The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner’s application for licensure as a resident all-lines adjuster should be approved or denied.
Findings Of Fact DFS is the state agency responsible for licensing and regulating insurance adjusters and agents pursuant to chapters 624 and 626, Florida Statutes. On April 20, 2016, Petitioner filed with DFS his application to become licensed as an all-lines adjuster in the state of Florida. On the second page of the application form, Petitioner answered “yes” to the question asking whether he has ever pled nolo contendere, no contest, or guilty to, or ever had adjudication withheld for, or ever been convicted of or found guilty of, any felony crime under the laws of any state. Despite answering yes to that question, on the third and fourth pages of the application, Petitioner answered “no” to the following three questions: First, Petitioner was asked whether his felony crime(s) fell within the following categories: any first-degree felony; a capital felony; a felony involving money laundering, fraud of any kind, or embezzlement; or a felony directly related to the financial services business. Second, Petitioner was asked whether his felony crime(s), if not falling in one of the above categories, were crimes involving moral turpitude. Lastly, Petitioner was asked whether his felony crime(s) were within the category of “all other felonies.” The questions asking how to categorize the felony crime(s) that Petitioner acknowledged on page two of the application correlate to the statute prescribing a range of consequences depending on the type of felony criminal background an applicant has. According to the statute, an applicant with felony criminal history falling in the first group above (first degree felony, etc.) is permanently barred from applying for licensure in Florida as an insurance agent or adjuster. For an applicant whose felony criminal history does not fall in the first group, but is categorized as a felony (or felonies) involving moral turpitude, the statute provides for a long period of disqualification. If an applicant’s felony criminal history does not fall in either of the first two categories, then a shorter period of disqualification is provided by the statute. See § 206.207, Fla. Stat., adopted in its current form in 2011 (with one immaterial amendment in 2014 to change a statutory cross-reference). Petitioner’s admitted felony history must, of necessity, fall within one of the three groups: the felony history must have involved one or more felonies identified for permanent bar, other felonies involving moral turpitude, and/or all other felonies. The application answers were internally inconsistent and at least one of the answers on pages three and four was wrong. At hearing, Petitioner did not offer any explanation for his incorrect answer(s).1/ Petitioner did not file with his April 2016 application submitted to DFS, and did not offer into evidence at hearing any proof of the felony criminal history to which he admitted in his application. Petitioner gave little information at all about his criminal background at hearing. He testified that he identified his prior criminal history on page two of the application (by answering “yes” to the question asking whether he had ever been convicted, etc. of any felony crimes). The only detail he was asked by his counsel to address was as follows: Q: Now the criminal history that you identified, is that something that occurred a while ago? A: Yes, sir. Q: And can you give me the approximate time period? A: The offense? It was in 1994, I believe. Q: Okay. And do you recall when you finished all your restitution and probation concerning any of these prior convictions? A: 1999. (Tr. 32). Petitioner later acknowledged on cross-examination, as suggested by his attorney’s attempted correction in his follow-up question, that there was not just one (“the”) offense--there was more than one offense and more than one conviction. Other than correcting that error, Petitioner volunteered no information regarding his prior convictions. He did, however, offer into evidence documentation generally corroborating his testimony regarding when he completed probation for his prior convictions. Two letters from New Jersey Superior Court personnel state that court records reflect that Mr. Bivona completed three different probationary terms associated with three different indictment numbers, as follows: for indictment number 96-03-0031-I, probation was completed as of August 9, 1999; for indictment number 95-10-0453-I, probation was completed as of May 2, 1999; and for indictment number 95-05-0206-I, probation was completed as of September 27, 1998. Although Petitioner offered no details or documentation for his prior felony convictions, either with his application or at hearing (other than the letters documenting when he completed probation), Petitioner said that he had previously provided documentation to Respondent regarding his felony convictions, a fact confirmed by Respondent. Respondent had in its files certified copies of court records for Petitioner’s felony convictions in New Jersey, obtained by Respondent in 2010 in connection with a prior license application by Petitioner.2/ Respondent offered into evidence at hearing certified copies of court records regarding Petitioner’s felony criminal history, including indictments issued by grand juries setting forth the original charges, and the subsequent judgments of conviction issued by New Jersey Superior Court judges. Because Respondent was willing to use the criminal history documentation previously provided by Petitioner that was already in Respondent’s files, Respondent did not require Petitioner to obtain or submit the same documentation again in connection with his new license application.3/ The indictment numbers identified in the three judgments of conviction match the three indictment numbers contained in Petitioner’s exhibit offered to prove when he completed his probationary terms for his prior convictions. Thus, although Petitioner was evasive at hearing, unwilling to identify the court records of his prior convictions, the records themselves establish the missing information about Petitioner’s felony criminal history that Petitioner only alluded to at hearing. In a September 28, 1995, judgment of conviction issued by Judge Leonard N. Arnold, New Jersey Superior Court for Somerset County, Mr. Bivona pled guilty to, and was convicted of, the charges set forth in indictment 95-05-0206-I. As enumerated in the judgment of conviction, these were: four counts of fraudulent use of a credit card, a third-degree felony; one count of unlawful theft or receipt of a credit card, a fourth-degree felony; four counts of forgery, a fourth-degree felony; and one count of theft by deception, a fourth-degree felony. For sentencing purposes, the court merged nine of the counts into count two (one of the charges for fraudulent use of a credit card), and imposed the following sentence: three years of probation, restitution of $271.60, a $500.00 fine, and other monetary assessments. On May 3, 1996, another judgment of conviction was issued by Judge Leonard N. Arnold. The judgment of conviction shows that Mr. Bivona pled guilty to, and was convicted of, the charges set forth in indictment 95-10-0453-I. As enumerated in the judgment of conviction, these were: three counts of fraudulent use of a credit card, a third-degree felony; and one count of theft, a fourth-degree felony. The sentence imposed by the judgment of conviction was incarceration for 