The Issue Whether Respondents committed the offenses set forth in the Administrative Complaint and, if so, the penalties that should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a state government licensing and regulatory agency charged with the responsibility and duty to prosecute Administrative Complaints related to the real estate profession pursuant to the laws of the State of Florida. Respondent Valyne Batchelor is now and was at all times material hereto a licensed real estate broker in the State of Florida, having been issued license number 0311190 in accordance with Chapter 475, Florida Statutes. The last license issued to Respondent Batchelor was in care of Adventure Properties, Inc., 10800 N. Military Trail, Palm Beach Gardens, Florida 33410. Respondent Adventure Properties, Inc. was at all times pertinent to this proceeding a corporation registered as a real estate broker in the State of Florida having been issued license number 0238654 in accordance with Chapter 475, Florida Statutes. The last license issued to Respondent Adventure Properties, Inc., was at the address of 10800 N. Military Trail, Palm Beach Gardens, Florida 33410. At all times pertinent hereto, Respondent Batchelor was licensed and operating as a qualifying broker and officer of Respondent Adventure Properties, Inc. At all times pertinent hereto, Respondent Batchelor was a one-half owner of Dream Home Builders of Royal Palm Beach, Inc. (Dream Home). Joel B. Wingate was in the land clearing business and had done work prior to September 1988 for Dream Home and Dream Home's subsidiary, Redi Concrete. On September 18, 1988, Dream Home, the owner of a house located at 5510 Royal Palm Beach Boulevard, Royal Palm Beach, Florida, entered into a contract to sell that house to Joel B. Wingate, his wife, Eva C. Wingate, and his mother, Sarah F. Wingate. The contract reflected that the purchase price of the property was $87,400. The contract reflected that the sum of $4,400 was received by Adventure Properties as a deposit. The balance of the purchase price was to be paid by a first mortgage in the amount of $69,900 to be obtained by the Buyers from a lending institution and by a second mortgage in favor of Seller in the amount of $13,100 that was to be amortized over a period of 30 years with a balloon payment at the end of 5 years. Respondent Batchelor executed the contract on behalf of Adventure Properties and on behalf of Dream Home. In addition, Respondent Batchelor signed a statement on the face of the contract which acknowledged receipt of the deposit that was to have been held in escrow. The sum of $4,400 was not paid over to Respondent Adventure Properties or to Respondent Batchelor by the Wingates at the time the contract was executed and there never was a deposit made into the escrow account of Adventure Properties. Instead, Mr. Wingate agreed to pay the sum of $4,400.00 prior to the closing from sums he would earn from work he was performing for Redi Concrete. All parties pertinent to this transaction, including the bank that financed the first mortgage, knew that the Wingates had not paid that sum. The Wingates applied for financing with Security First Federal for financing of the first mortgage. The application for the loan was in the name of Sarah F. Wingate because of Joel Wingate's poor credit. On September 17, 1988, a "Good Faith Estimate of Settlement Charges" was prepared by Security First Federal which estimated that the settlement charges that would be due from the Wingates at closing would equal $4,328.30. On September 19, 1988, the Wingates, as buyer, and Dream Home, as seller, executed an addendum to the contract which provided that the Seller would pay up to $4,400 in closing costs and that the amount of the second mortgage would be increased from the sum of $13,100 to the sum of $17,500. The addendum provided, in pertinent part, as follows: Seller to pay up to $4,400 in closing costs. Buyer agrees to give seller a second mortgage in the amount of $17,500. Said Mortgage to be for a term of one year from date of contract and is to be paid as follows: Buyer agrees to do work for Redi Concrete, Inc. consisting of clearing, digging of necessary fill, building and compact ion of house pads according to Palm Beach County Building Codes, all grading and trash removal at contract price of $2,450 per lot. Of this amount $1,250 is to be applied to second mortgage until mortgage is paid in full. Additionally, any unused portion of the $4,400 allowance for closing costs not used for that purpose is to be applied to the second mortgage of $17,500. If any portion of this agreement is not kept, Redi Concrete, Inc. reserves the option to impose interest at the rate of 10% per annum against any unpaid amount of second mortgage. The fact that the amount of closing costs Dream Homes agreed to pay on behalf of the Wingates ($4,400) was identical to the amount that the Wingates were supposed to pay as a deposit ($4,400) was coincidence. Respondent Batchelor executed the addendum to the contract in her capacity as an officer of Dream Home. There was no attempt on the part of Respondents to deceive the Wingates, who had agreed to this method of financing the purchase. On October 24, 1990, the transaction closed. The buyers executed the first mortgage in favor of Security First Federal Savings and Loan Association in the principal amount of $69,900, and a second purchase money mortgage in favor of Dream Home in the principal amount of $13,100. (There was no explanation as to why the second mortgage that was executed at the closing was for $13,100 instead of for $17,500. Dream Home's letter of October 27, 1988, to the Wingates, signed by Ms. Batchelor, refers to a revised second mortgage that should be executed by the Wingates and recorded. There was no evidence that the revised second mortgage was, in fact, delivered to the Wingates or executed by them.) The second mortgage note required monthly payments commencing November 24, 1988, with a balloon payment of $12,965.22 due on October 24, 1991. The Wingates were aware of the manner in which their purchase of this property was financed. There was insufficient evidence to establish that Respondents dealt with the Wingates in anything other than an honest, straightforward manner. The unusual owner financing involved in this transaction was an attempt to accommodate the buyers. There was no intent by Respondents to deceive the Wingates, Dream Home, Security First Federal, or any other party pertinent to these proceedings. There was insufficient evidence to establish that the Wingates, Dream Home, Security First Federal, or any other party pertinent to these proceedings was, in fact, deceived or tricked by any act of Respondents. The Wingates moved into the premises prior to the closing of the transaction. Ms. Batchelor did not give the Wingates permission to move into the house prior to closing and she did not personally inform the Wingates that they would have to pay rent if they moved in prior to closing. Ms. Batchelor had been told by her business associate, Mr. Vander Meer, that the Wingates would pay a per diem rental fee until the closing. On October 27, 1990, Ms. Batchelor, on behalf of Dream Home, advised the Wingates that they were being charged a rental fee of $27.54 per day that they had occupancy prior to the closing. For the 36 days the Wingates were in the house prior to closing, the total rental claimed came to $920.52. The Wingates disputed the amount claimed for rent and had not, as of the date of the formal hearing, paid that amount. There was no evidence that Respondents were attempting to deceive, trick, or defraud the Wingates in any manner by claiming rent for the period between the time the Wingates moved in to the house and the time of the closing. By letter dated September 20, 1989, Ms. Batchelor, on behalf of Dream Home, notified the Wingates that the second mortgage balloon payment was $12,795.52 and that, according to her records, would become due on May 1, 1990. Although this statement of the due date is inconsistent with the instrument executed by the Wingates, there was no evidence that this statement was anything other than a mistake. The Wingates have defaulted on the first and the second mortgages. When Petitioner's investigator, Sharon Thayer, conducted an office inspection and escrow audit of Respondents' offices on March 13, 1990, Respondents did not have an enclosed room within which negotiations and closings of real estate transactions could be conducted and carried on with privacy. The negotiations between the buyers and sellers in the Wingate transaction were, however, conducted in private. Buyers were prompted to file a complaint against Respondents approximately one year after the closing when an unidentified bank officer told them they may have committed a fraud. Without knowledge or complicity of Respondents, Sarah F. Wingate falsified her loan application with Security First Federal Savings and Loan Association. Respondents received no commission in regard to the Wingate transaction. Respondents moved their offices and have corrected the deficiency related to the absence of an enclosed, private area.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Real Estate Commission enter a final order which finds that Respondent violated the provisions of Rule 21V-10.002, Florida Administrative Code, and consequently, Section 475.25(1)(e), Florida Statutes, which finds that Respondents violated the provisions of Section 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes, and which provides for the issuance of a letter of reprimand to said Respondents for such violations and the assessment of an administrative fine against Respondents in the amount of $500.00. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of December, 1990, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Hearing Officer The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 904/488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of December, 1990. APPENDIX TO THE RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 90-3587 The following rulings are made on the proposed findings of fact submitted on behalf of the Petitioner. The proposed findings of fact in paragraphs 1-15 and 19-22 are adopted in material part by the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 16 are rejected as being unsubstantiated by the evidence. The entry on line 501 of the copy of the closing statement introduced as Petitioner's Exhibit 8 is too faint to read. However, the copy of the closing statement included as part of Joint Exhibit 1 reflects that the entry on line 501 is the figure $4,400 and not the figure of $4,100 reflected in Petitioner's proposed finding. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 17 are rejected as being unnecessary to the conclusions reached. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 18 are rejected as being contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. Although the proposed findings correctly reflect Ms. Batchelor's statement to Petitioner's investigator, that statement was made several months after the transaction and before Ms. Batchelor had had the opportunity to review her files. Other evidence regarding the addendum is found to be more credible as reflected by the findings made. The following rulings are made on the proposed findings of fact submitted on behalf of the Respondent. The proposed findings of fact in paragraphs 1-21 are adopted in material part by the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 22 are rejected as being unnecessary to the conclusions reached. COPIES FURNISHED: James H. Gillis, Esquire Senior Attorney Florida Department of Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Suite N-308 Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Lawrence Maxwell Fuchs, Esquire Fuchs and Jones, P.A. 590 Royal Palm Beach Boulevard Royal Palm Beach, Florida 33411 Darlene F. Keller Division Director Department of Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32801 Kenneth E. Easley General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
Findings Of Fact On July 6, 1981, the Applicant submitted to the Department of Banking and Finance (Department) an application pursuant to Section 658.19, Florida Statutes (Supp. 1980), for authority to organize a corporation for the purpose of conducting a general banking business to be located at 1000 Massey Boulevard, unincorporated Palm City, Martin County, Florida. Notice of receipt of the application was published in the Florida Administrative Weekly on December 11, 1981. Protests and requests for hearing were filed by American Bank of Martin County (American), Central Savings and Loan Association (Central), Florida National Bank of Martin County (Florida National), and First National Bank and Trust Company of Stuart (First National) on or before December 30, 1981. On September 27, 1982, Florida National withdrew its protest. Publication of the Notice of Hearing in this cause appeared in The Stuart News on October 1, 1982. A hearing was held in this cause on October 19 through 20, 1982, in Stuart, Martin County, Florida. The pronosed bank will occupy 3,300 square feet of an existing single- story structure located at the west end of the Villa Plaza Shopping Center fronting on Massey Boulevard, also known as Martin Downs Building. The proposed bank will have visibility and access to Massey Boulevard and also to First Street along the rear (south side) of the Villa Plaza Shopping Center, through use of the ingress and egress facilities of the shopping center. (View by Hearing Officer) The site has facilities for three drive-in lanes. The plan of the proposed bank will include a teller line, lobby area, private offices, teller work area, coupon booth area, vault, restrooms and an employee lounge. Adequate parking facilities already exist and there is room for expansion. (T. 48-50; View by Hearing Officer) The facility is adequate to handle the projected business of the bank for a reasonable period of time and is of such a nature to warrant customer confidence in the security, stability and permanence of the bank. The Applicant intends to lease the facilities from R&S Equities, a Florida partnership whose partners are John C. Robinson and Woodrow J. Smoak. The lease terms include a five year term with annual rent of $36,000 payable in monthly installments of $3,000. The lease also provides for renewal options every five years for a maximum of thirty (30) years with specified annual rental payments to be used during each of the five year terms. Applicant anticipates an investment of $174,500 in fixed assets, including $49,500 for leasehold improvements and $125,000 for furniture, fixtures and bank machinery. Temporary quarters for the bank are not anticipated as the existing structure is ready and the planned improvements can be completed quickly. Applicant has no plans to purchase or lease any land, buildings, improvements to be made thereon, or equipment, furniture, or fixtures to be installed therein, from a director, officer or stockholder who owns 5 percent or more of the capital stock of the Applicant or any controlled company of any officer, director or stockholder. The Applicant's primary service area incorporates portions of the City of Stuart, unincorporated Martin County and a portion of unincorporated Martin County known as Palm City. The PSA is a "bedroom community" with shopping, recreational and public school facilities. Included within the PSA are U.S. Census Enumeration Districts 11, 12, 32, 33, 61, 65, 66, 67 and a portion of 10. The PSA's northern, eastern, southern and western boundaries are the St. Lucie County/Martin County Line (along with the St. Lucie River and Frazier Creek), Colorado Avenue (State Road 76), Indian Street, extended to Florida's Turnpike, and Florida's Turnpike respectively, and are located 2.4 road miles, 0.9 miles, 1.8 miles and 2.5 miles respectively from the proposed site. The south fork of the St. Lucie River runs north and south through the eastern protion of the PSA. The Palm City Bridge, a modern fixed span bridge, crosses the river and connects the larger portion of the PSA west of the river with the eastern portion and the City of Stuart. The bridge's western end is approximately 0.2 miles from the Applicant's proposed site. The delineation of the boundaries of the PSA took into consideration the locations of the offices of existing financial institutions, along with the other economic and demographic factors. The ability of PSA residents to reach the proposed site in a convenient and timely manner was likewise a factor considered in delineating the boundaries of the PSA. The northern boundary of the PSA, consisting primarily of the St. Lucie County/Martin County Line, presents a logical and political northern boundary. The eastern boundary, Colorado Avenue, is a major north/south thoroughfare chosen primarily because of its proximity to existing financial institutions. The southern boundary, Indian Street, extended to the Florida Turnpike