Findings Of Fact Respondent issued a Notice Of Assessment And Jeopardy Findings against Jesus Abauza, also known as Jesus I. Valdez, on May 16, 1989, (the "assessment"). The assessment was made for the tax imposed on the unlawful transportation of approximately 90 kilograms of cocaine. The tax base in the assessment is the retail value of the cocaine. The retail value of the cocaine was estimated in the amount of $1,341,000 by multiplying the weight of the cocaine by the retail price listed in the Florida Department Of Law Enforcement ("FDLE") memorandum in effect at the time for Broward and Dade counties. The price per kilogram listed in the FDLE memorandum was $14,900. The FDLE memorandum became effective on May 4, 1988, and was the current price list used by the FDLE on May 8, 1989, when Petitioner was arrested and charged with possession of a controlled substance. Tax was assessed against the tax base at the rate of 50 percent and in the amount of $670,500. A 25 percent surcharge was assessed in the amount of $335,250. The total tax assessed in the amount of $1,005,750 is the sum of the amount of tax due at the rate of 50 percent and the amount of tax due for the 25 percent surcharge. An additional 50 percent penalty was assessed in the amount of $502,875. The total tax and penalty assessed in the amount of $1,508,635 is the sum of the tax due ($1,005,750) and the penalty ($502,875). A Warrant For Collection Of Delinquent Sales and Use Tax (the "warrant") and a Corrected Warrant (the "corrected warrant") was issued against Petitioner on the same day as the assessment. The warrant and corrected warrant are identical except for the addition of Petitioner's social security number in the the top right corner of the corrected warrant and a note in the right margin of the corrected warrant stating: This CORRECTED WARRANT is being re-recorded to reflect the correct amount of tax lien as being $1,005,750.00. Interest will accrue at the rate of $330.66 per day beginning 6/2/89 thru date of satisfaction of lien. 11/26/91[.] The amount stated in the assessment, warrant, and corrected warrant as the tax due is $1,005,750. The amount stated as the penalty due in all three documents is $502,875. The amount stated as the total and grand total due in all three documents is $1,508,625. The note in the right margin of the corrected warrant, however, eliminates the 50 percent penalty by stating that the corrected amount of the "tax lien" is $1,005,750. Interest accrues on the tax due at the rate of one percent per month. The amount stated in the bottom left corner of the assessment, warrant, and corrected warrant, as the "Daily Interest Rate" is $329.86. The correct per diem amount of interest is $330.66. 5/ Interest begins accruing on the 21st day of the month following the month for which the tax is due.6 The tax was initially due in May, 1989, when the assessment was issued. Although the corrected warrant states that interest accrues from "6/2/89", interest actually began accruing on June 21, 1989. The assessment was mailed to Petitioner by certified mail, return receipt requested. Petitioner received the assessment, but the date of receipt cannot be determined from the evidence of record. 7/ Petitioner unlawfully transported approximately 90 kilograms of cocaine. Petitioner was arrested by officers in the Metropolitan Dade County Police Department (the "Police Department") on May 8, 1989, and charged with possession of cocaine. In the criminal case against him, Petitioner filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized by the Police Department based upon the alleged illegality of the police officer's investigatory stop of the car Petitioner was driving. The district court denied the motion to suppress, and Petitioner successfully appealed the trial court's ruling to the United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit. The district court's denial of the motion to suppress was reversed in United States v. Valdez, 931 F.2d 1448 (11th Cir. May 22, 1991), and the case was remanded for further proceedings. The district court granted the motion to suppress and scheduled the criminal case for trial during the two week period beginning September 23, 1991. 8/ Petitioner stipulated in the Supplemental Pretrial Stipulation that he did not admit or stipulate that any of the matters set forth in the stipulation were factually correct. The findings of fact made in this Recommended Order, however, are substantially the same as the factual account contained in the official transcript of the criminal proceedings and reported by the appellate court in Valdez as the basis for its reversal of the trial court's denial of Petitioner's motion to suppress. On the afternoon of May 8, 1989, Detective Jerry Houck and Special Agent Steven Hills were conducting the surveillance of a residence (the "residence" or "house") located in Miami, Florida from an unmarked police car. Detective Houck and Special Agent Hills were part of a Police Department narcotics investigative team led by Detective Francisco Trujillo. Detective Trujillo was not personally present at the residence but monitored the events which occurred at the residence over the police radio in his unmarked vehicle. Detective Trujillo was assisted by Officer Douglas Almaguer, a uniformed police officer for the Police Department who was in a marked patrol car. Detective Houck observed a Honda Accord automobile (the "Honda") driven by Petitioner stop in front of the residence. Petitioner got out of the car, knocked on the front door of the house, and entered the residence. Detective Houck was unable to observe the events which took place inside the house. While Petitioner remained inside the house, two men later identified as Jose and Jorge Fernandez came out of the residence. They moved two cars parked in the yard and positioned the Honda so that its trunk was in close proximity to the front door of the residence. Jose and Jorge Fernandez opened the trunk of the Honda, reentered the residence, and reappeared within the next few minutes outside the house carrying plastic garbage bags which appeared to Detective Houck to be fairly heavy. The two men placed the garbage bags with their contents in the trunk of the Honda. They reentered the residence and quickly reappeared carrying additional bags which they also placed in the trunk of the Honda. Shortly thereafter, Valdez came out of the residence, got into the Honda, and drove away. Detective Trujillo advised Officer Almaguer that: [W]e were conducting an investigation and we had a vehicle we wished for him to follow, and if that person was to commit a traffic infraction which he normally cites somebody for, we wished for him to stop the vehicle. If that occurred, and he did stop the vehicle, I wanted him to ask the occupant of the vehicle for consent to search the vehicle, and I instructed him to ask if he would consent to a search. Officer Almaguer did not recall that he had been directed by Detective Trujillo to stop the Honda only for something which constituted the kind of traffic offense for which he would ordinarily stop a driver. Over the police radio, Detective Houck provided Detective Trujillo with the description and tag number of the Honda and notified Detective Trujillo when Petitioner drove away from the house. Detective Houck left his surveillance position at the residence and followed the Honda to 122nd Avenue. At that point, Detective Trujillo identified the Honda and Detective Houck confirmed the identification. As Petitioner approached the intersection of 8th Street and 122nd Avenue, Detective Trujillo was positioned across the intersection. Officer Almaguer was directly behind Detective Trujillo in his marked patrol car. Petitioner made a right turn against a red traffic light signal and violated the right-of-way of a vehicle approaching through the green traffic light signal. The approaching vehicle slowed abruptly in order to avoid a collision with Petitioner's Honda. Neither Detective Trujillo nor Officer Almaguer were able to state the speed at which the approaching vehicle was traveling before it slowed down, and neither officer heard any screeching of the tires of the approaching vehicle. Detective Trujillo advised Officer Almaguer that Petitioner was the subject of the narcotics investigation. Officer Almaguer followed the Honda for 18 blocks from the intersection where the traffic violation had occurred and then stopped Petitioner. Detective Trujillo parked two blocks away from the point of the stop and observed Officer Almaguer conduct the stop. Officer Almaguer approached Petitioner and asked for Petitioner's driver's license and registration. Petitioner produced his driver's license but stated that the car was loaned to him by a friend. Officer Almaguer asked Petitioner if Petitioner knew why he had been stopped. Petitioner answered "yes." Officer Almaguer requested permission to search the car, and Petitioner consented. Officer Almaguer found five sealed trash bags inside the trunk of the Honda. Officer Almaguer asked Petitioner what was inside the bags. Petitioner replied that it was cocaine. Officer Almaguer arrested Petitioner, handcuffed him, and placed him in the back seat of the patrol car until Detective Trujillo arrived at the point of the stop. Officer Almaguer issued Petitioner a citation for violation of the right-of-way. Detective Trujillo then advised Petitioner of his Miranda rights. Officer Almaguer's stop of Petitioner's vehicle was unreasonably pretextual, and Petitioner's consent to search was not voluntarily given. Officer Almaguer would not have pursued Petitioner's Honda, stopped it, and issued a traffic citation, but for Detective Trujillo's instructions that the Honda was the car which the narcotics investigation team wanted stopped. Officer Almaguer ordinarily did not search a vehicle for a violation of right-of-way, or even ask its driver for consent to search the vehicle. Officer Almaguer had no reason to ask for permission to search the vehicle based solely on the traffic violation he observed. Petitioner's consent to the search was tainted by the illegal, pretextual stop and detention. The contents of the five bags seized by the Police Department when Petitioner was arrested were tested by a chemist for the Police Department. The contents of the five bags weighed approximately 90 kilograms. Samples of each kilogram from the bags were tested and found to contain cocaine. The percentage of cocaine and purity of the cocaine was not determined.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a Final Order upholding the assessment of tax and interest in the amount determined by Respondent. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 24th day of February, 1992. DANIEL MANRY Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of February, 1992.