180 days in the county jail, a three-year probationary term, restitution of $380.02, and monetary assessments. On August 9, 1996, a judgment of conviction was issued by Judge Marilyn Hess, New Jersey Superior Court for Hunterdon County. As shown on the judgment of conviction, Mr. Bivona pled guilty to, and was convicted of, the charges set forth in indictment 96-03-00031-I. As enumerated in the judgment of conviction, these were: one count of theft by deception, a third-degree felony; one count of forgery, a fourth-degree felony; and one count of credit card theft, a fourth-degree felony. The sentence imposed by the judgment of conviction was a three-year probationary term, restitution of $2,488.30, and monetary assessments. As noted, Mr. Bivona testified that he completed the probationary terms for his prior convictions in 1999. He provided documentation corroborating that he served the three probationary terms and completed them on three different dates in 1998 and 1999, the last of which was August 9, 1999. No evidence was presented to prove that Mr. Bivona has paid all restitution, fines, and other monetary assessments imposed in the three judgments of conviction, and, if so, when all payments were completed. Petitioner’s application was initially denied by DFS because of Petitioner’s felony criminal history. DFS determined that at least two of the judgments of conviction, and possibly all three, were for felony crimes involving fraud. DFS did not undertake a review of Petitioner’s rehabilitation from his past crimes or his present trustworthiness and fitness to serve as an insurance adjuster, because in DFS’s view, Petitioner was subject to the statutory permanent bar from applying for licensure. DFS did not determine that Petitioner did not otherwise meet the requirements for licensure as a resident all-lines adjuster. At hearing, neither party went into any detail regarding the requirements for licensure as an all-lines adjuster. Instead, the focus of both Petitioner and Respondent was on whether Petitioner’s criminal history renders him disqualified from applying for licensure as an adjuster, either permanently or for a period of time, and, if the latter, whether mitigating circumstances reduce the disqualifying period. No evidence was offered of aggravating circumstances. Respondent has not disputed whether, aside from the implications of Petitioner’s criminal history, Petitioner otherwise qualifies for licensure. Therefore, it is inferred that Respondent was and is satisfied that, aside from the implications of Petitioner’s criminal background (including questions about rehabilitation, trustworthiness, and fitness), Petitioner otherwise meets the requirements for licensure as an all-lines adjuster. Petitioner presented evidence addressed to the mitigating factors in Respondent’s rule to shorten the period of disqualification in certain circumstances, where there is no permanent bar. Petitioner testified that he moved to Florida with his wife in 1998 (apparently before he had completed his probationary terms for at least two of his convictions). He and his wife started a business in the Sarasota area, a corporation that has operated under two different names, but has remained essentially the same since 1998. The business has always been small; although it has gone up and down in size over the years, Petitioner said that the business has had at least five employees for over three years. Since 1998, the nature of his business has been to provide technical support and assistance to insurance adjusters. The business has not been engaged in the actual adjuster work; instead, his clients are licensed adjusters who perform the actual adjuster work. Petitioner testified that he has been employed by the corporation he owns, working at least 40 hours per week for a continuous two-year period within the five years preceding the filing of his application. This parrots one of the mitigation factors in Respondent’s rule, and although no documentation of his employment hours was provided for any period of time, the undersigned accepts Petitioner’s testimony as sufficient under the mitigation rule. If Petitioner is determined to be disqualified for a period of years and subject to the mitigation rule, this mitigation factor would reduce the disqualification period by one year. To meet another mitigation factor, Petitioner submitted five letters of recommendation in evidence. Three of those letters appear to be from someone who has known Petitioner for at least five years (one undated letter states that the author has known Petitioner for three years; another letter, more of a business reference from an insurance company representative in Maryland, does not state how long the author has known Petitioner). Those letters that are dated bear dates after the license application was submitted and initially denied, but there is no impediment to receiving and considering them in this de novo hearing. The letters meet the requirement in Respondent’s rule for mitigation. If Petitioner is determined to be disqualified for a period of years and subject to the mitigation rule, this mitigation factor would reduce the disqualification period by one year. Although the letters satisfy one of the mitigation factors in Respondent’s rule, the contents of the letters are hearsay, as none of the authors testified. The matters stated in the letters, for the most part, do not corroborate any non- hearsay evidence, except in a few immaterial respects (such as that Petitioner runs his own business and has daughters who play volleyball). Petitioner did not present any testimony from witnesses at hearing who could attest to his character, his business reputation, or his trustworthiness. Petitioner testified that he does volunteer work on a “sporadic” basis. He is active as a volunteer for his three daughters’ schools and travel volleyball activities, and he also works with youth groups in his church. Although Petitioner testified that he believes he has volunteered at least 180 hours over the three years preceding the filing of his application, Petitioner did not present any documentation from one or more charitable organizations confirming the number of his volunteer hours. It is undisputed that Petitioner held an insurance adjuster license in Florida for some period of time, until, according to DFS, the license expired by operation of law. Although Petitioner admitted that since 1998, his business has not been engaged in insurance adjuster work, merely holding a license appears to at least superficially satisfy a mitigation factor in Respondent’s rule. No evidence was presented to show that Petitioner has been arrested or charged with any criminal violations since he completed his third probation in August 1999, more than 17 years ago. The length of time without any additional criminal incidents is a positive consideration. Notably lacking from Petitioner were: an explanation for the circumstances underlying the multiple crimes he committed that involved fraud, theft, forgery, and deception, through use of other people’s credit cards and checks; express acceptance of responsibility for his criminal past; the expression of genuine remorse for his wrongdoing; and an explanation as to why his criminal history should not present concerns if Petitioner becomes authorized to engage in insurance adjusting. As Petitioner acknowledged, a licensed adjuster “would negotiate settlement [of claims under insurance policies], would offer payment, [and] would have authority to write payment and receive payments” (Tr. 