The Issue There are three issues presented: Whether the signs in question were erected at such a time and under such conditions that would entitle them to be permitted; Whether the signs in question, if not entitled to a permit, have some type of grandfather status where the owner would be entitled to compensation for the removal; and Whether the signs in question qualify as on-premise signs not requiring a permit. Both parties submitted detailed proposed recommended orders, which have been read and considered. There are few disputes concerning the basic facts. To the extent the findings herein differ from the proposals, those findings are based upon the most credible evidence. Certain findings have been deleted because they are not relevant to the issues or are not findings of fact.
Findings Of Fact The signs in question in Cases No. 81-1672T and 81-1675T are on the north-facing wall of the "El Okey Market" at 1630 NW 27th Avenue in Miami, Florida. Each sign is an aluminum framed poster six by 12 feet. An inspector of the Department of Transportation (Department) Investigated the signs at the El Okey Market in March of 1981, and notices of violation were issued to Empire Outdoor Advertising (Empire) on May 11, 1981. The parties stipulated that the inspection revealed neither sign bears a valid outdoor advertising permit issued by the Department. The signs are visible to traffic traveling south on 27th Avenue and are located within 660 feet of the right of way Empire has acknowledged owning the signs in question The inspector's investigation of the El Okey Market signs also revealed the existence of a permitted outdoor advertising sign, owned by another sign company, which is located approximately 70 feet south of the Empire signs and which also faces north. The Department introduced into evidence a map, certified by a Department official, which shows the Federal-Aid Primary Highway System for the Miami area as it existed in 1979. The inspector located the El Okey Market on the map, which indicates that that portion of 27th Avenue was a Federal-Aid Primary Highway in 1979. No contrary evidence was introduced. At the location of the subject signs, 27th Avenue is a Federal-Aid Primary Highway. The Vice President and General Manager of Empire testified that the present company evolved from a firm called Peppi Advertising Company started by his father, and that he had been employed by the company since the early 1950's. The firm was sold to Donnelly Advertising and then to Ackerly Communications, and continued to operate as Empire. The firm obtained a building permit on June 6, 1965, for the erection of billboard-type signs on the side of the building located at 1630 NW 27th Avenue. The Vice President testified it was company policy to erect signs shortly after the permit was issued. He further testified that he serviced the poster through the 1960's. The signs in question were erected in 1965, and have been in existence since that date. No permits were applied for when the signs became subject to regulation in 1971. Photographs had been taken of the signs in question showing advertising copy on July 15, 1982, to consist of Kraft Mayonnaise and EverReady Energizer Batteries. Advertising copy on June 24, 1982, shows Kraft Cheese and J & B Scotch in Spanish. The above items are products of national companies who pay Empire to advertise their products. Empire pays the El Okey Market for the privilege of placing the signs on the wall of the market. The signs in question are not on-premise signs. Patrick D. Galvin, the Department's Administrator for outdoor advertising, testified that it is the Department's policy to deny permits to signs lawfully erected within the city limits prior to the date such signs became subject to Chapter 479, Florida Statutes, where the sign is less than the prescribed distance from a second sign which has obtained a valid outdoor advertising permit from the Department. It is the inspector's practice to recommend that a permit be issued to applicants where the sign in question has no permit but was built before the date permits became required and is otherwise a lawful sign. The Department admitted policy is that lawfully erected signs may lose their grandfather status as nonconforming signs under Chapter 479 and may thus become subject to uncompensated removal because the owner failed to obtain a permit within the 60-days period which followed the effective date of Florida's outdoor advertising regulations.
