Findings Of Fact 13. The factual allegations contained in the Stop-Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment issued on February 11, 2009, the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment issued on March 5, 2009, the 2"4 Amended Order of Penalty Assessment issued on March 11, 2009 and the 3 Amended Order of Penalty Assessment issued on October 30, 2009, which are fully incorporated herein by reference, are hereby adopted as the Department’s Findings of Fact in this case.
Conclusions THIS PROCEEDING came on for final agency action and Alex Sink, Chief F inancial Officer of the State of Florida, or her designee, having considered the record in this case, including the Stop- Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment and the Amended Orders of Penalty Assessment served in Division of Workers’ Compensation Case No. 09-036-D1, and being otherwise fully advised in the premises, hereby finds that: 1. On February 11, 2009, the Department of Financial Services, Division of Workers’ Compensation (hereinafter “Department”) issued a Stop-Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment in Division of Workers’ Compensation Case No. 09-036-D1 to BEST WELDING AND FABRICATION, INC. 2. On February 11, 2009, the Stop-Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment was served by personal service on BEST WELDING AND FABRICATION, INC. A copy of the Stop-Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment is attached hereto as “Exhibit A” and incorporated herein by reference. 3. On March 5, 2009, the Department issued an Amended Order of Penalty Assessment in Case No. 09-036-D1 to BEST WELDING AND FABRICATION, INC. The Amended Order of Penalty Assessment assessed a total penalty of $196,980.30 against BEST WELDING AND FABRICATION, INC. 4. On March 16, 2009, the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment was served by certified mail on BEST WELDING AND FABRICATION, INC. A copy of the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment is attached hereto as “Exhibit B” and incorporated herein by reference. 5. On March 11, 2009, the Department issued a 2°4 Amended Order of Penalty Assessment in Case No. 09-036-D1 to BEST WELDING AND FABRICATION, INC. The an Amended Order of Penalty Assessment assessed a total penalty of $50,968.94 against BEST WELDING AND FABRICATION, INC. . 6. On March 26, 2009, the 2°4 Amended Order of Penalty Assessment was served by certified mail on BEST WELDING AND FABRICATION, INC. A copy of the 2"! Amended Order of Penalty Assessment is attached hereto as “Exhibit C” and incorporated herein by reference. 7. The Employer requested a formal hearing on April 6, 2009. A copy of the Request for Hearing is attached hereto as “Exhibit D” and incorporated herein by reference. 8. On April 21, 2009, the request for formal hearing was forwarded to the Division of Administrative Hearings for assignment of an Administrative Law Judge. The matter was assigned to Administrative Law Judge Barbara Staros and given case number 09-2138. 9. On October 30, 2009, the Department issued a 3rd Amended Order of Penalty Assessment in Case No. 09-036-D1 to BEST WELDING AND FABRICATION, INC. The 3rd Amended Order of Penalty Assessment assessed a total penalty of $10,179.61 against BEST WELDING AND FABRICATION, INC. 10. On October 30, 2009, the 3™ Amended Order of Penalty Assessment was served on legal counsel for BEST WELDING AND FABRICATION, INC. A copy of the 3" Amended Order of Penalty Assessment is attached hereto as “Exhibit E” and incorporated herein by reference. 11. On November 9, 2009, BEST WELDING AND FABRICATION, INC. filed a Notice of Voluntary Dismissal. A copy of the Notice of Voluntary Dismissal is attached hereto as “Exhibit F” and incorporated herein by reference. 12. On November 12, 2009, an Order Closing File was entered. The Order Closing File relinquished jurisdiction to the Department. A copy of the Order Closing File is attached hereto as “Exhibit G” and incorporated herein by reference.
Findings Of Fact 6. The factual allegations in the Stop-Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment, the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment, and the 2"4 Amended Order of Penalty Assessment, which are fully incorporated herein by reference, are hereby adopted as the Department’s Findings of Fact in this case.
