The Issue The issue is whether Respondent engaged in prohibited discriminatory conduct against Petitioners, Irene Cassermere (Ms. Cassermere) and Milagross Diaz (Ms. Diaz), within the terms and conditions, privileges, or provisions of services or facilities in the sale or rental of real property in violation of Section 760.23, Florida Statutes (2002).
Findings Of Fact Ms. Diaz is a female of Hispanic ethnicity with a physical disability that limits one or more of her major life activities. At all times material, she lived in the State of New York. Ms. Diaz was in Florida during the month of February 2002. On February 20, 2002, she completed an application for lot rental in the Sherwood Forrest Mobile Home Park (Sherwood Forest) with the intent to purchase a mobile home located on a rental lot at 216 London Drive, Kissimmee, Florida, owned by Beth Koze (Ms. Koze), who did not testify. Respondent informed Ms. Diaz that her credit check would be completed within a couple of days to ascertain her income and credit history. It was her understanding that Respondent had no interest in the potential purchase transaction between her and Ms. Koze. However, Respondent explained to Ms. Diaz, that ownership of a mobile home at the time of application was not required in order to be approved. According to Ms. Diaz, Respondent eventually informed her that due to insufficient income shown on her application she had been disapproved for lot rental. Ms. Diaz testified that Respondent informed her that she needed approximately twice the amount of her reported monthly income to qualify for lot rental approval. Thereafter, Ms. Diaz submitted a second lot rental application to Respondent. On the second application, Ms. Diaz included a co-applicant, Ms. Cassermere, who intended to relocate to Florida with her when the mobile home purchase and the lot rental application were completed. No monthly income for Ms. Cassermere was included on the lot rental application. On the second lot rental application, Ms. Diaz testified that she listed her "Occupation of Applicant" as "disabled." In the column regarding "income," she included her income and listed a Mr. LaRosa as a source of monthly income of $400.00, the amount she claimed Respondent previously informed her she needed to qualify for lot rental. According to Ms. Diaz, Respondent received her second lot rental application and called her to discuss the matter. During the conversation Respondent asked "[W]hat she was doing for Mr. LaRosa that he would put out $400.00 on her behalf." Ms. Diaz testified that she was offended by the tone of Respondent's voice and the implications that she believed prompted the question. She believed the question to have been irrelevant and did not answer. Ms. Diaz testified that in the "Assets and Income" column of her second lot rental application, she listed the amount of $10,000. When asked by Respondent the source of the $10,000, which apparently was not initially included on her first lot rental application, she explained to Respondent she intended to make a cash purchase of the mobile home from Ms. Koze for $10,000. When asked by Respondent the source of such a large sum, when her monthly income was insufficient to qualify for lot rental, she explained that she was to receive a lump sum, five years' retroactive social security benefit payment. Ms. Diaz testified that approximately one month after submitting her second rental lot application to Respondent and having received no response, she called Ms. Koze to ascertain the status of the mobile home sale. Ms. Diaz also testified that Ms. Koze advised her to call Respondent to find out what was holding up her second lot rental application. Believing the lot rental approval was a condition precedent to the mobile home sale, Ms. Diaz testified that at no time during her conversation with Ms. Koze did Ms. Koze advise her that she intended to take the mobile home off the market. Ms. Diaz then called Respondent and spoke with Andy Windfelder (Mr. Windfelder) about the rental lot application status. Mr. Windfelder told her to call Ms. Koze. Ms. Diaz's recollection of the telephone conversation between her and Ms. Koze follows: [A]t this point it's just too much trouble, that at this point she was going to keep the house. . . for a family member--So I told her at this point, she's been patient and she's been holding up with me for that whole time that we were waiting on this credit report, which is four weeks, that I'm not going to put her on the spot of going against them and tell me what transpired in that conversation for them to convince her not to sell to me. I told her that at that point I have no alternative but to tell her that I was going to go file a housing complaint, and I'm sorry that I would have to involve her, but that we had a contract and I gave her a deposit. So at that point she took my name and address and she mailed me my deposit back on a check, and at that point, I didn't contact Sherwood--I contacted Sherwood Forest only to tell them right after that that I filed this housing complaint, that I was going to file this housing complaint . . . As stated, Ms. Diaz filed her discrimination complaint with the Florida Commission on Human Relations and no longer communicated directly with Respondent regarding the matter. The core of Ms. Diaz's complaint is Respondent's failure, or refusal, to contact her by mail or by telephone about the result of her second lot rental application. Further, Ms. Diaz opined that Respondent pressured Ms. Koze not to sell her mobile home to her, which caused Ms. Koze to return Ms. Diaz's purchase contract deposit money. Ms. Diaz argued that Respondent's conduct, unreasonable delay in acting upon her lot rental application and pressure on Ms. Koze not to sell, had two direct effects: (1) she lost the opportunity to purchase the mobile home located on the rental lot at 216 London Drive, Kissimmee, Florida, and (2) she was denied the right to reside in Respondent's facility because she was a dark, disabled, Hispanic female. At all times material, Jeff Leeds (Mr. Leeds) was general manager of Sherwood Forest in Kissimmee, Florida. In that position, Mr. Leeds supervised a staff of 28 persons, of whom many were Hispanic. The park consisted of approximately 1,600 rental sites. According to Mr. Leeds, approximately 30 percent of Sherwood Forest residents were Hispanic, and he had never met Ms. Diaz. According to Mr. Leeds, Ms. Diaz's background check reflected insufficient income that raised an alert. Her second application, based upon his conversation with Ms. Diaz, would include her sister, Ms. Cassermere, as co-applicant. Ms. Diaz was unaware that in October 2003, Ms. Koze placed her mobile home back on the market and was willing to sell to her. This information was made available to Ms. Diaz by and through Respondent through the report provided to Respondent by the Commission's investigator. Based on the evidence of record, Ms. Diaz failed to present any credible evidence to substantiate her claim of discrimination. Ultimate Factual Determinations Respondent rejected Ms. Diaz's initial lot rental application, not because of her handicap or her Hispanic ethnicity, but because through a reasonable process of credit check references, it was discovered that Ms. Diaz's disability income was insufficient to meet Respondent's requirements for lot rental. The additional income of $400.00, an apparent loan from her friend, entered on her second rental lot application raised reasonable concerns; and, when inquiry was made, she refused to respond. There is no credible, competent evidence that Respondent attempted to influence and/or pressure the mobile home owner, Ms. Koze, to take her mobile home off the market and/or cancel her contract for sale with Ms. Diaz. Ms. Koze voluntarily returned Ms. Diaz's deposit money. There is no credible, competent evidence that Respondent intentionally delayed processing Ms. Diaz's second lot rental application with the intent or for the purpose of denying her approval because of her disability, gender, or her Hispanic ethnicity. In short, Respondent did not unlawfully discriminate against Ms. Diaz; rather, the delay caused by her second lot rental application to Respondent was for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason and was not proven to be the reason Ms. Koze took her mobile home off the market.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission enter a final order dismissing Petitioners', Irene Cassermere and Milagross Diaz, Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of July, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. FRED L. BUCKINE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of July, 2004.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent unlawfully discriminated against Petitioner by refusing to rent her an apartment because she is legally blind and relies upon a service dog to ambulate independently.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner Lourdes Guzman (“Guzman”) is legally blind and relies upon a service dog (also referred to as a guide dog or “seeing eye” dog) to ambulate independently. Respondent Charles Harris (“Harris”) owns an eight-unit apartment building (the “Property”) located in Bay Harbor Islands, Florida. Harris, who is retired, holds the Property for investment purposes and lives on the rental income it generates. In or around April of 2002, Harris placed an advertisement in the newspaper seeking a tenant for one his rental units. Guzman saw this ad, was interested, and made an appointment to see the Property. A short time later, Guzman and her live-in boyfriend José Robert (“Robert”) met Harris and Paul Karolyi (“Karolyi”) late one afternoon at the Property. (Karolyi is a tenant of Harris’s who helps out at the Property; Guzman and Robert viewed him as the “building manager,” which was apparently a reasonable perception.) During their conversation, the prospective renters mentioned that they owned a dog. Upon hearing this, Harris explained that he had just finished renovating the advertised unit because the previous tenant’s dog had destroyed the rug and caused other damage to the premises. Thus, Harris told Guzman and Robert, he was not interested in renting this unit to someone with a dog. Robert then informed Harris that: (a) Guzman’s sight was impaired; (b) the dog in question was a service dog; and (c) Harris was legally obligated to let Guzman bring the dog into the unit, should she become Harris’s tenant, as a reasonable accommodation of her handicap. Once he understood the situation, Harris acknowledged that a service dog was different and stated that he would not refuse to rent the unit to someone with a service dog. Accordingly, Harris gave Guzman and Robert a rental application, which Guzman later completed and returned to Harris. After receiving Guzman’s application, Harris checked her references and discovered that Guzman’s two most recent landlords considered her to be a poor tenant. While Guzman disputes the veracity of