Recommendation The Department of Transportation has shown that the signs in question are subject to removal because they have been in existence for more than five years since they became nonconforming. The Department may remove the signs at anytime upon payment to the owner for full value of the subject signs which were erected prior to December 8, 1971. DONE and ORDERED this 21st day of September, 1982, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of September, 1982. COPIES FURNISHED: Vernon L. Whittier, Jr., Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 L. Martin Reeder, Jr., Esquire Jeffrey Bercow, Esquire 1400 SE Bank Building Miami, Florida 33131 Paul N. Pappas, Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 =================================================================
The Issue At issue in this proceeding is whether the Department of Transportation's Notice of Denied Application for an outdoor advertising permit at State Road 61 (U.S. 319), 168 feet west of Thomasville Road, Leon County, issued to Lamar of Tallahassee on May 30, 2008, should be upheld pursuant to Section 479.07, Florida Statutes,1/ or whether the sign should be permitted as a nonconforming sign as defined by Section 479.01(14), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact The Department is a state agency empowered to regulate outdoor advertising signs along the interstate and federal-aid primary highway systems of Florida pursuant to Chapter 479, Florida Statutes. Lamar is licensed to engage in the business of outdoor advertising within the state of Florida pursuant to Section 479.04, Florida Statutes. Lamar owns a V-shaped sign located on certain real property at 1940 Thomasville Road in Tallahassee. Thomasville Road is also known as State Road 61. Lamar does not own the real property, but has the right to erect and maintain its sign on the property under a lease that Lamar executed with the landowner in 1998. Lamar's sign was erected in 1998, with the approval of the City of Tallahassee. The sign is located on the southwest corner of the intersection of Thomasville and Betton/Bradford Road, behind the Southern Flooring showroom. The east side of the sign face is within 660 feet of and visible to State Road 61. State Road 61 is a federal-aid highway and thus a "controlled road" subject to the jurisdiction of the Department pursuant to Section 479.07(1), Florida Statutes. Therefore, the east side of the sign requires a permit from the Department. The west side is visible only to Bradford Road and does not require a permit from the Department. On February 10, 2008, Lisa Adams, an outdoor advertising inspector conducting an annual inventory on behalf of the Department, identified the subject sign as an unpermitted sign that is visible from State Road 61. Ms. Adams completed a Department compliance checklist stating that the sign was possibly illegal because it lacked a Department permit and the east side of the sign was visible from State Road 61. On April 22, 2008, the Department issued a notice of violation stating that the sign was illegal and must be removed within 30 days of the date of the notice, pursuant to Section 479.105, Florida Statutes. Lamar did not file a request for hearing in response to the notice of violation, and does not contest the notice of violation in this proceeding. On May 16, 2008, Lamar filed an Application for Outdoor Advertising Permit for the sign. The Department reviewed the application and issued a Notice of Denied Application on May 30, 2008. The application was denied because the sign site does not meet the spacing requirements of Section 479.07(9)(a)2., Florida Statutes, in that it is closer than 1,000 feet from another permitted sign owned by Lamar. The other permitted sign was built in 1979. The 1,000 foot spacing requirement has been in the statute at all times since the 1998 construction of the sign at issue in this proceeding, meaning that it could never have met the spacing requirement of Section 479.07(9)(a)2., Florida Statutes. Myron Laborde was Lamar Advertising Southeast's regional manager in 1998 when the sign was built. His area of authority included Tallahassee. Mr. Laborde testified that in 1998 the view of the sign from State Road 61 was obstructed by several palm trees, some scrub oaks, and a very tall tallow tree. Some of these trees were removed when Southern Flooring took over and remodeled the old Helms Exterminators building at 1940 Thomasville Road about four years ago. Mr. Laborde testified that the sign is now visible from State Road 61 due to the removal of the trees, but only "if you . . .turn your head 90 degrees" while driving north on State Road 61. Loyd Childree has been the vice-president and general manager of Lamar of Tallahassee since 2003. Mr. Childree testified that the renovations to the Helms Exterminators building began some time after March 2005, and that the building's size was nearly doubled to accommodate the Southern Flooring showroom. Mr. Childree testified that a lot of trees were removed during the renovation, including palm trees and a "canopy-type tree" about 25 to 30 feet tall with a full crown similar to that of an oak. Mr. Childree testified that the sign is now visible from State Road 61 due to the removal of the trees. Mr. Childree further stated that Lamar markets the sign to advertisers based on the traffic counts from Bradford Road, not those from State Road 61. Ms. Adams, the inspector who identified the possible illegality of the sign, has worked for the Department's contractor, TBE Group, since August 2004. Her job is to conduct an inventory of permitted signs on controlled roads such as State Road 61 and determine which unpermitted signs are visible from the roadway. Ms. Adams inventoried State Road 61 in 2005, 2006 and 2007 without identifying Lamar's sign as an unpermitted sign visible from the roadway. Ms. Adams testified that her predecessor in the position inventoried State Road 61 every year since Lamar's sign was erected and never identified the sign as one visible from State Road 61. Ms. Adams testified that she might have seen the sign in a previous year but did not identify it as illegal because she believed it had "on-premise" advertising, i.e., it advertised Southern Flooring. With certain restrictions, a sign erected on the