Conclusions THIS PROCEEDING came on for final agency action and Alex Sink, Chief Financial Officer of the State of Florida, or her designee, having considered the record in this case, including the Stop-Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment, the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment, and the 2°4 Amended Order of Penalty Assessment served in Division of Workers’ Compensation Case No. 09-283-1A, and being otherwise fully advised in the premises, hereby finds that: 1. On October 8, 2009, the Department of Financial Services, Division of Workers’ Compensation (hereinafter “Department”) issued a Stop- Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment in Division of Workers’ Compensation Case No. 09-283-1A to CHARLES M. EIDENS, JAMES A. HABAN , RITA ZARNIK, AND RICHARD E. EIDENS, d/b/a PAINT BUSTERS OF THE EMERALD COAST, INC., A DISSOLVED FLORIDA CORPORATION, AND PAIN T BUSTERS OF THE EMERALD COAST, INC. (“PAINTBUSTERS”). The Stop- Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment is attached as “Exhibit 1” and fully incorporated by reference. The Stop-Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment was personally served on October 8, 2009, on PAINTBUSTERS. The Stop-Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment included a Notice of Rights wherein PAINTBUSTERS was advised that any request for an administrative proceeding to challenge or contest the Stop-Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment must be filed within twenty-one (21) days of receipt of the Stop-Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment in accordance with Sections 120.569 and 120.57, Florida Statutes. 2. On November 13, 2009, the Department served by certified mail an Amended Order of Penalty Assessment on PAINTBUSTERS. The Amended Order of Penalty Assessment is attached hereto as “Exhibit 2” and fully incorporated herein by reference. The penalty assessed on PAINTBUSTERS was $98,242.15. The Amended Order of Penalty Assessment included a i Notice of Rights wherein PAINTBUSTERS was advised that any request for an administrative proceeding to challenge or contest the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment must be filed within twenty-one (21) days of receipt of the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment in accordance with Sections 120.569 and 120.57, Florida Statutes. 3. On November 24, 2009, PAINTBUSTERS submitted a Request for F ormal Hearing (“Petition”). The Petition was forwarded to the Division of Administrative Hearings (“DOAH”) and assigned DOAH case number 09-6634. 4. On January 8, 2010, the Administrative Law Judge granted the Department’s Motion to Amend Order of Penalty Assessment. The 2°4 Amended Order of Penalty Assessment superseded the original Amended Order of Penalty Assessment and increased the penalty to $98,336.87. A copy of the 2"! Amended Order of Penalty Assessment is attached hereto as “Exhibit 3” and fully incorporated by reference. 5. On March 25, 2010, the Administrative Law Judge issued an Order Relinquishing Jurisdiction and Closing File in Case No. 09-6634 as a result of PAINTBUSTERS failing to comply with DOAH’s request for a Status Report. A copy of the Order Relinquishing Jurisdiction and Closing File is attached hereto as “Exhibit 4” and fully incorporated herein by reference.
Conclusions WHEREFORE, it is ORDERED and ADJUDGED, that the Department rejects all bids for Invitation to Negotiate 2011-38, and the Formal Written Protest and Petition for Administrative Hearing is dismissed. DONE AND ORDERED this 1g day of January, 2012, in Tallahassee, Florida. COPIES FURNISHED TO: Cynthia S. Tunnicliff Brian A. Newman Pennington, Moore, Wilkinson, Bell & Dunbar, P.A. 215 South Monroe Street, 2"? Floor Tallahassee, Florida 32303 (850) 222-3533 Clerk Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399 Commissioner of Education Donna E. Blanton Lisa Caroline Scoles Radey, Thomas, Yon, and Clark 301 South Bronough Street, Suite 200 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (850) 245-6654 James H. Peterson, Ill Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-3060 NOTICE OF RIGHTS a Any party to this’ proceeding has the right:to seek judicial review of this Order under Section 120.68, Florida Statutes, by the filing of a notice of appeal under Rules 9.110 and 9.190, Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure, with the Agency Clerk and by filing a copy of the notice of appeal accompanied by the applicable filing fees with the appropriate district court of appeal. The notice of appeal must be filed within thirty days after this order is filed with the clerk of the Department. Failure to make a timely appeal will result in waiver of the right of judicial review in this matter. CERTIFICATE OF THE AGENCY CLERK | HEREBY CERTIFY that a copy has been furnished via U.S. Mail to the below, this __( g day of January, 2012. Cynthia S. Tunnicliff Donna E. Blanton Brian A. Newman Lisa Caroline Scoles Pennington, Moore, Wilkinson, Bell & Radey, Thomas, Yon, and Clark Dunbar, P.A. 301 South Bronough Street, Suite 200 215 South Monroe Street, 2"¢ Floor Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Tallahassee, Florida 32303 (850) 245-6654 (850) 222-3533 | : LYNN ABBOTT Agency Clerk