and the western boundary, the Florida Turnpike, were chosen because they are areas beyond which population concentrations are limited. Also, Florida's Turnpike is a significant man-made barrier. There are no other significant natural or man-made barriers which would restrict the flow of traffic within the PSA. The PSA's major north/south arteries are 18th Avenue, Mapp Road, Palm City Avenue and Colorado Avenue. The PSA's primary east/west arteries are Highway 714, Massey Boulevard, a/k/a Martin Downs Boulevard and Murphy Road. The 1970-1980 population trends for the City of Stuart, Martin County, the State of Florida, and the Applicant's designated PSA were considered. This data was provided by the Applicant and the Department from census data and from data published by the University of Florida's Bureau of Economic and Business Research (BEBR). The PSA population grew from 3,300 in 1970 to 6,350 in 1980 for an average annual increase of 9.2 percent. The City of Stuart grew from 4,820 in 1970 to 9,467 in 1980 for an average annual increase of 9.6 percent. The population of Martin County went from 28,035 in 1970 to 64,014 in 1980 for an average annual increase of 12.8 percent. Over the same ten year period, Florida's population increased an average of 4.4 percent annually from 6,791,418 to 9,746,324. The BEBR projected 1983 Martin County population at 70,600 by its low projection, at 74,600 by its medium projection and at 75,300 by its high projection. For Florida's 1983 population, the BEBR estimated 10,352,200 as its low projection, 10,595,100 as its medium projection and 10,757,200 as its high projection. The average annual 1980-1983 population growth rate projections for Martin County are 3.43 percent, 5.20 percent and 5.88 percent as calculated from the low, medium and high 1983 projections respectively. For Florida, tide average annual 1980-1983 population growth rate projections are 2.07 percent, 2.90 percent and 3.46 percent as calculated for the low, medium and high projections respectively. See "Data Source Packet" of Department's Official File (DSP). One hundred percent of the County's 1970-1980 population growth resulted from immigration, a proportion above the state's 91.97 percent. (DPS) Over the 1970-1979 period, the Martin County population aged somewhat, with the population proportion below age 15 having decreased from 23.8 percent to 18.6 percent; the population proportion within the working age group (15 to 64) increased from 54.9 percent to 56.3 percent; and the population aged 65 years and above increased from 21.3 percent to 25.1 percent. Florida population during the same period decreased from 25.8 percent to 20.4 percent for the group below age 15; increased from 59.6 percent to 61.9 percent in the working age group and increased from 14.6 percent to 17.7 percent for those 65 and over. (DPS) In April, 1980, the Martin County population was older than the Florida population. Martin County's population under age 15 was 16.4 percent; with 59.1 percent in the working age group; and 24.5 percent over age 65. In April, 1980, 19.3 percent of Florida's population was below age 15; 63.4 percent were in the working age group; and 17.3 percent were aged 65 or over. With a higher percentage of people over age 15, there is a relatively higher number of people in Martin County of an age to utilize banking services than exists on the average statewide. The rate of growth in the number of households in Martin County exceeded the rate of growth in the State of Florida during the 1970-1980 period. The BEBR estimated the number of Martin County households in 1980 at 25,863, having reflected at 155.5 percent increase above the 1970 level of 10,122 households. The number of state households increased 63.8 percent during the same period from 2,284,786 to 3,841,356. County and state average household sizes declined 11.8 percent and 12.1 percent, respectively, over the 1970-1980 period with the Martin County average household size having declined from 2.72 to 2.40 persons, and the state average declined from 2.90 to 2.55 persons. Statewide unemployment rates have significantly exceeded those of Martin County for all periods since 1974. During 1975, Florida's 10.7 percent unemployed rate exceeded Martin County's 8.7 percent rate. In 1976, Florida's 9 percent unemployment rate exceeded the 7.7 percent rate in Martin County. Florida's 8.2 percent unemployment rate exceeded the Martin County 6.9 percent rate in 1977. In 1978, Florida's unemployment rate was 6.6 percent which was also well above the 5.5 percent rate in Martin County. In 1979, the margin was even larger with Florida's unemployment rate at 6 percent and Martin County's unemployment rate at 4.8 percent. The margin continued to grow in 1980 with the Florida unemployment rate still at 6 percent but the Martin County unemployment rate having dropped to 4.4 percent. In 1981, Florida and Martin County's unemployment rates were 6.8 percent and 5.6 percent respectively. In 1981, the Florida unemployment rate remained well above the unemployment rate in Martin County. (T. 181) Between 1979 and 1981, average household effective buying income (HEBI) in Martin County grew from $16,339 to $20,119. In 1979, Florida HEBI was $18,613 and in 1981, was $21,301. The increase between 1979 and 1981 was much more significant in Martin County than in the State of Florida overall. HEBI increased 23.1 percent or $3,780 in Martin County while increasing only 14.4 percent or $2,688 in Florida between 1979 and 1981. Net income figures show an even more significant increase in Martin County. Between 1979 and 1981, net income in Martin County increased 73.3 percent from $336,574,000 to $583,448,00. During the same period, net income in Florida increased by only 34.2 percent from $63,889,652,000 to $85,768,756,000. Per capita personal income data (PPI) formulated for the state and county by the United States Department of Commerce, and reprinted by the University of Florida, was in evidence and considered. This data appears in the following table: YEAR 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 Martin Co. 3861 4258 4773 5246 5363 Florida 3693 4007 4461 4988 5341 YEAR 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 Martin Co. 5834 6437 7215 8094 9178 Florida 5634 6094 6733 7591 8521 PPI level in Martin County exceeded Florida PPI levels throughout the 1970-1979 period. Between 1975 and 1979, PPI in Martin County increased by $3,344 or 57.3 percent while per capita income in the State of Florida increased by only $2,887 or 51.2 percent. In addition, PPI in Martin County in 1979 exceeded the statewide figure by 7.7 percent. The Applicant submitted data on estimated retail sales in Martin County and Florida for 1975 through 1981. At the time the application was filed, the latest available figures were for 1979. Between 1979 and 1981, estimated retail sales increased 32.3 percent in Martin County while the State of Florida increased by only 28 percent. Five operating commercial bank offices are located in or within one mile of the PSA. Florida National operates a branch office 0.8 miles northeast of the proposed opened 0.2 miles west of the proposed site. The two branches are the only bank offices in the PSA. The following three bank offices are located within one mile of the PSA: Florida National's main office, operating 2.7 miles northeast of the proposed site; First National's main office, operating 2.1 miles northeast of the proposed site; and First National's branch office, operating 1.8 miles northeast of the proposed site. These five bank offices are operated by only two bank institutions, neither of which is a state chartered institution nor has its main office in the PSA. Florida National, the only bank operating in the PSA, withdrew its protest to this application. Seven savings and loan association (association) facilities were cited as operating in or within one mile of the PSA. These seven association facilities include two main offices in operation and five association branch offices. Two offices operate within the PSA: Harbor Federal Savings and Loan Association (formerly First Federal Savings and Loan Association of Ft. Pierce) operates a branch office 0.9 miles northeast of the proposed site. First Federal Savings and Loan Association of Martin County operates a branch office 0.9 miles northeast of the pronosed site.. The following facilities are within one mile of the PSA: Citizens Federal Savings and Loan Association operates a branch office 2.2 miles northeast of the proposed site; Community Federal Savings and Loan Association operates a branch office 2.7 miles northeast of the proposed site; First Federal Savings and Loan Association of Martin County has its home office 2.2 miles northeast of the proposed site; Home Federal Savings and Loan Association has a branch office 2.1 miles northeast of the proposed site; and the recently opened main office of Central Savings and Loan Association is one mile northeast of the proposed site. A period's inflation is most commonly estimated by the period's corresponding change in the consumer price index, which is the only method of record in this proceeding. Each month, changes in the consumer price index from the previous month and for the previous 12 months are published by the United States Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics. For the year ending September 30, 1981, the rate of inflation was 11.0 percent. For the year ending December 31, 1981, the rate of inflation was 8.9 percent. For the year ending March 31, 1982, the rate of inflation was 6.8 percent. (DSP) Only one bank office (a branch office) was in operation within the PSA in March, 1982. During the year ending March 31, 1982, the Florida National Bank of Martin County branch office within the PSA increased its total deposits from $12,638,000 to $16,307,000 or an increase of 29 percent, a rate more than four times that of the 6.8 percent rate of inflation that existed during the year ending March, 1982. Data is also available for the bank offices operating within one mile of the PSA. The main office of First National increased its total deposits during the period of March, 1981, to March, 1982, from $149,296,000 to $153,845,000 for a yearly increase of 3.0 percent. The branch office of First National close to the PSA increased deposits during the same period from $3,144,000 to $3,587,000 or an increase of 14.1 percent. The Florida National main office had a decrease in deposits from $89,806,000 to $3,587,000 or a loss of 2.0 percent during the year ending March 31, 1982. Total Martin County deposits for the period increased from $402,666,000 to $423,762,000 or a 5.2 percent increase. During the period from March 31, 1981, to March 31, 1982, bank deposits within the State of Florida increased from $41,478,327,000 to $43,933,129,000 or an increase of approximately 5.9 percent. In summation, the rate of growth in deposits within the PSA exceeded the rate of growth in deposits in Martin County and the rate of deposit growth was bore than four times greater than the rate of inflation for the same period. For the period between September 30, 1980, and September 30, 1981, the savings and loan association offices operating in the PSA showed increases in the volume of savings accounts as follows: Harbor Federal increased from $12,287,000 to $14,997,000 or a yearly increase of 22.1 percent; First Federal of Martin County (opened in March, 1980) increased from $2,194,000 to $6,033,000 or a total increase of 175.0 percent in one year. Thus, the increase in the two savings and loan offices in the PSA showed a combined one year gain of $6,549,000 or 45.2 percent. In Martin County as a whole, savings increased from September 30, 1980, to September 30, 1981, from $352,735,000 to $381,625,000 or a yearly increase of 8.2 percent. In the State of Florida as a whole, savings during the same period went from $42,560,303,000 to $45,332,969,000 or a yearly increase of only 6.5 percent. In summary, association deposits at offices in the PSA increased at a rate far in excess of those in Martin County as a whole, and in the State of Florida. In addition, the 45.2 percent increase of association deposits in the PSA during the reporting period was more than four times the 11 percent rate of inflation for the year ending September 30, 1981. The Applicant proposes to offer the full range of banking service offered by full-service commercial banks. No deficiencies in the proposed services were established by any Protestant. However, it should also be noted that there are, at present, only two branches of one multi-bank holding company (Florida National) located within the PSA. No other bank is presently represented in the PSA. No bank is headquartered in the PSA, nor is there a facility of a state chartered bank in the PSA. Also, only Florida National Bank and one other banking organization maintain bank offices in or within one mile of the PSA. Consequently, alternative or competitive choices are limited in the PSA and within one mile of its boundaries at the present time. Applicant projected total deposits of $5,000,000, $9,000,000 and $13,000,000 at the end of the proposed banks' first three years of operation respectively. It also projected a $22,381 net operating loss during the proposed bank's first operating year, and pre-tax net operating income levels of $257,715 and $466,208 during the bank's second and third operating years respectively. These deposit and increase projections were formulated under the assumption that the proposed bank would have: $2,750,000 in total time and savings deposits and $2,250,000 in total demand deposits at the end of the first operating year; $5,400,000 in total time and savings deposits and $3,600,000 in total demand deposits at the end of the second operating year; and $8,450,000 in total time and savings deposits and $4,550,000 in total demand deposits at the end of the third operating year. Applicant's projections are conservative, were unrefuted by the Protestants and are likely achievable. The Applicant's testimony and evidence established that there are nine active residential subdivisions in the PSA totaling 6,576 units of which 416 or 6.3 percent were cited as completed. Home prices range from between $65,500 and $580,000. Five areas are planned for single family units accounting for 95 percent of the total units planned. Prices for the single family units range between $75,000 and $580,000, while prices for condominium units range between $65,500 and $87,900. The single family subdivisions are Canoe Creek, Martin Downs, Mid-Rivers, Pipers Landing and Westgate. Utilities are being installed for 70 new lots in the PSA and there are 15 new rental units recently opened and under construction. Extensive testimony was presented about the Martin Downs project located within the PSA. Martin Downs is a 2,400 acre planned residential development which will contain 5,500 residential units. It will also contain two golf courses, racquet club, resort center, retail shopping center, office park, industrial park, government service center, schools, yacht club, parks and a utility plant. Road improvements have already been made in and around Martin Downs. Further, during 1983, major improvements will be made to Martin Downs Boulevard, the major east/west artery through the PSA. These improvements include widening that portion of Martin Downs Boulevard that runs past the proposed site of the Applicant bank. (T. 23-26) Martin Downs will be built in phases with a final population of 12,000 to 13,000 people. (T. 23) The builders of Martin Downs already have approximately $20 million invested in the project. The Crane Creek area of Martin Downs is one of the most exclusive residential sections in the PSA. (View by Hearing Officer) It consists of 346 lots of which approximately 300 are sold and approximately 150 lots are occupied or have homes under construction. The lots sell for $35,000 to $60,000. Homes sell from around $150,000 to $400,000. Crane Creek also contains a championship golf course, clubhouse and racquet club with thirteen tennis courts. (T. 15) Four condominium projects are presently under construction: Country Meadows, Mapletree Villas, The Crossings, and The Townhomes at Poppleton Creek. Prices range between $49,900 and $87,900. These four projects have 306 total units planned of which 60 were completed in October, 1982, and another 72 under construction. Residents living in all of the single family subdivisions cited and at Mapletree Villas and the Crossings must, as a practical matter, pass the Applicant's proposed site on their way to and from the City of Stuart. In addition to the developments cited, there are a large number of existing residences within the PSA. Many of these are located west of the South Fork of the St. Lucie River and these residents must also pass the Applicant's proposed site when going to and from Stuart. (View by Hearing Officer) Commercial activity in the PSA is primarily centered along Massey Boulevard and Mapo Road in close