some of the information that was provided to Harris, at hearing she admitted that much of what he learned was true. The following rental history is based on Guzman’s admissions. Town & Country Apartments. From October 2001 until January 24, 2002, Guzman lived at the Town & Country Apartments in Bay Harbor Islands, Florida. Her landlord was T & C Associates, Ltd. (“T & C”). At least six times during this 16-month period, Guzman failed to timely pay her rent and was required to pay a late fee. She also received at least five statutory “three-day notices” warning that her failure to pay the overdue monthly rent within 72 hours would trigger an eviction proceeding.1 T & C sued to evict Guzman after she failed to pay the rent due for December 2001. Consequently, when Guzman vacated the Town & Country Apartments on January 24, 2002, she did so pursuant to a writ of possession. Guzman claims that she chose to be evicted as an expedient means of breaking her lease with T & C. The Sahara. After being evicted from the Town & Country Apartments, Guzman moved into a unit at the “Sahara”—— which Guzman described at hearing as a “motel”——pursuant to a short-term lease. Guzman’s landlord at the Sahara was Allen L. Kaul (“Kaul”). Guzman lived at the Sahara for about two months.2 Guzman had some sort of dispute with Kaul, and when she moved out of the Sahara she took the keys to the unit she was vacating and the remote control device that opened a gate to the premises; these items were never returned to Kaul. These facts convinced Harris that Guzman was not an acceptable risk. He notified Guzman that he would not rent to her due to her “poor credit history.” Ultimate Factual Determinations Harris rejected Guzman’s rental application, not because of her handicap or service dog, but because he discovered, through a reasonable process of checking references, that Guzman had recently been evicted from one apartment and vacated another under suspicious (or at least questionable) circumstances, taking with her some personal property of the landlord’s that she never returned. There is no credible, competent evidence that Harris rented his apartments to non-handicapped persons having rental histories similar to Guzman’s. Nor does the evidence support a finding that Harris invoked Guzman’s negative rental history (the material aspects of which were undisputed) as a pretext for discrimination. In short, Harris did not discriminate unlawfully against Guzman; rather, he rejected her rental application for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the FCHR enter a final order dismissing Guzman’s Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of May, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of May, 2003.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Ordinance No. 06-03, as adopted by the Village of Islamorada, Village of Islands (Village), is consistent with the Principles for Guiding Development set forth in Section 380.0552, Florida Statutes (2006) (Guiding Principles).1
Findings Of Fact The Florida Keys were originally designated an Area of Critical State Concern (ACSC) by the Administration Commission in 1975 and were re-designated by the Legislature in 1986. See § 380.0552, Fla. Stat. The Legislative Intent Subsection (2) of the statute and the Guiding Principles together require an effective land use management system that protects the natural environment and character of the Keys, maintains acceptable water quality conditions, ensures adequate public facility capacity and services, and provides adequate emergency and post-disaster planning to ensure public safety. The Village's Comprehensive Plan has been adopted pursuant to the Local Government Comprehensive Planning and Land Development Regulation Act, as well as the authority of Section 380.0552(9), Florida Statutes. Provisions pertaining to vacation rentals are established in Policies 1-2.1.10, 1-2.4.7, 1-2.4.8, and 1-2.4.9. The policies allow vacation rentals but provide limits for such uses within single-family and multi-family residential properties within the Village. In addition, these policies also provide for the establishment of land development regulations (LDRs), which address enforcement and implementation of those policies. The applicable Village Comprehensive Plan Policies are as follows: Policy 1-2.1.10: Restrict Development of New Transient Units. Transient use shall be defined as any use of any structure for a tenancy of 28 days or less. Transient uses shall be considered as residential uses for the purposes of transferring development rights pursuant to conditions established in Policy 1-3.1.4 of this Plan. Islamorada, Village of Islands shall cap the number of new transient units at the number of current and vested hotel and motel rooms, campground and recreational vehicle spaces existing within the Village as of December 6, 2001. Single family and multifamily residences shall not be considered part of the above cap but instead may be used for transient rental use as provided for in Comprehensive Plan Policies 1-2.4.7 and 1-2.4.8. Policy 1-2.4.7: Limit Transient Rental Use of Residential Properties. Islamorada, Village of Islands shall continue to allow the transient rental use of 28 days or less, of single family and multifamily residential properties within the Village, including properties located within the Residential Conservation (RC), Residential Low (RL), Residential Medium (RM), Residential High (RH), Mixed Use (MU) and Airport (A) Future Land Use Map categories. Property owners located in the RL, RM, RC, MU, RH and A Future Land Use Map categories may continue transient rental subject to the following requirements: Owners of such properties shall annually register with the Village and shall demonstrate at the time of registration: That since December 6, 2001 the owner had continuously either paid or filed for all County tourist development taxes due, and paid local impact fees, for the property it wishes to register; That owner has applied for appropriate state licensure to conduct transient rental for the property it wishes to register and shall receive the license within six months of application; That the property is not registered for a homestead tax exemption pursuant to Article VII, Section 6 of the Constitution of the State of Florida; and That the property otherwise meets all requirements of the Village Land Development Regulations. The annual registration shall allow up to a total of 331 single family and multifamily transient rental units. For each annual registration period after the initial registration period, the following shall additionally apply: No new transient rental unit shall be allowed in any Residential Medium (RM) Future Land Use Map category, in mobile home parks or in the Settler's Residential zoning district. No new transient rental unit in the RH and MU Future Land Use Map categories may be registered unless it is assessed by the Monroe County Property Appraiser at a value in excess of 600% of the median adjusted gross annual income for households within Monroe County. No new transient rental unit in the RC, RL, or A Future Land Use Map categories may be registered unless it is assessed by the Monroe County Property Appraiser at a value in excess of 900% of the median adjusted gross annual income for households within Monroe County. The priority of registration for transient rental units for all registration periods, for purpose of the 311 unit cap, shall be based upon the total number of months that the unit owner has paid the Monroe County tourist development tax, with units registered in ascending order (i.e., those licenses demonstrating the most months of payment shall be the last retired). Notwithstanding paragraph 1.a. above, if the 331 unit cap is not reached in any year by those units that have paid the Monroe County tourist development tax, new units may be given priority by registration date. Property owners permitted transient rental use pursuant to this policy shall lose their privileges and retire their licenses when ownership (in whole or in part) of the unit is transferred, through an arm's length sale of the property or the asset. If the unit is owned by a natural person, the transfer of the fee simple ownership of the unit to the owner's spouse or children shall not result in termination of the license. Policy 1-2.4.8: Enforcement and Implementation of Transient Rental Regulations. Property owners permitted transient rental use pursuant to Policy 1- 2.4.7 shall pay an annual fee to the Village as established by resolution to be used for code compliance related to transient rental uses, with any excess funds to be used to further affordable housing programs. Transient rental unit owners shall lose their privileges and their permits shall be revoked for a property being used for transient rental if the property had been found by non- appealable Final Order on two occasions to have violated the Village Code regarding vacation renal units as provided for in the land development regulations. The Village shall establish land development regulations which shall address enforcement and implementation of transient rental use, including, but not limited to, the following: conspicuous notification on transient rental properties; requiring each unit to identify the unit manager who resides within the village; regulating the number and location of watercraft and automobiles on site; lease agreements to disclose village regulatory requirements and provide for access for adequate code enforcement; advertising to require identification of state and village license numbers; notification to adjacent property owners; and fines, penalties, revocation of license for violation of the regulations including but not limited to the advertising of units that are not lawfully licensed by the Village. Policy 1-2.4.9: Affordable Housing Study. The Village, based on its 2004 Workforce Housing Study, shall analyze appropriate policy revisions to the transient rental comprehensive plan policies and prepare a report no later than December 31, 2005. The Village shall establish and support the efforts of an Affordable/Workforce Housing Citizen Advisory Committee to address the relationship between affordable housing needs and transient rental uses within the Village. The applicable Village LDR, as modified by Ordinance No. 06-03 provides the following2: Section 30-1294. Vacation rental uses permitted within certain multifamily developments. Vacation rental uses shall be permitted to continue after May 1, 2003, in properly located in the Residential High (RH) future land use category of the Village Comprehensive Plan within multifamily developments with mandatory property associations, and if the member properly owners pursuant to applicable association requirements approve vacation rental uses within such multifamily development. Registration of Existing Vacation Rental Units. The owner of a property located in the RC, RL, RM, RH, MU, and A Future Land Use Map categories may continue vacation rental use