The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Respondent's certificate of registration to collect sales tax should be revoked.
Findings Of Fact In 1996, the Respondent and Lance Arnette were engaged in a dissolution of marriage action in the circuit court, Case No. 96-1185-FD. On June 20, 1997, the business known as Giff’s Sub Shop was awarded to Respondent, Linda Arnette. The circuit court transferred the business to Respondent free of any and all liabilities. Later, Respondent discovered that there was an undisclosed sales tax liability. The amount of that liability was not clear from the record. However, the Department was not a party to the Arnette’s dissolution of marriage action. On March 3, 1998, Respondent filed an application for a certificate of registration with the Department. The reason for the application was due to the change of ownership from Respondent’s ex-husband to Respondent. The application reflected an opening date for the business of June 1, 1997. Linda Arnette was reflected as the owner of the business. Respondent was the only person who signed the application. No other person was listed as having an interest in the sub shop. The certificate of registration was issued to Respondent and she became the registered dealer for the sub shop. As such, she was under a legal duty to collect and remit all taxes collected by the sub shop to the Department. She was also responsible to file tax returns for the business with the Department. Her first return would have been due on July 20, 1997. A tax warrant or lien for unpaid taxes was filed against Respondent on October 26, 2005. It is unclear what happened with the 2005 warrant. Department records reflect that the sub shop did not file returns for November 2006, December 2006, January 2007, and February 2007. A second tax warrant for unpaid taxes was filed against Respondent on April 4, 2007. The warrant covered the period from August 2003 to February 2007. The amount of tax due under the warrant was $14,658.07, plus interest and penalties. The 2003 date was well after Respondent had taken over operation of the sub shop from her ex-husband. The evidence did not show that the amount included any taxes which may have been due prior to her award of the sub shop in 1997 or prior to the August 2003 date. Moreover, the warrant did not include months for which Respondent had timely paid the tax due. Data from the Department revocation worksheet showed that Respondent owed only interest for the months of August 2003 and March through August, 2006. The fact she owed only interest in those months indicates that the taxes were paid late. The Department’s data showed the month of December 2005 with zero tax due and zero interest due. It is not clear from the evidence why the Department claimed the month of December 2005 was out of compliance. However, even without the month of December 2005, the Department’s data showed 30 months of noncompliance by Respondent either by not filing timely or not paying the tax. On March 2, 2007, the Department sent Respondent a notice of its intent to revoke her certificate of registration. An informal meeting was scheduled for April 17, 2007. The purpose of the meeting was to permit Respondent to present evidence on why her certificate of registration should not be revoked and to show that the amount of taxes due was incorrect. Respondent attended the meeting on April 17, 2007. The Department waived the penalties due on her tax liability. Interest due totaled $2,857.68. Respondent did not raise any issue regarding her ex-husband’s past tax liability or any payments she had allegedly made thereon. Indeed, Respondent’s argument regarding payment on her ex-husband’s past tax liability did not make sense and was not borne out by the evidence. Respondent did file her tax returns for November 2006, December 2006, January 2007, and February 2007. It was unclear, if Respondent brought her account books for the sub shop to the meeting. Respondent’s own books reflect that she reported tax liability for the period August 2003 through August, 2006 in the amount of $25,133.97, and through December 2006, she owed $27,620.97. Respondent’s records did not reflect the return amounts for 2007. Her records also reflect that for the period August 2003 through August 2006, she paid $13,311.68 and through December 2006, she paid $16,029.68 to the Department. Returns filed with the Department for 2007 totaled $1,379.78 though February 2007. In 2007, Respondent’s records reflect that through April 2007, she paid $1,912.08 to the Department. In short, Respondent’s own records reflect that for the period August 2003 through August 2006, she owed past due taxes in the amount of $11,822.19 and through December 2006, she owed past due taxes in the amount of $11,591.29. Her own records reflect she had repeatedly not complied with the requirements of Chapter 212, Florida Statutes, to timely remit and pay taxes. More importantly, Respondent entered into a compliance agreement with the Department at the April 17, 2007, meeting. In the agreement, Respondent admitted she owed taxes in the amount of $14,658.07, plus interest in the amount of $2,857.68, for a total of $17,515.75, to the Department. She admitted she had not complied with Sections 212.14(1), 212.14(2) and 212.15(1), Florida Statutes, regarding timely filing of returns and timely payment of taxes. These failures were repeated. Additionally, Respondent agreed to timely file all tax returns for the period April 2007 through March 2008, timely pay all tax due for the same period, as well as, comply with the payment schedule for the past due amount referenced above. Failure to abide by the terms of the compliance agreement would permit the Department to initiate revocation of the Respondent’s certificate of registration and the use of the compliance agreement to establish the facts of the earlier noncompliance with Chapter 212, Florida Statutes. Respondent made the payments required under the payment schedule in the compliance agreement, but did not make such payments timely. Her most current return was late. Respondent also paid the current taxes due each month, but did not timely pay those taxes. Thus, Respondent has accrued $2,519.96 in interest and $214.22 in penalties through July 18, 2007, in addition to the amount she agreed was due in the compliance agreement. Given this history, Respondent has clearly not complied with the requirements of Chapter 212, Florida Statutes, and her certificate of registration should be revoked.