premises of a business establishment that bears advertising for that establishment is exempt pursuant to Section 479.16(1), Florida Statutes. Ms. Adams frankly conceded that she was speculating and that her memory was unclear as to whether she had seen and noted this sign in past years. In any event, Lamar's log of advertisers showed that Southern Flooring never advertised on the sign. Lynn Holschuh is the Department's state outdoor advertising administrator, and had held this position since 1992. Ms. Holschuh testified that State Road 61 has been inventoried by an outdoor advertising inspector every year since Lamar's sign was erected in 1998. None of the inspectors noted the visibility or possible illegality of the sign until Ms. Adams noted the sign on February 12, 2008. Ms. Holschuh lives in Tallahassee and has driven on State Road 61 hundreds of times over the years. In her deposition, she testified that she believed the sign was not visible when it was built, and only became visible from State Road 61 when a third party removed the obstructing trees. The testimony of Mr. Laborde, Mr. Childree, and Ms. Holschuh was credible and uncontroverted as to the history of the sign. It is found that the sign was not visible from State Road 61 when it was erected in 1998, but that it became visible from State Road 61 when trees were removed by the landowner during renovations to the old Helms Exterminators building at some point after March 2005. Lamar's sign, now visible from State Road 61, is subject to the Department's jurisdiction pursuant to Section 479.01, Florida Statutes, because State Road 61, as a federal- aid primary highway, is a "controlled road" under the statute. A sign visible from a controlled road must carry a Department permit. Lamar contends that the facts of this case establish that its sign meets the definition of a "nonconforming sign" set forth in Section 479.01(14), Florida Statutes: "Nonconforming sign" means a sign which was lawfully erected but which does not comply with the land use, setback, size, spacing, and lighting provisions of state or local law, rule, regulation, or ordinance passed at a later date or a sign which was lawfully erected but which later fails to comply with state or local law, rule, regulation, or ordinance due to changed conditions. Lamar's sign was not visible from State Road 61 in 1998 and therefore was "lawfully erected" in terms of the Department's licensing requirements. Lamar contends that the removal of trees by a third party constituted "changed conditions" that rendered the sign out of compliance with state law, and that the sign is therefore a nonconforming sign under Section 479.01(14), Florida Statutes. The Legislature has provided no definition of the term "changed conditions," and the Department has no rule to provide interpretive guidance to the words of the statute. On September 17, 2008, Lamar filed a motion for leave to amend its petition for hearing in this case to challenge the Department's alleged interpretation of the phrase "due to changed conditions" as an unadopted rule. In particular, Lamar alleged that the Department was applying an unadopted rule limiting "changed conditions" to those initiated by a government agency. On September 19, 2008, the Department filed an unopposed motion to remand the case to the agency. The motion was granted on September 22, 2008. In the Florida Administrative Weekly dated November 26, 2008 (vol. 34, no. 48, p. 6228), the Department published a Notice of Development of Proposed Rule, with the following preliminary text of an amendment to Florida Administrative Code Rule 14-10.006: 14-10.006 Additional Permitting Criteria. Each application for an outdoor advertising sign permit shall meet the requirements of Sections 479.07(9) and 479.11, F.S. In addition, an application must comply with the requirements of the agreement between the state and the United States Department of Transportation referenced in Section 479.02(1), F.S., which have not been duplicated in Sections 479.07(9) and 479.11, F.S., or superseded by stricter provisions in those statutes. The requirements are: through (8) No change. (9) The term "changed conditions" referenced in Section 479.01(14), F.S., defining nonconforming signs, means only the actions of a governmental entity, as defined by Section 11.45, F.S., which includes for example: Rezoning of a commercial area, reclassifying a secondary highway as a primary highway, or altering a highway's configuration causing a preexisting sign to become subject to the Department's jurisdiction. (Emphasis added) Ms. Holschuh testified that this draft rule language was written in direct response to Lamar's allegation that the Department's denial of its application was based on an unadopted rule. On December 16, 2008, the Department held a workshop on the draft rule. At the workshop, the Florida Outdoor Advertising Association ("FOAA") submitted the following suggested draft language for subsection (9) of Florida Administrative Code Rule 14-10.006: (9) The term "changed conditions" referenced in Section 479.01(14), F.S., defining nonconforming signs, means, and shall include, any of the following: An action taken by a governmental entity, as defined by Section 11.45, F.S., such as the rezoning of a parcel of property fro commercial to noncommercial, reclassifying a secondary highway to a primary highway, altering a highway's configuration, or the taking of any other action within the powers of such governmental entity which thereby causes a preexisting sign to become subject to the Department's jurisdiction; The action of a third party, who is not the owner of a preexisting sign, relating to modifications to the topography, vegetation, buildings or other physical characteristics of the property upon which the sign is located, or the property surrounding the sign, which thereby causes a preexisting sign to become subject to the Department's jurisdiction. an act of God which thereby causes a preexisting sign to become subject to the Department's jurisdiction. The Department rejected the FOAA's proposed language, and ultimately abandoned the effort to adopt a rule defining the term "changed conditions." On September 18, 2009, the Department filed a motion with DOAH to reopen this case and proceed to a fact-finding hearing regarding