provided that the owner's use of the unit meets all of the following conditions: Since December 6, 2001, the owner had continuously either paid or filed for all County tourist development taxes due and paid local impact fees for the unit it wishes to register as a vacation rental use; The owner has applied for and received the appropriate state licensure to conduct vacation rental use for the unit; The property is not registered for a homestead tax exemption pursuant to Article VII, Section 6 of the Constitution of the State of Florida; The unit is not a deed restricted affordable housing unit; and The property otherwise meets all requirements of the Village Land Development Regulations. The Florida Keys Principles for Guiding Development are set out in Section 380.0552(7), Florida Statutes: To strengthen local government capabilities for managing land use and development so that local government is able to achieve these objections without the continuation of the area of critical state concern designation. To protect shoreline and marine resources, including mangroves, coral reef formations, seagrass beds, wetlands, fish and wildlife, and their habitat. To protect upland resources, tropical biological communities, freshwater wetlands, native tropical vegetation (for example, hardwood hammocks and pinelands), dune ridges and beaches, wildlife, and their habitat. To ensure the maximum well-being of the Florida Keys and its citizens through sound economic development. To limit the adverse impacts of development on the quality of water throughout the Florida Keys. To enhance natural scenic resources, promote the aesthetic benefits of the natural environment, and ensure that development is compatible with the unique historic character of the Florida Keys. To protect the historical heritage of the Florida Keys. To protect the value, efficiency, cost- effectiveness, and amortized life of existing and proposed major public investments, including: The Florida Keys Aqueduct and water supply facilities; Sewage collection and disposal facilities; Solid waste collection and disposal facilities; Key West Naval Air Station and other military facilities; Transportation facilities; Federal parks, wildlife refuges, and marine sanctuaries; State parks, recreation facilities, aquatic preserves, and other publicly owned properties; City electric service and the Florida Keys Electric Co-op; and Other utilities, as appropriate. To limit the adverse impacts of public investments on the environmental resources of the Florida Keys. To make available adequate affordable housing for all sectors of the population of the Florida Keys. To provide adequate alternatives for the protection of public safety and welfare in the event of a natural or manmade disaster and for a postdisaster reconstruction plan. To protect the public health, safety, and welfare of the citizens of the Florida Keys and maintain the Florida Keys as a unique Florida resource. Section 30-1294(a)(5) of Ordinance 06-03 has little to no impact on the Guiding Principles, except Principles (a), (d), (j), and (l). All it does it add to the Comprehensive Plan's vacation rental provisions authorizing properties in certain future land use categories to continued pre-existing vacation rental use the requirement those properties "otherwise meet all the requirements of the [LDRs]." In regard to Principle (a), Section 30-1294(a)(5) clearly provides further authority to the local government to regulate land use and development. The evidence also proved that this increased authority will strengthen the Village's capabilities for managing land use and development and achieving the objectives of the Guiding Principles without the continuation of the ACSC designation. Petitioners essentially make the argument that Section 30-1294(a)(5) is inconsistent with Principle (a) because "all requirements" of the Village's LDRs is too broad, too difficult to interpret, gives the planning director too much discretion to interpret the requirement, and places an impossible burden on applicants for vacation rental licenses, which ultimately will discourage compliance and undermine the vacation rental ordinance. The evidence did not prove any of those arguments. In regard to Principle (d), Section 30-1294(a)(5) further ensures the maximum well-being of the Florida Keys and its citizens through sound economic development. In regard to Principle (j), Section 30-1294(a)(5) addresses the critical need for affordable housing within the Florida Keys. With regard to Principle (l), Section 30-1294(a)(5) clearly demonstrates and provides for the public health, safety, and welfare of the citizens of the Florida Keys and maintains the Florida Keys as a unique Florida resource. When the legislative intent behind Chapter 380, Florida Statutes, is taken in account, it is clear that Section 30- 1294(a)(5) is not the type of land use decision that Chapter 380 is most concerned with. Because this provision does no harm to the natural environment and waters of the Florida Keys ACSC, the State's interest is protected. The issue is essentially local, and deference should be afforded the Village in establishing such regulations through its police powers. Given the purpose of DCA's involvement in this matter, the legislative intent of Chapter 380, Florida Statutes, and the evidence presented in this proceeding, it is clear that Section 30-1294(a)(5) is consistent with the Guiding Principles, considered as a whole.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Community Affairs enter a final order approving Ordinance No. 06-03 as consistent with the Principles for Guiding Development set out in Section 380.0552(7), Florida Statutes. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of January, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of January, 2007.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Deborah Lynn Tengzelius (Tengzelius), was at all time material hereto a licensed real estate broker in the State of Florida, having been issued license number 0229363. Tengzelius was the qualifying broker for Respondent, The Rental Center, Inc. (Rental Center), a corporation licensed as a real estate broker in the State of Florida under license number 0229362. Respondents are, inter alia, engaged in the business of providing rental information for a fee. Consequently, in October 1983, pursuant to the requirements of Rule 21V-10.30, Florida Administrative Code, Respondents forwarded to the Petitioner, Department of Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate (Department), a copy of their proposed rental information agreement. By letter of October 31, 1983, the Department returned Respondent's proposed agreement with instructions to correct certain provisions to bring it into compliance with Section 475.453, Florida Statutes. Respondents made the necessary changes, and by letter of November 15, 1983, the Department advised them that their agreement now appeared to comply with the rules and regulations of the Florida Real Estate Commission. On August 22, 1985, Tengzelius, on behalf of the Rental Center, executed its standard rental information agreement with Elizabeth Wilson (Wilson) in exchange for a fee of $60.00. That agreement, previously approved by the Department, provided in part: NOTICE: Pursuant to Florida law, if the rental information provided under this contract is not current or accurate in any material aspect you nay demand within thirty (30) days of this contract date a return of your full fee paid. If you do not obtain a rental you are entitled to receive a return of seventy-five (75 percent) percent of the fee paid if you make a demand within thirty (30) days of this contract date. CLIENT COMMITMENT As a prospective Tenant, I hereby agree: 1. To make any refund request within 30 days following above date, in writing, and delivered to The Rental Center, Inc. .... (Emphasis added). In mid-September, less than 30 days after the rental information agreement was signed, Wilson telephoned the Rental Center and requested a return of the fee she had paid. Wilson averred that she was not able to obtain a rental. Respondents refused to return 75 percent of the fee because Wilson's request was not in writing.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the administrative complaint be DISMISSED with prejudice. DONE AND ORDERED this 10th day of February, 1987, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM J. KENDRICK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of February, 1987. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 86-3776 Respondents submitted an unnumbered 13 paragraph memorandum of law and facts". These paragraphs have been number 1-13 and addressed as follows: Addressed in paragraph 4. Addressed in paragraph 3. 3-4. Addressed in conclusions of law. 5-7. Addressed in paragraph 2. 8-13. Addressed in conclusions of law if pertinent. Respondent's suggestion that the doctrine of entrapment is applicable to the facts of this case is ill-founded. See: Thomas v. State, 243 So.2d 200 (Fla. 2d DCA 1971). COPIES FURNISHED: Arthur R. Shell, Jr., Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 C. Michael Shalloway, Esquire 909 North Dixie Highway West Palm Beach, Florida 33401 Harold Huff, Executive Director Division of Real Estate Department of Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Van Poole, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Wings Benton, General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the allegations of the Administrative Complaint, Gerald Schultz was a real estate broker holding License #0215135 and active firm broker for Choice Rentals and Realty Corporation (formerly Choice Rentals, Inc., and hereinafter "Choice Rentals"), which was a corporate broker holding License #0195222. Rosemary Hufcut entered into a contract with Choice Rentals on July 30, 1980, for Choice Rentals to provide her with rental information based upon criteria she gave Choice Rentals. Hufcut paid a fee of $50 to Choice Rentals for its services. Hufcut was looking for an apartment for herself and her two daughters. She specified she wanted a good neighborhood with good schools. Hufcut was given rental data by Choice Rentals and, with her father, visited a number of the apartments listed. The apartments were not suitable. On the following day, Hufcut requested a refund and submitted a written request for a refund on August 6, 1980. On August 26, 1980, Hufcut's refund request was denied by a letter from Choice Rentals (Petitioner's Exhibit #6). This letter provided in part: Refusal to accept available rental properties meeting the requirements as set forth in your contract with us, does not constitute cancellation of contractual agreement. (This is pursuant to the Florida Law regarding "obtaining a rental".) note - produced available rental property meeting the requirements stated on contract. Hufcut has never received a refund from Choice Rentals. The Board introduced Petitioner's Exhibits #1 through #6, which were received in evidence.