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner's request for attorney's fees and costs should be approved.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: In these cases, Petitioner, Couch Construction, L.P., seeks to impose sanctions against Respondents, Darel Holland (Holland) and Diane Lowery (Lowery), on the ground that they allegedly filed petitions for an improper purpose challenging the issuance of a permit by the Department of Environmental Protection (DEP). In responsive papers filed by Respondents, both deny that the actions were initiated for an improper purpose. The facts in the underlying DEP case involving Holland (OGC Case No. 98-3015) show that on October 30, 1998, Petitioner published a copy of DEP's Notice of Intent to Issue Permit to Petitioner authorizing the construction of a hot mix asphalt concrete plant at 2780 North Highway 95-A, Cantonment, Florida, with potential emissions of up to 29 tons per year of particulate matter. After learning of the proposed action, various citizens in the Cantonment area signed a petition opposing the project. In addition, a local attorney, John T. Reading, Jr., Esquire (Reading), offered to provide them with pro bono assistance as a "community service." Among other things, Reading prepared a form petition challenging the issuance of the permit and requesting a formal hearing. That form was apparently made available to the local citizens so that they could sign and file it, if they chose to do so. Holland says that he did, and it is fair to infer that this form was the source of Lowery's petition as well. Holland lives only 9 blocks from the proposed plant and suffers from a lung disease which has left him with only 58 percent of his lung capacity. Because of his legitimate concerns about the projected amount of particulate emissions and their potential effect on his respiratory system, on November 12, 1998, he filed in proper person a Petition for Formal Administrative Hearing challenging the proposed issuance of the permit. Holland's petition alleged that he was a property owner in the area where the plant would be constructed; that "due to respiratory problems," he would be "substantially affected by the permitted 29 tons of particulate emissions"; that his property "may be substantially reduced in value and peaceful enjoyment" as a result of the permit being issued; and that the petition was not "being interposed merely for the purposes of delay, or any other improper purpose as listed in F.S. 120.57(1)(b)(5)." There was no showing that the petition was filed for an improper purpose or that Holland's concerns were not genuine. Holland's petition also requested an extension of time "to determine which rules or statutes require reversal or modification of the Department's action" and "to obtain counsel" to assist him in his action. On December 21, 1998, DEP entered an order dismissing Holland's petition on the ground that he failed to allege the information required by Rule 28-106.201(2)(e), Florida Administrative Code. It also determined that no good cause had been shown to warrant an extension of time for Holland to determine if any rules or statutes supported his position. He was, however, granted leave to file an amended petition within 15 days from the date of service of DEP's dismissal order (December 23, 1998). This meant that an amended petition had to be filed with DEP no later than January 7, 1999. After learning that his petition had been dismissed, Holland had a brief conversation with Reading about the dismissal and was left with a somewhat vague understanding that Reading "would get an extension" from DEP. Thereafter, on January 12, 1999, or 5 days after the due date, Reading filed with DEP an Amended Petition of Darel Holland for Administrative Hearing. The petition was signed by Reading, and it represented that a copy of the petition had been served on Petitioner's counsel on January 5, 1999. On January 14, 1999, Reading also filed with DEP on behalf of Holland a paper styled Plaintiff's Motion to Enlarge Time in which Reading claimed that "due to circumstances not known," the amended petition had not been timely filed. Reading accordingly requested that DEP authorize the untimely filing. By order dated January 28, 1999, DEP denied the Motion to Enlarge Time and dismissed the amended petition, with prejudice, as being untimely. No appeal from that final agency action was taken. Lowery did not attend the final hearing. However, according to Holland, Lowery lives only 500 feet from the proposed cement plant. She boards horses on her property and frequently has children visit the property to ride their horses. The papers filed in her underlying case (OGC Case No. 98-2932) reflect that the facts in that case are essentially the same as those involving Holland. On November 12, 1998, Lowery filed in proper person a Petition for Formal Administrative Hearing which was virtually identical to the petition filed by Holland. As an additional ground, however, she alleged that the October 30, 1998, notice published by Petitioner was defective, and she requested that DEP require Petitioner to re-advertise the matter. There was no evidence that this petition was filed for an improper purpose or that Lowery's concerns were not genuine. On December 21, 1998, Lowery's petition was dismissed by DEP because she had failed to comply with the requirements of Rule 28-106.201(4), Florida Administrative Code. Like Holland, she was given until January 5, 1999, in which to file an amended petition. In papers filed by Lowery after this sanction proceeding arose, she denies that she had any knowledge that any further papers in the permit case would be filed on her behalf after the DEP dismissal order was entered. In any event, on January 12, 1999, or five days after the due date, Reading filed on Lowery's behalf with DEP an Amended Petition for Formal Administrative Hearing which was identical to that filed on behalf of Holland. Also, on January 14, 1999, Reading filed a Plaintiff's Motion to Enlarge Time seeking to excuse his tardiness in filing the amended petition. Both papers were served on Petitioner's counsel. On January 28, 1999, DEP entered its Final Order Denying Motion to Enlarge Time and dismissing Lowery's amended petition, with prejudice. No appeal from