Findings Of Fact The Respondent, C-Sand Company, was issued permit number AE315-10 on May 8, 1981. This permit authorized the erection of a sign to be located approximately 1.8 miles west of SR 267 in Gadsden County, Florida. This location is in an unzoned area and the permit was granted because of its proximity to a nearby commercial activity known as Imperial Nurseries. Prior to submitting an application for this permit to the Department, the owner of the Respondent company contacted the Department's inspectors in the Chipley district office to determine where a sign could be legally erected. He did this in order to locate a site which would be permittable before entering into a lease on the property. The Department's district supervisor met the Respondent's owner in April of 1981 in Quincy. The two of them drove I-10 for a couple of hours looking for a sign site which would be permittable. The Department's district supervisor informed the Respondent that only two locations could be issued a permit, one of these being the site which is the subject of this proceeding. Based upon this representation, the Respondent entered into a lease for this site, subject to issuance by the Department of a permit to erect a sign thereon. After all of this had transpired, on May 4, 1981, the Respondent completed the permit application and submitted it to the Department. Prior to the Department's issuance of the subject permit, one of its inspectors whose duty is to observe a proposed sign site and determine if it is as represented in the application and if it meets the requirements of the statutes and rules, field inspected the proposed site of the subject sign. Based on this inspection he recommended the issuance of the permit upon his determination that this area was unzoned commercial, that the sign site was within 800 feet of a commercial activity known as Imperial Nurseries, and that this commercial activity was within 660 feet of the right of way of I-10, and visible from the main traveled way of I-10. There is sufficient credible evidence in the record of this proceeding to support a finding of fact that the subject area was as the field inspector found it to be. The area in question is rural in nature and generally suitable for agricultural activities. However, the business being conducted by Imperial Nurseries in 1981 was the growing of ornamental evergreens primarily for distribution in Northern markets. These ornamental evergreens were grown in containers on top of the ground, and shipped by truck. The cuttings were grown, then rooted, and planted in containers until mature. Between 1,500-2,000 yards of potting material was hauled in by truck each year from Tennessee, Georgia and Canada. This material consists of pine bark, peat moss and sand, which is mixed on the premises. The entire nursery is irrigated by an impact sprinkler system. There are 260 acres under irrigation. Approximately 1,400 tons of liquid fertilizer are mixed each year, and delivered via this irrigation system. There has been a weather shed on the property since before 1981, and this is within 660 feet from I-10. Portable toilets are located in various places on the property to accommodate the nursery employees. Beyond 660 feet from I-10 is a potting station and a loading area. Further away is an office building, two lunch rooms, and two storage buildings for fertilizer and peat moss. Nevertheless, parts of the overall operation of conducting the business of this nursery are situated 660 feet and less from I-10. Imperial Nursery ships its mature evergreens via truckers and brokers. Nursery employees assemble the shipments in the field, and they are brought to a central location for loading onto the trucks. These trucks are 40-45 foot refrigerated tractor-trailers. Approximately 400 truck loads of cuttings are shipped each year to an area from Washington D.C. to Canada The operation of Imperial Nurseries is the same now as it was in 1981. The field inspector's recommendation to approve the site as a permittable location was joined in by his supervisor after the supervisor had also conducted a field inspection of the area. Both of them based their approvals on the weather shed, the portable toilets, and the activities observed by them such as the employees moving the potted plants around, the loading and unloading of material taking place, and the employee activity throughout the area but particularly in the vicinity of the weather shed. The site where the Respondent proposed to erect his sign was within 800 feet of the various locations on the Imperial Nurseries property where its loading, unloading, or other activities took place. The assertion of the Respondent on his sign permit application that the proposed location was within 800 feet of a business was not false or misleading. The Department's inspector and his supervisor concurred in this characterization of the area. Neither has the Respondent violated any of the provisions of Chapter 479, Florida Statutes. All of the facts were set forth on his permit application, and these facts were verified by the Department after the area was inspected to determine their accuracy. The policy of the Department leaves the determination of what is and what is not an unzoned commercial area to the field inspector, with the approval of his supervisors. In this case, the determination was made that the activities of Imperial Nurseries were commercial in nature, and the permits were granted on the basis of this determination, not on the representation of the Respondent. In the summer of 1984, the subject site was inspected by the Department's Right-of-Way Administrator, who determined that the business being conducted by Imperial Nurseries was agricultural, and not commercial in nature. Although Imperial Nurseries has an agricultural exemption on its property and its employees are classified as agricultural for withholding tax purposes, the facts support a finding that Imperial Nurseries is a commercial activity. There is no statutory definition of "agricultural" and the Department has not defined the term by rule. Webster's New Twentieth Century Dictionary, Unabridged, Second Edition, defines "agriculture" as the cultivation of the ground, the art of preparing the soil, the tillage or the culture of the earth. These are not the activities of Imperial Nurseries. Pursuant to the issuance of the sign permit by the Department, the Respondent's lease on the property where the sign was erected became effective, and this lease continues to date.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department's violation notice seeking removal of the Respondent's sign on the north side of I-10, approximately 1.8 miles west of S.R. 267 in Gadsden County, Florida, be dismissed; and that permit number AE 315-10 remain in effect as a permit for a non-conforming sign. THIS RECOMMENDED ORDER entered this 10 day of July, 1985 in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM B. THOMAS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of July, 1985.
Findings Of Fact Emerald applied for an outdoor advertising sign permit for a location approximately 778 feet west of the location for which a permit had previously been issued to Lamar. If the permit previously issued to Lamar were not in spatial conflict with the permit site sought to be used by the Petitioner, the Petitioner's permit could be granted. The Petitioner's proposed site, however, is in statutorily prohibited proximity to Lamar's site, if Lamar's permit is deemed valid. The Department denied Emerald's application because its proposed application was, in the view of the Department, in spacing conflict with the site related to Lamar's permit. The controversy at issue relates to a parcel of land in Destin, Florida, owned by members of the family of Kathleen Jones. Herman Jones owned a portion of the property, and Mildred Castro owned a portion of the property. Kathleen Jones held a life estate to Mildred Castro's portion of the property. Permits were issued to Lamar on June 25, 1981 for a sign at the Jones/Castro site. The sign was erected in August of 1981 and was supported by leases of the real estate involved between Lamar and the Joneses. That sign was maintained continuously until May of 1992. Herman Jones sold his portion of the property in 1992 to Frank J. Roberts and Destin Renaissance, Inc. A survey in conjunction with that sale revealed that the sign was partially on the parcel sold to Roberts and partially on the parcel retained by the Jones family. Lamar, accordingly, moved its sign, since it encroached on the Roberts parcel and executed a release of its lease as to the real estate which Herman Jones had sold to Roberts. Ever since the 1981 erection of the sign, the lease for the site had been between Lamar and Kathleen Jones. It was a written lease and provided for annual renewals. The annual lease payment had been increased in 1985 and again in 1987. On July 27, 1990, the lease was again re-written to increase the annual rental payment. On March 11, 1992, Mr. Roberts sent a letter to the Department's Chipley office stating that he and his corporation had purchased