Elawyers Elawyers
Ohio| Change
Find Similar Cases by Filters
You can browse Case Laws by Courts, or by your need.
Find 49 similar cases
SILVIA M. URRECHAGA vs DEPARTMENT OF MANAGEMENT SERVICES, DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, 06-003265 (2006)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Miami, Florida Aug. 29, 2006 Number: 06-003265 Latest Update: Jan. 29, 2007

The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner held a "regularly established position" during the period from January 1979 through June 1979, when she worked as a teacher's assistant for a district school board; if so, then she would be entitled to receive retirement service credit for the period, which Respondent so far has declined to grant.

Findings Of Fact Historical Facts Petitioner Silvia Urrechaga ("Urrechaga") worked for nearly 30 years, in various positions, as an employee of the Miami-Dade County School Board ("MDCSB"). As an employee of a district school board, she became a member of the Florida Retirement System ("FRS"), which is administered by Respondent Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement ("Division"). It is undisputed that, before July 1, 1979 (and thus at all times material to this case), local employers (such as district school boards) that participated in the FRS had the authority to determine, in the exercise of discretion, which of their employees would be covered under the FRS. At that time, the Division did not have the authority to review and overrule local employers' decisions in this regard. From January 1979 through June 1979, Urrechaga was employed as a teacher's assistant. A "Request for Personnel Action" memorandum dated January 8, 1979, memorializes MDCSB's hiring of Urrechaga to fill this part-time hourly position. The memorandum specified that Urrechaga would be "paid from discretionary funds until [the] end of [the] 78/79 school year." On or around January 19, 1979, a "Personnel Transaction Form" was completed, wherein it was recorded that, effective January 8, 1979, Urrechaga would participate in Retirement Plan "F." It is undisputed that Plan "F" meant the FRS. It is further recorded on the personnel form that MDCSB would contribute 9.1 percent of Urrechaga's salary into the FRS trust to fund her retirement benefit. An Annual Earnings Report for the 1978-79 school year shows that for the payroll period ending February 6, 1979——her first as a teacher's assistant——Urrechaga was paid a gross salary of $208.89, and that MDCSB deposited 9.1 percent thereof, or $19.01, into the FRS trust for the benefit of Urrechaga, a Plan "F" participant. Beginning with the very next pay period, however, and continuing through the end of June 1979, Urrechaga's retirement plan designation on the Annual Earnings Report is "J" rather than "F." It is undisputed that "J" meant no retirement benefit. Consistent with that designation, MDCSB (apparently) did not contribute to the FRS on Urrechaga's behalf for the pay periods ending February 9, 1979 through June 22, 1979, at least according to the Annual Earnings Report. MDCSB does not presently have any records documenting the grounds, if there were any, for removing Urrechaga from the FRS. There are likewise no existing records reflecting that Urrechaga was notified contemporaneously that, wittingly or unwittingly, she had been taken out of the retirement plan. It is reasonable to infer, and the undersigned does so, that MDCSB neither informed Urrechaga that she was being excluded from participation in the FRS nor notified her about any administrative remedies that she might have had in consequence of such action. Years later, after an issue had arisen regarding whether Urrechaga is entitled to retirement service credit for the months from January 1979 through June 1979, MDCSB investigated the situation and concluded that Urrechaga had been removed from the retirement plan by mistake. This determination was reported to the Division by MDCSB's Retirement Coordinator, Maria Y. Perez, in a letter dated July 23, 2003, which provided in pertinent part as follows: In reviewing the payroll/personnel records of Ms. Urrechaga, it's [sic] been determined that from January, 1979 through June, 1980, she was excluded from the retirement plan in error. Ms. Urrechaga was hired January 8, 1979, as a part-time hourly teacher assistant, job code 4259, a position eligible for retirement coverage[,] and [she] worked though June, 1979 [in that position.] The Division refused to accept MDCSB's determination, however, on the ground that it was not supported by sufficient proof that Urrechaga had been paid out of a "regular salary account." Consequently, by letter to the Division dated February 28, 2006, Ms. Perez reiterated MDCSB's conclusion, stating in relevant part as follows: Although I cannot provide you with a specific account serial number listing indicating [sic] that specifically Ms. Urrechaga was in a regularly established position; all our hourly teachers assistants were hired in a regularly established position, particularly as late as 1979, and not in a [sic] Other Personnel Services accounts. As support for this statement, Ms. Perez furnished the Division with the records of several other teacher's assistants who, the records unambiguously show, had been treated by MDCSB as FRS participants at the time that Urrechaga, who held the same employment position, had been excluded from the retirement plan. As of the final hearing, Ms. Perez continued to be MDCSB's Retirement Coordinator, a position she had held since 1982. In that capacity, Ms. Perez was MDCSB's senior management person in charge of retirement matters. Ms. Perez's communications to the Division regarding Urrechaga, which were written in her official capacity as MDCSB's agent, did not give voice to mere personal opinions, but rather——as statements clearly falling within the scope of her agency and authority——constituted MDCSB's official statements on the subject of Urrechaga's retirement benefit.1 In other words, Ms. Perez's letters to the Division concerning Urrechaga's retirement benefit expressed an agency determination of Urrechaga's substantial interests, namely the conclusion that Urrechaga had worked for MDCSB in a regularly established position and, accordingly, was supposed to have been a participant in the FRS during the period from January 1979 through June 1979, notwithstanding that conflicting statements in contemporaneously prepared documents give rise to some confusion concerning her participation therein.2 Determinations of Ultimate Fact From January 1979 through June 1979, Urrechaga worked in a "regularly established position" as a teacher's assistant with MDCSB. As an employee in such a position, Urrechaga was entitled to participate in the FRS, and she earned retirement service credit for her work during the period at issue.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Division enter a final order awarding Urrechaga the retirement service credit that she earned for working in a regularly established position as a teacher's assistant with MDCSB during the period from January 1979 through June 1979. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of December, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of December, 2006.

Florida Laws (2) 120.569120.57
# 1
RICHARD BRANDENBERGER vs DEPARTMENT OF MANAGEMENT SERVICES, DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, 06-003659 (2006)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Orlando, Florida Sep. 25, 2006 Number: 06-003659 Latest Update: Jan. 16, 2008

The Issue The issue in the case is as set forth in the Notice of Forfeiture of Retirement Benefits dated November 10, 2005, and issued by the Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement (Respondent), to Richard Brandenberger (Petitioner).

Findings Of Fact At all times material to this case, the Petitioner was employed by the Orange County Board of County Commissioners as a correctional officer at the county jail and participated in the Florida Retirement System (FRS). The Respondent is the state agency charged with administering the FRS. The applicable position description for employment by Orange County as a correctional officer included, in relevant part, the following description of the job duties: Supervises inmates to prevent altercations, intimidation, undesirable or illegal acts, intercedes when necessary, and to ensure the safety of the facility, other Correctional staff and the inmates. On or about October 29, 2003, a grand jury issued a one-count indictment against the Petitioner as follows: On or about July 3, 2003, in Orange County, Florida, defendant knowingly and intentionally possessed with intent to distribute and distributed Methylenedioxymethamphetamine ("MDMA") commonly known as "ecstasy", and marihuana, controlled substances listed in Schedule I of 21 U.S.C. Section 812, all in violation of 21 U.S.C. Sections 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(C), and 841(b)(1)(D). The Petitioner was subsequently arrested. He then retired from employment in December 2003 and began receiving benefits from the FRS the following January. On or about January 29, 2004, the Petitioner, represented by legal counsel, entered a plea of guilty to the indictment and executed a written plea agreement that stated in material part as follows: Count Pleading To The defendant shall enter a plea of guilty to Count One of the indictment. Count One charges the defendant with possession with intent to distribute and distribution of MDMA and marihuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. Sections 841(a)(1). * * * Elements of the Offense The defendant acknowledges understanding the nature and elements with which defendant has been charged and to which defendant is pleading guilty. The elements of Count One are: First: That defendant knowingly possessed or distributed MDMA or marihuana as charged; and Second: That defendant possessed the substance with the intent to distribute it. * * * Factual Basis Defendant is pleading guilty because defendant is in fact guilty. The defendant certifies that defendant does hereby admit that the facts set forth below are true, and were this case to go to trial, the United States would be able to prove those specific facts and others beyond a reasonable doubt.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Respondent enter a final order stating that the Petitioner has forfeited his rights and benefits under the Florida Retirement System. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of February, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of February, 2007. COPIES FURNISHED: Geoffrey M. Christian, Esquire Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 160 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 Edward Gay, Esquire 1516 East Concord Street Orlando, Florida 32803 Sarabeth Snuggs, Director Division of Retirement Department of Management Services Post Office Box 9000 Tallahassee, Florida 32315-9000 John Brenneis, General Counsel Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950

USC (1) 21 U.S.C 812 Florida Laws (4) 112.312112.3173120.569120.57
# 2
ROBERT P. HATCHER vs DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, 93-005528 (1993)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:West Palm Beach, Florida Sep. 27, 1993 Number: 93-005528 Latest Update: Aug. 17, 1995

The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Petitioner, Mr. Robert P. Hatcher, is eligible to retire under the Florida Retirement System rather than under the Teachers' Retirement System.

