The Issue Whether Respondent discriminated against Petitioner in its employment decisions in violation of Section 760.10, Florida Statutes (2001).
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Oscar Jones (Petitioner), is a black male. He began working for Respondent in July 1997, as a longshoreman working on "chicken boats." In that position, Petitioner loaded boxes of frozen chicken into the holds of refrigerated ships. Respondent, Coastal Maritime Services, LLC (Respondent), is engaged in the business of stevedoring and seaport terminal operations, including loading and unloading ships, and receiving cargo. On May 28, 1998, Respondent injured himself when a very heavy box of frozen chicken fell on his ankle. Other than first aid at the worksite, Petitioner declined further medical treatment that day. He was given a medical form authorizing treatment at the medical clinic which provided medical services to injured employees who might be covered under Respondent's workers' compensation insurance. The next day, on May 29, 1998, Petitioner sought medical treatment for his injury at the medical facility which handled Respondent's workers' compensation injuries. As part of that treatment, Petitioner was asked to take a drug test and Petitioner consented. Although no formal written drug test policy was in effect by Respondent at the time of Petitioner's injury, the general policy and practice was that a work-related injury would subject an employee to a voluntary drug test. Petitioner's drug test came back positive for marijuana. As a result of the positive drug test result, Respondent's insurance carrier controverted Petitioner's workers' compensation claim. There was no evidence that Respondent's management had any responsibility or involvement in the carrier's decision to controvert Petitioner's entitlement to workers' compensation benefits. During the 12-month time period of January 1998 through December 1998, Petitioner was not the only employee of Respondent required to take a drug test after a work place injury. In fact, in June 1998 (the same time period as Petitioner's test) seven white employees were required to take a drug test and three black employees were required to take a drug test. For the entire 1998 calendar year, 51 total drug tests were administered, with 31 of those tests administered to non- black employees (for example, white or Hispanic) and only 21 of those tests administered to black employees. Similarly, for the entire 1998 calendar year, a total of 18 employees were not administered drug tests, either because medical attention was refused or because of the severity of the injury. Of those 18 employees, 11 were non-black employees and seven were black employees. Employees who were not required to take a drug test either were those who refused medical attention or who were severely injured and had to seek treatment from hospital emergency rooms where drug tests were not given. Clearly, race played no factor in who was required to take a drug test or who received a drug test. Petitioner did cite the names of two white employees, Jay Chavers and Andy Wiley, who allegedly were treated more favorably than Petitioner, in that those two employees did not take a drug test. However, those two employees were not "similarly situated" to Petitioner. First, the injuries of both Mr. Chavers and Mr. Wiley were much more serious in nature than the contusion (bruise) that Petitioner had suffered and both were taken to emergency rooms for their injuries where drug tests were not routinely administered. Specifically, Mr. Chavers had fallen from a high distance and suffered numerous broken bones, thus, rendering him incapable of giving consent to a drug test at the hospital. As to Mr. Wiley, his injuries were not subject to workers' compensation coverage, unlike Petitioner's. Thus, given the nature of the injuries of Mr. Chavers and Mr. Wiley, those two individuals were not sufficiently "similarly situated" to Petitioner to enable him to establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination. Petitioner's positive drug test result had no other impact on his employment with Respondent, apart from the controversion of his workers' compensation benefits. Indeed, Respondent attempted to get Petitioner to return to work. Shortly thereafter, in early June 1998, Petitioner contacted the chief financial officer of Respondent, Kathleen Wiley, who in 1998 was Respondent's office manager. Petitioner expressed concern to Ms. Wiley about his workers' compensation benefits and his employment status with Respondent. Ms. Wiley informed Petitioner that he was still considered to be employed with Respondent and that he needed to contact Ben Brown for a light duty assignment. Petitioner was expressly informed that light duty work was available that would meet his medical restrictions imposed after his injury. Petitioner never followed-up with Mr. Brown about light duty work. Almost immediately thereafter in June 1998, Respondent hired Bud Underwood as its new safety manager. Mr. Underwood's responsibilities were to oversee workers' compensation cases and follow up on accidents and injured employees. Ms. Wiley informed Mr. Underwood to follow up on the situation of Petitioner to get him to return for a light duty assignment. In late June or early July 1998, Mr. Underwood contacted Petitioner as directed and offered him light duty work within his medical restrictions. Petitioner informed Mr. Underwood in very obscene terms that he was not going to accept any light duty assignments. Petitioner never appeared for any light duty assignments after that conversation. Based upon Petitioner's response to that telephonic offer of light duty employment, Respondent sent Petitioner a letter around July 9, 1998, informing him that based upon his refusal of light duty work, he had been deemed to have abandoned his employment, and thus was no longer employed by Respondent due to self-termination. Thereafter, in September 1998, Petitioner contacted Respondent by telephone seeking employment. However, by that time, opportunities for longshoremen, such as Mr. Jones were extremely limited, as the "chicken boat" operation had all but shut down for financial reasons, and no positions were available at the time. Thus, Respondent sent Petitioner a letter dated September 2, 1998, informing him that no positions were available, but encouraging him to reapply. Despite the invitation to Petitioner that he should reapply, Petitioner never submitted any subsequent inquiry for employment. Respondent's "chicken boat" operation had shut down completely by February 1999. Petitioner later applied for unemployment compensation benefits, but those benefits were denied on the ground that Petitioner had abandoned his employment by refusing the light duty work that was offered to him. In fact, in an evidentiary hearing held in his unemployment compensation matter, the Unemployment Appeals Referee found as a fact that Petitioner admitted that he had refused the light duty work offered to him. Petitioner's appeal of that adverse decision was, likewise, denied by the Unemployment Appeals Commission. Petitioner's race played no role in Respondent's determination that Petitioner had abandoned his employment or in Respondent's determination that no position existed for Petitioner in September 1998. Similarly, race played no role in the insurance carrier's decisions regarding Petitioner's workers' compensation benefits. In fact, Petitioner voluntarily settled his workers' compensation claim disputes in a settlement agreement signed by him and his attorney dated March 22, 1999. Petitioner had a family to support and needed the money. Pursuant to that settlement agreement, Petitioner agreed to accept $4,500 in full, final and complete settlement, release and discharge of any and all claims against the employer arising out of Petitioner's alleged accident, injury, and disability in issue, including, but not limited to claims for temporary total, temporary partial, permanent total, and/or permanent partial disability compensation, and past and future medical benefits. Petitioner verified that the settlement was adequate and was not entered into under duress. Rather, Petitioner of his own accord thought that the settlement was in his best interest. The Department of Labor approved the settlement. Petitioner has made no credible showing that there was any relationship between his race and the adverse employment actions of which he has complained.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Petition be dismissed. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of December, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DIANE CLEAVINGER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of December, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Peter Reed Corbin, Esquire Richard L. Ruth, Jr., Esquire Ford & Harrison LLP 121 West Forsyth Street Suite 1000 Post Office Box 41566 Jacksonville, Florida 32203 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Oscar Jones 1817 East 27th Street Jacksonville, Florida 32206 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue An Administrative Complaint, dated March 8, 1990, but amended with leave of the Hearing Officer in an order dated December 17, 1990, alleges that Respondent violated the provisions of Section 943.1395(5) and (6), F.S., and Rule 11B- 27.0011(4)(d), F.A.C., by failing to maintain the qualification established in Section 943.13(7), F.S., requiring "good moral character". The complaint, as amended, alleges that Respondent James E. Lyons, Jr., attempted to purchase, and introduced, cocaine into his body in violation of Section 893.03, F.S., on or about January 20, 1989. The issues are whether those violations occurred and, if so, what discipline is appropriate.