35), placing the adjuster in a position of trust and responsibility in dealing with other people’s money. Simply noting that it has been a good number of years since Petitioner completed his probations, that he is running his own business (that does not engage in insurance adjusting), that he has a family, that he is involved with church, and that he does volunteer work is not enough, when Petitioner’s past crimes and the concerns they present go unexplained, to support a finding of rehabilitation, moral fitness, and trustworthiness today. It may well be that Petitioner could prove these things if he had addressed them; it may have been an unfortunate strategic choice to avoid any mention of Petitioner’s past crimes in anything but the most general and vague terms. Perhaps in light of decisional law discussed in the Conclusions of Law below, Respondent’s licensure application form asks applicants who disclose criminal history whether they have had their civil rights restored. Petitioner answered yes. He was asked to explain, and his response was: “Rights were restored and I have the ability to vote and act as a standard US Citizen.” (Pet. Exh. 11 at 4). In the initial review of Petitioner’s application, DFS staff apparently accepted Petitioner’s representation that his civil rights had, in fact, been restored.4/ However, in a “deficiencies” listing at the end of the application, DFS noted that Petitioner failed to provide a certificate of civil rights restoration, or other proof of restoration of his civil rights. Petitioner’s application was not denied because of these omissions, and Petitioner’s failure to provide such evidence in his application would not have been an impediment to receiving and considering proof of restoration of Petitioner’s civil rights at hearing, had such evidence been offered. At hearing, Petitioner attempted to prove that his civil rights were restored. However, Petitioner presented no evidence that he ever applied for restoration of his civil rights, or that his civil rights have been restored by order of the governor in the exercise of clemency power. Instead, the only evidence offered by Petitioner was a Florida voter status printout showing that he is an active registered voter. The exhibit was admitted for the limited purpose of showing that Petitioner was registered to vote in Florida. However, this fact is insufficient to support an inference that Petitioner’s civil rights must have been restored or he would not have been allowed to register to vote. If Petitioner has actually had his civil rights restored, there would be direct evidence of that, and Petitioner had no such evidence. It is equally or more plausible that Petitioner was allowed to register to vote in Florida by mistake; Petitioner acknowledged that he represented in his voter registration application that his civil rights were restored (just as he represented to DFS in his license application). Petitioner’s counsel argued that Petitioner was allowed to register to vote in Florida because Florida gave full faith and credit to what New Jersey had done. This argument was unsupported by evidence of how Petitioner became registered to vote in Florida. Regarding what was done in New Jersey, the only evidence offered by Petitioner was a “voter restoration handbook” from the state of New Jersey, which indicates as follows: “In New Jersey, any person who is no longer in prison or on parole or probation, can register to vote. . . . In New Jersey, unlike some other states, those who have been convicted of felony offenses in the past are not forever barred from voting. . . . Any ex-felon who has satisfactorily completed the term of his or her sentence can register to vote.” (Pet. Exh. 7, admitted for a limited purpose, at 1 - 2). The rest of the handbook simply describes how one goes about registering to vote in New Jersey. Under New Jersey law, then, one particular civil right--the right to vote--is taken away from convicted felons only until they complete their sentence, parole, and probation. This is confirmed by a New Jersey statute that has been officially recognized, providing that the right of suffrage--the right to vote--is taken away from any person “[w]ho is serving a sentence or is on parole or probation as the result of a conviction of any indictable offense under the laws of this or another state or of the United States.” § 29:4-1(8), N.J. Stat.5/ The right to vote is only one of the civil rights that may be lost by reason of being convicted of a crime. For example, under another New Jersey law officially recognized in this proceeding, persons convicted of a crime are disqualified from serving on a jury. See § 2C:51-3b., N.J. Stat. Petitioner presented no evidence to prove that he ever sought or received a restoration of his civil rights by executive order of the governor pursuant to an exercise of executive branch clemency power, either in the state of New Jersey or in Florida. In New Jersey, restoration of civil rights and privileges (one of which may be the right to vote) is accomplished pursuant to section 2A:167-5, New Jersey Statutes, officially recognized in this proceeding and providing in pertinent part: Any person who has been convicted of a crime and by reason thereof has been deprived of the right of suffrage or of any other of his civil rights or privileges . . . may make application for the restoration of the right of suffrage or of such other rights or privileges . . . which application the governor may grant by order signed by him. (emphasis added). Similarly, the Florida Constitution vests in the executive branch the following clemency powers: [T]he governor may, by executive order filed with the custodian of state records, suspend collection of fines and forfeitures, grant reprieves not exceeding sixty days and, with the approval of two members of the cabinet, grant full or conditional pardons, restore civil rights, commute punishment, and remit fines and forfeitures for offenses. (emphasis added). Art. IV, § 8(a), Fla. Const. Petitioner admitted that he did not apply to the governor for a restoration of civil rights in New Jersey, and he has no order from the governor restoring his civil rights. Similarly, Petitioner did not apply for and receive an order from the governor restoring his civil rights in Florida. Instead, he admitted that he is relying on whatever happened in New Jersey. The following testimony reveals Petitioner’s misconception of the process in New Jersey for restoration of civil rights: Q: Okay. Mr. Bivona, what’s your understanding of how your civil rights were restored in New Jersey? A: My understanding is that once probation and restitution and everything is completed, that civil rights are restored in the State of New Jersey. Q: And did that happen, to your knowledge? A: The completion? Q: Yes. A: Yes, sir. I also verified that with the State of New Jersey. I called them. The Court: I can’t consider that.[6/] A: I understand. I’m sorry. The Court: Do you have any exhibits that show that civil rights have been restored? Mr. Terrell: There’s a handbook from New Jersey that’s also how the rights are restored. [Pet. Exh. 8, in evidence for limited purpose] (Tr. 44).
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Financial Services issue a final order denying Petitioner’s application for licensure as a resident all-lines insurance adjuster. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of April, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ELIZABETH W. MCARTHUR Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of April, 2017.