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is: RECOMMENDED that the Department of Revenue enter a final order revoking Respondent’s certificate of registration pursuant to Section 212.18, Florida Statutes. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of March, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DIANE CLEAVINGER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of March, 2008. COPIES FURNISHED: Warren J. Bird, Esquire Office of the Attorney General The Capitol, Plaza Level 101 Revenue Litigation Bureau Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Glen M. Swiatek, Esquire 5 Clifford Drive Shalimar, Florida 32579 Marshall Stranburg, General Counsel Department of Revenue The Carlton Building, Room 204 501 South Calhoun Street Post Office Box 6668 Tallahassee, Florida 32314-6668 Lisa Echeverri, Executive Director Department of Revenue The Carlton Building, Room 104 501 South Calhoun Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent, the Department of Revenue, should grant Petitioner's application for a consumer's certificate of exemption from sales and use tax.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a nonprofit organization incorporated under the laws of the State of Florida on or about August 27, 1997. Petitioner applied to Respondent for a consumer's certificate of exemption from sales and use tax. While the application indicates that it is based on exemption status as an "enterprise zone," Petitioner clarified at final hearing that it actually was basing its application on exemption status as a "charitable institution." ("Enterprise zone" is not an exemption category under the applicable statutes. See Conclusions of Law, infra.) The IRS has determined that Petitioner is exempt from federal income tax under IRC Section 501(a) as an organization described in IRC Section 501(c)(3). A letter dated February 2, 1999, stated that Petitioner: was formed in 1997 to plan and implement redevelopment efforts in the Greater Newtown Community which lead to overall improvement in the quality of life of its residents. In the short time since our inception, we have responded to community needs by implementing a broad range of programs that will have a positive impact on our community. But from the evidence presented (which included no testimony from either party), it is difficult to ascertain factual detail about Petitioner, its activities, or its finances. In addition to grant application and fund-raising activities, it appears that Petitioner has been involved in informational and participation-recruitment meetings and information-gathering surveys for planning purposes (called the Business Retention and Expansion Survey). Petitioner also appears to have been involved in a Storefront Renovation Program and several community celebrations. Petitioner has plans for other economic and community redevelopment activities. But it cannot be ascertained from the evidence which of the other economic development activities have taken place and which are still in grant application or planning stages. For example, documentation regarding Petitioner's involvement in one activity refers to the activity as the "proposed WAGES Employment Challenge." Petitioner obtained $128,000 of funding from the City of Sarasota for seed money for its economic redevelopment and other activities. Petitioner budgeted to spend the $128,000 in 1998. The entire budget consists of salaries, fringe benefits, and overhead expenses. According to a "Profit and Loss" statement for January through October 1998, Petitioner spent $30,581.49 during that time period. All of those expenditures were in the category of payroll and overhead expenses. One activity referenced in Petitioner's documentation is Petitioner's "partnering" with financial institutions and mortgage brokers to process mortgage loans for affordable housing. In that case, the expenditures would be by the other institutions, not by Petitioner. There is no information as to any other expenditures made by Petitioner.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Revenue enter a final order denying Petitioner's application for a consumer's certificate of exemption from sales and use tax. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of November, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of November, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Bill Nickell, Esquire Department of Revenue Post Office Box 6668 Tallahassee, Florida 32314-6668 Cynthia E. Porter, Executive Director Greater Newtown Community Redevelopment Corporation 1751 Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., Way Sarasota, Florida 34234 Joseph C. Mellichamp, III, Esquire Office of Attorney General The Capitol, Plaza Level 01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Linda Lettera, General Counsel Department of Revenue 204 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100 Larry Fuchs, Executive Director Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100
Findings Of Fact Having listened to the testimony and considered the evidence presented in this cause, it is found as follows: Petitioner is a domestic corporation. Petitioner provided medicare services to patients in the 1969-70 fiscal year. An on-site audit by the medicare auditing team was concluded in December of 1971, and petitioner received $56,131.00 of medicare reimbursements in January of 1972, for the services provided in the 1969-70 fiscal year. The petitioner did not file an amended federal income tax return for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1979. The adjusted federal income reported on petitioner's federal income tax return for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1972, included the $56,131.00 of medicare reimbursements received by petitioner in January of 1972. On petitioner's Florida income tax return for its fiscal year ending September 30, 1972, petitioner did not include the $56,131.00 figure in its adjusted federal income. On March 31, 1975, the respondent notified petitioner of a proposed deficiency in the amount of $2,100.99 arising from the petitioner's omission of the medicare reimbursements from its adjusted federal income as shown on its Florida corporate income tax return for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1972. Further correspondence ensued between the petitioner and the Corporate Income Tax Bureau of the respondent and the petitioner filed the present petition requesting a hearing on the issue. The respondent requested the Division of Administrative Hearings to conduct the hearing.