proximity to the subject site. Downtown Stuart lies approximately 2.5 miles northeast of the proposed site. As of May, 1981, 35 businesses were established within one-half mile of the proposed site. In addition, the Monterey Plaza, a large, modern shopping center within one mile of the proposed site, contained 44 businesses in August, 1981. There are 43 businesses within one-half mile of the site. Manufacturing is limited in Martin County. However, the county's largest manufacturer, Grumman Aerospace Corporation, is located at Witham Field, approximately 2.7 miles east of the proposed site. In addition, there are two areas established for industrial development in the PSA itself. One is a planned industrial park to be located in Martin Downs. The other is a ten acre industrial park known as Heritage Square, located at Palm City School Road and State Road 714, approximately 1.7 miles southwest of the proposed site. There are approximately three acres currently developed in the park which opened in 1978. At the time the application was filed, it had 12 tenants, 11 of which are small manufacturing firms. The proposed bank will be capitalized with a total of $1,500,000. The capital will be divided into common capital of $1,000,000, surplus of $300,000, and undivided profits of $200,000. The bank will issue 100,000 shares of stock, with a par value of $10 and a selling price of $15 plus $.50 per share assessed for the Organizational Expense Fund. All 100,000 shares have been subscribed to. The proposed directors have personally subscribed to 30,000 shares as follows: Herbert-Biggs, 5,000 shares; Stephen Frasier, 5,000 shares; Richard Jemison, 5,000 shares; Charles Pope, 5,000 shares; Donald Ricci, 5,000 shares; and Roy Talmo, 5,000 shares. The proposed Board of Directors is composed of six members with diverse business backgrounds, some of whom have had prior banking experience. Herbert Biggs is an 11 year Florida resident living in Jupiter, Florida. Mr. Biggs has a B.S. degree from Mississippi State University and a J.D. from the University of Mississippi. After a short period as a professional basketball player, Mr. Biggs came to Martin County to practice law. He has since left the practice of law to pursue a career as a general contractor and developer. He is currently the president of Suncastle Homes, Inc., a construction and development corporation. Mr. Biggs holds professional licenses as a realtor, general contractor and attorney. Mr. Biggs is a U.S. citizen. Mr. Biggs has a reputation evidencing honesty and integrity and has an employment and business history demonstrating his responsibility in financial affairs. Stephen Frasier is a 12 year resident of Martin County. He holds a B.S. degree from Florida State University and J.D. from the University of Florida. Mr. Frasier served in the Navy as a Flight Officer and is presently a Lieutenant in the Naval Reserve. He served as the Assistant City and County Attorney in Martin County and is presently engaged in the private practice of law in Martin County as a partner in the firm of Frasier and Bateman, P.A. Mr. Frasier is a member of the Civitan Club, the Masonic Temple, the Elks Club, Martin County Bar Association, on the Board of Directors of the Visiting Nurses Association, Florida Bar, on the Board of Directors for the Paradise Ranch for Boys, and is the Chairman of the Board for the Sailfish District of the Boy Scouts of America. (T. 122) Mr. Frasier is a U.S. citizen. (T. 121) Mr. Frasier has a reputation evidencing honesty demonstrating his responsibility in financial affairs. (T. 80, 113; Exs. 1, 5) Richard Jemison has been a Florida resident since 1939, and presently lives in Stuart, Florida. (T. 102; Ex. 1) He has a B.S. degree in Civil Engineering from the University of Florida. (T. 103) Mr. Jemison was in the printing business in St. Petersburg, Florida, for 13 years and is now the president of Seabridge Associates, Inc. (T. 104) He holds licenses as a real estate broker, mortgage broker, and contractor. (T. 103) Mr. Jemison is a member of the Palm City Chamber of Commerce, Stuart Chamber of Commerce and Kiwanis Club. Mr. Jemison has substantial banking experience in that he served on the Board of Directors of the First State Charter Bank in St. Petersburg from 1968 through 1974. (T. 106; Ex. 1) He is a U.S. Citizen. (T. 102) Mr. Jemison has a reputation evidencing honesty and integrity and has an employment and business history demonstrating his responsibility in financial affairs. (T. 83, 115-116; Exs. 1, 4) Charles Pope has lived in Florida since 1951 and presently lives within the PSA of the proposed bank. He received a B.S. degree from the University of Florida and has completed all of the course work for an M.B.A at the Florida Institute of Technology. Mr. Pope has direct banking experience from his past employment with First National Bank and Trust Company of Stuart, Atlantic Bank Corporation, and First American Bank and Trust Company (formerly First American Bank of Palm Beach) Mr. Pope is the president of Charles Pope & Associates, Inc., an investment banking firm. He holds a mortgage brokers license from the State of Florida, is a Certified Commercial Lender and a Certified Review Appraiser. He is a member of the American Bankers Association, American Institute of Banking and the Chamber of Commerce. Mr. Pope is a citizen of the United States. He has a reputation evidencing honesty and integrity and has an employment and business history demonstrating his responsibility in financial affairs. Donald Ricci has lived in Florida since 1975, and in Martin County for the past five years. After being honorably discharged from the U.S. Air Force, Mr. Ricci was a part owner and general manager of an automobile dealership. Mr. Ricci became interested in the real estate business and worked as the Marketing Director for First Southern Holding Company, the developers of Martin Downs. As Marketing Director, he was in charge of sales and marketing for Martin Downs. Mr. Ricci is a 50 percent partner and manager of Seabridge Associates, Inc., a real estate development firm whose offices are located in the PSA and close to the proposed site of the Applicant bank. Mr. Ricci is a licensed real estate broker and a member of the Palm City Chamber of Commerce and the Stuart/Martin County Chamber of Commerce. Mr. Ricci is a U.S. citizen. He has a reputation evidencing honesty and integrity and has an employment and business history demonstrating his responsibility in financial affairs. Roy W. Talmo has lived in Palm Beach County, Florida, since 1964. He received a B.B.A. and M.B.A from the University of Minnesota. Mr. Talmo has extensive direct banking experience, having been employed as a banker since 1959. Mr. Talmo has been employed by the Continental Bank in Chicago and the First National Bank of St. Petersburg, and is the past Chairman of the Board of Miami National Bank. Mr. Talmo is presently Chairman of the Board of First National Bank and Trust Company in Palm Beach, and has directed its growth from an $11 million bank to its present size of just under $500 million. Mr. Talmo also serves as a Director of First American Bank of Broward County, First City Bank of Dade County, and First State Bank of Broward County. He is a member of the Palm Beach Junior College Foundation, the Palm Beach Festival, and the Tourist Development Committee for Palm Beach County. Mr. Talmo is a U.S. citizen. The Applicant adduced evidence which was not refuted, and which established that Mr. Talmo has a reputation evidencing honesty and integrity and an employment and business history demonstrating his responsibility in financial affairs. As of the date of the final hearing, the Applicant had not selected a President or Chief Executive Officer, nor a Cashier or Operations Officer. The Applicant has selected the name First American Bank of Martin County. There are no Florida financial institutions with a name so similar as to cause confusion with the proposed name. Parenthetically, it should be noted that a cogent discussion and resolution of the issue of "name confusion" is extant in First Bank of Hollywood Beach and Office of the Comptroller vs. American Bank of Hollywood, DOAH Case No. 80-1581, opinion filed May 13, 1981. The Applicant has proven that public convenience and advantage will be served by the approval of the application. The Applicant has proven that local conditions indicate a reasonable promise of successful operation for the new bank. DONE and ENTERED this 4th day of April, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of March, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: C. Gary Williams, Esquire Michael J. Glazer, Esquire Post Office Box 391 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Noel Bobko, Esquire Post Office Drawer 2315 Stuart, Florida 33495 James L. S. Bowdish, Esquire Post Office Drawer 24 Stuart, Florida 33494 Walter W. Wood, Esquire Office of the Comptroller The Capitol, Room 1302 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 The Honorable Gerald Lewis Comptroller The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER ================================================================= STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF BANKING AND FINANCE DIVISION OF BANKING IN RE: Application of First Administrative Proceeding American Bank of No. 83-5-DOB Martin County DOAH No. 82-034 / FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND FINAL ORDER Pursuant to Notice, an Administrative Hearing was held before P. Michael Ruff, Hearing Officer, with the Division of Administrative Hearings on October 19 and 20, 1982, in Stuart, Martin County, Florida. The purpose of the hearing was to receive evidence concerning the application of First American Bank of Martin County for authority to open a new bank in Stuart, Martin County, Florida. At the hearing, the parties were represented by counsel: For Applicant, C. Gary Williams, Esquire First American Bank Michael J. Glazer, Esquire of Martin County: Post Office Box 391 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 For Protestant, Noel Bobko, Esquire American Bank of Post Office Drawer 2315 Martin County: Stuart, Florida 33495 For Protestant, James L. S. Bowdish, Esquire First National Bank & Post Office Drawer 24 Trust Co. of Stuart: Stuart, Florida 33494 For the Department of Walter W. Wood, Esquire Banking and Finance: Office of the Comptroller The Capitol, Suite 1302 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Having fully considered the facts and information contained in the record relating to the application of First American Bank of Martin County for authority to organize a corporation for the purpose of conducting banking business in Stuart, Florida, the Comptroller of the State of Florida, as Head of the Department of Banking and Finance, hereby renders the following FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND FINAL ORDER in the above-styled case.
Conclusions The statutory criteria set forth in Chapter 658, Florida Statutes, which were in effect at the time the application was filed, are the standards which govern this application. Chapter 3C-10, Florida Administrative Code, which was in effect at the time the application was filed, contains the rules under which this application was considered. As set forth in Rule 3C-10.051, Florida Administrative Code, when an application for authority to organize and operate a new state bank is filed, it is the applicant's responsibility to prove that the statutory criteria warranting the grant of authority are met. The Department shall conduct an investigation pursuant to Section 658.20, Florida Statutes, which was done in this case, and then approve or deny the application in its discretion. This discretion is neither absolute nor unqualified, but is instead conditioned by a consideration of the criteria listed in Section 658.21, Florida Statutes, wherein it is provided that: The Department shall approve the application if it finds that: Public convenience and advantage will be promoted by the establishment of the proposed state bank or trust company. In determining whether an applicant meets the requirements of this subsection, the department shall consider all materially relevant factors, including: The location and services offered by existing banks, trust companies, trust departments, and trust service offices in the community. The general economic and demographic characteristics of the area. Local conditions indicate reasonable promise of successful operation for the proposed state bank or trust company and those banks, trust companies, trust departments, and trust service offices already established in the primary service area. In determining whether an applicant meets the requirements of this subsection, the department shall consider all materially relevant factors, including: Current economic conditions and the growth potential of the area in which the proposed state bank or trust company intends to locate. The growth rate, size, financial strength, and operating characteristics of banks, trust companies, trust departments, and trust service offices in the service area of the proposed bank. The proposed capital structure is in such amount as the department shall deem adequate, but in no case shall the paid-in capital stock be less than $800,000. In addition to the capital required, every state bank or trust company hereafter organized shall establish: A paid-in surplus equal in amount to not less than 20 percent of its paid-in capital; and A fund to be designated as undivided profits equal in amount to not less than five percent of its paid-in capital. The proposed officers have sufficient banking or trust company experience, ability, and standing, and the proposed directors have sufficient business experience, ability and standing, to indicate reasonable promise of successful operation. The name of the proposed state bank or trust company is not so similar as to cause confusion with the name of an existing financial institution. Provision has been made for suitable quarters at the location in the application. If, in the opinion of the Department, any one of the six foregoing criteria has not been met, and cannot be remedied by the Applicant, it cannot approve the application. An Applicant can, however, take corrective action in most circumstances, to meet the criteria set forth in Sections 658.21(3)(4)(5) or (6), Florida Statutes, if any one of these is found to be lacking. For example, if all other statutory criteria are met, the Applicant may increase capital, or make certain changes in the board of directors, or change the name or alter the provisions for suitable banking house quarters, because these factors are, at least to some degree, within its control. It is the Department's policy to allow applicants to make certain changes to meet these criteria if all other criteria are met; to do otherwise would be to subject applicants to unnecessary red tape. However, it is the Department's position that there is little, if anything, that an applicant can do to alter its ability to meet the criteria set forth in Sections 658.21(1) and (2), Florida Statutes, since the applicants cannot easily change the economic and demographic characteristics of an area. Therefore, if either one or both of these criteria are not met, the Department cannot approve the application. For the purposes of applications for authority to organize and operate a bank, Section 658.12(19), Florida Statutes, defines the primary service area (PSA) as: " . . . the smallest geographical area from which a bank draws, or a proposed bank expects to draw, approximately 75 percent of its deposits; the term also means the smallest geographic area from which a trust company or the trust department of a bank or association draws, or a proposed trust company or a proposed trust department of a bank or association expects to draw, approximately 75 percent of the assets value of its fiduciary accounts." The Applicant's PSA which incorporates portions of the City of Stuart, unincorporated Martin County and a portion of unincorporated Martin County known as Palm City appears to have boundaries delineated around a natural market area. The designated boundaries do not unrealistically exclude competing financial institutions or include areas of concentrated population. The Department concludes that a market exists for the Applicant in the PSA and that the Applicant may reasonably expect approximately 75 percent of its business to arise from the PSA. Consequently, the Department deems that the PSA has been realistically delineated and that the criteria set forth in Section 658.12(19), Florida Statutes, for a realistically delineated PSA has been met. It is the opinion and conclusion of the Department that public convenience and advantage will be promoted by the proposed bank's establishment. Therefore, the criterion in Section 658.21(1), Florida Statutes, is met. As set forth in Rule 3C-10.051(3)(a)(1), Florida Administrative Code, the location and services offered