Findings Of Fact The Petitioner was employed by the Hillsborough County School Board on August 25, 1959, and was enrolled in the Teachers' Retirement System (TRS) at that time. The Petitioner worked for the Palm Beach County School Board for 27 years, from 1966 through May 15, 1992. The Petitioner worked with no breaks in service during all years in which the Legislature provided open enrollment periods for members of the TRS to transfer to the Florida Retirement System (FRS). The Petitioner was aware of the open enrollment periods, but declined all opportunities to transfer to the FRS. In this regard, the Petitioner specifically rejected membership in the FRS for the 1974 and 1978 open enrollment periods by signed ballots dated November 27, 1974, and November 2, 1978. Petitioner voluntarily terminated his employment with the Palm Beach County School Board on May 15, 1992. Following his termination with the Palm Beach County School Board, Petitioner began seeking employment with an agency that participated in the FRS in order to become eligible to transfer from the TRS to the FRS. The Petitioner's first contact with the Okeechobee County School Board (OCSB) was approximately two years ago when Dr. Mary Gray, Petitioner's acquaintance, introduced Petitioner to Mr. Owens. The Petitioner approached Mr. Owens in an attempt to obtain employment with the OCSB. The Petitioner sought employment with the OCSB for the sole purpose of obtaining entry into the FRS. Mr. Owens recruited and interviewed the Petitioner for the position of Custodian I at the OCSB. At the time the Petitioner was recruited and interviewed, Mr. Owens knew the Petitioner wanted to work for the OCSB for the sole purpose of establishing retirement eligibility. The Petitioner requested that he be hired to work only long enough to establish retirement eligibility by working for a state employer that was a member of the Florida Retirement System. Prior to the Petitioner's request, the OCSB had never had such a request before. The OCSB hired the Petitioner with the knowledge that he had health problems and believing that he would not be able to perform the duties of custodian for more than a short period of time. By letter dated June 23, 1993, the OCSB approved the Petitioner's employment as Custodian I for the OCSB effective June 30, 1993. The Custodian I position was classified as a regular position, not a short-term position. The Petitioner reported to work at the Okeechobee High School on June 30, 1993. He answered phones for several hours, performed some inventory work, then resigned that afternoon. The OCSB acknowledged receipt of the Petitioner's resignation letter, effective June 30, 1993, by letter dated August 2, 1993. The Petitioner submitted an application for membership in the FRS to the OCSB on June 30, 1993. Prior to his employment with the OCSB, the Petitioner investigated the possibility of transferring from the TRS to the FRS. The Petitioner was neither told nor did he receive any written communication by the DOR that he could transfer to the FRS based upon employment for one day. By letter dated August 16, 1993, the Respondent notified the Petitioner that he could not obtain entry into the FRS because his employment was not bona fide, but that he could retire under the TRS. If the Petitioner were to retire under the TRS, his Option 1 monthly benefit payment would be $2,571.64; his Option 3 monthly benefit payment would be $2,396.25. Under the FRS, Petitioner's Option 1 monthly benefit payment would be $3,054.91; his Option 3 monthly benefit payment would be $2,771.20.

Recommendation On the basis of all of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that the Division of Retirement issue a final order concluding that the Petitioner is not eligible for participation in the Florida Retirement System and denying Petitioner's application for transfer from the Teachers' Retirement System to the Florida Retirement System. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of January 1994 in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MICHAEL M. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of January 1994. APPENDIX The following are my specific rulings on all proposed findings of fact submitted by all parties. Findings submitted by Petitioner: Paragraphs a and b: Accepted in substance. Paragraph c: Accepted in part and rejected in part; accepted that the Petitioner obtained the described employment, but rejected that the employment was bona fide. Paragraph d: Accepted in part and rejected in part. The conclusion that the one day was sufficient to qualify the Petitioner for transfer to FRS is rejected as incorrect and as not warranted by the evidence; the remainder of the facts in this paragraph are accepted. Paragraph e: Rejected as constituting a conclusion of law, rather than a proposed finding of fact; a conclusion which is, in any event, not warranted by the evidence in this case. Paragraph f: Rejected as constituting a conclusion of law, rather than a proposed finding of fact; a conclusion which is, in any event, not warranted by the evidence in this case. Findings submitted by Respondent: All of the proposed findings of fact submitted by the Respondent have been accepted in whole or in substance in the Findings of Fact made in this Recommended Order. COPIES FURNISHED: Jodi B. Jennings, Esquire Division of Retirement Building C Cedars Executive Center 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560 Allan L. Hoffman, Esquire 1610 Southern Boulevard West Palm Beach, Florida 3406 J. McMullian, III, Director Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center, Building C 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560 William H. Lindner, Secretary Department of Management Services Knight Building, Suite 307 Koger Executive Center 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 Sylvan Strickland, Acting General Counsel Department of Management Services Knight Building, Suite 309 Koger Executive Center 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950

Florida Laws (6) 120.57121.011121.031121.051121.052121.055 Florida Administrative Code (2) 60S-1.00260S-6.001
# 3
FREDERICK STIEF vs DEPARTMENT OF MANAGEMENT SERVICES, DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, 00-001935 (2000)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Miami, Florida May 05, 2000 Number: 00-001935 Latest Update: Nov. 28, 2000

The Issue Whether Petitioner is entitled to a refund of interest he paid in 1999 on the employee contribution that became due when he opted to change his retirement classification from the regular class to the special risk class for the period September 1974, through September 30, 1975.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner was employed by the Metropolitan Dade County Police Department (now Miami-Dade Police Department) on September 9, 1974, as a Police Technician. He has held that employment since that date of hire. Petitioner was enrolled in the FRS when he was first employed. His employer reported him as a member of the regular class for retirement purposes. During the period September 9, 1974, and September 30, 1975, the FRS was a contributory system, which required both the employee and the employer to make contributions towards the employee's retirement. Since October 1, 1975, the FRS has been a non-contributory system, which means the employer makes all contributions on behalf of each employee. In addition to the regular class for retirement purposes there are other retirement classes, including the special risk class, which requires higher contributions than the regular class, but provides enhanced benefits. In June 1977, Petitioner applied to Respondent for membership in the special risk class. The Director of the Division of Retirement denied this requested change. Petitioner thereafter requested a hearing before the State Retirement Commission. Following a hearing on December 20, 1978, the State Retirement Commission entered a Final Order on February 17, 1979, that reversed the decision denying Petitioner's eligibility in the special risk class. Pursuant to rules in effect when the State Retirement Commission entered its ruling, the Director of the Division of Retirement determined in 1979 that Petitioner was entitled to the special risk class retroactive to June 1, 1977. 1/ In 1982, the Division of Retirement changed its rules to permit employees to claim special risk membership retroactive to the date of employment in any position that qualified for special risk class. 2/ As part of his retirement planning Petitioner asked the Division of Retirement in 1998 to audit his retirement account to provide an estimate as to his retirement benefits. In response to that request, the Division of Retirement reviewed Petitioner's retirement status. On January 26, 1999, the Division of Retirement determined that because of changes in its rules, Petitioner was now entitled to claim membership in the special risk class retroactive to September 9, 1974. On January 28, 1999, the Division of Retirement mailed an estimate of his retirement benefits and options to Petitioner. One of the options contained an estimate that assumed Petitioner would elect to claim membership in the special risk class retroactive to his date of hire. The estimate for that option reflected that Petitioner would owe the FRS the sum of $2,201.69 if he claimed special risk class retroactive to September 9, 1974. In response to Petitioner's request for an explanation as to why he would owe that sum, the Division of Retirement advised him on May 18, 1999, that he would owe the sum of $503.12 for the previously unpaid employee contribution for the period September 9, 1974, through September 30, 1975, and that, in addition, he would owe interest on that unpaid contribution in the amount of $1,698.57. 3/ Petitioner thereafter paid the employee contribution in the amount of $503.12 and he also paid, under protest, the interest that is at issue in this proceeding. 4/ Petitioner was not aware until 1999 that he could claim membership in the special risk class for the period at issue in this proceeding.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a final order dismissing this proceeding. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of October, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of October, 2000.