Findings Of Fact James Edward Lyons, Jr., Respondent, was certified as a law enforcement officer by the Petitioner on June 14, 1986, and was issued certificate number 02-86-002-02. At all times relevant to the issues in this proceeding, Officer Lyons was employed as a law enforcement officer by the Brevard County Sheriff's Department and was assigned to the Special Investigations Division, a vice/narcotics enforcement unit. Around midnight on December 31, 1988, Brevard County Sheriff's Deputies, Billy Mitchell Young and Timothy Pemberton, sat in their parked vehicle near Railroad Avenue, an area of the county well-known for illicit drug activity. They had binoculars and were looking for activity with the purpose of intercepting dealers or buyers. They observed a vehicle which, as Deputy Young remarked to his partner, looked alot like "Eddie's" (Respondent's) unmarked department vehicle: a white Thunderbird. Respondent was not a participant in the detail to which the two officers were assigned that evening. The Thunderbird was immobile, and there were two or three people standing around it and moving around in a manner consistent with activity of street dealers competing for a sale. The vehicle stayed parked for about 10-15 minutes. As the two deputies were leaving to back up another team on a traffic arrest, they noticed the Thunderbird run a stop sign at Cross Road and Highway U.S.-1. They commenced pursuit, still unaware of the identity of the occupant. With blue lights flashing, and a spotlight on, the deputies followed the car about three miles before it finally pulled over. The Respondent got out and walked back to the deputies' car to present himself. They were his colleagues, and they knew him to be happy-go-lucky and affable. In this encounter he was very nervous and, according to Deputies Mitchell and Pemberton, he was uncharacteristically anxious to leave. He told them something about hearing about a traffic stop on his radio and going to the Railroad Avenue site to assist. This did not make sense, as the stop to which he referred had occurred much earlier. Mitchell and Pemberton were uncomfortable and somewhat saddened by the event and, at some point, mentioned it to Phillip Shimer, who at that time was in charge of the Brevard County Sheriff's Staff Services Division (including Internal Affairs). On January 20, 1989, Phillip Shimer became involved in an internal investigation involving James "Eddie" Lyons when he was contacted at home early in the morning and was informed that Deputy Lyons was being detained by the Melbourne Police Department on an alleged narcotics violation. The prior evening Deputy Lyons had been found in an area of the City of Melbourne known for narcotics activity. He was in his department Thunderbird attempting to buy crack cocaine from two undercover Melbourne police posing as drug dealers. When one of the undercover police pulled his gun to apprehend him, he fled and was arrested a few blocks away at a convenience store. In a voluntary interview given to Phillip Shimer after his release to the Brevard County Sheriff's personnel, Deputy Lyons explained that he was in the area to meet another Special Investigation Divisions Agent and drove into north Melbourne to see if he could initiate some case activity involving the sale of crack cocaine. He approached two black males on the street and initiated a conversation with them. He attempted to purchase a quantity of cocaine. As the transaction started to take place they identified themselves as police. Deputy Lyons feared that he was going to be robbed, and drove away. The account given by Respondent in his testimony at hearing was similar, but instead of affirmatively trying to make an arrest through a bogus buy, he claimed he was looking for a suspect, "Bobo", and was inquiring of his whereabouts of the two street males when one pulled a gun and he fled. The story would be more plausible if it were not for ensuing events. After listening to Deputy Lyons' explanation, Phillip Shimer suspended him with pay, removed his credentials and secured his department vehicle. He was released on his own recognizance by the Melbourne Police. He was ordered to return to Staff Services at 10:00 a.m. This was delayed until later in the day when Deputy Lyons contacted his superior officer and indicated that he was somewhat upset and did not feel he could respond yet. The parties' prehearing stipulation establishes the following: On January 20, 1989, the Respondent reported to Wuesthoff Hospital in Rockledge, Florida; [in the company of an Internal Affairs Investigator, as required by his superior officer.] At about 2:30 p.m., in a private area of Wuesthoff Hospital, the Respondent urinated into a sterile urine sample cup provided by Wuesthoff Hospital. The cup containing the Respondent's urine sample was promptly received from the Respondent by Wuesthoff Hospital laboratory employee Mr. Wade Wallace. Mr. Wallace immediately capped and sealed the sample cup and labeled it in a manner making it uniquely identifiable as the Respondent's urine sample. At about 2:35 p.m., the sealed sample cup containing the Respondent's urine sample was delivered to the Wuesthoff Hospital Toxicology Laboratory by Mr. Wallace. On January 20, 1989 at about 3:00 p.m., the sample cup containing the Respondent's urine sample was retrieved by laboratory employee Deborah Lanza. Ms. Lanza dispensed a portion of the Respondent's urine sample from the sample cup and performed an initial chemical screen for the purpose of determining if there was evidence of controlled substances or their metabolites in the Respondent's urine sample. On January 20, 1989 at about 3:15 p.m., laboratory employee Valerie Lasobeck Davies dispensed a portion of the Respondent's urine sample from the sample cup and performed a confirmation analysis of the sample. Neither the sample cup nor the Respondent's urine sample had been tampered with, altered or adulterated since the respondent's urine sample was initially collected in the sample cup. Ms. Davies tested the Respondent's sample utilizing the fluorescence polarization immunoassay analysis method. The test results showed that the sample was positive, containing some 4,830 nanograms per milliliter of a metabolite of cocaine, benzoylecgonine. Shortly thereafter, Ms. Davies performed a confirmation analysis by gas chromatography/mass spectrometry. This analysis yielded a positive finding for the cocaine metabolite, ecgonine. Both benzoylecgonine and ecgonine are unique metabolites of cocaine. The quantity of cocaine metabolite in the Respondent's urine sample was indicative of illicit use of the drug by the Respondent within seventy-two hours previous to the time at which he gave the urine sample. The quantity of cocaine metabolite was wholly inconsistent with casual handling of articles contaminated with cocaine or the mere handling, as opposed to ingestion, of the drug itself. Although cocaine residue can be absorbed through the skin, the level that would be achieved on a drug analysis would be substantially less than a 300 nanogram cutoff for a "positive" finding. In addition to evidence of his use of cocaine, Respondent's explanations of the events of December 31st and January 20th are further discredited by the fact that his mode of operation was contrary to well- established instructions and prudent practices of undercover law enforcement. Officers must not work alone, for their own safety and to preserve the integrity of the operation. A witness is important for the legal proceedings that follow. When an undercover operation is planned, law enforcement agencies with concurrent jurisdiction are informed to avoid the obvious possible result: cops arresting cops. After a jury trial, Respondent was acquitted of the criminal offense of attempted purchase of a controlled substance.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby, recommended that the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission enter its final order finding Respondent guilty as charged in the Amended Administrative Complaint and imposing the penalty of revocation of his certificate. RECOMMENDED this 7th day of May, 1991, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MARY CLARK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of May, 1991. COPIES FURNISHED: Joseph S. White, Esquire Department of Law Enforcement P.O. Box 1489 Tallahassee, FL 32302 James E. Lyons 415 18th Street, S.E. Winter Haven, FL 33880 Jeffrey Long, Director Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission P.O. Box 1489 Tallahassee, FL 32302 James T. Moore, Commissioner Dept. of Law Enforcement P.O. Box 1489 Tallahassee, FL 32302
The Issue Whether there was just cause to terminate Respondent’s annual employment contract during the term of the contract.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the duly authorized entity responsible for the operation, control, and supervision of all public schools (grades kindergarten through 12) in Charlotte County, Florida, and for otherwise providing public education to school-aged children in the county. Art. IX, § (4)b, Fla. Const.; § 1001.32, Fla. Stat. (2016). During all times relevant hereto, Petitioner employed Respondent as a classroom teacher working pursuant to an annual contract. Between the years 1986 through 2000, Respondent worked as an educator for the School District of Hillsborough County, Florida. During the late 1990s, Respondent had multiple surgeries on her lungs and jaw. Respondent was prescribed various pain medications following her surgeries, and unfortunately she became addicted to the medication. Around 1998, Respondent’s addiction to pain medication caused her to engage in criminal activity (i.e. attempting to obtain a controlled substance by fraud), which resulted in her arrest. Respondent, at the time of her arrest in 1998, was employed as a teacher by the Hillsborough County School District. As a result of her arrest, Respondent resigned from employment with the Hillsborough County School District. Additionally, the Florida Department of Education (DOE) was notified of Respondent’s arrest and as a result thereof suspended Respondent’s teaching certificate for two months, imposed a two-year probationary period, and required Respondent to submit to substance abuse treatment. Respondent left the teaching profession in 1998 and did not return to the profession until 2014, when she became employed by Petitioner. When Respondent returned to the profession in 2014, she still needed to complete the two years of probation imposed against her teaching certificate by DOE. As part of her probation, Respondent was required to submit to two years of random drug testing. For the 2014-2015 and 2015-2016 school years, Respondent passed each of her randomly imposed drug tests and has subsequently been released from probation by DOE. Respondent has suffered from migraine headaches for several years and would often miss work due to migraine-related symptoms. Although Respondent missed several days of work during the 2016-2017 school year as a result of migraine headaches, her absences did not rise to the level to where it became necessary for her school principal to speak with her regarding the issue. On the morning of January 3, 2017, which was a teacher planning day, Respondent awoke with a migraine headache. Teachers are expected to report to work by 6:35 a.m. on teacher planning days. Respondent and Lisa Pellegrino were colleagues and friends. On January 3, 2017, at 7:16 a.m., 7:20 a.m., and at 10:29 a.m., respectively, Respondent called Ms. Pellegrino, who was at work. Respondent’s calls were not answered by Ms. Pellegrino because at the time, Ms. Pellegrino did not have her phone in her possession. At 9:01 a.m., on January 3, 2017, Respondent sent a text message to Ms. Deb Capo, who is the school’s secretary. The text message states: “Woke up with a headache . . . will be in ASAP.” At 10:36 a.m., Ms. Capo responded to the text message asking: “Are you here yet. Lou needs to see you.” Respondent replied and stated, “Not yet . . . I’ll be there by noon. All ok?” Ms. Capo then replied, “Yes. See you then.” At approximately 10:50 a.m., Ms. Pellegrino retrieved her cellphone and noticed that she had missed three calls from Respondent. Fearing a possible emergency, Ms. Pellegrino immediately called Respondent. Ms. Pellegrino testified during the final hearing as follows: I just called her because I wanted to see what was going on. I figured I had three missed calls; maybe there was an emergency. And when I spoke with her, she informed me that she had a really bad migraine, she didn’t think she was going to be able to make it, or she was trying to get pain pills because she couldn’t get her Imitrex prescription for a couple of days, and she was having a hard time getting to work to get her grades completed by the end of the day. And she asked me for pain pills or if I had any, and I said no.