that final order was taken. Because no appeal was taken by either Respondent, DEP's intent to issue a permit became final, and it is fair to infer that a permit has been issued to Petitioner. On January 7, 1999, or prior to DEP's final order of dismissal, Petitioner's counsel noticed both Respondents for a deposition in Pensacola, Florida, on January 14, 1999. Because Reading had signed the amended petitions, Petitioner's counsel logically served the notices by Federal Express on Reading. However, Reading failed to notify Respondents, and neither he nor Respondents appeared at the deposition or advised counsel prior to the depositions that they would not appear. As a result, Petitioner incurred the costs and fees for having its counsel travel to Pensacola. In addition, Petitioner presumably incurred the cost of a court reporter's appearance fee. Assuming that Petitioner's claim is meritorious, those costs would be the responsibility of Reading, and not Respondents. At the hearing, it was represented that Reading is no longer a member of the Florida Bar. This is because in an unpublished order dated January 7, 1999, the Florida Supreme Court revoked his license to practice law effective 30 days thereafter, or on February 7, 1999. His current address is unknown. Petitioner has asserted that in defending against Respondents' petitions, "the bulk" of its costs and fees are related to the deposition and that a few other undisclosed fees and costs have been incurred. At the final hearing, Petitioner did not specify the amount of fees and costs that it seeks or provide any breakdown of those amounts; rather, it opted to provide an affidavit detailing those costs after this final order is rendered, assuming it prevails in this action.
The Issue Whether the petitioner is entitled to an award under section 57.111, Florida Statutes, of attorney’s fees and costs incurred in the appellate matter Witmer v. Department of Business and Professional Regulation, 631 So. 2d 338 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994), and, if so, the amount of such award.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: The Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, is the state agency responsible for issuing occupational licenses to veterinarians with access to the backside of a racetrack and for regulating such licensees. Sections 550.10(1)(b) and .105(2)(d)2, Florida Statutes. Dr. Witmer has been licensed to practice veterinary medicine in Florida since January 1, 1993, and, as of October 19, 1993, he was authorized to practice veterinary medicine at Florida racetracks by virtue of a pari-mutuel wagering occupational license (“license”) issued by the Department. He has been domiciled in Florida at all times material to this matter. On October 19, 1993, Dr. Witmer was a partner in a professional practice in veterinary medicine with its principal office at 1450 Southwest Third Street, Pompano Park, Broward County, Florida. His professional practice had three full-time employees and a net worth, including both personal and business investments, of less than $2 million. In the Administrative Complaint and Emergency Order of Suspension dated October 19, 1993, the Department took two actions with respect to Dr. Witmer’s license.1 First, in the administrative complaint, it put Dr. Witmer on notice that the Department had initiated a disciplinary action against him, charging him with violations of a statute and a rule governing his license which, if proven, would justify the imposition of penalties, including revocation or suspension of his license. Secondly, in the emergency order of suspension, it summarily suspended Dr. Witmer’s license. Dr. Witmer requested a formal administrative hearing pursuant to section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes, to challenge the truth of the allegations contained in the administrative complaint. The request was forwarded to the Division of Administrative Hearings and assigned DOAH Case Number 93-6638. That action was pending at the time Dr. Witmer filed the application for attorney’s fees and costs at issue in this proceeding. Underlying proceeding On the basis of the allegations contained in the administrative complaint and its determination that Dr. Witmer’s interest in his license was “far outweighed by the immediate danger to the public health and safety and to the integrity of harness racing in the State of Florida,” the Department suspended Dr. Witmer’s pari-mutuel wagering occupational license as of October 19, 1993, ordered him to cease and desist from all activities authorized by the license, and barred him from entering any pari-mutuel establishment as a patron for the duration of the emergency suspension. Dr. Witmer chose to seek immediate judicial review of the emergency order pursuant to sections 120.60(8) and 120.54(9)(a)3, Florida Statutes (1993). It is this appellate proceeding which is the proceeding underlying Dr. Witmer’s application for attorney’s fees and costs at issue herein. State agencies are authorized by section 120.60(8), Florida Statutes (1995) to immediately suspend a license under the following circumstances and subject to the following conditions: If the agency finds that immediate serious danger to the public health, safety, or welfare requires emergency suspension, restriction, or limitation of a license, it shall show compliance in its order with the requirements imposed by s. 120.54(9) on agencies making emergency rules. Summary suspension, restriction, or limitation may be ordered, but a formal suspension or revocation proceeding under this section shall also be promptly instituted and acted upon. Section 120.54(9)(a), Florida Statutes, provides in pertinent part: If an agency finds that an immediate danger to the public health, safety, or welfare requires emergency action, the agency may adopt any rule necessitated by the immediate danger by any procedure which is fair under the circumstances and necessary to protect the public interest, provided that: * * * 3. The agency publishes in writing at the time of, or prior to, its action the specific facts and reasons for finding an immediate danger to the public health, safety, or welfare and its reasons for concluding that the procedure used is fair under the circumstances. . . . The agency’s findings of immediate danger, necessity, and procedural fairness shall be judicially reviewable. On February 2, 1994, the District Court of Appeal for the Fourth District of Florida issued its opinion in Witmer v. Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, Case Number 93-3232, reported at 631 So. 2d 338. The court quashed the Emergency Order of Suspension, concluding that the order was “facially inadequate,” and ruling that “the Department’s findings of immediate danger to the public welfare are not supported by specific facts and reasons as required by 120.54(9)(a)3, Florida Statutes.” Id. at 340, 343. The district court in Witmer observed that its review was limited to a determination of whether the order complied with the requirements of section 120.54(9)(a)3 and based its analysis upon the following rules of law: If the facts alleged in the complaint and [emergency] order are sufficient to demonstrate immediacy, necessity and fairness, no hearing is required prior to the emergency suspension. . . . The factual allegations contained in the emergency order must sufficiently identify particularized facts which demonstrate an immediate danger to the public. (Citation omitted.) Where, as here, no hearing was held prior to the entry of the emergency order, every element necessary to its validity must appear on the face of the order. (Citation omitted.) The order must be “factually explicit and persuasive concerning the existence of a genuine emergency.” (Citation omitted.) Witmer, 631 So. 2d at 341. In reaching its conclusion that the emergency order was facially inadequate, the court in Witmer held that the Department failed to allege facts in the complaint and order to establish the essential elements of the violations upon which the emergency suspension was based. Firstly, the court found that the charge in the emergency order that Dr. Witmer had failed to report gratuities was not supported by any allegations of fact in the complaint and order. Id. at 341. Secondly, the court found that the Department failed to allege that Dr. Witmer’s actions related to horse racing or to race horses, an essential element of a violation of section 550.235(2), Florida Statutes, and of rule 61D-1.002(10), Florida Administrative Code. Id. at 342. Thirdly, the court found that the Department failed to allege that Dr. Witmer reached an agreement with a second person to commit the violation, an essential element of any conspiracy, including one to violate section 550.235(2) and rule 61D-1.002(10). Id. Finally, the court concluded that the public harm alleged by the Department in the order was too attenuated to support the emergency suspension of Dr. Witmer’s license. Id. at 343. The district court issued its mandate to the Department on February 18, 1994, directing it to act in accordance with the opinion quashing the Emergency Order of Suspension. The Department did not seek review of the decision of the district court in the Florida Supreme Court. Consequently, the decision of the district court had the effect of nullifying the emergency suspension of Dr. Witmer’s license. Summary Dr. Witmer was a small business party, as that term is defined for purposes of section 57.111, at the time the Department entered the emergency order.2 The evidence is sufficient to establish that the Department initiated an action against Dr. Witmer when it entered an Emergency Order of Suspension. This order was issued under the authority granted state agencies in section 120.60(8), Florida Statutes. The order had the effect of immediately and summarily suspending Dr. Witmer’s pari-mutuel wagering occupational license. Dr. Witmer had the right to seek immediate judicial review of the emergency order pursuant to section 120.54(9)(a)3. The appellate court quashed the emergency order because it was legally insufficient to support the suspension of Dr. Witmer’s license under the standards of section 120.54(9)(a)3. The Department did not appeal or seek further review of the appellate court’s decision. Dr. Witmer, therefore, prevailed in the administrative proceeding initiated by the Department. The Department presented no evidence to establish that its action in ordering the emergency suspension of Dr. Witmer’s license had a reasonable basis in law and fact or that any special circumstances exist which would make an award of attorney’s fees and costs in this case unjust.3 The monetary value of the attorney’s fees rendered in connection with the appellate proceeding culminating in the decision quashing the Emergency Order of Suspension is $9,715.00, and the costs incurred total $250. These fees and costs are reasonable and were necessary to prosecute the appellate proceeding.4
Findings Of Fact 10. The factual allegations contained in the Stop-Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment issued on August 5, 2010, the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment issued on August 12, 2010, the 2"? Amended Order of Penalty Assessment issued on June 2, 2011, the Stipulated Motion to Relinquish Jurisdiction filed on September 14, 2011, and the Order Relinquishing Jurisdiction and Closing File issued September 14, 2011, which are fully incorporated herein by reference, are hereby adopted as the Department’s Findings of Fact in this case.