Florida Laws (2) 120.57121.081 Florida Administrative Code (1) 60S-3.0035
# 4
REX C. BISHOP, JESSIE N. KARP, ET AL. vs. DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, 80-001297 (1980)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 80-001297 Latest Update: Jun. 08, 1981

Findings Of Fact The Respondent, State of Florida, Division of Retirement, is charged with the general administration and the responsibility for the proper operation of the retirement system, and for implementing the provisions of Chapter 238, Florida Statutes. The Division of Retirement was created in 1972, and is the trustee of the annuities savings trust fund and the pension accumulation trust fund of which Petitioners are beneficiaries. In this capacity Respondent is successor to prior trustees, the Teachers Retirement System and the State Board of Administration. Subsection 238.07(2)(d), Florida Statutes, provides for a teacher's retirement upon reaching the age of 50 after 25 years of service (known as Plan D). Petitioners retired in 1973 an 1974, having satisfied the requirements of Plan D and are receiving retirement allowances under this plan. The allowance consists of a pension funded by the State of Florida and an annuity funded by member contributions. Petitioner, Rex C. Bishop, was a teacher in the Dade County Public School System from 1949 until his retirement under Plan D in 1974. At retirement on August 1, 1974, Mr. Bishop began receiving an annual retirement allowance of $5,656.40 which included an annual pension of $3,477.65 and an equal annuity of $2,178.75. The annuity was financed by the member's accumulated contributions plus accrued interest of $34,422.07, resulting in a monthly benefit of $471.37 under the option chosen by Mr. Bishop. Petitioner, Jessie N. Karp, was a teacher in the Alachua County Public Schools from 1950 until 1969, at Lake City Community College from 1969 through 1972, and the University of Florida, Gainesville, Florida, from 1972 until her retirement in 1973 under Plan D. At retirement on July 1, 1973, Mrs. Karp began receiving an annual retirement allowance of $4,158.85 which included an annual pension of $2,676.67 and an annual annuity of $1,482.18. The annuity was financed by the member's accumulated contributions plus accrued interest of $25,111.13, resulting in a monthly benefit of $346.58 under the option chosen by Mrs. Karp. Petitioner, Stanley G. Rosenberger, was a member of the faculty of the University of Florida, Gainesville, Florida, from 1947 until his retirement in 1974 under Plan D. At retirement on January 1, 1975, Mr. Rosenberger began receiving an annual retirement allowance of $7,446.33 which included an annual pension of $4,708.44 and an annual annuity of $2,737.89. The annuity was financed by the member's accumulated contributions plus accrued interest of $41,572.08, resulting in a monthly benefit of $620.53 under the option chosen by Mr. Rosenberger. Plan D provides for a pension to be funded from monies paid by the State equal to one one-hundredth (one percent) of the average final compensation times the number of years served. Plan D also includes a variable annuity funded by the member's accumulated contributions. The total benefit or retirement allowance is not a fixed percent of average salary because the annuity is variable. However, Plan D was designed to provide an annual retirement benefit equal to approximately one-half of the average final compensation after twenty-five years of service at age fifty. This would require an annuity of one percent, which would approximately match the state funded pension. 1/ When Mr. Rosenberger, who was the only Petitioner to testify in this proceeding, elected to participate in Plan D effective in 1947, he was advised by the personnel administrators at both the Florida Agricultural Extension Service and the University of Florida that he would receive half of his average income at the retirement age of 50 after 25 years of service. This information was consistent with the goal of Plan D as established in Chapter 238, Florida Statutes. An actuary had assisted in setting up Plan D in 1947, based on 1939 data. However, no actuary was utilized again until about 1955. By the early 1950's, it became apparent to retirement system administrators that Plan D was not obtaining the funds required for the one percent annuity. Factors contributing to annuity benefits of less than one percent included increasing average salaries, low earnings on investments, and a limitation on contribution rates. The rate of contribution to Plan D as initially set by the actuarial firm of George Buck & Company, New York, was 9.24 percent to 13.58 percent of salary depending upon the member's age at entry into Plan D. That rate of contribution was later raised to 9.49 percent to 13.83 percent based on a legislative increase in the Survivor's Benefit Fund under Subsection 238.09(5), Florida Statutes (1957). The actuarial funding of a one percent annuity would ultimately have necessitated raising the contribution rate to between fifteen and twenty percent of salary during the years of active employment. Rather than increase contribution rates to levels considered prohibitive, retirement system administrators closed Plan D to new members on July 1, 1951. When the annuity funding problems became apparent to administrators, various meetings were held with teachers' groups and letters were mailed to personnel officials in the state school system to advise Plan D members that they could not expect the proposed one percent annuity to be realized. However, retirement system officials did not attempt to inform individual members of the Plan D annuity shortfall since mailing addresses were not maintained. Petitioner Rosenberger first became aware of the shortfall in 1972, when he began preparing for retirement. Until 1957, the funds were invested by the Board of Trustees of the Teachers Retirement System. During this period, investments were limited by law to government guaranteed securities. Interest was distributed to member accounts by determining total earnings in the annuity trust fund, subtracting expenses, and distributing the remainder proportionally to each member's account. The interest credited to members' accounts from 1947 to 1957 did not exceed three percent. After 1957, the State Board of Administration assumed responsibility for investing all state funds including retirement funds. Interest credited to member accounts increased from three percent in 1957 to seven percent in 1974. During comparable years, U.S. Treasury Note interest payments generally exceeded these annual interest credits by one to two percentage points. High grade corporate bond interest rates and new home mortgage yields were substantially higher than the interest credited to member accounts during comparable years. The annuities Petitioners now receive are the actuarial equivalent of their accumulated contributions on the basis of the assumptions in effect at the time of their retirement in 1973 and 1974. Had Petitioners retired before an annuity rate table change in 1972, they would have received a 15 percent higher annuity with respect to their final salaries. These reduced rates resulted from changes in mortality assumptions and interest rates, and cost of living escalation mandated by the Legislature. As a result of changes in the system and the early funding shortfalls, each Petitioner suffers a deficit in anticipated retirement benefits in excess of $1,000 annually. However, each Petitioner had the opportunity to make a lump sum contribution to the retirement trust account in order to assure a retirement allowance equal to one-half of his or her prospective average final compensation. See Subsection 238.09(1)(f), Florida Statutes. Mr. Rosenberger specifically declined the limp sum contribution option when it was called to his attention. The remaining Petitioners were presumably aware of this provision and likewise declined.

Recommendation From the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Administration, Division of Retirement, enter a final order dismissing the Petition. 2/ DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of May, 1981, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. R. T. CARPENTER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of May, 1981.

Florida Laws (4) 238.07238.09422.07768.28
# 5
JOHN R. NELSON vs DEPARTMENT OF MANAGEMENT SERVICES, DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, 11-004343 (2011)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Aug. 24, 2011 Number: 11-004343 Latest Update: Jun. 07, 2012

The Issue Whether Petitioner must forfeit and repay distributions he received from the Deferred Retirement Option Program and subsequent monthly retirement benefits received as a consequence of his election to the position of County Commissioner of Jefferson County within six months of terminating state employment.

Findings Of Fact The Division of Retirement (Division) is, and was at the times material to this case, the state agency charged with the responsibility of administering the Florida Retirement System (FRS). Petitioner, John Nelson, was employed by the Department of Financial Services (DFS) from October 1977 through July 31, 2010. For the last five years of his employment with DFS, Petitioner participated in the Deferred Retirement Option Program (DROP). Prior to ending his DROP participation, Petitioner completed a DROP Termination Notification Form (DP-TERM Rev. 06/06) on April 23, 2010, confirming he would terminate employment on July 31, 2010. The DROP Termination Notification was also signed by a representative from FRS confirming Petitioner's employment termination date and reads in pertinent part: I understand that I cannot work for any Florida Retirement System (FRS) covered employer during the calendar month following my DROP termination date or my DROP participation will be null and void. If I fail to meet this requirement, I will forfeit my accumulated DROP benefit including interest. I also understand that I may not be reemployed by any FRS employer in any capacity including part-time, temporary, other personal services (OPS) or non-Division approved contractual services during the calendar month immediately following my DROP termination date. If I fail to meet this requirement, I will forfeit my accumulated DROP benefit, including interest retroactive to me enrollment date in the DROP. The above-referenced version of the DP-TERM (Revised 6/06) has been incorporated by reference into Florida Administrative Code Rule 60S-9.001(ee). Due to significant statutory changes made by the Legislature, the Division sent to Petitioner a second DROP Termination Notification, (Form DP-TERM revised 04/10) which he signed on June 9, 2010. The wording in the revised form reflected statutory changes which would take effect July 1, 2010. The revised form states in pertinent part: If your DROP termination date is on or after July 1, 2010: Your termination requirement means you cannot remain employed or become re-employed with any Florida Retirement System (FRS) covered employer during the FIRST SIX calendar months following your DROP termination date. This includes but is not limited to: Part-time work, temporary work, other personal services (OPS), substitute teaching or non-Division approved contractual services. During the 7th-12th calendar months following your DROP termination date, you may return to work for a participating FRS employer but must suspend your retirement benefit for any of these months your[sic] are employed. There are no reemployment exceptions during the reemployment limitation period. After the 12th calendar month following your DROP termination date, there are no employment restrictions. If you fail to meet the termination requirements noted above, you will void (cancel) your retirement and DROP participation, you must repay all retirement benefits received including your DROP accumulation, and you must apply to establish a future retirement date. If you void your retirement your employer will be responsible for making retroactive retirement contributions and you will be awarded service credit for the period during which you were in DROP through your new termination date. Your eligibility for DROP participation will be determined by your future retirement date and you may lose your eligibility to participate in DROP. (emphasis added). The revised form DP-TERM (Revised 04/10) has not yet been adopted as a rule. At the time of hearing, rulemaking had been initiated. Petitioner terminated his employment with DFS on the agreed termination date of July 31, 2010, and was no longer an employee of DFS after that date. Sometime between July 31, 2010, and November 2010, Petitioner was paid his accumulated DROP monies in the amount of $181,635.09, in the form of a direct rollover into an eligible retirement account. Petitioner was also paid monthly retirement benefits for the months of August through November 2010, in the total amount of $11,286.76. The Division deactivated Petitioner's monthly retirement benefits in December 2011. The total amount of retirement benefits paid to Petitioner after terminating employment with DFS is $191,921.85, which the Division seeks to recover. In April of 2010, at the urging of community members, Petitioner registered to run for public office in Jefferson County, Florida. He won the election and was sworn into office as a Jefferson County Commissioner on November 16, 2010. Tyler McNeill is the Chief Deputy Clerk and Human Resources Officer for Jefferson County. Following Petitioner's election as a County Commissioner, Mr. McNeill began to process a small packet of employment-related documents which he provides to elected officials. Mr. McNeill went to Petitioner's home on a Sunday evening to get the necessary papers signed. Prior to this meeting, Petitioner was unaware that Jefferson County participates in the FRS. Petitioner described his reaction to learning this as "shocking." When Mr. McNeill and Petitioner got to the FRS form, Petitioner did not want to sign it and informed Mr. McNeill of that. Mr. McNeill described Petitioner as appearing physically ill, shocked, and "so upset" upon learning that the County was an FRS participating employer. On November 22, 2010, Petitioner and Mr. McNeill called Ira Gaines, FRS Benefits Administrator, using a speakerphone. At the time they placed this call, Petitioner had not yet signed the employment documents supplied to him by Mr. McNeill, and Petitioner informed Mr. Gaines of this. During this conversation, Petitioner expressed his willingness to resign from office and refuse to accept payment from the County for his newly elected position. According to Mr. McNeill, Petitioner was not yet eligible to receive compensation from the County because the employment papers had not yet been processed. Mr. McNeill testified that he would have been able to discard the documents. During this telephone conversation, Mr. Gaines advised that Petitioner was legally a person employed by the County by virtue of his being sworn into office on November 16, 2010. Mr. Gaines equated bring sworn into office as being an employee. At hearing, Mr. Gaines reiterated his position: that he did not know any way Petitioner could not be enrolled in FRS when occupying an elected position. As a result of this telephone conversation with Mr. Gaines and in reliance on Mr. Gaines' advice, Mr. McNeill processed Petitioner's employment papers including the FRS reenrollment form. Mr. Gaines then began receiving salary payments for being a county commissioner. On December 6, 2010, Mr. Gaines sent a letter to Petitioner stating that his election to the position of County Commissioner had voided his DROP participation, and consequently, Petitioner would have to repay $181,635.09 for the DROP payment, and $11,286.76 in monthly retirement benefits. The letter further informed that Petitioner will continue to earn credit as an elected official in the Elected Officer's Class of FRS membership and that Petitioner's retirement account would be adjusted to reflect service from August 2005 through July 2010 (his DROP period) which he estimated would increase Petitioner's retirement benefits by $1,200 per month. In response to the December 6, 2010 letter, Petitioner appealed the voiding of his DROP participation. By letter dated February 1, 2011, the Division denied the request. The February 1, 2011 letter also informed Petitioner of his right to request a hearing, which gave rise to this proceeding.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Division of Retirement enter a final order rescinding the February 1, 2011, notification letter requiring reimbursement of Petitioner's DROP distribution and reimbursement of Petitioner's monthly retirement benefits from August 2010 through December 2010 when those benefits were discontinued; reinstating those monthly benefits beginning six months following the completion of Petitioner's DROP period, and nullifying Petitioner's reenrollment in the Elected Officers' Class of FRS membership. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of March, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S BARBARA J. STAROS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of March, 2012.