Findings Of Fact During the year 1976, for several years before, and until February or March of 1977, petitioner worked in the comptroller's office of the University of West Florida. From at least as early as December of 1976, until she left the comptroller's office, she worked as an account clerk II in the student receivable section of the office, under the direct supervision of Ms. Wynell Collins Heidema. One of petitioner's responsibilities was the collection of checks returned to the University for insufficient funds. Dishonored checks, like all other checks that arrived in the mail, went first to a secretary in the comptroller's office who logged in checks of all kinds on a form called a mail transmittal. The mail transmittal, together with the checks, then went to the head cashier who verified the accuracy of the mail transmittal and sorted the checks into different categories. After segregating checks which had been returned for insufficient funds, the head cashier gave them to Brenda Hill, a teller, who recorded the checks on journal vouchers. When Ms. Hill finished this task, she gave both the checks and the journal vouchers to petitioner. Putting the journal vouchers to one side and working from the checks, petitioner filled out a "collection effort card" for each check and mailed a form letter to the person who had drawn the check, asking that the check be made good. She noted the date the letter was mailed on the collection effort card. Afterwards, the checks were placed in a notebook. If necessary, petitioner followed up the original letter with additional efforts to secure payment of the returned check. This procedure was followed with respect to most, but not all, of the dishonored checks returned to the University. If the returned check was drawn by a faculty member, the faculty member was likely to be notified by a telephone call instead of by a letter. In September of 1976, a University vice president wrote a check against insufficient funds. When the vice president's check was returned to the University by the bank on which it was drawn, it was rerouted before petitioner saw it and Mr. Charles E. Clark, the University's comptroller, personally took the check to the vice president. One day in the fall of 1976, petitioner's brother promised petitioner that, in partial repayment of a loan petitioner had made to him, he would deposit fifty dollars ($50.00) in her checking account on a specified date before December 8, 1976. Petitioner wrote a check in the amount of twenty dollars ($20.00) on December 8, 1976, and cashed it at the University. She did not learn until later that her brother had failed to deposit the money he had promised to deposit. When the University's bank presented the check to petitioner's bank for payment, petitioner's bank dishonored the check and mailed notice of its action to petitioner. As a routine matter, the University's bank presented petitioner's check for payment a second time. Petitioner's bank again refused to pay it because the funds in petitioner's account were still insufficient. On December 21, 1976, the University received in the mail from the bank the twice dishonored check. A day or two before the check arrived, petitioner had told her supervisor, Ms. Heidema, that it would be coming. The secretary who opened the mail on December 21, 1976, recorded petitioner's returned check on the mail transmittal The teller who received the returned checks from the head cashier recorded petitioner's check on a journal voucher, saying aloud to nobody in particular that a check drawn by petitioner had been returned. When petitioner received the returned checks from the teller, she logged them all in. She wrote letters and filled out collection effort cards for each of them, except for her own check. She put all of the checks, including her own, in the notebook she used for filing returned checks. Ms. Heidema, testified that the dishonor of petitioner's check was the first such incident in five years' time and that she did not feel it was necessary to ask petitioner to redeem the check because she knew that petitioner would do it on her own. On January 3, 1977, Mr. Clark happened to notice petitioner's check among the other returned checks in the notebook. The following day he investigated and discovered that petitioner had not prepared a collection effort card for her own check and that there was no other indication that she had written herself a letter. He then "discussed the check" (R13) with the assistant comptroller, Mr. Norris, and with Mr. Cordell, an employee in the comptroller's office, neither of whom had previously been aware that petitioner's check had been returned. The three of them "agreed that [they] would wait the rest of the week to see if Mrs. Josey would redeem the check on her own. (R13) About this time, Mr. Clark learned of a letter petitioner had sent to Chancellor York in which she expressed "grave concern about the