[1/] Within an hour or so of speaking with Respondent, Ms. Pellegrino and a few of her colleagues were preparing to leave for lunch when the question was asked, “did Lori [Respondent] come in yet?” One of the teachers in the lunch group was Amy Haggarty, who is the chairperson of the school’s math department and was aware of Respondent’s history of addiction to pain medication. Ms. Pellegrino, in response to the question about Respondent’s whereabouts, mentioned to Ms. Haggarty that she had just gotten off the phone with Respondent and that it was a weird conversation because Respondent said, according to Ms. Pellegrino, “that she has a bad migraine headache and she can’t fill her pain medication,” and asked her [Ms. Pellegrino] “if she had any pain medication.” Ms. Haggarty, because she knew of Respondent’s history with addiction to pain medication, became alarmed by Ms. Pellegrino’s statement and she immediately arranged to meet with the school principal, Mr. Long, to discuss what she had been told about Respondent. During her meeting with Mr. Long, Ms. Haggarty informed him of what she had been told by Ms. Pellegrino. Mr. Long, upon concluding his meeting with Ms. Haggarty, then met with Ms. Pellegrino. Upon questioning by Mr. Long, Ms. Pellegrino confirmed that she had spoken with Respondent that morning and that Respondent asked her for pain medication. Mr. Long then contacted the school board’s office of human resources to report what he had been told by Ms. Pellegrino. Mr. Long was advised by a representative from the office of human resources that Dave Carter would report to the school on the morning of January 4, 2017, to “possibly place Ms. Lorenz on administrative leave.” Dave Carter is a “human resources investigator” for the Charlotte County School Board and he reports to, among others, Mr. Chuck Breiner, assistant superintendent for the school board. According to Mr. Carter, his job responsibilities include conducting “personnel investigations based on allegations of misconduct or violations of school district policies, rules, or the Department of Education code of ethics.” During his testimony, Mr. Carter explained that when Mr. Breiner, or others as appropriate, believes that reasonable suspicion exists to subject an employee to drug testing, he [Mr. Carter] will go to the employee’s worksite, perform “an on- scene concurrence evaluation” of the employee, and, if necessary, transport the employee to the drug testing facility. Mr. Carter testified that an on-scene concurrence evaluation consists of him “interview[ing] the principal, call[ing] the employee down, [and] mak[ing] a physical observation of [the employee].” Mr. Carter testified that upon completion of the concurrence evaluation, if he believes that reasonable suspicion does not exist for drug testing, he will contact Mr. Breiner who will then make the final determination of whether the employee should be subjected to drug testing. Respondent arrived at the school around 6:15 a.m. on the morning of January 4, 2017. Soon after arriving at the school, Respondent saw Mr. Long who informed Respondent that he needed to meet with her during the “second hour” of the day, which is her planning period. A reasonable inference from the evidence is that Respondent taught her first-period class before meeting with Mr. Long and Mr. Carter at 8:10 a.m. There is no evidence indicating that Mr. Long took any steps to observe Respondent’s “performance, appearance, or behavior” in preparation for his January 4, 2017, meeting with Respondent and Mr. Carter, or that Mr. Long reasonably believed that Respondent was under the influence of drugs such that she should be prevented from teaching her class.2/ At about 8:00 a.m. on the morning of January 4, 2017, Mr. Carter reported to Port Charlotte High School for the purpose of interviewing Respondent as part of an investigation into an unrelated matter. When Mr. Carter checked in at the school, he met with Mr. Long who informed him of the allegations concerning Respondent’s solicitation of pain medication from Ms. Pellegrino. Mr. Carter immediately contacted Mr. Breiner and informed him of the allegations against Respondent. Mr. Breiner, when he spoke with Mr. Carter, was not aware of Respondent’s history of drug addiction and, consequently, this was not a factor that he considered when ordering that Respondent be drug-tested. Mr. Breiner, based on the information that Respondent allegedly solicited pain medication from Ms. Pellegrino, as reported by Mr. Long, and the fact that Respondent, like a number of other employees, had multiple absences from work, directed Mr. Carter to terminate the investigation into the unrelated matter and to proceed with taking Respondent to an authorized facility for reasonable suspicion drug testing. At no time prior to directing Mr. Carter to subject Respondent to drug testing did Mr. Breiner instruct Mr. Carter to personally interview Ms. Pellegrino regarding her conversation with Respondent. Additionally, at no time prior to Respondent’s drug test did Mr. Carter even attempt to question Ms. Pellegrino about her conversation with Respondent and the circumstances related thereto. It was only after Respondent had been drug tested that Mr. Carter interviewed Ms. Pellegrino. Mr. Carter, after receiving direction from Mr. Breiner, and with the assistance of Debbie Anderson, who works as a personnel analyst in Respondent’s department of human resources, met with Respondent and explained that she was required to submit to drug testing pursuant to the school board’s drug-free workplace policy. Reasonable Suspicion Indicators Petitioner uses a form titled “Reasonable Suspicion Indicators Checklist” (checklist), when evaluating employees for suspicion of violating Petitioner’s Drug and Alcohol Free Work Environment Policy. The checklist provides as follows: Manager/Supervisor: This form is to be used to substantiate and document the objective facts and circumstances leading to a reasonable suspicion determination. After careful observations of the employee’s performance, appearance or behavior, please check all the observed indicators that raised the suspicion that the employee may have engaged in conduct which violates the Drug- and Alcohol-Free Work Environment Policy. Incident or reason for suspicion Apparent drug or alcohol intoxication Nausea or vomiting Abnormal or erratic behavior Evidence of possession, dispensation, or use of a prohibited substance Industrial accident requiring medical attention Physical altercation or assault Odors and/or Appearance Odor of alcohol (on breath or person) Distinctive, pungent aroma on clothing Excessive sweating or skin clamminess very flushed very pale Jerky eye movements Unfocused, blank stare Dilated or constricted pupils Dry mouth, frequent swallowing or wetting lips Bloodshot or watery eyes Behavior and Speech Slurred or incoherent speech Breathing difficulty or irregularity Loss of physical control, dizzy or fainting Unsteady walk, poor coordination Euphoric, fidgety, agitated or nervous affect Shaking hands/body, tremors, twitches Extreme fatigue or sleeping on the job Lackadaisical, apathetic attitude Irritable, moody, belligerent or aggressive demeanor Nausea or vomiting Suspicion of others; paranoia; accuses others Physical and/or verbal abusiveness Rambling, loud, fast, silly or repetitious speech Talkative, cursing, other inappropriate speech Diminished (or lack of) concentration Delayed or faulty decision making Impulsive, unsafe risk-taking Inappropriate response to instructions Mr. Carter and Ms. Anderson each completed a checklist. None of the indicators listed above were checked by either Mr. Carter of Ms. Anderson as it pertains to their evaluation of Respondent. There is, however, an “indicator” appearing on the respective forms that is different in substance when comparing the form completed by Mr. Carter with the one completed by Ms. Anderson. On the form completed by Mr. Carter, there is a marked indicator that reads “Colleague disclosed that employee solicited ‘pain medication’ (controlled substance) during a teacher work day.” By comparison, the form completed by Ms. Anderson notes a different indicator which states “Employee discloses that he or she has consumed alcohol, used or ingested a controlled substance during or immediately prior to duty.” Neither party offered an explanation regarding the differences between the forms. Nevertheless, both Mr. Carter and Ms. Anderson attached a narrative to the checklist regarding the circumstances surrounding Ms. Pellegrino’s statement about Respondent allegedly soliciting Ms. Pellegrino for pain medication. Mr. Carter and Ms. Anderson each completed their respective checklist on January 11, 2017, which coincidentally, was the same date that Respondent’s lab results from her drug test were received by Petitioner.3/ The evidence does not explain why both Mr. Carter and Ms. Anderson waited several days to complete their respective checklists. Mr. Carter testified that when he performed his concurrence evaluation of Respondent on January 4, 2017, the only indicator present for subjecting Respondent to reasonable suspicion drug testing was the statement of Ms. Pellegrino indicating that Respondent solicited pain medication from her on January 3, 2017. Ms. Anderson did not testify at the final hearing. Mr. Breiner, who made the ultimate decision to subject Respondent to reasonable suspicion drug testing on January 4, 2017, testified that two factors drove his determination: the first being Ms. Pellegrino’s statement, and the second being Respondent’s history of absenteeism from work during the 2016- 2017 school year.4/ On cross-examination, however, Mr. Breiner admitted that in Respondent’s notice of termination he made no reference to absenteeism being a factor in his decision to subject Respondent to reasonable suspicion drug testing. Morphine and Imitrex Respondent admits that on January 3, 2017, she took morphine in order to get relief from her migraine headache. Respondent testified that she typically takes Imitrex to treat her migraines, but when that drug is ineffective she takes morphine for relief of her symptoms. According to Petitioner, she has been taking Imitrex since about 2007 and she suffers no side effects from the medication. Respondent testified that she typically takes morphine about once or twice a year “when the Imitrex [is not] working” and that the effects of the morphine last “[a]nywhere from four to six hours, sometimes eight, but nothing after that.” Petitioner did not rebut Respondent’s statement and offered no evidence regarding the effects of morphine and the period of time after ingestion that a person is typically under the influence of the drug. According to medical records from Peace River Medical Center, Respondent was discharged from the hospital on August 23, 2007, following treatment for: 1. “[c]hest pain, myocardial infarction protocol; 2. [p]leuritic pneumonia; [and] [m]igraine.” At the time of release from the hospital, Respondent was “discharged home with Morphine 60 mg p.r.n.” According to Respondent’s unrefuted testimony, the morphine pill that she took on January 3, 2017, was part of the batch of pills that she received when discharged from the hospital in 2007. Petitioner, when first interviewed by Respondent on January 13, 2017, denied soliciting pain medication from Ms. Pellegrino.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Charlotte County School Board enter a final order finding that there was no just cause to terminate Respondent’s employment during the term of her 2016-2017 annual contract with the School Board. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of July, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LINZIE F. BOGAN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of July, 2017.