The Issue Whether Respondent has committed the acts alleged in the Stop Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment and if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact The Department is the state agency responsible for enforcing the statutory requirement that employers secure workers' compensation insurance for the benefit of their employees. § 440.107, Fla. Stat. On August 11, 2006, Robert Lambert, the Jacksonville District Supervisor for the Division of Workers' Compensation, Bureau of Compliance, was contacted by Katina Johnson, an investigator for the Division.1/ Based on the information provided to him by Ms. Johnson, Mr. Lambert approved the issuance of a Stop Work Order against Capella Ventures, Inc. The investigator served a Stop Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment, both by posting at the worksite and by hand delivery, on Capella Ventures. The Department investigator also issued a Request for Production of Business Records for Penalty Assessment, requesting records for a period of three years, from July 31, 2003. These records were requested in order to calculate the penalty required pursuant to Section 440.107, Florida Statutes, for not having workers' compensation insurance. The records were to be used in conjunction with the classification codes contained in the Basic Manual (Scopes Manual) published by the National Council on Compensation Insurance. Records were provided by Capella Ventures' counsel. Based on the records provided, an Amended Order of Penalty Assessment was prepared, assessing a penalty of $8,769.16. Mr. Peter King was, at all times material to this case, an officer of Capella Ventures, along with his father. His father is now deceased. Mr. King admitted that workers from Capella Ventures were assisting his father with a construction project on a home next to the home where they lived. He did not dispute that the workers were performing construction work and that the company had no workers' compensation coverage for them at the time. Nor did he dispute the amount of the penalty reflected in the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment. He contended that while his father performed the framing on the property, one of the two other employees did not have the skill to actually perform framing. The class code used by the Department to determine the appropriate penalty was 5645, which is used for carpentry operations on residential structures. Use of this code was appropriate. Capella Ventures filed for an address change in August of 2006, and voluntarily dissolved in January of 2008. No evidence was presented regarding what actions were taken by Capella Ventures with respect to the dissolution of the corporation. No evidence was presented regarding what, if any, distribution of assets was undertaken at the time of dissolution. No evidence was presented to indicate that any successor corporation or entity was formed upon the dissolution of Capella Ventures.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the facts found and conclusions of law reached, it is RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered finding that Respondent, Capella Ventures, Inc., violated Section 440.107, Florida Statutes, by failing to secure workers' compensation for its employees, and assessing a penalty of $8,769.16. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of September, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LISA SHEARER NELSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of September, 2008.
Findings Of Fact On August 21, 1990, the Petitioner submitted an application for licensure as a real estate salesman in the state of Florida. Item 7 of the licensure application form required the applicant to answer the following question: "Have you ever been convicted of a crime, found guilty, or entered a plea of guilty or nolo contendere (no contest), even if adjudication was withheld?" Petitioner responded yes to that question. The application form provided that "If you answered 'YES,' please state the details including dates and outcome in full. (Use separate sheet if necessary)." The only response provided by Petitioner was "1970 found guilty shooting a firearm in a dwelling - served 28 months Avon Park and work release." In fact, Petitioner has been arrested and/or convicted on several other occasions that were not listed on his application. On October 19, 1964, the Petitioner was found guilty of breaking and entering an automobile, petit larceny, and carrying a concealed weapon in Case 64-755 in the Criminal Court of Record in and for Dade County, Florida. Petitioner was placed on probation for a period of one year in connection with that case. On August 13, 1975, the Petitioner entered a plea of guilty to a charge of unlawfully and feloniously breaking and entering a dwelling with the intent to commit a felony therein, to-wit: grand larceny. The court suspended imposition of sentence, withheld adjudication of guilt and placed the Petitioner on probation for a term of five years. This case was Case Number 75-5081 in the Circuit Court of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Florida in and for Dade County. On June 18, 1976, the Petitioner entered a plea of guilty to robbery, shooting into an occupied dwelling, and unlawful possession of a firearm while engaged in a criminal offense. Petitioner was sentenced to five years in the state penitentiary. The case was Case No. 76-3328 in the Circuit of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Florida in and for Dade County. Apparently, this was the case the Petitioner was referring to in the disclosure set forth in his Application. However, the application lists the date of conviction as 1970 and the offense actually took place in 1976. As a result of the Petitioner's conviction in Case No. 76-3328, his probation in Case No. 75-5081 was violated and Petitioner was ordered to serve two years in the state penitentiary to run concurrently with the sentence in Case No. 76-3328. The violation of probation order was entered on June 18, 1976. In an Information dated April 26, 1982, the Petitioner was charged with disorderly conduct and two counts of resisting an officer without violence. The charges were assigned Case No. 82-61725 in the County Court for Dade County, Florida. Petitioner was found guilty of the two charges of resisting arrest without violence and was fined on June 21, 1982. On February 22, 1988, the Petitioner entered a plea of Nolo Contendere to the offense of battery on a law enforcement officer in Case No. CR-87-6784 in the Circuit Court of Orange County, Florida. On February 24, 1988, the court entered an order withholding adjudication and placing Petitioner on probation for two years. On November 29, 1988, the Petitioner entered a plea of guilty to two counts of grand theft in the third degree in Case Nos. 88-21122 and 88-21123 in the Circuit Court for the Eleventh Circuit in and for Dade County, Florida. The Petitioner was ordered to serve one day imprisonment as a result of those convictions.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recommended that the Florida Real Estate Commission enter a final order denying the Petitioner's application for licensure as a real estate salesman in the State of Florida. RECOMMENDED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 16th day of May 1991. J. STEPHEN MENTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of May 1991. COPIES FURNISHED: Mr. Stephen C. Stein 2515 Northeast 208th Terrace North Miami Beach, Florida 33160 Manuel E. Oliver, Esquire Department of Legal Affairs 400 West Robinson Street Suite S107 Orlando, Florida 32801 Jack McRay General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Darlene F. Keller Division Director Division of Real Estate Department of Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32801
Findings Of Fact The Respondent Michael Rush is a Doctor of Podiatry having been issued license number PO 0000529. The Respondent Rush was charged with and convicted of conspiracy to possess and import marijuana, Title 21 USC 841(a)(1), in the United States District Court, Connecticut. On March 30, 1981, the Respondent's conviction was affirmed, United States v. Rush, 666 F.2d 10 (2nd Cir. 1981). The Respondent Rush was incarcerated for a period of fourteen months, paid a fine of $15,000 and forfeited $33,000 from his savings account to the federal government pursuant to 21 USC 881(a)(6)(1976). The Respondent Rush is a resident of Broward County, Florida and maintains a professional office at 4700 Sheridan Street, Hollywood, Florida. Prior to the instant conviction, the Respondent Rush had never been charged with or convicted of any crime. The Respondent Rush has been active in community affairs, having participated in Little League, Boy Scouts, the Broward County Fair, and has received character references from a variety of local community leaders. The Respondent Rush is currently practicing his profession, has obtained professional liability insurance through the Podiatry Trust and is on the staff of Community Hospital of North Broward and Hollywood Pavillion.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Administrative Complaint filed against Michael Rush by the Board of Podiatry be dismissed. DONE and ORDERED this 30th day of December, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida. SHARYN L. SMITH, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of December, 1982.