the property from Herman Jones and that he did not have a lease with Lamar. Acting upon that letter, the Department sent a letter to Lamar on April 6, 1993 which stated: This office has received information to the effect that you no longer have permission from the land owner to erect or maintain signs on the South side of US 98, 6.3 miles East of SR 85. The permits numbers are AE678-06 and AE679-06. If, in fact, this information is true and correct the permits issued for these sites are invalid pursuant to Section 479.07(7) Florida Statutes. You are hereby notified that the Department's determination of invalidity will become con- clusive and the subject permit(s) will be revoked unless you elect to challenge this action by requesting an Administrative Hearing pursuant to Section 120.57, Florida Statutes, within thirty (30) days from receipt of this letter. The request should be addressed to: Clerk of Agency Proceedings Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 In the interim, if you can furnish documentary evidence of current permission from the present property owner to refute this information, it may be possible to resolve this matter to mutual satisfaction. Lamar replied to that letter on April 15, 1993 stating: We do have landowner permission for the referenced site as evidenced by our recorded lease of 8/07/90 and our amended lease for the same site dated 12/16/92. In addition the referenced tags were replaced by tags BG796-35 and BG797-35 on 2/15/93. This should be substantial evidence to refute any claim that we do not have landowner permission. Please indicate to me in writing the effect this will have on the need for an administrative hearing. In conjunction with the submittal of that letter of April 15, 1993, Lamar submitted a copy of its recorded lease with Herman Jones dated August 7, 1990 and a copy of its lease with Kathleen Jones dated December 16, 1992. Upon receipt of those documents, the Department concluded that Lamar did have written permission from the landowner to erect a sign at a location for which the permits described in paragraph three above were issued. The Department took no further action to revoke Lamar's permit, and Lamar, therefore, did not apply for an administrative hearing. The Department rejected Emerald's application by letter dated February 9, 1993, and Emerald requested an administrative hearing to contest that initial decision. The rejection of Emerald's permit application was due to the fact that the proposed permit was located less than 1,000 feet (778 feet) from Lamar's permit location. The Department took the position that Lamar's permits were still valid because it had provided satisfactory evidence to the Department that it still had landowner permission for the subject Lamar sign, by presenting a valid lease for the property in question, the Jones/Castro parcel.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered by the Department of Transportation finding that the applications of Emerald Outdoor Advertising, Inc. for outdoor advertising permits in Destin, Florida, be denied. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of February, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of February, 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 93-2668T Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact Accepted. Rejected, as contrary to the preponderant weight of the evidence and subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter. Rejected, as contrary to the preponderant weight of the evidence and subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter, and as constituting a conclusion of law instead of a proposed finding of fact. Respondent Department's Findings of Fact The Respondent, Department of Transportation, adopts the proposed findings of fact submitted by the Respondent, Lamar Advertising Company of Ft. Walton Beach, Inc. Thus, those proposed findings of fact are accepted. Proposed finding of fact number nine submitted by the Department, in addition to those submitted by Lamar, is rejected as being unnecessary and subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter. Respondent Lamar's Proposed Findings of Fact The Respondent, Lamar Advertising Company of Ft. Walton Beach, Inc.'s proposed findings of fact are accepted in their entirety as are the facts stipulated to by the parties. COPIES FURNISHED: Martin B. Daniel, Esq. 47 North Third Street Memphis, TN 38103 Robert P. Gaines, Esq. BEGGS & LANE Post Office Box 12950 Pensacola, FL 32576 Paul Sexton, Esq. Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, MS 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0458 Ben G. Watts, Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, MS 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0458 Thornton J. Williams, Esq. General Counsel Department of Transportation 562 Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0458
The Issue Is the Notice of Violation against Respondent valid; and if valid, may the Department of Transportation require that the allegedly offending signs be removed?
Findings Of Fact On June 7, 2001, DOT issued Notice of Violation 10B ST 2001 412, against a billboard sign located adjacent to Interstate 95 (I-95), approximately 1.3 miles north of the intersection of I-95 and U.S. Highway 1 at Exit 92. The notice alleged that the sign violates Chapter 479, Florida Statutes, in that it is unpermitted. DOT contends that the sign advertises for the Café Erotica restaurant, a business establishment not located on the same premises as the sign, and that there is no visible business occurring on the premises where the sign is located. I-95 is part of the Interstate Highway System. The sign is located within 660 feet of the nearest edge of the right-of-way of I-95 and can be seen without visual aid by motorists of normal visual acuity traveling on I-95. The sign is a "permanent" one and has never been permitted by DOT. Exit 94 has not applied to DOT for a sign permit for the subject sign or paid any sign permit fees for it. No sign permit has been issued to any entity for the sign. The sign displays the words "Café Erotica/We Dare to Bare/Adult Toys/Great Food/Exit 94, Inc." The phrases on the sign are displayed on two stacked faces without the slashes. The letters are all capitalized; the size of the letters and the paint colors of yellow and black call the viewer's attention to the phrases, "CAFE? EROTICA," "WE DARE TO BARE," "ADULT TOYS," "GREAT FOOD," and "EXIT 94." The words "WE DARE TO BARE" and "EXIT 94" are in very large black type and cover most of the two faces of the sign. The phrases "CAFÉ EROTICA," "ADULT TOYS," "GREAT FOOD," and the abbreviation "INC.," are the phrases smallest in size, located at the very top left, middle right, middle left and bottom right of the sign. All the small phrases are in black type and are relatively inconspicuous compared with the rest of the sign. There are no addresses, telephone numbers, arrows, or other identifying information on the sign. Respondent, Cafe Erotica, We Dare to Bare, Adult Toys/Great Food, Exit 94, Inc., is a Florida corporation. It was incorporated in 1998. At all times material, Café Erotica, We Dare to Bare, Adult Toys/Great Food, Exit 94, Inc., has been a corporation in good standing with the Florida Department of State, which has registered and approved its corporate name pursuant to Section 607.0401, Florida Statutes. Asher G. Sullivan, Jr., a/k/a Jerry Sullivan, is incorporator, president, shareholder, and director of Respondent. Mr. Sullivan chose the name of the company because the words and phrases "get your attention," are memorable, and are words and phrases Mr. Sullivan has used a lot over the years to advertise for the Café Erotica. Exit 94 does not sell food or adult toys. It does not offer dancers for public viewing. The business of Exit 94 is the development of hunting and fishing camps on various pieces of property it owns or leases in Florida and Georgia. Café Erotica of Florida, Inc., d/b/a Café Erotica (Café Erotica), is a Florida corporation which holds the license and owns the assets of the Café Erotica restaurant. Jerry Sullivan also is president, shareholder, and owner of Café Erotica. Exit 94 leases the land where the sign is located from James Grady Wainright, the owner of the property. The rental property consists of approximately ten acres. The lease was signed on April 20, 2001. The annual rent is $3000.00 per year. Mr. Wainright has received all the rent for 2001 from Mr. Sullivan. Mr. Sullivan was reimbursed by Respondent shortly after he paid the rent to Mr. Wainright. The stated purpose of the lease is the construction and maintenance of a hunting and fishing camp. The lease also authorizes Exit 94 to erect advertising signs on the property, states that any such signs will remain the property of Exit 94, forbids Mr. Wainright from obstructing the highway view of such signs, and grants Exit 94 permission to remove any vegetation that may obstruct the view of such signs. Mr. Wainright originally contacted Mr. Sullivan about leasing the property because he was interested in obtaining income from having a sign on