The Issue Whether Respondent, a certified correctional officer, failed to maintain good moral character by testing positive for a controlled substance, marijuana, as set forth in the Administrative Complaint, and, if so, what disciplinary action should be taken.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Willie B. Ward, is a certified correctional officer in the State of Florida. He was issued Correctional Officer Certificate No. 193831 on October 20, 2000. Respondent was employed by the Highlands County Sheriff's Office as a correctional officer during the period March 6, 2000, through March 13, 2002. On or about April 22, 2002, Respondent was referred for a random drug test. Respondent signed the certification indicating that he provided his urine specimen to the collector; that he had not adulterated it in any manner; that each specimen bottle used was sealed in a tamper-resistant seal in his presence; and that the information provided on the Custody Control Form and on the label affixed to each specimen bottle was correct. The sample was then sent to LabCorp for analysis. It was received with the seal intact. The sample was initially screened at a screening cutoff of 15 nanograms per milliliter. The sample showed positive for cannabis. Since the sample was positive, it was sent for gas chromatography/mass spectrometry (GC/MS) confirmation testing for a specific marijuana metabolite. The results by LabCorp reflected a positive drug test on the initial screening and the confirmation test. On or about April 25, 2002, the electronic positive result was then sent to the National Medical Review Corporation, along with a faxed copy of the Custody Control Form. Dr. John Eustace, M.D., medical review officer (MRO) for National Medical Review Corporation, provides MRO services to the Highlands County Sheriff's Office pursuant to a contract for a drug-free workplace. Dr. Eustace received the Custody Control Form from LabCorp showing a positive drug test on Respondent for a test taken on April 22, 2002. Dr. Eustace processed the final certification of the Custody Control Form, Copy 4, certifying the drug test as positive. Dr. Eustace requested LabCorp to quantify the amount of the chemical present and document it on a Forensic Drug Analysis Report. LabCorp reported 28 nanograms of cannabinoid. It did not change the positive result; it merely quantified it. The MRO and his assistant then attempted to contact Respondent. They finally made contact with him on May 1, 2002. Respondent indicated he had tested positive a year and a half prior to this test of April 22, 2002. He also stated that he took over-the-counter pain killers, Advil or Aleve. Dr. Eustace stated these medications would not cause a false positive for marijuana. The GC/MS test rules out the possibility of a false positive. The MRO contacted the Human Resources Department of the Highlands County Sheriff's Office to report the positive drug test result after speaking with Respondent. Human Resources then contacted Respondent's supervisor, Captain Hinman, who sent a memo to Sheriff Godwin requesting an investigation. An investigation was opened; Respondent was called in and gave a statement. He had no explanation or mitigation for his positive drug test result. He admitted that he had followed all of the chain of custody procedures and that he had seen the lab technician place the seal on the container. Respondent had a prior positive drug test in April 1999 that was not prosecuted because the confirmation levels were not codified by sheriff's office policy. As a result of the investigation, Respondent was terminated from the Highlands County Sheriff's Office. The evidence is clear and convincing that Respondent tested positive for a controlled substance, marijuana, during a random drug test administered on April 22, 2002.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission enter a final order as follows: Respondent be found guilty of failure to maintain good moral character as required by Section 943.13(7), Florida Statutes (2001). Respondent's certification be revoked. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of February, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of February, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Laurie B. Binder, Esquire Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Willie B. Ward 1043 Booker Street Sebring, Florida 33870 Rod Caswell, Program Director Division of Criminal Justice Professionalism Services Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Michael Ramage, General Counsel Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
The Issue The issues are whether Respondent failed to maintain good moral character in violation of sections 943.1395(7) and 943.13(7), Florida Statutes (2017),1/ and Florida Administrative Code Rule 11B-27.0011(4)(d); and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact The Commission is an agency of the State of Florida responsible for the certification, and the revocation of certification, of officers and instructors in the criminal justice disciplines. Officer Barcia was certified as a law enforcement officer in the State of Florida by the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission on April 1, 2016, and issued Correction Certification No. 332010. Officer Barcia was employed by the Department from June 19, 2017, to January 3, 2018. As part of his employment agreement with the Department, he agreed to submit to random drug testing. On November 20, 2017, Officer Barcia was randomly selected by the Department to provide a drug test, signed a document indicating his agreement to take a drug test, and submitted a urine sample for drug testing. Prior to the submission of his sample, Officer Barcia did not notify his employer of any reason his drug tests would come back positive or indicate any reason to distrust the drug test laboratory. After submitting the sample, Officer Barcia signed a form, which stated "I certify that I provided my specimen to the collector; that I have not adulterated it in any manner; each specimen bottle used was sealed with a tamper-evident seal in my presence; and that the information and numbers provided on this form and on the label affixed to each specimen bottle is correct." Section 112.0455, Florida Statutes, "the Drug-Free Workplace Act" (Act), establishes standards for workplace drug- testing programs. The Act authorizes random testing, establishes collection procedures to avoid sample contamination, requires accurate labeling, provides for chain of custody, and sets requirements for testing laboratories to conduct initial screening and confirmation testing. Officer Barcia does not dispute the testing procedures or qualifications of the employees or testing procedures used by the laboratory that tested his urine sample, or the chain of custody of his sample. Dr. Bucklin is a practicing physician and the national MRO for U.S. Healthworks and Centra. He has been certified for 20 years and is on the faculty for the American Association of Medical Review Officers, an accrediting organization. He was licensed as a physician by the State of Florida at both the time the drug test was conducted and at the time of his testimony at hearing. Dr. Bucklin's office reviewed the drug tests conducted on the urine sample of Officer Barcia that had been taken on November 20, 2017, and identified the presence of two anabolic steroids: drostanolone and trenbolone. Both the parent drugs and metabolites were identified by immunoassays, the screening test (very sensitive, but not specific), and by gas chromatography-mass spectometry, the confirmation test (highly specific, but not as sensitive). Prior to submission of these test results to the Department, on December 8, 2017, Officer Barcia was contacted by Dr. Bucklin and notified that he tested positive for anabolic steroids. Officer Barcia was asked if he could give a reason his results were positive. Officer Barcia told Dr. Bucklin that he was on "estrogen blockers" and that he would send verification to Dr. Bucklin. The drug tests in this case were conducted in accordance with section 112.0455 and were not contested by Officer Barcia. At hearing, Officer Barcia testified that a doctor gave him a prescription for drostanolone sometime around September 2015 to treat a slight bump under his left nipple that had sensitivity and swelling. He was not prescribed a two-year dosage. He testified that he obtained the prescription from the WFN Clinic, which was later shut down in February 2017. He testified that he believed at the time that the clinic was legitimate and that he had no reason to believe the prescription was unlawful. Officer Barcia stated that when he was originally given the prescription, he was instructed to "take as needed" and that he took it only for the prescribed purpose. He stated that in August 2017, he felt a bump that resembled the one he had when he was originally given the medication so he took it "as needed" and the bump vanished. Dr. Bucklin credibly testified at hearing, and it is found, that neither drostanolone nor trenbolone may lawfully be prescribed to a patient in the United States. As Dr. Bucklin testified, even if drostanolone or trenbolone were illegally prescribed, those prescriptions could not be filled at a pharmacy. Dr. Bucklin also credibly testified at hearing that no verification of a prescription was ever received from Officer Barcia, that a male would be prescribed estrogen blockers only under unusual circumstances, and that even if estrogen blockers were ingested, they would not have turned into drostanolone or trenbolone, as detected in the urine sample. Officer Barcia's testimony that he thought he obtained a legitimate prescription from WFN Clinic was not credible. He failed to identify the doctor who prescribed the steroids. Even had his testimony about his medical condition been credible, it would not explain the drug test results. There is no reasonable explanation as to why a physician would secretly give an unlawful prescription for steroids (rather than a medicine that could be lawfully prescribed) to an unwitting patient in order to treat a medical condition, while misrepresenting to that patient that he was receiving estrogen blockers. Officer Barcia failed to maintain good moral character in that he unlawfully injected, ingested, inhaled, or otherwise introduced anabolic steroids into his body, as evidenced by a drug test conducted in accordance with sections 112.0455. No evidence of any prior disciplinary history was introduced for Officer Barcia.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that: The Florida Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission enter a final order finding Ernie Barcia in violation of section 943.1395(7) and 943.13(7), Florida Statutes, and Florida Administrative Code Rule 11B-27.0011(4)(b), and suspending his certification for a period of two years, followed by a two-year period of probation, subject to terms and conditions imposed by the Commission to facilitate his rehabilitation. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of January, 2019, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S F. SCOTT BOYD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of January, 2019.