by existing financial institutions in the service area are indicative of the competitive climate of the market. The traffic patterns in the area, as well as the area's general economic and demographic characteristics shall also be considered. Because it is recognized that the establishment of a new bank or trust company anywhere would promote convenience and advantage for at least a few people, substantial convenience and advantage for a significant number of people must be shown; otherwise, a new bank could be justified for every street corner in the state. Clearly such a result was not the legislative intent in regulating entry into the banking industry, nor is it in the public interest. Based upon the facts in the record, the Department has determined that the establishment of the proposed new bank will substantially increase convenience to a significant number of residents and workers of the PSA. The location of the proposed site at a shopping center 0.2 miles from the only bridge from the eastern end of the PSA to the western end makes it convenient to residents, shoppers and commuters. The Department, therefore, concludes that the criteria of public convenience and advantage is met. It is the opinion and conclusion of the Department that local conditions indicate reasonable promise of successful operation for the proposed bank and those already established in the area. Therefore, the criterion in Section 658.21(2) Florida Statutes, is met. As set forth in Section 658.21(2)(a) and (b) , Florida Statutes, and Rule 3C-10.051(3)(b) , Florida Administrative Code, current economic conditions and, to a lesser extent, the growth potential of the area in which the new bank or trust company proposes to locate are important considerations in determining its probable success. Essential to the concept of banking opportunity is that there does and will exist a significant volume of business for which the bank or trust company can realistically compete. The growth rate, size, financial strength, and operating characteristics of financial institutions in the primary service area are also important indicators of economic conditions and potential business. It is noted that the statutory standard requires that: " . . . local conditions indicate reasonable promise of successful operation for the proposed state bank or trust company and those banks . . . already established in the primary service area . . ." Banking involves a public trust. Unlike private enterprise generally, banks operate on the public's capital and therefore, the Legislature has vested in the Comptroller the responsibility of protecting the public interest. Furthermore, the failure of a bank, as opposed to private enterprise generally, may have an unsettling effect on the overall economic welfare of the community, and that is why the Florida Legislature and the United States Congress have imposed stringent requirements for the industry. This Department is responsible for enforcing this legislative standard. Public interest is best served by having a banking system whereby competition is encouraged, where appropriate, yet at the same time, ensuring that the financial resources of the residents of the community are stable and safe. That was the obvious intent of the Legislature in regulating entry into the banking industry. The facts in the record show a significant and growing number of residential developments that are not centrally served by any main office, commercial bank, and no state-chartered banks at present. Thus, a significant number of PSA businesses and residents, especially on the western side of the PSA from the St. Lucie River, can be expected to patronize the proposed bank, insuring that there is a reasonable promise of successful operation. The facts in the record show that the rate of growth in deposits within the PSA exceeded the rate of growth in deposits in Martin County and the rate of deposit growth was more than four times greater than the rate of inflation for the same period. Based upon the above, the Department concludes that local conditions do indicate a reasonable promise of successful operation for the proposed bank and for those financial institutions already established in the area. It is the opinion and conclusion of the Department that the proposed capital structure of the proposed new bank is adequate. Therefore, the criteria of Section 658.21(3) Florida Statutes, is met. Capital should be adequate to enable the new bank or trust company to provide necessary services . . ., including loans of sufficient size, to meet the needs of prospective customers. Capital should be sufficient to purchase, build, or lease a suitable permanent facility complete with equipment. Generally, the initial capital for a new nonmember bank should not be less than $1.0 million in non-metropolitan areas and $1.5 million in metropolitan areas. The capital referred to in the Findings of Fact shall be allocated among capital stock, paid-in surplus, and undivided profits in the ratios set forth in Subsection (3) of Section 658.21, Florida Statutes. The proposed capital accounts of $1.5 million are allocated according to the statutory ratios. It is the opinion and conclusion of the Department that the criteria of Section 658.21(4), Florida Statutes, are met. As set forth in Rule 3C-10.051(3)(d), Florida Administrative Code, the organizers, proposed directors, and officers shall have reputations evidencing honesty and integrity. They shall have employment and business histories demonstrating their responsibility In financial affairs. At least one member of a proposed board of directors, other than the chief executive officer, shall have direct banking or trust company experience. In addition, the organizers, proposed directors and officers shall meet the requirements of Section 658.33, Florida Statutes. Officers shall have demonstrated abilities and experience commensurate with the position for which proposed. Members of the initial management group, which includes directors and officers shall require prior approval of the department. Changes of directors or chief executive officer during the first year of operation shall also require prior approval of the department. While it is not necessary that the names of the proposed officers be submitted with an application to organize a new state bank, the chief executive officer and operations officer must be named and approved at least sixty (60) days prior to the bank's opening. The Department concludes that the proposed directors have, as a group, good character, sufficient financial standing and business histories demonstrating ability and experience commensurate with the positions for which they are proposed and at least one proposed director (other than the chief executive officer) has direct banking experience. It should be noted that interlocking directorships involving existing financial institutions competitively near the proposed site of a new institution are discouraged. Such interlocking directorships could possibly restrict competition and create fiduciary problems. The Department concludes that there is no interlock problem in this instance. It is the opinion and conclusion of the Department that the name of the proposed new bank, First American Bank of Martin County, would not cause confusion with the name of a Florida financial institution. Therefore, the criterion of Section 658.21(5), Florida Statutes, is met. It is the opinion and conclusion of the Department that provisions has been made for suitable banking house quarters in the application's specified area. Therefore, the criterion of Section 658.21(6), Florida Statutes, is met. As set forth in Rule 3C-10.051(3)(f), Florida Administrative Code, permission to open in temporary quarters may be granted, for good cause shown. Under the rules of the Department, the permanent structure of a new bank should contain a minimum of 2,500 square feet, unless the Applicant satisfactorily shows that smaller quarters are justified due to the performance of certain auxiliary services off-premises. In addition, it shall meet the Federal Bank Protection Act requirements and be of sufficient size to handle the projected business for a reasonable period of time. The banking house . . . facility shall be of a nature to warrant customer confidence in the institution's security, stability and permanence. Other pertinent factors include availability to adequate parking, adequate drive-in facility if such is contemplated, and possibilities for expansion. Temporary quarters are not contemplated and Applicant's permanent quarters meet the above standards. Rule 3C-10.051(5), Florida Administrative Code, relating to insider transactions requires that: Any financial arrangement or transaction involving, directly or indirectly, the organizers, directors, officers and shareholders owning 5 percent or more of the stock, or their relatives, their associates or interests must he fair and reasonable, fully disclosed, and comparable to similar arrangements which could have been made with unrelated parties. Whenever any transaction between the proposed bank or trust company and an insider involves the purchase of real property, appraisals of land and improvement thereon shall be made by an independent qualified appraiser, and be dated no earlier than 6 months from the filing date of the application. The Department has determined that there is no insider transaction involving the leasing of the proposed bank's office space. Therefore, the criterion in Rule 3C-10.051(5) Florida Administrative Code, is met. RULING ON PROTESTANTS' EXCEPTIONS Section 120.57(1)(b)12, Florida Statutes, provides as follows: " . . . The agency shall allow each party at least 10 days in which to submit written exceptions to the report." The Department's procedural Rule 3C-9.11, Florida Administrative Code, Post-Evidentiary Procedures, follows the wording of the statute and provides that "the Department shall allow each party 10 days from the date of the hearing officer's report in which to submit written exceptions thereto pursuant to Section 120.57(1)(h) 12, Florida Statutes." The Department interprets that the word "submit" means that the Department must receive the exceptions by the 10th day in the same manner as when documents are required to be filed by a date certain. See Sonny's Italian Restaurant v. State of Florida, 414 So.2d 1156 at 1157. In Sonny's Italian Restaurant v. State, the Third District Court of Appeal in a per curiam decision affirmed a final agency order upon a holding that: "Any error resulting from the entry of the Final Order on July 2, 1981, prior to receipt of Appellant's exceptions to the recommended order, is not material in light of the fact that the exceptions, dated July 6, 1981, were not filed within the requisite 10-day period of Section 120.57(1)(b)8, Florida Statutes, when measured from either the date the recommended order was entered (June 19), or the date submitted to the agency and parties (June 23)." The wording in Section 120.57(1)(b)8, Florida Statutes, concerning the time for filing of exceptions is identical to that of Section (1)(b)12 concerning the filing of exceptions for applications for a license or merger pursuant to Title XXXVIII. The Report of the Hearing Officer, C. Michael Ruff, in this case was done and entered on April 4, 1983, with a cover letter dated April 5, 1983, and was received by the Department on April 6, 1983. A copy of Protestant American Bank of Martin County's exceptions was received by the Department on April 21, 1983. A copy of Protestant First National Bank and Trust Company of Stuart's exceptions were received by the Department on April 19, 1983. The Department deems that all exceptions were untimely filed since the last day to file exceptions with the Department was April 15, 1983. Nevertheless, it has been determined that the exceptions that were untimely received would not have had any effect on the final outcome of this matter.
Findings Of Fact On November 15, 1976, the Outrigger Club, Inc., a Florida corporation, through its president, Ervin Freeman, and its Secretary, Joan Dimon, executed a warranty deed conveying all right, title and interest, in and to certain property located at Northeast 135th Street and Biscayne Boulevard, North Miami, Florida, to Petitioner, Biscayne South, Inc. (hereafter Biscayne South), a Florida corporation. The warranty deed was recorded with the Clerk of the Circuit Court of Dade County, Florida, on November 16, 1976. On November 22, 1976, Biscayne South executed a mortgage deed in favor of Fidelity Mortgage Investors, a Massachusetts business trust, as a second mortgage on the same parcel of land to secure the payment of a promissory note in the principal sum of $1,500,000.00 which note was made by Outrigger Club, Inc., on the same date in favor of Fidelity Mortgage Investors. On November 22, 1976, Outrigger Club, Inc., as the "borrower" executed a future advance agreement with Fidelity Mortgage Investors as "lendor". The future advance agreement provides for the advancement of the sum of $1,500,000.00 to be secured by a prior mortgage dated October 27, 1972, executed by Outrigger Club, Inc., in favor of Fidelity Mortgage Investors, which mortgage provided for future advances. On November 22, 1976, a construction loan and disbursement agreement was executed by the parties thereto which provided that the $1,500,000.00 advance be paid to Miami National Bank as disbursement agent for the benefit of Biscayne South. On November 23, 1976, the mortgage deed and the future advance agreement were recorded in the public records of Dade County, Florida, and on that same date, the warranty deed was rerecorded in the public records of Dade County, Florida. Because the 1.5 million dollars was paid to Miami National Bank to be disbursed for future construction work on a draw-down basis, Outrigger Club, Inc., the grantor, never received the 1.5 million dollars. The warranty deed provides in paragraph 9 thereof that the conveyance is subject to: a second mortgage wherein the Outrigger Club Inc., is mortgagor and the trustees of Fidelity Mortgage Investors, a Massachusetts business trust, is mortgagee, dated the day of November, 1976, which said mortgage is given as additional collateral for payment of certain sums as provided under a settlement and release agreement between the Outrigger Club, Inc., a Florida corporation, and Lawrence F. Lee, Jr., and others as trustees of Fidelity Mortgage Investors, a Massachusetts business trust dated the 16th day of January, 1976. Neither the Department of Revenue nor Biscayne South have introduced evidence to establish that such a mortgage in fact exists or if it did, the value of such mortgage. The only mortgage in evidence is Respondent, Department of Revenue's Exhibit 2, which shows Biscayne South as mortgagor rather than the Outrigger Club, Inc., as recited in the warranty deed. However, the future advance agreement introduced as Respondent's Exhibit No. 3, establishes the existence of a mortgage encumbering the subject property in which the Outrigger Club, Inc., is mortgagor and Fidelity Mortgage Investors is mortgagee. Such mortgage is dated October 27, 1972, and not dated with the month of November, 1976, as recited in paragraph 9 of the warranty deed. As recited in the future advance agreement, the mortgage of October 27, 1972, secured an indebtedness of $7,214,000.00. The mortgage provided that future advances could be made to Outrigger Club, Inc., not to exceed in the aggregate $16,500,000.00. The future advance agreement provides that an additional advance of $1,500,000.00 is to be made to Outrigger Club, Inc., thereby increasing the indebtedness represented by the October 27, 1972, mortgage to the aggregate sum of $8,715,000.00. In other words, the buyer of the property sought to borrow an additional 1.5 million dollars. The lender, in order to achieve priority of lien to secure its loan, treated the funding as an advance against a preexisting mortgage originally binding the seller, but then delivered the 1.5 million dollars directly to Miami National Bank for the benefit of the buyer. Accordingly, the seller never received the proceeds of the loan but rather participated in a "book transaction" for the benefit of the buyer and the lender.
The Issue Whether Respondent violated section 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes, by committing fraud, misrepresentation, concealment, etc., or by violating a duty imposed upon him by law or by the terms of a listing contract and, if so, what is the appropriate penalty; Whether Respondent violated section 475.25(1)(d)1., by failing to timely account or deliver to any person any personal property such as money, funds, deposit, check draft, etc. and, if so, what is the appropriate penalty; and Whether Respondent, a sales associate, registered as an officer, director of a brokerage corporation, or general partner of a brokerage partnership is in violation of Florida Administrative Code Rule 61J2-5.016 and, if so, what is the appropriate penalty.