its proposed rejection of Lamar's application. In her deposition, Ms. Holschuh testified that the rulemaking effort was abandoned because the language proposed by the FOAA made it clear that it would be "nearly impossible" to arrive at a definition that would cover "every situation that might arise for when an existing sign might suddenly become visible." Ms. Holschuh testified in deposition that it is now the Department's policy to review these matters on a case-by- case basis. However, she also testified that the Department, as a matter of "policy," continues to limit its consideration of "changed conditions" to actions taken by a governmental entity. The Department bases this limitation on the examples provided by 23 C.F.R. § 750.707(b), defining "nonconforming signs" for purposes of the Federal Highway Administration: A nonconforming sign is a sign which was lawfully erected but does not comply with the provisions of State law or State regulations passed at a later date or later fails to comply with State law or State regulations due to changed conditions. Changed conditions include, for example, signs lawfully in existence in commercial areas which at a later date become noncommercial, or signs lawfully erected on a secondary highway later classified as a primary highway. Ms. Holschuh stated that the Department's policy was applied to Lamar in the instant case, and would continue to be applied in the future unless some "extraordinary circumstance" in a specific case led the Department to revisit the policy. At the final hearing, Ms. Holschuh backed away somewhat from her flat statement that the Department's "policy" was to limit consideration of changed conditions to those caused by government action. She stated that FOAA's proposed rule language caused the Department to reconsider its position that governmental action should be the exclusive reason for granting a permit for "changed conditions," and testified that the Department will consider other circumstances in its case-by-case review of permit applications. Ms. Holschuh testified that, under the facts presented in this case, the Department would deny the permit because there is DOAH case law on point for the proposition that tree removal does not constitute "changed conditions," and because broadening the definition of "changed conditions" to include the situation presented by this case would open up the process to abuse. Ms. Holschuh testified, at more than one point in the proceeding, that the Department would have very likely granted the permit had the trees been removed by the Department rather than the private landowner. She gave no indication that Section 479.105(1)(e), Florida Statutes, or any other statute would prevent the Department from granting the permit for Lamar's nonconforming sign, should the Department find that the sign fell into nonconformity due to "changed conditions." The DOAH case law cited by Ms. Holschuh is Lamar of Tallahassee v. Department of Transportation, Case Nos. 08-0660 and 08-0661 (DOAH September 15, 2008), discussed more fully in the Conclusions of Law below. Ms. Holschuh testified that Lamar's sign is not located in a Department right-of-way and is not a hazard to the public in its current location.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Department of Transportation denying the application of Lamar of Tallahassee for a state sign permit for a location described as State Road 61 (U.S. 319), 168 feet west of Thomasville Road, in Leon County, Florida (Application Number 57155). DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of June, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of June, 2010.
The Issue Whether the subject outdoor advertising signs are illegal because they were erected without state permits from Petitioner. Whether the subject signs should be removed. Whether Petitioner is equitably estopped to assert that the signs are illegal and should be removed.
Findings Of Fact Respondent owns and maintains an outdoor advertising sign located adjacent to Interstate 95 on Northwest 6th Court, which is between Northwest 75th Street and Northwest 76th Street, Miami, Dade County, Florida. For ease of reference, this sign will be referred to as the Interstate 95 sign. The Interstate 95 sign has two facings, each of which is visible from Interstate 95. The Interstate 95 sign is located within 147 feet of the right-of-way of Interstate 95. Respondent owns and maintains an outdoor advertising sign located adjacent to Interstate 395 at the corner of Northwest 14th Street and Northwest 1st Court, Miami, Dade County, Florida. For ease of reference, this sign will be referred to as the Interstate 395 sign. The Interstate 395 sign has two facings, each of which is visible from Interstate 395. The Interstate 395 sign is located within 240 feet of the right- of-way of Interstate 395. Eugene A. (Andy) Hancock, Jr., is the President of the corporate Respondent and, at the times pertinent to this proceeding, controlled the activities of Respondent. Mr. Hancock caused the corporate Respondent to lease the respective properties on which the subject signs are located in November 1998. He thereafter caused the corporate Respondent to erect the two double-faced signs at issue in this proceeding. The subject signs were constructed during September and October 1999. Each sign was constructed without a state permit from Petitioner. Each sign is within the permitting jurisdiction of Petitioner. Mr. Hancock testified that his company did not apply for permits from Petitioner because of a conversation he had with Bernard Davis, a former outdoor advertising administrator for Petitioner. Mr. Hancock testified that Mr. Davis represented to him that his company would not need permits from Petitioner if it had permits from the City of Miami. This testimony is rejected. 3/ Respondent has applied for state sign permits for the subject signs. Permits for these signs have not been issued because of their proximity to existing, permitted signs. 4/
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a final order finding that the subject signs are illegal and must be removed pursuant to Section 479.105, Florida Statutes. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of February, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of February, 2001.