management of the Controller's Office at the University of West Florida," petitioner's exhibit No. 1, reported the resignation of several long time employees of the comptroller's office, asked that a managerial audit of the office be performed, and asked that her letter be treated as confidential. On January 7, 1977, petitioner was summoned to Mr. Norris' office where Mr. Cordell was also present and was asked when she intended to redeem her bad check. She answered that she would do it as soon as possible. Mr. Norris directed her to do it before the end of the day. Within a matter of hours, she brought Mr. Norris a one hundred dollar bill. In the course of her discussions with Mr. Norris and Mr. Cordell, petitioner felt her honesty was called into question and was not as polite as she would have been otherwise. Messrs. Norris and Cordell recommended to Mr. Clark that petitioner be suspended. Mr. Clark was initially reluctant to act on this recommendation for fear it would appear to disinterested observers that he was acting in retaliation for the criticisms petitioner had leveled in her letter to Chancellor York, but he overcame this reluctance.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That respondent pay petitioner the money she would have earned if she had been permitted to work on January 10, 11 and 12, 1977. DONE and ENTERED this 20th day of January, 1978, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Mrs. Donna S. Josey Route 5, Box 121 Thomas Town Estates Pace, Florida 32570 Mr. J. J. Menge, Esquire Shell, Fleming, Davis and Menge Post Office Box 1831 Pensacola, Florida 32501 Mrs. Dorothy Roberts Appeals Coordinator Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304
The Issue Whether Mike Futch, d/b/a Futch Construction Company, (Respondent) violated Sections 440.10 and 440.38, Florida Statutes, and if so, what penalty should be imposed. References to sections are to the Florida Statutes (2004).
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency responsible for enforcing provisions of Florida law, specifically Chapter 440, Florida Statutes, which requires that employers secure workers’ compensation coverage for their employees. At all times material to this case, Respondent was engaged in the construction business within the meaning of Chapter 440, Florida Statutes. Its individual principal, Mike Futch (Mr. Futch), was responsible for the day-to-day operations of the business. At all times material to this case, Respondent is an employer within the meaning of Section 440.02(16)(a), Florida Statutes. At all times material to this case, Respondent was legally obligated to provide workers' compensation insurance in accordance with the provisions of Chapter 440, Florida Statutes, for all persons employed by Respondent to provide construction services within Florida. Chapter 440 requires that the premium rates for such coverage be set pursuant to Florida law. It is undisputed that Respondent had not furnished the required coverage, and that there was no valid exemption from this requirement. Accordingly, on May 12, 2004, the Stop Work Order was properly entered. Thereafter, Petitioner reviewed Respondent's payroll records, which revealed that Respondent employed individuals whose identities are not in dispute, under circumstances which obliged Respondent to provide workers' compensation coverage for their benefit. Based upon Respondent’s payroll records, Petitioner correctly calculated the penalty amount imposed by law under all the circumstances of the case, and issued the Amended Order imposing a penalty assessment in the amount of $198,311.82. Respondent did not persuasively dispute the factual or legal merits of Petitioner's case. Rather, Respondent suggested that this forum has some type of general equity powers to lessen the penalty on the grounds that Respondent made a good faith effort to provide coverage for its workers. The record does demonstrate that Mr. Futch in good faith engaged a Georgia insurance agent and instructed him to obtain workers' compensation coverage which would satisfy the requirements of Florida law with respect to Respondent's Florida operations. The Georgia agent's failure to obtain coverage that satisfies Florida's requirements is a regrettable circumstance, but it raises no issue over which this forum has authority.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department of Financial Services, Division of Workers’ Compensation, enter a final order that affirms the Amended Order in the amount of $198,311.82. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of January, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S FLORENCE SNYDER RIVAS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of January, 2005. COPIES FURNISHED: Joe Thompson, Esquire Department of Financial Services 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-4229 Patrick C. Cork, Esquire Cork & Cork 700 North Patterson Street Valdosta, Georgia 31601 Honorable Tom Gallagher Chief Financial Officer Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Pete Dunbar, General Counsel Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