Findings Of Fact The Department is the state agency charged with regulating the practice of real estate pursuant to section 20.165 and chapters 120, 455, and 475, Florida Statutes. DOAH has jurisdiction, pursuant to section 120.574, to render a decision in this matter, which shall be final agency action subject to judicial review under section 120.68. Mr. Rivas is a licensed real estate sales associate, holding license number 3385508, issued by the State of Florida. Structure of the Brokerage Corporation On or about April 7, 2015, Respondent registered GREH with the State of Florida, Division of Corporations ("Division of Corporations"), identifying himself as the registered agent and manager of GREH. Respondent filed documents on behalf of GREH with the Division of Corporations on the following dates and identified himself with the following titles with GREH: On April 13, 2016, March 14, 2017, and April 17, 2018, Respondent identified himself as the registered agent, managing member, and president; On November 22, 2017, and April 17, 2018, Respondent identified himself as an authorized member; On April 22, 2019, Respondent identified himself as a registered agent, an authorized member, and managing member; On October 23, 2019, Respondent identified himself as registered agent and member; On November 27, 2019, Respondent identified himself as a registered agent, member, and manager; On December 6, 2019, Respondent identified himself as registered agent and shareholder; and On December 10, 2019, Respondent identified himself as registered agent. On March 23, 2017, GREH registered with the Florida Real Estate Commission ("Commission") as a real estate corporation in the State of Florida, having been issued license number CQ 1053189. At no time was Respondent registered with the Commission as a real estate broker in the State of Florida. From November 27, 2017, to October 3, 2019, Mr. Avila, who at that time was a real estate broker in the State of Florida, having been issued license number BK 3401612, was the qualifying broker of GREH. From October 3, 2019, to October 15, 2019, and from November 25, 2019, to December 9, 2019, GREH's license was invalidated due to it not having a qualifying broker. From October 15, 2019, to November 25, 2019, Gamila Murata was the qualifying broker for GREH. From December 9, 2019, to July 29, 2020, Mr. Henson was the qualifying broker for GREH. On August 22, 2019, without the authority of the qualifying broker for GREH, Respondent filed a civil action on behalf of GREH against Arnauld and Annelyn Sylvain (collectively, the "Sylvains") in the Circuit Court of the 15th Judicial Circuit in and for Palm Beach County, Florida, in case number 502019CA008774XXXXMB, seeking, among other things, to recover real estate commissions allegedly claimed due by GREH and Respondent. Respondent subsequently retained attorney Monica Woodard to represent GREH in the civil proceedings, and GREH's complaint was dismissed. On or about November 19, 2019, the Sylvains filed a separate civil action against GREH in the Circuit Court of the 15th Judicial Circuit in and for Palm Beach County, Florida, in case number 502019CC015230XXXXMB, seeking to recover a $10,000.00 escrow deposit. Respondent failed to inform the qualifying broker of record for GREH, Mr. Henson, who assumed that position shortly after the filing of the civil action, of the pending lawsuit. Respondent opened bank accounts on behalf of GREH, including an account called an "Escrow Account," which was controlled by Respondent and at no time was controlled by a qualifying broker for GREH. Respondent deposited escrow funds into the Escrow Account for GREH, without the authority of the qualifying broker for GREH. Respondent closed the Escrow Account held in the name of GREH and removed funds that were to be held in trust from the account without authority of the qualifying broker for GREH. Respondent controlled all communications regarding certain real estate transactions on behalf of GREH, without the knowledge or authority of the qualifying broker for GREH. Contract 1 On or about March 4, 2019, an "AS IS" Residential Contract for Sale and Purchase ("Contract 1") was entered into between the Sylvains, as buyers, and Frederick F. Breault and Evelyn Breault (the "Breaults"), as sellers, for property located at 16595 93rd Road North, Loxahatchee, Florida 33470 ("Subject Property 1"). Respondent facilitated Contract 1 on behalf of the Sylvains. Pursuant to the requirements of Contract 1, the Sylvains deposited $10,000.00 with GREH, to be held in escrow as the initial deposit. The escrow funds were delivered to Respondent in the form of a certified check drawn from SunTrust Bank in the amount of $10,000.00 and purchased by Mr. Sylvain on March 4, 2019 ("SunTrust Certified Check"). The $10,000.00 escrow funds were deposited into a bank account held in the name of GREH. The SunTrust Certified Check was deposited into a bank account over which Respondent had sole control. The GREH account in which the SunTrust Certified Check was deposited was at no relevant time controlled by a Florida licensed real estate broker. Contract 1 provided that the Sylvains had 20 days from the effective date to obtain loan approval ("Loan Approval Period"). Paragraph 18(F) of the Contract provided as follows: TIME: Calendar days shall be used in computing time periods. Time is of the essence in this Contract. Other than time for acceptance and Effective Date as set forth in Paragraph 3, any time periods provided for or dates specified in this Contract, whether preprinted, handwritten, typewritten or inserted herein, which shall end or occur on a Saturday, Sunday, or a national legal holiday (see 5 U.S.C. 6103) shall extend to 5.[:]00 p.m. (where the Property is located) of the next business day. Because 20 days from the effective date fell on a Sunday, the Loan Approval Period expired on Monday, March 25, 2019. Paragraph 8(b)(i) of Contract 1 provided that: "Buyer [the Sylvains] shall ... use good faith and diligent effort to obtain approval of a loan meeting the Financing terms ('Loan Approval') and thereafter to close this Contract." Paragraph 8(b)(v) of the Contract further provided that if neither party timely cancelled the Contract pursuant to paragraph 8, the financing contingency would "be deemed waived." Paragraph 8(b)(vii) finally provided that "[i]f Loan Approval has been obtained, or deemed to have been obtained, as provided above, and Buyer fails to close this Contract, then the Deposit shall be paid to Seller … ." The parties agreed to close Contract 1 by April 10, 2019. The Sylvains did not obtain final loan approval ("clear to close") within the Loan Approval Period. The loan was not denied for any of the exceptions set forth in paragraph 8(b)(vii), to release of the escrow deposit to the seller. The Sylvains did not terminate the contract within the Loan Approval Period. After the Loan Approval Period expired, the Sylvains sought to extend Contract 1, without consideration for the extension. The Breaults countered the Sylvains' request to extend with an offer that an extension would be granted for consideration that the Sylvains agree to forfeit the earnest money deposit. The parties never reached an agreement to extend Contract 1 and Contract 1 failed to close. On or about May 2, 2019, the Sylvains's loan application for Contract 1 was denied. On May 8, 2019, the Breaults executed a Release and Cancellation of Contract demanding release of the $10,000.00 escrow deposit on Contract 1, which Respondent received by email on that date from Betty Khan, the sales associate representing the Breaults. The Sylvains also executed a Release and Cancellation of Contract seeking return of the $10,000.00 escrow deposit on Contract 1, which Respondent communicated to Ms. Khan on May 8, 2019. Also, on May 8, 2019, Respondent informed the Sylvains of the Breaults's claim on the earnest money deposit. Despite knowing that there were conflicting demands for the escrowed funds, Respondent failed to inform Mr. Avila, the qualifying broker for GREH at the time, or the Department, of the escrow dispute. The Breaults were never informed of any escrow dispute filed with the Department, were never sued in relation to the escrow deposit, and never went to mediation or arbitration with regard to the escrow deposit, despite making a demand for the escrow deposit. Respondent claimed that he applied the $10,000.00 escrow funds to another contract under which the Sylvains were buyers. Respondent closed the GREH Escrow Account, removing the $10,000.00 from the account, without consent of either the Sylvains or the Breaults. Contract 2 On or about May 2, 2019, an "AS IS" Residential Contract for Sale and Purchase (Contract 2) between the Sylvains, as buyers, and the Mossuccos, as sellers, for property located at 7584 Apache Boulevard, Loxahatchee, Florida 33470 ("Subject Property 2"). Respondent facilitated Contract 2 on behalf of the Sylvains. In relation to Contract 2, specifically paragraph 2(a), which required an earnest money deposit in the amount of $10,000.00, Respondent requested that the Sylvains provide him a check in the amount of $10,000.00 to show the Mossuccos. On or about May 6, 2019, the Sylvains then drew a check from a business account held with TD Bank in the amount of $10,000.00 and payable to Global Business Financial Investment ("TD Bank Check"), which the Sylvains delivered to Respondent. Respondent took a photograph of the check and promised the Sylvains that the check would not be cashed or deposited. On or about May 6, 2019, Miledy Garcia, now known as Miledy Rivas, Respondent's spouse, a Florida licensed real estate sales associate, having been issued license number SL 3383271, issued an escrow deposit receipt for $10,000.00 for Contract 2 on a GREH form ("May 6, 2019, GREH Receipt"). The TD Bank Check was never deposited or cashed by Respondent; rather, the Sylvains immediately issued a stop payment order on the check to TD Bank. Despite having never deposited the TD Bank Check, Respondent communicated the May 6, 2019, GREH Receipt and a photo of the TD Bank Check to Mrs. Mossucco and Ms. Weintraub. The $10,000.00 escrow funds from Contract 1 were the escrow funds represented on Contract 2. Respondent represented that the $10,000.00 escrow funds were applied to Contract 2, prior to cancellation of Contract 1, and continued to represent the same, even after Respondent knew the Breaults were making a claim against the funds. Contract 2 failed to close. After Contract 2 failed to close, the Mossuccos and Sylvains agreed to cancel Contract 2 and release each other from liability under the terms of Contract 2, and further agreed that any earnest money deposit could be returned to the Sylvains. Respondent failed to deliver the escrow funds to the Sylvains. Rather, Respondent believed that the funds belonged to him (or one of his companies) and that he was entitled to remove the escrow funds and use them as he (or his company) saw fit. Respondent testified that he submitted a notice of escrow dispute, dated "9-30-2019," to the Department, identifying the parties to the transaction as the Mossuccos and the Sylvains, and the subject property as 7584 Apache Boulevard, Loxahatchee, Florida 33470. Respondent gave conflicting testimony, including, for example: First testifying that he believed the $10,000.00 escrow funds belonged to him (or his company) to be spent as he saw fit; then, after a break in the proceedings and on re-direct by his counsel, changing his story by saying that counsel for Petitioner put words in his mouth and that he meant only that there was a "dispute on the funds." First testifying that Mr. Avila was a signatory on the GREH "Escrow Account," then admitting that Mr. Avila was not a signatory on the account. There was also conflicting testimony between Respondent and several of the witnesses; however, where there were inconsistencies, Petitioner's witnesses' testimony was substantially consistent and supported by the documentary evidence presented. Parts of Respondent's testimony were inconsistent with documentary evidence admitted into evidence by stipulation of the parties. Facts Concerning Aggravation or Mitigation of Penalties Respondent collected escrow funds and deposited them into an account that he, only a licensed real estate sales associate, controlled, rather than one that was controlled by the qualifying broker for GREH. Respondent admittedly removed escrow funds in the amount of $10,000.00 from the bank account in which they were deposited, without all parties having a claim to the escrow funds executing a release. Respondent testified that he believed the escrow funds belonged to him (or one of his companies) and that he had a right to do with the funds as he (or he through one of his companies) saw fit. Respondent used vulgar language, threats, and demeaning language toward his clients, other real estate professionals, and title agents to attempt to coerce those individuals into submitting to his demands. Respondent failed and refused to comply with the direction of the qualifying broker with supervisory responsibility over Respondent and GREH. Respondent failed to keep the qualifying broker of GREH apprised of the real estate transactions in which Respondent was involved. There was significant testimony establishing that Respondent was performing tasks that are only allowed to be performed by a licensed real estate broker, not a real estate sales associate, mortgage broker, or mortgage loan originator. Additional Facts Raised by Respondent In his proposed conclusions of law, Respondent raises, as a matter of fact, that the "Department failed to plead sufficient facts underpinning its argument" regarding the handling of escrow funds. In paragraph 25 of his Proposed Final Order, Respondent states: Nowhere in the administrative complaint does the Department allege that Mr. Rivas falsely represented that GREH received the TD Bank Check as earnest money for Contract 2, or that he falsely represented to the Sylvains that the Breaults did not have a legitimate claim against the $10,000.00 escrow funds deposited by the Sylvains toward Contract 1, or that he misrepresented to the Sylvains that the $10,000.00 funds from the SunTrust Certified Check could be and were applied to Contract 2. Respondent further argued that none of the "facts relevant to aggravation or mitigation" set forth in the Department's Proposed Final Order were pled in the A.C., in violation of Respondent's due process rights. Both of these arguments are rejected as set forth in paragraphs 108 and109 below. Additional Facts Concerning Department Costs The Department presented competent evidence that it incurred investigative costs in the amount of $1,551.00.