This witness's testimony was vague and uncertain. Petitioner should have produced one of the 60-65 other persons who took classes from Mr. Bonet while improperly supervised by Respondent. Even such testimony, however, would somehow have had to link Respondent with Mr. Bonet's unlawful activities. COPIES FURNISHED: R. Timothy Jansen, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of State Division of Licensing The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 James E. Meade, Jr., pro se 8425 Mattituck Circle Orlando, Florida 32829 Honorable Jim Smith Secretary of State The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Ken Rouse General Counsel Department of state 1801 The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250
The Issue Whether Respondent committed an unlawful employment practice in violation of Sections 760.10(1), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Beard Equipment Company, Inc., sells and maintains heavy equipment in Panama City, Florida. The Petitioner, Robert G. Harrison began employment with the Respondent in Panama City, Florida, in September, 1988. The Petitioner was employed as a janitor. Petitioner's duties included running numerous and varied errands which required driving of a motor vehicle. In April of 1989, Petitioner was hospitalized in order to adjust his medication for what he indicated was a bipolar disorder. However, at the hearing, Petitioner produced no expert testimony to establish that he was mentally handicapped or had bipolar disorder. At that time, Respondent became aware that Petitioner had a medical problem. Later, Petitioner was hospitalized in order to adjust his medication on two more occasions in 1989, and twice in 1992. On each occasion the Respondent accommodated Petitioner by making arrangements to hire temporary employees or readjust other employees' duties so that they could perform Petitioner's duties while he was hospitalized. In early 1992, the Respondent's liability insurance company conducted a random audit of employee driving records. The Respondent was notified by its insurance company that no coverage would be provided for any accident where the employee/driver had a DUI conviction. This random audit prompted Respondent to conduct a complete company- wide internal audit of driving records of all employees. The driving record audit resulted in some transfers for those employees for whom driving was an essential part of their job duties, but whose driving records would prohibit them from being covered under Respondent's liability policy. Employees who could not fulfill the duties of a non-driving position were terminated. Respondent could not afford to allow employees to drive who could not be insured by Respondent's liability carrier. The in-house driving record audit revealed that Petitioner had a DUI conviction on his record. Respondent had no other non-driving positions for which the Petitioner was qualified. Respondent was therefore forced to discharge the Petitioner since he could no longer fulfill the duties of his employment. Petitioner was discharged in November of 1992. When Petitioner was terminated, Petitioner was advised by Mark Veal, his supervisor, that the driving record audit had revealed that Petitioner had a DUI conviction, and because he would not be covered under the company insurance policy, they had no alternative but to discharge him. Within a day or so, Petitioner's wife called and requested his discharge letter in writing. Veal prepared the letter, indicating that due to Petitioner's medical history, his operating a motor vehicle would be too much of a liability. Although the real reason for Petitioner's discharge and the reason given him at the time was the DUI conviction, Veal tried to write the discharge letter in such a way as to minimize any embarrassment for the Petitioner due to his DUI conviction. Therefore, the termination letter does not support the conclusion that Respondent discriminated against Petitioner based on a mental handicap. In fact, there was no substantial evidence that Respondent terminated Petitioner based on a mental handicap. The evidence clearly showed Respondent was terminated for his driving record and his lack of qualifications to fill any other non-driving position. Moreover, Petitioner failed to establish that his position was filled by a person not in a protected class or that Respondent is an employer employing more than 15 employees. Given these facts, Petitioner has not established a prima facie case that Respondent committed an unlawful employment practice.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is accordingly, RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order finding that Petitioner did not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he was discriminated against because of his alleged handicap in violation of the Florida Human Rights Act and that the petition be dismissed. DONE AND ORDERED this 22nd day of December, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE CLEAVINGER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of December, 1994.