Recommendation Based upon the above findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is my recommendation that there is no legal basis for affording the petitioner any relief from the proposed deficiency and that said deficiency in the amount of $2,100.00 be sustained. Respectfully submitted and entered this 17th day of September, 1975, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE D. TREMOR, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: E. Wilson Crump, II, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs Tax Division, Northwood Mall Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Homer E. Ward, N.H.A. Administrator/President University Park Convalescent Center 1818 E. Fletcher Avenue Tampa, Florida 33612
The Issue The issue is whether petitioner's candidacy for the office of Tax Collector would conflict or interfere with his employment as an auditor for the Department of Revenue.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: Petitioner, Robert M. Hendrick, a career service employee, is employed with respondent, Department of Revenue (DOR), as a Tax Auditor IV in its Leesburg, Florida field office. He has been employed by DOR since September 1991. In his position, petitioner primarily audits tangible personal property assessments performed by the local Property Appraiser and, on occasion, he inspects the property which is the subject of the assessment. In March 1996, the Lake County Tax Collector publicly announced that he would not run for reelection. After learning of this decision, by letter dated March 19, 1996, petitioner requested authorization from his employer to run for that office. The letter was received by DOR's Executive Director on April 1, 1996. On April 10, 1996, the Executive Director issued a letter denying the request on the ground the candidacy would conflict with petitioner's job duties. More specifically, the letter stated in relevant part that: Under section 195.002, Florida Statutes, the Department of Revenue has supervision of the tax collection and all other aspects of the administration of such taxes. Your position with the Department may require you to review or audit the activities of the office you propose to seek. Also some of your duties in supervising other officials in the administration of property taxes may be affected by your proposed candidacy. Your job requires you to review appropriate tax returns, and other records to resolve complex issues related to taxing statutes administered by the Department of Revenue. It also requires you to identify and scrutinize transactions to ascertain whether taxpayers have escaped paying property taxes. In addition, it also requires you to review and audit procedures used by counties to identify and value tangible personal property and accomplish statutory compliance, to investigate taxpayer complaints, to conduct field review with county staff as appropriate, and to provide education and assistance to county taxing officials. Because of the Department's statutory supervision of the office of tax collector, there cannot be a certification that your candidacy would involve "no interest which conflicts or activity which interferes" with your state employment within the definitions in section 110.233(4), Florida Statutes. The letter went on to say that This letter is a specific instruction to you that you should not qualify or become a candidate for office while employed in your current position. If you wish to commence your campaign by performing the pre-filing requirements, the law requires that you first resign from the Department. Failure to do so shall result in disciplinary action to dismiss you from your position in accordance with the Department's disciplinary standards and procedures, and Rule 60K-4.010, F.A.C., on the grounds that you are in violation of the Department's Code of Conduct, Section 110.233, Florida Statutes, and Rule 60K- 13.002(3), F.A.C. After receiving the above decision, by letter dated April 15, 1996, petitioner requested that the Executive Director reconsider his decision. Thereafter, on April 24, 1996, petitioner filed a request for a formal hearing to contest the agency's decision. Both the Property Appraiser and Tax Collector play a role in the property tax program in the State of Florida. The Property Appraiser generally values or assesses property subject to taxation and applies the millage rate set by the taxing authority. After the tax roll is approved by DOR, it is certified to the Tax Collector who then collects the taxes and distributes them to the appropriate taxing authorities. It is noted that ad valorem taxes make up the lion's share of taxes at the local level while tangible personal property taxes are a very small source of revenues. DOR is charged with the duties of providing oversight to the property tax program and aid and assistance to the Property Appraiser and Tax Collector. In this regard, DOR views the two offices as an integral part of the property tax program rather than two separate entities. It characterizes the program as "a stream or process where (the) lines of delineation (between the two offices) are not as distinct as they might have been ten or fifteen years ago." Because of the highly sensitive nature of the tax program, it follows that a certain degree of trust and integrity must exist between DOR (and its employees) and the local offices. Petitioner does not interface with the office of Tax Collector in any respect, and his duties do not require that he audit any of that office's records. His only duties are to audit the tangible personal property assessments performed by the Property Appraiser. These facts were not controverted. Although he has never differed with a valuation of the Property Appraiser during his five year tenure at DOR, and no such disagreement has occurred in Lake County during the last twenty-five years, petitioner could conceivably disagree with an assessment while running for office during the next few months. If