Recommendation Having found the Respondents guilty of violating Section 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes, the Hearing Officer recommends that the Board of Real Estate suspend the licenses of Respondents for ten years. DONE and ORDERED this 25th day of March, 1982, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of March, 1982. COPIES FURNISHED: Theodore J. Silver, Esquire 9445 Bird Road Miami, Florida 33165 Mr. Gerald Schultz c/o John Hume, Esquire 5100 North Federal Highway, Suite 405 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33308 Choice Rentals & Realty 3367 North Federal Highway Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33308 C. B. Stafford, Executive Director Board of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Samuel Shorstein, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent operated two contiguous four-unit buildings as an unlicensed public lodging establishment in violation of Subsection 509.241(1), Florida Statutes (2003).
Findings Of Fact The parties stipulated to most of the facts in this case. The disputed issues of fact involve issues of whether the two four-unit buildings comprise a single complex of buildings that Respondent operates as a single entity. With this exception, the parties submitted the case to the ALJ as an issue of law. Petitioner is the state agency responsible for regulating public lodging establishments defined in Subsection 509.013(4), Florida Statutes (2003). Respondent owns and operates two four-unit buildings located, respectively, at 11220 and 11240 Third Street East, Treasure Island, Florida 33706. Petitioner inspected each building on July 2 and October 16, 2003, and found that Respondent had not licensed either building as a public lodging establishment. Respondent has never licensed either building as a public lodging establishment. The two four-unit buildings are located on contiguous lots that are not separated by a highway. However, the evidence is less than clear and convincing that the two buildings comprise a single complex of buildings within the meaning of Subsection 509.013(7), Florida Statutes (2003). The buildings are not situated on the same tract or plot of land. Each parcel of land on which a building is located is a separate lot bearing a separate street address, a separate legal description, and a separate survey. Each lot is separately titled to Respondent and his wife under a separate warranty deed acquired in separate transactions. Respondent is legally entitled to transfer each lot independently without first severing or subdividing one lot from the other. Each lot secures a separate mortgage for which the lender, in the event of default, may foreclose without foreclosing against the other lot otherwise encumbering the other lot. Respondent does not operate the two buildings under one business name within the meaning of Subsection 509.013(7), Florida Statutes (2003). Respondent does not operate the two buildings under any business name. Neither building bears a name, and Respondent does not manage the two buildings from a single rental management office. Respondent operates each building pursuant to a separate occupational license for each building. The two buildings do not comprise a public lodging establishment within the meaning of Subsection 509.013(4)(a), Florida Statutes (2003). For reasons previously stated, the evidence is less than clear and convincing that the two buildings comprise a single complex of buildings. In addition, Petitioner failed to submit any evidence that Respondent either rents to any guest for a period that is less than 30 days or advertises to the public that the eight units are regularly rented to guests. Rather, the only relevant evidence shows that Respondent rents to guests for one year or more and does not advertise the rental units in any manner. The two four-unit buildings satisfy the requirements of an express exclusion in Subsection 509.013(4)(b)3., Florida Statutes (2003). Each building is an establishment that rents four units or less. Petitioner submitted no evidence that Respondent either advertises the units for rent to guests or that Respondent regularly rents the units to transients defined in Subsections 509.013(10) and (11), Florida Statutes (2003). The only relevant evidence shows that Respondent does not advertise the units and does not rent to transients.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a final order finding that the two four-unit buildings do not comprise a public lodging establishment and dismissing the Administrative Complaint for lack of jurisdiction. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of December, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of December, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Charles F. Tunnicliff, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street, Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202 Ted J. Starr, Esquire 8181 U.S. 19 North Pinellas Park, Florida 33781 Leon Biegalski, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street, Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202 Geoff Luebkemann, Director Division of Hotels and Restaurants Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
The Issue Whether Petitioner was the subject of unlawful coercion, intimidation, threats, or interference in the exercise of her rights in connection with Respondent?s regulatory actions regarding rental property owned by Petitioner, in violation of section 818 of Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, as amended by the Fair Housing Act of 1988 and the Florida Fair Housing Act, chapter 760, Part II, Florida Statutes (2011).
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, an African-American woman, owns and manages a residential tri-plex rental unit located at 302 Dubs Drive, Holly Hill, Florida. Dubs Drive is zoned R-2 single-family residential. Petitioner?s tri-plex was constructed in 1955, and is grandfathered as a non-conforming use. The other houses on Dubs Drive are newer, and are all single-family homes. Petitioner purchased the tri-plex in 1998. At the time of her purchase, the tri-plex consisted of a single-story building with 3 apartments and two garages, and was configured, from south to north, as a two-bedroom apartment, a two-bedroom apartment, a one-bedroom apartment, a garage with a washer/dryer connection, and a garage with a toilet. The garages had drywall interiors, except that the ceilings lacked drywall. After she purchased the tri-plex, Petitioner hired Arthur Kowitz, a realtor, to manage the property for her. He performed management services from the time of the purchase until 2001. Mr. Kowitz is white. In 2001, Petitioner retained All-Florida Realtors to manage the property. All-Florida performed management services from 2001 to 2004. All-Florida is a white-owned company. In 2004, Petitioner retained John Benzette to manage the property. Mr. Benzette performed management services from 2004 through November 2007. Mr. Benzette is white. In 2004, Petitioner applied to Respondent for a permit to install an electric meter at the tri-plex. The purpose of the meter was not to serve the apartments -- each of which already had meters by which the tenants individually received and paid for service -- but was a “house meter” or “landlord?s meter” for exterior lighting, garage lighting and outlets, and other uses common to the tri-plex. The permit was issued, and the meter was installed. During one of the 2005 hurricanes that hit the area, the meter was knocked off of the unit by falling debris. It was not reinstalled at that time. The property managers from 1998 through 2007 were responsible for general maintenance and repair activities. Those types of activities did not require building permits. From the time she purchased the tri-plex in 1998, until 2008, the unit was not subject to any formal code-enforcement actions by Respondent. Starting in December, 2007, Petitioner began managing the tri-plex on her own. One of the first activities she performed as owner/manager was the conversion of the garage on the northern end of the building -- separated from the apartments by the other garage -- to a living space. That was accomplished by removing the garage door, constructing a block wall with a window and exterior door, completing interior drywall work, and installing a shower. Petitioner did not apply for or receive a building permit for the work. As part of the construction, Petitioner had the electric meter that was knocked off in 2005 renovated and reinstalled onto the unit. When Petitioner requested service from Florida Power & Light, Florida Power & Light contacted Respondent to confirm a legal connection. Respondent sent employees Mark Ballard and Tim Harbuck to the tri-plex. At that time, it was determined that Petitioner had performed construction without a building permit. Respondent?s employees initially thought the new living space was to be rented as a fourth apartment, an act that would have constituted an unallowable expansion of the non- conforming use of the property. Their belief was not unreasonable, as the configuration of the converted garage was conducive to its being used as a separate apartment, and since Petitioner subsequently placed a “For Rent” sign on the unit, despite the fact that she was living in apartment #3 at the time. However, Petitioner has denied that the rental of the converted garage as a separate unit was her intent, but that the converted garage was intended as an added room for apartment #3. Regardless of whether the conversion of the garage was intended to result in a separate apartment, the construction required a building permit. As a result of the determination that the construction was not permitted, the meter was removed on February 8, 2008. The requirement that the meter be removed, despite the 2004 permit, was not related to Petitioner?s race, but was related to the unauthorized construction and intended use of the converted garage. On April 25, 2008, Respondent sent Petitioner a Notice to Appear at a hearing before a special magistrate. The notice provided that the purpose of the hearing was the “violation of City Ordinance Building Permit Required.” The hearing was set for May 14, 2008. Petitioner asserted that she called the telephone