Findings Of Fact Michael A. Doub was employed as a correctional officer I at DeSoto Correctional Institution, Department of Corrections. He held this position from October 3, 1986 until he was determined to have abandoned his position on June 8, 1989. During this period, Doub's work performance had been rated at the "achieves standards" level. Doub had in excess of twenty (20) days of accumulated leave credits available for use at the time of his separation from employment with the Department. On June 4, 1989, Officer Doub was arrested by the Hardee County Sheriff's Department on the charge of sexual battery. Doub was taken to the Hardee County Jail where he was confined until he could post appropriate bail. Doub was scheduled to work from 8:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. on June 4, 1989. On June 4, 1989, DeSoto Correctional Institution, specifically Lieutenant James Jacobs, was notified by Sergeant J. Krell of the Hardee County Sheriff's Department of Doub's arrest, the charges pending against him and his confinement at the Hardee County Hail pending the posting of appropriate bail. Lieutenant Jacobs is Officer Doub's immediate supervisor. This contact was not initiated at Officer's Doub's request. Officer Doub was aware the Sheriff's Department had notified the Institution of his whereabouts and situation. Doub did not contact the Institution in order to specifically request that he be granted leave pending his release from jail. On June 12, 1989, Officer Doub was released from the Hardee County Jail after posting bail. On the same date, he received the letter of abandonment from DeSoto Correctional Institution. On June 12, 1989, Officer Doub contacted DeSoto Correctional Institution seeking permission to return to work. This requested [sic] was denied based on the letter of abandonment. Thereafter, Doub filed a request for review of the decision of the Institution finding him to have abandoned his position. The criminal charge of sexual battery pending against Officer Doub was withdrawn by the State Attorney of the Tenth Judicial Circuit, in and for Hardee County, Florida.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Petitioner be reinstated as a Correctional Officer I, as he did not abandon his position within the Career Service System for three consecutive workdays. DONE and ENTERED this 29th day of November, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. VERONICA E. DONNELLY Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of November, 1989. COPIES FURNISHED: Gene "Hal" Johnson, Esquire 300 East Brevard Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Perri King, Esquire Department of Corrections 1311 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2500 Louis A. Vargas, Esquire General Counsel Department of Corrections 1311 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2500 Richard L. Dugger, Secretary Department of Corrections 1311 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2500 Ms. Aletta Shutes, Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Augustus D. Aikens, Esquire General Counsel Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 =================================================================
The Issue Whether Petitioner has shown, by clear and convincing evidence, that she is rehabilitated from her disqualifying offenses; and, if so, whether Respondent's intended action to deny Petitioner's request for an exemption from employment disqualification would constitute an abuse of discretion.
Findings Of Fact APD serves clients with disabilities such as autism, intellectual disabilities, Downs Syndrome, and Prader-Willi Syndrome. APD's clients range from those needing total care to those who can live on their own with minimal assistance. The services APD provides to its clients include personal care, respite care, adult day training, supported living, and a wide variety of other services. The aforementioned services are provided by APD's vendors in individual homes, group homes, and supported living arrangements. Petitioner is seeking to work as a direct service provider in a group home for persons with developmental disabilities. Section 435.06(2), Florida Statutes, mandates that an employer may not hire someone for a position requiring contact with any "vulnerable person" until a completed background screening "demonstrates the absence of any grounds for the denial or termination of employment." The Department of Children and Families ("DCF") administers the background screening process for APD. APD's Action Petitioner's background screening identified three felony counts that are disqualifying criminal offenses, and all for resisting an officer with violence to his person. On November 14, 2016, DCF notified Petitioner that she was disqualified from employment due to her criminal history and specifically because of the three counts of resisting an officer with violence to his person from a November 26, 1975, Miami Dade incident. On or around December 1, 2016, Petitioner submitted a request for exemption, which included the exemption application and questionnaire to DCF. The instructions provided: "[f]or EACH criminal offense appearing on your record, please write your DETAILED version of the events and be specific. Attach extra pages as needed and please type or write legibly. When Petitioner filled out the questionnaire, she provided the following answers to each question on the exemption questionnaire: Question #1 asked for "disqualifying incident(s)." Petitioner responded "3 Counts of Resisting Arrest with Violence." In response to Question #2 "Non-disqualifying Offenses(s)," Petitioner again provided none of the details surrounding these offenses. She listed two non-disqualifying offenses, "Battery" and "Petit Theft" to which she had criminal dispositions. Question #3 asks, "What is the current status in the court system?" Petitioner responded, "N/A." In Response to Question #4 on her Exemption Questionnaire, regarding "the degree of harm to any victim or property (permanent or temporary), damages or injuries," Petitioner indicated "N/A." In answering Question #5, about whether there were "any stressors in [her] life at the time of the disqualifying incident," Petitioner again indicated "N/A." Question #6 asked whether there are any current stressors in her life, Petitioner responded: "[D]ivorced living at home with my 3 minor children. I am a spokes-person for the SEIU union. Fight for Fifteen. I feed the homeless in my community." As confirmed at hearing, Petitioner listed educational achievements and training as the following: Fla College of Business – Certified Nursing Assistant (1985) National School of Technology – Surgical Tech (1998) Food Service – Brevard C.C. Under Question #8 of the Exemption Questionnaire, in response to the question whether she had ever received any