the matter could not be informally settled, the tax rolls would not be certified by DOR, and litigation against DOR could be initiated by the Property Appraiser. Under those unlikely circumstances, petitioner might be called as a witness in the case, although the general practice has always been for DOR to use personnel from the Tallahassee office in litigation matters. To the very minor extent that petitioner could affect the tax rolls by disagreeing with the Property Appraiser's valuations, this could also impact the amount of money collected by the Tax Collector. DOR cites these circumstances as potentially affecting in an adverse way the level of trust and integrity between DOR and the office of Tax Collector. However, under the facts and circumstances of this case, this potential conflict is so remote and miniscule as to be wholly immaterial. The evidence also shows that in his audit role, petitioner has the "opportunity . . . to look and have access to tax returns," some of which "are of TPP (tangible personal property) nature (and) have attached to them federal tax returns" which might be used by the Property Appraiser for establishing the value of tangible personal property. Whether petitioner has ever had access to, or reviewed such, returns is not of record. In any event, to the extent this set of circumstances would pose a potential conflict with the Property Appraiser, as to the Tax Collector, it would be no more significant than the purported conflict described in finding of fact 7. Finally, DOR suggests that if petitioner was unsuccessful in his bid for office, it would likely damage the "relationship of trust" that now exists between DOR and the Tax Collector. Again, this purported conflict is so speculative as to be deemed immaterial. The parties have stipulated that, as of the date of hearing, petitioner's only option for qualifying to run for office is to pay a $6,173.00 qualifying fee no later than noon, July 19, 1996. The opportunity for submitting an appropriate number of signatures in lieu of a filing fee expired on June 24, 1996. On the few, isolated occasions during the last twenty-five years when the Lake County Tax Collector has requested information from DOR personnel, he has spoken by telephone with DOR legal counsel in Tallahassee. Those matters of inquiry, primarily relating to ad valorem taxes, do not concern any area related to petitioner's job duties. He also pointed out that his office always cooperates with the office of the Property Appraiser, especially when "corrections" must be made due to errors by that office. Even so, he described the two offices as being separate and with entirely different duties. This testimony is accepted as being the most persuasive on this issue. At least four persons have already announced that they would run for Tax Collector for Lake County. The parties have stipulated that one of those persons is a regional administrator for the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles who was not required to resign his position in order to run for office. According to the incumbent Tax Collector, that individual supervises other state employees who occasionally audit certain aspects of his office pertaining to automobile license plates and decals. Because of the time constraints in this case, and although not legally obligated to do so, respondent has voluntarily agreed to allow petitioner to take annual leave (or presumably leave without pay) commencing on the date he qualifies for local public office, or July 19, 1996, and to remain on leave until a final order is issued by the agency. At that time, if an adverse decision is rendered, petitioner must choose between resigning or withdrawing as a candidate. These terms are embodied in a letter from DOR's counsel to petitioner dated July 3, 1996. If petitioner is allowed to run for office without resigning, he has represented that he will campaign while on leave or after regular business hours. He has also represented, without contradiction, that his campaign activities will not interfere with his regular duties. If elected, he intends to resign his position with DOR.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Revenue enter a final order granting petitioner's request that it certify to the Department of Management Services that his candidacy for the office of Lake County Tax Collector would involve no interest which conflicts, or activity which interferes, with his state employment. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of July, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of July, 1996. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER Respondent: Partially accepted in finding of fact 1. Partially accepted in findings of fact 2 and 3. 3-5. Partially accepted in finding of fact 1. 6. Partially accepted in finding of fact 5. 7-9. Partially accepted in finding of fact 4. 10-11. Partially accepted in finding of fact 7. 12. Rejected as being irrelevant since petitioner was not an employee of DOR in 1990. 13-17. Partially accepted in finding of fact 7. 18. Rejected as being unnecessary. 19-20. Partially accepted in finding of fact 5. 21. Partially accepted in finding of fact 8. 22-23. Partially accepted in finding of fact 5. Partially accepted in finding of fact 9. Rejected as being unnecessary. Note - Where a proposed finding of fact has been partially accepted, the remainder has been rejected as being irrelevant, not supported by the evidence, unnecessary, subordinate, or a conclusion of law. COPIES FURNISHED: L. H. Fuchs, Executive Director Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100 Linda Lettera, Esquire Department of Revenue 204 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100 Mr. Robert M. Hendrick 5022 County Road 48 Okahumpka, Florida 34762 Peter S. Fleitman, Esquire Department of Revenue Post Office Box 6668 Tallahassee, Florida 32314-6668