Florida Laws (11) 100.041112.3173120.569120.57120.68121.011121.021121.031121.053121.091121.122 Florida Administrative Code (1) 60S-6.001
# 6
WALTRAUND E. PAEHLER vs DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, 95-004841 (1995)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Jacksonville, Florida Oct. 05, 1995 Number: 95-004841 Latest Update: Jul. 23, 1996

Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: Petitioner, Waltraud E. Paehler, was a classroom teacher in the Clay County public school system until 1993, and says she had a total of nineteen years of service. During that time period, she participated in the Florida Retirement System, which is administered by respondent, Division of Retirement (Division). In 1992, petitioner was suffering from a number of illnesses, including chronic kidney failure and congestive heart failure, which impaired her ability to continue working as a teacher. She also suffered from depression. These conditions continued into 1993. During this time period, she was hospitalized on at least two occasions. Because her work was very stressful, and tended to exacerbate her medical condition, petitioner accepted her physician's advice and decided to resign her teaching position effective April 14, 1993. On April 21, 1993, or a week later, she executed her application for retirement and opted to take early retirement effective May 1, 1993, when she was fifty-four years of age. Even though the local school board had periodically distributed information booklets to all teachers, including petitioner, concerning early, normal and disability types of retirement, and the various retirement options were discussed annually at each school's in-service training seminar, petitioner says she was still unaware of the disability retirement option. Thus, she elected to take early retirement on April 21, 1993. Because of her age, her retirement benefits were reduced by forty percent, or five percent for each year under the normal retirement age of sixty-two. Assuming she was qualified, had she elected to take disability retirement, there would have been no penalty because of her age. At or about the time petitioner decided to resign her teaching position, her daughter, who was assisting petitioner in her personal affairs, telephoned the local school board in an effort to ascertain potential retirement options for her mother. She spoke with an unknown individual in the school personnel office who the daughter says was not "very knowledgeable." The two discussed "in general what (her) mother could do" with respect to retirement, but the daughter says she received no specifics other than the fact that her mother would be "entitled to partial pay." She also requested that an application for service retirement form be mailed to her mother. The daughter then relayed this sketchy information to her mother. Because of financial constraints, and in order to receive her benefits immediately, petitioner decided to take early retirement rather than wait until normal retirement age. After selecting the option 1 benefit, which entitled her to benefits for her lifetime only, petitioner carried the form to her school's personnel office where she executed it on April 21, 1993, before the principal's secretary, a notary public. Although the secretary could not recall the specific event, she affirmed that she would not allow anyone to sign a document who did not appear to be competent. In selecting option 1, which gave the highest monthly benefits for early retirement, petitioner acknowledged she understood the ramifications of making that choice when she did so on April 21, 1993. Thus, on that date she possessed sufficient mental capacity to know that these benefits would last only during her lifetime, and her daughters would not receive any benefits after her death. At final hearing she confirmed that, prior to executing the form, she had reviewed the various options under early retirement and selected the first option since she "figure(d) (she had) done enough for them all (of her) life, they can take care of themselves." In June 1994, petitioner read an article in a teacher trade publication and learned that a number of states offered disability retirement as an option and did not penalize retirees for early retirement due to a disability. This article prompted petitioner the following month to write a letter to the Division. When petitioner made inquiry with the Division in July 1994 concerning a change from early (service) to disability retirement, she was told that under Rule 60S-4.002(4), Florida Administrative Code, she could not do so after cashing her first check. By then, petitioner had long since cashed the first retirement check mailed to her at the end of May 1993. That advice prompted her to eventually challenge the Division's rejection of her claim on the theory that she was "incapacitated" when she made her decision to take early retirement. In support of her contention that in 1993 she lacked the necessary mental capacity to make a reasoned decision concerning her retirement, petitioner presented the testimony of three health professionals from whom she was receiving care in 1993. Their deposition testimony is found in petitioner's exhibits 1-3 received in evidence. Dr. Hardin, a family physician, was petitioner's primary treating physician from February 1992 until April 1993. In the spring of 1993, he recalled petitioner as being "confused," "in an imbalanced state," suffering "mental duress," dependent on explicit instructions for appointments, and taking a variety of prescribed medications for tobacco cessation, chronic renal failure, congestive cardiac condition, high blood pressure, cardiomyopathy, tremors, anxiety and migraine headaches. Because of these conditions, Dr. Hardin found it difficult to believe that she could "handle" a more complicated matter such as choosing a retirement option. Dr. Hardin acknowledged, however, that during the spring of 1993, he had little chance "to follow her" since another physician, Dr. Stoneburner, was managing petitioner's most important illness, renal failure. Dr. Stoneburner, a nephrologist and internist who has treated petitioner for a kidney disease since 1985, felt that in the spring of 1993 she "was not in a very good position to make a competent decision based on her emotional state." Just prior to her retirement, he observed petitioner as having "significant depression" and "a lack of desire to work." She was also taking as many as six or seven medications at one time which could "possibly" cause "someone to be confused." Based on these circumstances, Dr. Stoneburner opined that petitioner was not competent to make a rational judgment. However, Dr. Stoneburner conceded that if petitioner had been given retirement options explained in layman's terms, and had someone to assist her in explaining the various options, she could have made an intelligent decision. Kristina Crenshaw, a licensed mental health counselor, met with petitioner on four occasions between February 18 and April 12, 1993. Ms. Crenshaw found petitioner to have "significant difficulty with depression," in an "agitated, very stressed, (and) overwhelmed" condition, and with a "strong sense of uncertainty about her future." While the witness believed that petitioner would have understood a pamphlet describing her retirement options, she would not have "necessarily understood all the implications to her own personal life." The witness agreed, however, that once petitioner made a decision to resign her job, she seemed more "upbeat" and "positive." Further, petitioner had told her by telephone on April 15, 1993, that she felt "much better" after retiring from her job. The counselor did not know if petitioner was mentally competent when she opted for early retirement a week later. Nothwithstanding the testimony of the health professionals, the findings in paragraph 7 are deemed to be more compelling on the critical issue of competency, and it is found that on April 21, 1993, petitioner understood the nature and consequences of her acts, and she was capable of binding herself by the retirement application. Therefore, her request to have rule 60S-4.002(4) waived, or to have her "contract" with the Division set aside, should be denied.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Division of Retirement enter a Final Order determining that petitioner was mentally competent when she elected to take early retirement and that her request to have rule 60S-4.0002(4) waived so as to permit her to file a request for disability retirement be denied. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of May, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of May, 1996. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 95-4841 Petitioner: Partially accepted in finding of fact 1. Rejected as being unnecessary. Partially accepted in finding of fact 12. 4-5. Partially accepted in finding of fact 2. 6-7. Partially accepted in finding of fact 3. 8-9. Partially accepted in finding of fact 4. 10-11. Partially accepted in finding of fact 8. Partially accepted in finding of fact 9. Covered in preliminary statement. 14-20. Partially accepted in finding of fact 12. 21-24. Partially accepted in finding of fact 11. 25-31. Partially accepted in finding of fact 13. 32-37. Partially accepted in finding of fact 6. 38-39. Partially accepted in finding of fact 5. 40. Covered in preliminary statement. 41-43. Rejected as being unnecessary. Respondent: Rejected since the evidence shows that petitioner was employed by the Clay County School Board and not the Duval County School Board. Also, the only evidence of record as to years of service is the testimony of petitioner that she had nineteen years of service. However, this fact is not necessary to resolve the dispute. Partially accepted in finding of fact 8. Partially accepted in findings of fact 8 and 9. Partially accepted in finding of fact 9. Partially accepted in finding of fact 10. 6-7. Partially accepted in finding of fact 12. 8-9. Partially accepted in finding of fact 11. 10-12. Partially accepted in finding of fact 13. Partially accepted in finding of fact 5. Partially accepted in finding of fact 6. Rejected as being unnecessary. Note - Where a proposed finding of fact has been partially accepted, the remainder has been rejected as being irrelevant, unnecessary for the resolution of the issues, not supported by the evidence, cumulative, or a conclusion of law. COPIES FURNISHED: Mark H. Levine, Esquire 245 East Virginia Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301-1263 Stanley M. Danek, Esquire Division of Retirement 2639-C North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560 A. J. McMullian, III, Director Division of Retirement 2639-C North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560