Conclusions THIS PROCEEDING came on for final agency action and Jeff Atwater, Chief Financial Officer of the State of Florida, or his designee, having considered the record in this case, including the request for administrative hearing received from MARIO PAINTING, L.L.C., the Stop-Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment, and the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment, the 2™ Amended Order of Penalty Assessment, the Stipulated Motion to Relinquish Jurisdiction, and the Order Relinquishing Jurisdiction and Closing File, and being otherwise fully advised in the premises, hereby finds that: 1. On August 5, 2010, the Department of Financial Services, Division of Workers’ Compensation (hereinafter “Department”) issued a Stop-Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment in Division of Workers’ Compensation Case No. 10-320-1A to MARIO PAINTING, L.L.C. The Stop-Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment included a Notice of Rights wherein MARIO PAINTING, L.L.C. was advised that any request for an administrative proceeding to challenge or contest the Stop-Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment must be filed within twenty-one (21) days of receipt of the Stop- * Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment in accordance with Sections 120.569 and 120.57, Florida Statutes, and must conform to Rule 28-106.2015, Florida Administrative Code. 2. On August 5, 2010, the Stop-Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment was served by personal service on MARIO PAINTING, L.L.C. A copy of the Stop-Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment is attached hereto as “Exhibit A” and incorporated herein by reference. 3. On August 12, 2010, the Department issued an Amended Order of Penalty Assessment to MARIO PAINTING, L.L.C. The Amended Order of Penalty Assessment assessed a total penalty of ~-$32,830:40 against MARIO PAINTING, L.L.C. Fhe Amended Order-of- Penalty-Assessment included-a- —- Notice of Rights wherein MARIO PAINTING, L.L.C. was advised that any request for an administrative proceeding to challenge or contest the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment must be filed within twenty-one (21) days of receipt of the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment in accordance with Sections 120.569 and 120.57, Florida Statutes, and must conform to Rule 28-106.2015, Florida Administrative Code. 4. On August 16, 2010, the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment was served by personal service on MARIO PAINTING, L.L.C. A copy of the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment is attached hereto as “Exhibit B” and incorporated herein by reference. 5. On September 2, 2010, MARIO PAINTING, L.L.C. timely filed a request for administrative hearing with the Department. The petition for administrative review was forwarded to the Division of Administrative Hearings on September 8, 2011, and the matter was assigned DOAH Case No. 11-4537. A copy of the petition is attached hereto as “Exhibit C” and incorporated herein by reference. 6. On June 2, 2011, the Department issued a 2™ Amended Order of Penalty Assessment to MARIO PAINTING, L.L.C. The 2"! Amended Order of Penalty Assessment assessed a total penalty of $26,857.15 against MARIO PAINTING, L.L.C. The 2 Amended Order of Penalty Assessment included a Notice of Rights wherein MARIO PAINTING, L.L.C. was advised that any request for an administrative proceeding to challenge or contest the 2" Amended Order of Penalty Assessment must be filed within twenty-one (21) days of receipt of the 2° Amended Order of Penalty Assessment in accordance with Sections 120.569 and 120:57, Florida Statutes, and must conform to Rule 28-106.2015, Florida Administrative Code. 7. On June 8, 2011, the 2"! Amended Order of Penalty Assessment was served by certified mail on MARIO PAINTING, L.L.C. A copy of the 2" Amended Order of Penalty Assessment is attached hereto as “Exhibit D” and incorporated herein by reference. 8. On September 14, 2011, the Department filed a Stipulated Motion to Relinquish Jurisdiction Pursuant to Section 120.57(1)(i), Florida Statutes. A copy of the Stipulated Motion to Relinquish Jurisdictionis-attached hereto-as “Exhibit E” and incorporated herein-by-reference—-----~ 9. On September 14, 2011, the Administrative Law Judge issued an Order Relinquishing Jurisdiction and Closing File. A copy of the Order Relinquishing Jurisdiction and Closing File is attached hereto as “Exhibit F” and incorporated herein by reference.