counseling, Petitioner indicated "N/A." Question #9 of the Exemption Questionnaire asks, "Have you ever used/misused drugs and alcohol? Please be specific and list the age at which you started and how you started." Petitioner again responded "N/A." Question #10 of the Exemption Questionnaire asks whether Petitioner was involved in any community activities. Petitioner responded, "I have volunteered with Senator Dwight Bullard, Fla. State Rep. McGhee, Mayor Woodard, Joe Garcia, etc." Question #11 asks the applicant to "Document any relevant information related to the acceptance of responsibility for disqualifying and non-disqualifying offenses." Petitioner responded as follows: "Yes. I accept responsibility at the time of this offense I was 17 years of age and trying to fit in with my friends. I have learned when you know better you do better." The Exemption Questionnaire also requested Petitioner to provide her three prior years' work history. Petitioner provided detailed information about her 18-year work history in the health care field, which included care of the vulnerable community. Petitioner has worked in a hospital, nursing home, private home, and with both mental health and hospice patients. Petitioner's answer also outlines how she had performed some of the same job responsibilities as a direct service provider for the following employers: JR Ranch Group Home LLC: C.N.A 10/3/16 to present-Companion to individual bathing, feeding, dressing, grooming, etc. Nurse Plus Agency: C.N.A. 3/12/08 to 9/7/15- Working in private homes with hospice patients bathing, feeding grooming, shaving, R.O.M. T.C.C. vital signs, doctor's appointments, etc. Gramercy Park Nursing Home: C.N.A. 2/15/05 to 3/12/08-Working in skilled nursing facility doing patient care, vitals, charting, lifting, bathing, feeding, dressing, physical therapy, etc. Jackson M. Hospital: C.N.A. 1/7/98 to 5/8/2001-Working on HIV unit, patient care, R.O.M., bed making, bathing, feeding, dressing, shaving, oral care, transferring, lifting, etc. On December 15, 2016, DCF sent a letter to Petitioner requesting additional documentation to complete the exemption application. Petitioner was asked to "provide the arrest report (from arresting agency) and CERTIFIED court disposition JUDGMENT AND SENTENCE" for the following offenses appearing on [her] criminal history screening report: 05/20/2013 MIAMI-DADE POLICE DEPARTMENT, BW DRIVING WHILE LICENSE SUSPENDED 5/11/2002 MIAMI-DADE POLICE DEPARTMENT, AGGRAV BATTERY 5/11/2002 MIAMI-DADE POLICE DEPARTMENT, AGGRAV BATTERY 12/22/2001 MIAMI-DADE POLICE DEPARTMENT, COUNTY ORD VIOL 1/13/1998 MIAMI-DADE POLICE DEPARTMENT, AGGRAV BATTERY 1/13/1998 MIAMI-DADE POLICE DEPARTMENT, BATTERY 1/13/1998 MIAMI-DADE POLICE DEPARTMENT, AGGRAV BATTERY 1/13/1998 MIAMI-DADE POLICE DEPARTMENT, BATTERY 9/28/1996 MIAMI-DADE POLICE DEPARTMENT, AGGRAV BATT-POL OFF 9/28/1996 MIAMI-DADE POLICE DEPARTMENT, RESISTING OFFICER 9/28/1996 MIAMI-DADE POLICE DEPARTMENT, BATTERY 9/28/1996 MIAMI-DADE POLICE DEPARTMENT, RESISTING OFFICER 4/11/1994 MIAMI-DADE POLICE DEPARTMENT, AGG ASSLT - WEAPON 4/11/1994 MIAMI-DADE POLICE DEPARTMENT, AGG ASSAULT –WEAPON 01/14/1991 MIAMI-DADE POLICE DEPARTMENT, SHOPLIFTING 11/07/1981 MIAMI-DADE POLICE DEPARTMENT, ASSAULT 11/07/1981 MIAMI-DADE POLICE DEPARTMENT, RESISTING OFFICER 11/07/1981 MIAMI-DADE POLICE DEPARTMENT, DISORDERLY CONDUCT The DCF letter also instructed Petitioner that if she could not obtain the arrest report and/or court disposition, she might submit a notarized written "detailed statement on each arrest explaining why you were arrested. You must include the victim's age and relationship to you and the sentence you received (probation, jail, prison, etc)." Additionally, the letter requested proof of income, an affidavit of good moral character, two to five letters of recommendation, and a personal history explaining what happened with each arrest, current home life, education, training, family members, goals, and community involvement. The letter provided Petitioner a 30-day deadline and notified Petitioner "[n]o further action [would] be taken on [her] application for exemption until we receive the requested information." (emphasis added). On or about December 21, 2016, Petitioner complied with the DCF letter and provided 99 pages of documents including Florida Criminal History Record requested, certified police arrest reports, notarized printed dockets of her criminal offenses with court dispositions, notarized document from the Clerk of Circuit and County Court Harvey Ruvin listing all Petitioner's criminal charges and court dispositions available in Miami-Dade, certificate of parole, 2009 certificate of restoration of civil rights, taxes, nursing assistant certification, certificate of liability insurance, continuing education certificates, program certificates, June 13, 2015, White House Conference on Aging program listing Petitioner as a speaker at the White House, 2015 newspaper articles detailing Petitioner's substantive work in minimum pay raise advocacy nationwide for the Fight for Fifteen campaign, letters of recommendation, driving history records, ACHA exemption to work in the healthcare field as a Certified Nursing Assistant ("CNA"), and a personal statement. Petitioner's personal statement and testimony at hearing provided a comprehensive history of how she has been a caregiver since 1982 "working [i]n hospitals, nursing homes, mental health, hospice, private homes, SLF, etc." Petitioner's statement further detailed that she became a Certified Nursing Assistant in 1985 after the disqualifying offense incident and became a surgical technician in 1997. Petitioner also provided the requested following explanations for each of her arrests: 1.) 11/26/1975: I was arrested for (3) counts of resisting arrest with violence. At the time I was 17 years of age hanging with the wrong crowd. 2.) 11/07/1981: Was at a party drinking got in fight with boyfriend. No case action. 3.) 01/14/1991: In store buying groceries didn't realize there were a pair of socks in my buggy charged with petty theft no way I would have stolen a pair of one dollar socks. Judge was dumbfounded. 4.) 04/11/1994: Got into argument with my mother in which she was drinking she called police to say I had a gun. In which was not true. Office[r] ask me had I ever been to jail I stated yes he then said put your hands behind your back then placed me under arrest. My Mom was there next morning to bond me out. Case No Action. 5.) 09/28/1996: I was witness to a murder I told officer what I seen but didn't want to speak in front of people, also did not want to be labeled as a snitcher. I told the officer I would come to talk but I would not walk with him. I proceeded to walk away the officer grabbed me by the back of my hair, the officer and I proceeded to fight at that time other people got involved. The lead detective asked the officer why he did that. The lead detective promise me he would come to court with me in which he did case was dismissed. Case No Action. 