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is currently licensed, and as of the date of the Administrative Charges and Complaint, held license No. HB-0008511 as a mortgage broker and was president and principal broker of Bay Area Financial Services, Inc. He has held such license since November 1979. He sold the business in April 1980 and has reapplied within six months for an individual license. The application was received on May 16, 1980. Pursuant to Rule 3D-40.03(3), Florida Administrative Code, Respondent is treated as a current licensee, and as an applicant. From October 25, 1977, until June 12, 1979, Respondent was employed as vice-president and principal mortgage broker by United Companies Mortgage and Investment of St. Petersburg, Inc., hereinafter UCMI, a mortgage brokerage firm. United Companies Financial Corporation, hereinafter UCFC, is a Louisiana corporation, authorized to do business in Florida. The company engages in the business as a mortgage lender. On August 31, 1978, UCMI by and through its broker, Respondent, made a loan to "James G. Anderson" and "Lorraine Anderson, his wife," and accepted a note in the amount of $14,500.00 made by "James G. Anderson and Lorraine Anderson," together with a first mortgage also made by "James G. Anderson and Lorraine Anderson, his wife," as security for the repayment of the loan. The first mortgage purported to encumber Lot 25, Oak Harbor Subdivision, according to the plat thereof as recorded in Plat Book 5, page 94, Public Records of Pinellas County, Florida. On August 31, 1978, UCMI, for value, assigned the note and mortgage to UCFC. The Respondent has no objection as to the authenticity and genuineness of Exhibit 11, a copy of a contract for sale of real estate which, on its fact, was executed by "James G. Anderson and Lorraine Anderson," as purchasers of certain real property from the seller, Linda Carol Querry, a/k/a L. C. Querry. The document reflects that the purchase price be $18,500.00, payable $100.00 in cash as a deposit, $900.00 cash within twenty-four hours, $4,500.00 additional deposit at time of closing, and $13,000.00 mortgage balance. (Exhibit 2). Anderson acknowledged his signature on this document but has no recollection of signing it. On August 31, 1978, a Notice to Customers, required by federal law, was executed by "James G. Anderson and his wife Lorraine," setting forth the disclosure requirements of Regulation Z. The lender is reflected as UCFC and the broker as UCMI of St. Petersburg. Respondent Hughes executed such document as a witness to the signatures of "Mr. and Mrs. Anderson." On August 31, 1978, a promissory note was executed by "James G. Anderson and Lorraine Anderson" promising to pay UCMI the sum of $14,500.00. (Exhibit 3). On August 31, 1978, a document entitled Consummation of Loan Secured by Real Property, was executed by "James G. Anderson and Lorraine Anderson," as the borrowers. (Exhibit 4). On August 31, 1978, a document entitled Notice to Customer Required by Federal Law was executed by "James G. Anderson and Lorraine Anderson," as the borrowers. (Exhibit 5). On August 31, 1978, a document regarding the loan transaction was executed by "James G. Anderson and Lorraine Anderson," acknowledging receipt of the "Good Faith Estimates," and certain other materials. (Exhibit 6). On August 31, 1978, a Notice to Purchaser-Mortgagor was executed by "James G. Anderson and his wife, Lorraine Anderson" acknowledging receipt of such notice. (Exhibit 7). On August 31, 1978, an Owner's Affidavit was executed by "James G. Anderson and his wife, Lorraine." (Exhibit 8). On August 28, 1978, a loan application was executed by "James G. Anderson" for the $14,500.00 to be secured by a first mortgage. Respondent personally handled the application as indicated on the application itself. (Exhibit 1). On August 31, 1978, check No. 15-39091 was executed by Respondent Hughes, as authorized representative of United Companies, Inc., as payor, to James G. Anderson and Title Consultants, as payees, in the amount of $11,014.58. The check was endorsed by "James G. Anderson and Lorraine Anderson." (Exhibit 10). On August 31, 1978, a Warranty Deed was executed by Linda Carol Querry, a/k/a L. C. Querry, as seller of certain real property to "James G. Anderson and Lorraine Anderson, his wife." Respondent Hughes executed the document as a witness to Linda Querry's signature and execution. The property described in the Warranty Deed is the identical property mortgaged by "James G. Anderson and Lorraine Anderson" to secure the loan from UCMI and UCFC. (Exhibit 13). On August 31, 1978, a Mortgage Deed was executed by "James G. Anderson and Lorraine Anderson, his wife," as mortgagors, to UCMI of St. Petersburg, as mortgagee, as security for the repayment of the loan. Respondent Hughes executed the Mortgage Deed as a witness to the signatures of "Mr. and Mrs. Anderson." (Exhibit 9). On August 31, 1978, UCMI, by and through its principal broker and vice president, Respondent Hughes, assigned the Anderson mortgage and note to UCFC. The applicable Florida law governing this matter is Chapter 494, Florida Statutes (1977), and as amended in the 1978 Supplement, and Chapter 3D- 40, administrative rules regulating mortgage brokerage, Florida Administrative Code. In August 1978, James G. Anderson, who worked in the Sanitation Department of the City of St. Petersburg, also worked part-time repainting houses purchased for resale by Vic Vogel, a speculator. While so employed, Anderson had seen Respondent a few times in the company of Vogel, but had never formally met Respondent. Vogel offered to sell one of these houses to Anderson on terms that would require no down payment by Anderson, who would thereafter make monthly payments similar to the rental payments he was then making. Further, there would be no "red tape" and Anderson would be buying a home rather than renting one. Anderson trusted Vogel, who assured Anderson he would take care of all the details. The house Anderson agreed to buy was on 11th Street and 20th Avenue South in St. Petersburg and was one of the houses Anderson had worked on in his part-time job with Vogel. In the contract to purchase signed by Anderson (Exhibit 11) the block for the legal description of the property is blank. The various other spaces on the form now showing the purchase price, down payment, etc., were blank when signed by Anderson. For several years prior to 1977 Anderson had been living with Lorraine Walker but never held her out as his wife. The signature "Lorraine Anderson" on all exhibits except Exhibit 14, the quitclaim deed from Anderson to United Companies Financial Corporation, were signed by someone other than Lorraine Walker. At the instigation of his attorney, Anderson and Lorraine Walker signed Exhibit 14 to clear up foreclosure proceedings that had been instituted against Anderson. The closing of the sale of property to Anderson took place at the offices of United Companies at 300 S. Duncan Street, Clearwater, Florida on 31 August 1978. Anderson was picked up by Vogel and driven to the closing. Accompanying Vogel was Mike Robertson, an associate of Vogel; Linda Querry, Vogel's girl friend, who signed the deed conveying the property to Anderson; and an unidentified black woman. While awaiting Respondent's arrival for the closing, Vogel took the group to lunch. At the closing, Anderson signed numerous documents and other people, including the black woman who obviously signed "Lorraine Anderson," also signed these documents as witnesses and/or notary. Anderson does not recall having seen Verona Krnjaich, who notarized his signature on the documents he signed at the closing and Ms. Krnjaich does not recall a closing at which Anderson was present. However, she testified that her normal practice is to notarize only documents notarized in her presence, and that she follows this practice at all closings. On the other hand, she has good recall of faces seen at closings but does not believe she ever saw Anderson before this hearing. Anderson testified that he trusted Vogel and signed whatever documents Vogel asked him to sign; that all the documents bearing his signature were blank when he signed them; that he did not know the black woman in the room at the closing or that when she signed these documents she did so in the name of Lorraine Anderson; that the closing took place on the second or third floor of a building just off U.S. 19 between Clearwater and St. Petersburg; that he doesn't know the address of this building but could return to it, and in fact, a few months prior to this hearing, took one of Petitioner's agents to the building where the closing took place; that he received no copy of any document signed by him at the closing; that he thought he was buying a house from Vogel; and that he expected Vogel to notify him after the closing when he could move in and how much he would pay each month. Vogel did not again contact Anderson and apparently has left the area. A few months prior to this hearing Anderson accompanied one of Petitioner's agents to show the agent where the closing occurred. The building to which the agent was taken by Anderson is two-storied and occupied by Ellis National Bank. In August 1978 there was no other occupant of this building and the second floor was unfinished but contained restrooms and some offices occupied by bank employees. Anderson made no cash payment before, at, or after the closing on this house; nor did he ever move into it. The legal description on the deed conveying the property to Anderson is for property located at 626-27th Avenue South, St. Petersburg, Florida, and not for the house at 11th Street and 20th Avenue South which Anderson thought he was buying. After Anderson became delinquent on his mortgage payments Respondent went to Anderson's home one Sunday afternoon demanding payment of the delinquent monthly payments owed by Anderson. The latter told Respondent he hadn't bought any house from the lender, owed no money, and wasn't going to pay. Respondent shortly thereafter turned the case over to the United Companies' attorney, who instituted foreclosure proceedings. When served with these papers Anderson took them to his lawyer. After some of the facts surrounding this transaction became apparent, the assignee of the mortgagee accepted a quitclaim deed to the mortgaged property from Anderson. Lorraine Walker accompanied Anderson to the lawyer's office and signed the quitclaim deed "Lorraine Anderson" (Exhibit 14). The deed signed by L. C. Querry conveying Lot 25 to Anderson (Exhibit 13) conveyed the property to "James G. Anderson and Lorraine Anderson, his wife." Respondent had known Vic Vogel for five or six years prior to August 1977 and had been involved in ten or twelve transactions in which Vogel had picked up distressed property, refurbished it and sold it. Anderson had few debts and readily qualified for the mortgage loan without considering the income of Lorraine or his income from his part-time work. He understood he was buying the house without any down payment, and, in fact, Anderson paid nothing down when he signed the contract and he produced no cash at the closing. The only disbursement made at closing was by the mortgagee, whose check for $11,014.58 (Exhibit 10) was payable to Title Consultants and Anderson. The latter endorsed this check and presumably Title Consultants disbursed to the seller. Closing statements for the buyer and seller were not in the files of UCMI or Title Consultants, nor was a contract to purchase in which the description of the property to be bought was shown. Respondent's witness testified that she reviewed all documents prior to a closing; that she recalls the Anderson transaction; doesn't recall who prepared those documents but believes she typed them; that documents were never signed in blank and the blanks subsequently completed; that she did the credit check on Anderson; and that all documents used in the closing were completed in full before the closing at which they were signed by Anderson and the person signing as Lorraine Anderson. A check with the credit bureau should have disclosed Anderson's marital status as not married and this witness was unable to explain the failure to pick this up when Exhibit 1, the loan application, was verified with the credit bureau. Respondent testified that he recalled the Anderson transaction on 31 August 1978 but later in his testimony stated he did not recall this specific transaction. He believes he followed his usual procedure and explained the various documents to Anderson before the latter signed them. Prior to 1978 he had closed many transactions for UCMI without a contract to purchase having been executed. The loan application is mailed to the main office of United Companies in Baton Rouge, Louisiana and telephonic approval is given by Baton Rouge. Accordingly, it was not unusual for Anderson's loan application to be prepared 28 August 1978, the original mailed to Baton Rouge and approval received in time to close the transaction on 31 August 1978. The contract upon which this house was conveyed, and the closing statements of buyer or seller, were not presented at this hearing. Witnesses testified these documents were missing from the files in which they would be expected to keep. Regardless of this, it is uncontradicted that Anderson made no payment at closing and, if any payment was made prior to closing, any such payment would have been accounted for by the escrow agent. It is also evident that no such accounting was made. By signing a note and mortgage for $14,500.00 Anderson purported to purchase a house for slightly more than $11,000.00, which is the amount of the check endorsed by Anderson at closing and which sum presumably went to the seller. Some $3,000.00 was retained by the lender as prepaid finance charges ($1,567.67) and brokerage fee ($1,545.45). (Exhibit 2.) Accordingly, the mortgage of $14,500 represented approximately 130% of the amount paid for this house. This fact was known, or should have been known, to Respondent, who presumably was representing his principal, UCMI, the lender at this closing. Respondent was paid a fixed salary by UCMI and did not receive additional compensation for each transaction he closed. UCMI suffered a financial loss on the repossession of the house from Anderson and filed suit against Industrial Valley Title Insurance Company (Exhibit 15).
Recommendation From the foregoing it is concluded that Respondent was guilty of concealing material facts from UCMI involving the transaction with Anderson at which UCMI was mortgagee, and that, as a result, UCMI suffered injury. It is therefore RECOMMENDED that Robert E. Hughes' license as a mortgage broker be suspended for a period of six (6) months. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of October 1980. COPIES FURNISHED: Franklyn J. Wollett, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Office of the Comptroller Room 1302, The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301 George W. Greer, Esquire 302 South Garden Avenue Clearwater, Florida 33516 K. N. AYERS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of October 1980.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Respondent, Michael Crudele, should be disciplined for alleged violations of the statutes and rules governing the conduct of insurance agents.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Michael Crudele, is currently eligible for licensure and is licensed in Florida as a life insurance agent and as a life and health insurance agent. The Respondent was the agent-of-record on two American Life and Casualty Insurance Company (American Life) annuities purchased by Mary Clem, one in the face amount of $30,000 dated October 28, 1992, and the other in the face amount of $20,000 dated December 28, 1992. Clem was 84 years old at the time and a widow. The annuities represented more than 80 percent of her life savings. The Respondent became agent-of-record on these annuities at the request of Charles Perks, a good friend and former fellow Metropolitan Life agent. Clem had been an insurance customer of Perks since approximately 1985. When Clem complained to Perks that "the bottom fell out of interest" on her certificates of deposit, he suggested the American Life annuities as a safe alternative that paid higher interest. But Perks was not an authorized agent for American Life, so he asked the Respondent to participate in the sales and split the commissions. In 1992, the Respondent became involved in the Zuma Engineering Co., Inc., a startup tire recycling venture. After being introduced to Zuma, the Respondent became very enthusiastic about its prospects. He invested $30,000 in Zuma, received stock in return for his investment, and became a thirty percent owner. He also became involved in all aspects of the startup business, from promoting the business to the public, to raising capital from and working with private investors, to cleaning up Zuma's recycling facility. He understood that he was a corporate director, but corporate filings with the Secretary of State indicate that he was a vice-president from October 27, 1993, until March 20, 1994. The Respondent not only solicited investors himself, he participated in recruiting a sales force. As part of this effort, he recruited his friend Charles Perks. In late 1993 and early 1994, Perks and the Respondent approached Mary Clem to solicit her investment in Zuma. It is not clear from the evidence how the solicitation of Mary Clem proceeded. It is believed that Clem may have initially contacted Perks around the time of the anniversary date of the $30,000 annuity to complain that she had been notified of a drop in the interest rate paid by the annuity. Mary Clem received a guaranteed 5.75 percent interest, plus a one percent interest "bonus" for a total of 6.75 percent interest during the first year of her two American Life annuities. The "bonus" interest automatically terminated at the end of the first year. In addition, the evidence was that the standard interest guarantee decreased to five percent starting with the second year. It is not clear when Clem received notice of the decrease in the interest guarantee or whether she received notice from American Life as to the elimination of the interest "bonus," but it is found that by December 2, 1993, Clem knew the interest rate on her $30,000 annuity was being decreased to five percent for the second year of the annuity. It is possible that she also knew by then that the interest on her $20,000 annuity was being decreased to five percent as well. Perks saw Mary Clem's dissatisfaction with the American Life annuities as an opportunity to sell Zuma promissory notes to her. On or about December 2, 1993, Charles Perks approached Mary Clem and sold her a $10,000 promissory note issued by Zuma. On its face, the promissory note was dated December 3, 1993, and paid twelve percent interest, with a single balloon payment of principal and interest due on June 3, 1995. The evidence was that the