Findings Of Fact Harris Corporation is a large, multi-national corporation with headquarters in Melbourne, Florida. Harris Corporation conducts its business through several divisions, one of which is Harris Composition Systems Division ("the taxpayer"). The taxpayer is engaged in the business of manufacturing and selling computerized printing equipment. On January 28, 1977, the State of Florida, Department of Revenue ("the Department") mailed a letter to the taxpayer, advising that an audit of the taxpayer's books and records be made available. The audit was undertaken by agents of the Department and on June 25, 1979, two Notices of Proposed Assessment (the "notices") were mailed to the taxpayer by the Department. The period covered by the Notices is January 1, 1974 through June 30, 1978. No proposed or actual assessment of the sales and use taxes referred to in the Notices was made by the Department prior to the proposed assessment. After receipt of the Notices, the taxpayer's representatives attended an informal conference with representatives of the Department on September 25, 1979. As a result of that conference the Department issued two Revised Notices of Proposed Assessment. The Revised Notices eliminated January 1, 1974 through May 31, 1974 from the period covered by the Notices but retained the period June 1, 1974 through June 30, 1978. The portion of the sales and use tax assessment proposed in the Revised Notices that is in dispute in this case is the portion that is attributable to the June 1, 1974 through June 30, 1976 period. The tax in controversy is $49,934.01. The Department has developed a form to be signed by taxpayers in situations where the Department believes that the statute of limitations on assessment of sales and use taxes may expire before an assessent can be made. The Department did not request that the taxpayer in this case execute such a form, nor did the Department request in any other manner that the taxpayer waive or extend the statute of limitations applicable to sales and use tax assessments and the taxpayer did not do so. Neither the Department nor the taxpayer instituted any judicial or administrative proceedings for review of the assessment proposed in the Notices or in the Revised Notices prior to the filing of a petition by the taxpayer in this case on March 20, 1980. The Department contends that any delay in issuing the proposed notices of assessment was directly attributable to difficulties encountered in obtaining records in a timely fashion from the taxpayer's parent company, and that the taxpayer should, therefore, be estopped to raise the defense of violation of the statute of limitations. The record in this proceeding does not support such a conclusion. Although there appear to have been some delays in performing the tax audits, the taxpayer was by no means responsible for all of those delays. In fact, the longest such delay, from about December 1, 1977, through May 3, 1978, was occasioned by the Department's own budgetary problems relating to per diem and travel expenses for its auditing team. Although some delays were requested by the taxpayer, they were acquiesced in by the Department in the course of establishing its own priorities in conducting the audit of all of the divisions of Harris Corporation. The record is devoid of any indication that the Department at any point considered any failure of the taxpayer to furnish requested information of sufficient severity to invoke the remedies available to the Department under Section 212.13(1), Florida Statutes (mandatory injunction to require examination of books and records) or Section 212.14(1), Florida Statutes (issuance of estimated tax deficiency together with distress warrant for collection of such taxes).
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be entered by the State of Florida, Department of Revenue, assessing sales and use taxes against Respondent in the amount of $49,934.01, together with the applicable amount of interest through the date of entry of said Final Order. DONE AND ORDERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 14th day of January, 1981. WILLIAM E. WILLIAMS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of January, 1981. COPIES FURNISHED: Linda C. Procta, Esquire Assistant Attorney General The Capitol, Room LL04 Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Brian C. Ellis, Esquire 620 Twiggs Street Tampa, Florida 33602 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER =================================================================
The Issue The issue is whether Section 11B(3) of the Florida Workers' Compensation Reimbursement Manual for Hospitals, 2004 Second Edition, is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority.