Findings Of Fact Respondent owns a sign within 660 feet of the I-4 erected alongside SR 424A (Fairbanks Avenue) outside the corporate limits of Orlando or Winter Park, Florida, on the east side of I-4, an interstate highway. The sign is visible from the I-4 and the face of the sign is nearly parallel to the I-4. The sign is located within the interchange of the I-4, i.e., it is located within two lines running easterly and perpendicular to the commencement of the off ramp and end of the on ramp of the I-4 at the Fairbanks Avenue intersection. The I-4, which is considered to be an east-west highway, runs in a northwesterly-southeasterly direction where it crosses over Fairbanks Avenue, which runs generally east and west at this point. Respondent's sign is located in the vicinity (within 200 to 500 feet) of several signs erected by Peterson Advertising Company before 1971 and which are now permitted as nonconforming signs. These signs are erected along the curve of the eastbound (which at this location moves in a northwesterly direction) off ramp and are at varying angles with the I-4, but all can be seen from the I-4. Respondent's sign can be seen by both east and westbound traffic on the I-4; however, it is closer to the eastbound lane of traffic. Before the construction of this sign was completed, Respondent was advised the sign would not be permitted because it was within 1,000 feet of another sign on the same side of the I-4 facing in the same direction and within 500 feet of the interchange.
The Issue The central issue in this case is whether the Respondent is entitled to a sign permit for a location on Fairbanks Avenue facing Interstate 4, and whether the sign which has been erected at that location is in violation of applicable provisions of Chapter 479, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the testimony of the witnesses and the documentary evidence received at the hearing, the following findings of fact are made: The Department is authorized pursuant to Chapter 479, Florida Statutes, to regulate outdoor advertising signs. The Respondent owns or controls an outdoor advertising sign (subject sign) located on Fairbanks Avenue which faces I 4 and which is 480 feet from the centerline of I 4. The sign face and direction of the subject sign are visible from I 4 following that route as it is normally traveled, i.e. on the main-traveled way. The subject sign is no more than 480 feet from the interchange at Fairbanks and I 4. The subject sign was erected in June, 1979, when SR 424 was not designated a federal aid primary road and a state permit was not required. On May 17, 1979, the Department's then district sign coordinator issued a letter to Respondent in response to Creative Media's sign permit application which provided that "a state permit is not required at this time." (e.s.) The Respondent's application in 1979 specified that the sign location was not within city limits which is presumed true for purposes of this record. Further, the 1979 application specified that the sign would be located .1 of a mile (presumably 528 feet) from the intersection. That description of the proposed sign is also presumed true. Subsequently, Fairbanks became a part of the state highway system and a requirement for outdoor advertising permits for signs erected along that roadway became effective. The sign face for which the present permit is sought is within 500 feet of the I 4 interchange. On January 30, 1990, Inspector Dollery photographed the subject sign which contained the following verbiage: "ENRICH YOUR LIFE. Barclay Place Rental Apartments at Heathrow". When Inspector Dollery visited the location on January 3 and 4, 1991, the sign face was painted white with only a telephone number (425-5100) depicted. On February 5, 1990, the Department's current district outdoor advertising administrator issued a notice of alleged violation regarding the subject sign. On February 26, 1990, the Respondent filed an application for a permit for the sign face in dispute. The 1990 application acknowledged that the sign was 480 feet from the I 4 intersection. The Department returned the application as not meeting the spacing requirements for signs facing I 4 and for being less than 500 feet from the interchange. POA Acquisition, an outdoor advertising company, holds permits for signs located on I 4 which are within 1500 feet of the subject sign.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Transportation enter a final order finding the subject sign in violation of the rule as set forth in the notice of alleged violations dated February 5, 1990, and denying the permit application of the Respondent. DONE and ENTERED this 22nd day of April, 1991, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOYOUS D. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of April, 1991. APPENDIX TO CASE NO. 90-2193T RULINGS ON THE PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT SUBMITTED BY THE DEPARTMENT: 1. Paragraphs 1 through 3 are accepted. RULINGS ON THE PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT SUBMITTED BY THE RESPONDENT: The six unnumbered paragraphs are addressed in the order presented. The first paragraph is accepted. The second paragraph is accepted. The first sentence of the third paragraph is accepted. The second sentence of the third paragraph is rejected as contrary to the weight of the credible evidence or irrelevant if intended to establish that a DOT official told Mr. Fekete to retain paperwork. The fourth paragraph is rejected as contrary to the weight of the credible evidence. If the sign had been constructed as represented on the application, the fifth paragraph could be accepted; however, Respondent did not build the sign as stated in the 1979 application nor can it be determined from this record whether the spacing requirements along I 4 could have been met in 1979. Certainly, for a sign facing on Fairbanks, the spacing requirements could have been met. The distance from the interchange is ultimately why Respondent's application would have failed in 1979 if accurately requested. Consequently, as drafted, the fifth paragraph must be rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. The sixth paragraph is accepted. COPIES FURNISHED: Vernon L. Whittier, Jr. Assistant General Counsel Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street, M.S. 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Gerald S. Livingston Kreuter & Livingston, P.A. 200 East Robinson Street Suite 1150 Orlando, Florida 32801 Ben G. Watts, Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building ATTN: Eleanor F. Turner, M.S.58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Thornton J. Williams General Counsel Department of Transportation 562 Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458
The Issue Whether Florida Administrative Code Rule 14-10.007(6)(b), which provides for revocation of outdoor advertising permits for nonconforming signs that are abandoned or discontinued, is an "invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority" as alleged by Petitioners.