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Tedd B. Williams (Williams), was certified by Petitioner, Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission (Commission), on March 13, 1985, and was issued Corrections Certificate Number 03-85-502-01. Williams' social security number is 128-50-2456. In September, 1992, Williams was employed by the Broward County Sheriff's Office (Sheriff's Office) as a correctional officer. Each employee of the Sheriff's Office is assigned an employee identification number. Williams' employee identification number was 3973. The Sheriff's Office had implemented a drug testing policy by which a computer would randomly select employees to be tested for drug use. The employees selected would be given notice and would be required to give a urine sample, which would be analyzed by a laboratory. The Sheriff's Office contracted with Sunshine Medical Center (Sunshine) for the collection and testing of the urine samples. Williams was selected by the computer for drug testing. On September 30, 1992, Williams gave a urine sample for testing. The specimen identification number assigned to Williams' sample was 1052539-4. Williams' specimen number, employee number, and social security number were placed on a collector's form which accompanied the specimen to the laboratory. Williams certified on the collector's form that the label on the bottle in which the specimen was placed bore the identification number of 1052539-4 and the bottle was sealed in his presence with tamper evident tape. Williams indicated on the collector's form that he had taken the following medications within the previous 30 days: Tylenol, Penicillin, vitamins, amino acids and yohimbe bark. Sunshine sent Williams' specimen to National Health Laboratories (National) for forensic testing. The specimen bottle arrived on October 2, 1992, at National in a sealed bag with the bottle seal intact and bearing specimen identification number 1052539-4. Williams' specimen was tested at National. The test results were positive for cocaine metabolite. The gas chromatography/mass spectrometry (GC/MS) cutoff for cocaine metabolite was 150 nanograms per milliliter (NG/ML). Williams' specimen tested at 205 NG/ML. The GC/MS test used to analyze Williams' specimen is 100 percent accurate for the detection of cocaine metabolite. National conducted a second analysis which confirmed the positive result. National reported the test results to Sunshine. Dr. James Byrnes, who was Medical Review Officer at Sunshine, met with Williams on October 9, 1992, to discuss the positive test results and to ascertain whether any medications Williams had taken prior to the testing could have caused the test results to be positive. Williams advised Dr. Byrnes that he did take some products related to his weight lifting program and he showed the products to the doctor. Based on a review of the labels on the bottles, Dr. Byrnes could not document that the use of the products would cause the test results to be positive for cocaine metabolite and concluded that there was no reason for the positive drug test for cocaine, other than Williams' own use of cocaine. On October 15, 1992, Sergeant William Robshaw, who was assigned to Internal Affairs at the Sheriff's Office, met with Williams, who provided Sergeant Robshaw with samples of supplements and vitamins that he had been taking. Sergeant Robshaw received the following from Williams: a bottle of "Fast Mass," a bottle of "Super Yohimbe Gold," a bottle of Siberian Ginseng Root," a bottle of "Xtla Boost," a bottle of Whild American Gold Seal Herb," a bottle of "Sports Pep," and a plastic bag containing eleven capsules and pills. The samples were submitted to the Sheriff's Office crime laboratory, where they were analyzed by Allen Greenspan. The samples tested negative for the presence of cocaine. Mr. Greenspan prepared a report of his analysis, which was forwarded to Dr. Byrnes and received by Dr. Howard Taylor, the Laboratory Director at National. It was the opinion of Dr. Byrnes and Dr. Taylor that the samples would not produce a positive test result for cocaine metabolite. Dr. Taylor, who was qualified as an expert in forensic toxicologist, opined that only the ingestion of cocaine could have resulted in Williams' test results of 205 NG/ML of cocaine metabolite. Dr. Taylor further opined that the presence of cocaine will remain in the body two to three days after ingestion. Williams did not contest the presence of cocaine in his body, only whether he willfully ingested cocaine. Williams offered no plausible explanation of how he came to ingest cocaine, other than willfully. Accordingly, I find that Williams did willfully ingest cocaine within at least two to three days prior to giving a urine sample for testing on September 30, 1992.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Criminal Justice and Standards and Training Commission enter a final order (1) finding Tedd B. Williams guilty of having failed to maintain "good moral character," in violation of Section 943.13(7), Florida Statutes, by his unlawful use of cocaine and (2) revoking his certification based on such a finding. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of August, 1994, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUSAN B. KIRKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of August, 1994. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 94-0238 To comply with the requirements of Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes (1993), the following rulings are made on the Petitioner's proposed findings of fact: Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact. Paragraph 1: Accepted. Paragraphs 2-25: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 26: Rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. COPIES FURNISHED: Dawn P. Whitehurst, Esquire Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Mr. Tedd B. Williams 466 East Evanston Circle Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33312 A. Leon Lowry, II, Director Division of Criminal Justice Standards and Training Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Michael Ramage General Counsel Division of Criminal Justice Standards and Training Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent is guilty of violating Petitioner's rule requiring that all employees Respondent's job classification submit to random drug testing.
Findings Of Fact At all material times, Petitioner employed Respondent as a school bus driver. On January 12, 1995, Petitioner's representatives conducted a Drug Free Workplace Employee Training Session, which was attended by Respondent. This training session was one of many such sessions at which Petitioner's representatives explained to each covered employee the provisions of Petitioner's drug policies. These provisions include a provision that a refusal to take a random drug test is tantamount to failing a drug test and a basis for termination. The Employee Information on Drug and Alcohol Testing, which is the handbook distributed to Petitioner's school bus drivers, including Respondent, informs each driver that Petitioner will annually administer random drug tests to half of the driver positions and that, if selected for a random drug test, the driver must report immediately to the testing laboratory. The employee handbook informs drivers that a refusal to submit to a random drug test is prohibited. The employee handbook explains that engaging "in conduct that clearly obstructs the testing process" constitutes a refusal to submit to a random drug test. The employee handbook notes that conduct obstructing the testing process includes a "failure to immediately report to the testing facility after notification." Finally, the employee handbook warns that Petitioner may terminate drivers who have engaged in prohibited behavior. Article 32, Section 2, of the 1998-2000 Agreement Between the School Board of Pinellas County, Florida, and School Employees Union, Local 1221, Firemen & Oilers, An Affiliate of Service Employees International Union, AFL/CIO, CLC, contains the same requirements as those set forth above in the employee handbook. Section 3 warns that a violation of any of these requirements by a covered employee may result in termination. On March 21, 2000, Petitioner's Transportation Clerk Specialist II summoned Respondent to the transportation offices. When Respondent reported to her office, the clerk informed Respondent that she had selected him for random drug testing. Obviously, element of surprise is an important feature of random drug testing. Equally important to random drug testing is the control of the subject between the point at which he is informed that he is to take a random drug test and the production of the sample or samples to be tested; given enough time between the notification and the test, a subject might be able to ingest substances that could interfere with the ability of the test to detect drugs. Also important to random drug testing is the confirmation that the person presenting himself at the testing laboratory is the person who has been randomly selected for testing. Each of these elements plays a role in this case. Petitioner's clerk checked Respondent's identification, including his driver's license, and explained to him the procedures that he was to follow. Respondent had undergone random drug testing in the past while employed by Petitioner. In brief, Petitioner's clerk told Respondent that he had to report immediately to the testing laboratory, which is a short drive from the office. The clerk instructed Respondent to sign in upon arrival at the laboratory and, when called, to present all of the paperwork that she was giving him, as well as his driver's license. Petitioner's clerk warned him that he could not leave the laboratory premises until he had completed the drug test. Respondent reported immediately to the laboratory and signed in, as instructed. When called, Respondent presented his paperwork to the laboratory clerk, but he did not produce his driver's license, claiming that he did not have it with him. Respondent is not the first employee to appear at the laboratory without suitable identification. Petitioner's procedure is to maintain a photocopy of each employee's driver's license and fax the photocopy to the laboratory when employees report to the laboratory without identification. If the laboratory clerk cannot positively confirm the identification of the employee from the photocopied identification, then the laboratory employee detains the employee while Petitioner sends the employee's supervisor to the nearby laboratory to confirm the identity of the employee. Once done, the drug test proceeds. Pursuant to this procedure, the laboratory clerk telephoned Petitioner's clerk and informed her that Respondent had failed to produce his driver's license. The testimony of the laboratory clerk and Petitioner's clerk diverges at this point; each claims that the other clerk spoke to Respondent. However, the laboratory clerk testifies that she summarized the instructions given Respondent over the telephone by Petitioner's clerk. Just before Respondent left the reception room to search the bus for his driver's license, the laboratory clerk told him that he could go to the bus to look for his driver's license, but he was to return to the reception room. In any event, the clerks agree that Respondent received permission to return, unescorted, to his bus to search for his driver's license--a deviation from established procedure that prohibits the employee from leaving the laboratory once he has reported for a random drug test. The testimony of the clerks establishes that Respondent was permitted to return, unescorted, to his bus to search for his driver's license. The testimony of the laboratory clerk establishes that she clearly directed Respondent to look for his driver's license in the bus and return to the reception room. The discrepancy in the testimony of the clerks as to who conveyed the substance of the additional instructions to Respondent is, ultimately, immaterial; the possibility that one of the clerks could have given Respondent permission to leave the laboratory parking lot to search for his driver's license, or the possibility that Respondent could have misunderstood the clerk to have given him this permission, is negated by Respondent's later conversation with the Assistant Director of Transportation, as set forth below. Following his conversation with the laboratory clerk and possibly Petitioner's clerk, Respondent left the laboratory and went to his bus, ostensibly to search for his driver's license. Respondent did not return to the laboratory, but, instead, drove his bus back to the bus compound. Evidently, Respondent went home after returning