number printed on the notice to ascertain the purpose of the May 14, 2008, hearing. She alleged that she was told by an unnamed city employee that the hearing was to be held regarding issues pertaining to her rental license. The evidence of the call was entirely hearsay, and was not corroborated by any non- hearsay evidence. Regardless of the substance of the telephone call, the notice plainly stated that the purpose of the hearing was related to a required building permit. The hearing was held as scheduled on May 14, 2008. At the hearing, Petitioner was advised that the subject of the hearing was the unpermitted construction at the Dubs Drive location. Petitioner, claiming to have had no knowledge of the subject of the hearing, requested a continuance to retain an attorney to represent her. The request was denied. At the hearing, it was determined that, at a minimum, Petitioner removed the garage door, blocked up the front of the garage and installed a door and window in its place to convert it to living space, and installed a shower. On May 22, 2008, the special magistrate entered an Order of Non-Compliance in which he concluded that Petitioner violated the Holly Hill Zoning Ordinance requiring a building permit for the work done on the property, required Petitioner to obtain a building permit, and imposed an administrative fine of $250.00. If the corrective measures were not taken, or the fine was not paid, the Order authorized an additional penalty of $150.00 per day, and authorized Respondent to place a lien on the Dubs Drive location. Petitioner was warned that she was not to use the renovated garage as a separate dwelling unit, but could only use it as an addition to apartment #3. The action by Respondent to enforce its building code was entirely appropriate, and was undertaken with all due process rights having been afforded to Petitioner. There was no evidence presented to support a finding that Petitioner?s race had anything to do with Respondent?s reaction to Petitioner?s unpermitted construction, or that Respondent failed to enforce its building code, including permit requirements, against similarly-situated property owners who were not members of Petitioner?s protected class. Petitioner paid the administrative fine on June 2, 2008, and received the after-the-fact building permit on June 10, 2008. On September 5, 2008, Respondent placed a lien on the Dubs Drive location based on its mistaken belief that Petitioner had failed to pay the $250.00 administrative fine. The notice of lien letter was received by Petitioner on November 18, 2008. Petitioner advised Respondent that she had paid the fine. Ms. Sue Meeks confirmed that the fine was paid, and Respondent promptly recorded a satisfaction of lien. The evidence indicates that the decision to record the lien was a bureaucratic error that was immediately corrected. There was no evidence presented to support a finding that Petitioner?s race was Respondent?s motive for recording the lien. A business tax receipt is required for each of the three apartments at the Dubs Drive location in order for Petitioner to engage in the business of real estate rental. Authorization for the business tax receipt was adopted by ordinance by Respondent in July, 2000, and is applicable to all rental units in the city of the type owned by Petitioner. Prior to July 2000, Respondent did not require an owner of a small rental location to obtain a business tax receipt. The business tax receipt ordinance required Respondent to perform annual inspections of businesses within its municipal boundaries. The inspections were started in 2000 or 2001. Business tax receipts are issued for a term from October 1 to September 30 of each year. If a business tax receipt is not renewed on time, Respondent is authorized to assess a 25 percent penalty, plus additional filing fees. For 2008-2009, Petitioner timely paid the business tax receipts for apartment Nos. 1 and 2. The tax was $45.00 for each apartment. Petitioner failed to pay the business tax receipt for apartment #3 until March 2009, after the renewal date had passed. Therefore, a penalty and additional filing fees were assessed which raised the business tax receipt fee for that apartment to $70.00. Petitioner alleged that Respondent “overcharged” her for the apartment #3 business tax receipt, which she construed as evidence of a pattern of discrimination. The evidence demonstrates that the $70.00 charge was the result of Petitioner?s failure to timely renew, and was not the result of discrimination based on her race. There was no evidence presented to support a finding that Petitioner?s race had anything to do with Respondent?s assessment of late penalties and fees, or that Respondent failed to assess such late penalties and fees against similarly-situated rental apartment owners who were not members of Petitioner?s protected class. On or about February 6, 2009, Respondent issued a violation notice alleging that Petitioner failed to renew her business tax receipt for apartment #1 and #2. The notice was posted on the doors of the apartments on February 10, 2009. The notice allowed three days to correct the violation, a period that had already passed when the notice was received. Petitioner had already paid the business tax receipt, and went to city hall to inquire about the violation notice. She was advised that her check, identified by Petitioner as check #486, had not been received. Petitioner went to Bank of America to stop payment on check #486, for which a banking fee of $30.00 was assessed. Upon her return to city hall, Petitioner was advised that a search had resulted in the discovery of check #486 on a city employee?s desk. It had not been cashed. Petitioner wrote a replacement check. Respondent credited Petitioner?s utility bill for $30.00 to reimburse her for the Bank of America stop-payment charge and the matter was resolved without further ado. Petitioner alleged that the incident was “harassment,” which she construed as further evidence of discrimination. To the contrary, the evidence demonstrates that the violation notice was a minor bureaucratic error that was promptly corrected, and for which Petitioner was made financially whole. There is no evidence in the record that the incident was the result of discrimination based on Petitioner?s race. On February 19, 2009, Petitioner wrote Respondent to express her belief that she was being overcharged for water. She had a single meter to serve the Dubs Drive tri-plex, but was being charged for three connections. In fact, Petitioner had three apartments. In such cases, Respondent bills for each unit served by a single “master meter.” The minimum bill per apartment includes 2000 gallons of water per month, with additional usage added as an additional charge. Respondent billed for three connections at the Dubs Drive location since at least 1997, prior to Petitioner?s purchase of the tri-plex. Petitioner inquired whether she could have separate meters installed for each apartment, rather than having minimum and total bills determined by the “master meter.” Respondent would not allow separate meters since the Dubs Drive tri-plex was a non-conforming use in a single-family zoned area, and the installation of separate meters would “enhance the non- conformity.” Respondent?s approach to billing for water in multi- family locations accounts for the demand created by three families versus one family. The evidence demonstrates that Respondent bills all multi-unit complexes in a manner to account for the demand of multiple family consumption on its water facilities. There is no evidence in the record that Respondent?s billing practice for water consumption was applied to Petitioner differently from any other multi-family facilities, or was the result of discrimination based on Petitioner?s race. On or about March 3, 2009, as a result of an annual inspection conducted as part of the business tax receipt process, Respondent cited Petitioner for several deficiencies at the Dubs Drive tri-plex, including a lack of smoke alarms, some windows that would not open, and a lack of GFI (ground-fault interrupter) electrical outlets at one location in apartment #1, and two locations in apartment #2. GFI outlets are commonly known to prevent shocks, and are required at locations where the outlets may be exposed to water, e.g. kitchens and bathrooms. Petitioner installed the GFI outlets. There was no other sanction or penalty. There is no evidence in the record that the requirement that Petitioner install a reasonable and necessary safety feature in apartments being rented to others was the result of discrimination based on Petitioner?s race. On or about March 24, 2009, during the follow-up compliance inspection of the tri-plex, one of Petitioner?s tenants advised the inspector that Petitioner had been living in the converted garage for two months, and was receiving mail in “mailbox #4” during that period. The use of the converted garage as a separate living unit would be a violation of Respondent?s zoning ordinance regarding limitations on the expansion of a non-conforming use, and would have violated the special magistrate?s Order entered at the May 14, 2008, hearing. As a result, Respondent issued violation notices to Petitioner on March 24, 2009, and March 27, 2009, each of which concerned the use of the converted garage as a separate living unit. The March 27, 2009, notice indicated that Petitioner and Respondent were “working to resolve” the issue. On March 31, 2009, Respondent provided Petitioner with a letter resolving the separate living unit issue that stated: This letter is to inform you of the requirements of Compliance in reference to 302 Dubs Ave. Your triplex must not be occupied by more than 3 separate families. The new addition on the north end of the building can be used in conjunction with #3, [b]ut can not be used as a separate unit. Mailbox #4 must be taken down within 45 Days of this date. (March 31, 2009) The letter contained nothing more than a straight-forward recitation of the terms and conditions applicable to the non- conforming residential structure. Respondent imposed no penalties or sanctions. There is no evidence to suggest that Respondent imposed terms or conditions on the use of the tri- plex different from any other similarly-situated