his property. However, his interest resulted in the current hunting and fishing camp lease. The Café Erotica restaurant is a 24-hour per day, full-service restaurant which features dancers clad in bathing suits and which sells adult toys. The Café Erotica restaurant is located at 2620 State Road 207 (SR 207), at the intersection of SR 207 and the exit 94 off-ramp from I-95. The real property owned by Café Erotica is not contiguous to the subject real property owned by Exit 94. The real property owned by Exit 94, which is the subject of DOT's Notice of Violation, is approximately nine miles from the Café Erotica restaurant. Mr. Sullivan makes the advertising decisions for Café Erotica. In the past, Café Erotica has advertised "we dare to bare," "adult toys," and "exit 94" on other billboards located adjacent to I-95 in St. Johns County. Until about two weeks before the hearing of this matter, Café Erotica maintained a billboard at the café that displayed the words "PRIVATE DANCES," "GREAT FOOD," and "ADULT TOYS." At the time of hearing the billboards at Café Erotica now include words disparaging of the Department. Café Erotica does not own any interest in the subject sign and no citizen testified that the sign had caused him/her to patronize Café Erotica. However, given the similarity of the corporate name of Exit 94 to advertising used by Café Erotica and the location of Café Erotica at Exit 94, it is likely that Respondent's corporate advertising could also be interpreted as intended for Café Erotica and therefore be of incidental benefit to Café Erotica. On the other hand, the sign is intended to advertise Exit 94's hunting and fishing camps. In short, Mr. Sullivan and his corporations receive a dual benefit from the sign at issue here. Exit 94 lists addresses and locations other than the subject property as its business address(es) for various purposes. Mr. Sullivan's and Exit 94's main business address and office is on SR 206 off Exit 93 on I-95. Exit 94 maintains no office or telephone on the subject property. Jerry Sullivan has directed all activity on the Exit 94 property. His son is a licensed hunting and fishing guide. Jerry Sullivan anticipates creating, maintaining, and charging people for the privilege of using the subject property as a fishing and hunting camp with guide services, if desired, provided by his son. He also intends to reward employees and clients of his various enterprises with free privileges at the camp. Currently, Exit 94's only revenues have been payments from other companies owned by Mr. Sullivan or his wife for use of the hunting and fishing camps maintained by Exit 94. The company has operated at a loss since its inception. The loss is made up by Mr. Sullivan as is needed. There is no public access to the property Exit 94 leases from Mr. Wainright. The property is accessible by going through property owned by a timber company. The closest exit off I-95 to get to the property is Exit 92, where U.S. Highway 1 intersects with I-95. As of the hearing of this matter, Exit 94 was not operating a fishing camp open to the public on the property leased from Mr. Wainright. However, such a public enterprise is not required in order for Exit 94 to be a legitimate business. The parties do not dispute the fact that there is a pond on the subject property. The evidence varied as to the size and quality of the pond with the lower estimate by the Department at 1/2 to 3/4 of an acre and the higher estimate of two acres provided by the landowner. Respondent estimated the size of the pond to be slightly less than two acres. The pond was not stocked with fish, but did have some fish present. Respondent has ordered special hybrid bream to stock the pond for "catch and release" by Respondent's customers and guests. The property was not stocked with game animals, although such stocks would not be necessary for hunting since wild game including turkey, boars, and ducks are already present. There was also one very ramshackle deer blind on the property. There were no public restrooms, offices, or facilities to clean game on the premises. No fishing equipment was available for purchase. A small trailer was located on the premises. The trailer was placed there and is owned by Mr. Wainright. It is unknown if the trailer is available for overnight lodging. However, the trailer is not necessary for the property to function as an overnight camp and no witness testified to having camped overnight on the subject property. Petitioner routinely distributes corn for seeding the woods for deer and other game. Given the location of the subject property, game attraction is certainly feasible. Bill Harry showed DOT personnel around the subject property. The Department's witness, Tom Simmons, was generally critical of the quality of the hunting and fishing facilities. While there were no people using the pond during his brief inspection, Mr. Simmons has no personal knowledge as to whether people actually hunted or fished on the property at any other time. The Department's representative acknowledged that he saw feed corn scattered on the property for use in luring wildlife to the premises. Exit 94 holds an occupational license from St. Johns County as a "fish camp." In issuing this license, the county accepted Exit 94's designation of its business. Exit 94 has applied for a "fish farm" license from the Florida Game and Freshwater Fish Commission. Exit 94 produced invoices sent to clients for hunting and fishing privileges on the subject property, corresponding checks in payment, and tax returns. Exit 94 is a legitimate business. It is in the business of providing and developing hunting and fishing camps for use as directed by Exit 94. No reason was demonstrated to pierce the corporate veil of Exit 94. The sign located on the property at issue here only and primarily contains the name of the corporation and is exempt from the general sign permitting requirements. Therefore, the Notice of Violation should be dismissed.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is
The Issue There are two separate issues in this case: (1) Whether Petitioner breached its contract with Respondent by not making payments for a sign lease, thereby resulting in the sign permit becoming invalid; and (2) Whether Petitioner constructed a roadside sign illegally, i.e., without a permit.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, SG Outdoor, is a company engaged in the business of outdoor advertising in Florida. Respondent is the State of Florida ("State") agency responsible for monitoring compliance with State and Federal laws relating to outdoor advertising. According to those laws, signs within 660 feet of primary or interstate roadways visible from those roadways are subject to advertising regulations. There is currently a 1,500-foot spacing requirement (up from 1,000 feet in 1984) between signs. Further, signs must be located on land zoned for commercial and industrial use. Petitioner owns two signs which are at issue in this proceeding. One of the signs is a single facing sign of wood construction with a seven-foot height above ground level. The sign is assigned Tag No. AU557. The sign is situated just off Interstate 4, .871 miles east of State Road 33 in Polk County, Florida. This sign will be referred to herein as the "Original Sign." The Original Sign was built in 1971 and was located, at all times relevant hereto, on land owned by Mrs. Ona Grimes until that land was purchased by the State in October 2002. Petitioner also constructed another sign at approximately the same location. This sign, referred to herein as the "New Sign," has a double-faced, single-metal pole and is considerably higher in height than the Original Sign. Both the Original Sign and the New Sign are located on property which DOT contends is zoned as "Pasture, with residence." However, Polk County did away with its zoning ordinance in March 2000 and replaced it with Land Use Districts. The current Land Use District designation for the site is Business Park Center (within the Green Swamp Area of Critical State Concern). There was no competent testimony at final hearing as to whether that designation constitutes commercial or industrial zoning for purposes of roadside signs. The Original Sign was purchased by Petitioner in 1991 and was located on the Grimes property. Petitioner entered into a Ground Lease with Grimes that had a term of 30 years at a payment of $1,500 per year. In 2002, DOT entered into negotiations with Grimes to purchase the property. When DOT purchases property on which a roadside sign already exists, DOT may take the sign by way of condemnation through eminent domain (sometimes referred to by DOT as a "Take"). In such cases, the State must reasonably compensate the sign owner for the taking of its sign. In the alternative, the State may assume the sign lease and become a lessor to the sign owner. In that case, the sign owner must make its lease payments directly to the State. On May 22, 2002, DOT sent a letter to Petitioner explaining that DOT was in the process of acquiring the right of way on which the Original Sign was located. DOT offered to purchase (or