his bus. One to one and one-half hours after leaving the laboratory, Respondent telephoned Petitioner's clerk and informed her that he had not found his license and had instead become sick, so he had gone home to eat something and take his medicine. Respondent told her that he had retraced his steps, but had not found his driver's license. At this point, Petitioner's clerk transferred the call to her supervisor, who is the Assistant Director of Transportation. The Assistant Director of Transportation started their conversation by stating her understanding that Petitioner had sent Respondent for a random drug test, but he had not completed it. Respondent answered that he could not find his driver's license and believed that Petitioner's clerk may have failed to return it to him earlier in the morning when she had examined it. The Assistant Director of Transportation replied that the clerk had looked for the driver's license and failed to find it, so that they were sure that she had not failed to return it to Respondent. Pausing for about five seconds, Respondent answered, "I wasn't feeling well. I had to go home and take my medication." The Assistant Director of Transportation replied that she would treat this as a refusal to submit to a drug test. They spoke for a few moments more, confirming that Respondent was calling from his home and that the bus was at the compound. The Assistant Director then directed Respondent not to report to work and told him that a personnel employee would be contacting him. Respondent concluded the conversation by repeating that he had not been feeling well. At no point in the conversation with Petitioner's clerk or the Assistant Director of Transportation did Respondent ever claim that he left the laboratory parking lot with the permission of Petitioner's clerk or the laboratory clerk or that he left the laboratory parking lot thinking that he had the permission of one of the clerks. It appears that he had ample opportunity in his conversation with the Assistant Director of Transportation to make this claim. Instead, Respondent merely repeated his claim that he became ill. Thus, it is very likely that Respondent clearly understood the final directions of the laboratory clerk: Respondent was to search his bus for the driver's license and then return to the laboratory reception room. It is thus not difficult to determine that it is considerably more likely than not that Respondent left the laboratory parking lot, knowing that he did not have the permission of either clerk to do so. Petitioner's witnesses testified candidly. The Assistant Director of Transportation did not appear overbearing or intimidating, so as to deter Respondent from presenting all of the facts in his defense, such as a claim that he had left the parking lot with the accurate or mistaken impression that he could do so in an effort to find his driver's license. It is only a little more difficult to determine that Respondent's claim of illness as the cause for his departure from the parking lot is more likely than not to be a fabrication. The coincidence of a random drug test, misplaced driver's license, and sudden onset of debilitating illness is unlikely. Presumably, the illness would have arisen after Respondent had spoken to the laboratory clerk, or else Respondent would have mentioned something to her when he was in the reception room. Even if Respondent had been suddenly struck by some illness while on his way to search the bus or while searching the bus, he would have been able to return to the reception room and tell the laboratory clerk either that he had fallen ill and had to go home immediately or that he had fallen ill and needed to produce a urine sample immediately, with or without further identification. Obviously, the illness had not been so debilitating to have prevented Respondent from returning to the reception room and telling the laboratory clerk of the illness; after all, Respondent was able to drive the bus to the bus compound and then drive himself home. Based on all of the facts, Petitioner properly treated Respondent's acts and omissions as the equivalent of refusing to submit to a random drug test and, as authorized by the collective bargaining agreement, properly terminated Respondent's employment as a school bus driver.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a final order terminating Respondent's employment. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of October, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of October, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Dr. Howard Hinesley, Superintendent Pinellas County School Board 301 4th Street Southwest Largo, Florida 33770 Jacqueline M. Spoto, Staff Attorney Pinellas County School Board 301 4th Street Southwest Post Office Box 2942 Largo, Florida 33779-2942 Honorable Tom Gallagher, Commissioner Department of Education The Capitol, Plaza Level 08 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 Michael H. Olenick, General Counsel Department of Education The Capitol, Suite 1701 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 Glenn Cromartie 1639 26th Street, South St. Petersburg, Florida 33712
The Issue The issue to be determined is whether Respondent failed to maintain good moral character and thereby violated section 943.1395(7), Florida Statutes (2008),1/ and if so, what penalty should be imposed?
Findings Of Fact At all times material to the allegations in the Administrative Complaint, Respondent has been a certified law enforcement officer, issued law enforcement certificate 233642. At all times material to the allegations in the Administrative Complaint, Respondent was employed as an officer by the Jacksonville Sheriff's Office (JSO). As such, he was subject to random drug screenings as a condition of his employment. On April 23, 2009, Respondent was selected for a random drug screen. He reported to Baptist Occupational Health Clinic (Baptist) in Jacksonville to provide a urine specimen for testing. Respondent gave the specimen by urinating in a previously unused specimen cup provided to him by Heather Walizer, a medical assistant employed by Baptist. Respondent delivered the cup containing his urine to Ms. Walizer, who divided the specimen into two vials. She then capped and sealed the vials, and had Respondent initial each vial and sign the chain of custody form. Ms. Walizer labeled Respondent's specimen with his social security number, and assigned to the specimen a unique specimen number, in this case number 6228701, which would not be used for any other specimen. The vials containing Respondent's urine specimen were sealed with a label that prevented the vials from being opened without breaking the seal. Ms. Walizer packaged the two vials with Respondent's urine specimens in a bag which was also sealed and labeled. Ms. Walizer put the bag with Respondent's urine samples in a refrigerator at Baptist for pick up by a courier to be delivered to Quest Diagnostics (Quest) laboratories in Tucker, Georgia. Upon arrival at Quest, the specimen was assigned a unique laboratory accession number, 842481F, for purposes of drug testing. There is no dispute that the urine sample supplied by Respondent was received by and analyzed by Quest, and that the report generated is for the sample provided by Respondent. Quest maintained the required chain of custody procedures in handling Respondent's specimen. The package received by Quest was unsealed by laboratory personnel qualified to receive it and the specimen was subjected to screening and confirmatory analysis for evidence of the presence of controlled substances in the urine. The initial test performed by Quest is an immunoassay test used to screen all samples. Any sample that is positive by that screening method is then tested by a confirmatory method, i.e., gas chromatography/mass spectrometry. Respondent's urine sample tested positive for the cocaine metabolite benzoylecgonine, and was reported at a concentration of 556 nanograms per milliliter. The confirmatory test results were consistent with those obtained for the screening test. The cutoff for a positive result in the immunoassay screening test is 300 nanograms per milliliter. The cutoff for the confirmatory test is 150 nanograms per milliliter. The test results were reviewed by Dr. Liberto Columbo, M.D., the Medical Review Officer for Baptist, who called Respondent and discussed the results of the testing with him. Dr. Columbo reported the results of both tests to Nurse Gerald Shaw of the Jacksonville Sheriff's Office as positive for cocaine. Nurse Shaw notified the JSO Internal Affairs Office of the drug test results, and Respondent was interviewed on April 30, 2009. Respondent vehemently denied, as he did at hearing, the illicit use of cocaine. Respondent was terminated from his position as a law enforcement officer by the JSO. Respondent testified that he did not take cocaine and would not do so. He had taken off work in the days immediately preceding the test to care for his grandchildren while his daughter was delivering her third child. His daughter testified credibly that she would never have left her children in Respondent's care if she believed he was under the influence of cocaine. Respondent suffers from cluster headaches and has done so for several years. He believes that some honey given to him by his daughter, which was purchased overseas, contained coca leaves, and his ingestion of this honey in the weeks before the drug test may have been the basis of finding the benzoylecgonine metabolite in his system. Advertisements for the honey located on the internet represent that it contains coca oil and powdered coca leaves. Respondent went so far as to have the substance analyzed for cocaine metabolites. He also subjected himself to further drug testing, including a fingernail analysis. While the results of the testing and the information related to the product Respondent believes was the source of the positive drug test was not admissible in this proceeding,2/ the undersigned has considered the efforts Respondent undertook to determine whether there could be a source for the positive result other than his illicit use of cocaine. Dr. Columbo acknowledged that there are several commercially-available food products, produced primarily in South America, that contain coca. He testified that those food products include tea and a honey that contains coca oil and powder. Even assuming that Respondent could demonstrate that the honey he ingested would produce a positive result for benzoylecgonine, however, there was no evidence as to what amount of honey he would have to ingest in order to cause a positive drug test, or whether he in fact he did ingest that amount. There was no evidence presented indicating that Respondent has ever been disciplined previously, either by his employer or by the Commission. Further, there is no evidence presented of any impaired behavior by Respondent, or any history of substance abuse. To the contrary, Respondent credibly testified that he has prescriptions for Scheduled II controlled substances to treat his cluster headaches that he has chosen not to fill.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the facts found and conclusions of law reached, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission enter a final order finding Respondent in violation of section 943.1395(7), as defined in Florida Administrative Law Rule 11B-27.0011(4)(d). It is further recommended that Respondent's certification as a law enforcement officer be suspended for a period of 60 days, followed by probation for a period of two years. As condition of probation, it is recommended that the Commission require random drug testing and substance abuse counseling, as contemplated by Florida Administrative Code Rule 11B-27.005(7)(c). DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of February, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LISA SHEARER NELSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of February, 2011.