Findings Of Fact Coulter Electronics, Inc., Petitioner, is a manufacturer of machinery and instruments used primarily by medical and related professions. During fiscal years 1973 and 1974 the Department included in Coulter's apportionment formula certain inter-company sales of two of its subsidiary corporations, Coulter Diagnostics, Inc., (C.D.I.), and Blood Services, Inc., (B.S.I.). C.D.I. produces products which are used with the machinery and instruments to perform certain tests and B.S.I. produces certain materials which are used by C.D.I. to manufacture its products. Coulter is the parent corporation with C.D.I. being a 100 percent wholly-owned subsidiary and B.S.I. being an approximately 92 percent owned subsidiary. The central management group of Coulter selects and appoints management of both C.D.I. and B.S.I. with some overlap between the top management of the three corporations. During Petitioner's corporate fiscal years ending March 31, 1973, and March 31, 1974, Coulter, as the parent of an affiliated group of corporations, filed consolidated income tax returns for federal income tax purposes. Petitioner's subsidiaries also filed consolidated corporate income tax returns with the State for the fiscal years in question. As reflected on Petitioner's books, sales made to it in this State by its subsidiaries for the 1973 fiscal year total $13,875,153 and for the fiscal year ending 1974, the company sales total $13,961,516 (see Exhibit B to Petitioner's Complaint P.7). These inter- company sales were not included in either the denumerator or denominator of the Petitioner's apportionment formula in the original returns which are filed with the State of Florida. The department, pursuant to an audit by its corporate income tax bureau, included these, resulting in deficiencies of $39,436.00 for the 1973 tax year and $324.00 for the 1974 tax year. The Petitioner takes the position that the transactions in question do not constitute sales which are to be included in the sales factor of the apportionment formula, Section 214.71(3), F.S., because ownership, possession, control and right to direct the products in question at all times rested with the parent corporation and the operations of the subsidiary corporations were at all times totally under the direction and control of the parent corporation. Florida Statutes, Section 214.71(3), generally provides that: "The sales factor is a fraction, the numerator of which is the total sales of the taxpayer in this state during the taxable year period and the denom- inator of which is the total sales of the taxpayer everywhere during the taxable year or period." The Petitioner urges that its inter-company transactions do not constitute "sales" because they do not include elements traditionally associated with the legal concept of a sale such as passage of title from the vendor to the vendee in payment of a direct consideration from the vendee to the vendor. However, the statutorily defined concept of a sale is very broad in Section 220.15(1), Florida Statutes. That section provides in pertinent part that: "The term 'sales' in paragraph 214.71(3)(a) shall mean all gross receipts of the tax- payer except interest, dividends, rents, royalties, and gross receipts from the sale, exchange, maturity, redemption, or other disposition of securities; except that: (a) Rental income shall be in- cluded in the term 'sales' whenever a significant portion of the taxpayer's business consists of leasing or renting real or tangible personal property; (b) Royalty income shall be included in the term 'sales' whenever a significant portion of the taxpayer's business con- sists of dealing in or with the production, exploration, or development of minerals." (Emphasis supplied) Therein the legislature extended the term "sales" to much more than is traditionally associated with the legal concept of sales for purpose of defining the sales factor or corporate income tax apportionment formula. It thus appears that the presence or absence of title and the method of payment, necessary elements of the traditional concept of the "sale", would not necessarily prevent these inter-company transactions as reflected on the Petitioner's books, from being considered "sales" within the contemplation of the sales factor in the apportionment formula when consideration is given to the above section. Petitioner's Comptroller specifically testified that the inter-company sales formed a part of its gross receipts. None of the transactions involved here fall within any of the statutory exceptions. Evidence also reveals that the inter-company transactions reflected a percentage of profits for the various subsidiaries. Case law in this state has previously recognized that book transactions between members of an affiliated group could be considered as transactions for Florida's tax purposes even where there was no actual transfer of funds. See for example Zero Food Storage Division of American Consumer Industries, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 337 2d 765(1st DCA Florida 1976). Other state courts have also construed the "sales" factor in their apportionment formula broadly so as to include receipts by the taxpayer that clearly fall without the traditional concept of a sale. See Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation v. Phillips, 47 S.E. 2d 183 (1948). The Petitioner raises, for the first time, in its brief that the inclusion of inter-company sales in the sales factor of the apportionment formula as originally enacted related only to financial organizations. Petitioner based this argument on its contention that the original legislative enactment of the tax administration act as embodied in Chapter 71-359, Law of Florida, contained the language relating to inter-company sales as part of a subsection pertaining only to financial organization. It argues further that when the State Laws were codified in the Florida Statutes from 1971, and all succeeding years, it was placed as a separate subsection applicable to all corporations. This codification was made by the Division of Statutory Revision. That division receives its authority from Florida Statutes, Section 11.242. My consideration of the various paragraphs of Section 11.242(5), F.S., persuades me to conclude that the change which was made clearly fell within the power of the division and that the legislature has met continuously, at least on an annual basis, since 1971 when the above referenced arrangement was enacted in Section 214.71(3), F.S., by the Division of Statutory Revision, and it is that branch which should have addressed any alleged erroneous placement by the Division of Statutory Revision so as to conform to legislative intent. In any event, argument in this regard should be addressed to this legislature. For these reasons, I conclude that the inter-company sales as evidenced by the testimony constituting a part of Petitioner's gross receipts are therefore a proper item for inclusion in the sales factor of the apportionment formula, as provided in Chapter 214.71(3), Florida Statutes. As such, to the extent that the Florida sales here in question include a profit element, they are includable in the denominator and in the numerator.