Florida Laws (1) 120.57 Florida Administrative Code (1) 60S-4.002
# 7
WILLIAM B. NUNN vs DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, 90-008015 (1990)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Cocoa, Florida Dec. 18, 1990 Number: 90-008015 Latest Update: Apr. 09, 1992

Findings Of Fact Respondent, Division of Retirement, is the agency responsible for administering the Florida Retirement System (FRS), a statewide consolidated system encompassing over 500,000 active employees and over 100,000 retired employees, representing all levels of government: state agencies, counties, school boards, cities, special districts, the community colleges and the nine universities -- nearly 800 different public employers. Brevard Community College (BCC) is the previous employer of the three petitioners and is a participating employer in the FRS. BCC is located in Cocoa, Florida, with satellite campuses throughout Brevard County. Petitioners William Nunn, PhD Prior to his retirement on November 30, 1988, Dr. William Nunn worked for BCC for approximately 17 years in various capacities, including Director of Evening Studies, Chair of the Division of Social Sciences, Provost and Dean of the Titusville campus and Dean of Vocational/Instructional Planning in the central administrative offices. It was this latter position he held at the time of retirement. As Dean of Vocational/Instructional Planning, Dr. Nunn was responsible for college-wide coordination of BCC's vocational programs, developing new programs, providing reports on vocational education, developing the master course plans and the college catalog, and serving as head of the college's collective bargaining unit. Dr. Nunn received a salary of approximately $52,000.00 a year and all the fringe benefits of regular employment: vacation and sick leave, insurance benefits, worker's compensation coverage, and contributions to social security and the FRS. He reported directly to the Vice President and President of the college, and his performance evaluations were completed by the President. With the advice of his accountant, Dr. Nunn informed his employer in July or August 1988, that he would retire in November. The advance notification was a requirement for an early retirement program which provided a major incentive for retirement in the form of a cash bonus of 25% of salary. Upon his retirement, Dr. Nunn's duties were primarily split among existing staff persons and a new hire. Certain duties were not specifically assigned, and sometime in December, the BCC's President contacted Dr. Nunn and asked if he would be willing to provide work in those areas so that they would not fall through the crack while people were being trained to take them over. The arrangement to which Dr. Nunn agreed was that he would be allowed to work on his own, without specific hours, for a 6-month period, for $10,000.00. For cash-flow purposes, he asked for payment in monthly increments, with a maximum of 390 hours total, a limit he felt would assure that he would not violate the law allowing for a maximum of 780 hours of employment by retired adjunct instructors. A one-page form contract between the District Board of Trustees of Brevard Community College and William Nunn, dated January 3, 1989, provides that he perform the following services: Work to insure that the college is in compliance with the criteria of the Southern Association of Colleges and Schools. Classify for funding, reporting and data processing purposes all courses and programs of study. (Common Course Numbering and Community College Management Information System) Maintain master course plan files. Coordinate catalog additions, changes and deletions. (Pet. Exh. #2) For background information on the person performing the service, the contract provides: Dr. Nunn is a knowledgeable college administrator with over twenty years experience at the community college and university level. He has performed all of the functions for which he is being employed. (Pet. Exh. #2) A subsequent identical contract was entered between the parties for the period June 14, 1989 through December 21, 1989. Dr. Nunn continued to provide services through December 1990 under a series of contracts. Dr. Nunn worked at the college, for a while in his prior office, then in a different office. He also did some work at home. He used independent judgement based on his past experience and education. Because of his skill and because of the uniformity of the course system, Dr. Nunn could have performed most of the same services for any community college. No one else at BCC had the ability to perform the duties and eventually he trained someone to assume them. He kept his own hours and received no fringe benefits. For a period of approximately four months he was given the services of a graduate assistant who had been assigned to his office prior to retirement. He shared her services with other staff until she left when the term ended in April. He used college office supplies and the college computer. Dr. Nunn had been a member of the management team prior to retirement, and in that capacity attended various meetings and social functions. He no longer did this. As a volunteer, and not related to the services he performed under his contract, he travelled twice to statewide meetings on behalf of the college. He was reimbursed for his travel expenses. Dr. Nunn reported his earnings under the contract to the IRS as self- employment income. He did not obtain a business license and neither advertised nor did consulting work for other entities. The contract form utilized by the college for Dr. Nunn's services has no provision for termination. Both Dr. Nunn and the college administrators understood it could be terminated by mutual agreement. When he needed to consult with the college, Dr. Nunn reported directly to the President. Dr. Nunn received $35,715.99 in retirement benefits from FRS from January through November 1989. The Division has demanded repayment of that sum. John Mangus Prior to his employment with BCC in 1970, John Mangus had twenty-six years experience in machine work in private industry, including work for the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, Hercules Power Company and the Chrysler Corporation. In 1970, he was hired by BCC to teach machine tool technology. After ten years he became Division Chairman of the Industrial Division, and in 1988, he was appointed Assistant Director of the Palm Bay Vocational Center, also part of BCC. As Division Chair, Mr. Mangus was responsible for vocational shops at the various campuses in Brevard County. He administered the Division, performed faculty evaluations, recruited students, planned curriculum and met with counterparts from other colleges. He also coordinated a move of two vocational shops when the BCC facility at Patrick Air Force Base was closed. As Assistant Director for Palm Bay Vo Tech, he assisted the Director in purchasing equipment and meeting with industry representatives; he determined curriculum and continued to do some paperwork for the Vocational Division. He received a biweekly salary and received all fringe benefits of a regular BCC employee. After a heart attack and a cancer operation, Mr. Mangus retired from BCC on January 31, 1989. By retiring just prior to his 63rd birthday he was able to take advantage of the early retirement incentive. In late December or early January, around the time of Mr. Mangus' retirement, the Vocational Division was undergoing some changes. Teachers were retiring and programs were being reorganized. The administration decided to merge programs and move four different vocational shops. Since John Mangus had extensive experience in moving equipment, he was asked to return to BCC after retirement to handle the moves for the vocational shops. A contract, the same form utilized for Dr. Nunn, was executed effective March 1, 1989 between John Mangus and BCC, providing for his services from the period March 1, 1989 through December 31, 1989, at the rate of $536.00 a month, for a total of $5,360.00. The duties specified on the contract were: Assist the Provost in the operation of the Industrial Division, assist in the development of the curriculum for Building Maintenance program, supervise moving of equipment and tooling for several programs, and to include other duties assigned by the Cocoa Campus Provost. (Pet. Ex. #12) emphasis added Justification for the service was provided in the contract as follows: Will assist the Provost in the operation of the Industrial Division, will assist in orienting the new Chairman, and will be involved in planning, implementing and supervising program moves and curriculum changes, will work a total of 268 hours. (Pet. Ex. #12) John Mangus' primary responsibility under the contract was the move, a function which required a special expertise. The mechanical lifting and transport of heavy equipment is complicated, and Mangus had acquired this skill at the railroad and at Chrysler Corporation when he moved a shop from Melbourne to Cape Canaveral in 1969. He planned the BCC moves in his own home and arranged the schedules. Basis for the 268 hour limit was his estimate of the time it would take at what he considered a fair hourly rate. He insisted on monthly increments so that his railroad retirement benefits would not be affected. He also insisted that he not be required to attend meetings and that he be allowed to work on his own. He was assisted in the move by several college instructors, but he had no supervisory responsibility for them. All equipment was provided by the college. In addition to the moving, John Mangus prepared budgets and planned the curriculum. He worked at home mostly on the budgets, just as he had done when he was employed as Division Director. John Mangus received only the $536.00 per month from BCC, no fringe benefits, and ended up working more than the maximum hours for no additional compensation. He paid his own insurance and reported his income to the IRS as self employment. During the same time that he was handling the BCC moves, he was also moving, revising the curriculum and setting up shops for Lake City Community college on a contract at $200.00 a day. He did not advertise his services and did not incorporate as a business. His engagement at Lake City was by virtue of his reputation in the field. The Division of Retirement has demanded that John Mangus repay the $11,050.76 he received from the FRS from March through December 1989. William L. Benfield William Benfield was hired by BCC in 1969 as a maintenance employee, became supervisor of maintenance, and remained in that position until approximately 1984, when he took over the college hardware and locksmith shop. His primary responsibility during the last five years prior to retirement was as locksmith. He worked under a supervisor who gave him his duties each morning when he reported to work at the Cocoa maintenance department. He worked eight hour days, with an hour for lunch and two 15 minute breaks. He was required to turn in time sheets. He received $21,000.00 annual salary, plus benefits such as paid leave, insurance and retirement contributions. As locksmith, Mr. Benfield worked at all the BCC campuses, as directed. He was required to utilize the tools furnished by the employer and used the employer's vehicle. In June or July 1988, Mr. Benfield notified the college that he would take an early retirement. He planned on retiring at age sixty-two in February 1989, but was eligible for the financial incentive for early retirement. His retirement occurred effective November 30, 1988. Around the latter part of December, William Benfield was contacted by Harold Creel, BCC's Vice President for Maintenance, with regard to performing short-term contract work. They met, and Mr. Creel explained that the college wanted Benfield to work on the new keying system for the college. This was a computerized code system that required re-pinning each lock in the campus buildings. The work also involved keeping records in a code that would allow a key to be made. Mr. Benfield agreed to the work so long as it did not exceed 20 hours a week, as he did not want to jeopardize his social security income. A contract was executed on the same form as used for Petitioners Nunn and Mangus, for the period January 3, 1989 through June 30, 1989. The services are described as follows: Locksmith - repair door locks, make keys, repair doors, rekey building, etc. [sic] (Pet. Ex. #17) Consideration was set at $11.50 per hour for 20 hours a week. A second contract was entered for the period July 3, 1989 through December 31, 1989 for $11.50 per hour and 12 hours a week. (Pet. Exh. #18) William Benfield was familiar with these short-term contracts since carpenters, plumbers or electricians had been retained in this manner in his maintenance department. Benfield's work under the contracts was on his own time. He was not required to work a minimum number of hours or to check in at a given hour. He picked up work orders, as before, but used his discretion as to priorities. He used his own vehicle to travel to the various campuses and used his own tools, a substantial investment of several thousand dollars. He did not