Take) the sign from Petitioner for $17,300. While that offer to Petitioner was pending, DOT went forward with the purchase of the Grimes property. The purchase agreement for the property was signed by Grimes on July 11, 2002. Four days later, a letter from DOT to Petitioner was issued which said: Subsequent to receiving agreement and signed ODA [out door advertising] disclaimer from the property owner, an offer has been made to SG Outdoor, Inc. for the purchase of the ODA structure. Negotiations are ongoing. However, the purchase of Grimes property did not occur immediately. Meanwhile, in August 2002, Grimes entered into an illegal lease with Lamar Advertising, giving Lamar the same rights it had already contracted away to Petitioner. Petitioner was unaware of the lease with Lamar at that time. Such a lease would have been in violation of the already-existing lease between Grimes and Petitioner. At almost the same time, a DOT memorandum indicated that DOT was still "involved in ongoing negotiations" with Petitioner concerning the sign. The Grimes property purchase (by DOT) finally closed on October 1, 2002, at which time DOT became the owner of the Grimes property. Because of this fact, Petitioner was supposed to make its annual lease payments to the State of Florida ("State") as the new owner. Stated differently, the State became Petitioner's new lessor. On October 14, 2002, Lamar Advertising filed a Sign Permit Application with the Polk County Building Division. The application was for approval of its sign on the Grimes property. The application included a copy of Lamar's lease with Grimes; the lease had a 10-year period and a payment of $4,000 per year.1 On July 8, 2003 (ten months after DOT purchased the property), Petitioner filed a permit application with Polk County for the New Sign. Petitioner did not, at that time, have permission from DOT to erect a new sign, but believed it could obtain that permission after the fact. Petitioner then went forward with the construction of the New Sign. Meanwhile, Petitioner sent Grimes a check in October 2003, for its lease payment for the period June 1, 2003, through May 30, 2004. By that time, the State already owned the Grimes property. A member of the Grimes family sent Petitioner's check back to Petitioner in January 2004, explaining that all payments should be made directly to the State. There is no evidence in the record as to whether Petitioner attempted to make a lease payment to the Department at that time or at any other time. In November 2003, DOT issued a certified letter to Petitioner addressing Sign Permit No. AU557 that said: On October 2, 2002, the above referenced parcel was purchased by the Florida Department of Transportation. Although the Department will honor an existing lease, it will not engage in any new lease agreements nor grant permission for the referenced sign to remain. Since any potential oral agreement with the previous owner has expired, the Department requests that the [Original] sign be removed. Clearly DOT was mistaken. Petitioner had a written, not oral, lease with the prior owner. In response, Petitioner sent DOT a copy of its Ground Lease with Grimes. At that time, Petitioner also asked for a meeting with DOT's acquisition director to continue negotiating a fair price for the Original Sign. Several months later (on July 9, 2004), DOT issued its Notice of Violation regarding the Original Sign. The notice said "that the outdoor advertising sign referenced above has been acquired by the Department" (rather than saying the Department had purchased the land). The notice directed Petitioner to immediately remove the sign from the premises. The notice was partially in error; DOT had actually acquired the land, not the sign. Petitioner was in breach of its lease with the State by failing to make lease payments as required by the lease which DOT had assumed. However, it is unclear as to whether, upon notice of receipt of the written lease, DOT had ever advised Petitioner to send its lease payments directly to the Department. The Notice of Administrative Hearing Rights attached to the DOT Notice of Violation indicates a deadline of 30 days from receipt of the Notice for filing such a request, i.e., on or about August 10, 2005. Petitioner responded to the Notice with another letter (dated July 14, 2009) explaining again that it had a valid lease with Grimes for the sign location. Petitioner's letter asked DOT to abate its violation notice and reinstate Petitioner's permit. It also stated that "[i]f the State decides not to acknowledge the Judicial process [the ongoing probate dispute with the Grimes family concerning the lease with Lamar] and still proceeds with the Notice of Violation, then upon receiving your next correspondence, we will exercise our privilege to request an administrative hearing." Petitioner contends that the quoted statement constituted its request for an administrative hearing. However, the plain reading of the statement indicates that it is a statement of future intent based upon future actions by DOT. DOT then issued a letter dated August 10, 2004, to Petitioner explaining that the permit for the Original Sign had been revoked. The letter directed Petitioner to remove the sign. The letter stated that if Petitioner does not do so, then DOT would have the right to remove the sign. (As of the date of the final hearing in this matter, the sign was still in place.) The August 10 letter, in response to Petitioner's July 14 letter, appears to be the "next correspondence" Petitioner had requested. The exercise of its right to an administrative hearing would, therefore, be due on or about September 11, 2004. On September 8, 2004, Petitioner sent a letter to Holschuh declining DOT's offer to purchase the Original Sign for $17,000. That offer had been made in May 2002.2 This letter suggests a counter-offer of $82,500 as the purchase price. The letter did not invoke Petitioner's right to an administrative hearing. Holschuh responded that she was not involved in acquisitions, and Petitioner should contact the district office (with whom Petitioner had previously negotiated). Instead of heeding Holschuh's directions, Petitioner then sent her another letter asking her to send the correspondence on to someone in the acquisition division. The new letter also repeats the counter-offer of $82,500. This letter did not invoke Petitioner's right to a formal hearing, either. About one year later, on October 6, 2005, DOT issued another Notice of Violation, this one addressing Sign Permit No. AU557a (which Holschuh at final hearing said referred to the Original Sign, although there was no "a" nomenclature on the July 9, 2004, Notice of Violation). Also, on October 6, 2005, DOT issued a Notice of Violation addressing Sign Permit No. AU557a#2, which Holschuh said referred to Petitioner's New Sign, even though no permit for the New Sign had ever been issued by DOT. The New Sign by this time had been completed and was being used for outdoor advertising. Petitioner understands the need for a permit to construct a new outdoor sign on the State road right-of-ways, but opined that it believed it could do so after the fact. Petitioner has only obtained approval from Polk County for erecting the sign, an event necessary for construction purposes, but irrelevant to DOT requirements. In the letter to DOT from Petitioner dated October 26, 2005 (and presumably accepted by DOT as Petitioner's request for a formal hearing), reference is made to Sign Permit No. AU557a#2, i.e., the New Sign. However, the letter addresses the Original Sign and its perceived value by Petitioner. It is patently unclear as to which sign is actually being addressed, but facts surrounding both signs were presented at final hearing and both have been addressed herein. Nonetheless, Petitioner's October 26, 2005, letter was submitted within 30 days of the latest Notice of Violation and was presumably intended to invoke Petitioner's right to a formal administrative hearing. This letter was then forwarded to DOAH by DOT in March 2009, for the purpose of conducting the hearing. (No evidence was presented as to why the DOT's cover letter and Petitioner's request for hearing were not submitted to DOAH until three-and-a-half years after the letter was written.)
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by Respondent, Department of Transportation, reversing the revocation of Sign Permit No. AU557 and providing Petitioner, SG Outdoor, just compensation for that sign. Further, the final order should deem the newly constructed sign on the same site to be unauthorized and order its removal. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of November, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. R. BRUCE MCKIBBEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of November, 2009.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Respondent is guilty of using or attempting to use his position as mayor of the City of South Pasadena for his benefit or the benefit of candidates that he supported in the 2014 city commission election, in violation of section 112.313(6), Florida Statutes (2013).