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, I hereby recommend: That the Petitioner's challenge of the Department's determination of corporation tax due pursuant to Chapter 220, Florida Statutes, be denied, and that the Respondent's proposed corporate income tax deficiencies for Petitioner's corporate fiscal years ending March 31, 1973 and 1974 be sustained. DONE and ENTERED this 27th day of December, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 COPIES FURNISHED: James R. McCachren, Jr., Esquire Ervin, Varn, Jacobs & Odom, Law Offices 305 South Gadsden Street Tallahassee, Florida E. Wilson Crump, II Assistant Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs Fletcher Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant facts are found: Petitioner, Christian Television Corporation, is a not for profit Florida corporation formed in April of 1977. It is exempt from federal income taxation under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code (1954). Its first application for a Florida Consumer's Certificate of Exemption was initially denied by the Department of Revenue in December of 1977. After petitioner was successful in a rule-challenge proceeding to a portion of the Department's rules defining a "church", the Department reversed its initial decision and issued the petitioner a Consumer's Certificate of Exemption. Based on that issuance, petitioner dismissed its request for a formal administrative hearing regarding the initial denial of exempt status. In 1983, the Legislature enacted Section 212.084, Florida Statutes, which required the Department of Revenue to review every sales tax exemption certificate issued before July 1, 1983, to ensure that the possessor of the certificate was actively engaged in an exempt endeavor. The Department was given the authority to revoke the certificates of those entities found to be no longer qualified for an exemption. Section 212.084(3), Florida Statutes. Pursuant to this statute, the respondent notified the petitioner that an application for renewal of its previously issued Certificate would be required. Petitioner submitted such an application and the respondent gave notice of its intent to revoke petitioner's Certificate effective January 29, 1986. According to its Articles of Incorporation, the petitioner was organized "to produce and broadcast to the general public religious television and radio programs and thereby educate and instruct the general public in religious matters, and make available guidance to promote the general public welfare..." In furtherance of this purpose, the petitioner operates a facility in Largo, Florida, in a 43,000 square foot building. The building contains two television broadcasting studios, control rooms, storage rooms, administrative offices, a counseling area and a chapel. The petitioner views its purpose as one of assisting churches of all denominations in presenting the gospel to the community. It produces many programs in its Largo studios and considers these programs to be ministries in themselves. Live audiences are often present in the studios, which can accommodate from 30 to 100 people, depending upon the program. For example, during the production of "Joy Junction", children from various Christian schools in the area attend the taping. Senior adults come to the Largo studios to attend the "Action Sixties" program, and single adults attend the taping of "Solo Act". In addition, the petitioner sells air time to local churches and ministries. The petitioner also conducts benevolence activities in cooperation with area churches and local agencies. These include fund-raisers for other ministries and raising money or collecting clothing and food for the needy. Petitioner provides on-air announcement services for area churches and ministerial associations and allows other ministries to utilize its broadcasting facilities. Petitioner's staff also attempts to work with "non-Christian people" within the community and "pass them through our ministry into other churches". The petitioner provides a telephone counseling service from its Largo facility. For this purpose, it utilizes 45 regular, and 100 substitute, volunteer counselors. These counselors are trained by petitioner's staff, and callers receive Biblical answers to their questions and problems. Many who call in want prayer for some particular need. Callers perceived to have a more severe problem are referred to a Christian counselor in the area. Approximately 32,000 calls per year are received on petitioner's "prayer lines". The petitioner's staff includes two ministers. One serves as the director of the benevolence ministry and the counseling department, and the other serves as director of community ministries and does the liaison work with other churches. Both were previously Pastors of their own churches, and feel that Christian Television is as much or more of a "church" as the more traditional churches they formerly pastored. They described the use of video technology as an advantage and an asset, rather than as a substitute for more traditional forms of religious training. Worship services are conducted in the petitioner's chapel by both the staff ministers and other volunteer or paid ministers. The chapel, containing 1200 square feet and having a seating capacity of about 150, has high ceilings and contains an organ, an altar, a pulpit and chairs. The estimated value of the assets within the chapel is ten or twenty thousand dollars. The chapel is actively utilized during the week for staff devotionals and communion services, and is open to the public for special services and advertised programs conducted by those using a Biblical approach. Other approved ministries are permitted to utilize the chapel without charge for Bible studies or special prayer times. The chapel is not used as a production or broadcasting studio. As of December 31, 1983, the value of petitioner's assets, including plant, property and equipment, was $2,185,564.00. During 1983, petitioner received contributions totalling $1,137,000.00, and realized slightly more than one million dollars in revenue by providing broadcast and production time to various religious organizations.