non-conforming structure. There is no evidence in the record that Respondent?s response to the tenant?s statement that Petitioner was using the converted garage as a fourth apartment was either disproportionate under the circumstances, or was the result of discrimination based on Petitioner?s race. On April 30, 2009, the tenants of apartment #2 wrote to Petitioner with a long list of complaints regarding the conditions at the apartment that, on their face, were very serious, and which included structural, electrical, plumbing, and safety issues. The couple that lived in the apartment was white. The fact that the tenants were white does not minimize the fact that their concerns were legitimate. Having received no response to their complaints, the tenants called Respondent about the living conditions. In accordance with Respondent?s routine practice regarding complaints, Ms. Meeks was dispatched to inspect the property. Her inspection of apartment #2 confirmed the tenant complaints. Ms. Meeks also inspected apartment #1 at the request of the tenants of that apartment, and noted problems with “the bottom of the walls pealing [sic.] off and has some kind of bugs that are biting the children that live there.” The tenants also provided Ms. Meeks with a list of dates on which they alleged Petitioner had been staying in the converted garage which, if true, would have indicated that Petitioner used the addition as a separate living unit for more than 50 days over a three-month period. Respondent sent Petitioner a letter detailing the problems observed during the inspection, and advising Petitioner that her issues would be taken up at a hearing before the Special Master on July 8, 2009. The letter was received by Petitioner on June 15, 2009. The time between the letter and the scheduled hearing was ample time for Petitioner to correct the problems. On June 24, 2009, Respondent served Petitioner with a Notice to Appear at the July 8, 2009, hearing. On June 25, 2009, and June 29, 2009, Respondent obtained written statements from the tenants of apartment #2 detailing the problems that they had encountered with their leased apartment. Their statements were consistent with their earlier descriptions and the results of the inspection. On July 7, 2009, Petitioner requested a continuance of the July 8, 2009, hearing due to the death of her father. The request was granted by notice dated July 15, 2009, and the hearing was continued to August 12, 2009. Respondent was directed to “bring proof of her father?s passing” to the August hearing. On July 27, 2009, Respondent reissued a Notice to Appear for the August 12, 2009, hearing. On August 12, 2009, a hearing was convened before the special magistrate. Petitioner was represented by counsel. At the hearing it was determined that the back door of apartment #2 had been replaced to the tenant?s satisfaction, though Petitioner failed to obtain a building permit for the same, and that the electrical issue with the GFI outlet and the water heater breaker had been resolved. It was ultimately determined to be in the best interest of all of the parties to have the tri-plex inspected by Respondent, and to reconvene the hearing in September, 2009. Petitioner asserted that the August 12, 2009, hearing was continued because a white tenant had not appeared at the hearing to testify against her. The record does not support that reason. An Order Continuing Case was entered on August 26, 2009. The Order noted that Petitioner had not produced evidence of her father?s death as instructed. On August 27, 2009, Respondent reissued a Notice to Appear for September 9, 2009. On August 18, 2009, Respondent conducted an inspection of the tri-plex. It was determined that some of the deficiencies identified in the June notice had been made, but others had not. The hearing was reconvened on September 9, 2009. Petitioner was represented by counsel. After considerable discussion, it was determined that Petitioner had substantially resolved the issues identified in the June notice, some more recently than others. The special magistrate assessed a $250.00 administrative fine for the initial items of non-compliance resulting in the need to have the hearings, and $300.00 for failure to make repairs within a reasonable period after the initial notice in June. Petitioner also produced a copy of her father?s obituary as proof of his death in July. An Order of Non-Compliance reciting the outcome of the hearing was entered on September 25, 2009. The Order was not appealed. Petitioner stated her belief that the requirement that she provide evidence of her father?s death to substantiate the basis for the July 7, 2009, request for continuance was imposed as a result of harassment and discrimination against her due to her race. Although the requirement that she produce an obituary or the like seems insensitive and unnecessary, there was no evidence that Petitioner?s race was the basis for the request, or that such a requirement was not imposed on all persons seeking a continuance of a code enforcement hearing, regardless of race. On November 4, 2009, the special magistrate, after having received evidence of the completion of the repairs from Respondent, entered an Order of Compliance by which he found all of the deficiencies at the Dubs Drive location had been satisfactorily resolved. Petitioner has alleged that the code enforcement actions taken by Respondent were part of a pattern of harassment and intimidation directed at her because of her race. She argued that her white property managers were not cited for violations, thus establishing evidence of racial bias. While it is true that some of the violations for which Petitioner was cited concerned issues that pre-dated Petitioner?s assumption of management duties in December 2007, e.g., the use of interior- grade doors being used as exterior doors and the lack of GFI outlets, there was no evidence that Respondent ever noticed those deficiencies, or that any tenant had ever complained. The evidence demonstrates that the triggering event that drew the attention of Respondent?s code enforcement section was not Petitioner?s race, but was Petitioner?s unpermitted conversion of the garage into living space. The other triggering event was the complaint filed with Respondent by Petitioner?s tenants that alleged crumbling infrastructure, including the very poor condition of the exterior doors. Both incidents properly resulted in thorough inspections. There was no event at the Dubs Drive location prior to December 2007, that would have resulted in increased scrutiny. Thus, the evidence demonstrates that Respondent?s actions were reasonable and appropriate responses to conditions at the Dubs Drive location that were brought to its attention by the actions of Petitioner and her tenants, conditions for which Respondent would have been remiss had it failed to act. The evidence in this proceeding does not support a finding that Respondent?s actions were taken due to Petitioner?s race. The evidence produced at the hearing contained not a shred of competent, substantial evidence that would support a finding that Respondent took any action regarding the Dubs Drive tri-plex because of Petitioner?s race. Rather, the evidence supports a finding that Respondent was appropriately exercising its police powers to ensure that rental dwelling units within its jurisdiction are safe and sanitary. If anything, Respondent and the special magistrate treated Petitioner with considerable patience, restraint, and leniency given the nature of the non- compliance resulting from the unpermitted renovations, and from the delays in making necessary repairs to the property. Petitioner?s dated signature on the Housing Discrimination Complaint that forms the basis for this proceeding indicates that Petitioner filed her initial complaint of discrimination no earlier than August 31, 2010. However, the HUD Determination gives two dates on which Petitioner supposedly filed her complaint -- August 13, 2010, and September 2, 2009. Given the findings and conclusions herein that Respondent had no racial animus or bias in its actions regarding Petitioner -- going back to the December 2007 date on which Petitioner assumed her property management duties -- it is not necessary to determine which of the dates is accurate. However, to the extent it were to become an issue with regard to the application of the jurisdictional limits established by section 760.34(2), the most persuasive evidence demonstrates that Petitioner filed her Housing Discrimination Complaint on or after August 31, 2010. Ultimate Findings of Fact There was no competent, substantial evidence adduced at the hearing that Respondent took any regulatory, utility billing, or code enforcement action regarding Petitioner, or the Dubs Drive location, in an effort to coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere with Petitioner in the exercise of her rights as an owner of rental housing due to Petitioner?s race. Respondent?s actions were, in each instance, a legitimate response to unpermitted building activities, a correct application of Respondent?s ordinances, or a reasonable response to complaints filed by Petitioner?s tenants. At worst, Respondent committed two minor bureaucratic errors that were quickly resolved, and for which Petitioner suffered no loss. There was no evidence that Respondent applied its code enforcement ordinances or policies in its dealings with Petitioner in a manner that was inconsistent with their application to similarly-situated persons who were not members of Petitioner?s protected class. Having found no evidence to demonstrate that Respondent discriminated against Petitioner on the basis of her race, the Petition for Relief should be dismissed.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief filed in FCHR No. 2011H0053. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of May, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S E. GARY EARLY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of May, 2012.
The Issue Whether Respondent, while serving as an appointed member of the Ocoee Planning and Zoning Commission, violated section 112.313(7)(a), Florida Statutes (2015)1/ by having a contractual relationship that conflicted with his official responsibilities; and, if so, the appropriate penalty.