Findings Of Fact In March 2014, the Respondent was the mayor of the City of South Pasadena, having been elected the year before. City commission elections were scheduled for Tuesday, March 11. There were two contested slots. The incumbents were Max Elson and Arthur Penny. The challengers were Harris Blair and Robert Small. The Respondent supported the challengers and donated to their campaigns to unseat the incumbents, who had been voting against the Respondent's positions since his election as mayor. Of the two elections, the Respondent was more interested in unseating Penny, who regularly opposed the mayor. Pasadena Liquors is a retail business operating in the City of South Pasadena. It was operated by Jimmy Valenty, whose family trust owned the business. Although not a resident and not eligible to vote in the city commission elections, Valenty supported Elson, who was a personal friend. A few weeks before the election, Elson mentioned to Valenty that the campaign signs Valenty allowed him to place outside Pasadena Liquors kept disappearing. Elson asked if Valenty would let him use the marquee inside the front window. Valenty agreed. Elson then asked if Valenty also would let Penny use it. Valenty had no personal interest in Penny's campaign but agreed to his friend's request. Valenty arranged the letters on the marquee to read: "VOTE ELSON AND PENNY CITY COMMISSIONER." During the week before the election, the Respondent received telephone calls regarding the marquee from several constituents who were supporting Blair and Small. They did not recall the marquee being used to solicit votes for city commission elections in the past and questioned whether it was legal. The Respondent was not aware of the sign before receiving the telephone calls and told his constituents that he would look into it. On Friday, March 7, the Respondent went to Pasadena Liquors to talk to Valenty and tell him about the telephone calls he had received. Valenty asked if the Respondent was there as mayor, and the Respondent said, no, he was there as a concerned customer or concerned citizen. During the discussion about the propriety and legality of the sign, Valenty asked to see the city's sign ordinance. The Respondent offered to get a copy of it for Valenty. Normally, the mayor would not be involved in enforcement of the city's sign ordinance. The city's government is run by the mayor and five commissioners, all elected positions. The city has five departments. The mayor oversees the administration department. Each commissioner oversees one of the other four departments. Code enforcement, which includes enforcement of the sign ordinance, is part of the community improvement department (CID). Code violations usually would come to the attention of the city through either a code enforcement inspection or a citizen complaint, which would be referred to code enforcement for investigation. It was the CID director's job to interpret, as necessary, the ordinances being enforced. His interpretation would stand unless the city commission overruled him. In March 2014, Commissioner Elson was in charge of and oversaw the CID. The CID's director, Neal Schwartz, reported directly to Commissioner Elson. After talking to Valenty, the Respondent went to Schwartz's office, told him about his conversation with Valenty, and asked for a copy of the sign ordinance pertaining to the Pasadena Liquors marquee. Schwartz copied the sign ordinance, which was long and convoluted, and highlighted the pertinent provisions. It was the CID director's opinion that the sign was legal, in part because the marquee was a "reader board" with changeable letters. The CID director offered to check with the county election supervisor to verify his opinion and was told that the city clerk, who directed the administration department overseen by the Respondent, was in charge of city elections. It was not clear from the evidence whether the Respondent was still present in the office of the CID director when he telephoned the county elections supervisor. It was clear that the Respondent had left the CID director's office before the CID director talked to the city clerk. When the clerk was asked, she was of the opinion that the sign was legal because it was not paid political advertising. She was prepared to tell the Respondent her opinion if he contacted her. The Respondent did not contact the city clerk for her opinion. After meeting with the CID director, the Respondent returned to Pasadena Liquors to show Valenty the sign ordinance. Valenty saw nothing in the highlighted portions of the sign ordinance that made it clear to him that the sign was illegal, but there appeared to him to be a size limitation. Valenty got a tape measure and concluded that the sign exceeded the size requirements. Valenty asked if the Respondent was requiring him to remove the signage from the marquee. The Respondent said no, it was up to Valenty to decide what to do with the sign. Valenty was planning to remove the sign the next day anyway to replace it with advertising for St. Patrick's Day, so he decided to go ahead and switch the signage on the marquee that day. At the election on March 11, the incumbents won. After information was reported to him about the Respondent's actions regarding the Pasadena Liquors marquee, Commissioner Penny swore out an Ethics Commission complaint alleging that the Respondent went to Pasadena Liquors and demanded that the owner remove the "vote-for-the-incumbents" sign by falsely telling him that he was in violation of the political advertisement laws, after insisting that the CID director call the supervisor of elections and not waiting for the opinion of the city clerk as to the sign's legality. After receiving and reading the ethics complaint, the Respondent brought a copy to Valenty because his name was mentioned, and the Respondent thought he should know about it. Valenty read it and said there was nothing negative in it about him, so he was not concerned about it. The Respondent did not try to influence Valenty's reaction to the complaint, and there was no evidence that there was anything else to this encounter. A few months later, the Respondent asked the city clerk to begin the process of recognizing the lounge at Pasadena Liquors for being open for 25 years and to be sure to say that it was at his request. When the city clerk broached the subject with Valenty, he declined the honor because the timing suggested to him that the recognition was to "make up for" any hard feelings that arose from the issue regarding the business's election sign. In fact, the timing was a coincidence. The city had recognized Pasadena Liquors for the 10th anniversary of its lounge being open, and other businesses in the city were recognized similarly when they reached landmark anniversaries. It was not proven by clear and convincing evidence that the Respondent's actions with respect to the Pasadena Liquors marquee were taken for the purpose of influencing the election, and it is unlikely that they had any influence on the election. In part for these reasons, it was not proven by clear and convincing evidence that the Respondent's actions with respect to the Pasadena Liquors marquee were taken for the purpose of securing a special privilege, benefit, or exemption for himself or the unsuccessful candidates. It also was not proven by clear and convincing evidence that the Respondent's actions with respect to the Pasadena Liquors marquee were taken with corrupt intent.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Ethics Commission enter a final order dismissing the charges against the Respondent. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of May, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of May, 2015. COPIES FURNISHED: Virlindia Doss, Executive Director Florida Commission on Ethics Post Office Drawer 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709 (eServed) C. Christopher Anderson, III, General Counsel Florida Commission on Ethics Post Office Drawer 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709 (eServed) Millie Wells Fulford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Ethics Post Office Drawer 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709 (eServed) Melody A. Hadley, Esquire Office of the Attorney General The Capitol, Plaza Level 01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 (eServed) Joseph A. Corsmeier, Esquire Law Office of Joseph A. Corsmeier, P.A. Building B, Suite 431 2454 McMullen Booth Road Clearwater, Florida 33759-1339 (eServed)
The Issue Whether Petitioner's outdoor advertising sign permit applications should be granted.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at hearing, the parties' Prehearing Stipulation (which contains a "Statement of Admitted Facts"),1 and the record as a whole, the following findings of fact are made: Petitioner's Signs On or after July 21, 1998, Petitioner filed outdoor advertising sign permit applications for two signs2 (Petitioner's Signs) located on property it owns on the west side of Interstate 95 (I-95) within 660 feet of the nearest edge of the right-of-way of I-95, one-half mile south of Northlake Boulevard, and north of Blue Heron Boulevard, in Palm Beach County, Florida. This area of I-95 has been a part of the interstate highway system since at least August of 1967. Palm Beach County is the local governmental entity with authority to adopt a comprehensive land use designation for the property on which Petitioner's Signs are located (Property). From the time the Signs were erected in 1987, through the present, the Property (on which Petitioner conducts no business activities) has been zoned or designated for residential, not predominantly commercial or industrial, use. Petitioner's Signs, each of which exceeds eight square feet in area, contain advertising messages for Petitioner. The messages can be read without visual aid by motorists of normal acuity traveling on I-95. Previously, the Signs indicated the Property was for sale, but they have not been used for such purpose since December 14, 1994. The Department denied Petitioner's permit applications because the Signs are located in an "unpermittable land use designation" inasmuch as the Property is designated for residential, not predominately commercial or industrial, use. Other Signs Subsequent to December 8, 1971, the effective date of Chapter 71-971, Laws of Florida,3 the Department has issued and/or renewed outdoor advertising sign permits for other signs located within 660 feet of the nearest edge of the interstate or federal-aid primary highway system, notwithstanding these signs' location in areas not designated primarily for commercial or industrial use. Signs Assigned Permit Numbers AZ346-35, AZ347-35, AY935-35, AY936-35, AY937-35, and AY938-35. Among these signs are six signs (three sign structures with two facings each) that, like Petitioner's Signs, are located on the west side of I-95, south of Northlake Boulevard and north of Blue Heron Boulevard, in an area designated for residential, not predominantly commercial or industrial, use. The Department has annually renewed the sign permits for these signs since at least 1973. The 1974 annual permit renewals are the earliest records the Department has for these signs. (The Department has neither an original, nor a copy of, the initial applications or the initial permits, for these signs.) The signs currently have the following permit numbers: AZ346-35, AZ347-35, AY935-35, AY936-35, AY937-35, and AY938-35. According to Palm Beach County Building records, these signs were all constructed before January 27, 1972, and four of the signs were constructed in the late 1960's (in or sometime after July of 1968). These signs are in the same location as when originally permitted, and that location has been zoned or designated for residential use since before the time the signs were constructed and permitted. Signs Assigned Permit Numbers AN661-35 and BG910-35 Two signs (one sign structure with two facings) located within 660 feet of the westerly right-of-way of I-95, south of Forest Hill Boulevard and north or Seventeenth Avenue North, in Palm Beach County, Florida, were permitted by the Department in August of 1984. This area of I-95 has been a part of the interstate highway system since