Findings Of Fact The Department of Transportation is the state agency responsible for administering and enforcing the outdoor advertising program in accordance with chapter 479, Florida Statutes. The Department adopted Florida Administrative Code Chapter 14-10, which provides for the permitting and control of outdoor advertising signs visible to and within controlled areas of interstates and federal-aid highways. Rule 14-10.007 provides regulations for nonconforming signs. Section 479.01(17), Florida Statutes, defines nonconforming signs as signs that were lawfully erected but which do not comply with later enacted laws, regulations, or ordinances on the land use, setback, size, spacing and lighting provisions of state or local law, or fail to comply with current regulations due to changed conditions. Rule 14-10.007 provides in part that: (6) A nonconforming sign may continue to exist so long as it is not destroyed, abandoned, or discontinued. "Destroyed," "abandoned," and "discontinued" have the following meanings: * * * (b) A nonconforming sign is "abandoned" or "discontinued" when a sign structure no longer exists at the permitted location or the sign owner fails to operate and maintain the sign, for a period of 12 months or longer. Signs displaying bona fide public interest messages are not "abandoned" or "discontinued" within the meaning of this section. The following conditions shall be considered failure to operate and maintain the sign: Signs displaying only an "available for lease" or similar message, Signs displaying advertising for a product or service which is no longer available, Signs which are blank or do not identify a particular product, service, or facility. Carter is licensed to engage in the business of outdoor advertising in Florida and holds an outdoor advertising permit for a nonconforming outdoor advertising sign bearing Tag No. AS 228. The outdoor advertising sign for the referenced tag number is located in Lee County, Florida ("Carter Sign"). On February 22, 2010, the Department issued a Notice of Intent to Revoke Sign Permit to Carter for sign bearing Tag No. AS 228. The notice advises that "this nonconforming sign has not displayed advertising copy for 12 months or more, and is deemed abandoned, pursuant to s. 14-10.007(6)(b), Florida Administrative Code." Petitioner Nissi is licensed to engage in the business of outdoor advertising in Florida and holds outdoor advertising signs bearing Tag Nos. BK 731 and BK 732, which signs are located in Pasco County, and BN 604, BN 605, AR 261, AR 262, AT 485 and AT 486, which signs are located in Hernando County ("Nissi Signs"). In June and July 2013, the Department issued notices of intent to revoke sign permits, pursuant to rule 14-10.007(6)(b), based on the signs not displaying advertising for 12 months or longer. The notice issued to Nissi advised that the Department deemed the signs as having been abandoned. Carter and Nissi, as owners of nonconforming signs receiving violations under rule 14-10.007(6)(b), have standing and timely challenged the rule in dispute herein.
The Issue The issue in these causes is whether denial of Petitioners' outdoor advertising sign site permit applications by Respondent were correctly determined under Subsection 479.111(2), Florida Statutes (2003), on the basis that the sign sites were unzoned commercial/industrial areas; and on the basis that within attending factual circumstances, the sign site did not qualify as unzoned commercial/industrial areas as defined in Subsection 479.01(23), Florida Statutes (2003).