Findings Of Fact At all times material to the complaint, Respondent served as an appointed member of the Ocoee P & Z Commission. Respondent is subject to the requirements of part III, chapter 112, Florida Statutes, the Code of Ethics for Public Officers and Employees, for his acts and omissions during his tenure on the P & Z Commission. As a member of the P & Z Commission, Respondent is subject to the “Ocoee Florida Land Development Code, Section 3, Planning and Zoning Commission [Land Development Code].” Section 3-2 of Land Development Code provides in part as follows: Establishment and Membership The Planning and Zoning Commission shall consist of nine (9) members appointed by the City Commission and one member appointed by the School Board of Orange County as a non- voting member. The member appointed by the School Board of Orange County shall attend those meetings at which the Planning and Zoning Commission considers comprehensive plan amendments and rezonings that would, if approved, increase residential density on the property that is the subject of the application. No member shall be an employee of the City of Ocoee and all members, except the member appointed by the School Board of Orange County, shall be residents of the City of Ocoee. When selecting members to the Planning and Zoning Commission, the City Commission shall attempt to select persons from different geographical areas within the City so as to create geographical diversity and representation. * * * E. Compliance with Laws The Planning and Zoning Commission, and its individual members, shall comply with all applicable laws relative to public bodies, including disclosure of interests and procedure[s] for refraining from participation [when] a conflict of interest exists. * * * G. Duties and Responsibilities To act as the Local Planning Agency (LPA) of the City of Ocoee, pursuant to Section 163.3174, Florida Statutes, and to prepare on its own initiative recommendations for amendments to the Comprehensive Plan of the City of Ocoee, including text and/or maps, and to forward such amendments to the City Commission for consideration. No such recommendation shall be made except after a public hearing held in accordance with State and local requirements. To review and make recommendations to the City Commission on applications for amendments to the Comprehensive Plan. No such recommendation shall be made except after a public hearing held in accordance with State and local requirements. To prepare on its own initiative recommendations for amendments to this Code, text and/or maps, and to forward such amendments to the City Commission for consideration. No such recommendation shall be made except after a public hearing held in accordance with State and local requirements. To review and make recommendations to the City Commission on applications for amendments to this Code, including applications for annexation or change of zoning. Pursuant to Section 163.3174(4)(c), Florida Statutes, the Planning and Zoning Commission shall also have the responsibility to review and make a finding as to the consistency of the proposed land development regulation with the adopted Comprehensive Plan and to report such finding to the City Commission. No such recommendation shall be made except after a public hearing held in accordance with State and local requirements. To review and make recommendations to the City Commission on applications for various development approvals or permits as provided within this Code, including, but not limited to Planned Unit Developments (PUD), special exceptions, subdivisions, and any other application for which the City Commission requests a report and/or recommendation. Where a public hearing is required by the applicable procedural section, no such recommendation shall be made except after a public hearing held in accordance with State and local requirements. To act in an advisory capacity to the City Commission on land use and land development issues and to make such studies and to conduct such investigations as may be requested from time to time by the City Commission. To review zoning of newly annexed lands when it represents an increase in intensity of use or a conflict with the Comprehensive Plan pursuant to requirements of State law and City ordinance. In addition to serving on the P & Z Commission, Respondent buys and sells commercial real estate. Respondent is a manager and shareholder in W.O.R.Y. INVESTORS, LLC (WORY), an entity that is also in the business of buying and selling commercial real estate. Respondent, in his individual capacity, owned approximately four acres, which abutted six acres owned by WORY. Both properties have an address on West Road in Ocoee, Florida, and will be referred to collectively herein as the “West Road property.” The Contract On or about November 11, 2015, Respondent, in his individual capacity, and as manager for WORY, executed an “Agreement of Sale” wherein the West Road property was to be purchased by Charter Schools Development Group, LLC (buyer), for $1,890,540. According to the Agreement of Sale, the buyer wanted to “develop and construct on the Property a K-8 public charter school.” The Agreement of Sale contained a number of contingencies, referred to in the contract as “Buyer Required Approvals,” that Respondent was required to satisfy prior to finalization of the sale of the West Road property. Paragraph six of the Agreement to Sale sets forth a number of the pre-sale contingencies imposed on Respondent, and the same provides as follows: 6. Development The Buyer intends to develop and construct on the Property a K-8 public charter school and adjacent commercial development acceptable to Buyer consisting of buildings and other improvements including, but not limited to recreation fields, related landscaping, open space, storm water, and appropriate parking (the "Project"). Buyer's obligation to complete the purchase of the Property from Seller in accordance with the terms of this Agreement is contingent upon the satisfaction of each of the following conditions with regard to the Property (each of which may be waived in whole or in part in writing by Buyer): Buyer has obtained final, unappealed and unappealable approvals from all necessary governmental authorities (including governmental agencies), for zoning, utilities and any other approvals (including necessary parking requirements) Buyer deems necessary, in its sole discretion, permitting the construction and use of the improvements comprising the Project, including but not limited to any required special exception. Buyer has obtained final, unappealed and unappealable approvals and/or permits required by any and all governmental authorities (including governmental agencies) so that the Property shall have immediate and adequate access to water, sewer and all other utilities in accordance with the final approved site development plan. Buyer has obtained final, unappealed and unappealable approvals and/or permits required by any and all governmental authorities (including governmental agencies) for storm water management; including easements and agreements for constructing and maintaining storm water basins; all wetlands studies and approvals in such form that wetlands, if any, shall not preclude construction of roads, utilities, storm water management facilities, any other required improvements for erection of buildings on the Property. Buyer has obtained all permits and approvals, and all conditions thereof shall have been satisfied, so as to allow for recording of the final plan and issuance of building permits subject only to satisfaction of the following requirements by Buyer at or after Closing (i) submission of construction drawings in accordance with applicable law, (ii) execution by the Buyer of the necessary development agreements, (iii) execution and funding by Buyer of the necessary escrow agreements for municipal improvements, and sewer and water improvements, and (iv) payment by the Buyer of all municipal fees and charges associated therewith. Subject to Seller's obligation set forth in Section 6(f) below, Buyer has obtained any and all other easements, approvals and/or permits that may be necessary to construct and use the improvements comprising the Project. Buyer shall obtain, at no additional cost to Seller, all easements and roads that in Buyer's sole reasonable discretion are necessary for property access, utilities and signage to the Property in accordance with Buyer's final approved site development plan. The items referred to in subsections 6(a) through 6(f) hereof shall hereafter be referred to as the "Buyer Required Approvals." After the end of the Inspection Period, Buyer shall diligently proceed with the filing of all applications necessary for obtaining the Buyer Required Approvals. Seller agrees, at no expense to Seller, to cooperate with buyer in connection with the Buyer Required Approvals to the extent of signing all applications necessary for obtaining the buyer Required Approvals and appearing and testifying at the various hearings. Seller's cooperation as aforesaid shall not entitle Seller to any additional compensation. All permit fees, studies, deposit and investigation costs incurred in connection with the Buyer Required Approvals shall be the sole responsibility of buyer and buyer agrees to affirmatively use its good faith efforts to obtain all of the Buyer Required Approvals without delay and as expeditiously as reasonably possible. Seller hereby grants to Buyer a power of attorney to file, on Seller's behalf, all applications related to the Buyer Required Approvals; provided, however, that the Land shall not be rezoned prior to the expiration of the Inspection Period. Seller acknowledges that buyer will likely contact, meet with and/or obtain consents for the Project from neighboring property owners during the Inspection Period and in the process of obtaining the Buyer Required Approvals. (emphasis added). None of the provisions of paragraph six of the Agreement of Sale were waived by either party. Paragraph 15(b) of the Agreement of Sale provides as follows: (b) If Seller shall violate or fail (in breach of its obligations hereunder) to fulfill or perform any of the terms, conditions or undertaking set forth in this Agreement within ten (10) days written notice from Buyer or (five (5) days written notice in the event of a monetary default), Buyer shall be entitled to: (i) terminate this Agreement and receive the return of the Deposit and reimbursement of Buyer's documented out-of-pocket due diligence expenses up to $15,000.00, and, thereupon, the parties hereto will be released and relieved from all provisions of this Agreement, or (ii) pursue specific performance. Paragraph 17 of the Agreement of Sale states that “[b]uyer and Seller agree to cooperate with each other and to take such further actions as may be requested by the other in order to facilitate the timely purchase and sale of the Property.” Paragraphs 6, 15(b) and 17 of the Agreement of Sale obligated Respondent to take all steps necessary, including “appearing and testifying at the various hearings,” for ensuring that the “Buyer Required Approvals” were satisfied, which in turn would allow Respondent to receive his share of the purchase price for the West Road property. Section 112.311(1), provides in part that “[i]t is essential to the proper conduct and operation of government that public officials be independent and impartial and that public office not be used for private gain other than the remuneration provided by law.” Rezoning and Respondent’s Role In order for a charter school to be built on the West Road property, it was necessary to rezone the existing planned unit development land use plan covering the property. Ocoee City Planner Michael Rumer testified that there are two types of rezoning. There is a straight rezoning to a zoning category listed in the land development code and there is rezoning to a planned unit development (PUD). Both types of zoning use the following process: an application is filed; then there is a review process by a development review committee, which is a staff level review; that review is forwarded to the P & Z Commission for a recommendation; and then it goes to the Ocoee City Commission for two readings of an ordinance for rezoning if the rezoning is approved. This is the process that was followed for the West Road property PUD. On February 9, 2016, the issue of whether to recommend rezoning of the West Road property to allow for the charter school referenced in the Agreement of Sale came before the P & Z Commission. Respondent was present for the meeting. During the meeting, Respondent spoke in favor of the rezoning request for the West Road property. When a fellow commissioner made a request for more time to review the rezoning issue, Respondent opposed the delay by stating “[i]f you don't give them a go now, you basically kill the deal because it's a time sensitive thing that they want the kids in there in August.” During the meeting, the commissioners struggled with whether to recommend denial of the West Road property zoning request, recommend approval of the request without conditions, or recommend approval of the request with conditions. After two previous motions regarding the zoning request died for lack of a “second,” a third motion was made wherein approval was recommended “with the condition that we’re all going to look at the traffic movement with the final site plan design.” When it appeared as though this motion was also likely to fail for lack of a “second,” Respondent encouraged the chairman of the P & Z Commission to voice a “second” for the motion since Respondent was unable to do so.2/ Respondent’s actions during the meeting of February 9, 2016, were consistent with his obligations under the Agreement of Sale to assist the buyer of the West Road property with securing the “Buyer Required Approvals.”