Respondent did not participate in this transaction on December 2, 1993. Mary Clem does not recall, and both Perks and the Respondent testified that the Respondent was not present. The Respondent testified that he was not even aware of this $10,000 Zuma note until the Department's Order of Emergency Suspension and Administrative Complaint on or about July, 1996, but this testimony is rejected as not being credible. It is found that the Respondent knew about Clem's purchase of the $10,000 promissory note either on December 2, 1993, or soon thereafter. It is found that by December 2, 1993, or shortly thereafter, Clem complained to both Perks and the Respondent about the interest on her annuities. It is found that all three of them discussed Zuma promissory notes as an alternative investment. Contrary to the Respondent's testimony, it is found that, if he did not already know about Clem's purchase of the $10,000 Zuma promissory note by then, the Respondent would have learned of the $10,000 Zuma promissory note during these discussions. It also is found that, based on those discussions, Clem decided to surrender her $20,000 annuity and use the money to buy Zuma promissory notes. It is found that Perks and the Respondent helped Clem with the surrender of her $20,000 annuity. It also is found, contrary to the Respondent's testimony, that Perks and the Respondent assisted in arranging for Clem to be able to purchase a Zuma promissory note in the face amount of $20,000 for the net cash surrender value of the $20,000 annuity, after deduction of premium tax and surrender penalty. When American Life was notified of Clem's desire to surrender the $20,000 annuity, the company contacted the Respondent and asked him to "conserve" the annuity, i.e., dissuade Clem from surrendering it. It is found that, if he did not already know about it by then, the Respondent would have learned of Clem's intentions to buy Zuma promissory notes when he contacted her on behalf of American Life to comply with American Life's request that he attempt to conserve the annuity. It also is found that, if he did not already know about Clem's purchase of the $10,000 Zuma promissory note, he would have learned of the $10,000 Zuma promissory note at this time. By letter dated January 24, 1994, American Life responded to Clem's request to surrender her $20,000 annuity. American Life's letter advised Clem that she was entitled to principal and $69.67 in interest, less premium tax in the amount of $213.69 and surrender charges in the amount of $1,625.65, for a net of $18,230.33. A check for the net amount was enclosed. A copy of American Life's January 24, 1994, letter was sent to the Respondent as the agent-of-record. On or about February 1, 1994, Perks and the Respondent went to Clem's home to complete the purchase of a $20,000 Zuma promissory note. The Respondent testified that, since all of the arrangements had been made in advance, the Respondent's role in the transaction was solely as "corporate director and verifier" on behalf of Zuma; however, the Respondent also would receive $900 of the $2,000 commission paid by Zuma on the transaction. Meanwhile, his additional role as American Life's agent required him to attempt to "conserve" the annuity policy. At one point, the Respondent testified that, as "corporate director and verifier," he inquired into Clem's assets (presumably to ascertain if the investment was appropriate for her). But he also testified that he assumed her assets were unchanged from 1992, raising a question as to whether the Respondent undertook any inquiry into Clem's assets on February 1, 1994, at all. At another point, the Respondent testified that he understood Mary Clem to have $200,000 in assets. See Department Exhibit 6. But, if so, those assets consisted of her home, the annuities and the $10,000 Zuma promissory note. It is found that the Respondent had no reason to believe she had any other assets. The Respondent also testified that he did not determine from his alleged inquiry into Clem's assets, and did not know, that Clem already had purchased a $10,000 Zuma promissory note. As previously found, it is considered incredible that the Respondent did not already know by February 1, 1994, that Clem had purchased the $10,000 Zuma promissory note; it is all the more incredible that he would not have learned of it from a diligent inquiry into Clem's assets for purposes of determining the appropriateness of the $20,000 Zuma investment. Mary Clem testified that the Respondent and Perks touted the safety of the Zuma investment as well as the higher interest it paid. The Respondent testified that, although acting in the conflicting roles described in the preceding finding, he discussed the differences between the two investments, including the risk of the Zuma investment. The Respondent testified that he read to Mary Clem from a written disclosure statement that defined Zuma's promissory notes as being a "risk investment," but no written disclosure statement was introduced in evidence. In any event, the "verification" was a mere formality; as the Respondent knew full well, Clem already had decided to buy the promissory note. Clem wrote a personal check in the amount of $18,230, and Perks and the Respondent gave her Zuma's $20,000 promissory note bearing twelve percent interest. The note was erroneously dated February 1, 1993, and erroneously stated on its face that the single balloon payment of principal and interest was due on February 1, 1995. The note was supposed to have a 24- month term from February 1, 1994, to February 1, 1996. (This discrepancy would lead to problems later. See Findings 32-33, infra.) In view of the conflict of interest inherent in the Respondent's multiple roles in the transaction, it is found that the Respondent did not make a good faith inquiry into appropriateness of the Zuma investment for Mary Clem and did not fully disclose the risk associated with it, as compared to the American Life annuity. If the Respondent disclosed the risk, it is found that he did not do so fully and clearly, again probably due to the conflict of interest inherent in his multiple roles. Neither Mary Clem nor her late husband had ever invested in any stocks, mutual funds or even bonds. Before Mary Clem invested in the American Life annuities, she and her late husband always invested in certificates of deposit. While it is true that Clem wanted higher interest than she was getting on her annuities, she also wanted safety and security. It is found that, if the Respondent had fully and completely disclosed the risk of investing in Zuma promissory notes, Mary Clem would not have invested in them. Mary Clem also surrendered her $30,000 American Life annuity and used the money she received to buy another Zuma promissory note. The Respondent claimed not to have known anything about the third Zuma note, and the Department was not able to prove that he did. It is not clear exactly when Clem decided to surrender her $30,000 annuity and buy a third Zuma note. It was before March 3, 1994, the date of the American Life letter responding to Clem's request to surrender her $30,000 annuity. American Life's letter advised Clem that she was entitled to principal and $16.04 in interest, less premium tax in the amount of $324.71 and surrender charges in the amount of $2,474.92, for a net of $27,216.41. A check for the net amount was enclosed. As with Clem's request to surrender her $20,000 annuity, American Life contacted the Respondent and asked him to try to "conserve" the annuity. The Respondent also received a copy of American Life's March 3, 1994, letter as the agent-of- record. The Respondent admitted that he telephoned Clem on or about February 28, 1994, to try to conserve the annuity but that Clem was adamant. He claimed that Clem did not tell him what she intended to do with the money and that he did not ask. The meeting at which Clem bought the third Zuma promissory note took place on March 10, 1994. Mary Clem thought the Respondent was there but could not swear to it. Perks also testified that he thought the Respondent was there. The Respondent testified that he definitely was not there and did not know the transaction took place. By that time of the meeting on March 10, 1994, the Respondent had become suspicious and distrustful of Zuma's principals. They had diluted his thirty percent share of the company to a mere 0.3 percent. In addition, the Respondent did not think that the principals were following the business plan they had "sold" the Respondent, and which the Respondent in turn had "sold" to private investors, including Mary Clem. By early March 1994, the Respondent began to take steps to attempt to protect the investors in Zuma, including himself, and force Zuma to follow its business plan. Eventually, he emptied Zuma's accounts and placed the funds in the trust account of the lawyers he hired to sue Zuma and its principals to enjoin them to follow the business plan. The court ruled against the Respondent and required him to return the money to Zuma. The Respondent paid his lawyers' fees out of his own pocket. Based on the timing of events, it seems probable that the Respondent did not meet with Perks and Clem on March 10, 1994. By that time, he was becoming deeply involved in his dispute with Zuma and its principals. It is less clear that the Respondent was completely ignorant of Clem's intention to use the money from the surrender of the $30,000 American Life annuity to buy a third Zuma note, but he may well have lost track of Mary Clem and her intentions in the midst of his dispute with Zuma and its principals. It had been arranged before the March 10, 1994, meeting for Clem to be able to purchase a Zuma promissory note in the face amount of $30,000 for the net cash surrender value of the $30,000 annuity, after deduction of premium tax and surrender penalty. The Respondent denied participating in making these arrangements or having any knowledge of them. A similar arrangement already had been made for the $20,000 annuity and Zuma note, and it is conceivable that Perks did not require the Respondent's participation to arrange it for the $30,000 annuity and Zuma note. It is found that the evidence did not prove the Respondent's participation. On March 10, 1994, Clem wrote a personal check in the amount of $27,2126.41, and received Zuma's $30,000 promissory note dated March 10, 1994. On its face, the note paid twelve percent interest, with quarterly payments of $900 interest and the principal payable on March 10, 1996. The Respondent contacted Mary Clem in June or July, 1994, to inquire about her Zuma investment. Clem told him everything was fine. In December 1994, the notes were revised to show Mary Clem's daughter as a beneficiary on the notes in the event of Clem's death. The revised $20,000 note preserved the erroneous issuance and due dates. See Finding 21, supra. The $900 interest payment due on the $30,000 Zuma note on March 1995, was seriously past due. In addition, no payments were made on the $20,000 note. On April 1, 1995, the $20,000 note was renewed upon payment of $6,200 interest and penalties. Under the renewal note, monthly interest payments of $200 were due, and a balloon payment of principal and remaining interest was due on September 1, 1995. By mid-1995, Zuma was in default again, and Clem received no payments after August 8, 1995. Zuma paid Clem a total of just $23,400 on the three promissory notes. The Respondent conceded that there was a high risk of losing one's entire investment in Zuma and that someone investing in Zuma had to be prepared to lose the entire investment. He also conceded that Mary Clem should not have invested the bulk of her life savings in Zuma. He also conceded that it would have been significant to know, and he should have wanted to know, the extent of Clem's investment in Zuma before increasing her investment in Zuma.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Insurance enter a final order: (1) finding the Respondent, Michael Crudele, guilty of violating Sections 626.611(7), 626.621(3), and 626.621(6), Florida Statutes (1993); and (2) suspending his license and eligibility for licensure as a life insurance agent and as a life and health insurance agent for six months. RECOMMENDED this 6th day of January, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of January, 1998.
The Issue Is Petitioner entitled under Section 57.111(4), Florida Statutes, to attorney's fees and costs incurred in DOAH Case No. 97-5194?
Findings Of Fact Outcome of Prior Administrative Proceeding Thomas A. Birkhead, d/b/a Century Center ("Birkhead," "Mr. Birkhead, or the "business") is a business in the form of a sole proprietorship. On August 4, 1997, the Division of Hotels and Restaurants (the "Division") served the business with a Notice to Show Cause. Seven weeks or so earlier, on June 13, 1997, the business had been served with an Emergency Order of Suspension. The Emergency Order suspended the business's license to operate a public lodging establishment in Cocoa Beach, Florida, as a nontransient rooming house. The license, bearing number 15-04001 H, had been issued to Mr. Birkhead by the Division. Mr. Birkhead requested a hearing on both the Emergency Order and the Notice to Show Cause. The request was referred to DOAH and assigned Case No. 97-5184. Unlike this case for fees and costs in which Mr. Severs has appeared in behalf of Mr. Birkhead, at no time during the pendency of DOAH Case No. 97-5184 did any attorney, including Mr. Severs, file a notice of appearance or appear in any capacity on behalf of Mr. Birkhead. The hearing held in April and June of 1998 (at which Mr. Birkhead appeared pro se) culminated in a Recommended Order issued October 1, 1998. The order recommended that the Notice to Show Cause be dismissed but that the Emergency Order be sustained. On May 14, 1998, the Division issued a Final Order. The Order makes no mention of Mr. Birkhead having been represented in any capacity other than pro se in post-recommended order proceedings. In acceptance of the advice of the Recommended Order, the Division dismissed the Notice to Show Cause. As for the recommendation with regard to the Emergency Order the final order stated: The Emergency Order of Suspension was a final order of the Division and subject to judicial review pursuant to section 120.60(6) and 120.68, Florida Statutes, not administrative review. Thus, the part of Birkhead's request for formal administrative review that pertained to the issuance of the Emergency Order of Suspension should have been dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Final Order, page 9, Paragraph 16. Accordingly, the Division ordered that "Birkhead's Motion to Dismiss is hereby granted and the request for formal administrative review of the Emergency Order of Suspension is hereby dismissed." Final Order, page 10. Attorney's Fees and Costs When Case No. 97-5184 was initiated, Mr. Severs had long represented Mr. Birkhead as an attorney in various matters. His normal billing rate during the life of the case was $175 per hour. Although Mr. Severs did not appear as attorney of record in the administrative case, from the time the Emergency Order of Suspension was issued in June of 1997, through the issuance of the Final Order by the Department in Case No. 97-5184, Mr. Severs provided legal services to Mr. Birkhead. Some of the services were related to the administrative case; some were related to other matters. The fees for these services, related or unrelated, totaled $14,929.95, according to the petition filed in this case. An affidavit by Mr. Severs, attached to the petition, showed that only $4,860 of that amount was related to the administrative case. The related services were performed on at least fifteen occasions. Principally these included review and/or drafting of documents and consultation with regard to the reviewed or drafted documents. Mr. Severs' records demonstrate that at least 32.4 hours were expended in the performance of legal services related to Case No. 97-5184. (There were many telephone consultations not included in these hours because Mr. Severs moved from one firm, to his own firm, to the Titusville City Hall, where he is now the full-time City Attorney for the City of Titusville. Because of these transitions, phone records became unavailable.) At an hourly rate of $150 (the rate requested by Petitioner for this case, $25 below Mr. Severs' normal rate), total attorney's fees for 32.4 hours come to $4,860.00. These fees are reasonable. Court reporter costs in defending this action incurred by Mr. Birkhead totaled $478.50. He paid an expert witness fee in the amount of $200 to an engineer who testified in the proceeding. In addition, there were subpoenas for documents of $42; publications, such as the Fire Safety Manual 101, necessary to purchase in order to defend the case, in the amount of $49.35; photocopies of $48.10; office supplies of $56.12; postage and postage stamps of $173.52; and copier maintenance of $605.13. These costs total: $1,655.72. Mr. Birkhead also claimed additional costs of more than $10,000 used to maintain and operate the closed Century Center as an office for the duration of the administrative case. Mr. Birkhead explained this claim at hearing: The building that I was in there using as an office [Century Center] was shut down by the Division, so I could do nothing with it, except just work out of there myself to prepare this case, to work on the case. So, what I have given here is the direct charges of -- you know, that were during the time period for electricity and so forth. (Tr. 25). In addition to electricity, this sum includes charges for telephone, sanitation, pest control, water and sewer and fire extinguisher maintenance. Small Business Party The business's claim for attorney's fees and costs is filed under the authority of Section 57.111, Florida Statutes, a provision of the Florida Equal Access To Justice Act (the "Act.") Section 57.111(3)(d), Florida Statutes, of the Act defines the term "small business party," in pertinent part as: A sole proprietor of an unincorporated business . . . whose principal office is in this state, who is domiciled in this state, and whose business . . . has, at the time the action is initiated by a state agency, not more than 25 full-time employees or a net worth of not more than $2 million including both personal and business investments. . . Mr. Birkhead is the sole proprietor of the business, Thomas A. Birkhead, d/b/a Century Center. The business is unincorporated. Its principal office is in Florida. Mr. Birkhead is domiciled in Florida and his business has less than 25 full-time employees. The only criterion left in order for Thomas A. Birkhead, d/b/a Century Center to qualify as a small business party is net worth. Is Mr. Birkhead's net worth "not more than $2 million including both personal and business investments . . ."