6.) Boyfriend and I got into argument he was drinking and he wanted to drive I told him no he wouldn't give me my keys, so I proceeded to knock head lights out. Case No Action. 7.) 01/13/1998: Got in fight with boyfriend. Case No Action. Petitioner responded to the best of her ability to each of DCF's requests for information. DCF summarized Petitioner's 99 document submission in an Exemption Review Summary ("summary") and forwarded the application, questionnaire, and supporting documents to APD for review. The summary correctly identified Petitioner's 1975 acts of resisting an officer as the disqualifying offenses. The summary outlined twelve non-disqualifying offenses with which Petitioner was charged. However, the summary categorized one non-disqualifying offense as a driving charge and outlined an additional nine non-disqualifying offenses as dismissed or dropped, as Petitioner had reported in her personal statement when she said "no action" was taken. The summary only listed a 1991 shoplifting charge and a 2001 county ordinance violation for which Petitioner was prosecuted. On March 17, 2017, Agency Director Barbara Palmer advised Petitioner by letter that her request for an exemption from the disqualification has been denied. The basis for the denial was that Petitioner failed to submit clear and convincing evidence of her rehabilitation. On May 1, 2017, Petitioner requested to appeal APD's denial. Hearing At hearing, as well as in the exemption package, Petitioner took full responsibility for her disqualifying offenses. At hearing, Cunningham also showed remorse. In her personal statement she stated she "paid her debt to society . . . learned from [her] mistakes." Petitioner also credibly explained the circumstances at hearing for her 1975 disqualifying convictions and testified that she was 17 years old when she broke into the neighbor's empty house across the street and was hanging out there. When she was arrested they were handling her roughly. She was originally charged with burglary, larceny and resisting arrest. The burglary and larceny charges were dropped and she pled to three counts of resisting an officer with violence to his person. Petitioner was sentenced to a youth program but left it, was bound over as an adult, and was sentenced to prison where she served three and a half years. Petitioner successfully completed her parole on August 23, 1981, and her civil rights were restored on May 8, 2008. Petitioner testified to her other non-disqualifying offenses as she had detailed in her personal statement. She explained that the 1981 criminal charge was dropped and stemmed from a fight with her boyfriend while at a party where she had been drinking. In 1994, her mom, who was a drinker, was acting out and called the police on Petitioner. Her mother lied and told the police Petitioner had a gun, which she did not. The police asked Petitioner if she had been to jail previously and she answered yes and was arrested. Her mother came and got her out of jail the next morning and the case was dismissed. Petitioner verified that in 1996, she would not tell the police officer what she saw regarding a murder because she was going to the police station to report it privately. The officer grabbed her from behind, they fell to the ground, and she was arrested for Battery on an Officer. The next day the lead detective came to court and testified on Petitioner's behalf that the officer's behavior was inappropriate and Petitioner was released and the charges were dropped. Petitioner also explained that she received another arrest because her boyfriend was drunk and took her car keys and was going to drive. Petitioner testified she could not stop him so she knocked the headlights and windows out of her car to prevent him from driving and ultimately the charges were dropped. Petitioner confirmed at hearing that at least nine of the criminal charges she obtained were either dismissed or dropped and she had not been arrested in over 10 years. Petitioner's credible detailed testimony during the hearing was information that APD did not have the benefit of having while reviewing her application. Petitioner affirmed that she had a July 1999 public assistance fraud case on which adjudication was withheld for her trading food stamps to pay her light bill. DCF failed to ask Petitioner about the case in the request letter with the list of other charges. Petitioner admitted that the public assistance fraud case was the only case in which Petitioner had to make restitution. She paid back the total amount of food stamps she sold and then her food stamps were reinstated. Evelyn Alvarez ("Alvarez"), APD Regional Operations Manager for the Southern Region, made an independent review of Petitioner's Request for Exemption, Petitioner's Exemption Questionnaire, and documentation submitted on December 21, 2016. Among the factors identified by Alvarez as a basis for the recommendation of denial of the exemption was the perception that Petitioner's application was incomplete. Alvarez determined Petitioner did not take responsibility for her arrests or show any remorse. Alvarez testified that APD needs to be able to rely on the answers provided by the applicant in the Exemption Questionnaire to get the information needed to decide whether to grant an exemption. Although she relied on other information gathered as well, what the applicant stated in the Exemption Questionnaire is very important. Alvarez explained that she considered both Petitioner's disqualifying and non-disqualifying offenses, the circumstances surrounding those offenses, the nature of the harm caused to the victim, the history of the applicant since the disqualifying incident, and finally, any other evidence indicating whether the applicant will present a danger to vulnerable APD clients if employment is allowed. Alvarez also testified that she looked for consistency in the applicant's account of events in her Exemption Questionnaire, whether or not the applicant accepted responsibility for her actions and whether the applicant expressed remorse for her prior criminal acts. Alvarez concluded that there were inconsistencies between Petitioner's account of her disqualifying and non-disqualifying offenses compared with those found in the police reports. Alvarez further testified she was concerned that Petitioner had numerous traffic citations. Alvarez explained the citations concerned her because individuals who are granted exemptions would potentially be in positions to transport clients and an applicant that maintains a good driving record demonstrates an ability to ensure the health and safety of clients being served. At hearing, Petitioner testified that her driving record "was not the best." The summary detailed that the 2008 infractions included failure to pay required tolls, improper left, and lack of proof of insurance. Petitioner also had other driving offenses, such as a DWLS and Driver License in 2007 and a safety belt violation in 2006. After her review, Alvarez decided that Petitioner had exhibited a continuing pattern of criminal offenses over an extended period of time, many of which were violent and involved fights, and she concluded Petitioner had not demonstrated rehabilitation. At hearing, Tom Rice ("Rice"), APD Program Administrator for Regional Supports/Licensing, testified that an individual's good character and trustworthiness is important for individuals who provide direct care for APD because service providers are frequently responsible for assisting individuals in making decisions of a financial, medical, and social nature. APD must weigh the benefit against the risk when considering granting an exemption. Rice explained that APD's clients are susceptible to abuse because they are reliant on others to assist with intimate tasks, such as getting dressed, going to the bathroom, feeding, medicine, and funds. Direct service providers need to care and keep clients safe. Rice verified that Petitioner was eligible to work in an APD group home as a CNA. Rice also testified that APD was concerned with Petitioner's failure to disclose details in her accounts regarding her criminal offenses because it calls into question her trustworthiness. He further testified such factors demonstrate a pattern of poor judgment and decision-making and provide cause for APD to question Petitioner's fitness for providing services to the vulnerable individuals for which it is responsible and that is why Petitioner was denied. Findings of Ultimate Fact Upon careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned finds that Petitioner has demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that she is rehabilitated from her disqualifying offenses of resisting an officer with violence to his person and that she will not present a danger to disabled or otherwise vulnerable persons with whom she would have contact if employment in a group home were allowed. Petitioner has shown she is a responsible individual by successfully holding jobs in the health field for approximately 18 years. Her employment has been in positions where she cared for vulnerable persons and no evidence was presented that Petitioner was a danger while doing so. Instead, Petitioner's exemption package mirrors her credible testimony of her previous employment serving as a companion, bathing, feeding, dressing, grooming, taking vital signs, transporting patients to doctor's appointments, and working in a private home, which are personal care services that some direct service providers also supply. Petitioner was honest and forthright about her past and supplied 99 pages detailing her past to comply with DCF's request to complete her application. Petitioner testified convincingly that she has turned her life around. Petitioner's only disqualifying offenses occurred over 40 years ago. Even though she was arrested at least twelve times since then, nine of the charges were dismissed and Petitioner's last criminal arrest was 2002. Petitioner also obtained three certificates after her disqualifying offenses. Petitioner received licensure as a CNA and she has been successfully practicing under her license with an ACHA exemption in the health care field. Some of Petitioner's work has even been with vulnerable adults in both a hospital and nursing home. The undersigned further finds that denial of Petitioner's exemption request would constitute an abuse of discretion. As discussed above, it appears Respondent relied heavily on the initial application submitted, hearsay in the police reports, and traffic infractions, and failed to adequately consider the 99 pages and nine dismissed charges Petitioner provided regarding her rehabilitation. In doing so, Respondent failed to properly evaluate Petitioner's disqualifying offenses having occurred over 40 years ago and the last non-disqualifying criminal arrest being at least 15 years ago and the majority of the charges being dismissed. The evidence also indicates that Petitioner has performed successfully in a healthcare work setting, including some care of vulnerable individuals. Additionally, Petitioner has gone above and beyond to contribute in the community. She volunteers with the homeless and also volunteers with legislators and a mayor, and advocated nationally for a minimum wage increase in the Fight for Fifteen campaign, serving as the spokes-person. In 2015, the White House also extended an invitation to Petitioner to speak because of her advocacy, and Petitioner passed the background check and screening that the secret service conducted. As Petitioner testified at hearing, had she been any type of threat or been dangerous or violent based on her previous arrests, she would not have passed the high security screening and been allowed in the White House to speak. Petitioner also testified she does not have anything to hide. She demonstrated, by credible and very compelling evidence, that she made wrong decisions and took the initiative to turn her life around. For these reasons, it is determined that no reasonable individual, upon fully considering the record in this proceeding could find that Petitioner is not rehabilitated. The concerns expressed by Respondent in formulating its intended action, without the benefit of hearing testimony, particularly with those regarding her untruthfulness and lack of remorse for her actions, were effectively refuted by the credible testimony at hearing.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent, Agency for Persons with Disabilities, enter a final order granting Petitioner, Molita Cunningham's, request for an exemption from disqualification from employment. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of September, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JUNE C. MCKINNEY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of September, 2017. COPIES FURNISHED: Kurt Eric Ahrendt, Esquire Agency for Persons with Disabilities 4030 Esplanade Way, Suite 380 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 (eServed) Molita Cunningham 12437 Southwest 220th Street Miami, Florida 33170 (eServed) Jada Williams, Agency Clerk Agency for Persons with Disabilities 4030 Esplanade Way, Suite 335E Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 (eServed) Richard D. Tritschler, General Counsel Agency for Persons with Disabilities 4030 Esplanade Way, Suite 380 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 (eServed) Barbara Palmer, Director Agency for Persons with Disabilities 4030 Esplanade Way, Suite 380 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 (eServed)