advertise as a business and did no work for anyone else, as he did not want to affect his social security benefits. He did not have a business license. He received no fringe benefits and reported his income under the contracts to the IRS as self-employment. He received no performance evaluations. William Benfield earned approximately $8,000.00 under the two contracts with BCC; he also received $7,345.97 in retirement benefits from FRS during the same period in 1989. The Division of Retirement is demanding repayment of those benefits. General Findings and Summary The law with regard to reemployment of FRS retirees has been in a state of flux for over 10 years. At one time, reemployment was prohibited altogether. Then the law was changed to permit reemployment when the agency certified that no one else was available to fill the job. Reemployment was limited to 500 hours in a calendar year; the limit was expanded to 600 hours, and later to 780 hours or $4,000.00. In 1985, the legislature created a 12-month waiting period, during which retirement benefits had to be suspended if the retiree returned to work under an FRS-covered employer. After 12 months, the retiree could return and draw both salary and retirement benefits. Immediately, school boards prevailed with an amendment to allow teachers to return for a maximum of 780 hours in the first calendar year after retirement. The community colleges and nine state universities also obtained similar amendments for rehiring instructional staff. The Division of Retirement has conscientiously provided written guidance to its member employers in the form of rules, guidelines, handbooks, and memoranda. It also provides instructional leaflets to employees and retirees. As Associate Vice-President of Human Resources at BCC, Robert Lawton oversees the entire personnel operation for the college. He is familiar with the requirements of the law and rules of the Division of Retirement and reviewed the contracts for the petitioners' services. These contract forms are different from those used for adjunct faculty who are paid through a regular payroll account. Short term contractors are paid from a separate account. The contracts were drafted by the department heads seeking the petitioners' services. Robert Lawton recommended approval to the President after assuring himself that the contracts were appropriate. He had instructed a staffperson to call the Division of Retirement in his presence to get some guidance. There is no evidence that someone from the agency actually approved the circumstances. Rather, it is apparent that the guidance received through the phone call, in which the college may not have been identified, was of a general nature as to what the agency looks at in determining an independent contractor status. The college commonly uses the short-term contract form for consultant and mechanical services. While it routinely advertises to fill employment vacancies, it ordinarily obtains contractual services from individuals it knows can provide those services. The Division of Retirement became aware of Petitioners' contracts through a routine independent audit. The agency carefully scrutinizes these type of service provider relationships as it has the responsibility to maintain the actuarial soundness of the retirement fund for thousands of employees and retirees. That actuarial soundness relies on a proper balance of contributions to benefits. That balance is jeopardized if employers are able to avoid required contributions by obtaining services of employees through a contract. The opportunity to circumvent the law is particularly seductive where, as here, the employer needs the services of a recently retired employee. Scepticism by the agency in such instances is appropriate. Dr. Nunn's many successful years as a valuable member of the college's management team were served, by his choice and the college's, in the status of an employee. He retired, and was immediately retained to perform some of the same functions as before -- sensitive and significant functions that were integral to the successful administration of the institution--functions related to its accreditation and funding. Language in his contract such as "work to insure", "maintain", and "coordinate" connote an ongoing relationship, rather than discrete definable contract products. Indeed, his relationship with the college was ongoing, for two years beyond his official retirement date. The term, "coordinate", implies that he was not to work alone, but was rather meant to direct the work of others. Some actual evidence of that is found in the fact that a student assistant was provided, albeit briefly. As a highly qualified professional, Dr. Nunn could have performed the same or similar tasks for other institutions. He did not, and if he had, the circumstances would have to dictate whether he was a consultant to, or employee of, those other institutions. Dr. Nunn was not an adjunct professor nor member of the instructional staff, and was not entitled to the 780 hour exception to the 12 month reemployment prohibition. The 390 hour limit in his contract, however, reveals that his compensation, $10,000.00, was approximately the same rate of pay he received prior to retirement when he worked full time. The facts addressed at hearing regarding the relationship of Dr. Nunn to BCC, when considered as a whole, weigh more heavily in favor of finding an employee/employer relationship than that of consultant/client. The same conclusion is reached as to Petitioner, John Mangus. If his only contractual service had been the shop moves, his consultant or independent contractor status would have been more evident. As he eloquently described at the hearing, the transportation of heavy machinery is a unique skill, the exercise of which demands noninterference by others. However, the terms of his contract, and the actual services he performed also related to budget and curriculum, functions he performed as an employee and functions integral to the mission of his employer. The terms of his contract thoroughly belie his claims of independence. He was to "assist", to "supervise", to "be involved in planning, implementing, and supervising...". Perhaps most fatal is the language, "...and to include other duties assigned by Cocoa Campus Provost". Except for the move, the contractual duties were entirely open-ended and subject to the interpretation or direction of others. That he was also retained at the same time by another community college might imply that he was properly a consultant/specialist in moving industrial workshops, but this fact alone does not outweigh the more substantial evidence that at BCC he was still performing as an employee, much the same as he had performed prior to his official retirement. The evidence weighs differently as to William Benfield. His services as a locksmith were a specialized mechanical skill of a type commonly provided through a contract. His services were not integral to the nature of the institution and did not necessitate his working with, for, or over other staff. The substance of his contractual tasks is found on the face of the contract form, and his prior performance of the same or similar tasks as an employee does not indicate those tasks must always be provided by an employee. The terms and conditions of his relationship with the college were radically altered after his retirement. The college chose, in the words of Robert Lawton, to "privatize" certain mechanical functions previously provided in-house, and the locksmith function was one of them. William Benfield became an independent contractor to BCC after his retirement.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby, recommended that a Final Order be entered requiring repayment of retirement benefits received by Petitioners, Nunn and Mangus, during the time they were employed by Brevard Community College in the first 12 months of their retirement. RECOMMENDED this 15th day of January, 1992, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MARY CLARK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of January, 1992. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NOS. 90-8015, 90-8016, and 90-8017 The following constitute specific rulings on the findings of fact proposed by the parties: Petitioner's Proposed Findings Adopted in paragraphs #3. and #5. Adopted in substance in paragraph #5. Adopted in paragraph #7. Adopted in substance in paragraph #8. Rejected as contrary to the weight of evidence or immaterial. Adopted in substance in paragraph #9. Adopted in substance in paragraphs #8. and #9. Adopted in part in paragraph #9, otherwise rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in substance in paragraph #9. Adopted in substance in paragraph #10. Adopted in substance in paragraph #11. Adopted in substance in paragraph #10. Adopted in substance in paragraph #9. Adopted in substance in paragraph #12. Adopted in substance in paragraph #13. Adopted in substance in paragraph #16. Adopted in substance in paragraphs #14. and #15. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in paragraph #17. Adopted in paragraphs #17. and #19. Adopted in paragraph #21. Adopted in paragraph #20. Adopted in paragraph #21. Adopted in paragraph #19. Adopted in substance in paragraph #19. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in paragraph #21. Adopted in paragraph #22. Rejected as immaterial in light of other evidence that the relationship was not independent. Adopted in substance in paragraph #21. Adopted in paragraph #19. 32.-33. Adopted in paragraph #24. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in paragraph #27. Adopted in paragraphs #28. and #29. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in paragraph #28. Adopted in paragraph #30. Rejected as unnecessary. 41.-43. Adopted in paragraph #30. Adopted in paragraph #31. Adopted in paragraph #34. Rejected as immaterial. Adopted in substance in paragraph #34. Adopted in substance in paragraph #35. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in part in paragraph #35; otherwise rejected as contrary to the evidence. Adopted in part in paragraph #34; otherwise immaterial in light of the evidence that as to Nunn and Mangus, the relationship was not independent. 52.-53. Rejected as immaterial. 54.-56. Rejected as repetitive and unnecessary. Rejected as contrary to the weight of evidence. Adopted in paragraph #36. Rejected as repetitive or immaterial. 60.-77. Rejected as immaterial, unnecessary or unsupported by the weight of evidence. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact Adopted in substance in paragraph #13. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in substance in paragraph #8. Adopted in substance in paragraph #22. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in substance in paragraph #18. Adopted in substance in paragraph #31. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in substance in paragraph #28. Adopted in paragraph #1. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in paragraph #1. 13.-14. Adopted in paragraph #32. 15. Adopted in substance in paragraph #37. 16.-19. Adopted in substance in paragraph #33. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in paragraph #37. 22.-23. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in paragraph #3. Adopted in paragraph #4. Adopted in paragraph #9. Adopted in paragraph #6. Adopted in paragraph #7. Adopted in paragraph #8. Adopted in paragraph #8. Rejected as contrary to the weight of evidence (as to attendance at meetings). Adopted in paragraph #5. Adopted in paragraph #12. Adopted in paragraph #8. Adopted in paragraph #11. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in paragraph #11. Rejected as unsupported by the evidence. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in paragraph #10. Adopted in substance in paragraph #8. Adopted in paragraph #8. 43.-44. Adopted in paragraph #9. 45.-46. Adopted in paragraph #14. 47.-48. Adopted in paragraph #15. Adopted in paragraph #16. Adopted in paragraph #17. Adopted in paragraph #18. Adopted in paragraph #15. Adopted in paragraph #20. Adopted in paragraph #19. Adopted in paragraph #20. Adopted by implication in paragraph #35. Adopted in paragraph #17. Adopted in substance in paragraph #21. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in paragraphs #23. and #26. Adopted in paragraphs #23. and #24. Adopted in paragraph #26. Adopted in paragraph #28. Adopted in part in paragraph #28; otherwise rejected as unnecessary. 65.-67. Adopted in paragraph #30. 68.-69. Rejected as immaterial. COPIES FURNISHED: Larry D. Scott, Esquire Asst. Division Attorney Dept. of Administration Div. of Retirement-Legal Ofc. Cedars Executive Ctr., Bldg. C 2639 N. Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-1560 Peter L. Sampo, Esquire HOGG, ALLEN, NORTON & BLUE, P.A. 121 Majorca Ave., 3rd floor Coral Gables, FL 33134 A. J. McMullian, III, Director Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center, Bldg. C 2639 N. Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-1560 John A. Pieno, Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 Augustus D. Aikens, Jr. General Counsel Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550