The Issue The issue to be determined is whether Petitioner, St. Lucie County School Board (Petitioner or the School Board), has just cause to terminate the employment of Respondent, Renya Jones (Respondent or Ms. Jones).
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Renya Jones, is employed by the School Board of St. Lucie County, Florida. She has been employed by the School Board since the 2004-2005 school year, most recently as a music teacher at Village Green Environmental Studies School. Respondent has a professional services contract pursuant to section 1012.33, Florida Statutes. As a classroom teacher, she is covered by the Collective Bargaining Agreement between the School Board and the Classroom Teachers Association. When Respondent was hired by the School Board, she participated in an orientation process whereby she received training on a variety of School Board policies, including the Code of Ethics/Professional Competency and the Drug-Free Workplace Policy. On July 28, 2004, she signed a New Employee Orientation Verification of Training form indicating that she had received training in the areas listed (including those named above), and that she had received a copy of the St. Lucie County School Board New Employee Handbook. Respondent also submitted to pre-employment drug screening on July 30, 2004. On May 8, 2017, Respondent was a music teacher at Village Green Environmental Studies School, also referred to as Village Green Elementary (Village Green). The contractual hours for teachers at Village Green during the 2016-2017 school year were from 7:45 a.m. to 3:20 p.m. There were clubs that met in the morning before classes began at approximately 8:30 a.m., and those teachers working with clubs were required to report earlier so that they were present when the clubs were to start. Respondent was the teacher working with the chorus club, which would require her to be present early. When teachers arrive at school, they normally sign in at the front desk. Cynthia Garcia is the executive secretary to the principal at Village Green. During the 2016-2017 school year, the principal was Ucola Barrett-Baxter. Ms. Garcia typically arrives at school before anyone else and sits at the front desk as teachers sign in, as opposed to sitting in her office, adjacent to Ms. Barrett-Baxter’s. On May 8, 2017, Ms. Garcia was present when Respondent signed in at sometime between 7:30 and 7:50 a.m. Ms. Garcia asked Respondent if she was alright, because her appearance was different than normal. While Respondent was usually dressed professionally and wore make-up, that morning she was wearing no make-up and her wig was not on straight. Respondent replied that she was running a little behind and was a little messed up, and still needed to put on her make-up. Ms. Garcia testified that Respondent was different than when she usually signed in, and described her as a bit “giddy,” flailing her arms and laughing. Actavis McQueen is a fourth-grade teacher at Village Green. As she approached her classroom on May 8, 2017, Respondent called to her in the hallway a little after 8:00 a.m. Ms. McQueen described Respondent as giggly and loud, and when Ms. McQueen approached Respondent, she noticed that Respondent was not properly dressed for work. For example, her wig was twisted, she was not wearing make-up as she usually does, her stomach was showing under the tank top she was wearing, and she was wearing flip flops or slides instead of shoes. Most importantly, Ms. McQueen could smell the strong odor of alcohol. Respondent was loud and laughing, saying that the children would not recognize her without her make-up. Students were starting to come in for practice on the school play, and Ms. McQueen did not want the students to see Respondent in her current condition, so Ms. McQueen told students that there would not be a rehearsal that day. She told Respondent to go to her office in the back of her classroom and fix herself up. Ms. McQueen was shocked by Respondent’s appearance, and after telling Respondent to go to her office, Ms. McQueen headed toward the school office. On her way, she ran into Verna Brown at the cafeteria. The chorus room that served as Respondent’s classroom is adjacent to or behind the cafeteria, and can be entered from the cafeteria area by way of the stage. Verna Brown2/ is a health paraprofessional employed at Village Green. On this particular morning, she was on duty in the cafeteria for those students eating breakfast. Ms. McQueen approached her and told Verna Brown that she had spoken to Respondent, and it appeared that Respondent had been drinking. Ms. McQueen reported that Respondent smelled of alcohol and asked Verna Brown to go check on Respondent, because Ms. McQueen was uncertain what to do. Verna Brown went to Respondent’s class, and when she arrived, two other staff members were in Respondent’s room, so she closed the door and said she would come back, which she did once the others left the room. Like Ms. McQueen, Verna Brown could smell alcohol and observed that Respondent’s eyes were swollen and red, her hair was “wild,” and her stomach was showing. Respondent indicated that she had been to a party. Verna Brown was concerned for Respondent’s well-being and told Respondent she needed to get herself together. While she was talking to Respondent, students were trying to come into the room through the stage, and were asking Respondent questions about rehearsal. Respondent told them there would be no rehearsal that morning and to come back at 3:00 p.m. Verna Brown was trying to keep the students from seeing Respondent because she did not want them to see her in that condition. Verna Brown asked Respondent if Respondent needed her to call someone to come get her, but Respondent indicated that she had a rental car, and left out the back door.3/ Despite having signed in upon her arrival at Village Green, Respondent did not sign out when she left. Verna Brown was not authorized to arrange for a substitute for Respondent, but told her she would speak with Ms. Garcia about one. No substitute was ever procured. Verna Brown returned to the cafeteria and confirmed to Ms. McQueen that she also smelled alcohol on Respondent. Ms. McQueen went to the office accompanied by Sherri Brown, the media specialist, in search of the principal, Ucola Barrett- Baxter. Ms. Garcia advised Ms. McQueen that Ms. Barrett-Baxter was at student drop-off duty, and Ms. McQueen told Ms. Garcia that she needed to speak to her about a staff member. Ms. Garcia asked if it was Respondent, and went to the drop-off area to advise Ms. Barrett-Baxter of Ms. McQueen’s need to see her. Ms. Garcia believed that Ms. McQueen was very upset about Respondent and took over Ms. Baxter-Barrett’s duties at the student drop-off area so that Ms. Barrett-Baxter could speak with Ms. McQueen. Ms. Barrett-Baxter found Ms. McQueen at the media center, where Ms. McQueen advised her that she had seen Respondent and that Respondent appeared to be drunk and smelled like alcohol. Ms. Barrett-Baxter asked where Respondent could be located, and was told that she had already left the campus. Ms. Barrett-Baxter immediately called Aaron Clements, the director of Employee Relations, and explained the situation. Upon learning that Ms. Barrett-Baxter had not seen Respondent personally and that Respondent was no longer at the school, Mr. Clements advised Ms. Barrett-Baxter that at that point, there was nothing that could be done. As noted above, Sherri Brown is a media specialist at Village Green. At Ms. McQueen’s request, she accompanied Ms. McQueen to the office to find Ms. Barrett-Baxter. She and Verna Brown were both concerned about whether Respondent made it home safely, and she tried to call Respondent. Respondent did not answer her phone when Sherri Brown called, and she and Verna Brown received permission from Ms. Barrett-Baxter to leave campus and drive by Respondent’s home to make sure she had arrived. Once they saw the rental car Respondent had been driving parked at her home, they returned to campus. Respondent returned Sherri Brown’s call at about 10:17 a.m., and stated that she had left early due to an unidentified emergency. Sherri Brown told Respondent to contact Ms. Barrett-Baxter before she came back to work, and not to come back to the school. Sherri Brown relayed the telephone conversation with Respondent to her media assistant, Mary Bergerman, and told Ms. Bergerman that she needed to go to the office and report the contact with Respondent. Ms. Bergerman had heard Sherri Brown’s side of the telephone conversation and confirmed that Sherri Brown had told Respondent not to return to the school, as opposed to advising her that she needed to come back. When Sherri Brown arrived at the office, Ms. Barrett- Baxter was in a meeting with a parent. She stepped into Ms. Garcia’s office to relay the message that Respondent was going to contact the principal, and while she was there, Respondent entered the office behind her. Sherri Brown said hello to Respondent and returned to the library. She covered Respondent’s classes for the day, and she and a co-worker covered the rehearsal that afternoon. While Ms. Barrett-Baxter was in the parent conference, at approximately 10:24 a.m., she received a text from a number she did not recognize. She responded, “I’m in a meeting. Who’s calling,” to which Respondent responded, “Jones I’m there in 5 minutes.” Respondent arrived in the office while Ms. Barrett- Baxter was still in the parent conference, so she went in Ms. Garcia’s office to wait. After somewhere between ten and 30 minutes, the parent conference concluded, and Respondent went in Ms. Barrett-Baxter’s office. Ms. Barrett-Baxter testified that Respondent is normally well put together in terms of make-up and hair, but when she came in the office she looked disheveled, and noticeably different from her normal appearance. She could detect the smell of alcohol and her eyes were puffy and red. Respondent told her she had gone home to clean up a little bit, and Ms. Barrett-Baxter replied that it did not work, because she could smell the alcohol from across the desk. She told Respondent that she would have to contact the district office, and left Respondent in her office while she went to Ms. Garcia’s office to call Mr. Clements. Sometime that day, she also completed a