Findings Of Fact Based upon the observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying; documentary materials received in evidence; evidentiary rulings made pursuant to Sections 120.569 and 120.57, Florida Statutes (2003); and the entire record of this proceeding, the following relevant and material findings of fact are determined: Petitioner, Tropical Landholdings, a Florida Corporation, was created in 1998 and purchased approximately 700 to 800 acres of land comprised of residential multi-family and commercial properties along Interstate 75 (I-75) in Punta Gorda, Florida. On September 8, 2003, Petitioner, Crown Advertising, Inc., of Belleview, Florida, submitted three outdoor advertising sign site permit applications to the Department for review. On September 23, 2003, the Department denied the three outdoor advertising sign site permit applications for the following reasons: (1) the sign sites were not permitted under the local land use designation of site (§ 479.111(2), Fla. Stat. (2003)); and (2) the sign sites did not qualify as unzoned commercial/industrial area. § 479.01, Fla. Stat. (2003). The sign site permit application forms used by Petitioners in these causes were composed and authorized by the Department. The form required the applicant to obtain and provide information regarding the proposed sign site, what is proposed to be constructed on the site, and where the proposed construction is to occur. The sign site permit applications also required the applicant to secure information from the appropriate local zoning official of the future land use designation and the current zoning of the proposed sites enacted by the local government's Comprehensive Plan and land use development regulations. This form required information from the local government as to whether the applicant is or is not in compliance with all adopted local ordinances. Permission to erect an outdoor sign structure on the identified sign site is subject to approval by the City. Petitioners complied with the requested information. The local government, the City of North Port, approved the three sign site permit applications in question and granted Petitioners permission to erect three outdoor billboard signs. This local grant of approval was then subjected to concurring approval by the Department. After receiving the sign site permits that were approved by the City, the Department engaged the services of a consultant to conduct on-site review and identification of: (1) the local government's designation for each proposed sign site; (2) the permitted uses of each proposed sign site (local drainage facilities, pipeline corridors, underground communication cables, electric transmission lines, and outdoor advertising signs); and (3) a review of adjacent and surrounding parcels. The consultant reported to the Department the factual circumstances attendant the three locally approved sign sites. It should be noted that the consultant did not render an opinion regarding the Department's approval or denial of the sign site permit applications. The sign sites in question were zoned under the local "land use designation" of the City of North Port's Ordinance 02-46, Section 53.146 (Ordinance 02-46), as a "utility industrial corridor." The zoned land was composed of strips of land measuring 25 to 70 feet in width on the west side and 160 to 170 feet in width on the east side. The "permitted governmental uses" of a parcel zoned as a "utility industrial corridor," included such uses as underground communication cables, electric transmission lines, and outdoor advertising signs. Ordinance 02-46, under the title "Prohibited Uses and Structures," specifically prohibits "all commercial and industrial uses." Based upon a review of all information provided by Petitioners, the local government, and its consultant, the Department first determined the three sign sites on which the subject signs were to be erected and located, prohibited commercial or industrial uses. The Department then determined, based upon an analysis of the materials provided by its consultant and the City of North Port, the three sign sites in question had not been zoned for commercial or industrial uses as a part of the local government's comprehensive zoning plan. Based upon (1) the prohibition of commercial or industrial uses and (2) no commercial or industrial zoning of the sign sites, the Department concluded these three sign sites were zoned "primarily to permit outdoor advertising," a prohibited function. The denials were required. Under the local land use designation of Ordinance 02-46, the City of North Port's permitted uses included local drainage facilities and a pipeline corridor. Under governmental uses designation of Ordinance 02-46, the City of North Port's permitted uses included underground communication cables, electric transmission lines, and outdoor advertising. However, Ordinance 02-46 specifically prohibits all commercial and industrial uses under the governmental uses designation. When questioned by Petitioners, Ms. Holschuh testified "that the Department's intent was to allow [sign] permits whenever possible and never prohibit the installation of billboards." From this specific statement of testimony, Petitioners argued that "implementing the intent the Department must look beyond the labels of the zoning and look at the actual primary uses allowed under those designations." (Emphasis added.) Ms. Holschuh disagreed with Petitioners' characterization of the Department's procedures and convincingly maintained that the Department based its denials on "sign site zoning" and factors considered for determining an "unzoned commercial/industrial area" as defined by statute. Continuing with its argument, Petitioners conclude "[T]he department . . . appears to be in conflict with Judge Barbara Staros' decision of February 16, 2004, in a rule challenge proceeding, where she analyzed the Sign Permit procedure under Section 479.07, Florida Statutes." In her Final Order, Administrative Law Judge Barbara Staros made a Finding of Fact in paragraph 30, stating: Once the local government zoning official certifies that the proposed sign identified in the application is in compliance with the comprehensive plan adopted pursuant to Chapter 163, the