Florida Laws (2) 120.57121.091
# 8
FREDERICK MILLS vs DEPARTMENT OF MANAGEMENT SERVICES, DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, 03-000733 (2003)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Mar. 03, 2003 Number: 03-000733 Latest Update: Aug. 14, 2003

The Issue Whether Petitioner was eligible to participate in the Deferred Retirement Option Program (DROP) of the Florida Retirement System (FRS) when he applied on October 4, 2002.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner is employed by the Department of Business and Professional Regulation as a law enforcement officer, and has been since October 17, 1977 (Testimony of Petitioner). Petitioner was considered "vested" in the special risk class of the FRS when he reached ten years of service in 1987 (Testimony of Ira Gaines). On January 15, 2001, Petitioner reached 55 years of age. On October 4, 2002, Respondent received Petitioner's application to participate in the DROP. The Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement (Division), denied Petitioner's application for DROP participation because more than 12 months had passed since he first became eligible, and his opportunity to enter the program had lapsed. Petitioner testified that he was confused by the language of the educational materials on the Division's web site and thought he could defer DROP participation until he reached 25 years of service. The Division's web site stated the following regarding DROP eligibility when Petitioner became eligible: Eligibility - You are eligible to participate in the DROP when you are a participant of the Pension Plan, are vested and have reached your normal retirement date. Your "normal retirement date" is the earliest date at which you are eligible for full, unreduced benefits based upon your age and service. In most cases, you reach your normal retirement date when you are vested and reach age 62, or when you complete 30 years of service, regardless of your age (age 55 or 25 years of service for special risk members). You may make your election to participate in DROP up to 6 months before the date you plan to begin participation, and you must elect DROP participation within 12 months after you first reach your normal retirement date . . . . (Emphasis added) Petitioner admitted he never sought advice either from his personnel office or from the Division. Petitioner filed a timely request for a review of the Division's denial of his DROP application and this hearing followed.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement, enter a final order denying Petitioner's request to participate in the DROP. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of June, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of June, 2003.

Florida Laws (5) 120.569120.57121.021121.09126.012
# 9
RENEE RADICELLA vs DEPARTMENT OF MANAGEMENT SERVICES, DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, 11-005491 (2011)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tampa, Florida Oct. 27, 2011 Number: 11-005491 Latest Update: Mar. 16, 2012

The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner is entitled to change the type of her retirement benefits from early service retirement to disability retirement.