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law recited herein, it is RECOMMENDED that petitioner's Consumer Certificate of Exemption be reissued for a period of five (5) years. Respectfully submitted and entered this 6th day of October, 1986. DIANE D. TREMOR Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of October, 1986. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 86-0456 The proposed findings of fact submitted by the petitioner and the respondent have been carefully considered and are accepted and/or incorporated in this Recommended Order, except as noted below: Petitioner: 3 - 5. Recitations of testimony accepted as correct, but not included as factualfindings. 7. Partially rejected as argument as opposed to factual findings. COPIES FURNISHED: Jon H. Anderson, Esquire NCNB Bank Building 5001 South Florida Avenue Lakeland, Florida 33803 Edwin A. Bayo, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Randy Miller Executive Director Department of Revenue 102 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 William D. Townsend General Counsel 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue At issue herein is whether or not the Petitioner, a not-for- profit organization is entitled to a refund of taxes collected and paid to Respondent pursuant to the exemption provision of Subsection 212.04(2)(b)2., Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Based on the testimony of the Petitioner's witness, the arguments of counsel and Respondent's brief submitted on June 5, 1979, the following relevant facts are found. The Petitioner, Miami Civic Music Association, is seeking a refund of taxes collected and paid prior to October 1, 1978, on the sale of membership fees. The Petitioner obtained a certificate qualifying it as a not-for-profit organization from the United States Internal Revenue Service since approximately 1945. This status has been submitted to Respondent. Prior to October 1, 1978, Petitioner submitted to Respondent approximately $1,602.33 based on the sale of membership dues received for musical performances which were to he held subsequent to October 1, 1978, i.e., October 25, 1978 through April, 1979. Petitioner bases its refund claim on the fact that the actual concert series which gave rise to the ticket sales occurred after October 1, 1978. Respondent's position is that the Petitioner is not entitled to a refund, first, on the ground that the tax collections for which the refund is being sought were collected prior to October 1, 1978, and therefore not properly refundable under the exemption provision of Subsection 212.04(2)(b)2., Florida Statutes. Secondly, Respondent contends that Petitioner is without standing to seek a refund since the sales tax applicable to admission charges purportedly collected must first be refunded to the respective subscribers which the Petitioner has not done in this case. Subsection 212.04(2)(b)2., Florida Statutes, provides: No tax shall be levied on dues, membership fees, and admission charges imposed by not- for-profit sponsoring organizations or community or recreational facilities. To receive this exemption, the sponsoring organization or facility must qualify as a not-for-profit entity under the provisions of s. 501(c)(3) of the United States Internal Revenue Cede of 1954, as amended. This exemption became effective October, 1978. The membership fees here in question were sold by Petitioner prior to October 1, 1978, and taxes were collected and remitted to the Department of Revenue. An examination of the legislative intent embodied in Chapter 212, Florida Statutes, reveals that each and every admission is taxed unless specifically exempted. (Subsection 212.21(3), Florida Statutes.) Inasmuch as there was no statutory exemption for Petitioner's organization prior to October 1, 1975, and based on the fundamental rule of statutory construction to the effect that a statute operates prospectively unless the intent is clearly expressed that it operates retrospectively. State, Department of Revenue v. Zuckerman-Vernon Corporation (Florida 1977) 354 So.2d 353. Subsection 212.04(2)(b)2., Florida Statutes, reveals no legislative intent that this amendment was to be applied retrospectively. Finally, since an admissions tax like sales taxes, are collected on behalf of the State by the operator, it is in effect a form of excise tax upon the customer for exercising his privilege of purchasing the admission, the Petitioner herein lacks standing inasmuch as it did not pay the taxes, but merely remitted to the Department of Revenue the tax which was paid by subscribers of the memberships from the organization. See, for example, Scripto, Inc. v. Carson, 101 So.2d 775 (Florida 1958) and State ex rel Szabo Food Services, Inc. of N.C. v. Dickinson, 250 So.2d 529 (Florida 1973). In this case, in the absence of the Petitioner showing that it was the party entitled to a refund of the taxes herein based on a claim of either an overpayment, a payment where no tax was due or a payment erroneously made, Petitioner failed to advance a basis upon which its claim can be granted. Section 215.26, Florida Statutes. For these reasons, I shall recommend that the Petitioner's claim for a refund herein be denied.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is hereby, RECOMMENDED: That the Petitioner's claim for a refund herein be DENIED. ENTERED this 29th day of June, 1979, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: James H. Wakefield, Esquire Hedges, Gossett, McDonald & wakefield 3325 Hollywood Boulevard, Suite 305 Hollywood, Florida 33021 Linda C. Procta, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol, LL04 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact On or about August 18, 1977, Respondent, Charles Leon Winkleman (Winkleman), filed an application with Petitioner, Office of the Comptroller, Department of Banking and Finance (Department) for registration as an associated person with Tax Favored Securities, Inc., now known as Global Investors Securities, Inc. Winkleman's application was granted November 1, 1977. On April 11, 1984, Winkleman pled guilty to an information filed in the United States District Court, Southern District of Florida (District Court) , Case No. 84-6043-Cr-JLK, which charged that he: did wilfully and knowingly aid assist in, and counsel, procure, and advise the preparation and presentation to the Internal Revenue Service of a United States Individual Income Tax Return (Form 1040) of William I. and Amy Steele Donner for the calendar year 1978 which was false and fraudulent as to a material matter, in that it represented that said William I. Donner was entitled under the provisions of the Internal Revenue laws to claim deductions in the sum of $83,313.00 representing an ordinary loss of income, as a result of being owner of a sole proprietorship managed by Charles L. Winkleman, whereas, as . Winkleman . . . then and there well knew and believed William I. Donner was not entitled to said deductions all in violation of Title 26 United States Code, Section 7206(2). 