Recommendation Based on the Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a civil penalty of $10,000.00 be imposed against Respondent due to his violation of section 112.313(7)(a) and that Respondent also be publicly censured and reprimanded. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of April, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LINZIE F. BOGAN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of April, 2017.
The Issue Whether Respondent's license as a real estate broker should be suspended or revoked, or the licensee otherwise disciplined for alleged violations of Chapter 475, F.S. as set forth in Administrative Complaint dated December 22, 1981. This proceeding arises from the filing of an administrative complaint by the Board of Real Estate against Jack Braunstein on December 22, 1981, which alleges that he failed to refund an advance rental fee to Annette Richard on May 13, 1980, thus violating a duty imposed upon him by law or by the terms of a listing contract in a real estate transaction in violation of subsection 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes. The complaint further alleges that Respondent thereby violated subsection 475.25 (1)(d), Florida Statutes, in failing to account to Ms. Richard, and violation of Section 475.453, Florida Statutes, for failing to provide repayment of any amount over 25 percent of the fee for rental information, if the prospective tenant does not obtain a rental. Respondent requested an administrative hearing, and the case was referred to this Division for assignment of a Hearing Officer on February 8, 1982. At the commencement of the hearing, the parties stipulated as to the truth of Paragraphs 2-3, 5-7, 9-11, and 19-20 of the Administrative Complaint. The parties further stipulated that Respondent was licensed by Petitioner at the time of the incident alleged in the Administrative Complaint. Respondent objected to the proceeding on various grounds, as reflected in the transcript of the hearing. The Hearing Officer treated the objection as a motion to dismiss and denied the same. Petitioner moved to amend Paragraph 22 of the Complaint to correct a typographical error to allege a violation of subsection 475.25(1)(d), F.S. in lieu of the inadvertent recitation of a violation of subsection 475.25(d), F.S. The motion was granted. The post-hearing submission by the Petitioner has been fully considered, and those portions not adopted herein are considered to be either unnecessary, irrelevant, or unwarranted in fact or law.
Findings Of Fact Respondent Jack Braunstein is licensed as a real estate broker and was so licensed at all times relevant to the matters alleged in the Administrative Complaint. Respondent operates Rent-Aid, Inc. located in Fort Lauderdale, Florida, a corporate real estate broker, He is the active broker for that firm. (Petitioner's Exhibits 1-2, Stipulation) On April 15, 1980, Annette H. Richard went to Respondent's firm to ascertain the availability of an apartment for rent in the school district where her child attended school. She had previously talked to Respondent by telephone concerning her needs, and Respondent had informed her that rentals were abundant and that she should come into the office. After she arrived, Respondent turned her over to his associate Jeannie Nemett who took down the information concerning Ms. Richard's apartment requirements. Ms. Nemett informed her that they could find her an apartment in the area, but had nothing available at that time. Although Ms. Nemett looked through the firm's book of apartment listings, she did not permit Ms. Richard to do so. Ms. Nemett told her that there was a new duplex listing not far from the desired area and Ms. Richard agreed to look at it. Ms. Nemett had explained the fact that the firm's services were available for a $50.00 "membership" fee. Since Ms. Richard did not have the money with her, she and Ms. Nemett stopped at the bank on the way to see the property and, after paying the requisite fee, Ms. Nemett gave her a copy of the "membership" agreement. She then showed the duplex and one other rental apartment to Ms. Richard. (Testimony of Richard, Nemett, Petitioner's Exhibit 3) A few days later, Ms. Nemett, having identified some existing available apartments in the school district area in her book of listings, called Ms. Richard several times but could not reach her. The messages were recorded on a telephone answering device. Ms. Richard did not return the calls immediately. About four days after having been shown the duplex by Ms. Nemett, she found an apartment which met her needs as a result of a newspaper ad. Prior to locating this apartment, Ms. Richard had also left telephone messages for Ms. Nemett which had not been returned. About a week or ten days after their initial meeting, Ms. Richard telephoned Ms. Nemett and informed her that she had secured her own apartment and did not wish Rent-Aid, Inc. to proceed any further in her behalf. (Testimony of Nemett, Richard, Petitioner's Exhibit 3) The agreement signed by Ms. Richard with Rent-Aid, Inc. included the following statement: If you do not obtain a rental you are entitled to receive a return of seventy-five percent of the fee paid, if you make demand within thirty days of this contract date. All notices shall be sent by certi- fied mail. A rental has been obtained when company provides a guaranteed available rental unit upon the terms specified and requested by member. (Emphasis added) By letter dated May 10, 1980, Ms. Richard requested a refund of her $50.00 fee from Rent-Aid, Inc., but by letter dated May 13, 1980, signed by Ms. Nemett, Ms. Richard was informed that a refund could not be made, as follows: It has been construed that the obtaining of rental property is when you receive listings--available, shown by us, in your price range and area, or any other listings which you agree to see. We did, in fact, show you available rental property under the terms of the Rent-Aid policy #011061. Also at that time, I left messages on your answering machine, concerning other avail- able rentals. Under the conditions and terms of this policy--a refund cannot be made. On advice of counsel, Respondent refunded the amount of $37.50 to Ms. Richard on January 11, 1982. (Testimony of Richard, Respondent, Petitioner's Exhibits 4-5) On March 27, 1980, Respondent's attorney wrote to Salvatore A. Carpino, Staff Attorney of the Department of Professional Regulation enclosing Rent-Aid, Inc.`s contract form and requesting review of it to determine whether or not it met the requirements of Chapter 475. The form sent to Mr. Carpino contained the same language as that used in the Richard transaction. By letter of April 1, 1980, the attorney informed Respondent that he had heard from the Department of Professional Regulation about the case and that the form would be acceptable if he deleted the word "registered" in "registered mail." Thereafter, on May 8, 1980, the attorney again wrote Mr. Carpino enclosing print sizes of the form to determine if it met the Department's print size requirements. By letter of May 15, 1980, Carpino informed the attorney that the Respondent could continue to use the existing forms "with the changes that we have previously discussed." Respondent utilized the contract form in question in reliance upon the advice given to him by his attorney in the above regards, and believed that he was operating properly in accordance with the Department's requirements. He had inserted the definition of "obtaining a rental" in the contract form in order to eliminate the vagueness of the statute pertaining to refunds. (Testimony of Braunstein, supplemented by Respondent's Exhibits 1-2)
Recommendation That the Florida Real Estate Commission (formerly Board of Real Estate) issue a private reprimand and impose a $100 administrative fine against Respondent, Jack Braunstein, pursuant to subsection 475.25(1)(d), Florida Statutes. DONE and ENTERED this 20th day of July, 1982. THOMAS C. OLDHAM Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of July, 1982. COPIES FURNISHED: Bruce Lamb, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 John P. Gaudiosi, Esquire 3801 North Federal Highway Pompano Beach, Florida 33064 Mr. C. B. Stafford Executive Director Florida Real Estate Commission P. O. Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32801