Findings Of Fact The petitions filed by FFVA and TIC challenge the validity of Section 11B(3) of the 2004 Manual,4/ which prior to October 1, 2007, was adopted by reference as part of Florida Administrative Code Rule 69L-7.501(1). Florida Administrative Code Rule 69L-7.501(1) was amended effective October 1, 2007, to adopt by reference the Florida Workers' Compensation Reimbursement Manual for Hospitals, 2006 Edition ("the 2006 Manual"). Florida Administrative Code Rule 69L-7.501(1), as it existed when the petitions were filed and as it currently exists, adopts by reference the 2006 Manual, not the 2004 Manual. The 2004 Manual is no longer adopted by reference as part of Florida Administrative Code Rule 69L-7.501, or any other rule. AHCA applied the 2004 Manual in the reimbursement dispute initiated by HRMC against FFVA under Section 440.13, Florida Statutes, as reflected in the determination letter issued by AHCA on October 24, 2007, which was attached to FFVA's petition. The reimbursement dispute is the subject of the pending DOAH Case No. 07-5414. AHCA applied the 2004 Manual in a reimbursement dispute involving TIC under Section 440.13, Florida Statutes, as reflected in the determination letter issued by AHCA on January 9, 2008, which was attached to TIC's petition. The reimbursement dispute is the subject of the pending DOAH Case No. 08-0703.
Findings Of Fact In the fall of 1992, there were several Democratic candidates for the office of Tax Collector for Walton County. Among the Democratic candidates was Sue Carter who had been employed in the Walton County Tax Collector's Office prior to resigning to run for tax collector. The first Democratic primary was held in September, 1992, resulting in a runoff primary between Sue Carter and Sue Rushing in October, 1992. Ms. Carter defeated Ms. Rushing. In November, 1992, Sue Carter won the general election. Respondent, Teresa Gomillion (Gomillion), was employed in the Walton County Tax Collector's Office in 1992. Pat Pollard, Tammy Day, Patty Lynch, and Sylvia Rushing were also employed in the tax collector's office during the 1992 election campaign. Ms. Lynch and Gomillion supported Ms. Carter. Ms. Day did not support Ms. Carter. Ms. Rushing was related to Sue Rushing, Ms. Carter's opponent. Ms. Pollard did not support any candidate for the office of tax collector. Pat Pollard's work station was located about three feet away from Gomillion's work station. She overheard Gomillion ask a customer of the tax collector's office for whom he was going to vote. This was the only time that Ms. Pollard heard Gomillion talk to a customer concerning the race for tax collector. Gomillion and other employees in the tax collector's office did discuss the race for tax collector during office hours. Pam Dyess has been employed at a car dealership in DeFuniak Springs for 16 years. During 1992, her job responsibilities required her to go to the tax collector's office to handle the tag and title work for the dealership. After the first primary, Ms. Dyess went to the tax collector's office during working hours and while she was there the subject of the first primary was discussed. Ms. Dyess stated that she had voted for Harley Henderson. Ms. Gomillion joined the conversation and asked Ms. Dyess why she had voted for Harley Henderson and made some disparaging remarks about Mr. Henderson's qualifications. Rodney Ryals is now and was an employee of the City of DeFuniak Springs during the fall of 1992. During the election, Mr. Ryals spent a great deal of time at the tax collector's office taking care of city business and visiting with his friend Ms. Pollard. While Ryals was at the tax collector's office Gomillion told him, "You better vote for Sue Carter, she's the only qualified candidate." Ryals had told Gomillion and Ms. Lynch that they should not campaign on the job because it was illegal. Both women told him that if they did not politick that they might lose their jobs. Both Jack Little, the tax collector, and Ms. Carter had advised Gomillion not to politick in the tax collector's office. Having judged the credibility and demeanor of the witnesses, I find that Gomillion did not hand out campaign literature while she was on the job at the tax collector's office.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission on Ethics enter a final order finding that Teresa Gomillion violated Section 112.313(6), Florida Statutes, and recommending a civil penalty of $500 and a public censure and reprimand. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of August, 1994, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUSAN B. KIRKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of August, 1994. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 94-2067EC To comply with the requirements of Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes (1993), the following rulings are made on the parties' proposed findings of fact: Advocate's Proposed Findings of Fact. Paragraphs 1-10: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 11: Accepted to the extent that Ms. Gomillion had solicited Mr. Ryals' vote but rejected as far as Mr. Ryals observing Ms. Gomillion soliciting other customers. Paragraph 12: Having judged the credibility of the witnesses, I find that Mr. Ryals testimony that Ms. Gomillion handed out campaign literature not to be credible. Paragraph 13: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 14: Rejected as constituting recitation of testimony. Paragraphs 15-16: Rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact. Paragraphs 1-2: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 3: The first sentence is rejected as unnecessary. The remainder of the paragraph is rejected as constituting recitation of testimony. Paragraph 4: The first sentence is accepted in substance. The second sentence is rejected as constituting both recitation of testimony and argument. Paragraph 5: The first sentence is accepted in substance. The remainder of the paragraph is rejected to the extent that it implies that Ms. Gomillion properly performed her duties. The greater weight of the evidence shows that Ms. Gomillion's actions were prohibited by the tax collector and were not part of her duties. Paragraphs 6-8: Rejected as constituting recitation of testimony. Paragraph 9: The first sentence is accepted in substance except as it relates to Ms. Gomillion's solicitation of Mr. Ryals. The remainder of the paragraph is rejected as unnecessary. Paragraph 10: Rejected as unnecessary. Paragraphs 11-12: Rejected as recitation of testimony. Paragraph 13: The first sentence is rejected as unnecessary. The remainder of the paragraph is rejected as constituting recitation of testimony. Paragraph 14: Rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. Paragraphs 15-16: Rejected as constituting recitation of testimony. Paragraph 17: Rejected as unnecessary. Paragraphs 18-19: Rejected as constituting recitation of testimony. Paragraph 20: The first sentence is rejected as unnecessary. The remainder of the paragraph is rejected as constituting recitation of testimony. Paragraphs 21-22: Rejected as constituting recitation of testimony. Paragraph 23: The first sentence is rejected as constituting recitation of testimony. The remainder of the paragraph is rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. Paragraph 24: The first sentence is rejected as unnecessary. The remainder of the paragraph is rejected as constituting recitation of testimony. Paragraph 25: The first sentence is rejected as constituting recitation of testimony. The remainder of the paragraph is accepted in substance. COPIES FURNISHED: Carrie Stillman Complaint Coordinator Commission on Ethics Post Office Box 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709 Michael E. Ingram Assistant Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs, PL-01 The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399 E. Allan Ramey, Esquire 13 Circle Drive Post Office Box 369 Defuniak Springs, Florida 32433-0369 Bonnie Williams Executive Director Florida Commission On Ethics Post Office Drawer 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709 Phil Claypool, Esquire General Counsel Ethics Commission 2822 Remington Green Circle, Suite 101 Post Office Drawer 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709
Findings Of Fact Charles William Cramer applied for licensure as a Class "F" unarmed guard on March 27, 1979. On September 10, 1979, the Department of State denied the license on the basis that Cramer lacked the required character qualifications. The Department of State cited Cramer's arrest for probation violation on April 11, 1978, and his arrest for obtaining property with worthless bank checks on August 2, 1979. Cramer was found guilty of probation violation for failure to pay the cost of his probation. Cramer was placed on probation for turning in a false alarm. This offense did not appear on his arrest record. Cramer entered a plea of nolo contendere to the offense of obtaining property by worthless bank check and was placed on probation for five years. Cramer stated that this arose out of his bank's failure to credit a deposit to his account and an error he had made in his bank book. Copies of the Order Withholding Adjudication were received as Exhibit 3.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Hearing Officer would recommend that the Department of State issue Charles W. Cramer a license as a Class "F" unarmed guard and, if it deems it appropriate, institute further proceedings to revoke said license. DONE and ORDERED this 15th day of February, 1980, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: W. J. Gladwin, Jr., Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of State The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mr. Charles W. Cramer 2424 West 33rd Street Orlando, Florida 32805