Findings Of Fact Respondent is charged with managing, governing, and administering the Florida Retirement System (FRS). The FRS is a public retirement system as defined by Florida law. Nearly 1,000 public employers participate in the FRS, including state agencies, local governments, and district school boards. There are more than 600,000 individual active members in the FRS. Petitioner was an employee of the Pasco County School Board until she submitted her resignation on February 28, 2011, in order to retire. By reason of her employment with the Pasco County School Board, Petitioner is a member of the FRS. After Petitioner resigned, she met with Michael Hudson, the director of Employee Benefits for the Pasco County District School Board, on March 4, 2011, to complete the paperwork for her retirement. At the March 4, 2011, meeting, Petitioner completed and signed the form application for service retirement. The information filled out on the form in Petitioner's clear handwriting included her name, position, address, telephone number, social security number, birth date, and service termination date. The following statement appears on the application form immediately above Petitioner's notarized signature: I understand I must terminate all employment with FRS employers to receive a retirement benefit under Chapter 121, Florida Statutes. I also understand that I cannot add service, change options, change my type of retirement (Regular, Disability, and Early) or elect the Investment Plan once my retirement becomes final. My retirement becomes final when any benefit payment is cashed or deposited. (Bold in original). Petitioner also filled out the payment option selection form, selecting Option 1 as the option for how her retirement benefits are to be paid out. Immediately above Petitioner's signature on the option selection form is this statement: I understand I must terminate all employment with FRS employers to receive a retirement benefit under Chapter 121, Florida statutes. I also understand that I cannot add service, change options or change my type of retirement (Regular, Disability, and Early) once my retirement becomes final. My retirement becomes final when any benefit payment is cashed, deposited or when my Deferred Retirement Option Program (DROP) participation begins. (Bold in original). Petitioner was aware that she could seek to qualify for disability retirement benefits, but that in order to apply for disability retirement, she would have to submit certifications by two doctors that she was totally and permanently disabled, meaning that she was unable to work. Petitioner also knew that she could apply for early service retirement, which would not require proof of total, permanent disability. However, because Petitioner would be retiring early, her benefits would be discounted, so she would receive less. Petitioner understood, when she completed the application on March 4, 2011, that the type of retirement for which she applied was early service retirement. At retirement, she was 52 years and nine months old. In Petitioner's view, she was "forced" to retire. Petitioner had been employed as an adult education-health instructor at Marchman Technical Education Center, which she described as a stressful job. In 2010, she had to undergo three major abdominal and pelvic reconstructive surgeries. As she dealt with the challenges of complications and slow recoveries, she developed psychological issues that caused her to seek treatment from a psychiatrist. She was depressed and cried a lot, felt anxious and stressed, and experienced panic attacks. Petitioner took medication prescribed by her psychiatrist for her panic attacks and depression. She testified that the medication helped and that when she took her medication, she no longer cried all the time. However, she experienced side effects, including some drowsiness and difficulty processing information. By early 2011, Petitioner felt unable to return to her stressful job and had been attempting, without success, to find an appropriate job that she thought she could do with her limitations. She was worried and felt pressure, as a single mother who was supporting herself and her 17-year-old son, who lived with her. She was particularly concerned about ensuring a stream of income to pay for health insurance. Before Petitioner met with Mr. Hudson to apply for early service retirement, she discussed the different types of retirement with her good friend, Pat Beals. Ms. Beals had worked at Marchman Technical Education Center with Ms. Radicella. Both Petitioner and Ms. Beals testified that in discussing the different types of retirement, Petitioner believed at the time that she would not qualify for disability retirement. At the time in early 2011, Petitioner's belief was that she would be unable to obtain letters from two doctors who would render the opinion that Petitioner was unable to work. Ms. Beals apparently did not disagree with that opinion. Ms. Beals noted that Petitioner had been trying to get another job that she would be able to handle with her limitations. Ms. Beals said only that she thought Petitioner had tried to go back to work too soon, before she was fully healed. Petitioner went alone to her meeting with Mr. Hudson and did not ask any of her close friends or advisors, such as Ms. Beals or her neighbor, Mr. Edelman, to go with her. Petitioner testified that she had taken her medication to control her depression and her panic attacks that day. Petitioner was in good enough shape, mentally and physically, to safely drive herself to and from the school district administrative offices. Petitioner testified that Mr. Hudson explained Petitioner's choices to apply for early service retirement or to apply for disability retirement. Petitioner testified that Mr. Hudson explained that if she applied for disability retirement, two doctors would have to say she could never work again. This led Petitioner to choose early service retirement because, as she had discussed with Ms. Beals previously, she did not think two doctors would give the opinion that she was unable to work again. Moreover, at the time, Petitioner did not want to say that she would never work again. Petitioner found the meeting with Mr. Hudson to be very sad and embarrassing; she found the prospect of retirement itself to be very embarrassing, as she had always been independent and had always taken care of herself. Petitioner attempted to blame Mr. Hudson for the pressure she was feeling to make a choice and sign the paperwork presented to her, but Petitioner did not prove that Mr. Hudson was to blame for any pressure she felt. Petitioner failed to identify anything specific that Mr. Hudson said or did to create pressure, such as if he had told Petitioner she had to sign all of the paperwork then and there. Indeed, when asked if she felt pressured by Mr. Hudson, Petitioner's response was that "it was strictly business." Petitioner explained that she just "shut down," letting him give her papers, and she just signed them. Petitioner did not claim to misunderstand the different types of retirement benefits--early service retirement versus disability retirement--and indeed, expressed a very clear rationale for making the choice that she did. Petitioner had expressed that same rationale in conversations before March 4, 2011, with Ms. Beals. Petitioner testified that she did not understand the paperwork that Mr. Hudson presented her to sign and that she did not understand that she could not change the type of retirement from early service to disability retirement at a later date. Inconsistently, she testified that she understood that she would not be able to change her payment options after she cashed her first benefit check. That is part of the warning message appearing right above her signature. Petitioner did not credibly explain how she was able to understand that part of the warning message, while not understanding the other part of the warning message that she also could not "change my type of retirement (Regular, Disability, and Early)" after cashing her first benefit check. The notice appeared on both forms she signed that day in plain, clear language. Petitioner did not testify that she was given any misinformation or that she asked for explanations that were not forthcoming. Petitioner did not testify that she asked to delay signing the paperwork presented to her at the March 4, 2011, meeting, until she had had a chance to review it with one of her friends and advisors. Instead, Petitioner did not want to wait; she was in a hurry to sign the paperwork because the sooner she signed the paperwork, the sooner the payments would start. Petitioner attempted to disavow her March 4, 2011, early service retirement application on the theory that she lacked the mental capacity to understand the nature and consequences of her actions that day. Petitioner offered no competent medical opinion testimony or medical records to support her claim. Petitioner's two friends tried to support her theory, but they lacked the medical expertise to offer an opinion that Petitioner did not understand the nature or consequences of her actions that day. To the contrary, their testimony tended to confirm that Petitioner not only understood what she did on March 4, 2011, but that she acted as she did for a very rational, logical reason. The evidence did not establish that Petitioner was impaired to any great extent because of her physical or mental conditions or because of her medication taken to control her conditions. Petitioner may lack confidence and doubt herself; she may seek out opinions of her close friends when making important decisions because she did not trust her own ability to make decisions. However, as she acknowledged and certainly exhibited at the hearing, she is intelligent and capable. Petitioner was capable of functioning independently, living alone with her 17-year-old son and taking care of him. Petitioner was able to drive alone and did so. Petitioner took care of her own paperwork, writing out checks, and paying her own bills. Petitioner was not hospitalized or adjudicated incompetent because of her mental condition, nor was there any suggestion that her psychiatrist or good friends thought such steps were necessary for Petitioner's competency to manage her own affairs. After Petitioner returned from her meeting with Mr. Hudson on March 4, 2011, she called Ms. Beals to tell her about the paperwork she completed in her meeting with Mr. Hudson. Ms. Beals testified that she could tell Petitioner was anxious, because she was talking very fast. Nonetheless, Petitioner understood the nature and consequences of her actions on March 4, 2011, well enough to tell Ms. Beals that she had applied for early service retirement benefits. Ms. Beals was concerned and said that she may have made a mistake by not applying for disability retirement. While Ms. Beals expressed surprise that Petitioner did not ask her to go with her on March 4, 2011, she admitted that they had talked about the retirement issue previously and that Petitioner's actions on March 4, 2011, were consistent with what they had previously discussed. Petitioner's neighbor, Alvin Ellenwood, also testified that Petitioner called him later on March 4, 2011, and reported to him that she had completed the paperwork for early service retirement benefits. Mr. Ellenwood testified that he, too, was concerned and told Ms. Radicella that she may have made a mistake by not applying for disability retirement. Despite the concerns of both Ms. Beals and Mr. Ellenwood, apparently no steps were taken in the days after March 4, 2011, to review the forms that Petitioner had signed or to seek out any information from the Division regarding whether Petitioner could try to change the type of retirement benefits from early service retirement to disability retirement. On March 9, 2011, the Division issued and transmitted to Petitioner the following documents related to her application: Acknowledgement of Service Retirement Application (Acknowledgement); Estimate of Retirement Benefits (Estimate); an information sheet entitled, "What Retirement Option Should You Choose" (Option); and a FRS booklet published by the Division entitled, "Preparing to Retire" (Booklet). The Acknowledgement document confirmed receipt of Petitioner's service retirement application and repeated a similar warning as those appearing above Petitioner's signature on the forms she signed on March 4, 2011; this time, the notice was in all capital letters and in all bold print: "ONCE YOU RETIRE, YOU CANNOT ADD SERVICE, CHANGE OPTIONS, CHANGE YOUR TYPE OF RETIREMENT OR ELECT THE INVESTMENT PLAN. RETIREMENT BECOMES FINAL WHEN ANY BENEFIT PAYMENT IS CASHED OR DEPOSITED." Detailed information was provided about FRS retirement in the 15-page Booklet. The Booklet's first four pages are devoted to information for contacting the Division, including how to access the Division's website, and how to contact individuals, via numerous toll-free telephone numbers and e-mail addresses, to ask questions. And yet another warning message appears on page 11 of the Booklet, set apart from the rest of the text by a bold text box: Remember, once you cash or deposit any benefit payment or after the first payment is credited during your DROP participation period, you cannot add service credit, change your retirement benefit option selection, change your type of retirement from early to normal or from service to disability retirement, transfer to the FRS Investment Plan or cancel your DROP participation. The two other documents sent on March 9, 2011, the Estimate and Option documents, specifically addressed the retirement payment option choice. These two documents warned that Petitioner had selected Option 1 and could not change that option after cashing or depositing her first benefit check. Petitioner did not say what she did upon receipt of March 9, 2011, package of materials, whether she reviewed the material or whether she asked her friends to review it. Had these documents been reviewed, it would have been clear that once Petitioner cashed or deposited the first benefit payment, she could no longer change the type of retirement from early service retirement to disability retirement.2/ At any point in time before Petitioner received and cashed or deposited her first retirement benefit check, she could have sought to change the type of retirement benefit from early service to disability retirement. However, no such steps were taken. As Petitioner testified and Ms. Beals acknowledged, Petitioner did not believe at that time that she would qualify for disability retirement. In any event, it would have taken longer to seek disability retirement benefits because of the need to obtain verification by two doctors that Petitioner was unable to work, and Petitioner did not want to wait. Petitioner received her first retirement benefit check at the end of March 2011, and the state warrant was paid (cashed or deposited) on April 8, 2011. As of the hearing date, Petitioner had received an additional nine monthly payments for her early service retirement benefit. For some reason, it was not until June 2011, after receiving and cashing or depositing three early service retirement benefit payments, that Petitioner decided to submit an application for disability retirement benefits. The parties stipulated that Petitioner's disability retirement application was mailed to the Division on June 14, 2011.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby: RECOMMENDED that Respondent, Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement, enter a final order denying the request to change from early service retirement benefits to disability retirement benefits submitted by Petitioner, Reneé Radicella. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of February, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ELIZABETH W. MCARTHUR Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of February, 2012.

Florida Laws (3) 120.569120.57120.68 Florida Administrative Code (1) 28-106.217
# 10

Can't find what you're looking for?

Post a free question on our public forum.
Ask a Question
Search for lawyers by practice areas.
Find a Lawyer