The Issue The issue is whether a delay of 706 days between the date Respondent entered a stop work order against Petitioner's former business and the date Respondent referred Petitioner's request for hearing to a hearing officer to conduct an informal proceeding pursuant to Subsection 120.57(2), Florida Statutes (2005)(an informal hearing),1 is harmless error within the meaning of Section 120.68.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is the state agency responsible for enforcing the Florida Workers' Compensation Law enacted in Chapter 440. On May 7, 2004, Petitioner was a closely held Florida corporation wholly owned by Mr. Martin Valka. Petitioner was engaged in the construction business as a tile setter. The principal place of business was 5327 Mayfair Court, Cape Coral, Florida. On May 7, 2004, an investigator for Respondent determined that Petitioner was in violation of applicable law and issued a stop work order in accordance with the requirements of Subsection 440.107(1). The stop work order precluded Petitioner from conducting business until the matter was resolved. The stop work order also imposed a penalty equal to 1.5 times the premium Petitioner would have paid for workers' compensation insurance coverage. On May 10, 2004, Respondent issued an Amended Order of Penalty Assessment Number 04-166-D7-1 (Amended Order). The Amended Order assessed Petitioner with a penalty of $4,039.76. Respondent more recently amended the penalty assessment to $3,779.89, which is the assessment at issue in this proceeding. On May 27, 2004, Petitioner filed a written petition requesting an informal hearing. The next day, the investigator's supervisor reviewed the petition, determined it was procedurally deficient, and denied the petition. The investigator informed Petitioner by telephone of the supervisor's determination. However, Respondent did not inform Petitioner that the denial of the petition was without prejudice to file an amended petition correcting the procedural inadequacies, which, of course, were unknown to Petitioner because the denial did not state with particularity the reasons for the denial and did not state a deadline for filing an amended petition. Petitioner requested a written notice of Respondent's determination that the request for hearing was inadequate and the grounds for the determination. Respondent did not respond. Respondent took no further action for approximately 706 days. The stop work order remained in effect. On June 30, 2004, the investigator recorded a note in the investigative file that Petitioner had not paid the fine. The investigator referred the matter to "collections." On May 4, 2006, Respondent referred Petitioner's request for hearing to the director of the Division of Workers' Compensation for assignment of a hearing officer to conduct an informal hearing. Petitioner filed an amended petition in the informal hearing. Respondent moved to dismiss the amended petition, in relevant part, on the ground that the amended petition raised disputed issues of fact not raised in the original petition. The hearing officer conducted an informal hearing based on written submissions. He concluded he had no jurisdiction because of the presence of disputed issues of fact and recommended referral to DOAH. Respondent committed several procedural errors under Chapter 120 (the APA). Respondent failed to issue a written denial of the request for hearing, failed to issue a written denial within 15 days of the date of the request, failed to state with particularity the reasons for the denial, and failed to deny the request for hearing without prejudice, stating a deadline for filing an amended petition to correct any procedural deficiencies.2 The procedural violations were not harmless error. They prejudiced Petitioner and may have affected the fairness of the proceeding. The procedural violations prejudiced Petitioner in several ways. The resulting delays prevented Petitioner from conducting its business for approximately 706 days. Petitioner ceased to exist. The delays denied Petitioner the financial ability to pay the fine at issue in this proceeding. The 706- day stop work order deprived Petitioner of the financial means to retain counsel to represent Petitioner. Mr. Valka obtained employment in a different occupation, but that was inadequate and did not last. Mr. Valka became a "stay-home dad." The delays caused by procedural errors may have impaired the fairness of the proceeding. The delays operated to enforce a stop work order for 706 days with no recourse to Petitioner that complied with relevant due process requirements in the APA. Petitioner's request for hearing, unlike the normal penal proceeding under the APA, did not toll the imposition of an administrative penalty in the form of a stop work order. The request for hearing tolled only that part of the penalty proposed as an assessment of money. The procedural errors resulted in delays that may have impaired Petitioner's ability to cross examine witnesses for Respondent and Respondent's exhibits. The delays may have resulted in the unavailability of witnesses, or at least their ability to recall facts, as well as the unavailability of exhibits Petitioner needed to support a defense. The delay may have impaired discovery.