1/ On April 18, 1984, Winkleman filed an amended Form U-4 with the Central Registration Depository, and thereby advised interested parties that he had pled guilty to the information filed in the District Court. A copy of the amended Form U-4 was, contemporaneously, filed with the Department. 2/ On June 6, 1984, the District Court entered a judgment of guilt on Winkleman's plea. Winkleman was sentenced to six months imprisonment and fined $3,000.00. Winkleman failed, however, to notify the Department of such conviction until April 10, 1987, and offered no explanation at hearing for such failure. Following Winkleman's plea of guilty in the District Court, the Department of Commerce and Economic Development, Division of Banking, Securities and Corporations (Department of Commerce) in Juneau, Alaska, issued a notice of intent to revoke Winkleman's registration. This notice, dated June 4, 1984, sought revocation based primarily on Winkleman's plea of guilty to the charges filed in the District Court. Winkleman failed to notify the Department of the pendency of the Alaska proceeding until April 10, 1987, and offered no explanation at hearing for such failure. On March 10, 1987, the Department of Commerce entered an order revoking Winkleman's registration in Alaska based on his conviction in the District Court. By amended Form U-4, filed April 10, 1987, Winkleman advised the Department of his conviction in the District Court and the revocation of his registration by the State of Alaska. 3/ The order of the Department of Commerce, revoking Winkleman's registration, is currently on appeal. Winkleman seeks reversal of such order predicated on his assertion that the Department of Commerce breached an agreement to allow him to withdraw his registration in lieu of revocation. On July 20, 1987, the court, which is reviewing the Department of Commerce proceedings, entered an order staying the order of revocation pending the disposition of Winkleman's appeal. On April 1, 1987, a hearing was held before the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. (NASD), to consider whether Winkleman, because of his conviction, should be disqualified as a registered representative with Global Investors Securities, Inc. On August 13, 1986, NASD entered a "Notice Pursuant to Rule 19h-1 of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934" whereby it proposed that Winkleman not be disqualified. On January 8, 1987, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) rendered its decision that it would not invoke Section 15A(g)(2) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 to direct NASD to disqualify Winkleman.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the registration of Respondent, Charles Leon Winkleman, as an associated person under the Florida Securities and Investor Protection Act be REVOKED. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of October, 1987, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM J. KENDRICK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 904/488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of October, 1987.
Findings Of Fact The Sarasota Retina Institute Research Foundation, Inc., (Petitioner) is a non-profit corporation exempt from federal income tax under Section 501(c)3 of the Internal Revenue Code. The Sarasota Retina Institute (SRI) is a private medical practice consisting of three practicing ophthalmologists. The three SRI ophthalmologists are on the seven-member board of directors of the Petitioner. Documents provided by the Petitioner indicate that SRI has been involved in medical clinical studies. Although the Petitioner asserts that it provides financial support for the studies, the evidence fails to support the assertion. The Petitioner's Articles of Incorporation state that it is organized for religious, charitable and educational purposes sufficient to qualify for federal tax exemption. The articles do not establish that the Petitioner was originally organized or is currently organized for scientific research. According to the Articles, the Petitioner's property is held for religious, charitable and educational purposes. The Petitioner's application for IRS exemption states that the activities of the Petitioner are to offer a "source of revenue for educational purposes and research purposes" in the field of human eye disease. The evidence offered at hearing is insufficient to establish that the funds of the Petitioner are being used for research purposes. The evidence indicates that majority of expenditures by the Petitioner are being made not for scientific purposes but, to cover travel and seminar expenses of the SRI ophthalmologists. The Petitioner's expenditures are insufficient to establish that the Foundation is a scientific organization.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department of Revenue enter a Final Order denying the Petitioner's application for a Consumer's Certificate of Exemption. RECOMMENDED this 20th day of December, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of December, 1996. COPIES FURNISHED: Linda Lettera General Counsel Department of Revenue 204 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100 Larry Fuchs Executive Director Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100 David P. Johnson, Esquire 2201 Ringling Boulevard, Suite 104 Sarasota, Florida 34237 Ruth Ann Smith Assistant General Counsel Department of Revenue Post Office Box 6668 Tallahassee, Florida 32314-6668