Human Resources Reporting Form and emailed it to Mr. Clements. The Reporting Form summarized the reports she had received regarding Respondent’s apparent intoxication and what she had observed when meeting with Respondent before calling Mr. Clements. Reasonable suspicion existed to warrant testing for drugs and alcohol based upon Respondent’s appearance, behavior, and the smell of alcohol emanating from her person and noted by nearly every person with whom she came in contact. Mr. Clements advised that he would send someone from security to transport Respondent for testing. Ms. Barrett-Baxter had Respondent go sit in the conference room in the office area to wait for transport, and resumed her other duties. Ken Rodriguez is a security officer for the St. Lucie County School District (School District) and a retired police officer from New York City, and he has worked at the School District for the last nine years. He arrived at Village Green between 11:00 and 11:30 a.m. Once he arrived, he went to the conference room where Respondent was waiting. He identified himself to Respondent and explained that he would be transporting her to the district office where she would meet with Aaron Clements, who would explain to her the procedures that were going to take place. Mr. Rodriguez asked Respondent about any personal affects she might have, and then asked someone in the office to retrieve her purse for her. Upon receiving the purse, Respondent placed it on the table and started looking for something. From his vantage point standing by the table, he could see a large ziplock bag of capsules in her purse, as well as a box of box cutters. He did not search her purse, but asked her about the bag of capsules, and Respondent told Mr. Rodriguez that they were vitamins. Mr. Rodriguez took her explanation at face value, but advised her that he was going to hold onto both the bag of capsules and the box cutters as a safety measure while she was transported, and return them to her when they were finished. Mr. Rodriguez and Respondent arrived at the School District offices sometime after noon. Mr. Rodriguez directed Respondent to sit in the reception area while he went in to see Mr. Clements. Mr. Rodriguez reported to Mr. Clements that he had taken possession of the capsules and the box cutter as a safety measure and gave them to Mr. Clements, and then brought Respondent in to meet with him. Mr. Rodriguez did not sit in on the meeting between Mr. Clements and Respondent. Mr. Clements advised Respondent that she was going to be taken to the lab for drug/alcohol testing, and now would be the time for her to tell him if the pills were something illegal or would cause her to have a negative result from the test, and she again stated that they were vitamins. Mr. Clements reiterated that they were sending her for drug and alcohol testing, and she indicated that she understood. She was provided with the standard forms related to testing that are used for all employees being tested, and she signed them. Respondent did not ask Mr. Clements any questions, and appeared to understand what she was told. Mr. Clements is not the medical resource officer for St. Lucie County Schools. The medical resource officer is identified on the form for drug testing, along with his telephone number. No evidence was presented to indicate that Respondent asked to speak to the medical resource officer or was prohibited from doing so. The School District typically tests for both drugs and alcohol on a reasonable suspicion test. While there may be reasonable suspicion that someone is under the influence of either drugs or alcohol, without the testing, it is difficult to know for sure the source of the influence. After meeting with Mr. Clements, Respondent was provided with a St. Lucie Public Schools Drug & Alcohol Testing notification form that identifies the time Respondent left the School District and instructs her to report to the identified testing location no later than 30 minutes from receiving the form. Respondent and Mr. Clements both signed this form at 1:10 p.m. Mr. Rodriguez drove Respondent to Absolute Testing/Consulting (Absolute Testing), where he provided the paperwork to a technician, Gina Dinello, who took her back for testing while he waited in the reception area. Absolute Testing provides alcohol testing to St. Lucie County using a breathalyzer, and provides drug testing using a urine sample. Ms. Dinello holds the appropriate certifications to conduct the breathalyzer test and to collect the urine sample for the drug test. The sample for the urine test is obtained on premises and then transported to a laboratory for processing. The breathalyzer that Absolute Testing uses is DOT- certified, and is calibrated in accordance with DOT standards. Ms. Dinello took Respondent into the back room at Absolute Testing, and explained how the procedure for the breathalyzer works. She showed Respondent the documents related to the test, and Respondent signed them. With breathalyzer tests, where there is a positive test result, it is standard procedure to wait 15 minutes and then have the person being tested blow into the breathalyzer a second time. The theory is that, by waiting the 15 minutes, any extraneous influence, such as mouthwash, that might have affected the first test would have dissipated by the second test. Respondent cooperated with the first administration of the breathalyzer test, which resulted in a reading of .186 at 1:40 p.m. Once she learned the results of the first test, however, she did not want to wait for the second administration. Ms. Dinello asked Mr. Rodriguez to help explain the process to her, and he did so, telling her that a second test was a standard part of the process. Both Mr. Rodriguez and Ms. Dinello explained to Respondent that she had a right to refuse the test, but her refusal would be documented. Respondent then consented to the second administration, which resulted in a reading of .191 at 1:56 p.m. After the breathalyzer test was complete, Ms. Dinello explained that Respondent needed to provide a urine sample for the drug test. Respondent declined to do so, saying she had already blown the breathalyzer test, so there was no point to proceed with the urine test. Both Mr. Rodriguez and Ms. Dinello explained again that if she chose to refuse the test, the refusal would be documented and reported to the School District. Respondent refused to submit, and Ms. Dinello submitted paperwork to that effect. Mr. Rodriguez was not informed of the results of the breathalyzer test. When the testing was finished, he took Respondent to her home, returned her belongings to her, and she walked into her home. He did not allow her to drive her car home, which remained at Village Green, because he believed that she could still be under the influence of alcohol. He testified that when he transported her to the testing facility, he could smell the heavy odor of alcohol on her, and he did not believe she was physically capable of driving home. Respondent was paid a salary for May 8, 2017, and had not requested annual or sick leave. She was on duty when she arrived at the school that morning, and she remained on duty, despite the fact that she chose to go home without signing out for the day. On May 9, 2017, Respondent received a letter by hand- delivery notifying her that she was under investigation for having a breath alcohol level of .186 and .191 while at her work location, and for refusing the drug test. She was placed on temporary duty assignment. While on temporary duty, Respondent received all of her pay and benefits. Moreover, Respondent was paid for the entire term of her contract for the 2016-2017 school year, from August 12, 2016, through June 30, 2017. On May 10, 2017, Mr. Clements provided to Respondent a Meeting Notice, scheduling a meeting regarding the charges that she refused the drug test and had unacceptable breath alcohol test results. Respondent acknowledged receiving the notice in writing and attended the meeting with her union representative. The purpose of the meeting was to provide Respondent with “due process” and give her the opportunity to provide any information she might choose regarding the allegations against her. On May 15, 2017, Respondent received written notice of a second meeting, to be held on May 22, 2017. The purpose of this meeting was to provide Respondent the results of the School District’s investigation. Respondent and her representative attended this meeting as well. On May 22, 2017, Rafaal Sanchez, Jr., Mr. Clements’ supervisor and executive director of Human Resources for the School District, recommended to Superintendent Gent that Respondent’s employment be terminated. Superintendent Gent accepted Mr. Sanchez’s recommendation and by letter dated May 22, 2017, notified Respondent of his intent to recommend to the School Board that her employment be terminated, as well as the procedure available to her to contest that recommendation. The letter also advised Respondent that if she chose to request a hearing, the superintendent would recommend that she be suspended without pay pending the outcome of the hearing. That same day, counsel for Respondent wrote to Superintendent Gent regarding the allegations against Respondent. He advised the superintendent that Respondent was relieved of duty on May 8, 2017, and was later called and told to return to Village Green, and that she voluntarily complied with this directive. He also contended that she was not presented with any drug testing policies and she had no knowledge of the consequences of failing to submit to the drug test at that time. As a result of this letter, Mr. Clements opened a second investigation to see whether anyone had told Respondent to return to school. At that time, he gathered statements from staff members, who had seen Respondent at school on the morning of May 8, 2017, and ultimately closed the investigation as unsubstantiated.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the School Board finding that Respondent’s conduct as identified in the Findings of Fact constitute just cause for terminating her position as a teacher. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of February, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LISA SHEARER NELSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of February, 2018.