at least April of 1976. The two signs were erected after August of 1984. They currently are assigned permit numbers AN661-35 and BG910-35. The initial outdoor advertising sign permit applications that were filed with the Department for these signs (in August of 1984), unlike the applications submitted by Petitioner in the instant case, indicated that the signs were to be located in an area that was "commercial or industrial zoned." On each application, the applicant "certif[ied] that the statements made and the information given in this application [were] true and correct." In accordance with the Department's standard operating procedure, a review of these applications was conducted by Department staff and the information contained therein, including that relating to the zoning of the area in which the signs were to be located, was determined to be accurate. Accordingly, the permits were issued. Based upon the evidence adduced at the final hearing in this case, it appears that, contrary to the determination made by the Department, the zoning information provided by the applicant was inaccurate inasmuch as the area in which the signs were to be located was actually (and still is) an unzoned residential area. Signs Assigned Permit Numbers AX549 and AX550 State Road 80 in Section 35, Township 43 South, Range 40 East, in Palm Beach County, Florida, has been part of the federal-aid primary system since at least January of 1973. There are two signs (one sign structure with two facings) that are located within 660 feet of the right-of-way of State Road 80 in Section 35, Township 43 South, Range 40 East, in Palm Beach County, Florida, in an area not designated for predominately commercial or industrial use (State Road 80 Signs). These signs currently are assigned permit numbers AX549 and AX550. The Department issued sign permits for the predecessors of the State Road 80 Signs (Predecessor Signs) on April 15, 1979. An examination of the initial outdoor advertising sign permit applications filed with the Department (in April of 1979) for the Predecessor Signs reveals that each application has the entry "8/67" in the space for showing the "date [the sign is] to be erected,"4 and has the handwritten notation, "grandfathered," on that portion of the application to be filled out by the Department. The Department uses the term "grandfathered" to refer to signs which existed legally prior to a change in the law rendering them nonconforming, but which, notwithstanding such change, are still treated as lawful (albeit nonconforming) signs. The Department has a policy of permitting or "grandfathering" signs that existed (in compliance with the then- existing law) prior to the effective date of the aforementioned January 27, 1972, agreement between the State of Florida and the United States Department of Transportation (which is referenced in Section 479.111(2), Florida Statutes), provided no changes are made to the signs. The State Road 80 Signs are in the same general location (but not the identical location) where the Predecessor Signs were located, and all of the property in that general location is now, and has been since before the Predecessor Signs were permitted, zoned or designated for some use other than commercial or industrial. In 1986, the property on which the Predecessor Signs were located was acquired (for $42,000.00, excluding attorney's fees and costs) by the Department as a result of a settlement reached by the Department and the property owner in an eminent domain proceeding. In recommending (in writing) that the Department settle the matter, the Department's trial attorney stated the following with respect to the Predecessor Signs: The settlement figure of $42,000.00 dollars is a reasonable Award in light of the real estate and severance damages. Due to the specific difficulties involved in this matter, for instance the importance of a particular type of advertising sign combined with the fact that this advertising sign was grandfathered in and since the sign has been put up, restrictions had occurred in Palm Beach County which would have prevented a similar sign from being put up. Accordingly all parties had to work within the constraints of the original sign location with slight adjustment and renovation in order to make effectively a new sign into a renovated sign for purposes of seeking whatever variance. As the trial attorney had suggested in his written recommendation, the Predecessor Signs, with the Department's approval, had been removed from their original location and reconstructed (in or about June of 1986) on a part of the property that was not subject to the eminent domain proceeding. Signs Along the Florida Turnpike State Road 91 (the Florida Turnpike) in Palm Beach County, Florida, was designated as a part of the National Highway System by the United States Congress on November 28, 1995. It thereupon was deemed by the Department to be a part of the federal-aid primary highway system in the state. Before November 28, 1995, starting at least as early as 1973, the Department had issued at least 95 sign permits for signs located in Palm Beach County, which were within 660 feet of the Florida Turnpike right-of-way and not located in areas zoned or designated for commercial or industrial use at the time the permits were issued. Many, or all, of these signs are still in areas not zoned or designated for commercial or industrial use. With the concurrence of the Federal Highway Administration, the Department did not require signs along the Florida Turnpike to meet the requirements applicable to signs located along federal-aid primary highway system roadways, provided a permit application for these signs was received by the Department prior to July 1, 1996. A sign located within 660 feet of the edge of the westerly right-of-way of the Florida Turnpike, south of Forest Hill Boulevard and north of Lake Worth Road (State Road 802), in Palm Beach County, Florida, was issued outdoor advertising sign permit number BM818 by the Department on May 28, 1996. The application for this permit had been received by the Department on May 8, 1996. At the time of the issuance of the permit, the sign was located in an area not zoned or designated for commercial or industrial use. The sign is presently in the same location, which continues to be not zoned or designated for commercial or industrial use.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department issue a final order denying Petitioner's applications for outdoor advertising sign permits for his Signs. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of May, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of May, 1999.
The Issue The Petitioner appeals the disapproval of its license transfer application by the Respondent. Hence the issue posed is whether or not the Respondent unlawfully disapproved the application for transfer on the grounds that "the location failed to qualify for zoning approval" within the meaning of Section 561.18, F.S. The premises sought to be licensed is located at 1480 South Ocean Boulevard, Pompano Beach, Florida. The former name of the business was Paddock International, Inc., d/b/a Paddock International. The proposed name of the new business is Jacob's Ladder, Inc., d/b/a Jacob's Ladder. When the application for transfer was submitted to the Division of Beverage for approval, it was rejected on May 19, 1976, for, as previously stated, the reason that it "failed to qualify for zoning approval", citing Section 561.18, F.S., as amended. The disapproval was appealed and the matter is now before the undersigned to determine whether or not the applicants and the premises met all of the qualifications required in the beverage law. The Petitioner takes the position that the Respondent's and County Zoning Board's action amounts to arbitrary and capricious conduct and that in no instance, has zoning approval been required in license approval situations. C. Lloyd, Respondent's representative and employee for approximately eight years, testified that he processes approximately 600 license applications yearly of which approximately 40 to 50 percent represent transfer applications. Based on his experience, the Petitioner's application is the only transfer application requiring zoning approval. He was advised during his investigation by a Mr. Kauth that the Broward County Zoning Board acted on a previous mix-up in the type of license which was previously issued and the county was misinformed in giving zoning approval to the prior licensee. He testified further that in almost all cases no inspection is made as to whether or not the particular premises meets the zoning requirements in transfer application situations. By way of background, the record evidence reveals that the license was initially issued to the owners of the premises sought to be licensed here on or about January 4, 1960. Since that time, approximately 21 licenses have been issued and/or renewed and at no time has zoning ever surfaced as a problem. The most recent zoning certificate was dated December 4, 1974 and the zoning was satisfactory at that time. George Maurer, Chief of Zoning Inspection for Broward County and who has served as the Zoning Chief for the past three years testified that he supervises personnel in the zoning department and is charged with maintaining records; overseeing and enforcing zoning procedures. He recalled being asked to sign the zoning approval form for the subject premises and he refused in that there was no certificate on file and according to his testimony, such must be current with the present owner's name contained thereon. He admitted that the prior zoning approval certificate had not been revoked either administratively or otherwise and that there was no hearing as to any proposed revocation or notice of any intent to revoke the current zoning approval certificate. The zoning approval was withheld here due to the inadequate parking spaces and for violations of the South Florida Building Code and numerous other code violations. To the best of his knowledge, the code violations had been corrected with the exception of a sign which was erected on the premises sought to be licensed. When Petitioner filed its application for transfer of license from the previous owners, he was advised that there existed 47 parking spaces, however, based on a field examination conducted by him on August, 1976, his inspection revealed that there were only 38 parking spaces. On cross examination he testified that there has been no change in the zoning regulations from the time of issuance of the prior zoning certificate through the time that the disapproval was given for the license application in question. Robert R. Krauth, Deputy County Administrator of Broward County, testified he mailed a mailgram to beverage agent Joseph J. Scozzafava and advised that the zoning certificate had been improperly granted for the premises sought to be licensed under the previous ownership. The testimony is that he had no knowledge that zoning certificates were required in transfers and that to his knowledge no steps had been taken to close the restaurant due to these alleged inadequacies. On cross examination he testified that he had some knowledge that the use of the premises had changed however he had no evidence on that point. He received no complaints from Jacobs Ladder and to his knowledge the sole problem centered around the inadequate parking spaces. George C. Gatterer, 2/ an employee of Broward County Board of County Commissioners and the Assistant Director of General Services for the zoning department, testified that the area is located in a R-6 zoning area. The zoning certificate could not be approved for the subject premises based on the "improper parking spaces". He was aware of no regulation which required that new zoning certificates be changed based solely on a name change. He knew the former compliance officer, Smith, who certified that the property had been in compliance during the prior periods in which the zoning approval had been certified. Other evidence revealed that the parking lot had not changed nor had the use changed and that prior licensees had no problem getting licenses transferred. Petitioner's agents attempted to obtain parking in contiguous areas but were unable to obtain such.