? Net Worth Mr. Birkhead's undocumented testimony that his personal net worth and that of the business was less than two million dollars was not rebutted by any evidence offered by the Division. Cross examination revealed that Birkhead's net worth in June of 1997 was certainly in excess of $1.5 million. How much in excess could not be determined because his calculation of net worth was anything but precise as shown from Mr. Birkhead's testimony: Q What is the value of the hotel located across the street from the Century Center? A The value of the hotel at that time, I believe was one and a half million dollars . . . Q What portion of the hotel did you own? A Um? Q What portion of the hotel did you own? A Two thirds. Two thirds of the stock. * * * Q . . . And what was the Century Center worth [in June of 97]? * * * A Well, I had a mortgage against it for two hundred and some thousand dollars. I gave, I believe, five hundred something. So, five hundred and something minus two, whatever it was, forty or fifty thousand, two hundred and thirty five or forty thousand. It would leave three hundred thousand dollars. Q . . . Your testimony is that you've had an equity in the Century Center of three hundred thousand dollars? A That was my intention, to say that. Yes. I subtracted out in my mind the mortgage that I had against the property, versus what I had paid for it. Q And when did you purchase it? A I purchased it . . .in 1990. Q But you don't . . . know what the value was in 1997? A Not at the Century Center. * * * Q . . . What other properties did you own, besides the Century Center, the hotel and the condo in Cape Canaveral? A I own my house. Q How much is it worth? A Well I paid sixty five thousand for it, I believe. It's probably worth a little bit more than that now. * * * JUDGE: When did you buy it? * * * WITNESS: When did I buy it? I bought it in -- let's see. Twenty five years ago or more. * * * Q Was there any other property that we didn't cover so far that you owned at that time? A Let me think a little bit. Yeah. I've got one in Cape Canaveral. It's an empty lot up there. I think I paid very little for it. I bought it because it was cheap. It's the only reason I've still got the thing. I think I gave eighteen hundred dollars for it or something like that. It think it would be worth more than that now. I don't know exactly what it would be worth. Try to sell it. These lots go up, you know, they might be worth fifteen to twenty thousand dollars. I can't -- I can't give you an exact figure on that. JUDGE: When did you buy it? * * * A . . . April of 1967, I believe. * * * JUDGE: . . . What Mr. Biggins is getting at is he wants to know about all our your personal and business investments and what their . . . net worth is. And you said you made a list and you went through and you figured this out. WITNESS: Say what? JUDGE: You said that you figured this out before you filed this motion for attorney's fees . . . WITNESS: Yeah. I called and got the figures as to what I had in June of '97. And I looked at, you know, statements that I had, and this that and the other thing, and added it all up. . . Some of the things, like I say, are joint with my wife. JUDGE: Yes, sir. But what were those things? That's what I want to know. You say you did this calculation. You got together all this information. Now, what information was it and what did the information show? WITNESS: Well, it showed the value of the things that I had in June of '97. JUDGE: And what were those things? What information did you obtain? WITNESS: Well, bank accounts, stock brokers, whatever I could, you know, had money in. JUDGE: . . . What was the value of the bank accounts? WITNESS: Not a whole lot. I don't think I probably had over -- I'm guessing a little bit now. You know, three or four thousand dollars. JUDGE: How about stock? WITNESS: Um? JUDGE: Stock? WITNESS: Stock, what? JUDGE: Equities. WITNESS: Um? JUDGE: Equities? New York Stock Exchange? WITNESS: Well, my stock is largely in a joint account with my wife. And . . . JUDGE: . . . You have control of it? WITNESS: Um? JUDGE: You have control of it? WITNESS: Well, either one of us could be called in control. It's joint . . . with right of survivorship. JUDGE: . . . Did you include the value of that stock in this calculation you did? WITNESS: I believe I did. Yes sir. JUDGE: . . . And what was the value of that stock? WITNESS: I can't recall, Your Honor, exactly what it was. JUDGE: Well, we've been . . . dealing with approximations here. So, do your best. WITNESS: Well, it's a joint account. JUDGE: And what's the value of the account? WITNESS: . . . I think it's somewhere in the neighborhood of probably seventy five or a hundred thousand dollars. JUDGE: And you can't do any better than that? WITNESS: Um? JUDGE: You can't pinpoint it any more than that, a twenty five thousand dollar swing? WITNESS: I can't to be honest with you, Your Honor . . . (Tr. 38-50). Mr. Birkhead's testimony also revealed that he owned two "low priced condos in Cape Canaveral" (Tr. 36) held as rental property. At the time he purchased them, Mr. Birkhead "gave twenty four thousand and change for them." Id. Asked when they were purchased, Mr. Birkhead replied, "I'm not sure. Before 1997." When asked to approximate when they were purchased, Mr. Birkhead testified, "Five, ten years. I don't know." Id.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Hearing Officer recommends that the Florida Real Estate Commission suspend the license of Gracia Wittmack, t/a Leeside Realty, for a period of one (1) year. DONE and ORDERED this 27th day of July, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 APPENDIX The Respondent, Gracia Wittmack, t/a Leeside Realty, filed a Proposed Recommended Order in this case. This Proposed Recommended Order has been considered and the following findings are made regarding its contents: The findings of paragraphs 1, 3(1)(2) and 4 of the Proposed Recommended Order are included in the Hearing Officer's statement of the case in the Recommended Order. The findings of paragraph 2 of the Proposed Recommended Order is paragraph 1 of the Findings of Fact in the Recommended Order. The findings of paragraphs 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11 in the Proposed Recommended Order are contained in paragraph 2 of the Recommended Order. That portion of paragraph 21 of the Proposed Recommended Order which states that no evidence was introduced refuting Wittmack's and Markowski's testimony regarding deposit of the funds is irrelevant in light of the affirmative finding of paragraph 2 of the Recommended Order that the $500 was deposited to Wittmack's escrow account. The findings of paragraphs 12, 13 and 14 of the Proposed Recommended Order are contained in paragraph 3 of the Recommended Order. The findings of paragraphs 15, 16 and 18 of the Proposed Recommended Order are contained in paragraph 4 of the Recommended Order. The findings of paragraphs 17, 19 and 20 of the Proposed Recommended Order are contrary to the testimony of the Bertzels who knew that the contract contained a no zoning contingency clause. Although Markowski stated he didn't realize the clause had been deleted, he recognized the contract date September 13 1976 as a binding contract. Further, no misunderstanding of the parties would be a basis for releasing Wittmack from her fiduciary duties after demand was made for the funds. The findings of paragraph 22 of the Proposed Recommended Order are irrelevant in light of the findings of paragraphs 2, 3 and 6 regarding the deposit of the $500 to and its removal from Wittmack's escrow account. The findings of paragraph 23 of the Proposed Recommended Order are contained in paragraph 3 of the Recommended Order. The findings of paragraph 24 of the Proposed Recommended Order are rejected in light of the findings contained in paragraph 3 and 6 of the Recommended Order. The findings of paragraph 25 of the Proposed Recommended Order are rejected as being relevant in light of the Hearing Officer's findings that regardless of what escrow account the funds were deposited, they were removed and were not delivered to the Bertzels. The findings of paragraph 26 of the Proposed Recommended Order are contained in paragraphs 3 and 6, and paragraph 7 above, which find that the funds were held in escrow. The name of the account and its location is irrelevant. The record, Exhibit 8, reflects at least a $500 balance at all times in that account until the account was closed. The records of the opening of the Dadeland account were not introduced. But for the Respondent's admission that she removed the money and credited Tri-Sailing's account and the collaborative testimony of Markowski that this occurred, there would be no evidence of the alleged violation of removing the escrowed funds. The findings of paragraph 27 of the Proposed Recommended Order are contained in paragraph 7 of the Recommended Order. COPIES FURNISHED: Bruce I. Kamelhair, Esquire Florida Real Estate Commission 2699 Lee Road Winter Park, Florida 32789 Alan J. Kluger, Esquire Myers, Kaplan, Levinson & Kenin Brickell Executive Tower 1428 Brickell Avenue Miami, Florida 33131
Findings Of Fact During 1984 Philip Dennis on his own behalf and on behalf of Medi Fund Inc. negotiated in Florida with William Kickliter for the purpose of arranging a mortgage loan. During those negotiations Respondent Dennis represented to Kickliter that both he and Respondent Medi Fund, Inc., were mortgage brokers licensed by the State of Florida. In his stated capacity as a mortgage broker, Respondent Dennis drafted and entered into an agreement with Kickliter whereby Kickliter would obtain a mortgage loan from Respondent Medi Fund, Inc., for financing an ongoing business. Respondent Dennis signed the agreement between Kickliter and Respondent Medi Fund, Inc., pursuant to which Kickliter gave to Respondent Dennis a refundable advance fee of $1,500 by check made payable to Respondent Medi Fund, Inc. No mortgage loan was ever consummated. When Kickliter made demand on Respondent Dennis for the return of his monies, Respondent Dennis sent to Kickliter a post-dated check for only $850 with a notation on that check that it was allegedly for full payment of the refundable advance fee. When Kickliter deposited that check, the check "bounced." Respondent Dennis then stopped payment on the check. Kickliter's refundable advance fee has never been refunded to him by either Respondent Dennis or Respondent Medi Fund, Inc. In 1983 Respondent Dennis negotiated in Florida with Robert N. Goldstein to secure financing so that Goldstein's company Hospitality Consultants, Inc., could acquire a hotel. Respondent Dennis drafted and presented to Goldstein and Goldstein's partner Thomas Palumbo an agreement between Respondent Dennis and Hospitality Consultants, Inc., whereby Respondent Dennis would seek mortgage funding for the corporation. In that agreement Respondent Dennis designated himself as "the broker", a designation which matched his oral representations to Goldstein that he was a mortgage broker licensed in the State of Florida. Respondent Dennis executed that agreement on March 11, 1983, on his own behalf. In 1985 Respondent Dennis negotiated in Florida with Bryan Miller of Deco Redevelopment Corp. to secure real estate mortgage loan financing for hotels located in Miami Beach. Respondent Dennis on behalf of Respondent Medi Funds Inc., drafted an agreement whereby Respondent Medi Funds Inc. would secure financing for real estate renovation and new construction of a hotel complex to be built in Miami Beach. Respondent Dennis entered into that agreement on behalf of Respondent Medi Fund Inc. Pursuant to, that agreement, Miller paid to Respondent Dennis on behalf of Respondent Medi Funds Inc., the sum of $5,000 as a refundable advance fee. Neither Respondent Dennis nor Respondent Medi Funds Inc. has arranged any mortgage loan to Deco Redevelopment Corp. Furthers the $5,090 Refundable advance fee paid to Respondents Dennis and Medi Fund Inc. has never been refunded. In 1985 Respondent Dennis while in Florida negotiated with Millie Bulkeley of Arizona for mortgage loan financing for a mobile home park in Arizona. Thereafter Respondent Dennis drafted and entered into an agreement with Bulkeley whereby Respondent Medi Fund Inc., would secure real estate financing for her. Pursuant to that agreement Bulkeley deposited into Respondent Dennis's bank account in New York $20,000 as a refundable advance fee. No financing was ever secured for the project by Respondent Dennis or Respondent Medi Fund Inc. and the refundable advance fee has never been refunded. During 1983, 1984, and 1985 Respondent Dennis represented himself as being an officer of Respondent Medi Fund Inc. and misrepresented to persons both orally and in writing that both Respondent Dennis and Respondent Medi Fund, Inc., were mortgage brokers licensed by the State of Florida. During the time period of December 1982 up to and including May 2, 1986, neither Respondent Dennis nor Respondent Medi Fund, Inc., has been a licensed mortgage broker. By Order entered April 16, 1986, in this cause Petitioner was awarded certain costs against Respondent Medi Funds Inc., as a result of Medi Fund, Inc.'s, refusal to engage in discovery. Those reasonable costs are $45 for the attendance of the court reporter, $318.10 for the travel expense incurred by Petitioner's attorney, and $1,275 as an attorney's fee for Petitioner's attorney. The Order of April 16, 1986, also required Respondent Medi Funds Inc. to return to Petitioner the witness fee and mileage fee paid to it before its non-appearance at its scheduled deposition.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered finding Respondents Philip Dennis and Medi Fund, Inc., guilty of the allegations contained within the Cease and Desist Order filed herein ordering Respondents Dennis and Medi Fund, Inc. to forthwith and immediately cease and desist from any further violations of Chapter 494, Florida Statutes, requiring Medi Funds Inc. to return to the State of Florida the witness fee and mileage paid to it pursuant to the April 16, 1986 Order entered herein and requiring Respondent Medi Funds Inc. to pay to the State of Florida the sum of $1,638.10, as further required by the April 16, 1986 Order entered herein. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 29th day of August 1986 at Tallahassee Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of August, 1986. COPIES FURNISHED: Gerald Lewis, Comptroller State of Florida The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Deborah Hoffman, Esquire Thomas E. Glick Esquire Office of Comptroller 401 N.W. 2nd Avenue, Suite 870 Miami Florida 33128 Philip Dennis 2124 Northeast 167 Street North Miami Beach, Florida 33160 Medi Funds Inc., a Florida Corporation c/o Philip Dennis 2124 Northeast 167 Street North Miami Beach, Florida 33160