Recommendation Based on the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a final order dismissing the stop work order and proposed assessment against Petitioner. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of May, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of May, 2008.
Findings Of Fact 9. The factual allegations contained in the Stop-Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment issued on February 8, 2011, and the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment issued on Februrary 23, 2011, attached as “Exhibit A” and “Exhibit B” respectively, and fully incorporated herein by reference, are hereby adopted as the Department’s Findings of Fact in this case,
Conclusions THIS PROCEEDING came on for final agency action and Jeff Atwater, Chief Financial Officer of the State of Florida, or his designee, having considered the record in this case, including the request for administrative hearing received from CARLOS ALBERTO RODRIGUEZ, the Stop-Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment, and the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment, and being otherwise fully advised in the premises, hereby finds that: 1. On February 8, 2011, the Department of Financial Services, Division of Workers’ Compensation (hereinafter “Department”) issued a Stop-Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment in Division of Workers’ Compensation Case No. 11-047-D5 to CARLOS ALBERTO RODRIGUEZ. The Stop-Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment included a Notice of Rights wherein CARLOS ALBERTO RODRIGUEZ was advised that any request for an administrative proceeding to challenge or contest the Stop-Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment must be filed within twenty-one (21) days of receipt of the Stop-Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment in accordance with Sections 120.569 and 120.57, Florida Statutes, and must conform to Rule 28-106.2015, Florida Administrative Code. 2. On February 8, 2011, the Stop-Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment was served by personal service on CARLOS ALBERTO RODRIGUEZ. A copy of the Stop-Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment is attached hereto as “Exhibit A” and incorporated herein by reference. 3. On February 23, 2011, the Department issued an Amended Order of Penalty Assessment to CARLOS ALBERTO RODRIGUEZ. The Amended Order of Penalty Assessment assessed a total penalty of $163,791.63 against CARLOS ALBERTO RODRIGUEZ. The Amended Order of Penalty Assessment included a Notice of Rights wherein CARLOS ALBERTO RODRIGUEZ was advised that any request for an administrative proceeding to challenge or contest the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment must be filed within twenty-one (21) days of receipt of the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment in accordance with Sections 120.569 and 120.57, Florida Statutes, and must conform to Rule 28-106.2015, Florida Administrative Code. 4. On March 7, 2011, the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment was served by personal service on CARLOS ALBERTO RODRIGUEZ. A copy of the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment is attached hereto as “Exhibit B” and incorporated herein by reference. 5. On February 28, 2011, CARLOS ALBERTO RODRIGUEZ timely filed a request for administrative hearing with the Department. The petition for administrative review was forwarded to the Division of Administrative Hearings on March 28, 2011, and the matter was assigned DOAH Case No. 11-1574. A copy of the petition is attached hereto as “Exhibit C” and incorporated herein by reference. 6. On May 9, 2011, the Department served by U.S. mail its First Interlocking Discovery Request (‘discovery requests”) which included requests for admissions, interrogatories, and requests for production on Respondent. Respondent was required to serve its answers upon the Department within 30 days pursuant to Rules 1.340(a), 1.350(b), and 1.370(a), Florida Rules of Civil Procedure. However, pursuant to Rule 128-106.103, Florida Administrative Code, “five days shall be added to the time limits when service has been made by regular U.S. mail.” Therefore, Respondent was required to respond to the discovery on or before June 13, 2011. 7. On June 22, 2011, the Department filed a Motion to Deem Matters Admitted and Relinquish Jurisdiction Pursuant to Section 120.57(1)(i), Florida Statutes after having not received any answer from Respondent to the Department’s discovery requests. 8. On June 23, 2011, the Administrative Law Judge issued an Order Relinquishing Jurisdiction and Closing File. A copy of the Order Relinquishing Jurisdiction and Closing File is attached hereto as “Exhibit D” and incorporated herein by reference.