Findings Of Fact Based on the record evidence, it is clear that the request for a new zoning certificate was a new procedure utilized by the Division of Beverage in the subject case. Respondent's own witness testified that he was in charge of processing most license transfers and that he was aware of no other application in which a zoning certificate was required in order to gain transfer approval from the Respondent. The evidence further revealed that the same number of parking spaces, at least in terms of footage, now exist as has existed when zoning approval was given in the earlier situations. This situation has existed for more than 16 years and the county's witness who is in charge of the zoning approval testified that there has been no change in the zoning regulations since the issuance of the most recent zoning certificate in 1974. Evidence further reveals that at no time did the Petitioner receive and notification that the prior zoning approval was being withdrawn either administratively or otherwise, nor was any notice given of an intent to revoke the prior zoning approval. Based on these facts, the undersigned concludes that the requirement that a zoning approval be submitted along with the transfer application in this case represented a marked departure from the existing rules, regulations and procedures of the Division of Beverage, and amounted to a denial of due process. Based thereon I shall recommend that the transfer application be approved since, in my opinion, based on the evidence presented, the premises possess the requisite qualifications as required by the beverage law. It thus appears that Respondent's failure to approve the application for reasons advanced cannot stand and I shall recommend that the approval be issued forthwith.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings and conclusions of law, I recommend that the Department of Business Regulations, Division of Beverage, approve the application submitted in the subject case. DONE and ENTERED this 27th day of August, 1976, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675
The Issue Whether Petitioner, National Advertising Company, is entitled to the issuance of a vegetation control permit for its south-facing advertising billboard located West of Interstate I-75, in Lee County, Florida.
Findings Of Fact The Florida Department of Transportation (DOT) is the state agency charged with the duty to administer and enforce the provisions of Chapter 479, Florida Statutes, which regulates outdoor advertising structures along the state highway system, including interstate highways. Construction of Interstate 75 in the relevant area of Lee County, Florida, was completed and accepted by the DOT on or about February 22, 1979. On March 10, 1980, the Florida Department of Transportation issued an outdoor advertising sign permit to Florida Outdoor for a billboard to be located adjacent to I-75, .25 miles north of the intersection of I-75 and State Road 82 in Lee County. The billboard was constructed and the billboard structure, together with the sign permit, was acquired by Petitioner in May of 1982. Petitioner holds a current valid sign permit, DOT sign permit number AB-118-10, for the above sign. Said sign is a non-conforming sign under the Rules of the DOT and cannot be moved or raised. Petitioner submitted a properly completed application for a vegetation control permit to the DOT on February 4, 1991. Petitioner's sign board does not have five hundred feet of exposure along the interstate highway within a one thousand foot window and is therefore a screened board under the provisions of the DOT's rules. Following review of the application by the District Roadway Maintenance Engineer, it was determined that the area covered by the vegetation control permit was within an area specifically preserved during the construction process which prohibits any pruning, trimming, or removal of trees, shrubs, or vegetation in that area. Based on that determination, the permit was denied.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that: A Final Order be entered finding that the vegetation control permit requested by National Advertising Company on I-75 (S.R. 93) in Lee County, Florida, should be GRANTED, pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 14-13, Florida Administrative Code. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of December, 1991, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th December, 1991. APPENDIX The following constitutes my specific rulings, in accordance with section 120.59, Florida Statutes, on findings of fact submitted by the parties. National Advertising's Proposed Findings of Fact: Accepted in substance: paragraphs 1,2,3,4 (in part) 5,6 (in part), 8,10. Rejected as irrelevant or immaterial: paragraph 4 (in part-coverage in Preliminary Statement), 6 (in part), 7,9,11. Rejected as a conclusion of law: paragraph 12,13. Department of Transportation's Proposed Findings of Fact: Accepted in substance; Stipulation of Facts; paragraphs 1 (in part), 2 (in part). Rejected as conclusions of law: paragraphs 1 (in part), 2 (in part). Copies furnished: Gerald S. Livingston, Esquire Kreuter & Livingston, P.A. 200 East Robinson Street Suite 1150 Orlando, Florida Vernon L. Whittier, Jr., Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida Ben G. Watts Secretary Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0450 Thornton J. Williams General Counsel Department of Transportation 562 Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0450
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Petitioner’s applications for a State sign permit should be granted.