Department does not go behind that certification to look factually at whether the zoning action was consistent with the comprehensive plan. Page 13. The procedures followed by the Department in this proceeding complied with Judge Staros Finding of Fact in paragraph 31, where she wrote: The Department uses the application and the information contained therein to determine whether a proposed sign location falls within the definition of a "commercial or industrial zone." If it does, [fall within] then the Department determines whether those designations were adopted as part of the local government's comprehensive planning efforts or were "primarily" adopted to permit outdoor advertising signs on that location. Page 30. Based upon it's receipt, review, and analysis of the specific facts provided by all parties of interest, the Department determined the sites where the signs were to be erected prohibited commercial or industrial use. The Department factually determined that no local zoning identified the sites as commercial or industrial. The Department concluded correctly and in accord with Florida Administrative Code Rule 14-10.0052 that these three sign sites were zoned by the City of North Port, the local governmental entity, "primarily to permit outdoor advertising" contrary to sign site permit procedures under Section 479.07, Florida Statutes (2003). Based upon the evidence of record and considering the size of the sign site, the local government's zoning of the site, designated uses of the site, and prohibited uses on the site, denial of the sign applications was correctly determined pursuant to Subsection 479.111(2), Florida Statutes (2003), and Florida Administrative Code Rule 14-10.0052. Based on the testimonies of Ms. Holschuh and James Duff, who testified regarding his ownership, property taxes paid, and the investors' inability to use the property in question to their economic advantage, Petitioners failed to carry the burden of producing a preponderance of credible evidence to establish that the Department incorrectly and/or wrongfully denied Petitioners' applications for three sign site permits pursuant to Subsection 479.111(2), Florida Statutes (2003), and Florida Administrative Code Rule 14-10.0052.
The Issue Whether the sign of Petitioner, White Advertising International, should be removed by the Respondent, Department of Transportation, for violation of Section 479.07(1) and Section 479.11(2), Florida Statutes, and the rules and regulations promulgated thereunder.
Findings Of Fact A notice of violation was sent by the Respondent, Department of Transportation, to the Petitioner, White Advertising International, on March 21, 1977, citing an outdoor advertising sign owned by the Petitioner located 1.97 miles west of U.S. #1, State Road 50 E/B with copy "Real Estate Service." The violation noted that the sign violated Section 479.071(1), Florida Statutes, and Rule 14ER77-09 (now Rule 14-10.04) and Section 479.11(2), Florida Statutes, and Rule 14ER77-10, 11 (now Rule 14-10.05 and 14-10.06). There is no dispute as to the location or copy or ownership of the subject sign. It is not in a zoned business, commercial or industrial area and is outside an urban area. The sign does not conform to the current setback requirements. The sign has a permit tag dated 1971, the only permit tag on the sign. No application was alleged to have been made for permit or annual fee paid or offered subsequent to 1971 until the application noted in 4, infra. A sign permit application and annual renewal was processed by White Advertising International dated January 21, 1977. The application was an annual renewal for the year of "19 72-1976." The printed application form stated that, "The signs listed above meet all requirements of Chapter 479, Florida Statutes. Respondent, by its outdoor advertising section administrator, refused to grant the permit on the grounds that the sign which had been erected prior to the enactment of the current setback regulations and probably in the year 1967 had had no application for permit or annual fee paid since 1971 and therefore having become an illegal sign, no permit could be issued. The Petitioner sign company introduced into evidence a letter dated February 28, 1977, from Respondent, Department of Transportation, through its property management administrator which indicated that the State had previously contended the subject sign was built on an unplatted street and had to be removed without compensation but that it was discovered such was not the case and that the State then offered to reimburse Petitioner for relocation costs. Petitioner did not remove the sign and the letter states that the current position of the Respondent State is: That the sign is on the right of way, contrary to Section 339.301, Florida Statutes; Has no current permit; contrary to Section 479.07(1), F.S. Violates Section 479.13, Florida Statutes, as having been constructed, erected, operated, used and maintained without the written permission of the owner or other person in lawful possession or control of the property on which the sign is located; and The sign therefore is an illegal sign and must be removed by Petitioner without compensation. Respondent contends: that the sign is illegal, having failed to be permitted since the year 1971; that it has one pole of the sign pole on the right of way contrary to Section 339.301; that it has no lease contract as required by Section 479.13; that Respondent has no authority to renew delinquent permits; that once a sign becomes illegal a new permit cannot reinstate its nonconforming status. Petitioner, White Advertising International, contends: that it should be granted a permit inasmuch as permits for some signs had been granted by the Respondent although the annual permit fee was not timely made.
Recommendation Remove subject sign if the same has not been removed within thirty (30) days from the date of the Final Order. DONE and ORDERED this 6th day of July, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. DELPHENE C. STRICKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Philip S. Bennett, Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 William D. Rowland, Esquire White Advertising International Post Office Box 626 Titusville, Florida