Findings Of Fact No dispute exists that DOT is the State agency responsible for regulating outdoor advertising signs located within 660 feet of the State Highway system, interstate, or federal-aid primary system in accordance with Chapter 479, Florida Statutes. Mr. Monsalve wishes to place two advertising signs within 660 feet of Interstate 95 and visible to Interstate 95. The advertising signs require a permit. On or about June 16, 2008, Mr. Monsalve filed two applications, completing DOT’s forms titled “Application for Outdoor Advertising Permit” (Application), with DOT for outdoor advertising signs. The two applications indicated the same location for the outdoor advertising but with different height, width, and total square feet: one was a height of 4 feet, width of 60 feet, and 240 total square feet, and the other was a height of 12 feet, width of 12 feet, and 144 total square feet. The two Applications were assigned Application numbers 57196 and 57197, respectively. The location for the proposed outdoor advertising signs is 299 Southwest 17 Road in Miami, Florida, near Interstate 95, North of Southwest 3rd Avenue. Mr. Monsalve owns the property on which the advertising signs are to be located. The Application contained a section titled “Local Government Permission.” The section provided that it was to be completed by the appropriate local government official or that a “written statement indicating that the sign complies with all local government requirements” may be submitted or, “for a proposed sign location, a copy of the building permit issued by the local government may be submitted.” The section was neither completed by the local government official nor was a written statement submitted indicating that the signs comply with all local government requirements. However, Mr. Monsalve submitted a 1999 building permit from the local government. The local government was the City of Miami. The 1999 building permit was issued by the City of Miami on July 13, 1999, to Hampton Inn for a commercial painted wall sign, located at 299 Southwest 17 Road. The building permit was issued Permit Number SG 99-5011166. The Folio Number, i.e., Property ID Number, on the 1999 building permit is No. 01-4138-002-0020. Mr. Monsalve owns the property for which the 1999 building permit was issued for the advertising sign. The property is the same property identified on his Application, assigned Application number 57197. DOT requires that, in order for a building permit to constitute “local government permission,” the permit must have been issued within six months of the date of an application for an outdoor advertising sign. The 1999 building permit submitted by Mr. Monsalve was beyond the six-month time period of the date of Application number 57197. Furthermore, by letter dated June 25, 2008, the City of Miami notified DOT that the 1999 building permit no longer had legal status due to the City of Miami changing its laws regarding billboards and that Mr. Monsalve did not have local government permission.3 The evidence demonstrates that the 1999 building permit did not constitute local government permission. The evidence failed to demonstrate that Mr. Monsalve had obtained local government permission. In March 2004, DOT issued a permit to the Hampton Inn for an outdoor advertising sign on Mr. Monsalve’s property. The permit was issued Tag Number CA179, and the sign was built on August 19, 2004. The permit information provides, among other information, that the location of the outdoor advertising sign was located 0.040 miles North of Southwest 3rd Avenue and that the sign was 144 square feet. Hampton Inn and Mr. Monsalve entered into an agreement/contract for Hampton Inn to lease outdoor advertising space from Mr. Monsalve at 299 Southwest 17 Road, Miami, Florida. A Second Lease Agreement between Mr. Monsalve and the Hampton Inn indicates in provision numbered one that the lease agreement was extended until March 31, 2007. The evidence demonstrates that, subsequent to March 31, 2007, the lease of the space by the Hampton Inn continued on a month-to-month basis and that the last time that Mr. Monsalve received payment for the monthly lease was in March 2008. The location for the outdoor advertising sign permit, Tag Number CA179 is the same location of Mr. Monsalve’s proposed outdoor advertising sign in Application number 57197. In June 2008, the outdoor advertising sign permit, Tag Number CA179, was transferred from Hampton Inn to Outlook Media using DOT’s form titled “Outdoor Advertising Permit Transfer Request.” The permit is considered by DOT to be currently active. The location for Mr. Monsalve’s Application number 57197 is currently permitted to Outlook Media due to the transfer of outdoor advertising sign permit, Tag Number CA179 to Outlook Media. The distance between the proposed sign in Mr. Monsalve’s Application number 57196 and the space in the outdoor advertising sign permit, Tag Number CA179, is less than 1500 feet. The evidence demonstrates that the sign in Mr. Monsalve’s Application number 57197 conflicts with the outdoor advertising sign permit, Tag Number CA179, in that the two are the same location. Mr. Monsalve believed that he, as the property owner, owned the outdoor advertising sign permit, Tag Number CA179, as well. He did not agree for the permit to be transferred. Mr. Monsalve was not aware that the outdoor advertising sign permit, Tag Number CA179, had been transferred by Hampton Inn to Outlook Media. The evidence was insufficient to demonstrate that he owned or did not own the permit or that his permission was required for the permit to be transferred. Mr. Monsalve did not agree to lease the space for the outdoor advertising sign permit, Tag Number CA179, to Outlook Media. Mr. Monsalve notified DOT that a problem existed between him and the City of Miami regarding obtaining local government permission and requested DOT to put his Application on “Hold” in order to provide him with time to resolve the problem. He also notified DOT regarding his dispute with the transfer of the outdoor advertising sign permit, Tag Number CA179, to Outlook Media. DOT is unable to place applications on hold but is required to act on applications within 30 days. Also, Mr. Monsalve notified the City of Miami, among other things, of his dispute with the transfer of the outdoor advertising sign permit, Tag Number CA179, to Outlook Media, and that he did not give Outlook Media permission to erect a sign on his property for which the outdoor advertising sign permit, Tag Number CA179, was issued. By Notice of Denial issued on July 3, 2008, DOT notified Mr. Monsalve that his Applications were denied for the following reason: Other: No statement from the appropriate local governmental official indicating that the agency or unit of local government will issue a permit to the applicant upon approval of the state permit application by the Department (Section 479.07(3)(b), Florida Statutes). On July 15, 2008, DOT issued an amended Notice of Denial, notifying Mr. Monsalve that his Applications were denied for the following reasons: Sign does not meet spacing requirements (1500’ for interstates . . .) s.479.07(9)(a)1.&2., FS In conflict with permitted sign(s), tag #(s) CA 179 held by Outlook Media of South Florida, LLC . . . Sign/location does not comply with all local government requirements . . . s.479.07(3)(b), FS Other: The building permit submitted with the application is not in compliance with local governmental requirements. No evidence was presented to demonstrate that a determination had been made as to what Mr. Monsalve’s legal rights are as the owner of the property regarding his lease agreement/contract with the Hampton Inn and the outdoor advertising sign permit, Tag Number CA179; and regarding the transfer of the outdoor advertising sign permit, Tag Number CA179.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Transportation enter a final order denying Andres Monsalve’s application for an outdoor advertising sign permit. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of December 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ERROL H. POWELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of December, 2008.
Findings Of Fact Respondent owns a sign located on the west side of Interstate Highway 95 (1-95) in the city of Pembroke Park, Florida, 0.2 miles north from the Dade County line which bears the copy "Johnny Walker Red". This sign was created by connecting two previous signs by the use of a panel in the middle. The two former signs were six feet by twelve feet each and located approximately six inches apart. When joined they became one sign six feet by twenty-four feet. An alleged violation-of Section 479.07(2), Florida Statutes, was reported by Petitioner's Outdoor Advertising Inspector for changing the size of the signs without first obtaining a proper permit. Subsequent to the reported violation, a meeting was held between Respondent and representatives of the Petitioner concerning the converting of two signs into one. At the meeting, Petitioner's representative, O.E. Black, Administrator of the Outdoor Advertising section, apparently authorized such joinder if the signs were cut in the middle so that technically they constitute two signs. It was further agreed at that meeting that separate permit tags would be retained as required. The sign (or signs) is presently in accordance with the above policy, and application has been made for the necessary permit. (Testimony of Hackett, Simokat). Sign located on SR 5, 400' North of Kendall Drive, Southwest. This is a sign erected in Dade County which did not bear a State permit tag at the time the alleged violation was noted on January 5, 1976. The sign is located on properties zoned for "general use". After receiving the Notice of Violation, Respondent's representative discovered that four tags instead of two had been placed on a nearby sign owned by the company, and that apparently two of them belonged to the sign in question, but inadvertently had not been affixed. He thereupon placed the two extra permit tags on the offending sign. It is agreed by the parties that the sign is properly tagged and permitted at the present time. (Testimony of Conde, Owens). Sign located on SR 25A, southwest corner of Second Avenue and 54th Street N.W., Miami, Florida. This is a sign that was formerly two signs 6' X 12' which were made into one large sign 6' X 24'. A piece of metal was put between the two signs to join them. There is also a plywood embellishment attached to the merged signs which is the same height as the existing sign, but extends on the right end to make the total area approximately 15' x 28'. A permit was applied for by the Respondent and denied because the sign was less than 500' away from other permitted signs. Though, the signs were erected four or five years ago, the consolidated sign with new dimensions is considered by Petitioner to be a new sign that cannot be permitted because of +he above- mentioned spacing requirements. (Testimony of Conti, Simokat).
Recommendation That the alleged violations against Respondent Empire Advertising Industries, Inc., be dismissed. DONE and ENTERED this 13th day of July, 1976, in Tallahassee, Florida. THOMAS C. OLDHAM Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Phillip Bennett, Esquire Room 562, Haydon Burns Building Department of Transportation Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Robert Korner, Esquire 4790 Tamiami Trail Coral Gables, Florida 33134
